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A 21st CENTURY TRUMAN DOCTRINE?

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY WITH SENATOR TIM KAINE (D-VA)

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. JONES: Good morning, everybody. My name is Bruce Jones and I'm the vice president and the director of Foreign Policy here at Brookings. And it is a very distinct pleasure to welcome this morning Senator Tim Kaine back to Brookings for a discussion about foreign policy.

We often say at these things that so-and-so needs no introduction; that's usually not true. In this case, it's very much true, the senator needs no introduction. The former governor of Virginia has served in the U.S. Senate since 2013, and had a minor other job last year, as well, as Democratic vice presidential nominee.

He has had a life-long involvement and interest in foreign policy, since the days he took a year off from Harvard Law School to go to Honduras and work there. From his time in the Senate as a lawyer and the role that he's played both in the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the work that he has done to try to upgrade and reform the War Powers Act, which is an important piece of work that the Senator has tried to undertake within the House.

This is the 70th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, a moment of serious debate and serious innovation in the U.S. foreign policy around grand strategy after the second World War. We were just discussing back in the green room that we haven't yet had the great debate about where we are in contemporary foreign policy. So that debate's going to start today. Senator Kaine is going to come on stage in a couple minutes and talk about a piece of work that he's done in Foreign Affairs, making the case for updating the Truman Doctrine to the realities of the contemporary period. A thoughtful piece, provocative piece.

And then my colleague, Bob Kagan, senior fellow here at Brookings, will engage the senator in a discussion and, I suspect, a bit of a debate around some elements of how this could play out in the contemporary world.

It's a delight to have you back at Brookings. Thank you for joining us and thank you for everything you've done for our country. (Applause)

SENATOR KAINE: Hey, good morning, thank you. Well, I am thrilled to be here and I want to first express my appreciation to Brookings for the invite and to you for the great work that you do. You're so well known all over the world. And, Bruce, for your kind words and the chance to visit with Bob,

who I really admire. We'll have a good Q&A. But thanks for the opportunity to do this.

This is my second time at Brookings to speak. I came here when I was governor of Virginia in 2008 to enlighten the world about what we should do about infrastructure. And since we have solved all of that (Laughter) you know, they have me back now to talk about grand strategy, foreign policy strategy.

It's funny because the core of that talk in 2008, interestingly enough, was based on the Virginia experience in using public-private partnerships to do infrastructure. The Bush administration was proposing to do a major infrastructure plan relying almost completely on public-private partnerships and I came to say I'm a representative of the state that does more than just about anybody. I think public-private partnerships could get you about 25 percent of what you needed to do, but it's not going to get you 50 percent. It certainly won't get you 100 percent.

And the Trump administration has an infrastructure plan out that relies 80 percent on public-private partnerships, so it's sort of the same discussion from '08. Maybe we'll get back into it.

But here I am to talk about big picture strategy in American foreign policy, not as an expert, but as a passionate citizen and participant. I was a missionary in Honduras in 1980 and '81, and it has been a great joy since coming to the Senate to be working on both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. And my top-notch staff is here on both of those committees, where we often look at exactly the same issue, but through the different lenses of our military power and then our -- I don't like soft power, I like survival power: diplomacy, development, aid, moral example, trade. Looking at the same set of challenges through both lenses has been a great experience.

This piece I wrote in Foreign Affairs about the Truman Doctrine in actually part of a two-setter. I took the experience of being on a national campaign to reflect and I just wrote a piece about what should the Democrats' message be on the economy that was in USA Today. That was 750 words and this piece in Foreign Affairs is, I think, about 6,000 words, so I'm trying to reflect what I've learned and then use it as a guide for me going forward.

The Foreign Affairs piece that I wrote is a thought experiment, really. Truman and Lincoln are my favorite presidents. I grew up in Kansas City, and if you were from Kansas City when I grew up, Truman was your favorite president. You could go to the Truman Library in Independence as a

school group and you would see him. He would come out and visit with school groups. And so I really loved Truman.

This year, 2017, is the 70th anniversary of the Truman Doctrine and that doctrine was a grand strategy. It was a comprehensive foreign policy, national security strategy, and it lasted until 1991 through presidents and Congresses of both parties. That seems virtually impossible now. And so the thought experiment was extracting lessons from the Truman Doctrine, could we conceive of a similar sort of grand strategy now that would be comprehensive?

Not just about military posturing. The Truman Doctrine had a lot to do with the Peace Corps and the race to the moon, and Fulbright Scholarships, it wasn't just about military doctrine. That would be bipartisan. President Truman as I'll describe it, went to a very hostile Republican Congress; both houses had just switched Republican. They handed him his head in the '46 midterms. And in March of '47, two months later, after they came in, he went to them and asked them to do something they didn't want to do and they did. And finally, it was durable. It lasted for more than four decades.

So could we do something like that in the 21st century that would be durable, that would be bipartisan, that would be comprehensive?

Quickly, about the Truman Doctrine -- I don't need to spend much on it with this audience, but the seeds of it were really planted in 1946. In March of 1946, Harry Truman asked Winston Churchill, then not prime minister, to come to Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri -- a few miles from Mizzou where I went to school -- to give a speech. The speech is famously known as "The Iron Curtain Speech," though actually the title was "The Sinews of Peace: The Connecting Tissues That Create Peace."

But he talked about the reality of the Iron Curtain, and coined that phrase, and he called upon the West, but led by America, to prevent war and fight tyranny. Those were the cores. And Churchill was an excellent flatterer and so he was very flattering towards the United States and even towards Truman, in particular, about the role the U.S. should play. That was March of '46.

A year later, horrible midterms. The Democrats in Congress wouldn't even let Truman appear with them on the trail during the midterms. The Dems lost both Houses, and then shortly after the new Congress came in -- this double-House Republican Congress -- and Truman was faced with the

realities of insurgencies, primarily in Greece, but also in Turkey, Soviet-backed internal insurgencies. And he decided I've got to go to Congress and I've got to ask Congress, a hostile Republican Congress, a war weary Congress -- you know, we'd just come out of World War II -- sorry, I know you don't want to do this, but we've got to make investments in these nations, and possibly others, to prevent war and to fight tyranny.

Congress went along with it. A couple of months later, in June, Secretary of State George Marshall at the Harvard graduation speech laid out this amazingly ambitious plan to rebuild the nations of Europe, including adversaries. Not just France, not just Belgium, but also Germany and eventually also Japan.

Now, what were the odds with a hostile Congress and a war weary Congress dealing with so many domestic challenges -- the need to get people employed; they're just back from the war -- what were the odds that, yeah, we'll spend some money on doing this? And yet they did. And then sort of the last piece of the Truman Doctrine was the famous George Kennan piece in July 1947. I think it's called "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by X, who we now know as George Kennan, laying out the containment doctrine that was a core part of the Truman Doctrine.

Well, what we had in those three speeches and that article was the articulation of a basic strategy of the U.S. through international institutions, when at all possible, but often those wouldn't be strong enough, so we would act unilaterally trying to prevent war, but also prevent tyranny.

Now, tyranny ultimately was defined in sort of a reductivist way. It devolved down to where the Soviet Union wants to put up an X, we'll put up an O. The Truman Doctrine definitely was not perfect. Without it we might not have taken over the French colonial war in Southeast Asia; we wouldn't have toppled the governments of Iran, the Congo, Guatemala. There's a whole lot of faults to the doctrine and yet it is important to think about the fact that, wow, it lasted under Presidents of both parties and Congresses of both parties, even though it was articulated at a time when the chances of its success, I would argue, would seem really tough.

We think Congress is fractious now? We think we have challenges now? I'm not so sure the odds weren't even longer in 1947 about finding something on which we could reach a consensus than they are now.

All right, the Soviet Union collapses and the doctrine had become defined by this containment of the Soviet Union, so what happens after 1991? Well, first there's a lot of grand proclamations: We're now at the end of history. The society has evolved and the liberal democracy will reign now and henceforth into the infinite generations. Madeleine Albright famously declares that the United States is "the indispensable nation."

And we sort of enter into a non-strategic, very pragmatic case-by-case world under the end of the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration, tackling things with a kind of American pragmatism. Pragmatism is very much who we are as people. I think Americans kind of tend to be suspicious of strategies. We like common sense and practicality and we went into sort of a practical case-by-case mode on the foreign policy side without a strategy. And there were some successes.

The first Gulf War, wise restraint pushing Iraq back out of Kuwait, but then stopping at the border with Kuwait and not going in to knock over Iraq. The Irish Accords under President Clinton, there were some successes. But case-by-case also leads you to incongruities. Case-by-case means your allies don't necessarily know where you're going. They can't really predict what the outcome is. Why did we intervene in the Balkans and not intervene to stop genocide in Rwanda? When you look at that in the rearview mirror, an answer suggests itself that isn't pretty. What's the organizing principle? How do the American public or allies or adversaries understand what we're to do?

We had a theory that emerged as a result of the attack of 9-11, the War on Terror. And terrorism remains a central challenge, as I'll discuss, but the War on Terror as an organizing principle was just too narrow, too focused on military, not enough on diplomacy, moral example, trade, everything else. It didn't really fully describe the magnanimity or the greatness of the country and because of things like selling the Iraq War as necessary to reduce a WMD program that proved not to exist, that doctrine was discredited pretty quickly, even while terrorism has remained.

And then President Obama, who I deeply support -- President Obama was asked his foreign policy, his strategy: Don't do stupid stuff. That is so Obama. Many of you in this room know this president very well and I always find it comical when people assert what an ideologue he is. He is anti-ideology. He hates ideological constructs because he thinks they blind you to the reality of situations. If you pick a strategy, you'll try to force things into your box rather than really grapple with the realities on

the ground. So this “don’t do stupid stuff” really explains President Obama.

He was willing to do risky things. The Iran deal, that was high stakes. He’s willing to do it, but he was very, very focused on not -- we Catholics would say, minimizing errors of commission. He did not want to create errors of commission. Well, the problem is that there’s errors of commission and there’s errors of omission, and what I’ve said about the “don’t do stupid stuff” doctrine is, if that’s your doctrine, you can sometimes not do stuff that is stupid not to do.

It leads you to not maybe take a more firm position with respect to Syria before millions of refugees had left the country. It leads you to sort of dither and not take dramatic action when the government of Russia is cyber hacking an American presidential election. The fear of doing something stupid can sometimes paralyze you from doing something you need to do, and then the sin of omission becomes equally problematic.

We had testimony in the Armed Services Committee once, a year ago, that really struck me and then made me start to think about this. In the testimony from one of our senior military leaders who is still in service in the Trump administration is we have O plans, but no strategy. And that was about a particular set of thoughts, but the idea is we have operational plans. We have contingency plans for everything, but what’s the strategy that unifies them? We can pull off the plan about North Korea, or pull off the plan about South China Sea, but what is the strategy that unifies them?

But, also, we used to explain who we are to our own citizens and to others. And so, if we were to say, okay, the Truman Doctrine was durable, it was comprehensive, it was bipartisan, what would that look like circa 2017 if we were to try to come up with it?

The starting point of Churchill’s speech, and the starting point I think if we were to think about grand strategy today is, what’s the arrangement of power in the world? And Bob’s written a couple of really good pieces about this, and others have, too. As I think about it, I think, okay, Truman’s dealing with the bipolar Soviet bloc/Western bloc and I think the reality of power today is sort of tripolar: it’s democracies, authoritarians, and non-states.

With the non-states, especially non-states using violence to achieve their ends, is a significant factor in the world that wasn’t really the thing that Truman was grappling with. We’ve got to have a strategy as a nation to deal with each: democracies, authoritarians, and non-states.

We've got to shore up the democracies we have to challenge the authoritarians, and we have to defeat the non-states, at least insofar as they want to use violence to achieve their ends.

A word about the democracies: Good news all over the globe. The great spread of these democracies all over the globe -- my favorite little index of this is The Economist's intelligence unit. They do a democracy index every year or two. They rank 167 nations, 76 are democracies or flawed democracies. There's a hybrid regime and there's an authoritarian regime, and they do a pretty good job of explaining how they do it. You could quibble with the way they do it, but it's interesting to watch the moves over time.

But the good news is that these democracies are all over the globe. But they face major challenges: economic challenges, the euro zone; political challenges, Brexit; human rights issues like increasing anti-Semitism. One of the things that we can be guilty of, and we have, we kind of take the democracies for granted. They'll probably be okay. We should be worried about authoritarians or worried about others. We can't take democracies for granted anymore because democracies are showing signs of wear and tear, including our own democracy. And so, shoring up the democracies, who are our trade partners? Who are our security partners? It has to be an important part of what we do going forward.

On the authoritarians, these are the ones that we spend probably the most time on. They are challenging not only the United States as the United States, but there's a major effort underway, especially by Russia, to challenge the notion that democracies themselves or that the democratic model is up to the task of the 21st century challenges.

We've got nations -- Iran; China; Russia; Turkey, especially, in some interesting ways -- they're all engaged in historic renovations. They all think back to a day when they were much greater than they are now and they're all trying to get back to that day. They're revising history and trying to get back to a particular high point where they were at their apogee and they want to get back to that.

So, as we deal with the authoritarians, this is probably the most complicated piece of the equation because I said we've got to challenge them, but that means sometimes we cooperate battling terrorism. We do cooperate with Russia on that. Sometimes we challenge, sometimes we have to confront over issues like the South China Sea. And knowing when to cooperate, when to challenge, and when to confront is very, very difficult.

And then finally, the third pole in this tripolar world is the non-states. Now, it's not that non-states are completely new. I mean, President Jefferson dealt with Barbary Coast pirates and they weren't completely the Navy of a nation. They were sort of a quasi-non-state, but certainly as Truman was grappling with the bipolar world, and Congress was, in 1947, non-state power, non-states using violence was not a big concern. But today, whether it's ISIS and al Qaeda or whether it's the Sinaloa Cartel or whether it's multinational corporations that can figure out ways to evade taxation and legal accountability in the way they organize, non-state power is a big reality in the world.

Some non-state power is fantastic. The growth of the NGO movement, the growth of international institutions, but the non-state powers that use violence to achieve their ends, taking away the assumed monopoly of using violence that nation states get is destructive to all of us. And trying to defeat that aspect of non-states is probably the most significant area where authoritarians and democracies can cooperate together because it's threatening to both.

A couple of -- and then I want to bring Bob up. This notion about the tripolar world, okay then what are some things we ought to be doing? Well, the first thing I think the U.S. should do is defining our role. We should strive to be the world's exemplary democracy. I want to scrap the indispensable thing, the indispensable nation. That might have described us at one point in our history, but Charles DeGaulle said, "The graveyards are filled with indispensable men." You cannot say that without there being a hubris component to it and that hubris, even when you're right, is alienating and tends to put distance between yourself and others. So scrap indispensable, let's try to be exemplary.

And frankly, if we really try to be exemplary, we're more likely to be indispensable than if we try to be indispensable. Democracies in the world need a role model right now. The democracy as a form of government, we've not, in the end of history, since evolved so that's now going to be the form of government for everybody. Democracy is under attack and democracy needs a champion, and we are best suited to be that champion.

We're not all we can be right now. In the Democracy Index that I described earlier, we're not a democracy. We're a flawed democracy in their index for two reasons. We're dinged for two things in their calculation. One, low political participation compared to other democratic nations. That's a little challenging, and the data is what it is. Our political participation in presidential elections, much less

governors and the Senate, is shockingly low compared to other nations.

And we're also dinged in the Democracy Index around just the functioning of our government. Talk about sequester and shutdown and CR, and talk about anything that you want, there's evidence of the system not working to the degree that any of us would want it to work. However, we can re-earn our stripes as the exemplary democracy in the world. And I like having to re-earn something. People sometimes talk about American exceptionalism, but they talk about it as if it's American entitlement where it's entitled to be respected by everybody. We ought to be earning it every day.

And I find this moment in our time, certainly as I'm on Foreign Relations traveling the world, it's humbling. It's humbling to have people ask you, what the hell's going on? We expected so much more of you. And that's embarrassing and it's humbling, but it's not always bad to be humbled. Sometimes you are humbled and you have to realize the platitudes and the doctrines of the past and the shibboleths that you just keep repeating over and over no longer serve for the purposes of today and tomorrow. And you have to think of new language and new concepts and go out and re-earn it again, and if we will commit to do that.

You know, what we have done with LGBT equality is setting a standard globally. There are countries all over the world where journalists are being thrown in jail, and not that there aren't attacks on the press here, but we've got a robust and vigorous, multidimensional press climate. Other moves towards equality are the innovation aspect of our economy, which I was in India recently, and they were saying, boy, the one thing that we love about you guys economically. And I'm waiting, okay, what's the point? "You can fail in the United States and try again. If we try to do a business and failed, it's really hard to get the second crack at it. But in the U.S. you can still have this culture of try, fail, try again, fail better, in Beckett's words. And that's the culture that we have.

So there are aspects of us that if we really claim them, we can be that exemplary democracy. And what I would say is that we ought to be thinking about a global forum to promote and improve democracies. That's really powerful. Obviously, the U.N. isn't that. The U.N. is for everybody, and NATO is about military alliances and the OECD is about the advanced generally Northern democracies. But what about the democracies all over the globe and what about a forum that could be used to help up the games when it comes to governance, political participation, and other issues?

Second, how do we conceive of the military in this role? Obviously, defender. We let our guard down in an unacceptable way with respect to this Russia cyberattack. There's got to be a clear deterrence policy, not just a nuclear deterrence policy, but a deterrence policy generally. We haven't had one and that's why a successful attack happened without much consequence.

But the other role we're playing increasingly in the world, and I'm excited about, is security partner of choice. Nations all over the world, when they have security challenges, they want us to come and train them. I've got a boy who's an infantry commander in the Marine Corps and his subspecialty is training foreign militaries. And whether it's in Africa or Europe or all over the world, when people want to up their game, whether it's to fight terrorism, deal with external allies, poaching, human trafficking, they ask for the U.S. to come in and train, not just on military tactics, but on laws of war and human rights and important values that we can impart.

We've got to be a rule-builder, not an empire-builder. I share with Bob this belief that the U.S. as an architect of rules, norms, and institutions since World War II has been very powerful for the good of the world, but also for us. Now we don't need to build an empire. We don't need to be unilateral all over the globe, but we should be building up the institutions, rules, and norms, and getting as many countries to join and up their game in accord with international norms.

We have a huge stake in this and one of the things I most worry about this administration is a belief that we can step back from that role. It doesn't get better for us if we step back; it gets worse for us and for everybody else. Humanitarian leader, boy, when there's an Ebola crisis or a tsunami, whatever people say about the U.S., we are still the place people want to come for help and that's a compliment. It's a compliment. Sometimes it can feel like a burden, but it's a compliment when bad things happen and people want us involved, and we should always claim that role and celebrate it. And the great thing about it is, that's just not state stuff. Look at our NGOs. Look at corporate investment in philanthropic activities around the world now by U.S. corporations. There's real power in that.

And, finally, something that's just a particular interest of mine, let's have a north-south foreign policy, not just an east-west one. Our foreign policy has always gone around an east-west axis. It's been Europe, it's been the Soviet Union, it's been Russia, it's been China, it's been the Middle East, it's been Japan. Our attention to our own hemisphere has been pretty episodic.

And sometimes when we pay attention to the Americas, like the Monroe Doctrine, it's not really even about the Americas. That was a doctrine: hey, Europe, stay out of the Americas. During the Cold War a lot of what we did in the Americas was really about the Soviet Union, not about the Americas. And then the crisis abates and then we turn our attention away. In the Americas now, 37 nations, a billion people, without war for the first time in recorded history, as far as I know, among the two continents. Other continents can't say that today.

There's huge opportunities for us, not to be just focused on our backyard only, not an Americas only policy, but an all-Americas policy, that I think would be strong.

Last thing I'll say before Bob comes up. As we find ourselves deep in this investigation about how Russia sought to influence the American presidential election and why they did it, it's really interesting to go back to Kennan's piece in 1947. And I'm going to read you just a quote from what Kennan said, July 1947, 70 years ago, and just replace the word "Communist" with your choice of words.

"The palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Exhibitions of indecision, disunity, and internal disintegration within this country, the United States, have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement.

"Question, can the United States create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problem of its own internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time?"

That was a good question in 1947. The challenges we're facing with Russia right now, "palsied decrepitude" and "indecision, disunity, and internal disintegration," the more we show that, the more that we do exactly what they hope we will. But I think that question about demonstrating a spiritual vitality, demonstrating we know what we want, that we're handling our own internal challenges, which are constant, but we're handling them in a responsible way and handling the responsibilities of a global power. It was a good question then and it's a good question now.

Bob, come on up and let's continue the discussion. Thanks very much. (Applause)

MR. KAGAN: Well, thank you so much for that, Senator, but the answer to Kennan's question, both then and now, was almost certainly no.

First of all, let me just say it's terrific that you've written this essay in Foreign Affairs. It's terrific that you've taken this on because I really do feel, as you mentioned before, that we haven't had in this country a kind of free-ranging discussion about what direction we ought to be going in. There's clearly a lot of dissatisfaction in the country, and has been for some time. It didn't begin last November, I think it's been true, really, since the end of the Cold War with that sort of overarching rationale for our foreign policy, which sort of explained everything.

I mean, we felt like it explained everything. In fact, it didn't, but that was the impression. I think the minute that was gone, Americans began asking, what are we doing out there? Why are we so involved in this world? Can't it move on without us? And I think the thing about the indispensable nation -- and I'll get back to what I think that means and whether it's true or not -- but I think that many, many Americans do not want to be the indispensable nation because it is such a burden on them.

Before we get to the doctrine and the history, I can't help when you bring up this period of the Truman era, I can't help but think about some parallels with the present, which you alluded to. I mean, in those days the Republican Party was absolutely over the top on the subject of whether the Russians were infiltrating and controlling and subverting the American government.

One of my favorite lines of all, when Nixon was really at his most colorful, is when he referred to Dean Acheson as "the red dean of the college of cowardly containment." (Laughter) The idea that, first of all, there were obviously Russian spies in the U.S. Government, but the accusation went beyond that. It was that somehow American foreign policy, i.e., containment, was a sell out and that Americans in the government were effectively stooges of the Soviet Union. That was the Republican Party then.

The Republican Party today, it seems to me, does not want to talk about the possibility about Russia's involvement in our electoral process. And I must say, from my point of view, it was very bad to have Russian spies. I think it accelerated their nuclear program, but I feel like it's a much greater threat to the United States to be able to subvert our electoral process.

SENATOR KAINE: Yes, yes.

MR. KAGAN: And so, I guess I would ask -- again, I am struck by the irony of the Republican Party then and the Republican Party now. And not to ask the stupidest question ever asked

right at the very beginning, but do you have any explanation as to why Republicans are taking the position that they're taking? I know that's the stupidest question ever.

SENATOR KAINE: Beware when a smart person says, I'm sure this is kind of a stupid question. (Laughter) Then you know your pocket's about to be picked.

You know, it is obviously tremendously ironic that here we have the head of our Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Obama and President Trump, Joe Dunford, who's going to be with us later this afternoon in the Senate, has testified often, as have others, that the principal state adversary of the United States is Russia. And Joe Dunford has a quick answer when you ask him why. He says, well, you got to look at capacity and intent.

So capacity, they have big nuclear weapons stockpiled. They have a tremendous military force and they've demonstrated an intent. Go read what they did in the Montenegro elections three weeks before ours. That got less attention because we were focused on our own. It is staggering what they have done in Georgia and Ukraine and the United States, involvement in Brexit, attempts to hack into the French election in Montenegro. So they've got capacity and they've got intent.

So here they are, this foreign adversary, and we are involved in an investigation now of whether individuals connected to the campaign, transition, and current administration worked in tandem with a foreign adversary to attack the very basics of our democracy, to undermine it in exactly the way that Kennan was describing. This is what they want to do to us. They want internal -- this unit, disintegration, chaos, this is what they want to do because they want to not just knock you off, they want to weaken the validity of the entire model. And that's what they have done. And thus far, my colleagues on the Republican side have been publicly too quiet.

But I will say this. They're not unmindful of the challenge. You know, of the 52 Republicans in the Senate, certainly three-quarters are very, very worried about this. Some will say it, some are trying to wrap their head about when or if they'll say, but three-quarters are deeply, deeply concerned about it. And, you know, I think at some point your inner patriot and your political calculation starts to emerge and you're going to start to see more and more come forward one it.

And I do think last week's revelations about, you know, this meeting and there were a couple people there and now there were 5, now there were 8, now there were 10, this thing seemed like

we kind of got over a continental divide a little bit in the Senate last week about this meeting. But bottom line, and I said this to Bob before, I was really worried about this getting all swept under the rug until Flynn got fired.

Because when Flynn was fired, it was no longer about last year and the election. The sitting national security advisor to the United States gets let go because he was lying to the VP and the FBI while he was in office. And then the chief law enforcement official of the United States, the attorney general, has to recuse himself from their most important investigation after he was discovered to have testified at least in a misleading way, if not intentionally so a misleading way, to the Senate Judiciary Committee. And then Comey was fired.

But Mueller's on the case. This investigation, we'll get to the bottom of it through Senate intel through the Mueller investigation. It won't be quick. We'll probably have weeks where there'll be 10 revelations and months where there'll be none. This will not be quick, but we will get to the bottom of it.

MR. KAGAN: Okay. Well, I'm glad to hear that. (Laughter)

SENATOR KAINE: He seems so convinced.

MR. KAGAN: I'm looking forward to it. Well, unfortunately, I've done too much reading of American history and partisanship does have a big impact on the behavior of politicians, but I'm going to hope that patriotic urge that you're talking about does ultimately shine through.

So let's talk about this, your suggestions about how we might approach a new doctrine. I was struck when I was reading it and thinking about the Truman Doctrine, and you might say that we're in different times, but I would say your approach, it tends towards more about being an exemplary democracy, helping others, obviously fighting the terrorists. But in general, you emphasize sort of, I would say, the softer side of Sears, not the harder side.

And one thing that was true about the Truman Doctrine, it was all the things you say, it was economic aid, it was political involvement, et cetera, but there was a really hard edge to it. Dean Acheson talked as a fundamental principle of foreign policy in that period of creating what he called situations of strength to deal with the Soviet challenge. Some of that strength was economic, very importantly, but some of it was definitely military.

And what made the United States indispensable at the time was that after in both Europe

and Asia decades of conflict and a cycle, a sort of unending cycle of conflict, whether it was between Germany and France in Europe or between Japan and China, mostly with Japan doing the attacking, the United States after World War II essentially put a cork in both of those conflicts by becoming, in effect, a European power and an Asian power. I don't think any other country could have playing such a role or could play such a role.

SENATOR KAINE: I agree.

MR. KAGAN: And in that respect, it's not indispensable, like look at us, how wonderful we are. But it is almost literally indispensable in terms of maintaining that --

SENATOR KAINE: Some equipoise.

MR. KAGAN: -- basic security structure in both of those regions. Which leads me then to my question. One of the things that I think you don't emphasize a lot is geopolitical competition and conflict. It seems to me we have returned to a geopolitical competitive era. It happens that the two biggest competitors are authoritarian, but that's almost not the most important point. The most important point is they're seeking to reestablish themselves, as you said. What is our response to that?

In your piece, and I'll stop yammering here in one second, in your piece you talk about not sort of provoking them in their backyards. The problem I have with that is China's backyard is Japan, Korea, India, South East Asia. Russia's backyard is the Balts, Ukraine, Poland, Southeastern Europe, Central Europe. How do you square those two problems?

SENATOR KAINE: So I agree completely with what you said about the way the U.S. was in 1947 in the world. And of course, after the massive destruction of World War II, the gap between the U.S. and other nations in terms of power was dramatic. And so there wasn't anybody who could try to help enforce order, not even close to what we could do.

Well, frankly, the gap between us and others in terms of economic and military power has significantly narrowed. So if we're going to talk about situations of strength, we should still be looking at situations of strength, but I think circa 2017 power is more diffuse. The world is both hyperconnected and power is more diffuse. And we're more likely to create situations of strength through multilateralism than through unilateralism.

So I think you always defend yourself and do it vigorously, including have a deterrence

doctrine that is completely unilateral. We're not asking anybody's permission to defend ourselves either on our shores or interests that we care about anywhere. But if it's about the promotion of the values that you and I want to promote, you know, that we want the democratic model to be strong and people who live in authoritarian regimes to want to be more like that, no the promotion of values side I think it's more likely to be multilateral.

So the situations of strength that we create, we don't have, frankly, either the ability or certainly the budgetary appetite today to create those situations of strength that are as unilateral as we might have done in 1947. So I think you and I both are strongly into the multilateral norms, institutions, rules, and that the U.S. should play a leading role in that.

So militarily, I want to be strong to defend ourselves from any threat on our shores or far away. But I think the creation in the backyards of Russia and China of institutions that can check their bellicosity or their malign intent, they have to be creations of truly multilateral efforts to do that and not just us.

MR. KAGAN: No, absolutely. I guess the only question I'm asking is, to my mind there's a certain inevitability of tension in these relationships.

SENATOR KAINE: Yeah.

MR. KAGAN: And in Asia, it's not the same kind of multilateralism as we have in NATO because it's sort of the -- you know, we have independent alliance relationships, but it really is a kind of multilateral security structure. That security structure, our relationship with Japan, our relationship with Korea, our relationships with some of the Southeast Asian countries, Australia, et cetera, from China's point of view it's a belt of containment. From China's point of view, historically, they believe that's a region that China has historically be dominant in. It doesn't even mean that they are invading everybody, but it does mean that everybody in the region sort of reports to them. We are the obstacle to that.

SENATOR KAINE: Right.

MR. KAGAN: And one of the reasons for tension and one of the possible reasons why we could even wind up in a conflict is because of that fundamental disagreement.

SENATOR KAINE: Right.

MR. KAGAN: And if you say, well, why should we do this -- if the Chinese say why are

you doing this, you know, we can't claim that we have justice on our side. It's just the way it is.

SENATOR KAINE: Yeah, but we can also claim why does the Indian military do more exercise with the United States than any other nation? It's because we have so much in common with India. You know, oldest democracy, largest democracy, great Indian American population in this country, similar traditions of innovation. Why are we so deeply engaged with Australia? It's because they've been with us in everything we've ever done and that tie is historic.

So the fact that China might see it as provocative, that doesn't worry me. But do these relationships have an independent center of gravity and a cultural connection?

What I'd like to do is take that list of the 67 democracies and deepen our ties with them. We're not at war with anybody on that list. And if you look at the entire list, you don't see anybody who's at war with anybody on the list. If you're in the democracy list in this thing, you generally have pretty good relationships with each other, not that there aren't tensions.

So let's strengthen those ties, strengthen the abilities of these democracies all over the globe to get stronger. And, you know, we will then end up having influence on Russian and Chinese citizens. They'll seek a compelling model right in their neighborhood where there is more democracy and more freedom and they'll say, gosh, why can't we have more of that? By being exemplary we're more likely to influence the internal politics of other nations.

MR. KAGAN: That's a very revolutionary foreign policy. I mean, that is not a --

SENATOR KAINE: Write down what I just said, so I can know what I just said.

(Laughter)

MR. KAGAN: No, but that's a policy of transformation. That's a policy of -- well, I mean, really it's Kennan's approach to rush to the Soviet Union rightly understood, which was contain them militarily until you convert them, until they collapse. And I think the Chinese absolutely believe that that is what our policy is and that is one of the main reasons why they are hostile to our approach and would like to undo that even potentially at the cost of a military confrontation.

SENATOR KAINE: Containment was fundamentally sort of a negative doctrine: we want to block them from doing this. Where I would say, you know, we ought to be about democracy promotion. I would describe this as fundamentally a positive one.

Again, pull up this democracy list and take a look and you'll be struck by nations all over the world, and very different kinds of democracies, but they've all chosen this path. And if we can help them all be stronger, it's a model where there will be an authoritarian country right next door to some of these folks.

You know, what's the most destabilizing thing for Russia? The most destabilizing thing for Russia is if the Ukrainian democracy ever really caught hold. They dealt with corruption issues. They started to have economic growth and people could look right across the border and see, wow, democratic traditions, economic growth, we want more of that. And that's why Russia has tried so hard with corruption and other things to keep Ukraine from doing that.

The more we enable the democracies to grow and thrive, the more likely we will have the kind of effect we want to have on the authoritarians. And then we work with the authoritarians against the non-states.

MR. KAGAN: But what happens when -- so in the case of Ukraine, that is sort of the policy that we pursued and Russia's --

SENATOR KAINE: Tepidly, yeah.

MR. KAGAN: Well, I mean, before the intervention.

SENATOR KAINE: Oh, right, I hear you.

MR. KAGAN: We basically were welcoming them into -- well, the European Union was, but we were welcoming them into the European Union. We gave our assistance to the Orange Revolution. We supported Ukrainian democracy. And many people, including in the United States now, think that was provocative behavior. And it was right there. Ukraine, from Russia's point of view, there is no Ukraine, it's really Russia and has been from the founding of the Russian existence.

SENATOR KAINE: Since the conversion --

MR. KAGAN: Kievan Rus, right?

SENATOR KAINE: Yeah, Kievan Rus and Christianity in 798, yeah.

MR. KAGAN: And so there are people like Brent Scowcroft and others, people who call themselves realists, who would say we never should have gotten into that business because that's not our area. That's Russia's sphere of influence. And it led to, in fact, a Russian attack.

So what do we do? Would you still pursue that policy even if it was going to lead to that kind of result?

SENATOR KAINE: So I would definitely pursue a democratization strategy. Again, you know, best practices for democracy is how do you beat corruption? How d you encourage political participation? How do you reward pluralism, protection of religious ethnic minorities? Let's do that.

And if that had been the focus in Ukraine -- I mean, it's easy to do this in retrospect, you know. You can see it in hindsight. So much of the interaction we had after the collapse of the Soviet Union with those nations was about NATO. Right? So it was about military alliance.

Now, if you're in Russia, you think, okay, well, the Soviet Union's collapsed. We get it that the U.S. and Soviet Union were adversaries, but now the Soviet Union's gone. We don't consider ourselves your enemies anymore.

And then you see, well, we're going to continue to expand NATO. Wow, you must think we're still your enemies. You must think it's the same as the Soviet Union.

So even an adversary, and I would agree with General Dunford that Russia's our chief state adversary, you ought to put yourself in their shoes and kind of see the way they look at things. And they look at the NATO expansion as, wow, now we were ready to try to be friends, but you continue to view us as the enemy.

So my thought would be -- I mean, we have all these troops deployed. My son was deployed on the border between the Black and Baltic last year. We have all these troops there and we need to reassure these nations that are getting attacked by Russia, but let's lead with the democratization assistance. Let's really lead with that and make our interaction with these nations more about democracy promotion than about, you know, militarily checking off against this adversary.

MR. KAGAN: Yeah, well, I don't want to beat this horse into the ground, but that's not really the way that analogy works, that metaphor, but the Russians the Chinese both considered the democratization of Ukraine and Georgia and Kyrgyzstan at one time as geopolitical assaults because they are so embedded in what they consider to be their spheres of influence. So what we regard as we're just doing the right thing here, we're just supporting -- you know, we just want good government, they regard as effectively geopolitical aggression. Because what it does is it takes a country that they would

like to be able to control, pulls them out of their sphere and makes them an independent country.

And in the case of Ukraine, it has huge geopolitical implications, right?

SENATOR KAINE: Sure, it does.

MR. KAGAN: Whether Russia controls Ukraine or not is a major strategic issue. So --

SENATOR KAINE: But I will say this, this piece that I wrote, you know, the punchline isn't at the end: and if we do this, we'll have a world without tension. No, that was not my goal. I mean, I'm trying to say how should we articulate what uniquely we can bring to the table in the world not only in our own interests, but others'. It's not a strategy that I think is guaranteed to eliminate or even dramatically reduce tension. By doing the right thing, sometimes you'll increase tension, but conceiving of this role, what we want to do internally and how we want to project that to the world.

MR. KAGAN: Right. Well, let's turn to Syria, for instance, and stupid stuff.

SENATOR KAINE: Yeah.

MR. KAGAN: The thing that I have a problem with, the Stupid Stuff Doctrine, is it's always much easier to see how stupid things were when you did them than know whether they're going to be stupid in advance. And a lot of people thought that going into Vietnam was not stupid, that it was justified, as you say by the Containment Doctrine. And in retrospect, boy, was that stupid. How could anybody have ever thought? And by the way, all the people who once thought it was a good idea decided it was a terrible idea, and they want to know who got us into it.

SENATOR KAINE: Yeah, right.

MR. KAGAN: That happens over and over again, in fact.

So the question is, is there a doctrine that can actually keep you from making mistakes?

SENATOR KAINE: No. (Laughter)

MR. KAGAN: And how do you know -- good. I agree. (Laughter)

SENATOR KAINE: Yeah, this is a good question.

MR. KAGAN: So, you know, when I hear about saying, well, we never should have done Iraq, we need a doctrine that would keep us out of doing Iraq. And I always say, well, what would that doctrine look like?

There's a doctrine that says you won't ever do anything that involves sending American

troops. That is a doctrine, but it is not a doctrine that I think American President could possibly endorse.

So as you're looking forward, I think that President Obama -- I personally agree with you entirely about Syria, but I understand why he could look at Syria and say this is going to be yet another one of these things. Sure, we start with supporting the rebels and we start this and that, and the next thing you know we're off to the races again. Is there a way to sort of parse this given your view on Syria?

SENATOR KAINE: Well, and this, you know, what a horrible thing. And every President -- every President -- and the best President ends up out of office and looking back and saying, wow, I wish I would have adjusted this differently. So critiquing President Obama on Syria, I mean, every President has these.

Now, you know, here's the challenge, and I'm not revealing any inside info or conversations with President Obama, but I'm just giving you my intuition. President Obama said when Bashar al-Assad started committing atrocities against his own people in 2011, he said Assad must go. He shouldn't have said that.

When he said it, he was reminded, hmm, President Bush said Saddam Hussein must go and I said Mubarak must go and I said Qaddafi must go, and none of those really worked out the way we thought. And now I've just said that Assad must go, maybe I shouldn't have said that. Maybe the era of the U.S. deciding who should stay and who should go as a leader of another country, whether we like them or not, even if they're horrible, maybe that era of the regime change being a foreign policy of the United States is really over.

So he made the statement, which he probably shouldn't have made. Then he decided not to act on it, which was probably a wise decision, except that he'd raise expectations that he then couldn't fulfill. Set that aside.

And I changed my thinking about Syria along the way, so I'm on the Foreign Relations Committee. I supported the notion of missile strikes and the use of chemical weapons in the summer of 2013. John McCain was calling we should establish a no-fly zone in Northern Syria. The Obama administration didn't want to do it. And I was generally with the administration.

But then I went over in February of 2014, and I went over and I was in Jordan and I was in the region, and I saw this outflow, and I was in Lebanon, saw this massive outflow of Syrians leaving.

And I realized this is going to be massively destabilizing and there's millions more who are going to leave. So I came back and went to McCain and others with the Obama administration and said I'm ready to join you in the zone, but I don't like no-fly zone. That's a military concept. This isn't about military, this is about humanitarian.

The U.N. Security Council in February 2014, they were smart. We put up a resolution in the middle of Sochi Winter Olympics, so Russia couldn't veto it with everybody watching. And it was a humanitarian resolution, calling for cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid into Syria to protect people if they were victims of ISIS, Bashar al-Assad, cholera, poverty, whatever, they should have a safe haven.

As soon as that got passed by the U.N., we and other nations should have said, okay, now we're going to work to deliver humanitarian aid into Northern Syria. We're going to establish not a no-fly zone, a humanitarian zone. It's to enforce the U.N. resolutions, it's a humanitarian zone. And, oh, by the way, if you mess with us, there will be a consequence. There would have had to have been military protection for that provided by the U.S. and others.

But we didn't do that. And if we had done it, I am absolutely convinced we could have kept millions of Syrians who would rather stay in Syria from joining this massive exodus of refugees.

So again, this is easy to see in retrospect. McCain saw it before I did. I joined on and said terminologically let's lead with the humanitarian because that's what this is about.

Would a doctrine have enabled you to get that right? I think a doctrine, first, it's not a straitjacket. It's not mechanistic. It's not you put in an input and an answer spits out. You still have to apply judgment. But at least approaching situations with sort of, okay, so we want to shore up the democracies, we want to challenge the authoritarians, you know. We want to defeat non-states using power. This is kind of what we want to do. I think it gives you a predilection or at least kind of a default position in some of these, and I think in the situation in Syria, had we sort of had a bigger doctrine, we would have been more quick to try to take more aggressive action to abate this massive humanitarian crisis.

MR. KAGAN: Well, I agree with you. I think if it hadn't been that we'd already had the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, in the 1990s we did this kind of thing quite frequently, actually, some with some success and some with less success, but certainly the understanding that you had to create a

zone with military power that allowed humanitarian efforts to go forward was something that we had, in fact, learned in the 1990s, and our capacity to unlearn things we've learned is probably unmatched in the world. (Laughter)

SENATOR KAINE: And, you know, one of the things -- well, and having to relearn so many lessons all the time. You know, no greatness without goodness, I mean, is I think one we're learning now. But I think that one of the interesting things about the American public's reaction, when I voted to approve missile strikes against Syria after chemical weapons in August 2013, the calls coming into my office were 90 to 10 against it. Like, why would we want to do that? More military action in the Middle East? Why would we want to do it?

But the interesting thing is I bet if you had said to the American public we have to provide humanitarian aid to the Syrian people. And if we do, we can stop a big refugee crisis from going all over the world, and it's humanitarian aid. And, of course, if somebody messes with humanitarian aid, there's got to be a consequence. The public reaction to that would have been completely different to missile strikes.

So if you're leading with the military, that's one thing. If you're leading with a humanitarian purpose, which was the true purpose -- it wasn't a fake rationale; that would have been the true purpose -- if you lead with that, you suddenly find that you can engender a lot more support.

So we used to do these things because we would explain them in a way that the American people would tolerate and even support, and we've got to think about it in a different way.

MR. KAGAN: I wonder whether -- I mean, you're much more in touch with "the people" than I am, including the people in Virginia, where I live. But the interesting thing I noticed, I'm not in touch with any of those people. (Laughter)

SPEAKER: Not even your neighbors.

MR. KAGAN: No, I'm in touch with my children, so that's what I'm about to talk about it, which is that I had the interesting experience of my kids are going through high school and in high school it was Darfur, Darfur, Darfur. And everybody was in a Darfur group and you had to do something about Darfur.

And then she went into college and all this stuff, all the disasters in Syria started

unfolding and she found that the same people who were like, we have to do Darfur, were completely uninterested in Syria, and they didn't care about the humanitarian crisis. Now, part of me thinks that they didn't want to care about the humanitarian crisis because they didn't want to have to do anything that would be required to do something about it. But there really was a real shift in attitudes, and I don't know quite how to explain it.

But the thing that concerns me is that Americans have often felt like if they're doing the right thing, it ought to work out. I mean, that's the kind of -- it ought to work out and it ought to be painless, so we're just providing humanitarian aid in Somalia. Well, we're just feeding these poor people. Or we just want to do the right thing here or we just want to promote democracy.

And I think that we have a tendency to be a little naïve about the power implications of all those things. There's no such thing as just good, neutral behavior. If you're providing food to a people in a wartime situation, you're helping one side over the other because it's the other side's policy to starve those people. Right? That was the policy in Somalia. Creating refugees is the policy in Syria.

And so the only thing that I would be on guard against is believing that these good-sounding actions, at some point down the road there is a power element to them.

SENATOR KAINE: Yeah, that's a good point. I mean, set aside any war issues. Say you're providing food aid in a really poor country, but the commodities are owned by American farmers that you're shipping in and distributing maybe at low price. Say there's no corruption, distribute at low price. If you make it harder for a domestic agricultural industry to take hold to grow food, you're actually not really helping.

I mean, one of the key bits of evidence that can demonstrate hunger is the absence of local agriculture. And you can collapse local agriculture by doing commodity aid the wrong way.

And so we are well-intended people. You know, I wan to have the most liberal intentions and the most hard-edged analysis of whether the particular step we're taking is going to meet the intentions. And sometimes we have a real mismatch between humanitarian intention and then a strategy of accomplishing it that really undercuts whether we can successfully do it.

I've been disappointed in the Trump administration's budget for State and USAID, this dramatic cut. And what disappoints me about it is, I mean, bluntly, when we've dialogued with Secretary

Tillerson, he said, well, we can't spend that money. And what I wanted him to say is we're spending it wrong and we can spend it so much better, and I want to lay out how we can spend it better to accomplish our objectives, because how if you say that, I'm all ears. I want to figure out how to spend it better.

But I know what other nations are spending. I know what our competitors are doing. So when we say, well, we can't spend that, I'm like, are you kidding me?

So let's always try to get better about how we spend it so that we don't have an unintended geopolitical consequence. We want our consequences to be as intentional as we can make them.

MR. KAGAN: No, I mean, I don't think I agree with a whole lot of things that President Obama thought, but we do share a common love, which is Ronald Niebuhr's approach to foreign policy. And the thing that he always said, which Americans just have a very hard time with, he was never saying don't act because it's morally complicated. He's saying understand it's morally complicated even as you act; that there is no action or act of power that does not have within it evil elements, selfish elements, and bad results.

SENATOR KAINE: Solzhenitsyn, the line between good and evil runs through the heart of every person.

MR. KAGAN: Yeah, right.

SENATOR KAINE: So if it's every person, it's also every action.

MR. KAGAN: Every nation.

SENATOR KAINE: Yeah.

MR. KAGAN: And so, you know, we would like to say, well, we're just doing the good thing here and we're not doing any of the bad things. And it's just -- life isn't that simple.

SENATOR KAINE: And, you know, a sad thing for us is we have good intentions, we're doing the good thing, and then people are mad at us and hate us. And then as soon as the next disaster happens, the United States, please come in. You know, there's a great song, a Randy Newman song, "Political Science": "Nobody likes us, I don't know why. We may not be perfect, but, heaven knows, we try."

But they want us. That's the evidence that for all our warts, they want us.

I talk in my *Foreign Affairs* piece in the conclusion about this beautiful photo that's taken in Da Nang Harbor of the *USS John McCain* dock and the entire Vietnamese military brass saluting it. Now, this ship is named after McCain's grandson and McCain's grandfather. But 1-1/2 to 3 million Vietnamese were killed and 60,000 Americans were killed and tens of thousands more injured and affected, and we normalized relations. And what Vietnam wants is more U.S. I mean, that is a powerful tribute to the magnanimity of Vietnam, but it's also a pretty powerful tribute to the magnanimity of the United States that they recognize, well, for all this really painful history, we would really like the U.S.

Now, it's not all altruistic on their side either. They got a bigger neighbor that they're very worried about, but they want us. After this war, they want us. That's pretty powerful that for all our warts that it's a compliment to us that Vietnam and other nations, you know, they want us engaged.

MR. KAGAN: I have a slightly more cynical view of that. (Laughter) Well, and not just with regard to Vietnam either because we tend to think and, you know, it makes sense to want to think that people want to be with us because they like us. Mostly they've never really liked us that much, the truth be told. They didn't like us during the Cold War. We were never that popular. It's kind of a myth that we create that we were beloved.

But mostly people are like people everywhere: they want to know whether you can help them. And if they are frightened by their neighbor, they want your help. And they way they like you is because you're helping them.

SENATOR KAINE: Here's what I hear about whether they like us. So on Foreign Relations we have heads of state in all the time and one of the nice things is when you have a head of state from the Americas, often there will be a few of us there and a few of us will drift away and it'll get down to Menendez and Rubio and me, and then the President will quit speaking through a translator and we'll just talk in Spanish. And then without the translator -- and I'm sure, that's my charitable explanation of the meeting between Donald Trump and Putin without a translator. (Laughter)

When you set aside the translator and you just start to have the discussion in Spanish, you kind of feel like you're getting it unfiltered. And we had a head of state recently before us who said how do we like you guys so much more? Not like you're our buddies, but how many of my countrymen

are living in the U.S. or their kids are living in the U.S.? And we're all Americans, North, South, or Central, so we all call ourselves the same thing, and Catholicism and there's all these cultural ties, whether it's that we like you or we just know you, we're intimates, we're like relatives. But you're not here and China is, so we're doing all these deals with China. We're real suspicious of them. We don't feel that same understanding or simpatico that we feel with you, but they're here and you're not. They want more of us.

And you could say the same thing about India. When I'm in India, the interesting thing is the stereotype is that the Indian government is always kind of, because of the tradition of Congress, party tradition of non-alignment, that they're kind of skeptical of the U.S. But the Indian people, they love the U.S. And when I'm there I see that, and I'm sure a lot of it is because of the powerful Indian American community and just feeling that sense of connection.

So maybe that they like us, you've helped me crystalize my thought a little bit more. They feel close to us. You know, sometimes they like us, sometimes they don't, but they feel close to us because of the connections of this nation of immigrants. They see a lot of them in us.

MR. KAGAN: No, that's true and I don't want to minimize that. Whenever Latin Americans say they wish they had more America, I say be careful what you wish for. (Laughter)

Okay. I think we should open it up to questions, so please feel free to -- yes, sir. You were the first up. Please state your name and ask a question, if possible.

MR. HURWITZ: Yes, I will. My name is Elliott Hurwitz and I served in the State Department the same time as Dr. Kagan under George Shultz. I also was in the intelligence community and worked for the World Bank.

I know the subject to this is on foreign policy, but in this morning's *New York Times* there was an op-ed piece on voter registration and the actions of the current administration to restrain voter registrants. So the Russians are trying to interfere with our voter system and our 2016 election, but I wonder if either of you would like to comment on this article this morning.

SENATOR KAINE: Well, there is a set, a very systematic set of things that are taking place that are essentially disenfranchisement by other names. There's actual disenfranchisement of felons. There's reduction of early voting. There is super PAC spending and negative campaigning that

drives down, ah, it's yucky, I don't want to participate, so I won't vote.

There's efforts in states to screw around with voting. You know, the Voter Integrity Commission that the President has put together has some possibility. Russia's rummaging around in state Boards of Election. So there's a whole series of things that are basically -- you know, can you describe a nation as a democracy if there's a near universal franchise, but like 50 percent of the people, even in a presidential element, 50 percent of eligible voters vote? We're going to have to come up with a new phrase to describe a form of government where there's near universal franchise, but only minority participation despite that.

So we've got to tackle this. The problem is now in Congress is, you know, we want to fix the Voting Rights Act after the Shelby decision. We had a very simple fix -- very simple fix -- and despite the fact that the Republicans had been with us on the Voting Rights Act, first, the Voting Rights Act only passed in the Senate because of Republicans. They supported it more than the Dems did in the '60s, and all the reauthorizations were with Republican support. Now we have that party has -- hopefully temporarily -- switched their voting rights background and they're trying to reduce the franchise.

So these are tough questions. You can deal with them to some degree in states, but in Congress, although we're going to -- you know, we introduced a bill yesterday dealing with no secret money, the Disclose Act, but we can't even find one Republican sponsor of it.

MR. KAGAN: I'm sorry, I think I talked too long, so we only have time for two more questions. And two guys did this kind of silent auction thing, which somehow I succumbed to, so I'm going to go with you and you, and they better be really good because, otherwise, I'm never going to do this --

SENATOR KAINE: I've got a buddy over here. This one's going to be good.

MR. KAGAN: -- silent auction thing again.

SPEAKER: Senator Kaine, I have a comment and a question. The comment is you've been pretty good on this issue, but I know I'm monomaniacal about it, but you talk about the world's exemplary democracy and you talk about promotion of democracy. And right here where you are sitting and you failed to mention -- why is there laughter? Oh, no, this issue is never elevated. Every time I bring it up there's a little laughter as if it is not important.

SENATOR KAINE: I take it seriously.

SPEAKER: I know you take it seriously.

MR. KAGAN: People are still waiting for the subject here.

SPEAKER: The subject matter is 650 -- you live in Virginia, 650,000 people who live in the nation's capital don't have representation in the U.S. Congress. And no other capital in the world denies their own citizens representation. You grudgingly came along on statehood and I won't get into that, but why is that not an issue in this country? And somebody who is a proponent and a champion. I'd like Vladimir Putin, quite frankly, to say how dare you talk to me about democracy. You deny the citizens of your own country representation.

MR. KAGAN: I think we've got it. That's right.

SPEAKER: And my question is the following, having had nothing to do with that comment. When is military intervention necessary?

SENATOR KAINE: So I completely agree on D.C. statehood. And the thing I like about this exemplary democracy thing is it first forces us, we've got to look ourselves in the mirror and where are we weak, where are we strong? This is a weakness. Low voting turnout is a weakness. An abysmal record of electing women to office is a weakness.

Where we are in women in Congress, we're about 100th in the world in the percentage of our national legislative bodies that's women. We're behind Iraq. We're behind Afghanistan. We're at 20 percent and Rwanda is at 65 percent. Part of being good is being willing to be self-critical about the things we're weak on and that is definitely a weakness.

Military intervention, these are hard questions. I spoke last week to all Marine three- and four-stars, and they're grappling with the Marine concept: every Marine a rifle. Well, what if it's cyberattacks? What if it's -- you know, the warfare of the future is going to be so very, very different. And so military intervention, it can be manned, it can be unmanned. It can be obvious, it can be cyber hard-to-attribute. So even what military intervention is, is dramatically larger.

And that's one of the reasons why Senator McCain and I and Senator Flake and I, we've been spending time trying to rewrite the War Powers Resolution to kind to bring it up to date. Flake and I have an authorization for military force in, where we're basically trying to take ISIS, the Taliban, and al

Qaeda and do an authorization that repeals all the others, but approaches the topic of military force against non-states as sort of categorically different than military force against a state that follows Geneva Convention Rules.

You know, all the doctrines we think about were kind of formed with an assumption that war would be between states. What if it's with non-states where the geography isn't clear and they don't follow any of the Geneva Convention? So we've got an authorization trying to set up a template for what we think will be a problem that will stay with us for a while, which is military force against non-states.

MR. KAGAN: I'd like to end on a foreign policy question. Is it a foreign policy question? Okay, great.

MR. MURRAY: Senator, thank you very much. Matthew Murray, a former senior official with the Obama administration. Could you comment on the role of economic power in your strategy, U.S. economic power, both with respect how it will increase access to economic opportunity here at home and how by inducing better competition and more jobs it will strengthen our engagements abroad and help you promote the United States as a rule-builder in international economics? Thank you.

SENATOR KAINE: Absolutely. Yeah, an in my piece in *Foreign Affairs* I do talk about it, but I talk about it a little, not a lot. So one of the things I liked about writing it is there's a whole lot of ideas and I'm like, hmm, I should think more about that idea and write something about that or I should flesh this out.

Obviously, I think our economic role is still one of the most important one to play. And if you look at what people think about the -- you know, the 20th century's is the American century. The U.S. economy became the largest in the world in 1990. U.S. military probably became the most powerful in the world with the Great White Fleet sailing around the world in 1900 or so, certainly World War I. We became a diplomatic nation, you know, resolving the Russo-Japanese War and the Treaty of Versailles.

So the merger of economic, diplomatic, military within 20 years of each other, we assumed this great role. But the first that we achieved was the largest economy and we continue to be, although as soon as the average Chinese worker is one-fifth as productive as an American worker, they will have the largest economy. That's going to happen because of the differences in population.

But this is a role that's still very important, and it's not just the size of the economy. Who

cares if China passes us and we're second? It is the innovation. It's this thing, I mentioned my friends in India. Wow, you can start a business and fail. Be like Mark Warner, you know, fail at a couple of things and then be dramatically successful. He always tells that story and that does seem to be an especially, not peculiar, not uniquely, but an especially American story.

So the innovation, this sort of ecosystem of rule of law and property rights and intellectual institutions, like universities and government-funded research, that kind of drive this competitive dynamic, innovative economy, I mean, I still think it's -- you know, mostly it's good for us and our standard of living, but I also think it sends a message to others about the way they can find a path to success.

MR. KAGAN: Well, thank you so much, Senator. Speaking for myself, I'm pretty pessimistic about the country, but you give me hope. (Laughter) So thank you very much for being with us.

SENATOR KAINE: Thank you. (Applause)

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