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Intersections:
Professionalism in politics: The paradox of populism

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(Music)

PITA: Hello, and welcome to intersections I'm your host Adrianna Pita. We're here today to talk about professionalism and politics and the paradox of populism. I'm joined today by Ben Wittes, he's a senior fellow and editor in chief of lawfare the blog on hard national security choices. And Jonathan Rauch is also a senior fellow at Brookings and contributing editor at The Atlantic and author of among other books “Political Realism: How Hacks, Machine, Big Money, and Backroom Deals Can Strengthen American Democracy.” Together they wrote the paper “More Professionalism, Less Populism: How Voting Makes Us Stupid and What to do About it.” Gentlemen thank you for joining us today.

WITTES: Thanks for having us.

RAUCH: Thank you.

PITA: So at this point in political discourse it's incredibly cliche to remind people that you know actually the US is a republic and not a democracy. But the founders did in fact establish a system that balanced aspects of direct democracy and elite rule while rejecting the excesses of either. Your argument is that over the last few decades and increasingly in recent years the system has become overbalanced in favor of direct voter participation and that this has cost all kinds of problems. Can I ask you to start by setting out sort of the idea about how this happened what happened and what are some of the particular problems that this is causing. Jonathan would you like to start.

RAUCH: Well how it happened is pretty easy starting about 100 years ago with the rise of the progressive movement it became chapter and verse in America. That the more people participate the better the results would be. And back when that began a hundred years ago that was a pretty good rule because a lot of people were excluded as we all know. Problem was, it started working less and less well as we again began marginalizing and disempowering the people who do a lot of the behind the scenes work in politics and policy, the experts and the political professionals who have to make sure things actually work and have to broker the complicated deals. So today it's very hard to find anyone to defend those people in the roles that they play. And Ben Wittes and I are saying hold on a minute. There's nothing wrong with participation but it is not going to solve the problems that we have right now. Right now the problems we have require more input from professionals and more input from experts not less.

WITTES: One way to think about the distinction between you know between too much participation or sort of you know the obsession with increased participation and the good side of that is the question of whether these mediating institutions whether it's the political professionals or the substantive experts whether the ranks of those people should be inclusive of you know lots of the diversity of society and the answer is to the extent that the participatory instinct is an instinct to widen participation in those you know in those mediating institutions. That's a wonderful thing. To the extent that it is by contrast as it often is an attempt to sweep those people out of the way and let you know let voters kind of run things themselves. That is often a much less attractive thing and it gives rise to a lot of unintended problems. And ironically the response to a lot of those

unintended problems is to double down on the need for more of exactly the wrong sort of political participation.

PITA: When we're talking about these intermediary institutions or you're talking about political party systems like the DNC and the RNC. What else what are some of these other intermediaries?

RAUCH: The regular order system in Congress when it works which are committees which gather expert and a lot of input in the process of legislating for example the establishments in the executive branch and elsewhere. Institutions like inspectors general for example that help make sure that conduct is lawful. Expert notes like the Office of Management and Budget and the larger community of experts and professionals who engage in politics. All of them yeah. Of all of those I would argue that the most important and most disempowered the one that's really on life support and critical right now are the political party organizations which are no longer really even powerful enough to choose their own nominees. And that has become a critical problem.

PITA: How have they lost that much power.

RAUCH: Well it's been a bunch of things. Part of it is just the way the world has changed but a big chunk of it is starting about 40 50 years ago reformers in America said we don't need these intermediaries they just get in the way of the people. So they began systematically blocking the channels that parties and political professionals rely on to get stuff done. They said parties will have strict limits on the amount of money that they can raise. Instead the candidates themselves will raise the money and they said

parties will no longer be able to control their nominees that will be turned over to the voters in the form of primaries not realizing the primary voters are not representative of most voters and then they said well let's do something about the pork barrel spending. So they just empowered the ability of party professionals to direct money as ways to give incentives and I could go on but this was a process of dismantling not just an accident.

WITTES: You see it also in a whole lot of substantive areas where you know we have moved. This is less true at the federal level. But move to denude legislatures of the power to make very important decisions by referring major decisions to referenda. So you have this for example giant move toward legalized marijuana which has taken place across a lot of states without any legislature actually participating and that these are all done by ballot initiative. And you can say well you know whatever one thinks about about that as substantive policy the idea of major policy initiatives like that taking place around the you know the people who we elect to make decisions that's a very fateful and and substantial decision on the part of of a political structure to make decisions that way.

PITA: It's sort of getting at what you refer to in the paper as the paradox of populism that it seems counterintuitive but you postulate that professional intermediaries actually make democracy more inclusive and more representative than direct participation does all by itself. Can you talk a little bit more about that?

RAUCH: Yeah the paradox of populism goes right back to James Madison who wrote in The Federalist Papers I'll paraphrase but said that the representatives of the people meeting among themselves will often do a better job of understanding what the people want than the people will do themselves from the voting booth. And you think what. Well that's crazy. How could these people know better? Well we vote every two years our individual vote doesn't affect the outcome of an election except infinitesimally. And it turns out that people who vote know very little about what they're doing and tend to vote emotionally not because they're stupid but because they're smart. It's not worth investing a lot and becoming a policy expert for a vote that won't change the outcome. So Madison said you need a two tier system. You've also got to have these professionals and experts that will meet together and sort through things and say well what about the people who weren't heard from in the primary. What about the interests that don't have lobbies but need to be looked at so they can often actually take a broader more systematic view and Madison said way back then, he's a visionary but he gets it right. He says you need both filters you've got to have public input. But it is simply not enough. You've also got to have professional and expert input.

WITTES: One thing the public is really bad at doing left to its own devices is compromising. One reason is that there's actually not an obvious mechanism for the public to compromise so you know it's a whole lot of people support Obamacare and a whole lot of people oppose Obamacare. The only way you can kind of present that to the public is as a binary choice. On the other hand if you subject that to a really messy set of legislative processes it's an ugly thing. But one thing you might end up getting over time if you give it enough time is compromise and you need the political

professionals you need the smoke filled rooms maybe without the tobacco smoke but you need those environments in order to generate those compromises. And one thing about those compromises is that they will tend to be a little bit less zero sum by nature of being a compromise than a ballot initiative for example where someone's just to lose.

RAUCH: And remember turnouts are so small and most of these elections the average political primary turnouts on the order of seven to 11 percent of registered voters which means you're only you're not hearing from everyone you're hearing from a small zealous motivated group. So it's easy to actually be more representative than that.

WITTES: So let me give you a really tangible example of this that we talk about a bit in the paper which as you know sir if you say well what's the least democratic in the sense of political participation part of Congress as it would have to be the intelligence committees. Right. Most of what they do they do in secret. Most of what they do is it's not just highly technical from an intelligence point of view it's highly technical from a legal point of view as well particularly when you're dealing with you know technical intelligence systems like you know telecommunications and that sort of thing. And yet and so and the degree of public visibility into it it's not zero but it's it's really constrained. And yet if you look at poll data on the way you know how people think the federal government is balancing the different needs at issue in foreign intelligence collection and national security versus you know other goods. Most people think we're doing a pretty reasonable job at that. And I think that's pretty hard to explain except in the context of you know you turn the lights off on these institutions a little bit. You know you empower the professionals and substantive experts to do the thing that you're asking them to do. And they actually balance the various equities that different constituencies

in the country have reasonably well and much better than for example the committees that operate in public that you know are constantly worried about what they can do what the constituents are seeing on C-SPAN that they're doing they don't feel the same need to speak to the cameras in quite the same way and so ironically the greater democratization of some of the other committees has really eroded their functioning. And this has not happened in the one in the one area at least not to the same degree that functions a little bit more like the way Jonathan and I are are urging.

RAUCH: It's interesting to point out in that connection that the institutions that enjoy relatively greater popular support are the least populist institutions. The Supreme Court the Federal Reserve the military the intelligence community the least popular is Congress which is the most publicly accessible. So Madison was right. It's not always clear that the people know exactly what they want.

PITA: I did want to get at that point where you because you mentioned that in the paper too that Congress is the least popular with people even though it is the most populist in that it has the voters have the most direct impact on who their member of Congress is and that sort of thing. But in spite of the fact that Congress has really low public polling numbers people keep continually returning their incumbent to Congress. Congress has always had very high rates of return but the last two elections were particularly higher than usual. How do you how do you make sense of that.

RAUCH: Well they're unhappy with the institution but they like their member and that's a phenomenon and this goes back for many decades now and hasn't really changed and they're not wrong about that. The problem in Capitol Hill is not that we're electing terrible people and that we should kick them out and elect other people. The

problem is institutional it's systemic is that we're sending these people to a place where for some of the reasons Ben and I've talked about and many other reasons it's very hard for them to function to even pass something like a farm bill or a standard appropriations bill. Immense amount of friction now. They're all looking over their shoulders and getting hit with a primary challenge. For example, if they take one wrong vote that's not an environment in which it's easy to legislate. So we'd argue that if anything they may need a bit more insulation not less insulation.

PITA: I also wanted to ask about whether some of these issues are exacerbated by other systemic weaknesses like you mentioned the voting at primaries and also general election time. The fact that the US voting is held on a regular weekday you still have to go to work. Unlike a lot of other countries and also given some of the the gerrymandering that people often mention as one of the reasons why people are always being why Congress people are always worried about being primaried from their right or their left are these some other systems that fixing those systems might help fix some of these other problems that we're having

RAUCH: You know toward the end we walk through those very briskly in order to dismiss them. There are some of these tweaks to this system that we oppose like you know matched contributions from individuals to candidates. And there's some that we think are worth experimenting with. I don't know maybe weekend voting but our larger point is this: for now, forget about all that because for 40 50 or whatever number of years the policy debate hasn't been entirely focused on finding all these ways to make the people be more directly heard. Well we're not against the people being heard. But what's getting neglected here is the breakdown in the intermediary systems that

interpret what the people do and allow us to turn that into policy. That is what's broken and that we think is where we need to make a much bigger investment in figuring out what's wrong and fixing it.

WITTES: Another another way to make essentially the same point is to say that you know for 40 or 50 years we've broken down a lot of barriers to political participation and all of the problems that we're describing in this paper are the problems of populism have gotten worse. And so that does suggest that whatever the merits of increased participation and as Jonathan says we are not opposing increased participation. This is not the solution to this particular set of problems. And if you want to if you want to understand how to think about the solutions to these problems merely increasing the number of people who are contributing in an electoral context won't get you there.

RAUCH: Or tweaking the voting system or whatever, that's right. Our messages that participations become the chicken soup of American politics whatever ails you take more participation and we're saying no that's not it at all. In fact, that method from where we are today is not going to work and may actually make things worse not better because it neglects what really would be more constructive empowering parties for example.

PITA: What are some of the steps that you would like to see happen that might improve things?

RAUCH: Well since my paper with Ben was devoted mostly to understanding the problems with populism I refer you to for example the free ebook that you mentioned political realism how tax machines big money and backroom deals can strengthen

American politics. Which did I mention is a totally free e-book from Brookings So go get it for free. Little advertisement.

WITTES: How much does it cost Jonathan?

RAUCH: You know it costs nothing.

WITTES: Ok, just checking.

RAUCH: You can download it on Amazon or from the Brookings Web site for free.

PITA: For zero dollars.

RAUCH: And that goes through some of the things that could be done and it turns out that although it's hard to fix there are no magic bullets and all fixes are hard. There's a lot you can do to restore these intermediaries just by letting them do more of what they need to do. For instance you could lift the limits on how much money parties can raise so that they would become clearing houses for political money that would put them back more towards the center of things and allow them to move money around and coordinate with candidates and do the things parties are supposed to do. You could have a greater role for party leaders and officials like state chairs and elected officials in choosing nominees and there are a bunch of ways to do that. You don't have to change a single word of law to make that happen you just change party nominating rules. Some states are doing that already. You can allow earmarks. It's not a huge thing but it's it was a way that compromise got made on Capitol Hill you trade stuff so lift the ban on earmarks you could empower state parties in various ways. I could go on and on but the point here is that there are a lot of opportunities to strengthen these institutions. But first

we have to decide to do it. We have to decide you know what. It is important to have political middle people. And without those Nothing else will work.

PITA: That gets to really what I found to be the big question is that at a time when public distrust of government and also the news media when there's the fragmentation of information systems and all of this seems the least best place to try and accomplish this reversal. How do you convince people that it's that it is in fact in their interests?

WITTES: Well you can start by writing a paper which has the specific strategy that we started with.

PITA: The Think Tank way.

WITTES: Yeah exactly. And then maybe doing some interviews about it. But look I think the in-sync the populist instinct toward participatory augmentation as a kind of panacea for whatever ails you is very deep at this point in society and some of the reactions that we've gotten to this paper you know which you know accuse us of all of practically monarchism is you know is a reflection of that. And I think it's going to be a long road to a world in which our view of this does not come off to a lot of people as sort of eccentrically elitist and authoritarian. You know I'm ready to have that argument with anybody who wants to. But I do think at the end of the day the point that Jonathan made earlier is where the conversation for me begins and ends which is that if you look at the institutions and in our society that have the most public trust they are pretty consistently. I mean the public institutions they are the least democratic in a in a participatory sense institutions. And I think we all need to ask the question why that is why are we why is it

that you know we have this cult of political participation but we love the Supreme Court and we love the military. Now the military you know you can anybody can sign up and they do. But when you sign up you actually take orders from people who are have been elevated over time in the structure right. Your voice is not equal as any recruit in in basic training will tell you. And you know I think we need to ask the questions why. Why is it that the institutions that we trust are not the institutions that were function that are functioning in the fashion that we are holding out as the ideal and maybe the answer is because that's not really the ideal.

RAUCH: Let me add to that of course all of that's exactly right. But the question you just asked Adrianna, is the one I get asked most often which is how can you possibly favor this plan now when everyone's against you and I say the same things every time. Number one I'm a veteran of the gay marriage debate. And when we started that debate it was completely lunatic. But after a while when people realized the wrong answer isn't working they begin to start looking at other options. Evidence of that would be my second response. My writing on this subject has hit a chord. Turns out there are lots of people out there who are frustrated with the way things are going and it turns out there are a lot of people with an instinctive understanding that you've got to have people who do the organizing in politics and who get people in the room together and broke brokering the deals. This is as American as it comes. It's how the Constitution was drafted. We have these systems of expert mediation as deep in our DNA as a democracy as we do. Populism I'd argue deeper. This is what Madison and Washington and Hamilton were all about. So these nerves are there we just got to reactivate them and yeah it will take time but I believe that we're already beginning to see a move

toward thinking about how to strengthen institutions and I think we'll see a lot more of it over time.

PITA: What are you beginning to see that's giving you that iota of hope.

RAUCH: I'm seeing some rethinking in the reform community for example of all the disempowerment of parties that's gone on. For example, a center left think tank called the Brennan Center New York Law School in New York wrote a paper last year saying you know what maybe it is time to think about reducing the regulatory burden on political parties. Now to me from where I come from that's in some sense a small step as a policy step but it's kind of a breakthrough in the world of conversation because that's people in the center left saying hey wait let's let's rethink this. So that's that's one small straw in the wind. You also see that people on Capitol Hill both parties left and right want to reinstate regular order which is a committee system which it exists to gather information from many sources and bring it together in a mediated process instead of having leaders throw stuff together at the last minute. People can see what's happening with the health bill they see it's not going to work very well. There is a movement which Republicans want to do to reinstate earmarks on Capitol Hill. They're studying that right now. The Democrats are even now having a debate over superdelegates which are input into nominations by senior party people. So this is very much a live debate. Do not write this off as just academic pie in the sky.

PITA: I should mention an article that you wrote for The Atlantic last year which was how American politics went insane where you sort of detailed how the middle men of politics got taken out of the equation and it was it was a long article really interesting though and you both allude to some of these things in the present paper. And it started

struck me it's sort of really depressing to think about people made all these reforms thinking they were trying to do the right thing that they were trying to decrease corruption. They were trying to increase transparency increase accountability. But there were these unintended consequences and things didn't go the way that they were intended to and things got worse. Were there any reforms from the last couple of decades that have achieved what people intended or what are some other reforms that might be made that can keep those ideals of transparency and you know not too much corruption maybe just a little bit to grease the wheels too much, but that won't have these knock on effects?

RAUCH: Well I think basically you're asking where's the sweet spot. And to me the answer is that we had things in a pretty good place between about 1964 and about 1994. 1964 is when we break down the hegemony of Southern autocrats who controlled Congress and blocked racial desegregation. 1994, the other end of that is when Newt Gingrich becomes speaker and begins concentrating power in the speaker's office and attacking the committee structure on Capitol Hill. In between actually you had things government that worked pretty well, in real time. The reforms that you mentioned they are indeed well-intended and we're not saying no good came of him far from it we're just arguing for a correct we want to move the needle back toward balanced position that doesn't always attack intermediaries and parties and try to find work arounds. And as we said there are a lot of things we can do to build on the existing system that would strengthen those intermediaries I mentioned some of them earlier.

WITTES: I would just add to that that you know one of these reforms which I think is really worth thinking hard about whether what the role that it's played has been

is C-Span which you know used to be that when a member of Congress spoke on the floor of the House or the Senate the audience was other members of Congress. And that seems to be true after C-SPAN started you know now the audience has a national television audience and there's nobody in the chamber listening. And so one problem you know is, are our intermediaries even talking to each other? And we have these committees that meet. And if you've ever been to one of them you know the person who is immediately speaking and talking to the witnesses is there and often nobody else is or maybe just the person sitting in the chair seat as everybody else is gone off and doing other things sometimes voting sometimes just doing other things because the actual audience is a television camera. And you know I have spent some time over the years doing research on old judicial confirmations and when the when the Senate used to debate a judicial nominee that they were talking to each other. And I have this belief that the system might actually have worked better when members talked to each other and that when a debate on the floor was actually a debate rather than a series of dueling press conferences or not conferences because there's nobody asking questions rather a series of sort of press statements. And I think it's really worth somebody is doing a serious study of what the effect of C-SPAN has been on the functioning of the institution. And my suspicion is that the answer is mostly negative. And I think it's worth asking the question you know, Brandeis famously said that sunlight is the best disinfectant. But you know did they kill the patient with that disinfection and could you have maybe a live body that maybe has a little bit more infection a little more hospitable to bacteria, but actually is alive.

PITA: Rolling back C-Span would be one of the things that I think would be harder to achieve just because the optics of saying oh now the public can't see what we're doing.

WITTES: OK. I agree with that. I think you know rolling back C-SPAN and I look I don't want Brian Lamb to get upset at me. I'm not saying you know-

RAUCH: We love Brian Lamb.

WITTES: You know they did incredible work and there's a lot of great stuff was done by C-SPAN. I do think the question of whether committees should have more closed hearings is a reasonable one we should ask and also whether when Congress debates something they should have some period of that debate in which the doors are closed and which they actually are talking to each other. I'm not saying you know don't have a public debate. Don't state your positions in public don't question witnesses in public. But look right now we are watching a you know an incredible spectacle of the Senate Intelligence Committee doing this Russia investigation and a lot of people scratch their heads and say wow they're performing pretty well. You know, they actually look like they're doing a bipartisan investigation well what is one thing that we know about the Senate Intelligence Committee? Mostly they meet in secret, and they're actually a group of people that get together and they have a culture that is based on meeting without the public present. And so we have this window into the way they function. That's quite atypical because it's how they function when the cameras are on. But you can see in that the culture of the committee that functions better, way better, than most congressional committees in a way more collaborative and intellectually and morally and legally serious

fashion than most committees and I think it's worth asking ourselves the question of how much of that more bipartisan, more collaborative, more frankly dignified, and substantive functioning is a function of the fact that they don't always have cameras on them.

PITA: We've mostly been talking this whole time of course but the federal government Congress and the presidency and you talked about the rationality of voter ignorance because their votes have not as not much of an impact on particularly presidential nominations and elections. I'm wondering if these principles about how much voters should be involved in politics beyond the casting of a ballot. Are these sorts of argument that you're putting forward. apply really just for the federal level what about local politics is more voter participation make more sense there? How much ignorance is it about how easily people can see how policies affect them?

WITTES: Look I want everybody to have the opportunity to vote. I mean I want that at the local level. I want that at the state level. I want the federal want that at the federal level. I also want after they cast that vote for them to stay involved in the sense of commenting on the political environment in the sense of criticizing policy makers. But I want the people that they elect to have the ability to do their jobs and I don't want them - the role of the voter in a democratic society is to give and withhold consent and to talk about whether they want to give and withhold consent. That principle is true at the local level at the state level at the federal level. And the key thing is they get to they get to give and withhold consent. And the people to whom they give consent get to govern afterwards. And I think that's, and I don't think that differs by the level of government

RAUCH: Yeah, the principal we're arguing for I think it does not vary with level of government. The syndrome is worse at the federal level because the numbers are so much larger, you need intermediaries more in a situation where there are vast numbers of people and interests to intermediate than for example in a small county where a handful of politicians can know most of the voters directly and voters can have direct input in all kinds of to some of their own mediating at the federal level. It's hopeless to try to organize politics without all these institutions. There's just far too much going on so the federal levels where the disease is most advanced right now and where the need is greatest to re-empowered institutions.

PITA: And the one, one of the other things I wanted to ask about sort of this seems like an assumption of this paper and you alluded to and you talked about how the way that the Senate is currently dealing with the latest issue the latest version of the health bill and people can see that this is not. It did not work for 13 people to go and write a bill and it's OK now vote! go go! But I thought that the paper there was a line that was in the papers that the leaders of political parties or congressional committees they need to worry about the long term health of their institutions and so they you know the idea is that these political representatives and the intermediaries have this longer view that has the democratic norms and the health of these democratic institutions at heart. But I think a lot of people would point to the current procedure with the Senate health bill or the failure to bring up a vote for Merrick Garland or the Democrats changing the nuclear option about lowering the vote threshold for non-Supreme Court presidential nominations seeing these political actors not having those democratic norms at heart and taking actions just to preserve their political power to accomplish their policy goals

by any means is that an accurate presumption on your part that these political elements have the best interest of political norms at heart?

WITTES: Well so a few things one is the merits of the issues that you raised strike me as very very different. So the collapse and I think it's fair to call it a collapse of the norms associated with judicial confirmations which is actually a subject about which I've written a book that's a creature of the problems that we're talking about. This used to be a highly elite process in which the voters had no say no input. It was entirely a function of the mediating institution of this of the Senate and it was a highly collegial process in which people who were qualified got confirmed. That began to erode and it began to erode because of popular involvement and interest and passions about subjects related to the Supreme Court and eventually of lower court judges. But I see that as the culmination of years of erosion of a norm of comedy between one group of intermediaries, senators, and the executive branch. On the health care bill, I would just say look the story is not yet. And and I think it's perfectly reasonable to be appalled by the process that Senate Republicans have used but at least as we're sitting here talking today it doesn't look like they're going to get a bill through that way. And there was a story this morning that Mitch McConnell had announced that you know warned President Trump that if they couldn't get it through he might have to go talk to Democrats. And you know so what I would say is stay tuned because this could end up being a story in which Yeah you try to ram through your highly partisan policy preferences. But then at the end of the day you can't do it. And so the intermediaries actually get together and. And by the way you push that under pressure of the populist partisan base right. But then you can't quite get it done. And so what do you do you start

behaving like intermediaries and you start engaging in all of those activities like deal making and backroom deals and coalition building that you know we describe in this paper as good for inclusion and what happens. Oh the bill gets more inclusive the bill gets more palatable to more different groups of people. Now I'm not predicting that that's what's going to happen. I'm just saying looking at this case in a moment of the raw highest of partisanship and assuming that that's where the story ends might end up being a mistake.

RAUCH: I would only add to take issue with the form of the question because it's a very common form of the question is will look at x. x is terrible. Doesn't that show the system is failed? And the answer is Well it shows the system is broken and that's the whole point. Why are we seeing this kind of mayhem these ad hoc processes being made up on the fly this rogue president out there condemning the bill that he's supposedly trying to get through a house caucus that's so disorganized that it's almost impossible to get everyone on board one side shut out of the process. Well we're arguing a lot of that is because we've spent the last 50 years disintermediating and tearing down a lot of the systems by which members of Congress and kids to truancy interacted in an orderly way and with input but not too much input all the time from the public. So we're saying yeah right it's broken let's fix it.

PITA: All right. We're running close on time so I think I'll just ask if either of you have any final thoughts you'd like to offer.

RAUCH: I'd ask people to buy my book political realism except it's free.

PITA: That's a good point. I'm glad you brought that up John.

PITA: Well gentlemen thank you very much for being here and going more into your paper. It seems counterintuitive I think to a lot of folks. But it has some really interesting ideas about how to how to fix things. I encourage our readers to.

RAUCH: It's called, for the record, “More Professionalism, Less Populism. Why Voting Makes us Stupid and What to do About it.”

PITA: Yes. All right I'll remind our listeners that they can follow intersections as well as the rest of the Brookings Podcast Network policy podcast and they can find the both of you on Twitter as well. So thank you for listening.

WITTES: Thank you.

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