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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. CHHABRA: Good morning, everyone. And welcome to Brookings. My name is Tarun Chhabra. I'm a visiting fellow here at Brookings and at the University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House.

And I'm delighted to welcome all of you here for an event on America's global image, co-hosted by both Brookings and the Pew Research Center. This year marks the third year running that Brookings and Pew are co-hosting a public event to launch and discuss their important regular survey data about America's place in the world, and other pressing global issues.

As many of you are probably already aware, if you glanced at the newspaper or checked your social media accounts this morning, last night, Pew released the latest edition of its Global Attitudes Survey, which has been conducted since 2002, with this year's survey covering 37 countries and more than 40,000 respondents, all conducted after the inauguration of President Trump between February 16<sup>th</sup> and May 8<sup>th</sup> of this year.

And the findings are newsworthy, particularly during a week in which the White House is hosting the prime minister of India, on Thursday hosting the president of the Republic of Korea, and week ahead of President Trump's travel to Germany for this year's G20 Summit, where he will -- which will feature 20 heads of state in government in numerous bilateral meetings, including a possible meeting President Trump and Russian President Putin.

So, to share with us the highlights of this year's survey, we are privilege to have Richard Wike, director of Global Attitudes at the Pew Research Center. Richard has been the author of numerous recent Pew Survey Reports, and you've likely read his analyses in a variety of newspapers and seen his commentary on television, not just in the United States but also abroad.

Richard holds a doctorate in political science from Emory, and previously worked at the research and strategy consulting firm Greenberg Quinlan Rosner.

Following Richard's 20-minute presentation, I'll welcome to the stage a stellar panel of analysts from Brookings and the Council in Foreign Relations, whom I'll introduce to you when we are all seated, and we'll have 45-minute discussion of whether, and if so how these survey results matter. And then we'll then turn to a 25-mnminute Q&A with all of you here today.

I want to extend a special thanks, before we get started, to Sadie Jonath and Will Moreland, for putting together this event today, along with their counterparts at Pew. And with that, Richard, please take it away.

MR. WIKE: All right. Thank you, and thanks very much to Brookings for hosting this. Thanks to all the panelists for being here, and thanks to all of you for being here. I'm really happy to have a chance to talk about our most recent survey that we conduct at the Pew Research Center. And in particular I'm happy to have a chance to talk about this topic. We look at lots of different topics in our international survey work at Pew, but this is one we've done the most work on consistently over the years.

How does the world see the United States? We've been doing that now for a decade-and-a-half, and as you can imagine we've seen lots of changes over that decade-and-a-half, and we certainly have a lot of changes this year.

So, what I'll do, is I'll walk through a few slides that highlight some of the key findings from this report that we released last night.

Before I do that, I'll just tell you a little bit about the Pew Research Center, and who are and what we do. We've been around over two decades now; we are funded largely by the Pew Charitable Trust, and also get funding from other foundations. We are non-profit, non-partisan, non-advocacy, we like to call ourselves a fact tank rather than a think tank, because we put such an emphasis on data and empirical research.

You can see some of the topics here that we tend to look at in our research, and I'll put a plug in for website while I'm here. All our reports are there, things like op-eds and blog posts. Increasingly we have some cool interactive features, including one associated with this report, that you can go in and play around with the data a little bit yourself. And if you are a number cruncher you can go to our websites and download our datasets as well, and use that in your own analysis.

Briefly on the methodology for this survey, it was conducted in 37 countries around the world, I'll show you a map of those countries in just a moment; from February to May. In some countries we do telephone interviews, in most countries it's actually a face-to-face interview. And you can see the margin of error there, which is pretty typical for this kind of survey work. And I'll be happy to talk more about the methodology, or answer questions about how we go about conducting this type of work around

the world during Q&A, if you are interested.

So, these are the 37 countries that were included in the survey. You know, each year there's always countries we like to include but weren't able to for one reason or another, but in general I think we do a pretty good job of including countries from regions around the world.

So, what did we find? Well, let me start off by showing you some data on what I think are the two most fundamental measures in the survey. One is a question we've asked about a variety of world leaders for years. We asked about President Bush when he was president; President Obama, and then this about President Trump, and how much confidence in President Trump to do the right thing in world affairs.

And then the other question is a basic question we and others have asked, we call it U.S. favorability. Very simply: do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the United States? And what we see in this year's survey is that if you look at the confidence measure, there's been a big shift in how the world sees the U.S. President.

So, if you look at these 37 countries and go back to the last couple of years of the Obama era, 64 percent said they had confidence in President Obama; just 23 percent they lacked confidence in him.

This year, the same question about President Trump, 74 percent say they do not have confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs; just 22 percent across these 37 countries say they do have confidence in him' so, a big shift in terms of how the world sees the U.S. President.

And what we also see in this data is that change in who is in the White House has had a big impact on how the world sees the United States, so this is a question about whether you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the U.S.

Back again, at the end of the Obama era, 64 percent favorable, 26 percent unfavorable; as you can see favorable line has gone down, the unfavorable line has gone up. So, a big change in terms of how publics around the world sees the U.S. President, and a change in how they rate the United States as a country.

Now, let's take a look at some specific countries in terms of this confidence measure. So, in just about every country we surveyed, we see a significant gap in terms of ratings for Obama during the

end of his presidency, and ratings for Trump this year. And I can't fit all of them onto the slide, so this is just where we see a 50 percentage point gap or greater.

So take Sweden, for example, at the top up here, 93 percent in our survey there last year, said they had confidence in President Obama, just 10 percent say this about President Trump. Big gaps in other European countries, but also in South Korea, Canada, Australia; often the biggest gaps are in some of America's closest allies.

Now, there are two countries where we see President Trump getting higher ratings than President Obama, Israel and Russia; so, slightly higher ratings for President Trump in Israel, significantly higher ratings for President Trump in Russia. Obama's ratings had gone down a good bit after the Ukraine crisis, and didn't bounce back this year, much higher ratings among Russians for President Trump.

Now, let's take the timeline back a little bit to the Bush years, same question, this is data for four Western European countries that we surveyed just about every year for the past decade and a half, and as you can see, President Bush starts off his term, not especially popular in Western Europe, those numbers come down over time, you know, he is unpopular. There's a lot of opposition to key elements of his foreign policy, by the time he leaves office in 2008, his ratings were pretty low.

President Obama comes into office in 2009, he gets astronomical ratings, in some countries, it was more than 90 percent positive, for example, in 2009 in Germany and France. It comes down a little bit over time, the NSA, Snowden scandal, for example, had an impact on views towards President Obama in Germany, and some other countries. But his ratings had bounced a little bit at the end of his terms, he leaves office pretty popular.

And then you can see what happens this year, you know, a very steep slope downward and, you know, Trump's ratings this year, in these four Western European countries look a lot like what we saw in 2008 for President Bush when he left office.

The same measure, this time comparing President Trump with other world leaders. And these are all median percentages across the 37 countries that we surveyed. So we asked about Angela Merkel, and she is the only one of the four leaders we tested who gets unbalanced positive ratings, 42 percent saying they have confidence in her, just 31 percent saying they don't have confidence in her.

She and Putin both get negative ratings for the most part, but not as negative as what we see for President Trump. So, you know, she and Putin, it's not positive, but the negative ratings aren't as high as we see, globally at least, for President Trump.

Now, here is the question on U.S. favorability on a country-by-country basis, as you can see, you know, often we see variations among regions across the world, we also see variations within regions quite often, so you can see that in Europe, in places like Poland, Hungary, Italy, U.K., you know, mostly positive for the U.S., elsewhere mostly negative right now, including Germany, for example, 62 percent saying they have an unfavorable view of the U.S.

If you look at Asia, again, you get a lot variation across countries, very high ratings in Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea, Australians, you know, looking down at the bottom of the screen, if you can see, essentially divided right now, in terms views of the U.S. versus Australia, a long-time ally of the United States.

In the Middle East, consistently high ratings for the U.S. in virtually all of our surveys in Israel, even if views towards the U.S. President had fluctuated a bit over time. Negative ratings, mostly in the Middle East, something we've seen pretty consistently over time, which President Obama came into office hoping to turn around America's image in the region, give a famous speech in Cairo in June 2009, sort of to kind-off those efforts.

We didn't see a real C-change during the Obama presidency in terms of views of the U.S., and it's certainly very negative in this year's survey especially in Turkey and Jordan.

Africa is a region where we've typically seen mostly positive views towards the United States; that was true during the Bush era when there was a rise in anti-Americanism, in many regions. He was pretty popular there, his policies were relatively popular there, and the U.S. continued to get good ratings there. The same was true, or maybe even more so during the Obama era, and even though there have been some declines in Africa in this survey on balance, the countries we surveyed at least, continue to see the U.S. in a positive light.

Latin America, again, some differences across the Latin American nations that we surveyed, Mexico stands out as a place in this year's survey, it has very negative ratings for the U.S., at least vis-à-vis what people used to say in our Mexico surveys.

And you can see that a little bit on this map here, so this is a map that illustrates the change in U.S. favorability since the last time we surveyed in all of these countries. So, red countries are where there's been a negative change, dark grey is where there's been essentially no change, and in blue are places America's image has improved on this favorability measure.

So, the only two blue countries on the map, one is Vietnam, I wouldn't make too much of that, I believe the change in Vietnam was from 78 percent favorable to 84, so you know, it went from already very high to slightly higher. And of course the big change is in Russia, I believe the numbers there, the last time we surveyed in 2015 it was 15 percent favorable, and then 41 percent this year.

So, you know, again, in different places in the survey, Russia is an outlier. Lots of dark red in Europe, lots of dark red in Latin America; you know, the darkest red in Mexico. That's the country where we see the biggest decline in U.S. favorability, has gone from 66 percent favorable in 2015 to 30 percent this year.

So, we want to understand better, how the world sees President Trump, so we asked about some of his policies, and some of his character traits. So, when it comes to policy we tested 5, his proposal to withdraw from the Iranian Nuclear Deal, restricting people from certain majority Muslim countries from entering the United States, withdrawing from climate and trade agreements, and building the wall on the border with Mexico.

So, these, again, are global medians across the countries we surveyed, and as you can see, these policies are all broadly unpopular across the countries that we surveyed. The Iranian Nuclear Deal a little less so, but even there on balance global publics tell us they disapprove of this proposal.

Now, there are pockets of support for some of these, I believe the Iranian -- pulling out of the Iranian Nuclear Deal, for example, is popular in Israel and Jordan. You know, there are certain places where some of these policies are embraced, but on the whole we see a pretty widespread global opposition to the policy proposals that we tested on the survey.

Now, we also asked about certain characteristics both positive and negative and whether people associate those with President Trump. So, we read this list, some positive, some negative. And as you can see the negative characteristics, people tended to say, yes, I would describe Donald Trump in that way.

So, in particular, arrogant, majority around the world also say that they think Trump is intolerant, and even dangerous. Relatively low number, say he cares about ordinary people; whether he's well qualified to be President, about 4 in 10 say they think of him as charismatic. The kind of bright spot in terms of, you know, views about Trump around the world is this question of being a strong leader, you do see majorities around the world saying, yes, they associate the terms strong leader with him.

And that includes some places where other ratings for Trump are pretty negative. Take France, for example, I think 54 percent there say that think as Trump as a strong leader, while just 14 percent say they have confidence in Trump to do the right thing in world affairs. So, you know, that's a characteristic that stands out as being positive, even in some places where overall attitudes towards are very negative.

Something we've done in the past in our surveys, and did it again this year, is to look at attitudes towards the different aspects of, you know, what we might think of as American soft power. So, again, you know, global medians on some questions that we think sort of tap into the notion of soft power.

The American people continue to score pretty well on our surveys, 58 percent across the countries we surveyed say think of the American people in a positive light. People tend to say they like American popular culture, 65 percent say, I like American movies and music and television. The U.S. gets pretty good ratings in terms of respecting the individual liberty of its citizens. That's a question we've seen some downward trends on over the last few years in the wake of the NSA story, but on balance people still tend to think that the U.S. Government does respect personal freedoms.

More mixed views when it comes to American ideas about democracy, and then you see the negative ratings on this question we asked, about whether it's a good thing or a bad thing that American customs and ideas are spreading to our country. And this overall pattern is pretty typical of what we've seen on these questions. The numbers have come down a bit in some countries, but this overall pattern has pretty consistently been true.

You know, if you look, for example, at the American customs and ideas question in the popular culture question, it's sort of an interesting contrast. Right? People, you know, they want their JAY-Z, and their Taylor Swift, and their superhero movies, but they are also worried about American culture kind of pushing out their own local cultures and traditions, and it's representative of this kind of



push and pull that people feel about the United States in lots of ways.

And then a final topic we wanted to look at; was what people think about the near future of relations with the U.S. We asked people: now that Trump is President, do you think that relations between your country and the U.S. are going to get better, get worse or stay about the same? So, outside of Africa you don't see a lot of people saying things are going to get better, you see pretty significant numbers in many countries saying things are going to get worst.

But as you can from this slide across regions, really the prevailing view in many places is that things are going to stay about the same; which I think is an interesting finding given all the negativity we see towards President Trump and towards his policies that, nonetheless, people don't necessarily think there is going to be some sort of radical C-change in terms of their countries' relationship with the United States.

And, you know, I think that that finding illustrates a broader point that we see in these findings, and that is that, even with this pretty negative picture of how the world currently sees the U.S. there are some bright spots, and I think this is something that we've seen over the last decade-and-a-half in our research.

That, you know, even if there's a pretty unpopular American President if U.S. foreign policies are pretty unpopular there are still some strong suits in America's global image, and some things that people value about the United States, even if it's a time of great tensions with the American administration.

And I'll stop there. And I look forward to the panel discussion. Thanks. (Applause)

MR. CHHABRA: Thanks very much to you, Richard, for the initial presentation. I'll briefly introduce the panel, and then we'll get started.

So, to Richard's left you have Shadi Hamid, Shadi is a senior fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic world here at Brookings and our Center for Middle East Policy. He is the author of, among other books, "Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle over Islam Is Reshaping the World." And just out yes is a new piece on Turkey's President Erdoğan, published in The Atlantic for which Shadi is a contributing Editor. I highly recommend that piece to all of you. And prior to his tenure here, Shadi spent time at the Brookings Doha center and at the Project on Middle East Democracy.

To Shadi's left you have Constanze Stelzenmüller, who is the Inaugural Robert Bosch senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe, here at Brookings. She is the author of numerous publications on German, European and trans-Atlantic foreign security policy and strategy. Most recently publishing work, I recommend to all of you, on the legacy of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. And tomorrow she will be testifying in front of the Senate Intelligence Committee, on the question and interference in European elections; if you'd like to catch here there.

In previous lives Constanze has been a journalist and Jurist, she holds a doctorate in law from the University of Bonn. And just prior to joining Brookings, Constanze was a senior trans-Atlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, where she directed another influential survey on the Transatlantic Trends Program.

And finally to my right is Ely Ratner, the Maurice Greenberg senior fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he writes on U.S.-China relations, regional security in East Asia, and U.S. national security policy. Ely published most recently in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, a terrific piece on China's Maritime Advance. And Ely was a colleague in the Obama administration, he served from 2015 to 2017 as deputy national security advisor to Vice President Biden, in which capacity he focused particularly on Asian security affairs. And Ely also previously worked at the State Department on Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

So, to get started I thought we'd kind of consider the question of: what these survey results matter for -- in the parts of the world where you study. So, the drop in confidence from Obama to Trump is obviously precipitous, I noticed in particular that if you look at the top 10 countries where that drop was most precipitous, nine of the 10 countries are U.S. Treaty allies.

We talk a lot about the advantage of the United States in the world, drawing from a coalition of allies in partnerships around the world. But I do think we should step back for a moment, and I'd like to ask each of you, you know, in the regions where you focus, what difference do these results really matter from the perspective of both us interests, and for regional order? Shadi, (inaudible)?

MR. HAMID: Yes, sure. So, I focus on a region where favorability ratings towards the U.S. have been very low for a very long time, and you see slight increases under Obama when he was elected, and after the Cairo speech, but after that the expectations were unmet. We see a drop, and in

some cases, in several countries, favorability towards the U.S. was lower under Obama administration than it was in Bush's final year; which is an important point to emphasize, because that's sort of hard to process. How could that possibly be?

But even in the case of say, Jordan, it's only 1 percent increase, but U.S. favorability went up from 14 percent in 2015 to 15 percent under Trump. So, you know, pretty much the same, but it shows that at least in places where there's strong anti-American sentiment that's been there for a long time, do people really care that much if Trump was elected? They might not like him, but for them their life-long experience with the U.S. policy is a very negative one, and they are very skeptical that anyone can really change that.

And I think the Obama administration years really underscored that point, because, again, I mean the Cairo Speech was quite well received, but then people didn't actually see significant changes in policy.

Also if you look at Turkey, in one of the years under Bush, there was 12 percent approval of the U.S., it drops under Obama to 10 percent in 2011, and jumps up, and now it's 18 percent. So, depending on what years you look at, again, under Trump in 2017, is higher than some of the years of Obama tenure.

So it's just important to kind of keep in mind that Middle East is sort of an outlier if you look at the rest of the results. But I think it sort of gets to a question that applies to a lot of the results in this survey, is how much does any of this really matter.

I mean, what does it mean to say that favorability ratings dropped tremendously, or increased tremendously under a certain President? Does it actually matter as much as we might think it does? And clearly when you have a new President, they can shoot up 60 percent or go down 60 percent, as we've seen from the Bush/Obama transition, but also the Obama/Trump transition; so the world doesn't end with these changes in a sense.

And then just the last thing I'd say is, you know, I think that you could also argue that even though -- I would argue this to be clear -- that even if favorability ratings were quite high under Obama in a place like Europe, and Constanze will talk about this a little bit more, I think there's a legitimate debate to be had about whether Obama's policies were better for Europe. I mean, how do we

judge that? You know, could say that the refugee crisis in Syria because of Obama's inaction there, in part, led to serious problems in Europe.

So there's different ways to look at this, but I think what we are seeing now is a kind of natural experiment over the next four, possibly eight years, where, it's as if you are introducing the most offensive, problematic President to the world. And then we can now see, in real time, how much that affects our relationships with other countries.

Does it lead to things that are very, very bad? And I think that's the presumption, that at last a lot of people on the left have, that after four to eight years of Donald Trump, terrible will be the result, and you might never recover from that. I'm very skeptical of this narrative, but we will actually find out, and four years from now we can all sit down here, or in eight years, we'll see, and be able to say: Hey, what is the relationship between people hating our President and the world falling apart? (Laughter)

MR. CHHABRA: Constanze?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Well, yeah, I'm here as the sort of proxy for Germany and Europe, as has already been made clear, and as Tarun said, I once ran a survey myself for a couple years, which in general, and I have tremendous respect for Pew, and in particular I have tremendous budget envy (laughter), even retroactive budget envy, and a capability envy, and all sorts of envy.

I tend to take surveys sort of with a kilo of salt, simply because I'm a policy wonk, and I tend to think nothing really substitutes for examining actual policy. So, let me try and say how I think this looks from Europe. Of course, we have, unlike most Middle Eastern countries, with some exceptions, been America's ally since 1949; the Germans since 1956.

And we've had some (inaudible) over that time, during the cold war which is often forgotten, but also under Bush with the Iraq War, and under Obama with, particular the NSA spying allegations, which didn't do the relationship much good.

And of course there was a lot of criticism about Obama's actions or inactions with the (inaudible) of the Middle East, and there is a feeling, you know, that that may have had some impact on the refugee -- the (inaudible) refugee inflow that we experienced in 2015 and '16.

But that said, it's also a resilient relationship, and it's one where policymakers know that even when there is huge turbulence at the official level, policymakers tend to actually move closer

together, and to try and to prevent the worst, and to try and make sure that there is no bleeding, as it were, from areas of overt disagreement into areas where we know we have to cooperate.

It's been a pretty damn resilient relationship overall, but I will also say that this is kind of special. This particular administration holds challenges for Europe of the kind that we haven't encountered before, and we haven't simply not encountered and American President who has refused in public to reiterate the commitment to the Mutual Defense Clause in Article V of the NATO Treaty.

I think that really shocked a lot of people, and not just policymakers, and not just European leaders, but European publics. And of course it feeds into whatever anti-American, anti-Western attitudes that there are. And we could talk at length about these attitudes, we could say that they often a reflection of our own fears of ourselves, our fears of globalization, our fears of a complicated future, a loss of control, but the fact is that those are sometimes articulated in the form of uttering, and are, you know, our favorite others or our closest (inaudible), and in that case for the European, it's the Americans. So, yes, this is not helping.

Do I think I can predict what's going to happen in four years to the relationship? No. You know, I haven't been able to predict anything that has happened in the last 18 months so why should be able to say what's going to happen now?

MR. CHHABRA: Before we do move on to Ely, I do want to ask you though, and since you've been studying up on Russia and Russian election interference. I was struck by the fact that respondents in seven NATO allies, and this included Germany, by a ratio of 2 to 1, indicated that they have more confidence in President Putin than President Trump. So what are we to make of that with respect to Europe-Russia relations?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: I would think that is less a vote of confidence on Vladimir Putin, and I think if you look at other European opinion polls which I do a lot, because that is a question of interest, you will see that distrust for America -- sorry for Russia, has increased significantly in the last three or four years, particularly with annexation of Crimea, and the continued meddling, not just in Ukraine, I mean, fomenting conflict in the Ukraine by Russia, but also interfering in the European public space.

That's the context that you have to keep in mind, and I see very few of the European

polls, except for those who were trying to sort of unpick people's authoritarian leanings, where then -- that's of course something that does exist; that suggests that Putin is in anyway well received in Europe, by majorities.

So I think that this is a reflection of people's unhappiness with Trump. In the same way I would urge you to take the findings about Angela Merkel with a grain of salt, or more than that. And I think we are safe in assuming that she would do the same herself.

MR. CHHABRA: We'll come back to you on (inaudible). Ely, as Richard indicated in some respects the survey data on Asia is a bit of a bright spot. Perhaps not as much as African I should say. I wish we had room for more chairs on the stage so we could also talk about Africa and Latin America.

But, you know, 76 -- sorry, I think somewhere in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Republic of Korea favorable views of the United States exceed 75 percent. So, as you think about these results, one question I'd ask you to consider as well, is the administration poised to take advantage of some of that positive sentiment towards the United States at least?

MR. RATNER: Sure. And I'll get to that in just a second. And just to build on what's been said so far. I mean, to the question of: do these views matter? I think it's important to ask that question because in Asia as in elsewhere in the world, Obama's very high favorability rating didn't always translate into policy successes. So, on things like North Korea's nuclear program, and missile program was developing, China's maritime assertiveness was continuing, et cetera, et cetera.

So, we shouldn't assume that, again, there is a one-to-one relationship between popularity and policy success, but I think it does matter in Asia, perhaps, more than anywhere else for the following reason, which is that, the United States is in an emerging geopolitical competition with China, and that is starting in the first instance, over a competition over the future of the regional order in Asia.

And while these countries, you know, even allied countries are not going to make some fundamental binary choice between the United States and China; every day they are making choices, as to how they are going approach trade issues, how are they are going to approach human rights issues, how are they going to approach security issues.

And in every single country in Asia it's different from place to place, but publics in every

country, including American allies in South Korea, in Australia, and everywhere having very fierce debates about how they balance competing interests as it relates to China often, the economic benefits of their relationship with China with their historical, cultural, security and economic relationships with the United States.

And to the extent that these types of public opinion views are shifting and changing the public discourse in these countries it is important because it will affect the degree to which leaders are willing to stick their necks out and work with the United States, are willing to push back in China. So, I think it does, in Asia's case, it really does matter.

I think this survey had potentially even more good news than bad news as it relates to the region, and for some of the reasons you suggested. I think Asia is a historical beneficiary of American leadership. It's certainly less complicated than the Middle East, some of our allies in Northeast Asia and elsewhere have been less affected by what's happening in the Middle East.

I think some of the President Trump's more illiberal social policies resonate less in Northeast Asia than they do certainly in Europe, and in other progressive -- Australia, or other countries like that. So there does seem to be a wellspring of goodwill there, very high favorability ratings, the highest of any region of confidence or approval in American democracy, American values.

So, I think to the extent that part of the theory of the Obama administration's pivot to Asia, rebalancing, attention resources to Asia, was seeing Asia as the future, or a future if the United States to continue, it's now seven-year-plus project to try to expand a liberal order in the world. I think the promise and the importance of doing that in Asia is perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, and I think that we see in this data, is that there's still opportunity there to work on some of that.

I think the other, at least from a perspective of the nature of the U.S.-China competition; I think the very negative views of Xi Jinping were quite striking. I think there are a lot of Chinese diplomats around the world today that are hoping this survey doesn't make its way back to Beijing, because they are spending billions and billions and billions of dollars trying to improve, through state-run propaganda, global views of Xi Jinping, and I think this survey tells you that it's not working.

And so, whereas, yes, Donald Trump may be not particularly favorable, but the fact that the alternative of Xi Jinping is not rating very high I think matters in terms of how we think opportunities

for the United States. So, that, I think is the good news.

The bad news of course is what lurks behind these figures, and I know the questions here were about various policy issues, and there is diversity in the region, you know, what's worrying the South Koreans is not what's worrying the Indonesians, and not necessarily what's worrying the Australians.

But on balance some of the things the Trump administration has done, withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, raising concerns about the alliance commitments, and just more generally, not putting forward a view of American leadership in the world does have the region worried. And I think, you know, again, what I read from this data is that if -- to get to your initial question -- is the Trump administration poised to seize upon this.

I think if they do want to lead in Asia, the opportunity is still there that the public support; and the politics do still support it. But I think what we see in the data is real concern that United States isn't stepping up. And in the absence of American leadership, even if they don't want to live in a China-led world, they'll have no choice but to do so.

MR. CHHABRA: I want to come back to Richard in a moment about the resilience and the data that he mentioned. But while we are on leaders you mentioned President Xi. For Constanze, so --

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: You are not going to let go of this, are you?

MR. CHHABRA: No. I'm not going to let -- So, Angela Merkels' readings, you know, are double those of President Trump's, they are 50 percent higher than those of President Xi and Putin, so obviously, you know, you are going to have many people saying, she is, as they have already, the new leader of the free, or maybe even the less than free world. But what does that mean for someone like her, a Chancellor who, as you have written, depends on and takes advantage of ambiguity and who "inhabits a leadership culture that I ambivalent about public diplomacy."

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Oh, well. Thus, thus, are you punished for your words. Look, just by way of reminder, President Obama had approval ratings in Germany that were basically 250 percent, you know, going upwards. I was at the speech that he gave in the bigger -- Berlin's version of Central Park, Tiergarten, in the summer of 2008, with 200,000 people, Berliners who had come to see



him, when he was still just a candidate.

I think he still pretty much has rock star status in my country, so you know, that's a benchmark that no German politician is going to achieve that easily, right. The other thing is of course that Merkel is an odd candidate for the title of the Beacon of the Free World, because she, herself, has I think, despite the fact that I think she has grown to like Obama, and that she has become friends with him, the one thing that I think that she always appeared very skeptical about was his silver tongue.

You know, the ability to sort of spout forward endlessly in terms reminiscent of somebody standing at a pastoral pulpit rather in a political role. She is a very diffident public speaker, both by her ability, but also by inclination, and I empathize with that to some degree because Germans of our age which is, you know, 10 years older than I am tend to be suspicious of this kind of public pathos, for all the obvious reasons.

It's something that we are careful about; it's been abused too many times, both in West and East Germany, and its historical predecessors. The other thing of course is that Germany has, in recent years, become somewhat by default, somewhat through circumstances not created by itself, the default (inaudible).

In other words, this is not just a title given to us by other people, it's a political fact that German politicians and policymakers have actually spent a great deal of time trying to live up to recently. Some of you will remember the three famous speeches in Munich, where the President, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister said, we have -- you know, basically announcing a Spiderman doctrine: we have great power, therefore we must exercise greater responsibility.

And there's a great deal happening in response to the refugee crisis, the Euro Zone crisis, the crisis with Russia over Ukraine and its meddling in Europe. That is making Germans develop additional, institutional and political muscle to deal with all this.

But there is also an understanding that in Europe, you know, you can't do this on your own, it can only be Europe as Europe. And so we need our neighbors, our friends, our allies to pick up some of this well. Europe is not the kind of political project that one large state can lead. It's just, that is not how it works, and Germans and German politicians are deeply aware of that. So those kinds of stickers are not particularly helpful.

MR. CHHABRA: So, I'd like to talk a little bit about, the point regarding resilience that Richard made. So, Richard you noted that this is fairly -- there's a large delta, I think it's about 35 points between the median percentage of respondents that had no confidence in President Trump, and then the median unfavorable view of the United States, which is 74 percent to 39 percent. Is that delta sustainable based on previous survey data, is that something that you expect to converge over time? What's your sense?

MR. WIKE: Well, you know, obviously how the world feels about the U.S. President and U.S. foreign policy does have a big impact on how the world sees the U.S., but we know from our surveys that it's complicated too. There are lots of things that influence how people see America, and I think there are signs in this data, and signs in other surveys we've conducted over time, that do kind of highlight this resiliency in terms of America's image.

You know, despite all the negativity towards Trump as I mentioned, you don't see a huge majority saying they expect relations to necessarily get worse with the U.S. These we ask about soft power and American culture, and the American people, et cetera, you know, we've see in the survey, and we've seen pretty consistently over time that, you know, people tend to still like a lot of things about the U.S. even when they are not happy with the U.S. administration.

And in some ways the Obama era, I think, demonstrated this resiliency, right. You had anti-Americanism in many parts of the world during the Bush era; you've had anti-Americanism of different varieties for a very long time, long before George W. Bush. And yet, it's bounced back at different times as well.

And we saw a lot of the numbers that had turned very negative bounce back during our surveys in the Obama presidency. So, you know, we've seen some precedence for resiliency, and I think there are signs of it even in the survey this year, despite all the negativity that we see at the same time.

MR. CHHABRA: Just staying on that subject, I mean, for each of you, how are we to read the survey results that indicate that publics on balance are not necessarily convinced that bilateral relations with the United States are going to change. Do we read that normatively in the sense that they don't think the relationship should change despite their disregard for President Trump? Or do we read it empirically in the sense that maybe they don't think the ground will shift because they have faith in U.S.

institutions, or perhaps their own?

MR. HAMID: So I think one thing here is that we have an unusual situation where the U.S. doesn't have a unitary foreign policy. Of course it's never entirely unitary, there's -- always divisions within the bureaucracy, and among different institutions but I think, particularly under Trump, there are about four simultaneous U.S. foreign policies.

So even if you don't like Trump, if you follow things closely enough you might like the other three foreign policies. So, Nikki Haley has her own foreign policy, Secretary Mattis has his own foreign policy, McMaster has a different one, Manning. You know, the list goes on, right.

So I think we have to ask ourselves the question, who speaks for the U.S. to the extent that you have just in the past couple of weeks, Tillerson and Trump saying almost diametrically opposed things on one of the most potentially destructive crises we've seen in recent months certainly, but perhaps even recent years; the GCC crisis.

So, I mean, I preferred Tillerson's foreign policy over Trump's in this regard. So, I think that makes it a little bit more challenging that this is such an unusual President at such an unusual time, that it's very hard to compare it with what's come before. So, that's I think one thing but, you know -- but I think there is also this -- you know, people don't necessarily -- this is status quo bias, you think, hey, you know, things are more likely to stay the same.

And I think, you know, if I was responding to these kinds of polls, I would say; hey, you know, I personally don't like Trump at all but, you know, is it going to change the bilateral relationship with X, Y or Z country? I think I can see why a lot of people would say, probably not so much.

MR. CHHABRA: I sense that there's also some optimism bias in that from the perspective of Europe?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: I think, you know, I actually take more hope from the fact that survey respondents apparently think, or make a distinction between the President himself and the country. That was also the case in translating trends when I ran it. People made their distinction between President Bush and America, and I think that that's good. I mean, that shows a certain degree of maturity.

I think also for Europe, we come from a different place than many of the people who live

in the Middle East. Relationships have survived a great deal already as I've said. There is a sense that we are so deeply politically and economically integrated with each other, but it's actually, you know, despite, you know, a leaders best efforts it's quite difficult to completely rip apart this fabric.

And so there is an assumption that the machine, to some degree, is going to chug on by himself regardless of what the gentleman on the deck is attempting to do. Now, over time that could obviously change, if the gentleman is on the deck a long time, but for now, there's a feeling this is just -- this relationship is just so much bigger than one single government that we will weather this too. This, too, shall pass.

MR. RATNER: Yes. I'll just say, I think that's right, and though interestingly the country with some of the largest figures of concern, that there would be negative effects, Japan, South Korea, in Australia I think more than 40 percent of respondents saying that they would expect the relationship to be more negative.

I'll get to that in just a minute. But I would agree, I think with a lot of these relationships, they are much deeper, operating on many different levels. I think we saw a real case of that, when, if you recall early on in the administration, President Trump had a phone call with the Australia Prime Minister that didn't go that well. It was reported out as a bad call. It was ended much more quickly than it was supposed to be, and there was lots of press about, you know: has Trump broken the U.S.-Australia alliance?

And the response was a just a groundswell of support from civil society, Congress, Rubio put out statements, McCain, I think there was even a sense of the Senate on this, and it really activated the alliance managers, you know, it was a demonstration of how many people there are who think this relationship is really important, and they are going to fight and work for it, and ultimately won't allow Donald Trump to do something like that, because of the long, historical relationship.

What I would say though is I think, you know, this question about the bilateral relationship is potentially important, but just to get back to my earlier comment. I think in Asia in particular, you have a situation where you have a resurge in China in the context of concerns about at least uncommitted United States, and the concern that I have personally, but I think the concern people have in the region, is other things that are going to happen over the next couple of years, that would put the region on a path

dependence of a much less democratic future.

Or certain trade or political institutions that become predominant. Or a security order that's redefined through Chinese revisionism, that means even when President X is elected in 2020, and he or she goes out and says, America is back, here we are, that the region has been transformed in a fundamental way across some pretty important issues that the nature of the bilateral relationship isn't as important as the changes that have happened at the regional order.

So, again, I think that -- I would suspect if you started looking at -- if you went in to the people that are really concerned about these issues and follow them closely, in some of these regions, what's lurking behind is concerns about America's traditional leadership role forfeiting economic leadership on things like, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and then concerns about alliance commitments, and these things come together, potentially, in very negative way.

MR. HAMID: Please, can I just add one little point. I think you have to also remember that people's attitudes towards the U.S. especially in my region, are very complex, and there's almost like this love-hate aspect to it. So, I don't know how similar that is in certain parts of Europe, but to even ask a sort of binary question: how do you feel the U.S., good or bad?

I mean, I can imagine someone, like, writing a long essay on that, in like Egypt or Jordan, and it would be like a very complex position. Just because the history, there's so much there to sort of unpack, and I mean, just -- one kind of, an amusing result that I was reminded of, looking at the numbers, in 2005 in Jordan, confidence in George W. Bush, was 1 percent in Jordan.

I was actually living in Jordan in 2005, and I think I knew the 1 percent. (Laughter) So, I was just like, you know, but these are people who would never -- but they would never say that to a pollster, but there was a sense that George W. Bush is supporting the first Arab Spring, which was happening in 2004, 2005, more people were protesting. There was a sense of optimism, at least among elites, but these were also people who historically were very suspicious of the U.S.

So they were, like, wait, is George W. Bush improving this? But then again, we know the history, and again, so it's almost like internal struggle as people try to make sense of what they feel about the U.S.

MR. CHHABRA: While you are -- I want to raise yesterday's Supreme Court decision to

hear arguments regarding the immigration ban. This was covered in the survey. Disapproval of the administration's immigration restrictions was quite pronounced, and unsurprisingly with 77 percent of those in Turkey, 73 percent in Tunisia, and 96 percent for Jordan. So from your perspective, what will be the impact of the decision to allow portions of the ban to stand, pending a forward hearing later this year?

MR. HAMID: Well, I think it's understandable that people would be against a ban like that with targets Muslims. Although it's worth noting, and here there's an interesting public leadership divide. Many Arab governments supported Trump's ban -- the Muslim ban, or whatever, even countries that claim to speak for Muslims, like Saudi Arabia, and for a variety of complex reasons, which we don't have to get into right now. But I think that part of it is interesting, that even though you have very strong public disapproval of Trump's Muslim ban, that doesn't necessarily filter up to the governments.

And that's because most of these countries are not democracies, so I think when we are looking at the results at large, this question of how much governments are responsive to their own people is pretty critical, because if you have strong levels of public anti-Americanism, naturally if you are running in a campaign, you are going to have to feed off that anti-American sentiment.

So, I think one thing we'll see in the next four years, if politicians in, say, Europe or Asia, assuming they are democracies see that their people are pissed off at Trump, they might say, well, we are going to run on this, and really try to use that to our advantage.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: I mean it's already become visible in Germany's election campaign. We have a federal election on September 24<sup>th</sup>, that's less than 100 days out, this past weekend, Merkel's challenger, Martin Shultz went onto a full-throated campaign mode which essentially said, you know, forget 2 percent, we are never going to do that, that would mean arming Germany to the teeth.

In other words, playing on all the anti-American pacifists, ant-NATO tropes that you can think of, I have to say, I'm very disappointed by this. I thought that he was going to be more responsible than that. But he's also 14 points behind Merkel in the polls, and so clearly he feels that he has to do this. But there you go, I mean, these are means or narratives that people can pull up, and no doubt that will have an impact.

On the other hand, I'm also seeing some of my social Democrats friends on Facebook

agonizing over this and saying, oh, my, god, you know, this will -- now we really going to hell in a hand basket. This is not going to get us elected, and it shouldn't.

MR. RATNER: And to the question actually, I mean to the extent it seems to be the case that Trump wasn't traveling to London because there were concerns about protests there, and as compared to Asia again, President Trump's schedule to go to the Philippines and Vietnam for major multilateral meetings later this year. He accepted an invitation from President Modi yesterday to go out to India. He has told President Xi he is going to go to China; he'll likely go to Japan, and possibly South Korea at some point as well.

I don't think he would face that kind of public opposition in those places, so it will be interesting to see how it changes his world view, and sort of how this kind of public resistance or support will affect him if he starts traveling the world. And he'll be very welcome in places like Vietnam and the Philippines, who have a very different experience than some of these other countries so, I think it will matter.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: In some ways, insulting your friends is worse.

MR. CHHABRA: Richard, I want to ask you, so within political science now, or in international relations even, there's kind of more study of the role that leaders play in international politics. And in that sense I wonder, has Pew considered doing a survey, in parallel, of the elites. You've done some in the past. How do you all think about this question?

MR. WIKE: We have done some of that, it's just not always easy to survey elites, they won't respond to your surveys. I thought right off, when you try to get them to answer your question but --

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: So snooty.

MR. WIKE: Yes, yes. But we have done some of that, including we actually did a little project, for the German Marshall Fund recently where we surveyed some folks who attended one of their conferences. And you do see some gaps sometimes. I mean, I think that, you know, issues like globalization, for example, trade, you know, these kinds of issues can be seen very differently by elites and by average citizens across the world.

Now, that survey, where we did survey Trans-Atlantic elites essentially, I think had some common findings, in terms of, you know, these Trans-Atlantic elites were very concerned about, you

know, the Trump administration, concerned about trajectory of Trans-Atlantic relations. So, maybe on that front right now we are seeing some correspondence between elites and average citizens.

MR. CHHABRA: And Ely, because President Moon will be here on Thursday, I wanted to ask you, despite the relatively positive, and high-approval rating of the United States in South Korea, it was striking that 76 percent of South Koreans consider President Trump dangerous. This is also a country where we have nearly 30,000 U.S. troops. So what does this mean for President Moon when he walks into the Oval Office on Thursday?

MR. RATNER: Yes. That's striking, and I think that's a good demonstration of the degree to which, in all these regions, it's just a lot of diversity between what their interests are. Because what's driving result is clearly the concern that President Trump will be overly aggressive toward North Korea in one way or another, and could start a conflict there. So I'll read that as reflecting that.

President Moon has come into office in a much more conciliatory position toward North Korea than his predecessor, who was about as hard as you are going to get, and about as willing to go along with the type of global pressure campaign that the United States was trying to conduct. So I think this is, it's a good example of the type of tightrope walks that leaders have to do now when they come to meet with President Trump, because they at once have to serve their publics, and not be seen as being overly-deferential, but at the same time, don't want to signal to Trump that somehow, that South Korea isn't up for this alliance anymore.

I mean, you could imagine if Trump got the signal that South Korea was no longer willing to cooperate with United States on tackling the North Korea issue, given his history of questions about alliance, and what not, the first question he would ask himself, is why do we have tens of thousands of troops there? Why are Americans willing to die for their country if they are not willing to work with us, and try to deal with the mounting threat of a North Korea that could soon, to test an ICBM that could the Continental United States?

So I do think, again, this is a potential volatility that the domestic politics bring into this, but I also think it's something that, because of the --it's a good example of a relationship that is very deep. There have been Moon Officials in Washington coming through over the last couple weeks, meeting with people on the outside, as well as obviously doing a number of meetings inside to try to find a way to



thread the needle through this, and I they are good examples of this.

Modi just had a good visit. I think when Justin Trudeau came to Washington he had a very good visit, though you couldn't have two more different types of leaders, so it is doable but it requires careful diplomacy on both sides.

MR. HAMID: Ely, how do you interpret, Modi's sort of like, tackling and bear hug of Donald Trump yesterday. It's amazing, it's an amazing little clip.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Like (crosstalk) handshake.

MR. HAMID: Correct. They were going to shake hands, but then Modi just, like, jumps on him and gives a (crosstalk) --

MR. CHHABRA: Like a (crosstalk).

MR. HAMID: A pretty intense hug. And that was interesting. I don't know, was he trying to signal something toward domestic --

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: It would be difficult for a woman leader to do.

MR. RATNER: I don't know what was in Modi's head. I don't know. He loves Twitter, so maybe it was for social media, I don't know. But it was a good example again where, in some ways there are some sharp differences between the United States and India. But they were able to come and say, hey, we have some common ground here, we want to work together. And I think both probably some of the folks in the White House, but particularly people in the international community are learning, over time, how best to do these kinds of visits, and how to engage with President Trump, how to stay away from things that could go sideways. So I think -- I don't know, thanks for your question though.

MR. CHHABRA: One more question, U.S.-China relations, before we go to questions from the audience. There is news this morning that the administration is now poised to take a tougher line on China. If that is right, do you think the risk of U.S.-China confrontation is going to be seen with trepidation among these countries, or will a stronger U.S. (inaudible) be welcomed?

MR. RATNER: It depends entirely on whether they do it well or not. Tough on China policy that is a confident America, that's leading institutions, that's leading on economics, that's committing to its alliances, that's an important voice for freedom and democracy in the world, that takes on China like that, will have the support of the region. But a tough on China policy that's purely American

first, that's protectionist, that abandons regional institutions, and it takes unnecessary risks on military matters, will lose the region entirely. So, that's really question of how well they do it.

MR. CHHABRA: And we'll see. Richard has a survey coming out later this year, on the U.S.-China relationship.

MR. WIKE: Yeah. We'll have a survey also that's on global views towards China, and views about the balance of power between the U.S. and China, both in Asia and around the world. So that's -- it's a little bit -- in the last few years we framed a lot of our research on views of the U.S., not only in terms of how they see U.S. in and of itself, but how they see the U.S. vis-à-vis China. So, that's something we'll have more coming up on soon.

MR. CHHABRA: Okay. So, let's open it up. In the back?

SPEAKER: Thank you very much. My name is Yaya Fanusie, with United States of Africa 2017 Project Task Force. I usually like to ask the last question, but this thing is very important. The opening synopsis that the gentleman did, he asked this: how the world sees the U.S.? Two, how the world sees Trump? We ask people. Can you clarify, when you say "how the world" are you referring your survey result from the governing and political classes of those countries, is that what you are talking about? And why would you say the world when those leaders are not the largest representatives of the world?

Also, you need to understand this. Trump is undermining, sabotaging the ideological foundation of what all these leaders have experienced or followed over the last 70 years, so you have to look it in those contexts, not doing this your -- what I call it -- unnecessary (crosstalk) --

MR. CHHABRA: Let's take one more as well, and we'll answer both together. Also in the back --

SPEAKER: Thank you, all, very much. I'm going to ask a question out of right field, left field, whichever field you care to call it. Lorin Hershey. What's the role of public diplomacy today? How does the Pew Research look at it? IRI, NDI, Fulbright Program, universities bring in a million students a year into the U.S.? Your comments, please.

MR. CHHABRA: Okay. Richard?

MR. WIKE: Sure. Well, you know, in terms of, who are these people that are talking to in

these surveys. You know, it's not just elites or leaders in these countries; essentially it's a nationally-representative sample of these populations. So, you know, in terms of demographic profile of the people in our sample, it looks like the demographic profile of the country's population.

Now, you know, there are some countries where for one reason or another there may be relatively small parts of the country we can't get to for logistical or security reasons. But for the most part these are nationally representative sample. So, you know, it looks like what the citizenry looks like.

In terms of a public diplomacy, you know, we don't get into policy recommendations at the Pew Research Center, so we don't make recommendations about what the U.S. or other countries ought to do in terms of public diplomacy, and maybe some of the panelists might have some thoughts about that. We certainly see there's an appetite for this kind of information in the public diplomacy community. You know, I think they are very interested in the types of data we collect, and views United States, including things like soft power, et cetera, that they look to in order to kind of leverage in their programming.

MR. CHHABRA: Ely?

MR. RATNER: I think this question of public diplomacy is hugely important in the context of the U.S.-China relationship, and the U.S.-China competition. We obviously, the United States has not been thinking about an ideological or ideational contest for several decades now, and now we are facing one, where you have a very -- as I mentioned, a very active propaganda machine out of China, in the newspapers and what not.

And what's interesting is that that is having some effect, because I'd be interested to see these survey results on the U.S.-China relationship, because when publics are surveyed, they consistently overestimate their countries', for instance, economic dependence on China, or China's relative power. Imagine many countries in the world will say, China is the most important economy, or China is the most important country in the world.

There was very interesting survey out of Australia National University, where they ask people: how economically -- who do think is the largest investor in your country? So constant overestimation of Chinese influence, and then that's a direct result of Chinese propaganda, and the United States is really not engaged in that space at all.

So I think one of the tough policy questions for the United States, has got to be much bigger than what we've done in the past, on Voice of America, and sort of these little efforts. I think the United States and U.S. policymakers have to think of it themselves; and again, potentially more difficult in a Trump context rather than a more traditional U.S. foreign policy context. But I think the question of, how does the United States engage again in an ideational or ideological competition, is something that's coming back fast and furious to Washington.

MR. CHHABRA: But from your perspective focus more on China's relative influence, and less about (crosstalk).

MR. RATNER: Well, about the U.S. influence as well. So, again, you know, if you went to Southeast Asia and you asked someone on the street, who do you think is the largest investor in your country, the answer I imagine a lot of them would say China, when only it's -- it's only 8 percent, and the Japanese are three- or four-fold. And the same in Australia, the United States is the largest foreign direct investor. I don't think Australians would think that. So, yes, not only providing them more information about the realities of China's economic footprint, but also expressing the role of the United States.

And we haven't done a great job of that, in part, because the U.S. Government doesn't take credit for the U.S. economy in the way some other governments do, but I think we should. And so I think we'll have to be a lot more vocal and affirmative what we are providing these countries.

MR. CHHABRA: Right here, ma'am; the second row.

SPEAKER: Thank you very much. So, good news for Donald Trump and his voters, he has put America first, and people see him as a leader. So, in the next two to three years, shouldn't we expect more bullying of our supposed allies, more not shaking hands with people; to make sure that his voters understand that he is a strong leader, not manipulated by these elites along the fringes, and more power to the wall, the ban, and getting money out of Germany?

MR. HAMID: So, those are the two results that stood out to me as positive for Trump, if he was reading your report, which I'm not sure, I mean, he probably won't, but if he did -- (laughter) -- he might read like the top, like the page summary, or whatever. But if he read it, there are two positive things there, the fact that 55 percent see him as a strong leader, despite not liking him otherwise, that seems positive. But also 39 percent think he's charismatic. Those are two interesting results.

But I think, look, I don't think Trump -- my sense is that there is a kind of school of thought that says, hey, we don't care what the publics in other countries think about us, we want to get results. And I think Trump's perspective is that taking a hard line and bullying, if you will, can produce better behavior on the part of allies, but also on the part of adversaries.

And I think one example of this is you might actually -- hypothetically, what if after four years European nations, more of them actually decided to meet the 2 percent GDP expectation for NATO contributions. That's actually more plausible in a sense now, than it would have been a few years ago, in a kind of counterintuitive way, because people are afraid that the U.S. is doing its own thing and won't be there to support them, that they have take responsibility for their own defense more.

Hypothetically, that could be one scenario, so that would be -- I mean, so that's a different way of looking, I think, at foreign policy. Who cares if people like us? If we are feared, and I think there's also the anti-Obama aspect of this as well. There's a very strong perception that Obama was a bit of a softie, and that undermined the credibility of our commitments throughout the world.

And that's actually, you know, I will confess, an argument that I've made in the past, in terms of credibility when it comes to things like the red line or Syria. So I think it gets bigger debates about what leads to an effective U.S. foreign policy.

MR. CHHABRA: I know your thoughts on this, but I also want to ask, and perhaps it's already happened on Twitter, but there's a way in which the President and some in the White House could wear this as a badge of honor, is that in a sense potentially freed him up to do more business in Europe.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: You know, at this point a lot of people in Europe will tell you, we have been increasing our defense budgets because of Russia, because of Russian aggression, and in fact Germany is increasing its defense budget by 8 percent this year. The 2 percent target that we promised NATO is a voluntary target, but it's in our interest. And we promise to achieve it by 2024, and the chancellor has several times, including in this election year, said, and we are going to do this, I'm going to go on doing this until we reach the 2 percent in 2024.

So, to some degree there's a sense in Berlin, well, okay, you know, if he wants to take credit for that, fine; if that gets this off our plate, great, because we are going to do this anyway. The

economic stuff is a little more difficult, because that's where you are getting into the realm of, you know, you can have your opinion, ma'am, but not the facts, not your own facts.

Yes, Germany has a current account surplus, and that is, by the way, a very large current and trade account surplus, and whether we need to have that, and what we can do against is actually a matter of great debate in Europe, and in Germany.

But the Trump administration also seems to believe that we can tell the European Central Bank what to do, and how to set the value of the euro. That is, unfortunately, untrue. Germany wishes it were. But the reality is that the German position has lost out. We were against Quantitative Easing that the European Central Bank President, Mario Draghi, then instituted at the request of the Obama administration.

So, honestly these -- I think at this point what the European, and certainly what the Germans are doing is a combination of hugging and hedging. Right? We are willing to give the President credit for whatever, but there are points where that's just not possible, where we cannot go against the facts, or where we also cannot go against our own national interest.

MR. CHHABRA: And Ely, when you speak to this, I mean, where in Asia should we be worried when we begin to see it? What kind of hedging should we be most worried about?

MR. RATNER: Well, I mean, the first thing I want to say about this, is I think the interesting piece about this is that it's not as if the Democratic Party is a complete inverse of Donald Trump on every issue. So, yes, some of the issue is on board about the wall with Mexico, and refugees and what not, and immigrants, the Democratic Party is in a very different place, but on an issue like trade, it's not clear they are.

And in fact, you'll see Chuck Schumer having written an op-ed in The Washington Post, accusing Trump of not being tough enough on trade enforcement, or even considering certain protectionist measures.

So, there are big debates to be had in terms exactly how the politics of this shake out, or maybe where the Democratic Party lands on some of these issues may not be your traditional, liberal internationalist, sort of Republican centrist, Democrat foreign policy, we could end up with a set of arguments in 2020 from the left about trade protectionism and maybe not such a robust security policy.

That's not what I would support on either way, personally; but I think we could end up there, because the politics are more complicated.

In terms of, you know, the issues over which this will be expressed, you know, one will be, I think there's an opportunity in Asia as in Europe for allies to step up and do more, because again, the choice is not, well, you know, if the United States is shrinking away, does that mean we have to accommodate China, there is also a choice of working more together and trying to network more democratic allies.

And we are starting to see some of that, so I think there is a opportunity here for countries like Australia to work more with Japan, and India, and Singapore, and others, and whether they move forward with initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership 11, which will be TPP in the absence of the United States, I think will be an important sign of whether they are going to try to do some of this themselves or not.

MR. CHHABRA: In the back.

MR. BARBATI: I'm Gabriele Barbati from Voice of America. The report focuses on the idea that the U.S. could back off from the Iran Nuclear Deal signed in 2015, and it looks like many in the Middle East, in Muslim-majority countries support this idea, siding in a way more with Israel than Europe. So, for Mr. Hamid, why do you think it's so in the Middle East? And if I may, why is that the Europeans oppose the idea of withdrawing from the deal? For Ms. Stelzenmüller; thank you very much.

MR. HAMID: Okay. So, I think that, if you are talking Sunni-majority countries, obviously there's a kind of sectarian element in seeing Iran as a Shi'a regional hegemon. So that's certainly part of it. But also I think the experience with Iranian policy in the region, that Iran's policy is, at least from a Sunni Arab perspective have been destabilizing in a number of different context, whether it's Iran's support of Hezbollah, and Lebanon, or it's kind of meddling in other context.

So I think that it's only natural to expect this will be one area where you see some overlap between Arab publics and Trump's position. There is also one other area, where there is some overlap, again, and this one of the things that really stood out to me in reading the report.

There are 37 countries surveyed, the highest support for building a border wall with Mexico, Trump's wall, is actually among Jordanians. They are number one out of 37 countries, and 44

percent support a border wall.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: And do you have an explanation for this?

MR. HAMID: Well, we can speculate. I guess the one speculation would be that Jordan has had a massive influx of refugees --

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Exactly so.

MR. HAMID: -- over the past 15 years, not just even recently.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: And (crosstalk) want to?

MR. HAMID: Yeah. So, you've had Palestinian refugees, Iraqi refugees, and now Syrian refugees, and it's altered the demographic makeup of the country so that would be guess.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Yes. Yes.

MR. CHHABRA: Before we (inaudible). I was interested though on that point, 63 percent in Turkey opposed the border wall.

MR. HAMID: Opposed the border wall. Yes, so you'd think that maybe Turkey would share Jordan's perspective on this, again, because they've had a big influx of Syrian refugees yet -- I don't know -- Well, one possibility is that there haven't been previous influxes, so this is the first time that Turkey has really has had to deal with this. And Turkey is a much larger country.

Jordan is what, 6 million people, so if you have hundreds of thousands of refugees coming in, everyone feels it in some way. It affects the housing market; it affects prices and so on. And just my experience being in Turkey in recent years, you don't feel it as much, and also I think that if you support Erdoğan, and Erdoğan still has strong support among a big chunk of Turks, he sees that as one of the things to be proud of. That Sunnis, Syrian Sunnis who were oppressed by Assad regime have safe haven in Turkey. And he sort of promotes that as part of this kind of Turkish exceptionalism, if you will.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Mm-hmm. True.

MR. CHHABRA: Constanze?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: On the Iranian Deal, well keep in mind that Europe was part of the Iranian Deal; it was co-negotiated by the Brits, the French and the Germans, the so-called E3, the European 3. So we are invested in this, at the same time we are not naïve. I think if you talk to European policymakers both in the EU and in the national capitals, there is a great amount of concern about Iraq's



role -- I'm sorry -- Iran's role in the region. Iran's, you know, support of terrorist organizations, its sort of hegemonic ambitions, and of course very little trust in its willingness to actually stick to the deal.

That said, the deal at least gives us a framework. A framework to talking to Iran about this, so it's seen as an achievement that is definitely better than the alternatives, and it is certainly better than the prospect of the regional conflagration caused by a military strike, which was very much being discussed in the years before. And as we know, that kind of thing hits Europe a lot earlier than the consequences are felt in America. So I think that gives you explanation for how Europeans feel.

MR. CHHABRA: In the back, in the orange dress?

MS. WALTERS: Hi. I'm Anne Walters with the German Press Agency. I wanted to look ahead to the G20 and see how the panel thinks that these leaders will balance the views of their public with their need to engage with the U.S. on a variety of issues at the G20 coming up in just a couple of days. And also how you think Trump will be received given some of the major disagreements on things like trade and climate change?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: I think we are all going to behave like professionals. This is my guess. In other words, you know, as is often the case on summits like this, the actual issues and the communiqués are hashed out by staff on both sides, and I would expect that in the White House there are enough people who think, you know, this needs to be the domain of professionals, and who would be working with European capitals to do this.

Is it possible for there to be repetition of something like the Brussels' speech? Yes. You know, there's only so much purchase by any of us, I think, including the White House staff, have over the proclivities of the President to extemporize, shall we say, there is also I think conflicting views within the White House and the Administration and the Cabinet, on what is -- you know, how to deal with these trade disagreements, and how to talk to Europeans about them.

So, I think to that degree there's a significant element of uncertainty. And I would expect Europeans to be, again, as I said earlier, pursuing a sort of hugging and hedging strategy. In other words, attempting to make offers to Washington, attempting to find a framework in which it is possible to settle these disagreements.

But on some things such as climate change, I think we are just going to have to agree to

disagree. But I think it's in no one's interest for this to turn out -- to turn into a, you know, all-out confrontation over climate change or over trade.

MR. HAMID: And just to add to that. I mean, what's really interesting is that because there is this perception that Trump is vindictive if he doesn't get along with you personally, especially; and that leaders want to kind of go out of their way to make a deal, if you will, or to somehow make the relationship less tense.

So, you might recall, there's this New York Times article about -- I guess it was a NATO Summit -- where the European leaders were studying up on how to appeal to Trump, and there was a realization that you had to shorten your speeches, you know, probably it was just like talking for, like, you know, a very long time, to keep it short sweet.

Like a one-minute to five-minute comments, so that Trump could stay engaged. Now, that might sound in some ways, negative, and it makes us feel embarrassed as Americans, but it's interesting that despite the dislike of Trump, leaders do seem willing and interested to go the extra mile to be in Trump's good favor. I don't know quite to make of that yet, and what that means in practice, but I think that's something to watch pretty closely.

MR. CHHABRA: The gentleman in first row, here?

SPEAKER: This question I have is on leadership in Asia. You mentioned China and U.S. What does that really mean when you say you have leadership in Asia? When you start to talk about international trade, TPP was meant to be a way for other countries to compete with China; and how does it change as America makes decision on what to do with North Korea?

MR. RATNER: I'm not sure I understand connection with the North Korea piece but --

SPEAKER: No. Just in terms -- leadership in Asia, you know, we have our trade, and now this potential escalation of, what are going to do with North Korea, and how that impacts the relationship with China and U.S., and therefore all Asia; just your thoughts on leadership in Asia, as the role of American.

MR. RATNER: Okay. I'll take the TPP piece, when you talk North Korea, it's a little bit more of a complicated dynamic, I think, as it relates to the China piece, and the question of leadership. But I would say the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, again, as was indicated in the survey results, it's

devastating to perceptions of the United States. And the reason why that matters, in my view anyway is because, and we'll see it in the survey, I'm sure, there is a growing perception in Asia that the future of the economic order will be China-led, that it will be China's rules, China's institutions, multilateral or informal, that will be convening the region and determining its course, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership was the best mechanism to provide an alternative to that.

And the reason it matters primarily, in my view, it's not just because of the economics of the effects of the trade deal, in fact, I think there are some questions about how pronounced that would be, because the lack of U.S. leadership on this issue, the lack of the United States being the country that's convening and bringing together an alternative set of countries starts cascading into other sets of issues.

So, if a country like, I would say, a country in Southeast Asia perceives that the United States is withdrawing economically, that their economic fortunes will lie -- economic future will lie with China, and if they defy China over a variety of issues, they'll face economic punishment for them.

Again, that's going to cascade into other issues. They may be less willing to sign a new access agreement with the U.S. Military; they may be less willing to sign up for -- to criticize human rights at the United Nations. So, these things, I think given the centrality of the economics in Asia, this really matters. And the tag line that I keep saying as I go around town talking about these issues, there is no amount of defense spending that can make up for this. There are no numbers of ships that the U.S. Military can build that will reverse these perceptions.

It will be about economics, and the economics will start having effects. So, I think that particular finding, and again I'll be fascinated to see how it's revealed in the data on the competition, but I think it's going to be pretty stark, and if the Trump administration doesn't get in the game on a major ambitious trade and investment initiative, whether it's reviving TPP, or not, then U.S. leadership in the region will deteriorate no matter.

MR. CHHABRA: Let's take two final questions together. One on this side, the gentleman here, I think it's the fourth row, and then right across here as well.

SPEAKER: My name is Stephen Shore. Earlier Trump expressed gratitude with the outcome of Brexit. Is his slow learning curve on international economics a concern in much of the rest of

the world?

MR. CHHABRA: And so, right across here as well. I will take two, and wrap up.

SPEAKER: Vince LaFrance, a freelance writer. I actually wanted to touch on Middle East question for Shadi, about how the U.S. has been able to spread democracy in the Middle East and around the world, historically, been a beacon of U.S. foreign policy. But, you know, we saw in Libya, we saw in Iraq and Syria that, you know, the invasion of Iraq, creating these power vacuums has -- you know, it's been a problem in the region.

Do you think that U.S. foreign policy in terms of being the largest military power in the world, and having such a huge influence in the region, has maybe created -- you know, has put maybe a terrorist target on our backs? I mean, we've been seeing this in the U.S., we've seen this in Europe in that regard. Richard, and I do want to talk about the Pew Research Center sample. What kind of message can you send to Congress about these results, and how can that, maybe influence going forward? Thank you.

MR. CHHABRA: Constanze, do you want to start with the trade question?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Look, I was briefly addressing that earlier when I said, when you, you know, politics is very often a matter of interpretation, economics is not, you are dealing with actual facts, and you are dealing with pretty clear causal correlations, and it's without wanting to overstate the field of economics here, as a lawyer. But there is, I think, a real bemusement in European capitals at the -- not just at some of the economic theories or the trade being propounded, not by the President, but by significant members of the administration. But even more, in a way that's even more concerning, the degree to which there seems to be a feeling in this administration, that trade wars are a good thing.

And that trade relationships are something that are of necessity, or that from America's vantage point ought to always to be -- calculated on a bilateral level. And that therefore the question of fairness and reciprocity, needs to be settled bilaterally. For the European Union, where we as European nation states have delegated trade policymaking capability to Brussels and to the European Union authorities, that's an illegal and factual and possibility.

We can't do that, and all conversations that European leaders have had with the White House indicate that that fact which has been a fact for more than 20 years, is just not accepted. And that

makes that confrontation a really difficult one to have.

Again, I think, you know, there's a tremendous amount of sense in Europe that these things are so important that we cannot afford to let this relationship deteriorate. But we can't blow up the European Union just to make the White House trade negotiators happy. That's not going happen, and we are currently seeing in the context of Brexit, just how difficult it is for one country to leave. And it's not because we are making it particularly difficult. It's because the process itself is difficult, because so many laws and regulations bind us together.

MR. CHHABRA: Ely?

MR. RATNER: Just very quickly, and again just to underscore something I said a little earlier. I mean I think this issue is much bigger than Trump now, and I think the question will be: how is he activating American politics in a way where it's actually not necessarily about Trump? The Democratic Party is not showing bold leadership itself on free trade right now.

So, I think the political conversation in the United States is only going to get more difficult around these issues, and we start getting into areas of autonomy and robotics, and you know, it's a big problem, this question of globalization, and the future of work, and what advanced societies are going to do about that.

So, Trump matters, but he may -- whether he learns about the importance of the European Union or the Trans-Pacific Partnership, it's not clear the political waters in the United States will bear, if he did change his mind in either party. So, it's a lot of work to do now that goes way beyond Trump on these economic issues.

MR. HAMID: It's bothering me a little bit in the kind of media discourse the past few months, where people say, well, Trump is giving up on decades of bipartisan consensus on supporting democracy, and he's embracing dictators, like Sisi and other Arab autocrats, and it's almost as if we've forgotten that one major criticism of Obama was that he was unusually bad on human rights and democracy, and actively and quite conscious deemphasized those issues in the broader context of the U.S. foreign policy.

So take for example, the fact that Secretary Kerry was effusively praising Egypt President Sisi, two or three months after worst massacre in modern Egypt history, and crediting Sisi for presiding

over a democratic transition.

Can you imagine if Trump did something like that? The entire Left would be freaking out about it. So, I think we have to be very careful about disentangling our personal dislike of Donald Trump from our analysis. And I think that -- or whether it's analysts or journalists, that the sort of prevalent dislike of Trump I think has made it more difficult for us to be objective about Trump's foreign policy.

But the bigger point is that we have a pretty bad record on supporting democracy in the Middle East that's not the province of one President or another, that's a five or six decade thing that's been pretty consistent. So, I would be very careful about seeing Trump as exceptional in that regard.

And so the last thing on the question of: does intervening lead to more anti American sentiment? Yes, there is data in academic literature, which suggests the kind of relationship, sure. But at the same time, non-intervention, also seems to have a relationship with the rise of extremism and terrorism.

And I think Syria is a very good example of that. That's where we said, hey, we are going to stay as far away as possible from this. We are going to do a reverse Iraq in Syria. But what that led to, in practice, is the rapid rise and emergence of the most successful extremist group of recent decades, ISIS.

MR. CHHABRA: Richard, the final word to you. And, please, feel free to give us a plug for the upcoming survey results.

MR. WIKE: Sure. Yes. You know, in terms of economic policy, or some of these other policy areas that have come up in some of the comments, you know, obviously our survey shows a lot of opposition to Trump's proposals around the world. But I also think it's sort of a theme if you look across the different issue areas we tested, of a lot opposition of the idea of the U.S. withdrawing from commitments around the world, or putting up barriers with the rest of the world, in terms, you know, restrictions on people entering the country, from predominantly Muslim nations, or putting up a wall between the U.S. and Mexico.

Pulling out of climate change or trade agreements, pulling out of the Iran Nuclear Deal, I think there's a little bit of a theme that comes out of all these questions we ask about policies. And it plays into how people view America's role in the world.

And then, you know, just to put a plug for upcoming research. As I said, we'll be looking at America's image vis-à-vis China, is our upcoming research. We'll also look at attitudes towards globalization and democracy around the world, in some ways, I think we'll have some reports that speak to these debates about the fate of the Liberal World Order and, you know, which of course has been debated a lot, at a sort higher level right now, and hopefully what we can add to that debate is some data on average citizens around the world, think about these different components of that order.

MR. CHHABRA: Thank you, all, very much. Thank you all for coming. (Applause)

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