THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
FALK AUDITORIUM

ALL MEASURES SHORT OF WAR:
THE CONTEST FOR THE 21st CENTURY AND
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER

Washington, D.C.
Monday, June 5, 2017

PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction:

BRUCE JONES
Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution

Remarks:

THOMAS WRIGHT
Senior Fellow and Director, Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution

Discussion:

SUSAN GLASSER
Chief International Affairs Columnist
Politico

GÉRARD ARAUD
Ambassador of France to the United States

ROBERT KAGAN
Senior Fellow, Project on International Order & Strategy
The Brookings Institution

THOMAS WRIGHT
Senior Fellow and Director, Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution

* * * * *
MR. JONES: Good afternoon. I see we’re standing room only, which is terrific, a fitting tribute. My name is Bruce Jones. I’m the vice president and director of Foreign Policy here at Brookings; and it’s a really sincere pleasure to welcome you to today's event, the launch of this book, “All Measures Short of War”, by my friend and colleague, Tom Wright. Tom is the newly-appointed director of our Center on the United States and Europe, having very ably directed our Project on International Order and Strategy, to which he still actively contributes.

I first met Tom at a conference on international order at Princeton in which he and I disagreed, but very agreeably, on China's role in the evolving order. He was right, I was wrong; so, I did the only sensible thing, which was that I offered him a job. And, fortunately, he accepted and has been here since, and has flourished as one of the leading voices on the new geopolitics and great power competition as it's evolving in the contemporary landscape. And I can't help but interject that last week in recognition of his substantial accomplishments since he's been here, all of the vice presidents of Brookings met and unanimously and enthusiastically promoted him to senior fellow. I think that's just one sort of tribute to the quality of work that Tom has been doing. And, now, he's written what I think is going to be an essential book, one that will stand as the first major account of the new geopolitics.

As his first chapter lays out, the return of this competition, geopolitical competition, is sort of sweeping away some of the assumptions that we've carried with us since the first phase of the post-Cold War era, and the kind of first blush of post-G20 enthusiasm; a rising China is shifting dynamics in the Asian Pacific; an illiberal and populist wave in Europe, together with an expansionist Russia, is challenging the European project. We've seen the collapse of order in the Middle East that continues to undermine the peace and prosperity in the region, as well as having enormous human costs, and spilling over beyond its borders.

And Tom's book looks at each of these troubling trends against the backdrop - and this is for me the really critical part -- against the backdrop of an increasingly globalized economic world -- and begins to lay out, I think, for the first time, what geopolitical competition, including
militarized geopolitical competition is going to look like in a context of continuing economic integration and globalization. He'll expand on that, looking at how it is that globalization is shaping how the great powers will compete, placing a premium on tools like cyber warfare, economic warfare, coercive diplomacy, and other measures short of war; hence, the title of the book.

I think it's going to be a must read for those interested in the future of American grand strategy, and it's certainly the forefront of our work here on the new geopolitics. So, we'll look forward to hearing from Tom and after that Susan Glasser from Politico. Thank you, Susan, for doing this -- is going to chair our panel where we'll have a discussion about the themes, and our own Bob Kagan and Ambassador Gerard Araud -- thank you for coming back -- will join Susan on stage to grill Tom about his findings. So Tom, over to you.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Bruce, for that very kind introduction. I don't remember winning that argument, actually, back in Princeton many years ago, but thanks for revising history in my favor; and thank you to Susan, and to the Ambassador, and to Bob for joining us on the panel today; and to all of you, for coming.

I'm not the first person to predict the end of the post-Cold War order or the postwar order. Some people thought it would end with a bang, others with a whimper. I don't know of anyone who thought it would end with a tweet, but that's probably where we are today. But I'm just going to talk for a few minutes -- just about 10 minutes or so -- just about the book and then we'll get to the discussion; because, really, what I argue in the book is that we've come to sort of the end 20-year period after the Cold War, which was sort of an age of convergence in which the assumption was that all of the major powers in the world essentially saw things the same way, on the same trajectory, toward the single model of liberal international order.

This wasn't sort of the end of history idea that Francis Fukuyama put forward. It was really, you know, recognize that some countries wouldn't be democratic; they'd remain authoritarian, there'd be different stages in history; but that they would all sort of see the things they had in common as more important than the things that divided them; that they'd have common challenges, like climate change, pandemic disease, terrorism, managing the global economy; that they would cooperate in
pursuit of realizing their interests and objectives, and on those particular problems and that they
wouldn't really balance against each other. What political scientist sort of call, balancing, where one
country would organize to stymie or prevent another from achieving its objectives; and this 20-year
period was really unique because we have the absence of a geopolitical competition for the first time
really since the Peace of Westphalia.

There were plenty of moments where the major powers had problems and crises; but
those problems and crises were always quite limited. So, when the United States invaded Iraq in
2003, Russia and many other countries objected; but Russia didn't send troops to aid Saddam
Hussein; it didn't intervene in the Iraq War, militarily. It confined itself to diplomatic disagreements,
quite a stark contrast with today in Syria when Russia disagreed with what the United States was
doing and sent troops into Syria and backed Assad. So, we're seeing, I think, the return of real
geopolitical competition. And I think this has happened because some of the key pillars of
international order since the Cold War have sort of fallen apart. The thing that was upholding
convergence, I think, more than anything else was the disparity in power between the United States
and the other major powers, the sort of so-called "era of unipolarity." It just didn't make a lot of sense
for countries to balance against the U.S. Well, that gap has narrowed.

There was also the notion that the international order was actually providing for
people, that it was helping countries achieve their objectives and globalization with a pathway to peace
and prosperity; but after 2008 and 2009, that's a harder case to make. In the Middle East, both Bush
and Obama, in very different ways, believed that that part of the world was progressing toward a more
positive future. Bush believed it would happen through the use of force and a more assertive foreign
policy; Obama believe it would happen through indigenous change and the power of example. But
both of those assumptions really fell apart after the failure of the Arab awakening.

And, so, I think, starting with the financial crisis, but really through 2012 with the return
of Putin and the arrival of Xi Jinping, we've really seen sort of a fundamental change; and the question
is, I think, what follows next? What sort of is going to be our next sort of 10 or 20 years as we see a
China and Russia that are, I think, rebelling against the international order in their respective regions?
As we see in the Middle East, that's essentially in free-fall or unraveling; a global economy that isn't working that appears to be more crisis-prone; and the return of competition across all spheres, really -- ideological competition between democracies and authoritarian regime; military competition; and diplomatic competition. So, what is this sort of different world? So, I just want to make five very brief points about what type of world I think we're headed into.

As we look at the different choices that people make and leaders make, and governments make, we can get down into the sort of details about each policy choice; but I think, overall, foreign policy is actually about choosing between two different types of worlds because there are two different models of international order that's on offer. The first is some sort of version of the order that we had in the past, some version of the liberal international order. It may be a little bit different than what we had before -- India may play a greater role, other democracies may play a greater role -- but it will inherently be recognizable to us. It will be open, it'll be an open global economy that promotes trade; it will be broadly stable geopolitically; borders will pretty much remain intact; and there will continue to be international norms, and international institutions; that's sort of a familiar order, I think, that we could have over the next couple of decades.

But the second is a spheres of influence model and that tends to be more nationalist, more mercantilist. Russia plays a much greater role in Eastern Europe and is sort of the preeminent power in its near abroad because it's established a greater sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union, and maybe even further afield. In East Asia, China shares power with the United States, and has control, really, of the western part of the Western Pacific, and the region begins to organize more around the Chinese economy rather than on a relationship with the United States.

That these two different worlds, I think, are very fundamentally different, and they have very different dynamics. Russia and China, I think, are proactively trying to establish a spheres of influence order in very different ways; but, I think, the objective is similar. In Eastern Europe, Russia is a declining power in many ways, but it has increasingly deployable military power and it's using its hard power and its increased will to try to change borders, as we saw in Ukraine, potentially, elsewhere; and it wants to, I think, fundamentally, weaken the EU and NATO because it sees them as
a threat, not military -- you know, the military threat in Europe has actually declined considerably for Russia -- but it fears color revolutions; it sees the liberal order as essentially promoting regime change in Russia through the power of example; and that's something, and that it cannot tolerate. And so, it's interacting with these other existing crises in Europe -- and I named four others in the book, the Euro crisis, the refugee crisis, the Trump crisis, I think, in transatlantic relations, and Brexit -- all of which are coming together to create this negative synergy in that part of the world that plays into Putin's hands.

So, that's what Russia, I think, is up to in Europe; and then in China, you have a very different story. China is a rising power; it has a stake in the global economy; it wants to see a strong international economic order, in some ways a strong international political order; but in its region, it has considerable ambition and it wants to push that U.S. alliance system to the margins and replace it with something else, something in which it has more of a tributary system in line with it's past.

So, I think, that's what the sort of choice are, that's what the dynamics are. It is a regional competition at its heart; and some people say, you know, that means that it's not such a big deal because it's really all about the global. So, if China wants a strong global order but wants changes in its region, surely that doesn't matter too much. But one of the cases I make in the book is that, actually, that's really -- we should be really concerned about that because ultimately the global order rests on healthy regional orders more than it rests on the UN, or the IMF, and the World Bank. It's much more important -- as important as those institutions are -- it's much more important what countries do about borders and respect for the sovereignty of other nations in their near abroad than it does whether or not they fight over voting weights at the IMF, or other institutions. And so, when we look in the past about how orders unravel, they almost always unravel regionally first, and then globally. So, I think, the challenge we face is pretty significant.

The second point is that as countries sort of go about this competition, including the U.S., I think, they don't want to fight each other. You know, they don't want to fight a general war with each other. Russia doesn't intend to fight the United States directly, and China doesn't either; and the United States, I think, has no interest in doing the same to either of those nations. But they are, I think, competing -- and this is where the title of the book comes from -- with all measures short of war.
That they’re using cyber war, and economic war, coercive diplomacy, and lots of other different types of tools and methods to try to promote their interests; and they’re trying to go right up to that threshold of major conflict, or maybe a little bit short of it, to achieve their objectives.

As they do this, they’re using this 20-year period of integration where we all became closer; we all integrated our financial systems, our communications systems. They’re seeing that as providing vulnerabilities and strategic opportunities; and so, they’re pushing the envelope to try to exploit that. The country that arguably pioneered this really was the United States. I mean, the U.S., when faced with the threat from Russia and Eastern Europe used Russia’s reliance on the global economy and the international financial system as a weapon to try to punish Russia for its strategic actions.

Those countries, Russia, but also China, I think, have been trying to hedge against that by de-globalizing on the Russian side, in particular, from the global economy to protect their autonomy and protect their sovereignty. They have responded also, though, in kind on the cyber front where the U.S. is very reliant on these shared systems, and is very vulnerable itself; and so, the actions that Russia took last year, I think, were no accident. They were really part of this ongoing geopolitical competition where Russia tried to exploit Western vulnerability in the same way that the West tried to exploit Russian vulnerability on the global order.

This competition will play out in many different ways, and we can talk, I'm sure, in the panel about the South China Sea or Ukraine; but, one thing I think we need to keep in mind as we look at international cooperation, or climate, or anything else, is that it makes everything more difficult. I'm not saying that this is the only thing that's happening in the world. There are many things that are happening -- climate, counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation -- but the context for it, I think, is becoming much less permissive, because when you have geopolitical competition between major powers, it makes all types of cooperation more difficult. One very simple example in the book is that when the first Malaysian Airlines [plane] went missing, that the countries in the region couldn't share their data, and couldn't share the information that they had because they worried that it would be exploited by other countries for strategic reasons in the future, and that's a very simple case where all
countries basically shared the same objective; but that's likely to play out -- on the proliferation side, on the counter-terrorism side, on the global economy side -- very differently in the future. Imagine a financial crisis in Asia where you're required cooperation between the United States and China, and Japan. Would they all be focused on the same objective of stopping the crisis, or would they be looking for their own advantage?

And the final point is just on what this means for the U.S. I try to spend a lot of time in the book on the strategic choice that the U.S. has; and I think we do need to sort of look at the actual options and strategies that are available. This is often framed in a financial way, you know, that there should be more money spent on defense; or Europeans should pay more; or Asian countries should do more; but, actually, I think that it's really a strategic problem, not a resource problem. Things may be made easier if we 10 percent or 20 percent more resources, but it wouldn't solve the strategic dilemmas in the Middle East; it wouldn't solve the strategic dilemmas in Asia, or in Europe. Those would all remain intact; and so, I think, we do need to look at that.

I identify three sort of strategic problems that I think the United States needs to deal with -- that any strategy has to deal with. That's the return of revisionist powers, particularly in Russia and China, but potentially elsewhere too. The unraveling of the Middle East where the dilemmas is do you sort of engage to stop the contagion at the risk of being dragged into future conflicts there, or do you pull back, and what the trade-off is between those two; and the third, is how to build liberal order in an increasingly nationalist and populist world where there's less domestic support to promote a healthy global economy or to promote international cooperation.

So, I distinguish between two sort of broad types of strategies in the book. One is sort of a strategy of restraint or sort of pulling back in some way trying to define America's interests in more normal terms, like a normal power. Looking at sort of narrow interest in terms of territorial defense, or surrounding oceans, or trade routes -- looking very specifically, what are American's specific interests in the Middle East -- and, I think, in very, very, very different ways both Presidents Trump and Obama fall into that category, of trying to figure out a way to limit America's exposure to the international order. I think that in the long run, those types of strategies select for accommodating a spheres of influence
order. That they tend to pull back from the proactive role that the U.S. has had in promoting regional equilibriums in the key regions strategically of the world.

The second strategy which I make a case for in the book is something I call responsible competition, which is how to compete to try to preserve this liberal international order -- maybe reformed and renovated in certain ways in the 21st Century. And I'll just mention a couple of the things that I propose in closing. The first is to really accept that we are in a more competitive age, but to do so in a responsible way. To promote not sort of narrow national interest, but a certain type of broader sense of the national interest about an order that would work to the benefit of all nations because, I think, one key strategic asset that the United States has had is that the way the U.S. has defined its interest tends to be more compatible with how most countries in the world define their interests compared to hegemons or leaders of the past. Not always perfectly, and there's plenty of hypocrisy and insistency, but, I think, it does sort of trend in that direction. So recognizing the competitive nature, I think, of the international order, and that as more important, possibly, than some of the things that we looked at in the past, like convergence, is, I think, key to having a successful national security strategy.

The second thing is as we look at the competition between Russia and China, not to sort of focus on tit-for-tat retaliation -- you know, China's built this island, how do you sort of impose cost for building that island; or Russia has a certain part of Eastern Ukraine -- but to think of it more holistically about how do you deny the overall strategic objective of countries that have revisionist aims. So, it may be China builds certain islands in the South China Sea, but there are things that can be done to ensure that the South China Sea remains open to commerce and is not controlled, essentially, by China even if they have engaged in those activities.

The third thing is to have a little bit of a different attitude, I think, on burden sharing. I think this was overdone by President Obama, and by President Trump; and the emphasis, I think, is understandable on the two percent number in Europe; but I think it's overly-simplistic and really ignores the role that these countries play in upholding the international order.

And the final thing really is to look at how to preserve the liberal nature of -- and I
mean that in the classical sort of sense, rather than in a partisan sense -- of the international order because of the way in which I think that can help solve some of the common problems over the long run and to preserve cooperation with Russia and China in areas of common interests, even as there is an overall competition.

So, I hope that's a fruitful way to start our conversation. I look forward to your comments and questions. Thank you, very much.

MS. GLASSER: Well, thank you. Congratulations, Tom; and thank you to everybody here. I see we have a full house. Thank you to Brookings and to our panelists. We have Bob Kagan, and Ambassador Gérard Araud, and a lot to talk about. So, I was struck, as I'm sure a lot of people here were, that you very definitely -- you mentioned tweeting -- but more or less you managed to get through, you know, a really brilliant 20 minute conversation and not really deal so much with our present challenges, as it were. But, really, I have to say like it's an incredible feat in this, you know, sort of every 10 seconds there's something new happening age to be able to sustain a conversation about the world looks like 10 or 20 years down the road. So, I thought I would start out both with a question for you Tom, and also for the other panelists to bring them in, I did a conversation with our maximum leader Strobe Talbott for the [Global Politico] podcast this week, and he quoted a recent visit from a high level Asian diplomat, here to Brookings; and he said that this gentleman basically said, look, I'm sorry to say it, but right now, Washington, D.C. is the epicenter of global instability.

Yeah, it was a blunt statement; so, first of all, I guess I would like to see what everybody thinks about that statement, whether it's really true; and also just to challenge you a little bit. How does -- if you accept that or don't accept that -- how does this moment that we're experiencing of political change here, uncertainty around American foreign policy affect or not affect the broader, longer-term trends that you identify toward a world of much more competition; a world of much more overall uncertainty. So, let's jump in with that. Are we living of the epicenter of global political instability right here -- Brookings, Massachusetts Avenue?

MR. WRIGHT: Firstly, thank you. You know, I finished the book sort of just before November 8th, and I had a deal with the publisher that I could rewrite parts of it if the election turned
out in a certain way, but no one really expected that so they had their plan, and afterwards, you know, I took a look at it and I was like do I need to change all of this or not? I thought I would have to change more because what I realized was that the essential argument of the book is that the U.S., the world, is becoming more nationalistic, more competitive, more zero-sum; and I assumed, I guess, before the election that the U.S. would be pushing back against that; that the U.S. would be trying to uphold this order, and I didn't really understand the extent to which it could be consumed by that or actually were being enveloped by some of those forces. And, you know, I was always going to write the conclusion and the prologue after the elections, so I tried to address it there; but, I think, in some ways it shows that those forces are even stronger, you know, than I'd originally anticipated; and since the U.S. is so crucial, I think, in upholding the order and the role it's played -- the very unusual role that Bob has written so elegantly about -- over the last 70 years, I do agree, I guess, with our Asian diplomatic friend that the instability is emanating from here. I mean, it's amazing that in the first few months of this administration, that there's been no real external crises with the exception of a small, I think, relatively small crisis in Syria and an ongoing problem in North Korea; but there's been nothing external, it's all being internally generated, and the world is sort of watching very closely every day to see what comes out on Twitter or elsewhere. So, I think, that will continue for some time; but the big question I'm trying to figure out is will there be an external event and how that will interact with this internal instability.

MS. GLASSER: So, Bob, are we at the epicenter here?

MR. KAGAN: Well, sure; and for all the reasons that Tom outlines. The only thing I would say and, I mean, Trump is a unique person, and he's a unique president, but on foreign policy he's not as unique as we might like to believe. I think that the trend in the United States for some time since the end of the Cold War has been toward less and less tolerance for the rather usual global role that the United States played after World War II and throughout the Cold War. I think, you know, you could see it at the end of the first Bush Administration in '92 when he sort of had to run away from foreign policy. Bill Clinton said he was going to focus on the economy. George W. Bush said that America was overextended in the world, ironically in retrospect.

But this has been the trend, and I would say that the culmination of that trend was not
Trump but the Obama Administration. Where I think that President Obama because of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Financial Crisis felt that he'd been elected to reduce America's role in the world; and that he was going to do that; and he really, I think, was very faithful to that mission; and Trump is just this sort of crasser, nastier version of where we've been heading for some time; and, I think, the consensus that existed during the Cold War has broken down. And if -- this is the last comment -- if you look at the last election, the four most significant characters in American politics last year were Barak Obama, Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, and Bernie Sanders -- three of those, I think, agreed that America was too involved in the world. Only one of those was selling indispensable nation. I would say selling it sotto voce because it wasn't, particularly, a popular view to take.

So, I think, we're dealing with something much more like a secular problem than a particular Donald Trump problem. The particular Donald Trump problems exist in other areas which we're not talking about today.

MS. GLASSER: What do you think?

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: First, thank you very much. First, a disclaimer, I'm not expressing the position of my country. I'm here as a professional diplomat discussing this book. And I do agree with, you know, really with just what have been said. You are being too much obsessed right now by what is happening within the beltway. So, by, you know, I beg you for once to try to have a long-term vision. You know, like let's forget the tweets, let's forget, you know, the front pages of the newspapers, and let's have a look at what is happening in the world. You know, really, and in a sense what is happening in Washington right now is not that important. I'm really sorry to disturb you.

Really, we are living right now; we are living something which is exceptional and, I think, the quality of the book of Tom is trying to face it frankly. You know, first when people speak about liberal world order, I think, frankly, it's a nice way of saying American world order, or Western world order, if you want. You know, I was the permanent representative to the United Nations and I can tell you that people there, you know, the representatives of the 192 countries, or rather 191 countries there, you know, didn't see it as the liberal order, most of them, but as an American dominated order. And the question that we can raise, actually we can ask Tom, is really do you think
that it's coming back, the great power, really competition is coming back or maybe it has always been there. You know, really, basically, we had the Cold War where we had, obviously, the Soviet Union and the U.S. dominating their own camp. Really, after that you had, as you said, this unipolar moment when the Americans were so powerful that nobody felt, no country felt, powerful enough really in a sense to compete against the U.S. and, basically, what we are seeing now is simply that countries feel they have the means to balance against the U.S. So, in a sense, is it really a new period or is it simply the fact that the balance of power between other countries has changed and that suddenly the U.S., and they say it, the Western countries with the U.S., suddenly we feel that our hegemony, you know, is basically is contested by other countries.

MS. GLASSER: Well, this is a good question for Tom to answer; and also I would like to ask Bob sort of a corollary to this, which is can you ever think of any example where it's not so much that the United States has lost power as much as, arguablly, its walked away from playing this role in the world. (Laughter)

But I want to ask you before we go back to them. Is France, is Europe prepared to step in and to play the role that the United States has been playing on European defense, for example? We may criticize President Trump's sort of manner of delivery, but there is a critique which would suggest that the United States has played the role of hegemon in Europe because Europeans have been unwilling or unable to do so?

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: That's a very American question. (Laughter)

MS. GLASSER: Forgive me.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: You know, actually, if we all obliged to do it, we will do it. You know, we have been around for 1,000 years, so we know what the world is. So, if we feel that we need, actually, as you said, to step in -- we have not the impression that we have stepped out, but if you think -- we will do it. You know, we have defended ourselves, really for the worst and for the best, for 1,000 years.

So, again, you know, the fact is if the U.S. has really been so active in Western Europe since 1945 -- I think it's very important to know this -- that until 1945 the U.S. didn't want to
have a European policy. You know, really, in 1914, in 1939, you declared your neutrality; in 1937, you voted law of neutrality, the object of which was to deprive the French and the British from buying your weapons; I do remember.

On the 14th of June 1940, the Prime Minister of France sent a letter to FDR to say we are sinking, we are defeated, we are the democracies, please help us. So, you decided not to come. You went in 1945, why, because really, why, because Britain and France couldn't do the job because we were exhausted, and because there was the USSR; so, it was a global fight. So, in a sense the real conversation we should have had would have been in 1990 or 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. In a sense, we should have this conversation between Europeans and Americans saying, why; why are you in, really, why do you stay? And we didn't have this conversation because of the Balkans, because of the Clinton Administration, which was an internationalist administration, and after that there was Afghanistan and 9/11. So, maybe, actually, we are at the point that we have this conversation and I do agree with, really, what Bob said. Actually, this conversation has not started with Donald Trump; it has started also with Barack Hussein Obama. You know, really, by the way, you know, basically, his restraint, in willing to be polite, in his policy towards Europe. You know, so, only again, we are in a new world.

MS. GLASSER: Okay. There's a lot to unpack there. Tom, I'm going to give you a chance to jump in. I would note that this is the 70th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, and that seemed sort of relevant to the question of whether this is sort of the final end of that postwar period that we're (inaudible). What do you think, Tom?

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah, no, I don't really disagree with what the Ambassador said. I mean I do, I think, agree that geopolitical competition didn't really ever go away, it was that it was massively imbalanced in favor of Western countries, and that shift in the balance of power, I think, did result in the shift in behavior. I don't think it was necessarily inevitable. I mean, I do think that the individuals involved matter. I mean, if [Dmitry] Medvedev had stayed president of Russia, there would be lots of problems between the U.S. and Russia, but, I think, the Russian behavior would be somewhat different; and I think if the Chinese leadership had turned out a little bit differently, that might
be somewhat less tense as well. So, I think, all of these things are involved; but I do think that we are at sort of a critical point for whatever reason, however we got here, that the period we’re in now is, I think, substantially different to the mid-2000s or the mid-1990s. And, you know – Bob, I guess, you know, I learned sort of this point from him; he’d probably express much better than me -- but that period is really the aberration in international history and, so, what we’re seeing is the return of that normal system.

The case I try to make in the book is that normality will be very different and have lots of twists because it is taking place against the backdrop of globalization and interdependence. So, we’re not returning to the 19th Century or the 18th Century because we do live in the world that we created; and so, this period of greater tension between the major powers will have lots of uniquely 21st Century characteristics; and, I think, we aren’t going to see maybe the prospect of a major war like we did in the past -- and thank heavens for that -- but there will be many, many ways in which those old impulses -- that we really are not used to, I think, for quite some time -- will come back into focus.

MS. GLASSER: Bob, is this really a return? Okay, couple of questions. Is this really a return to something like status quo ante when it comes to kind of regionally-based great power competition? Is it sort of a restoration of regular order when it comes to the relative power of the United States to these other powers; or are we headed towards something that’s really substantially different in terms of international relations?

MR. KAGAN: Well, I think that when the United States started playing the role that it did play after World War II, which it did not play in the 50 years before that, we really entered a historically unique situation; and it’s unique if only for geographical reasons. It’s very -- no other power could play the role the United States has played just because it’s a very powerful, rich country that is surrounded by relatively weak neighbors -- with all due respect to Canada and Mexico -- and two oceans; and, therefore, unlike other powers, it sort of broke what international relations theory would call the sort of the rule of sort of strategic dilemmas and whatnot. It was actually able to become very powerful without immediately threatening its neighbors; and this gave it a tremendous capacity to actually project its power overseas and bring a sort of peaceful solution to regions that were sort of
end-locked in a cycle of conflict without, in a way, threatening to take them over. It was very hard for a European power to bring a reasonable peace with its power because its very power created the danger for neighbors.

So, in that respect alone, we’ve entered a totally different territory and past models don’t really cover it. So, to my mind, the question is really does the United States continued to play that role, or does it return to a role that is more like the role it played in the 20s and 30s, which is to have a more restricted view of its purview and responsibilities and let the regions go back to whatever they’re going to be. Now, I feel pretty confident that if Asia goes back to what Asia was, you really are back into, at the very least, a Chinese-Japanese syndrome which is likely, in my view, ultimately to lead to conflict in one way or another.

It’s much harder to predict where Europe goes if the U.S. pulls out; but I could imagine returning to some variation of what used to be called the “German problem.” Just because Germany, without any kind of American involvement, is sort of as it was, too big, too rich, too powerful for Europe and will create tensions, even if the Germans, themselves, don’t want it with their neighbors. So, I think, that is the key question.

I actually do not agree that America has lost sufficient relative power compared to Russia and China to be unable to play the role it’s been playing, just because its geostrategic advantages are so enormous. China cannot become more powerful without threatening its neighbors, who happen themselves to be very powerful. China’s surrounded by great powers. There is no equivalent of Germany right now. Russia is a third-rate power, which doesn’t mean it can’t make a lot of trouble, but it’s not about, as long as the United States is in the game, to sort of march across Europe. So, I think, the situation is manageable, but the real question is are we willing to manage it -- we Americans? Unfortunately, that's the key issue, and my concern is that increasingly we are not willing; we don't understand why it's necessary; and, therefore, we're kind of willing to let the world spin off in whatever direction it's going to spin off in -- but that’s a bad direction.

MS. GLASSER: Well that goes back to, I think, my next two questions. One, which is, is that the part of this equation where who is in the White House matters; and, you know, where you
get back to agency as opposed to the Ambassador's point of view which seems to be more that we're really looking at such macro trends that it's maybe a variation of degree but that, in fact, these are long-term strategic shifts in the world that are primarily fueled, you know, by economics as well as geopolitics and, therefore, you know, it doesn't really matter so dramatically whether we're paying attention to Donald Trump tweets today?

So, that's one question for you. Is that where American agency or, you know, sort of the great man or woman theory of things comes back into Tom's book?

MR. KAGAN: Well, I mean, obviously, history is interaction between individuals in important positions and larger trends. So, my view is if you would have elected Hillary Clinton, or half-a-dozen other republicans who were running, it was more likely that instead of sort of going along with this trend that America has been on, they might push back on it a little bit. I mean presidents do push back. Franklin Roosevelt didn't push back in his first term; he did push back in his second term against an American attitude. So, that was a possibility. So, instead of having that, you have someone who's encouraging the trend even more than it is, which doesn't mean there can't be a backlash. But I do think we have to recognize and not kid ourselves that the American public has been moving in the direction pretty steadily -- and I don't care what the polls say. You just have to look at the way Congress behaves. Congressmen think they know what the American people want, and they don't think the American people want more military spending, more global involvement, etc. etc. So, that is a trend that would need to be arrested and reversed, and that would take very significant leadership which now we are not going to have for the next four years.

MS. GLASSER: I want to probe into this question embedded in the title, all measures short of war. How much, Ambassador Araud, do you agree with the premise that this new era will be characterized by a very aggressive competition between states but it's not going to be a period of actual conflict between these powers? Do you think we're at risk for something more than Tom has --

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: You know, if you had the -- I think it was in January 1914, Sir Edward Grey, the secretary of the Foreign Office in London, said that really we have entered into a period of peace; and nobody, you know, could really think that the assassination of, an obscure crown
prince, with all due respect to Austria-Hungary, which is not represented here anymore. Nobody was believing that it could lead to a world war. So, the problem usually is nobody wants war, or it's really rarely. Usually people don't want war, and suddenly they stumble into war.

So, you know, if you look at the South China Sea, you know, you could think of an incident and so on. So, again, I agree, I do agree with Tom. Actually, I don't think that countries right now want war, but incidents may happen. Really, it's a -- if I may ask, you know, really in sort of a follow up and based on this book -- you know, really, I think we had nearly this discussion for Twitter with Tom when I was really reading the book, I was sending my comments to Tom; and basically -- and by the way, I was just browsing through [Hans] Morgenthau, the Morgenthau book, you know, *Conflict Among Nations* -- no, *Politics Among Nations* -- and Morgenthau really says there are three types of powers. One is the status-quo power; the second one is, in a sense, the revisionist power; and the third one is the imperialist power. The difference between the two latter, is that the first one doesn't want to destroy the world order, but wants, simply to have, you know, really a better position in the order. And the last one, the third one, wants to destroy the order.

In a sense, you are speaking in your book only of the revisionist power and status-quo power. It's not only a question of taxidermy; it's really a substantial question because if you have a country in front of you, if it wants to destroy the power, the world order, really, you have to have a containment policy. But if it simply considers that it wants to improve the situation, and what does it mean. What should you do? You know, really, as you know, for instance the British made the mistake of considering that, basically, Adolph Hitler wanted only to improve a situation; why he wanted to destroy the order; but it leads to a different position; and, frankly, when you are referring to the two main countries that you were referring to, Russia and China, this question has some, really has a significance and may have, actually, consequence in the definition of policy.

MS. GLASSER: That is a much better way of phrasing the question. You have to tell us again, sir.

MR. WRIGHT: I mean well, the first thing on the all measures short of war point because I do just want to briefly address that. I mean, that phrase -- one of its sources is FDR in the
30s who pursued all measures short of war against Germany, and war happened; and it's also the title of an essay, a famous lecture by George Kennan in the Cold War and, obviously, war almost happened in the Cold War. So, I'm not saying that war will not happen, and I'm sort of, you know, conscience that Sir Edward Grey said that, but there was also this famous book just on the eve of World War I by Norman Angell saying war was impossible. So, you know, I was a little worried when Donald Trump started his North Korea adventures that the title may be discredited before it was even launched.

But, you know, war could happen inadvertently or through miscalculation. The point I was really trying to make though is that the primary strategic challenge we face is not so much avoiding great power war, which is always there in the background and, I think, is being worked on to prevent it and, I think, everyone's conscience about it – it's really whether and how to engage in this competition on all these other dimensions that we don't have great answers to.

I agree, as well, I think, with your characterization of the three different types. I think that Russia and China both, actually, are not revolutionary, imperialist powers in the sense that they have the capacity and ability to completely overturn the international order. I think their aims are more limited; but if they achieve their aims in the most extreme form that they have them, I think that will create a less hospitable world. That will create a more dangerous world. If you look at China, for instance, you know, there are things it wants that are perfectly legitimate. I think the international economic agenda that it has is perfectly legitimate. We may disagree on certain things, but actually, it's a very reasonable disagreement and they are perfectly entitled to pursue the things they're pursuing, and to its west on the One Belt, One Road, and Central Asia, you know, many of its interests are very compatible with those of the U.S. and with its neighbors.

The question really is as it tries to assert its dominance over parts of East Asia that, that is, as Bob said, bumps up against these other major countries and creates less stable situations; and Russia, I think, it's different, but there's sort of a similar dynamic. So, these may be limited objectives, but the case I'm making is that it's still worth competing strategically to try to preserve that more rules-based system because, you know, if you look at what both Russia and China want in
Europe and East Asia, respectfully, it is sort of a quasi-imperialist system. You know, in which a lot of those smaller countries don't really have the voice that they have at the moment, but it's more mercantilist, less open, and I think it's worth thinking strategically about how to preserve some version of the status quo with necessary amendments and reforms, you know, to ensure that it continues to be legitimate.

MS. GLASSER: So, Bob, do you share the view of Russia and China as revisionist powers, or do you think there's something more going on there?

MR. KAGAN: I think I share the view that they're revisionist powers, but I don't take any comfort from that. I mean, you could argue that Germany in 1914 was a revisionist power, not an imperialist power; I'm not sure the French really thought that distinction was important, ultimately; and because whatever revision they were carrying out required the most disastrous and destructive war in history. So, it almost doesn't matter; and I do agree with Tom that were China to succeed in a limited goal of revising the security order in East Asia, whether that was their, you know, whatever their long-term goal was, the actual effect of that would be to destroy the international order as it currently exists, and move us toward a more genuinely multipolar world which I think will be inherently more dangerous than the present world. So, it doesn't really matter. And so, the real challenge for us is to somehow direct China in what we would call a more productive form of national aggrandizement which takes economic form rather than military form; but that's going to be a major challenge and I'm not sure we can succeed at it. The only thing else -- I would hesitate to say that nations generally only stumble into war. I think mostly you get wars because ultimately a nation decides that they prefer war to the alternative.

There's no question that Germany, in 1914, preferred war to the alternative, and in that respect they wanted to get what they wanted without war, but they were not willing to not get what they wanted; and so, they were willing to go to war. And I don't think that's where China is right this second, but I could imagine China getting to that point, at least, I think it would be foolish for us not to imagine China getting to that point, and preparing to deter it under those circumstances. And a lot of it -- I'm going to stop yammering now -- but a lot of it has to do with what the sort of distant balancing...
power does.

In the case of World War I, I believe that if Britain had made it very clear to [Kaiser] Wilhelm and the people around him that it was definitely coming into the war if they attack Belgium and France. I think it's quite possible that Wilhelm would have not gone to war. He really was banking on the British not coming in; and, therefore, I think it's very important if the analogy holds, that the United States make it very clear that it will, in fact, come to the defense of those that might be threatened; and, unfortunately, that is precisely the question that's being raised right now by his actions and statements, or non-statements, as the case may be, of Donald Trump.

MS. GLASSER: So it does matter what's happening here, right now?

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: I want to be the devil's advocate, as usual -- you know, I'm French. (Laughter) Actually, you know, very often I say, really I tell my young diplomats put -- using a sentence expression, put yourself in the shoes of the other side. And, you know, really try to imagine if you had Chinese ships patrolling at one hundred miles from the American coast, what would be the reaction of the Americans? There is something, you know, really -- and the fact that in a sense the basic assumption is on this that the world role of the U.S. is legitimate. It's totally legitimate that, for instance, you know, you are patrolling on the coast, not far from the coast of China -- but if you are Chinese, you know, really and if after one century of humiliation, you are becoming the second world power and if you look at your borders and you see that most of your borders, actually, are really problematic in a way, or in another, and really don't you think that really if you were the Chinese you wouldn't more or less do the same, try to secure your sealanes, for instance, you know, really. And as for the Russians, really, we are a member of NATO, and NATO is the most great -- greatest alliance -- in the world and, of course, it's defensive. You know, any alliance is defensive for the members and offensive for the non-members. You have to really -- try to imagine if Mexico and the Central Americans countries were part of an alliance with Russia. If there was a headquarters in Mexico City, really, with a Russian general, and everybody saying to the U.S., it's defensive; don't worry. What would be the reaction of the U.S.? So, in a sense, you know, in this new world of where, basically, you're right, the U.S. will be the dominant power for the coming decades really by far; but,
nevertheless, there is really a different balance of power which is less favorable to the U.S. and to the West. I think these questions, you know, really have to be raised. You know, really saying what the Chinese -- you know, basically, we are living in Asia, one of these very sensitive periods in the history of the world, which is an adjustment of power. Basically, China was a weak country and is becoming in a few decades the second world power.

MR. KAGAN: What's new, Mr. Ambassador? This is what the whole history of the world is about.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: Yes; adjustment.

MR. KAGAN: Justice, there is no justice in the international system.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: Ah, really?

MR. KAGAN: Germany, in 1914, felt that it was being deprived -- it called itself a "have-not nation" -- and felt that it was being deprived of all kinds of advantages, including empire, which France had; that it had somehow not been allowed to have. Germany in 1938, was trying to repair what clearly were -- it regarded as wrongs committed in the Versailles Treaty that took German lands at French insistence away from Germany -- you think the Germans didn't have, feel that they had a right to reoccupy their own territory in the Rhineland, okay. These kinds of problems exist constantly and the only thing you can do once you realize they have these beefs, which, of course, every nation in the world except the United States has a legitimate beef -- I mean that seriously, the United States has no legitimate beef with anybody, but everybody else in the world does. So, having recognized that what do you then do about it is the question.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: The question is (inaudible), short of war.

MR. KAGAN: Do you want to -- should we hand China --

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: No.

MR. KAGAN: -- the East Asia that it feels it deserves?

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: I've never said that.

MR. KAGAN: Well, then, what's the point of making the point you're making?

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: No, really; I'm making the point, there is a point. First, I'm
making the point that there is a point from the Chinese point of view --

MR. KAGAN: Of course.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: -- and after that, again; and the second point I'm making is, of course, you know, you can let the situation, you know, really go into the conflict; you can choose containment saying to the Chinese “whatever you are going to lift a finger we will be in front of you to prevent you from doing it”; or I'm asking the question, is it possible to manage it in an intelligent way? Because all the story of mankind, as you said, is adjustment of powers. The powers, there is no status-quo. There is powers going up and going down; and at this very delicate moments, we have to find a management of the foreign relations so that it doesn't entail a war. It's simply the question that I'm asking. We have a major adjustment of power, a major one. You know, China was a very, very weak country in 1970, and now is the second world power. You know, really, so we know that's a delicate moment, and I was simply saying, how can we manage it intelligently.

MS. GLASSER: Okay. So, moderator’s prerogative; we have Mars and Venus here. (Laughter) So, Bob, we'll come back to your book on this subject; but I want to ask our author here to square the circle for us. You know, is this, in fact, a case study of what happens when the old order unravels and you have people re-evaluating first principles, right? You have now everything in effect up to be litigated including the role that the United States should and should not play in this future world order.

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah, it's great to be in the middle here. (Laughter) You know, I do think, I mean I think that China has a legitimate gripe; and I think, you know, in the book I try to say it's not a question of right or wrong necessarily, I mean the U.S. was a revisionist power in the past, in the 19th Century. Revisionism comes in many forms. It can be good or bad depending on your perspective; but the net effect of what they're trying to do, I think, does have negative consequences, you know, objectively, for the world, you know, as a whole. So, for instance, you know, if they do want a sphere of influence in East Asia, if that means, you know, know that Taiwan, you know, has to be forcibly incorporated into China. That's a pretty big deal. If Russia's sphere of influence in Europe means that Ukraine ceases to exist or Baltic ceases to exist that's of major consequence too; and so
the question, I think, is how do you approach that? Do you try to accommodate it or do you push back? The answer I would give is that you accommodate on those things that you think are pretty legitimate, and so to the extent that China wants a much greater say in the global economy, you know, that's a legitimate goal; or that they want a greater say in regional security architecture, if it continues to respect the sovereignty of nations, that's fine too; but when it comes to this sovereignty of other countries or fundamental territory issues, I think it's reasonable to push back, because if you don't push back in that context then you, essentially, give a permission slip for future behavior. And, you know, again I think Bob has written about this more than I have in terms of influencing that debate, but there is a historical record that sort of suggests that when hardliners think they have, you know, an open goal, they push forward; and when they think that there's sort of a strong system in place to prevent that, they push back. We haven't really tested that proposition yet, but I think it will be put to the test in the coming years.

MS. GLASSER: Bob, I want to bring everyone in with your own questions, but, first, is this an old argument with Europe? Is this a return to our debates in the past or is this a reflection of the unraveling of the order and some kind of new geostrategic debate, or what have you?

MR. KAGAN: Yeah, this is an old argument.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: Really.

MR. KAGAN: We've had this argument a hundred times.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: In (inaudible), yes.

MR. KAGAN: Every time I hear how brilliantly Europe has managed foreign policy and taken care of itself in the past, I'm always amazed.

MS. GLASSER: Okay, but I'm going to push you on this though. You talked about China, but what about Russia and Europe, because I do think that is one where it seems that the consensus, to a certain extent on the panel, that it's less clear in many ways than a trajectory as we can imagine in China and in East Asia. Why is that; and do you think that war is less likely in Europe with Russia, or not?

MR. KAGAN: It's really -- it's hard to say because, again, this is something that Putin
would have to decide. I don't think that certainly Western Europe and the United States are not going
to look for a war with Russia, so he would have to decide how far he would want to push it. I actually
think that Putin is in a very good position right now; that he doesn't need to do very much. The West,
at least at the moment, is sufficiently divided and demoralized. The new weapon that he has figured
out how to deploy which goes directly into election processes that either discredit the election or get
the person that he wants elected, is something that I think he can play with for a long time. Ukraine is
unsettled; he's made great gains in Syria which, I think, he's not going to lose; Italy is, I think, is at risk
of becoming a different kind of state; he's got Hungary on his side; Poland is in a strange place -- not
on his side, but certainly not a good democracy now. So, Britain is behaving weirdly, you know, and
our hope now is the Franco-German engine, which I do hope -- it actually is the hope -- and I'm
hopeful that -- I know Gérard is going to play his role in making that work. But, I would say that Putin
doesn't need to do anything very aggressive right now to get what he wants which is a divided and sort
of hapless West, which is where we are at the moment.

MS. GLASSER: Tom, I'm going to put you on the spot again before we go to the
audience. You spotlighted for us three challenges where you saw through this, the broader questions
raised in your book come into play, the question of Russia and China, and the unraveling Middle East,
basically. The rise of nationalism versus sort of globalism, if you will, which is something we're seeing
in our politics as well as in the politics of partners in Western Europe and Eastern Europe. What are
several other known unknowns, if you will, that you contemplated while writing this book? What are
other flashpoints? I mean, let's all be real, 10 years ago we didn't expect that we'd be sitting here
talking about the sixth year of civil war in Syria that has sucked us all into an unsolvable policy conflict.
What are some other places that you feel could be the testing ground for the theories of all measures
short of war?

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah, great question. I think, so there's lots of things that aren't in the
book. I think because it tries to be sort of a, you know, a tight sort of argument for why we should sort
of care about these dynamics. So, clearly, you know, climate change, counterterrorism, nuclear
proliferation -- I mean, North Korea's dealt with in the book, but sort of pretty briefly -- I mean those are
all things that I think will often dominate the day-to-day foreign policy. But the one I'm worried about is the one we sort of started with, which is, you know, is U.S. policy; because I think, you know, there is, even since I wrote it, there are signs that this President is, you know, calling into question fundamental pillars of U.S. policy as it existed for seventy years; and that, I think, will create new flashpoints. So, I'm increasingly worried about the type of crises that we haven't seen for a very long time because there is an ambiguity or doubt about U.S. commitments that hasn't been there before; and, I think, that to me is the difference between President Obama and President Trump. I mean Obama wanted to pull back a bit; he did want to retrench I think, especially, in the Middle East; he did see the burden-sharing thing as pretty important, but he never sort of, you know, never really questioned the fundamental principles of the alliance commitments; he never suggested that he wanted to do away with the order proactively. Trump does. I think he's limited by the fact that he doesn't have a team in place to do that. Very few people agree with him, even in his own cabinet; so, I think, there are real limits to what he can do, but the things he may choose not to do over the next few years, I think, could be pretty significant. So that's probably the thing I would worry about the most.

MS. GLASSER: Ambassador Araud, are there examples of things that, if they were to come out of this administration would, in your view, represent a really revision on America's part of the world order, things that would concern you beyond the broader trend that we're seeing of America pulling back?

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: You know, I'm ambassador, so, again the prime is -- you have, again, as an outsider, you have a debate here in this city, of extreme tension. You know, really, and every word of the President, every tweet of the President, is immediately discussed, and you have arguments around it, and I think, we have not -- and the President has been there only for three or four months -- so, I guess, that we are maybe to wait to try to see whether, how this transition is going, where this transition is going to lead. I think people forget that any, every transition is difficult and long. You know, really takes a few months. You know, people forget it every eight years; so, maybe it's a bit particular, but I think, again, I trust the American system and in the coming months, you know, we could have a normalization of the American foreign policy.
MS. GLASSER: Normalization, Bob? (Laughter) I refer you to his previous writings.

MR. KAGAN: If I were ambassador, I'd be saying exactly the same thing. (Laughter)

MS. GLASSER: All right. We've got microphones here. I'm hoping someone will be a better questioner than I have been -- elicit more answers. We've got a microphone here; we'll take this and then this. Please identify yourself and try to make it a question when you do?

MS. MCKELVEY: I'm Tara McKelvey. I work for the BBC, and I have a question for you, maybe starting with the Ambassador, about diplomacy in Washington; and maybe there's lessons that you could draw from history that would help you to understand how better to conduct diplomacy today, and what you described as the Trump crisis and transatlantic relations?

MS. GLASSER: That was for you.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: Really?

MS. GLASSER: You can narrow it if you want to.

MS. MCKELVEY: Anything mainly about diplomacy.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: What am I supposed to say? You know, really --

MS. GLASSER: Okay; fair enough. We'll take another one.

MR. WRIGHT: I'll answer it in a second. Maybe you could take a couple at a time and we can --

MS. GLASSER: Okay, sure; let's do that. I did call on you sir, and then Dan.

SPEAKER: Thank you. Christophe Shaw. I'm on Der Spiegel magazine from Germany. How should Europe deal with Donald Trump, with a president who takes conscious decision to not reaffirm its commitment to Article V; who pulls out of the Paris Agreement; is an overly-firm handshake; enough? (Laughter) Thank you.

MS. GLASSER: Okay, I can see the questioners are tougher than I was; so, Tom, do you want to start then.

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah, I can start with both. I mean, you know, I think it's a big dilemma for all countries, particularly allies, is how to deal with this administration. I think what we've seen so far is a very sort of clear approach which is to engage; and, you know, I think there is -- when
countries sort of are really annoyed with you and, you know, but not deeply frightened, they tend to really let you know how they think and they would say in the Bush Administration, you're a warmonger or shouldn't invade Iraq; or with President Obama over certain things, countries may have been upset about Syria, and they'd say that. But when they're really, really, really frightened, they tend to say you're doing really great. You know, you're terrific, keep doing what you're doing. You know, we like you, we want to engage; and that's sort of what's happening. You know, there's unprecedented anxiety, but everyone's being super nice because they feel like they're handling explosives most of the time when they're dealing with the administration, and that's what we've seen, I think, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. European countries, I think, are finding it and much more difficult because, you know, they are democracies; yes, Japan and others are too, but there are elections in Europe. These are very divisive domestic political issues, and so, I think, it's a more normal approach but it's one that has a huge downside which is this president does take things quite personally and does look at things in very minute ways; doesn't want to engage in the normal types of diplomacy; and the hope is that over time, that trends towards, you know, normal foreign policy. We don't know. My own take is that there is two, you know, forces in this administration that are in tension, and that tension will never be resolved; and the first is the uniqueness of the president, and the second is the fact that the vast majority of its cabinet are very mainstream and believe in a traditional foreign policy; and we're just going to see that play out, and how to handle that, I think, is very difficult, but that's the task, I think, that every sort of ally has.

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: I think you have also to be fair, which means really to look at Europe from the American point of view and to wonder whether Europeans can really take the high moral ground. When you see BREXIT; when you see that really the populous outburst, the populous wave is sweeping, you know, really, a large part of Europe, including France, even if the result of the election was what it was. You know, you have a lot of Europeans -- a strong minority of Europeans -- which are actually considering that what we call the liberal order, actually, is not a very good order because they are anti-free trade. They want to get their country out of the European Union. So, it's not, you know, really or again, first it's not one person; it's a general crisis of the Western societies;
and I think it's part also of the redefinition of a world order.

We have also to solve the problems of the Euro Zone. We have to find, you know, really to define the future of the European Union. So, the questions are not only at the doorsteps of the American administration but also at our doorstep.

MS. GLASSER: Okay. Dan, I promised to call on you, and then we'll --

MR. DREZNER: Daniel Drezner, Tufts University and Brookings, I guess, a non-resident fellow. I guess one question for Bob and one question for Tom. The question for Bob is I don't disagree with your point that each of the post-Cold War presidents started off campaigning on a more retrenchment platform and, yet, all three of them changed dramatically once they were in office in no small part because the international situation sort of dragged them either to Bosnia; or in response to the war on terror; or in response to the rise of ISIS, and so on and so forth. My question is, what does an activist Donald Trump look like in foreign policy, if there's an actual foreign policy problem that emerges, and will he actually be able to handle it?

And then my question to Tom is, the background assumption, it sounds like, for your book is the assumption that we are going to have an open global economy, and that we're so interdependent going forward that that's not going to change; and I kept thinking about in the run-up to World War I, factually, that was correct, but you started seeing, you know, state actors starting to take steps to ensure that if a war broke out that they would have enough gold reserves, for example, to run their currency, and so on and so forth. So, I guess my question is, what would be the canary in the coal mine kind of signals in terms of the global economic order to indicate that, in fact, we're going to have all measures including war going forward?

MS. GLASSER: Chery questions, Bob?

MR. KAGAN: You know, I think, that I agree, obviously, in the case of Clinton and W. Bush that they sort of came in saying one thing and then were pushed to another. I think the case is a little more complicated for Obama because he immediately did a kind of other reaction by increasing the troops in Afghanistan -- albeit in a limited way, or at least in a deliberately limited way -- I think he did, when he did Libya, I think, he later decided that was the biggest mistake that he had made, and I
would say that unlike most presidents, he was pretty firm all the way through the rest of his administration; and I think it's because that he felt that he had made a mistake in imagining the American people wanted him to do those tougher things to sort of, in a traditional sense, prove that he was a tough president. I think he discovered that they actually didn't, or at least he didn't feel that they did. So, we can have an argument about Obama.

Trying to predict what Donald Trump is going to do is a very dubious activity, but my general view of Trump is that -- which I think has been proven right -- which is that he does not believe in world order, and he does not believe in America’s global responsibility, which to some extent, all presidents had, including Obama. Therefore, he has a very narrow view of American foreign policy, which is going to benefit America in very narrow, direct ways. That does not preclude the use of force, but it suggests that force will be used for very narrow American-focus purposes. So, I can imagine him responding to a terrorist threat with a very violent response but not care what he leaves behind after he has schmised whoever needs to be schmised -- that's an IR term for the people out there.

(Laughter) And, you know, you kind of can imagine -- like if America in the 1920s also happened to be the world's super power, what would it have done; and they sort of marry a country that says we're not interested in anybody else except ourselves, but we are very powerful and will use our power unilaterally. I mean, people got upset about George W.’s unilateralism. George W. didn’t even begin to approach real unilateralism, which is something that we could -- that's the only activism that I can imagine in Trump's foreign policy.

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah, in answer to Dan's question, I may not have articulated this properly earlier, but I actually agree with that and talk about it in the book that I think the fact that the global economy has been integrated creates these vulnerabilities and, in response to that countries will disintegrate strategically in a targeted way to protect themselves against being exposed to their rivals; and so, you will see, I think, countries taking steps unilaterally to ensure that they're not exposed on the sanction side, or on the cyber side, or in many other areas. And then, combined with the broader shifts in the global economy toward a more nationalist, mercantilist approach, I think we may be seeing some de-globalization. Now, globalization, will I think, will continue, but it will just be
shaped by strategic consideration. So, its patterns will change but will continue to be integrated; and, I think, it will continue to surprise us because as, you know, countries take a look at this and figure out how they can manipulate it and use it, they'll come up with new ways to do so, and we won't be anticipating those. So, I think this will be a constant, you know, thing over the next 10 years or so.

MS. GLASSER: Okay, lots of hands up. I want to get somebody in the back there.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible) from the Bush of Government and Public Service. My question was towards Mr. Wright. I was wondering, you mentioned the need for accommodation, and you gave examples of how China could be accommodated, but I wanted you to elaborate what would Russia's accommodation look like in practice. Thank you.

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah, I think that's a much tougher question, to be honest, because with China you can identify areas where it has overlapping interests with the U.S., and with Western powers. It wants a healthy global economy. It's very concerned about transnational challenges; but in Russia's case, they don't, I think, share the same view of the global economy because Putin has been trying to de-globalize pretty rapidly to have a more autonomous national economy because he doesn't want to be dependent on the global one; and to some degree he sees, you know, discord in the global economy as an equalizing effect, and so it's, you know, they're not, I think, in the game as much on that area. And there are, obviously, issues on, you know, we saw on Iran, potentially in North Korea -- although that's been a little less even, maybe in terms of the Russian role in that -- and a few other areas where I think there are common interests; but, I think, it is hard to see a basic accommodation of Russia's interest in Europe because any accommodation would really require a fundamental downgrading of the role of the EU and of NATO, both of which are sort of unpalatable for other reasons. So, I think, that the contrast there is larger, although there are people coming up with ideas to try to square the circle in that, but I haven't seen one I agree with yet.


MR. O'REILLY: Hi, my name is Sean O'Reilly, and I'm with Search for Common Ground, and my question is for Robert. Earlier you alluded to that China may or may not choose to go into an adversarial relationship to gain some advantage. Given the interconnectedness of the
economies of the world today, what do you think would be some of those issues that China may be willing to engage in adversarial relationship risking the relationships with the other world powers?

Thank you.

MR. KAGAN: You know, I mean, the thing about economic interconnectedness is that it's really powerful until it isn't; and then it isn't powerful at all. So, you know, if you go back to prior to World War I, the interconnectedness of British and German economies, and German and French economies, they were, you know, very interconnected and those were very important until other factors took precedence; and those other factors are usually nationalism, geopolitical competition, and often a combination of nationalism and geopolitical competition. There are theories also that if there is an, you know, if a country is suffering from an economic crisis, or in the case of China, some kind of legitimacy crisis, maybe even a leadership crisis, which is not inconceivable, that this can tilt things in a direction of a more aggressive policy. I don't mean a policy that would say, let's go to war; but countries decide -- as I say, it's the question of, you know, can we tolerate not going to war; what are the risks if we do go to war; do we think that we can get away with it; do we think that we can succeed, etc., etc. That kind of thing happened in Japan and led to war; and so those are the kinds of things that can happen, internal. There's an existing situation which is a potential conflict, which is competition in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The question is what sets it off? And those things can be, as I say, entirely internal to Chinese political economic situation.

MS. GLASSER: Okay. We're almost out of time. I want to take one or two more questions. You sir, and then you, ma'am.

MR. ROSE: Herb Rose. Considering North Korea, what measures can you take to stop what it's currently doing short of war?

MS. GLASSER: And let's get this final question, as well.

MS. SAARIKOSKI: Hi, I'm Laura Saarikoski from the Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat. This is especially for Robert, but for the others as well. Do you have any new ideas about how the liberal democracy should handle terrorism because the old one seems to breed populism?

MS. GLASSER: Okay. Well, I feel like those are two pretty powerful questions.
Maybe we can just go around to everybody and finish up on that and anything else we want to --

MR. KAGAN: Any question that begins, do you have any new ideas, makes me nervous. (Laugh) I have a very limited number of ideas, and very few of them are new. You know, I think, by and large, believe it or not, we are doing a pretty good job of disrupting most kinds of terrorist attacks and the kinds of terrorist attacks that are occurring I don't, for the life of me, know how we're supposed to entirely rid ourselves of them. I mean, if it's a weapon to drive a truck; if people can pop out of a truck and start stabbing people; I mean, I don't know exactly. All I can say is it's more intelligence; more penetration; more education; more awareness by citizenry; but other than that, I just, you know, I don't know what can be done to completely eliminate the capacity of people to do such things, okay. That's the question that was directed at me, right?

SPEAKER: Yeah.

MS. GLASSER: Okay. Ambassador, do you want to weigh-in in that or North Korea?

AMBASSADOR ARAUD: No, on terrorism, I think Bob is totally right. Really, when there were terrorist attacks in France, you know, people were saying, oh, it's because of secularity. The French are secularist. It's working much better in Britain. So, unfortunately, it doesn't; so, I think it's the usual, law enforcement, international cooperation; and, in this respect, I don't see what could be the role of NATO, to be frank. Greater law enforcement, more education, more jobs, you know, really, I think we are engaged into a long-term fight. And on top of that, considering Europe and the geography of Europe, of course, we are on the frontline because it's much easier to come back from Syria to Paris than to come back from Syria to New York; and also we are also exposed, vulnerable because of the migrations.

You know, people are speaking about the migrations from the Middle East, but you have also potential migrations from Africa, you know, really. The population of this continent is really growing extremely quickly, so there will be also on the European side the question of managing the long-term problem of migrations. Again, we don't have new ideas, but there is something that we are sure is that we are engaged into a long-term, really a long-term fight.

MS. GLASSER: Okay, Tom, you get the last word and maybe a little bit on North
Korea as well.

MR. WRIGHT: Yeah, thank you; and thank you, by the way, to all of you for being the panel today; and I learned a lot here and before that's really informed the book; but let me just say a couple of quick words about the terrorism thing and then North Korea because I agree with the Ambassador and Bob said on terrorism. But I would just add one thing which is President Obama had this view that you could sort of narrow America's engagement with this problem, right; and sort of focus on ISIS, focus on the particular terrorist threat and sort of disengage a little bit from the Middle East; and, I think, what we saw was that all of these regions that we were talking about earlier are interlinked, right; and no one really imagined that pulling back from Syria could result in a refugee crisis prompted by, you know, Assad's actions largely in Syria that could almost collapse the European Union, but that, you know, almost happened.

And the case I would make is not a new idea but I do think that, you know, the outside-in approach of having some sort of agenda for regional equilibrium in the Middle East that sees a stable order there as a crucial part of the international system, I think, is pretty clear now, and it's not possible to sort of disengage from that and just hope that it doesn't actually come back to effect us. Now quite to how to go about that, I think, there's a lot of different, you know, debates about how to do it because there are no real good options out there, so every option has a huge downside. But I think we can't get away from that, and so much of the debate on counterterrorism is on the very specifics of resources for this agency or that agency, or intelligence sharing; and, I think, we've moved away from that regional equilibrium part.

On North Korea, I honestly don't really see it getting solved because I don't think there's anything that can be done to the Kim Jong Un regime that is sufficient to cause him to fundamentally change his objective of pursuing ICBM-capability with the, you know, nuclear weapon that could be delivered against the U.S. If you look at China -- we've told ourselves this story that China is a crucial part of this, and China has the solution -- but the North Korean economy is actually doing quite a bit better than it was in the past. They went through much worst before, much worse than they could conceivably go through in the future, and they didn't change then; and so, I think China
could do more, but I don't see that if they did do more that it would necessarily solve it, which leaves you with the military action or not, and there's really no solution to the proximity problem that, you know, is caused by where Seoul is located. So, you know, there may be very targeted, limited, military strikes and that could be, you know, part of the picture at a future point. But I think we're sort of drifting into this scenario where, you know, that situation does get worse and we need to figure out a way to essentially muddle through and it will be worse than it is at present.

But I don't want to end on a totally pessimistic note, so I will just say that I do think that the, you know, the part I come out at the end of the book is to say that, you know, these are essentially choices. I do think that, you know, Western countries, and democracies, and emerging democracies not in the West, that there is enough power there, enough options there, to actually to be able to, you know, achieve the objectives if people want to achieve them -- of a more open, stable, and prosperous order. I just think it requires a change in mindset and a change in policy over the next decade or so; but I think that's very much in our grasp, but, thank you.

MS. GLASSER: I'm so glad to know that Tom's glass is half full; and congratulations on the book; and thank you, again --

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you.

MS. GLASSER: -- to a fantastic panel with Bob and (applause) I think there are books outside, by the way; and I know Tom would probably sign any of them; so, thank you.

* * * *
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2020