Barriers to Competition in the US pharmaceutical industry

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Background

- Expenditures on pharmaceuticals are high and rising; there are too many examples of prices unrelated to value
- Regulation is really hard to get right when innovation is important, innovation costs are sunk, and marginal costs are low
- \Rightarrow Competition between drugs in well-functioning markets can bring down prices and also generate innovation that people value
- Exactly because competition is so effective, manufacturers attempt to avoid it –
 - Use influence with regulators to get regulations that dampen competition
 - Use influence with legislators to prevent pro-competitive legislation
 - Utilize creativity in complex markets to reduce rivalry



Motivation

- This paper argues that enabling vigorous competition should be the first response to the problem of high pharma spending
- Remove barriers to competition
 - Some created by manufacturers
 - Some created by science
 - Some created by regulators
- If regulators pay attention to competition, enhance and enable it, may get lower prices, innovation, and no need to regulate
- Caveat: Paper does not address unique patented valuable treatments (see early paper by Richard Frank)





Price growth: specialty / biologic versus small-molecule drugs



Stylized price paths: biologics (top line) v small-molecule

drugs with generic entry (bottom line)

••••• Small-Molecule Price ••• Biologics Price

Biologics

policyagencyaction1)Biosimilar entry neededFDAquick entry andapprove interchangeable biosimilars

Europe has had biosimilars since 2006. More than 20 on the market today generating significantly lower prices. The United States has 2 biosimilars for sale. FDA has approved a grand total of 5 biosimilars to date (disputes over patents or regulatory procedure are blocking the sale of 3)



Impact of second filgrastim brand (granix)

Impact of first 6 months of generic entrant (zarxio)







Biologics

policy action agency 1) Biosimilar entry needed quick entry and **FDA** approve interchangeable biosimilars 2) Biosimilar naming FDA one scientific name 3) Procurement redesign j codes CMS 4) Orphan drugs reform Leg



Generics

- Pay for delay
- REMS
- Product hopping
- Small market monopoly
- Approval delays
- Complex product
- Shortages

FTC	antitrust enforcement
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FTC	antitrust enforcement
Leg	importation
FDA	quicker approvals
FDA	clearer guidelines
FDA	keep inspecting



Demand side

- Ther subst Part D
- Ther subst Part B
- PBM competition
- PBM incentives

CMSrelax formulariesCMS/Legreference pricingFTC6(b) studyFTC/Legrebates flow directly

Confidential rebates promote price competition.

If 100% of rebates flow back to plan sponsor, can then negotiate PBM compensation from position of full information = > may intensify competition



Demand side

- Ther subst Part D
- Ther subst Part B
- PBM competition
- PBM incentives
- Patient kickbacks
 - Coupons
 - PAPs
 - Patient benefits

CMS CMS/Leg FTC FTC/Leg

OIG, States IRS, CMS OIG, CMS relax formularies reference pricing 6(b) study rebates flow directly

ban limit, make unprofitable limit, ban



Rank	Foundation	Total Giving	PAP
1	Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	\$3,439,671,894	
2	Silicon Valley Community Foundation	\$956,834,000	
3	The Abbvie Patient Assistance Foundation	\$853,356,401	1
4	The Bristol-Myers Squibb Patient Assistance Foundation, Inc.	\$811,433,684	1
5	Johnson & Johnson Patient Assistance Foundation, Inc.	\$711,632,110	1
6	Merck Patient Assistance Program, Inc.	\$686,800,564	1
7	Genentech Access To Care Foundation	\$680,278,040	1
8	Pfizer Patient Assistance Foundation, Inc.	\$668,050,404	1
9	GlaxoSmithKline Patient Access Programs Foundation	\$625,427,284	1
10	The Atlantic Philanthropies	\$521,711,000	
11	Ford Foundation	\$518,380,000	
12	Lilly Cares Foundation, Inc.	\$503,299,479	1
13	Sanofi Foundation for North America	\$485,359,572	1
14	Novartis Patient Assistance Foundation, Inc.	\$456,825,176	1
15	The Susan Thompson Buffett Foundation	\$416,440,853	

Largest US foundations.

PAPs accept taxfree donations of medicine and then give them away as free samples.



Example in trade press to illustrate the profits gained from a \$10million contribution to a Patient Assistance Program

8	Charitable Margin	60%
7	Revenue	\$16,000,000
6	Insurer Cost Share	88%
5	Subsidized Patient Revenue	\$2,000,000
4	Market Share	25%
3	Net Contribution	\$8,000,000
2	Charity Overhead	20%
1	Charitable Contribution	\$10,000,000

Note the role of the contributor's market share (25%). Then \$2m in "patient" copayment generates \$16m in insurer payments.

The \$16m in incremental revenue is greater than the \$10m contribution. Moreover, the contribution is subsidized by the taxpayer, as it is tax deductible.

