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PART IV

The CEQ (Commitment to Equity) Assessment Tools

Available only online at www.ceqinstitute.org, under "Handbook."

1. Planning for a CEQ Assessment: Data and Software Requirements

CEQ Institute

2. Planning for a CEQ Assessment: Recommended Team Composition and Timeline

CEQ Institute

3. CEQ Assessment: CEQ Master Workbook (MWB) CEQ Institute

4. CEQ Master Workbook: Example for Mexico, 2012

John Scott, Sandra Martinez-Aguilar, Enrique de la Rosa, Rodrigo Aranda

5. CEQ Do Files in Stata for Constructing Income Concepts: Example for Mexico, 2012

John Scott, Sandra Martinez-Aguilar, Enrique de la Rosa, and Rodrigo Aranda

6. CEQ Assessment: CEQ Stata Package

Sean Higgins, Rodrigo Aranda, and Ruoxi Li

7. CEQ Assessment: Sample Stata Code for Measuring the Indirect Effects of Indirect Taxes and Subsidies

CEQ Institute, adapted from the IMF's "Distributional Analysis of Fuel Subsidy Reform (Stata Programs)," available for download from https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/subsidies/

8. CEQ Assessment: Checking Protocol

Sandra Martinez-Aguilar, Adam Ratzlaff, Maynor Cabrera, Cristina Carrera, and Sean Higgins

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