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Available only online at www.ceqinstitute.org, under “Handbook.”

1. Planning for a CEQ Assessment: Data and Software Requirements
CEQ Institute

2. Planning for a CEQ Assessment: Recommended Team Composition and Timeline
CEQ Institute

3. CEQ Assessment: CEQ Master Workbook (MWB)
CEQ Institute

4. CEQ Master Workbook: Example for Mexico, 2012
John Scott, Sandra Martinez-Aguilar, Enrique de la Rosa, Rodrigo Aranda

5. CEQ Do Files in Stata for Constructing Income Concepts: Example for Mexico, 2012
John Scott, Sandra Martinez-Aguilar, Enrique de la Rosa, and Rodrigo Aranda

6. CEQ Assessment: CEQ Stata Package
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7. CEQ Assessment: Sample Stata Code for Measuring the Indirect Effects of Indirect Taxes and Subsidies
CEQ Institute, adapted from the IMF’s “Distributional Analysis of Fuel Subsidy Reform (Stata Programs),” available for download from https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/subsidies/

8. CEQ Assessment: Checking Protocol
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