

The Economics of German Unification, Twenty-Five Years Later

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Korean Unification: Prospects and Global Implications Washington DC, 27-28 February 2017



Overview

- Initial conditions for the German Democratic Republic in 1990
- East-West German integration, as seen through the lens of Solow and Swan (1956)
- East-West German integration, as seen through the lens of Ramsey (1928) – maximizing discounted utility
- East-West German integration, as seen through the lens of Solow (1957) – the role of TFP
- Lessons for Korean unification



Lens of Solow and Swan (1956)

- Neoclassical growth model
- Originally closed economy, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1995) opened it to include factor mobility
- Assumes common production function (TFP convergence is instantaneous)
- Empirically, (conditional) convergence rate of GDP per capita is impressively robust at about 2%/year (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992)
- Consistent with the Solow/Swan neoclassical model without any factor mobility and a capital share of 2/3



Convergence




Figure 1: Per capita GDP. German states, 1991



Convergence




Figure 2: Per capita GDP, German states, 2015



Lens of Solow and Swan (1956)




Figure 3: Growth and Investment in the German states



Lens of Solow and Swan (1956)




Figure 4: Convergence



Lens of Ramsey (1928)

- What is the social planner's optimum as opposed to the market outcome? How closely did Germany approximate it?
- First obligation of the social planner: Maximize the pdv of utility in east and west, possibly equally weighted
- Constrained by overall resources, fixed factors, cost of adjustment, externalities with respect to public goods and congestion, as well as a distortionary financing constraint
- Separate production from consumption decisions frontload "investment" in structural change but raise consumption immediately
- Subsidize housing to reduce migration; tax labor income





Convergence in the Small: Access to Consumption Goods


	1993	1998	2008	2016
Durable Good	East/West	East/West	East/West	East/West
Automobile	66/74	71/76	73/78	70/79
Landline telephone	49/97	94/97	86/91	100/92
Cell phone	-/-	11/11	86/86	95/95
Personal Computer	16/22	34/40	72/76	87/89
Internet access	-/-	5/9	58/66	88/90
Television	96/95	98/95	95/94	98/98
Cable access	-/-	64/51	55/46	55/43
Satellite dish	-/-	30/29	34/40	39/50
Video recorder	36/49	61/63	-/-	-/-
Refrigerator	95/97	99/99	99/99	100/100
Microwave oven	15/41	41/53	70/70	74/73
Dishwasher	3/38	26/49	55/64	64/71
Washing Machine	91/88	94/91	-/-	98/96
Dryer	2/24	14/33	22/42	24/46

Source: German Federal Statistical Office (2016)





Life Expectancy



Source: Human Mortality Database (2016)


Lens of Ramsey (1928)



Happiness

Life Satisfaction Since 1991

On a ladder of life from 0 to 10, on which step do you stand at the present time? Percent saying 7,8,9 or 10



PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Source: Pewglobal (2014)





Convergence in the Large: Macroeconomic Indicators in East Germany in relation to West Germany

		Nominal	Nominal	Labor	Labor			
	Private	wages per	wages per	producitvity	productivity	GDP per	Unemployment	Participation
Year	consumption	hour	worker	per hour	per worker	capita	rate	rate
1991	64	n.a.	57	n.a.	45	44	165	116
1993	75	n.a.	74	n.a.	67	59	193	107
1995	82	n.a.	78	n.a.	72	67	163	109
1997	83	n.a.	79	n.a.	74	68	177	109
1999	84	n.a.	79	n.a.	75	68	195	108
2001	85	73	80	72	76	67	235	106
2003	86	74	80	73	78	69	216	106
2005	85	75	81	73	78	69	187	103
2007	85	74	80	73	78	70	201	104
2009	87	75	81	74	80	72	186	105
2011	85	76	82	74	79	71	188	104
2013	80	76	82	75	80	71	173	103
2015	n.a.	79	81	78	n.a.	72	161	n.a.

Source: German Federal Statistical Office, Bundesagentur für Arbeit



The traces of structural change






Figure 9: Unemployment rates, October 2016



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Labor market in November 2016



Unemployment rate (%)

Germany

5.7 Nov 16

6.0 Nov 15

West

5.3 Nov 16

5.4 Nov 15

East

7.8 Nov 16

8.5 Nov 15

Berlin

9.2 Nov 16


10.0 Nov 15

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The curse of Bismarck?


Social security contributions as a fraction of total employee costs, West Germany (1970-1992) and Germany (1992-2013)



Source: OECD



Also in Korea?





Lens of Solow (1957): TFP Convergence?

- While the 2% rule seems to work for Eastern Germany over the whole sample, it didn't for the first ten years – in the past decade labor productivity and GDP/capita have ceased
- More likely a conditional proposition to a different steady state (different production function, different steady state level of TFP)
- Refers to research with Battista Severgnini (2015)



Lens of Solow (1957): TFP Convergence?

Denison-Hall-Jones TFP estimates and GDP per capita, 2011




Figure 5: Total factor productivity (TFP) and GDP levels

Lens of Solow (1957): Counterfactuals






Figure 7: Counterfactual Output



Lens of Solow (1957): Counterfactuals





Figure 8: Counterfactual employment ratios




Figure 1: Labor productivity, expressed as a fraction of Baden-Württemberg (BW)'s, 1993-2013






Contribution of capital to labor productivity $(K/Y)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}$.



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
Contribution of total factor productivity (TFP).



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Figure 3: Contributions of capital and TPF in the East-West. Denison-Hall-Jones Decomposition 1991-2011.



TFP: Where is it?



Table 2: Denison-Hall-Jones decomposition of labor productivity in German region-states, 2011, relative to Baden-Württenberg

Region/State	Total Economy		Agriculture		Industry			Service				
	$\frac{Y}{L}$	$\left(\frac{K}{Y}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$	TFP	$\frac{Y}{L}$	$\left(\frac{K}{Y}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$	TFP	$\frac{Y}{L}$	$\left(\frac{K}{Y}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$	TFP	$\frac{Y}{L}$	$\left(\frac{K}{Y}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$	TFP
Baden-Württemberg	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Bavaria	1.01	1.05	0.95	0.98	1.12	0.87	1.01	1.02	0.99	1.03	1.03	1.00
Berlin / Brandenburg	0.84	1.05	0.80	0.94	1.03	0.91	0.84	1.29	0.65	0.89	0.94	0.94
Lower Saxony / Bremen	0.91	1.01	0.90	1.36	0.88	1.55	0.96	1.10	0.87	0.93	0.95	0.98
${\bf Hamburg\ /\ Schleswig\text{-}Holstein}$	1.04	0.99	1.05	0.98	1.01	0.97	0.95	1.13	0.84	1.14	0.87	1.30
Hessen	1.07	0.95	1.13	0.99	1.07	0.93	0.95	1.05	0.91	1.15	0.87	1.33
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania	0.72	1.20	0.60	1.69	0.94	1.79	0.59	1.66	0.36	0.79	1.05	0.76
North Rhine-Westphalia	0.96	0.93	1.03	1.34	0.87	1.53	0.94	1.10	0.85	1.00	0.86	1.16
Rheinland-Palatinate	0.89	1.08	0.82	1.22	0.80	1.52	0.94	1.08	0.87	0.89	1.06	0.84
Saarland	0.89	1.04	0.86	0.86	1.13	0.76	0.91	1.13	0.80	0.90	1.01	0.89
Saxony	0.72	1.09	0.66	1.16	0.91	1.28	0.68	1.52	0.45	0.75	0.99	0.76
Saxony-Anhalt	0.73	1.14	0.64	1.80	0.90	1.99	0.72	1.56	0.46	0.74	1.03	0.72
Thuringia	0.70	1.13	0.62	1.29	0.89	1.44	0.66	1.42	0.46	0.72	1.07	0.68
Eastern Germany including Berlin	0.76	1.09	0.69	1.33	0.93	1.42	0.72	1.45	0.50	0.80	ట్ట 0.99	0.81
Western Germany excluding Berlin	0.98	0.99	0.99	1.13	0.97	1.16	0.97	1.06	0.92	1.02	0.94	1.08
All Germany	0.94	1.01	0.93	1.17	0.96	1.21	0.93	1.12	0.83	0.98	0.95	1.03

Source: Authors' calculations based on Statistische Bundesamt, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen.



Summary of Burda/Severgnini (2015)

- Significant TFP differentials explain persistent East-West gaps in GDP per capita and labor productivity
- Sectoral differences exist, manufacturing dominates
- Capital intensity in East Germany now exceeds that of West Germany in industrial sectors
- Frontier approach of Griffith, Redding and van Reenen
 (2004) links TFP growth to distance to the frontier and R&D
- Very strong explanatory power of manager intensity and density of semi-professionals
- Suspicion that it may also have to do with distrust and lack of social capital



Lessons for Korean Unification

- Back of the envelope: It will be really big and expensive
- Providing North Korea's 25 million with *half* of South's 2015 per capita consumption would cost about \$160 billion, or about 11% of South GDP (\$1.4 trillion).
- This can be expected to last until the North ramps up output, which judging from Germany will take five years (for TFP) or ten years (for West German K/Y)
- Matching Germany's per capita investment in the East for first seven years about (4000 EUR annually of GDP at the time) adds another 2-3% of SK GDP



Lessons for Korean Unification

- Expensive! 13-15% of GDP. Who's gonna pay?
- South Korea may not be "scalable" to the North low TFP in East Germany has hardly moved in 15 years
- Social system will be a massive burden to Korea's competiveness if extended without qualification to the North (see German experience)
- At currently low (and possibly rising) interest rates, it makes sense to create a sovereign fund to prepare for the day – otherwise unaffordable



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