

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Brookings Cafeteria Podcast:
The Pakistan Challenge

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DEWS: Welcome to the Brookings Cafeteria, a podcast about ideas and the experts who have them. I'm Fred Dews. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is the sixth largest country in the world in terms of population, and lies at the crossroads between Central and East Asia. It is a declared nuclear weapons state, and since 1947 has fought multiple large-scale conventional wars and smaller skirmishes with its neighbor, India; two of the wars over the disputed region known as Kashmir. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Pakistan has been a partner for the U.S. in the war on terrorism in the region, but its intelligence services have also supported terrorist activities against India. Pakistan's territory provided logistic support to NATO forces in Afghanistan, while at the same time the Pakistani military supported the Afghan Taliban.

To help us understand these contradictions, to offer his expert views on what's happening in the region, and to discuss the policy challenges facing the Trump administration with respect to Pakistan, I'm joined once again on this podcast by senior fellow Bruce Riedel. He is the director of the Intelligence Project, part of our Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, who retired from the CIA in 2006 after 30 years of service; and has been a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents as a National Security Council staffer.

His many books include *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*; *JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA and the Sino-Indian War*; and *Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back*, all available from the Brookings Institution Press. Finally, Bruce is a contributor and co-author on a new paper from the Hudson Institute on "A New U.S. Approach to Pakistan."

Stay tuned in this episode to hear from Molly Reynolds on what's happening in Congress. And then Tom Loveless talks about his research in the new Brown Center Report on education policy.

Now, on with the interview. Bruce, welcome back to the Brookings Cafeteria.

RIEDEL: Thanks for having me back.

DEWS: You were last on about a year and a half ago to talk about terrorism, the Islamic State, and war in Yemen. I highly encourage listeners to go back and listen to that one. I decided we needed to hear from you Pakistan and South Asia. Before we get to that, though, I'd like to ask you about an issue that we've heard in the news a lot in this new Trump administration, and that's the so-called deep state in the U.S. government that some people claim exists and is thwarting President Trump's agenda. Is there a deep state and if so, what is it?

RIEDEL: I don't think there's a deep state in the United States. There is a deep state in Pakistan. Let me describe it briefly. Pakistan is a democratic country with a freely elected civilian government that actually passed a milestone two years ago when one freely elected government passed power to another freely elected government. That had never happened before.

But underneath the civilian state is the military state, what people call the deep state, which is the Pakistani Army and the Pakistani Intelligence Service, known as the Inter-services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI. The civilian state has little, if any, control over what the military and intelligence services do. It doesn't even pretend, really, to have control over, and Pakistanis know that the intelligence services and the army can literally kill anyone they want to and get away with it, and there are thousands of

disappeared who've ended up either in jail, or in many cases being killed by this deep state.

Now in the United States we have a military, but it's subject to the bounds of civilian rule. The head of our military is a civilian. The current case, Jim Mattis is a retired military but that's unusual. Usually, it's run by civilians. We have an Office of the Secretary of Defense run by civilians in order to ensure civilian control over the military. Our intelligence services are similarly overseen by numerous checks and balances, including the Congress of the United States. So to make the argument that we are now somehow a deep state like Pakistan, I think, is just absurd.

DEWS: One of then-President Elect Trump's first calls with a foreign leader was with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. But we haven't heard much from the Trump administration about Pakistan since then, I think it was in January. What have you heard about the Trump administration's approach to Pakistan?

RIEDEL: Pakistan, I would say, is among the most difficult foreign policy problems President Trump or any of his last three or four predecessors has to face. It's a very complicated state, as you said in your introduction. On the one hand, it's a victim of terrorism. Pakistan has seen more acts of terror in the last decade than almost any country in the world, with the exception, possibly, of Iraq.

And at the same time, it is a patron state sponsor of terrorism. Pakistani Intelligence Service is a sponsor of groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group that attacked Mumbai in November 2008. It is the sponsor of the Afghan Taliban, which carries out acts of terrorism in Kabul almost every week, and which is involved in what is now America's longest war, in Afghanistan. Those are just some of the contradictions here. I

think the Trump administration is doing what it should do, which is take its time. Don't rush on this. This is a real headscratcher, and you should take some time and think about what you're going to do. I published with other colleagues from the Heritage Foundation and the Hudson Institute—we think we ought to take a tougher approach towards Pakistan in the future and make it clear to Pakistan that there will be a price to be paid for continued sponsorship of terrorist groups like the Afghan Taliban.

DEWS: Well, I know that there's been some criticism leveled against the Obama administration in particular—perhaps against previous administrations, but on Obama in particular—that the administration was, maybe, too willing to offer inducements to Pakistan to get Pakistan to change its behavior. Looking back on it, do you think that was an accurate charge, and was the wrong approach?

RIEDEL: In the interest of full disclosure, I should remind people that President Obama asked me at the beginning of his administration to chair an interagency study on Afghanistan and Pakistan, so if he made mistakes I guess you have to point the burden at me.

I think what the Obama administration tried was to see if a package of inducements could encourage Pakistan to change its behavior, move towards shutting down the sanctuaries for the Taliban in Pakistan, move towards shutting down support for groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba. I think it was worth a try, but I think at some point in this process you have to come to the conclusion: we tried that, it didn't work, and now we need to try a different mix.

The president also, in 2009, faced a situation that President Trump doesn't really face today. In 2009, al-Qaida was alive and well—more than that, it was rampant in the

Pakistani borderlands with Afghanistan. And as we now know, Osama bin Laden was living in a house inside Pakistan's city where they have their major military academy. Thanks to the policies that President Obama embarked on in 2009, especially the drone war, that threat doesn't exist to the extent it did—today in 2017—in 2009. So President Trump doesn't have to deal with the immediate threat the President Obama faced in 2009, and therefore has a little bit more flexibility that his predecessor did.

DEWS: So you referenced the recent work that you've done with colleagues from Heritage and others—I know it's on the Hudson Institute's website—and you call for tougher measures now. We've also heard recently from Texas Congressman Ted Poe and James Clad, who was a former Defense official in the George W. Bush administration. They call the U.S. relationship with Pakistan "toxic," and they also say that Pakistan's military and security leaders "play a lethal double game." Can you explain their reasoning and kind of what perspective they're coming at it from?

RIEDEL: They're arguing the case that there is no balance in Pakistan, that the military and intelligence services have basically been misleading America going back to, say, the Clinton administration and that they're engaged in direct attacks on Americans. And to a certain extent, that's true. The U.S. mission in Afghanistan has been plagued from the beginning by the fact that Pakistan provides safe haven and sanctuary for the Afghan Taliban. It's almost impossible to win a guerilla war if the guerillas can run to a hideout on the other side of the border and get away with it.

I think putting Pakistan on the state sponsors of terrorism list is, at this point, premature. I and many of my colleagues refer to this as the nuclear option, that once you put them on the terrorism list you've really cut off all contact with Pakistan. I think

that's too extreme at this point. I think there are steps that we can take that are not that extreme, but that will send a useful message to Pakistan. I'll give you one example. In May of last year, President Obama authorized a drone strike on a convoy, which had the then-head of the Afghan Taliban, in Pakistan.

The drone strike ended up killing the head of the Afghan Taliban, but it turned out it was a one-off. We only did it once. I think we ought to think about doing it more frequently. Not every day, not every other day, but I think a half dozen drone strikes on senior Taliban targets in Pakistan would begin to demolish the notion that there really is a sanctuary there. If it's no longer safe, it's not a safe haven. It would also put pressure on the Pakistan establishment to do something about the Afghan Taliban. The risks are always there that there will be civilian collateral damage, but I think a carefully crafted program to make these safe havens less safe is in our national interests, and that's one of the recommendations in the report that we put out earlier this year.

DEWS: To stay on the terrorism topic for a few more minutes, can you elaborate more on the nature of the terrorism threat that emanates from Pakistan?

RIEDEL: I would characterize it in two factors. One is the threat posed to Afghanistan and U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. That comes from the Haqqani network and the rest of the Afghan Taliban. The other threat is groups that Pakistan has sponsored over decades whose main target is India but who often kill Westerners, including Americans, when they carry out their attacks in India—like the Mumbai attack in November 2008, in which a half dozen Americans were killed.

These groups are even closer to the heart of the Pakistan army and the Pakistani intelligence services. They are, in many ways, an extension of the Pakistani intelligence

service, and they reflect the now almost 70-year-old rivalry between India and Pakistan. People often say Pakistan is an army with a state attached to it. The reason it is an army with a state attached to it is because the rivalry with India and the many wars fought with India have become the consuming passion of the Pakistani military.

DEWS: And I definitely want to follow up with you on that. It's a fascinating and kind of a scary idea. On Afghanistan, with the U.S. continuing withdrawal from Afghanistan, is Pakistan still important in terms of what the United States and NATO are continuing to do in Afghanistan?

RIEDEL: It's less important to the logistics of our operations in Afghanistan than it was in the past for the simple reason that when you have 10,000 troops in the country, you don't need to get as much stuff to them as when you have 100,000 troops in the country. And over the years, we have developed other lines of logistical supply to get equipment to our forces in Afghanistan. It's an interesting question, what the Trump administration will do about Afghanistan. The military is making it pretty clear that they think that we need to ramp up forces in Afghanistan, not continue the drawdown.

We didn't hear very much about Afghanistan in the political process leading up to the election. It's really remarkable—the longest war in American history, and the two leading candidates, neither one of which spoke about Afghanistan at all. It really has become the forgotten war, but it's not forgotten for the men and women of the American armed forces who are fighting it these days, and it is one of those questions that the Trump team, I think, is going to have to deal with pretty early on.

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DEWS: Let's take a short break now to hear about what's happening in Congress. Our scholar looks beyond the headlines of the week to the very important issue of the congressional schedule.

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REYNOLDS: My name is Molly Reynolds and I'm a fellow in the Governance Studies program here at Brookings. It's been a busy week on Capitol Hill, with three major stories unfolding that in an average week on the Hill would be sufficiently important to suck up all the available oxygen in the room. Instead, they've been competing against one another for attention. We had FBI Director Jim Comey's appearance before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, where he testified that the Bureau is carrying out a counterintelligence investigation into the Russian government's attempts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. election—an investigation that include exploring whether there were links between anyone associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government.

A Congressional hearing about this kind of investigation would often dominate the news cycle, but it occurred on the same day as another high-profile hearing, the first of several days of sessions held by the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. Supreme Court. Supreme Court nominations are always subject to intense scrutiny, but this one involves particularly high-stakes political dynamics, with Democrats still reeling from the refusal by Republicans to consider the nomination of Merrick Garland by President Obama to the high court this time last year. Democrats also must decide what the best strategic play is on the Gorsuch nomination, since it's widely believed that if there are not enough Democratic votes to help break a

filibuster of the nomination, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell may use the so-called nuclear option to change the Senate's precedence for considering Supreme Court nominees, reducing the number of votes needed to end debate from 60 to 51.

It's not just these two hearings that have been competing for attention from Congress-watchers this week. It's also the fate of the House Republicans' legislation to repeal and replace parts of the Affordable Care Act. Republicans have continued to struggle to overcome their internal differences over the bill, and it marks the first major test of their ability to make the transition from the opposition party they often functioned as during the Obama administration, to a governing party in this new era of unified party control.

This action-packed week not only makes it hard for Congress-watchers to absorb everything that's happening on the Hill. It also reminds us of the importance of the calendar in setting the congressional agenda more broadly. On the healthcare bill specifically, the desire to move as fast as possible isn't just about scoring as many political points as possible early on. It's also about the specific procedural strategy Republicans have chosen to move the legislation. They're using a special procedure called budget reconciliation, and ideally they'd like to use those same procedures a second time later this year to pass a tax reform bill.

Most Senate-watchers, however, believe that Congress's rules only allow one reconciliation bill to be moving at a time, so Congress must either finish its first reconciliation bill on healthcare before moving on to the second, or abandon its first effort as dead in the water if it wants to start working on the tax bill.

This week's jam-packed schedule also reminds us that there are other important deadlines facing Congress in the coming weeks and months that give an incentive to squeeze more action in now, before its attention gets diverted elsewhere. The temporary funding bill funding most discretionary federal programs expires at the end of April, so Congress will need to come to an agreement on at least another temporary measure in order to avoid a government shutdown. Democrats have indicated that if such a measure includes funding for President Trump's promised border wall or language defunding Planned Parenthood, they would be willing to play hardball and threaten to shut down the government.

Also looming later this year is necessary action to increase the debt limit, which as we saw during the Obama administration can also serve as an occasion for high-stakes legislative drama; and necessary action on next year's federal budget, which has the potential for significant conflict given Trump's request for increased defense spending at the expense of cuts to non-defense programs. His proposal has been met with opposition from both sides of the aisle, and budget work has the potential to consume lots of Congress's attention later in the year.

Republicans, under new unified control of both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, certainly have lofty legislative goals for the year, but their need to act on legislation on a certain schedule—either one imposed by the particular strategy Republicans have chosen, or by the external demands of the annual budget process—means that the calendar can be both friend and foe. We'll have to keep watching to see how it plays out for Republicans this year. That's what's happening in Congress.

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DEWS: Alright, now let's go to India and Pakistan. It's one of the most fraught relationships on planet Earth. Can you talk about what you see happening now and in the future, if you could, in terms of Pakistan-India relations and their continued sparring in Kashmir?

RIEDEL: If there is a nuclear war in our lifetimes, it almost certainly will be in South Asia. Pakistan has the fastest-growing nuclear weapons arsenal in the world. It will soon be either the fourth- or fifth-largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world. It's developing tactical nuclear weapons as well as city-busting bombs. It's doing all of this because of its obsession with India. India, for its part, is also building up its nuclear weapons inventory. So you have two countries here who have a history of going to war with each other, who have a disputed border in Kashmir, who have a legacy of hatred and bitterness which is really hard to fathom if you aren't living in South Asia, and they're armed to the teeth including with nuclear weapons.

And the stakes have been getting worse, not better, in the last year. A year ago, a Pakistani-sponsored terrorism attack on an Indian military post led Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to retaliate with a cross-border attack into Pakistan. The next significant terrorist attack inside India linked to Pakistan, he's going to have to do something even bigger than that, and that could set us on the escalatory ladder to disaster.

DEWS: Is their conflict really all about Kashmir, the disputed territory, or does it extend beyond that region?

RIEDEL: The heart of it is Kashmir. Kashmir is a Muslim-majority state, but the then-Hindu leader of Kashmir opted to move the state into India back in 1947, leading to

the dispute we have today. It's divided now between Pakistan and India. It is the heart of the dispute, but there's also a bigger psychological issue, which is Pakistan has never really accepted that it is a smaller, less prosperous state than India. It's always felt that it wants to be India's equal, but in every category it's not. And India has never, in some extents, really accepted the notion that Pakistan should be a fully independent state. There's a whole welter of psychological and emotional issues attached to the India-Pakistan dispute, but at its core it's a territorial dispute over the future of what is now Indian-held Kashmir.

DEWS: Speaking of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, I also read a news report that Pakistan has been collaborating with the Chinese in terms of maybe developing a nuclear-capable submarine capacity. Is that true, and if so, what would that do in terms of India-Pakistan military tensions?

RIEDEL: Pakistan and China are very close allies. I would say Pakistan may be China's closest ally anywhere in the world. China has embarked now on a \$46 billion project to build roads leading from Chinese territory in Tibet and Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan. China has been intimately involved in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program since its start. Back in the 1970s, they provided the Pakistanis with the design for their bomb. They may have provided Pakistan with some enriched material at the beginning of this process. And yes, Pakistan now wants to have a seaborne nuclear option just as India is developing a seaborne nuclear options. And the logical place for Pakistan to look for help is from the Chinese, and I'm sure they'll get it.

DEWS: I've also seen a news report that Saudi Arabia has requested a Pakistani combat brigade. Why would Saudi Arabia do that, and will that request be met?

RIEDEL: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are also very, very close allies. Saudi Arabia has given more aid to Pakistan than any other country in the world, and in the past, in the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistani military forces were deployed in Saudi Arabia. Two years ago, though, at the start of the war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to send forces to participate in the war, and a remarkable thing happened: Pakistan said no. Not only did it say no, the Pakistani Parliament voted unanimously against sending troops to Saudi Arabia.

Given the amount of time and attention and money that Saudi Arabia has devoted to incurring goodwill among Pakistanis, it was a remarkable turndown. Now they're asking Pakistan again, not to send forces to go into Yemen, but to help defend Pakistani territory. That's something the Pakistanis may be much more willing to do, as long as it's clear that they're not sending troops to join the war in Yemen.

DEWS: So let's now turn our attention to the current administration and policy toward Pakistan. As we've mentioned a couple times, you are a collaborator on a new paper called "A New U.S. Approach to Pakistan." What are some things that you think the Trump administration should change, vis a vis the Obama administration, in its approach to Pakistan?

RIEDEL: One is its terminology. Both the George W. Bush administration the Barack Obama administration referred to Pakistan as an ally. It's not an ally. Pakistan is providing safe haven and sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban, including the Haqqani network, which is targeting American troops and American civilians in Afghanistan. Let's stop calling them an ally. Just the change in terminology begins to send a different message. George W. Bush gave Pakistan the title of major non-NATO ally. I think we

should revoke it, take it away. They're not a major non-NATO ally. The symbolism alone will begin to start sending the signal that we're going to take a tougher approach.

On top of that, as I said earlier, I think we should have a very careful, thought-through, selective use of unilateral military measures—drones included but perhaps also, occasionally, Special Forces missions—attacking the Taliban safe havens across the border inside Pakistan. And I would keep the nuclear option—that is, determining that they are a state sponsor of terrorism—on the table. I wouldn't use it, hopefully wouldn't use it at all, but I would leave it there as something on the table that we're actively continuing to consider if we don't start to see signs of change in Pakistani behavior.

The last thing I would emphasize: we need to still engage with Pakistan, especially the civilian side. It's the deep state in Pakistan that's the problem, not the civilian side. So Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, we should engage him and his government as aggressively as we can, recognizing that he's not always in control of the deep state underneath him.

DEWS: Well let's finish up here, Bruce, if we could. I want to give you a chance to talk about any other research avenues that you're pursuing here at Brookings in the coming months.

RIEDEL: I'm finishing up a book on United States relations with Saudi Arabia, which is titled at this point, *Kings and Presidents: Inside the Special Relationship between Saudi Arabia and America since FDR*. Saudi Arabia is our oldest ally in the Middle East, but it's also in many ways a lot like Pakistan, a troubled and difficult relationship. And this is going to be an in-depth look at that relationship over the

decades since 1943, when it really began. It's particularly fun for me because in my career in the U.S. government, I spent a quarter of a century working very, very closely with Saudi Arabia and I have many friends in Saudi Arabia. So it's in some sense a trip down memory lane as well as a book project.

DEWS: Let me take this opportunity, then, to plug the Brookings Essay that you wrote, also about a year and a half ago, that was about the Saudi royal family. It was a fascinating read, and I'm sure that your new book will be equally fascinating, so thank you for that. And Bruce, I want to thank you for sharing your time and insight on Pakistan today, very interesting.

RIEDEL: My pleasure, thank you for inviting me.

DEWS: You can learn more about Bruce Riedel and get more research and analysis on Pakistan and South Asia on our website, [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu).

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DEWS: Since 2000, in the Brown Center Report on American Education, expert Tom Loveless has analyzed the state of education in America using the latest measures of student learning. Here he is talking about one of the findings in the most recent Brown Center Report: that suspension rates for African-American students escalate in middle school.

LOVELESS: My name's Tom Loveless, I'm a nonresident senior fellow at the Brown Center at the Brookings Institution, and I recently authored the 2017 Brown Center report and have three studies in the report. The three studies are separate. One of the studies is on race and school suspensions. In recent years, there has been a controversy over exclusionary punishments of kids in schools, and by exclusionary

punishments I mean primarily suspensions, where kids are sent home for some kind of disciplinary infraction and then—they're sent home for two or three days and then they return back to school. One of the concerns of using out-of-school suspensions is that there is a large racial disparity associated with suspensions, and that is African-American students are disproportionately suspended from school.

So I took a look at this issue by examining data from the state of California. Now, California's a good source for this kind of study. It has data available online—you have to do quite a bit of linking of databases to find out what's going on in schools, but it does have data on suspensions online, and they break the data out by race. I examined data from 7,180 schools over a three-year period, 2013-2015. And I divided the schools into two groups, one group being the group of schools that have a high suspension rate for African-American students—and by that I mean they suspend African-Americans at a rate that exceeds 5% of school enrollment. So when a school with a hundred black students—these are schools that have five or more suspensions during the school year that are associated with black students.

The other group is the low suspension rate group, and so that group has a suspension rate lower than 5%. In fact, the overwhelming majority of those schools have no suspensions of African Americans at all. After I divided my sample into these two groups, I examined some of the characteristics of the schools of the two groups to see if there were any particular characteristics associated with being a high suspension rate school or a low suspension rate school. And I discovered actually four different characteristics that are interesting.

The first has to do with the graded configuration of the school, and by that I mean we have kids at different ages and they go to different kinds of schools, so I looked at elementary schools, and they have very low suspension rates. I looked at K8 schools, those are schools that go from kindergarten to eighth grade. They also have low suspension rates. But then suspension rates begin to rise, and they rise rather dramatically. In fact, the graded configuration with the highest suspension rates of African Americans that I could find were middle schools. These are schools that serve kids in grade 6-8. High schools also have high suspension rates of African Americans, but not as high as middle schools. So middle schools are where the tipping point occurs, and the disproportionate rate of suspending black students begins, in its highest amount, in the middle school configuration.

The second characteristic that I examined was school population, and in this case, very large schools, schools with over 1,300 kids, had higher suspension rates of African Americans than smaller schools. In fact, the very smallest schools that I looked at, those are schools with 200 or fewer students, had extremely low rates of suspending black students.

The third characteristic I looked at was school poverty. So this has to do with the concentration of poverty, of kids in poverty, at the school. And although I found that schools with a lot of poorer students may have higher rates of suspending African American students, it wasn't as much as I'd thought before I conducted the study. So it is a correlate, but it's not as highly correlated as the other statistics I looked at.

Finally, I looked at the proportion of enrollment at schools that is African American, and there have been other studies—there have been some studies out of

Indiana with student-level data that have looked at this issue—and this is highly correlated with a high suspension rate of African Americans. So put in plain English, a black student who is going to a predominantly black school is more likely to be suspended than a black student that's going to more racially mixed school.

Now what are the implications of this, and why should we be concerned about it? The first thing to consider is that the state of California has been pushing schools to lower suspensions over the last two or three years, and they've succeeded in doing so. Suspensions are down dramatically since 2012 throughout the state and throughout all the different grade levels. But the racial disparities have not shrunk. They remain very stubbornly high. Blacks' suspension rate is about three and a half times higher than both Hispanics and whites.

So the implications of this are, as we think about disciplinary reform in the future—and right now a lot of people are proposing what's known as restorative justice as a remedy for the suspension rate problem. As we think about these different programs that might be used instead of suspending kids, let's also consider some of the structural characteristics of schools. Now, my study is not causal at all. These are simply correlations. They're correlates.

But in the future, we should have hypotheses that test whether reconfiguring the grade levels of schools—making sure that we break up very large middle schools, for example, and maybe reconfigure them with elementary schools so that they become K8 schools—those kinds of structural characteristics might be related to suspending kids and we might find it fruitful to examine some of those reforms in the future if we want to eliminate racial disparities in school suspensions.

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DEWS: You can find the Brown Center Report on our website, brookings.edu.

Hey listeners, want to ask an expert a question? You can, by sending an email to me at bcp@brookings.edu. If you attach an audio file, I'll play it on the air, and I'll get an expert to answer and include it in an upcoming episode. Thanks to all of you who have sent in questions already.

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DEWS: And that does it for this edition of the Brookings Cafeteria, brought to you by the Brookings Podcast Network. Follow us on Twitter @policypodcasts. My thanks to audio engineer and producer Gaston Reboredo, with assistance from Mark Hoelscher. Vanessa Sauter is the producer, Bill Finan does the book interviews, and our intern is Kelly Russo. Design and web support comes from Jessica Pavone, Eric Abalahin, and Rebecca Viser; and thanks to David Nassar and Richard Fawal for their support. You can subscribe to the Brookings Cafeteria on iTunes and listen to it in all the usual places. Visit us online at brookings.edu. Until next time, I'm Fred Dews.