

A “Brazilian way”? Brazil’s approach to peacebuilding

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Introduction

Since 2000, a number of “rising powers” have sought a more active global role commensurate with their economic status and regional positions of influence. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), as well as Turkey, Mexico, and Indonesia have stepped up their activism on the world stage in a bid to transform the international order toward greater multipolarity.² It is not just the size of these countries’ economies that led to their status as “emerging” or “rising” powers, but also their dynamism. As former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva noted in 2009, even though the BRICS’ GDP accounted for only 15 percent of global GDP, Brazil was responsible for 65 percent of the growth of that GDP.³

Their economic protagonism (despite some fluctuations and recent retractions) has been accompanied by efforts to play a greater role on the stage of international peace and security. The BRICS, Turkey, and Mexico dramatically increased their development cooperation efforts as a tool of foreign policy, even as they adopted new roles in international crises and armed conflicts. India became an important player in post-Taliban Afghanistan, just as Brazil assumed a high-profile role in the top crisis in its own hemisphere, Haiti, as well as in Lusophone Africa. Turkey initiated its own mediation effort in Somalia, while South Africa has supported peace processes throughout the continent.

Brazil represents an especially high-profile rising power that has sought to enhance its strategic-political profile and influence on the international order, even as it faces internal constraints on its capacity to project influence abroad. Like Turkey, Brazil has experienced domestic political turmoil and economic malaise in the past few years that call into question the sustainability and reach of its global ambitions. Its policies and stances on peace-related issues have continued, but with less protagonism and fewer resources. However, its policies on “peacebuilding”—one thematic area within its broader diplomacy and security policy—have persisted and offer a window into Brazil’s foreign policy, especially the close interdependence of security and development.

Moreover, Brazil’s peace-related initiatives offer an especially well-articulated example of a rising power’s approach to peacebuilding. Since the early 2000s, Brazil has acted in the areas of development cooperation, peacekeeping, and other initiatives related to peacebuilding, not just implementing concrete initiatives, but also participating in normative debates and advocating for alternative approaches. The country’s historical commitment to non-intervention and to non-militaristic policies are part of a broader style of soft regional leadership. As one South American

diplomat put it when Brazil was called a “tiger” in the continent: “Yes, but it is a vegetarian one!”⁴

Brazil’s avid efforts to deepen and diversify its role in international security are not a novelty in the post-Cold War era, but these initiatives became particularly visible during the administration of President Lula da Silva (2003-2010). During this period, Brazil sought greater prominence on the international stage on several fronts.⁵ Brazil pressed for transformations in the multilateral system, including by helping to create and then exercise leadership in loose fora such as the G-20, the BRICS coalition, and the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) Dialogue Forum, and by boosting its role in organizations like the Union of South American States (UNASUR) and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). It also worked to gain greater influence within the multilateral system, boosting its historic bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council and contesting what Brazilian political elites view as excessive securitization of the UN. Under Lula, Brazil nearly tripled its development cooperation to 1.6 billion reais (\$923 million at the time). Some 66.3 percent of these funds were channeled through multilateral cooperation, while the remainder was allocated to bilateral efforts focusing on Latin America and Africa.⁶ This amount represented a significant surge and diversification in Brazil’s role in development, including in a number of conflict-affected countries.

More broadly, Brazil became more active in a variety of initiatives during this period that can be considered to fall under the concept of peacebuilding—policies and programs broadly geared at boosting stability and preventing the outbreak or recurrence of armed conflict. As part of its South-South development cooperation efforts, Brazil vastly expanded its official technical cooperation with post-conflict countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and East Timor. It also sponsored and executed peace-related development projects to support the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), whose military command it held continuously for an unprecedented 12 years, starting in 2004. Both in its home region and beyond, Brazil engaged in conflict mediation efforts, whether through organizations like UNASUR and the CPLP or via ad hoc arrangements like IBSA. At the U.N., Brazil was instrumental in the creation of the Peacebuilding Architecture, including the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), of which Brazil assumed a leadership role, especially with respect to Guinea-Bissau. It also increased its contributions to humanitarian assistance, especially via U.N. agencies and programs. In U.N. normative debates, Brazil promoted peacebuilding as a complement, and sometimes as an alternative, to militarized approaches to peacekeeping, arguing that investing in political processes and socioeconomic development is essential to the promotion of peace.

This purpose of this paper is to describe the scope of, and trends in, Brazil’s peacebuilding activities since the early 2000s, focusing on the presidencies of Lula and Dilma Rousseff. This paper does not focus on Brazil’s general peace-related activities abroad; rather, it seeks to unpack the specific concept of “peacebuilding” as it is used by Brazilian diplomats. The paper analyzes the broader context, key principles, and main mechanisms of Brazilian peacebuilding; identifies major patterns and trends; and notes some of the most important challenges and contradictions. In particular, we examine whether there is a “Brazilian” approach to peacebuilding and what its elements might be, as well as how that approach differs from dominant or Western principles and practices. That Western approach generally focuses on building state institutions, is top-down, relatively short-term, template-driven, and often conditioned on the adoption of liberal policies. The research is based on interviews conducted in

mid-2015 and mid-2016 in Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and New York, as well as analysis of official documents from the U.N. and the Brazilian government.

The paper begins with a brief synthesis of Brazil's historical approach to peace issues, and then turns to the principles underlying Brazil's "peacebuilding" approach as it began to emerge in the late 1990s. We then analyze how Brazil's peacebuilding works in practice—especially how these initiatives relate to efforts at peacekeeping, mediation, development, and private sector initiatives in war-torn countries. We address the retraction of Brazilian peacebuilding starting under President Rousseff and note some implications for understanding rising powers' roles in international politics and security.

We find that Brazilian stakeholders rarely use the term "peacebuilding" (in Portuguese, "*consolidação da paz*") outside U.N. debates, and that the way they use it within the U.N. context differs slightly from in Brasilia. Brazilian "peacebuilding" refers to efforts at building the foundations of sustainable, longer-term peace. It overlaps (but is not coterminous with) peacekeeping, and also refers to development and capacity-building efforts by the Brazilian state. This includes conflict-related humanitarian efforts, and at times (though not usually) mediation initiatives.

While there is no single dedicated government agency guiding this engagement (rather, a broad gamut of institutions whose efforts include peacebuilding activities), related Brazilian initiatives constitute a loose but emergent approach to promoting stability and development in partner countries. Brazil has articulated clear principles of a peacebuilding approach that differs in key respects, both in terms of policy design and on-the-ground approaches, from those of Western donors. Nevertheless, Brazil's approach also shares some similarities with Western peacebuilding, both normatively and operationally. In the post-Lula years, two main elements—the economic downturn in Brazil and the political turmoil surrounding Rousseff's presidential impeachment—have contributed to changes in Brazilian foreign policy, raising new questions about Brazil's ability to sustain its emerging role in peacebuilding.

Foundations of a Brazilian approach to peacebuilding

Brazil has no single document, such as a White Paper, outlining a policy framework for peacebuilding. The term *consolidação da paz*, in fact, is seldom used outside multilateral settings such as the U.N. and IBSA. Beyond those platforms, Brazil's approach to peacebuilding can be inferred from official speeches and statements, national security documents, diplomats' understandings, and actions along three fronts: development cooperation, international conflict mediation, and humanitarian assistance.

Despite the breadth of these initiatives, certain common principles underlie Brazil's approach to peacebuilding, and these concepts are frequently invoked by Brazilian diplomats and some academics in arguing that there is a distinct "Brazilian" approach to promoting peace and stability. While Brazilian officials and specialists do not exclude the possibility that other countries embrace similar principles, they often defend the idea that these principles are based on Brazil's somewhat unique historical trajectory and experiences with peace and development. As a result, they claim, Brazil's engagement with peacebuilding entails more equitable relations of power among stakeholders.

Historical foundations

Although most initiatives that make up Brazil's peacebuilding have emerged in the past 15 years, the country's historical trajectory offers a source of inspiration for its current approach. That trajectory has reflected a view of a liberal order that is anti-imperialist, non-militaristic, and heavily multilateralist. Relevant here are (a) Brazil's status as a colony of Portugal that "shrugged off" the empire and assumed independence with minimal inter-state violence; (b) its legacy as the largest slave importing state in the Americas, as well as the last nation in the Western world to abolish the practice; and (c) its position as a regional power that nurtures ambitions to become a global power yet remains sensitive to how its exercise of power in the hemisphere is perceived by its neighbors.

As a result of its own colonial experience, as well as its sheer size (Brazil is now the world's fifth largest country by territory and accounts for 48 percent of South America's territory), Brazil has repeatedly sought to reassure other countries in its vicinity that it would not abuse its vast geography to seek regional hegemony. According to mainstream historiography, upon independence in 1822, Brazil adopted a "culture of pacificism" with respect to other states, so as to prevent the newly formed sovereign country from being seen as imposing or intruding on its neighbors.⁷ The 1934 constitution—which only lasted three years but was extremely influential in the drafting of subsequent constitutions—states that Brazil will "never engage in a war of conquest" and stipulates that war shall not be launched until arbitration is exhausted.⁸ Similarly, textbooks stress the country's non-military approaches to foreign engagement—leitmotifs that have carried into contemporary discourses of foreign policy.⁹ There were some early territorial wars against neighboring countries, especially over the Cisplatine province (which became, with British mediation, independent Uruguay in 1928), and coercive diplomacy was used with Bolivia and Argentina during territorial disputes. Internally, there were several bloody revolts in the southern and northern regions (including the Canudos War, a popular-messianic uprising that was crushed by the Brazilian army in 1897). Despite these incidents, the country managed to avoid major inter-state conflicts and, as a result, the country's pacifist discourse emphasizes that Brazil has never launched a war.¹⁰

Despite its relatively peaceful trajectory in defining its borders, and although the country's population is historically diverse, Brazil has a far less harmonious history when it comes to issues of ethnicity and race. The formation of Brazil as a people was the result of violent processes.¹¹ The colonial state exterminated and marginalized indigenous people and, even after the formal end of slavery, its "whitening" immigration policies favored Europeans. Over a century of institutional denial of racial and ethnic differences has led to deep, unacknowledged inequalities and discrimination that are most visible in the country's contemporary high rates of violence.¹² As a result, despite its official discourse of pacifism and harmony, Brazil's internal contradictions sometimes belie the rhetoric of peace and stability that officials and others draw upon in legitimizing Brazil's role in peacebuilding abroad. The same can be said of the country's turbulent history with democracy, with several periods of repressive military rule (including from 1964 to 1985) and a political trajectory marred by several presidential coups and coup attempts.

The post-WWII period

During the Cold War, and especially when the country was under military rule, Brazilian foreign policy largely aligned with that of the United States, even as Brazil retained its membership in

the G-77 and was among the most active states fighting for the inception of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Although Brazil has never been a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), it has followed many of the group's initiatives as an observer, and there are strong parallels between the discourses of solidarity expressed by both Brazil and NAM. This ambivalence in Brazilian foreign policy towards the rest of the developing world—and its resulting policy shifts—also characterized Brazil's stance towards the struggle against colonialism in the mid-20th century. As Portugal's empire was collapsing in the early 1970s, Brazil—which previously had mostly stood by Portugal's position against the independence of African states in U.N. debates—began supporting decolonization in Angola, Mozambique, and other Lusophone colonies.¹³ Thereafter, Brazil's foreign policy placed an even stronger emphasis on non-intervention and peaceful approaches to resolving conflict.

Outside of its immediate vicinity, Brazil engaged in issues of international security by becoming an early contributor to U.N. peacekeeping missions, starting in 1956 with the first mission in Sinai. This participation launched a long-term commitment to U.N. peacekeeping, although troop contributions have varied over time. To date, Brazil has participated in more than 50 peacekeeping operations and related missions, having contributed over 33,000 military officials, police officers, and civilians.¹⁴ This role reflects Brazilian foreign policy's longstanding commitment to multilateralism, particularly via the U.N.

Towards the end of the Cold War, even as Brazil underwent a gradual transition from military to civilian rule, it worked with Argentina to overcome a deep historical rivalry that had culminated in both countries attempting to develop nuclear weapons. The two sides successfully resolved their tensions by deepening political and economic ties (these efforts culminated in the creation of Mercosur) and voluntarily dismantling their nuclear weapons programs, while maintaining their peaceful elements. The 1991 establishment of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), a bilateral safeguards agency, marked an innovative way of institutionalizing peaceful conflict resolution between the two states and avoiding regional tensions.¹⁵ The resulting expansion of ties between the two countries is often cited by Brazilian diplomats seeking to boost Brazil's credentials in international conflict prevention and resolution.¹⁶

The post-Cold War period

With the end of the Cold War, Brazil began relying even more heavily on multilateral platforms to expand its role in international peace and security, not only through the U.N. but also via regional platforms such as Mercosur and, more recently, UNASUR, which was created in 2008.¹⁷ Brazil has been active in peacebuilding through the CPLP, especially in Africa. Since the 2000s, it has also helped to create new coalitions of rising powers, such as IBSA and the BRICS. Working through multilateral institutions not only provides Brazil with added legitimacy in peacebuilding, it also allows it to participate in key normative debates and extends its geographic reach, since other members sometimes engage in peacebuilding efforts in countries where Brazil's bilateral relations are relatively weak.

This predilection for multilateralism has been essential to understanding Brazilian efforts to promote democracy and human rights abroad. Brazil has historically eschewed direct, bilateral engagement in promotion of democracy and human rights in other countries because this practice is sometimes associated with Western powers' self-interested and selective efforts, which have often yielded counterproductive outcomes. However, Brazil does engage in democracy and

human rights promotion when a specific demand arises via a multilateral forum, including the Organization of American States (OAS), UNASUR, and the CPLP.

Brazil has, on occasion, tried to boost its role in conflict mediation, especially in South America. In 1995, it worked with the United States, Chile, and Argentina to mediate the Cenepa War, the brief border conflict between Peru and Ecuador.¹⁸ The ensuing 1998 peace agreement, the Brasília Presidential Act, was definitive in establishing the formal demarcation of the border, putting an end to one of the longest territorial disputes in the Western Hemisphere. Despite these examples, Brazil's engagement in conflict mediation within its own region has remained sporadic and selective. For instance, although Brazil has supported the peace process between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas, its direct engagement in the negotiations and their aftermath has been very modest.

The core principles of Brazilian peacebuilding

The early 2000s witnessed a new, concerted effort by Brazil to engage on peacebuilding issues, with Lula playing a central role in this surge. A former factory worker and union leader who was imprisoned briefly by the military dictatorship, Lula led the socialist Workers Party for 14 years through the country's transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Initially elected as part of a coalition representing urban workers, peasants, and the lower middle classes, Lula sought to transform Brazil into a more equitable society while using foreign policy to boost development and expand the country's influence abroad, including in international security issues.

In foreign policy, Lula's government frequently drew on domestic policy initiatives as sources of inspiration to combat poverty and hunger globally. To this end, the Brazilian government promoted a discourse of solidarity and horizontality, presenting its South-South development cooperation efforts as devoid of the sharp power asymmetries resulting from Europe and the United States' colonial and imperial legacies in much of the developing world. In 2013, the director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) underscored the principles believed to differentiate Brazil's approach from those of donors and established multilateral organizations:

The policy of Brazilian cooperation is based on international solidarity [...] we react to the demands (we don't have previously prepared projects to be presented to partners). [...] The principle of South-South cooperation that we follow is that of no conditionality, which is the non-linkage between technical cooperation and pursuit of economic and commercial goals and benefits or concessions in areas of services in exchange for cooperation. [Another principle Brazil respects is the] non-interference or non-intromission in internal affairs.¹⁹

These historically-rooted principles—solidarity, demand-driven cooperation, non-conditionality, and non-interference—are invoked by Brazilian diplomats as the hallmarks of a distinct “Brazilian way.” In addition, the Lula administration emphasized national ownership of development cooperation projects abroad as part of the country's respect for sovereignty. However, some have criticized Brazil's solidarity as strictly targeting other governments (regardless of the type of regime) and of equating national ownership with government decision-making, as opposed to more participatory processes that would include non-governmental and opposition voices in partner states.²⁰ Other traits of what might be termed a “Brazilian way” include Brazilians'

proclivity for closeness to people in local communities abroad (a point that is often stressed with respect to Brazilian peacekeepers), an emphasis on economic programs and job generation in post-conflict countries, and reliance on development cooperation rather than on aid.

Some of these principles resonated with, and were in turn reinforced by, Brazil's initiatives in global coalition building, especially with other rising powers. The creation of coalitions like IBSA, which brings together three diverse democracies, and the BRIC (which in 2011 expanded to include South Africa and became known as BRICS), reflected both a desire to transform the international system into a more multilateral configuration and an aspiration to open up more space for Brazil's own possibilities abroad. The BRICS adopted a highly controversial discourse vis-à-vis certain components and norms of the established global governance architecture, and it began to deepen intra-group cooperation and coordinate some positions on issues, especially on those related to economic cooperation and development financing. The coalition also began launching new institutions, such as the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB).²¹ The NDB is meant not only to help fill the gargantuan demand for infrastructure financing in the developing world, but also to place further pressure on established institutions like the Bretton Woods organizations to undertake serious reform in their decision-making processes. The new institution is relevant to peacebuilding because, at a normative level, the bank reinserts infrastructure investment at the heart of development debates, including in conflict-affected areas.

Despite their visibility in international affairs, the BRICS and IBSA are not the only informal coalitions on Brazil's rising power agenda. The G-20, initially launched in 1999, became more important to Brazilian foreign policy in the 2000s as a high table for global governance and economic policy. On a far lesser scale, Brazil also helped to establish and expand bi-regional summits such as the Summit of South American-Arab Countries and the Africa-South America Summit. Brazil's role in these various informal coalitions of states, which helped to expand its influence across the Global South, was decisive and influential for its peacebuilding initiatives in part because they granted Brazil greater legitimacy in engaging in a wider variety of contexts.

Within the U.N. System, this controversial tone translated into demands for organizational reforms, including changes to the Security Council that would guarantee Brazil a permanent, veto-wielding seat. In this respect, Brazil has sought alignments beyond other rising powers. In the mid-2000s, for instance, the country joined Germany, Japan, and India in the G-4, whose members seek a more democratic Security Council that would reflect contemporary interstate relations rather than the global power structure in the aftermath of WWII.²² Although these countries helped prompt the formation of a High-Level Panel on U.N. Reform in 2014, its recommendations for broadening the Security Council's membership were not acted upon. As a Brazilian diplomat in Brasília put it, "this failure to reform added to the palpable sense of frustration among [us], thus strengthening the resolve to launch alternative routes outside the U.N. architecture, especially through the loose coalitions of rising powers."²³

Nevertheless, at the U.N., Brazil engaged more directly in key normative debates about security and development. At the UN Security Council, where it occupied a non-permanent seat in 2004-2005 and in 2010-2011,²⁴ Brazil argued that the U.N. has neglected its original focus on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction in favor of heavy-handed military interventionism, whether led by NATO or otherwise. As one Brazilian diplomat has stated,

In general terms, the UN has focused too much on the pillar of peace and security versus development. Decisions have been toward militarized solutions. . . . In our view, peacekeeping and peacebuilding shouldn't be sequenced, but should be dealt with together, in tandem. When dealing with a post-conflict situation, one must deal with the causes of the conflict – institutional, political, social and environmental.²⁵

These sentiments reflect the foreign policy principles encoded in the 1988 federal constitution, such as non-intervention, self-determination, international cooperation and the peaceful settlement of conflicts—principles that had long guided Brazil's positions at the U.N. Back in the early 1990s, for instance, Brazil proposed that the U.N. Secretariat produce an "Agenda for Development" to complement the influential "Agenda for Peace" published by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992.²⁶ However, under Lula, Brazil placed greater emphasis on the transformative agenda. When chairing the Security Council in 2011, Brazil chose to focus a debate on "security and development." Brazil emphasized the interconnectedness of these aims as reflected in the presidential statement (PRST) adopted by the Security Council: "The Security Council underlines that security and development are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace."²⁷ The statement also recognized and called for strengthening the links between peacekeeping and early peacebuilding.

One Brazilian diplomat reflected on Brazil's efforts:

I see that [PRST] statement as the culmination and heyday of a process of thinking about peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Brazil. From 2002 to 2011, we were learning how to be norm-setters in the international community. Haiti was formative in conceptual development but also in the coalition-building element. We learned how to twist arms to have our concepts included in the Council's resolutions.²⁸

Similarly, Brazil's 2012 attempt to temper the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by proposing the concept of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP)—despite never gaining significant traction—demonstrates Brazil's occasional willingness to make high-profile proposals for alternatives to Western approaches. Although RwP reflected similar principles as Brazil's peacebuilding policies, the former was not considered conceptually part of the latter. Yet the proposal shows that Brazil's primary platform for engaging with international security and peacebuilding, at least at a normative level, remains the U.N. We now turn to how these broader concepts and principles play out in practice in Brazil's peacebuilding efforts.

Brazil's peacebuilding in practice

UN peace missions

When Brazil assumed the leadership of the military component of MINUSTAH in 2004, the move represented a significant step up in its commitments to U.N. peacekeeping. That engagement became even more complex after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti created a humanitarian crisis superimposed on an already highly unstable setting. Even before the disaster, Brazil was the single largest troop-contributing country to MINUSTAH, as well as part of the core group of countries in Port-au-Prince and in the "Group of Friends of Haiti" in New York. Brazil saw the Haiti mission as a chance to initiate an alternative approach to U.N. peacekeeping—in essence, a more peacebuilding-oriented approach. As one Brazilian diplomat

said, “This was key in Haiti: how do we make it different? Our assessment was that the US effort in the 1990s was a failure because it invested too much in the military and not enough in development and capacities.”²⁹

Brazil pressed for authorization to use U.N. peacekeeping resources, generally restricted to funding peacekeepers and their operational needs, on development and peacebuilding-oriented programs in Haiti. As another diplomat reported, “In the Security Council and in the fifth [budget] committee, we pushed for quick-impact projects [QIPs] and community violence programs for Haiti.” The UN allocated approximately \$5 million annually to these QIPs.³⁰ In one example that combined elements of development and peacebuilding, the “Light and Security” initiative, coordinated by Brazilian troops, installed solar lampposts in the most vulnerable parts of the capital, making those areas safer at night.³¹

The Brazilian Corps of Engineers also helped to drill wells, build bridges and dams, and carry out slope stabilization in landslide-prone areas.³² One Brazilian diplomat reported that, in Haiti, “Our military engineers pushed the boundaries. The U.N. Secretariat wouldn’t let us repair roads too far from the battalion base [i.e., not required for MINUSTAH’s operational needs], so we brought in our own asphalt manufacturing capability and used Embassy funds to pay for road repairs elsewhere.”³³ In many of these initiatives, Brazilian troops built upon the development-oriented activities that the Brazilian Armed Forces carry out domestically, for instance in remote areas of the Amazon and border regions. The rationale is that, by contributing towards basic infrastructure, Brazil can not only help with post-disaster reconstruction but also boost development and help mitigate some of the factors leading to recurring instability.

In Haiti, the Brazilian government also created an unusual partnership with Viva Rio, a Rio de Janeiro-based non-governmental organization (NGO) that had specialized in community peacebuilding and disarmament in urban Brazil, to carry out humanitarian and development initiatives in areas of Haiti that had been strongly affected by the earthquake and ensuing crisis. For instance, Viva Rio coordinated a reconciliation program in which it helped mediate between the Haitian national police and leaderships from different parts of Bel Air, Cité Soleil, and Delmas. Viva Rio also received MINUSTAH financing to carry out sports activities (including *capoeira*) and cultural initiatives (such as *Carnaval* celebrations) to strengthen this mediation initiative.³⁴ At the same time, the Brazilian government provided bilateral technical cooperation in social policy areas like public health, agriculture, energy, and capacity-building. Through these different arrangements, Brazil worked to complement the military role of MINUSTAH with initiatives that would promote long-term social well-being and stability.

Brazilian diplomats and analysts identify specific differences in the country’s approach to peacekeeping that have led some to refer to the “Brazilian way.” First among these is the warm conviviality of Brazilian culture, including the open and friendly manner of its soldiers in dealing with the Haitian population. Many Brazilian soldiers come from the poor *favelas* and communities that share traits with the most difficult communities in Haiti, and many are similarly dark-skinned, despite Brazil’s complicated race relations. Related to this cultural affinity was Brazil’s early decision to deploy its forces with greater contact and proximity to the local populations, especially in shantytown communities like Bellaire and Cité Soleil, which were considered to have been taken over by politicized criminal gangs opposed to the government. According to one analyst, when Brazil’s troops entered Bellaire in 2006, they made a conscious decision to remove their sunglasses, look into the eyes of the people, and—in contrast

to the Jordanian units—get out of their armored personnel carriers (APCs) and walk in the streets and converse with the population.³⁵ In addition, Brazilian forces announced their entry into the community a few days prior, letting the criminal gang leaders leave and granting Brazilian troops non-confrontational entry and continued presence in these communities. Brazil also followed up these operations with social programs. Numerous analysts have evaluated and documented the more positive reaction of the inhabitants of these communities to the Brazilian units over earlier troops.

Brazil's approach in Haiti, including in Bel Air, was neither uniform nor unproblematic. Despite the discourse on Brazilian conviviality and ease in integrating with locals, the country's participation in MINUSTAH has not been without critics. Some note that there is a feedback loop between the Brazilian security forces' heavy-handed presence in (or incursions into) the favelas in Rio and the peacekeepers' approach to urban gangs in Haiti.³⁶ Certain Brazilian observers have criticized the insufficient coordination among stakeholders in Haiti, including Brazil.³⁷ Others have also noted that, as a result of its engagement in Haiti, Brazil's approach to peacebuilding often relies on a heavy military component and an uneasy or incomplete relationship with both Brazilian and local civil society actors.

The same can be said of Brazil's humanitarian efforts, in which Brazilian civil society and its official engagement with local non-governmental actors is minimal, if at all present. Rather, its humanitarian assistance—primarily donations of financial resources and grains to U.N.-led initiatives around the world—has been centralized within the Ministry of External Relations (MRE, also known as Itamaraty).³⁸

Aside from Haiti and Timor-Leste, most conflict-affected countries that Brazil has engaged with are in Africa.³⁹ As part of a broader drive to increase Brazil's presence and relevance in Africa, especially the sub-Saharan countries, Brazilian peacebuilding initiatives expanded on the continent, particularly during the 2000s. Lula engaged in a highly visible presidential diplomacy, visiting 27 African countries.⁴⁰ He opened or reopened 19 embassies and diplomatic missions around the continent. His speeches tended to underscore the idea of solidarity and kinship, stressing that Brazil had a moral debt to Africa due to the heavy influence of African slavery on Brazilian society. This proactive diplomacy increased expectations around Brazil's engagement with peacebuilding in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings.

Development cooperation

In its efforts to expand Brazilian cooperation with partner nations, the Lula government significantly broadened technical expert cooperation, especially in Africa and Latin America, with a focus on social policy areas such as tropical agriculture, public education, and public health. Brazil's expanded development and peacebuilding efforts reflected not just ideological commitments to South-South solidarity, but also a pragmatic recognition that Brazil's ambitions to transform global power would require the political support of many countries of the global South.

Brazil branded itself a policy innovator in areas like public health, education, and tropical agriculture, framing its own development experiences as more similar to those of partner countries than those of traditional donors. Most of this technical cooperation is coordinated by the ABC, with some support from the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP). The ABC's annual budget grew from 18.7 million reais in 2006 to 52.26 million reais in 2010, the last year

of Lula's second term.⁴¹ In 2009, half of the budget was spent in African countries, while 23 percent was spent in South America, 12 percent in Central America and the Caribbean, and 15 percent in Asia—illustrating that Brazil's technical cooperation portfolio was not driven entirely by regional considerations.⁴² Brazil's solidarity with sub-Saharan African countries that emerged from the Portuguese empire explains the location of its peacebuilding efforts better than investment potential or short-term strategic interests.

The ABC works with Brazil's implementing institutions—mostly other ministries or associated institutions, such as Fiocruz, the public health institution attached to the Ministry of Health, and Embrapa, the public agriculture research and development company affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture. Less frequently, ABC partners with non-governmental institutions like SENAI (National Service for Industrial Learning) to carry out vocational and professional education programs abroad, but Brazil's technical cooperation initiatives rarely have direct involvement from local civil society entities in partner states. Although Brazil still lacks a legal framework for regulating its international development cooperation (or humanitarian assistance, examined below), its project portfolio diversified considerably during Lula's two terms, both geographically and thematically. It also came to incorporate more trilateral cooperation arrangements, whether with donor state institutions, such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), or with multilateral platforms like the European Union and IBSA.⁴³

The majority of cooperation projects involve sending Brazil-based experts from those institutions on short missions abroad to share knowledge and experience with their counterparts in partner states, typically drawing inspiration from Brazil's domestic experiences. This approach means that Brazilian technical cooperation lacks the thick middle layer of "development experts" that populate other countries' donor agencies and international organizations, as Brazil's providers hold expertise in their given technical field much more than in the transmission of those skills in foreign countries. Although this approach generates few knowledge-generating mechanisms and less institutional memory, it also reduces bureaucracy and some expenses, for instance the maintenance of offices and resident personnel abroad.

There were some exceptions to this pattern of periodic missions. In post-conflict Mozambique, for instance, Brazil sought to foster stability through projects such as a factory to produce drugs locally, including antiretrovirals for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. It also undertook a triangular project with JICA called ProSavana to transform large swaths of Mozambique into an agricultural corridor for export-oriented production of commodities.⁴⁴ Both of these projects ran into problems of scale and financing and, in the case of ProSavana, met resistance from local as well as Brazilian civil society actors. These examples have made some Brazilian diplomats and specialists from the implementing agencies reluctant to take on ambitious, costly projects abroad.

The most strategic initiatives in these settings have become labeled as "structuring projects" (*projetos estruturantes*), and they are meant to build individual and institutional capacity to catalyze sector-wide reform inspired by Brazilian policy models. For instance, Fiocruz has been engaged in the creation and expansion of national public health schools that draw inspiration not only from Brazil's own public health schools, but also from its public health system, the *Sistema Único de Saúde* (SUS), which is based on Brazil's constitutional right to universal access to free health care. Through these structuring projects, Brazil has offered state-led alternatives to models promoted by Western donors and major international organizations. However, in some instances they are implemented with little attention to local civil society, which contrasts with

the very origins of those systems back in Brazil. The SUS itself resulted as much from grassroots activism during Brazil's re-democratization in the 1980s as from government efforts. As a result, when such models are used as inspiration for post-conflict settings like Mozambique and Angola, they may run into difficulties resulting from the "political disembeddedness" of the cooperation projects, which do not take into account the role of local civil society.⁴⁵

Brazil's peacebuilding has also included economic cooperation, including trade and investments (particularly in infrastructure), which are viewed as necessary for triggering growth in partner states and essential for post-conflict reconstruction. For instance, although starting from a relatively low base in absolute numbers, there were efforts under Lula to both intensify and diversify Brazil's commercial exchanges with African states. These flows were mostly comprised of Brazil exporting manufactured and semi-processed goods and importing commodities from Africa. In addition, there was an expansion of Brazilian investments in Africa, especially by large companies—either state-affiliated ones like the oil company Petrobras or the airplane manufacturer Embraer, or private ones like Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa, and other Brazil-based multinationals focusing on infrastructure construction. The mining company Vale purchased major concessions and planned large investments around Africa. Some of these companies' investments were partially financed by public institutions, primarily the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), which created special credit lines for export incentives and even opened a regional office in Johannesburg to help coordinate these ties.⁴⁶ Many of the companies that have dealt with BNDES have been beset by allegations of serious corruption.

Within Africa, Brazil has engaged most deeply, although sporadically, in Guinea-Bissau. Many of the strengths and contradictions of Brazilian peacebuilding are evident in this case. At the U.N., Brazil has long acted on behalf of Guinea-Bissau, trying to call the international community's attention to the country's problems, which concern not just recurring political instability but also chronic underdevelopment. Even as Brazil was a very active participant in the creation of the U.N. peacebuilding architecture, including the PBC, it continued to work through the U.N. and the CPLP to garner resources and political dedication to trying to solve Guinea-Bissau's instability and poverty. Once the PBC was established, Brazil assumed leadership of the commission's dedicated committee for Guinea-Bissau, through which it has tried to mobilize political solutions, especially by helping to coordinate the role of regional states and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in preventing further coups-d'état in Guinea-Bissau.⁴⁷ After the April 2012 coup, then Brazilian Ambassador to the U.N. Antonio Patriota undertook fact-finding missions to the country, strengthened communications about Guinea-Bissau between the PBC and the U.N. Security Council (where Guinea-Bissau competes for attention with more severe crises), and was highly proactive in working with ECOWAS to prevent spillovers from the crisis.⁴⁸

Brazil has also tried to implement bilateral cooperation efforts in Guinea-Bissau, ranging from the construction of a security forces training center to technical cooperation in areas like education and agriculture, particularly in helping to diversify the country's economy away from its narrow reliance on the cashew nut cash crop.⁴⁹ Finally, Brazil has invested heavily in trying to boost Guinea-Bissau's electoral system and human rights institutions, but the recurrence of coups in the country attests to the limitations of Brazil's approach as well as the efforts of the broader international community.

During the Lula years, Brazil also expanded its humanitarian role abroad. In 2004, a separate division called the General Coordination of Humanitarian Cooperation and Fight Against Hunger (CGFOME) was created within the MRE. The division was tasked with coordinating Brazil's humanitarian assistance, much of which focused on agricultural and nutritional issues through financial and grain donations to U.N. agencies and programs, as well as specific initiatives undertaken in partnership with other government divisions, such as the Ministries of Health, Defense, and Agriculture. From 2006 to 2015, Brazil channeled humanitarian assistance to 96 countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.⁵⁰

International conflict mediation

Brazil also tried to expand its role in international mediation, which historically had been largely limited to South America, for instance in the successful efforts to mediate a brief border conflict (the Cenepa War) between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. In the 2000s, Brazil became more willing to engage in international conflict mediation outside its own region. For instance, in 2007, Brazil was the only Latin American country to be invited to the Middle East peace conference on the Palestine-Israel peace process, held in Annapolis. Yet the most visible and controversial such attempt involved a collaboration with Turkey and the United States to temper growing tensions surrounding Iran's nuclear program. These efforts culminated in a 2010 agreement signed by Iran, Brazil, and Turkey, whereby Iran would send low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for enriched fuel for Iran's nuclear research reactor.⁵¹ The deal was not implemented for a variety of reasons, including the withdrawal of U.S. support, and the outcome made Brazilian diplomats more reluctant to engage in such high-level mediation attempts. However, the experience did not stop Brazil (under Dilma Rousseff) from working through IBSA in an attempt to mediate the intensifying conflict in Syria; in August 2011, the three countries sent ministerial delegations to Damascus and were met there by President Bashar Assad, who promised (in vain) that his regime would act to stop the escalation of violence.⁵² In 2015 and 2016, Brazil sought ways to support the peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC without playing a key role in the negotiations.

Points of tension

Brazil's peacebuilding is also marked by some points of tension between its discourse and practice. To some analysts, Brazil's longstanding commitment to non-intervention seemed to contradict its participation in MINUSTAH, a mission authorized under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (although the Brazilian government argued that only one section of Security Council Resolution 1542, which established the Multinational Interim Force, was based on Chapter VII, rather than the whole resolution).⁵³ Brazilian peacebuilding has also been criticized for the insufficient transparency and accountability of its initiatives. Although the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the government think tank, has been in charge of collecting data on different aspects of Brazil's South-South cooperation, the government institutions that are invited to open up their data do so voluntarily.⁵⁴

More broadly, the MRE in particular has been reluctant to adopt monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices because these are considered by some Brazilian cooperation specialists to have a heavily Western bent, especially when associated with the practices of donor countries and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, ABC began considering the possibility of developing "homegrown" M&E practices in 2016, recognizing the need for more systematic planning that establishes benchmarks for both process and outcome-

based evaluations. The public institutions from which Brazil's South-South cooperation experts are drawn, such as Fiocruz and Embrapa, have robust mechanisms for M&E that are applied to projects domestically, although these tools have not been implemented abroad (partly due to the weak institutionalization of Brazilian peacebuilding, but also due to some political resistance).⁵⁵ At any rate, the objective of this technical cooperation is partly political in that it promotes the maintenance of good diplomatic relations, an element that is not readily captured by traditional M&E processes.

On the flip side, Brazilian arms companies like Taurus also benefitted from expanding African markets (and indirectly, from African conflicts and instability) to boost their sales of arms and military equipment, including some, such as cluster bombs, that had been banned under U.N. regimes. In 2013, Brazilian exports transferred some \$10 million worth of small arms and accessories alone to other countries.⁵⁶ As with other major arms-exporting countries, these transfers sometimes undermine Brazil's peacebuilding credentials abroad.⁵⁷

The retraction in Brazil's peacebuilding

Despite their close political relationship during Lula's presidency, the transition from Lula to his former chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, saw a noticeable shift in foreign policy. Rousseff seemed to take little interest in issues of foreign policy, aside from commercial and investment relations, and her presidential diplomacy reflected this relative lack of attention; for instance, in her five-and-a-half years of presidency, she only visited three African states—South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique. There were also strained relations between the presidency and the MRE, with abrupt switches of foreign ministers on two occasions. Although Brazilian diplomats (who are overwhelmingly career professionals) provided some continuity to political and cooperation efforts (for instance Brazil's commitment to the BRICS), there was a considerable retraction in high-visibility engagement, both in South-South cooperation and in relations with the North. As one Brazilian diplomat remarked in 2015 about the country's role at the U.N., "We learned how to be agenda makers. Now maybe we are rolling back that role."⁵⁸ Brazil's global role was also complicated by damaged U.S.-Brazilian relations after WikiLeaks documents showed widespread cyberespionage by the U.S. government against Brazilian companies and political leaders, including the president herself.

This foreign policy shift and its economic context—a combination of falling prices in key commodities and ineffective policies—have had concrete repercussions for Brazil's peacebuilding efforts. By 2014, Brazil was facing serious economic challenges, as GDP growth dropped from a peak of 7.5 percent in 2010 to below 1 percent in 2014. With the country entering economic recession, the government implemented wide budget cuts, including to the MRE. These cuts affected not only Brazil's South-South development cooperation at ABC, but also the day-to-day operation of its embassies and other diplomatic representations abroad. According to one diplomatic source, the budget of the CGFOME dropped precipitously from 2010 to 2014.

Unfortunately, the high-profile investigation centered on *Petrobras* and other scandals besmirched not just President Rousseff and her administration, but many members and leaders of Congress (from all parties) and other political and economic elites. Lengthy investigations for corruption and related political feuding hampered the effectiveness of Rousseff's second term, culminating in her impeachment and removal. When the Brazilian Congress first voted to

impeach President Rousseff in spring 2016, Vice President Michel Temer became interim president and appointed José Serra, a São Paulo politician and former presidential candidate from an opposition party, as foreign minister. In his inaugural speech, Serra indicated that the Temer government would stress different priorities than the two preceding Workers Party-led governments, notably by de-emphasizing the role of South-South cooperation and seeking to deepen ties to the U.S. and Western Europe. Temer's government indicated that it wished to tone down the anti-Western rhetoric of both Lula and Rousseff and to deepen ties to the OECD and to Northern countries.⁵⁹ Obtaining a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council has also taken a backseat, although Brazilian leaders have continued to reaffirm the importance of multilateralism to Brazil's engagement abroad.

Within Brazil, discussions began about phasing out the country's role in MINUSTAH, although some have noted that such a retraction would deeply impact Brazil's visibility in international peacekeeping unless troop contributions to other U.N. missions were made. With the delays in the elections and the damage inflicted by Hurricane Matthew in October 2016, Brazil's peacekeeping presence was extended and is likely to persist until the mission ends in the next several months. However, its uniformed forces had declined to 986 as of November 2016.⁶⁰ At the same time, some restructuring within the MRE has generated new sources of uncertainty. In August 2016, after Rousseff was officially impeached, the government announced that the CGFOME had been permanently closed. Although its humanitarian assistance initiatives were reallocated to ABC and the Social Policy division, this reordering signaled that Brazil's role in humanitarian action would not be a priority of the Temer government.⁶¹

Although it is too soon to say what the mid to long-term effects of the new government's reorientation will be, deep uncertainty surrounds Brazil's future role in peacebuilding, especially outside of the U.N. Brazil's engagement with peacebuilding follows an arc—a steep surge followed by a seemingly equally steep decline in its engagement abroad. This variance raises broader questions about how vulnerable the rising power's newfound roles in peacebuilding are to political winds and economic downturns. The low degree of institutionalization and questionable commitment of the state to these recent initiatives make their sustainability unclear, even as demands for innovative approaches to peacebuilding soar with the proliferation of complex and prolonged armed conflicts.

Conclusion

Brazil has pursued both bilateral and multilateral avenues in its peacebuilding engagement, which peaked in the 2000s. However, in comparison with other large rising powers like China, Russia, Indonesia, India, and Turkey, much of Brazil's engagement has taken place through multilateral institutions—not only the U.N., but also informal coalitions such as the G-20, BRICS, and IBSA. This strategy reflects the central role that multilateralism has played in Brazilian diplomacy, including the belief that collective, U.N.-sanctioned initiatives tend to be the most legitimate course of action.

Despite the discourse of demand-driven initiatives, Brazil's peacebuilding is motivated by a combination of interests and identity. While the country's history, including its constitutional landmarks, have established a set of principles that serve as more or less stable guidelines for its foreign policy, they are not always applied in a uniform or consistent manner. Under Lula,

Brazil's aspiration to accelerate the transition of the international system towards a more multipolar configuration undoubtedly influenced some of its peacebuilding engagements. A related objective—a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council—was also among the drivers behind Brazil's expanding engagement with peacebuilding during this period. In turn, these aspirations raised the expectations that other actors in the international community have for Brazil's role in peace and security, both quantitatively (for instance, in terms of financial or troop contributions) but also qualitatively, through innovative approaches to promoting peace.

Brazil has consistently argued in favor of a less militarized approach to international security issues, and most of its peacebuilding efforts rely more heavily on mediation, investment in socioeconomic development (through social policy and job generation, as well as infrastructure development), and coordination between national and regional actors. This combination of elements can be understood as an emerging Brazilian approach to conflict prevention that focuses on tackling some of the root causes of armed conflict, including social exclusion and underdevelopment.

One persistent question, however, concerns the sustainability of these initiatives. Will there be a resurgence in Brazilian peacebuilding? Within the U.N., it is likely that Brazil's political commitment to the peacebuilding architecture, which has been deeply entrenched both in Brasilia and at the mission in New York, will continue. Outside of the U.N., the possibility of another surge in Brazilian peacebuilding is constrained not only by the dual political and economic crisis, but also by the "spread too thin" nature of Brazil's engagement during the 2000s. This overextension is particularly evident in the country's South-South development cooperation portfolio, with many projects indefinitely suspended in 2016 due to budget cuts. Combined with weak institutionalization, as reflected in the lack of a dedicated legal framework and career path specializing in development cooperation within the MRE, the funding gap leads to lapses in institutional learning and feedback mechanisms that would enable improvements, such as in project planning and accountability.

Although Brazil's expanded peacekeeping role has been highly visible thanks to its participation in MINUSTAH and the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the way that Brazil links peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives differs from the approaches of the other rising powers. For instance, whereas India sees development and peacebuilding as deeply intertwined, and whereas Turkey links peacebuilding with humanitarian and peacemaking efforts, for Brazil there is a clearer (but by no means absolute) distinction between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Brazil does embrace the distinction between those two spheres made in U.N. circles, but these two dimensions are more closely linked to Brazilian practices than to Western efforts. This is because Brazil views peacebuilding as a key corrective to conventional approaches to peacekeeping, especially the heavy focus on security and military-dominated initiatives. By linking civilian peacebuilding with peacekeeping operations, as was done in Haiti through the partnership with Viva Rio, Brazil hopes to ensure that peacekeeping missions not only meet the everyday security needs of local populations, but also help to ensure their economic and social wellbeing. Brazil's main contribution, therefore, is not to enhance the Western approach to peacebuilding, but rather to use peacebuilding in order to help rebalance Western approaches in a less securitized direction—to inject more peacebuilding into peacekeeping.

What do Brazil's efforts in peacebuilding indicate about the broader role of emerging or rising powers? Kahler distinguishes between emerging powers' capabilities and their strategies.⁶² In terms of capabilities, Brazil has shown an ability to enhance the global supply of peacekeepers (to a small extent), and to enhance the attention given by the international community to peacebuilding efforts. However, compared to major donors, its development cooperation was minor during the Lula administration, and these efforts have since dwindled to a negligible amount. Its impact on global peacebuilding has thus been more at the normative and qualitative levels than in quantitative terms. Its use of peacebuilding programs to enhance Brazilian business interests also suggests a direction that other rising powers have pursued and may pursue more aggressively in the future.

As with the roles of Turkey, South Africa, and Indonesia, Brazil's expanded role in mediation efforts, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict programs has concentrated on countries that are not at the heart of major international security debates. This focus has helped to bring attention to areas that compete with more visible hubs of instability and conflict in the international agenda. Its emphasis on African and Lusophone countries reflects cultural principles in ways that contribute to this alternative focus. At the same time, despite its own resource constraints, Brazil has articulated and pushed for an alternative approach to peacekeeping – one that rests fundamentally on peacebuilding – with clear principles set out. Its effects as an alternative have been noted and have piqued interest among other stakeholders, but they have not yet been transformative. Indeed, in many instances, the peacebuilding efforts of all rising powers have actually helped to advance the traditional powers' liberal order by picking up some of the slack in the less strategic corners of the globe, with few resources and a distinctive approach that remains largely symbolic.

However, these efforts might yet prove more than symbolic. With some relatively successful peace initiatives in a handful of places like Haiti, Myanmar, or Somalia, rising powers could gain greater influence in multilateral fora. These states could ultimately stir deeper debate on militarized approaches in more prominent crises, on par with the U.N. Security Council debates on Libya, Syria, and Iran in recent years. Preliminary signs of the Trump administration's foreign policy suggest a potential for a backlash or balancing from rising powers, both within their respective regions and at a global level. Their behavior hints at what a more equitable global order might look like. Indeed, if some more influential powers such as China or Germany were to embrace such approaches, the impact could be considerable. However, with the recent political crises experienced by Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa, the upward arc of rising powers' trajectory in global fora has faltered. In order to play a transformative role, Brazil will need to regain its economic and political footing, and then reboot its efforts to make its own peacebuilding more sustainable, coherent, and accountable.

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⁸ See Article 4, Brazil Constituição de 1934: <http://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/consti/1930-1939/constituicao-1934-16-julho-1934-365196-publicacaooriginal-1-pl.html>.

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- ⁵⁷ See, for instance: Robert Muggah and Nathan B. Thompson, “Brazil’s Merchants of Death,” *The New York Times*, October 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/opinion/brazils-merchants-of-death.html?_r=0.
- ⁵⁸ Charles T. Call personal interview with Brazilian diplomat who requested anonymity, August 2015, Brasilia.
- ⁵⁹ Ministério das Relações Exteriores, “Discurso do ministro José Serra por ocasião da cerimônia de transmissão do cargo de ministro de estado das Relações Exteriores,” May 18, 2016, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes->

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⁶⁰ Kai Michael Kenkel, “Contributor Profile: Brazil,” *Providing for Peacekeeping*, February, 2017, www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Brazil-Kenkel-10-Nov-2016-1.pdf.

⁶¹ Gabriela Valente, “Itamaraty extingue departamento de combate à fome,” *O Globo*, September 19, 2016, <http://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/itamaraty-extingue-departamento-de-combate-fome-20101655>.

⁶² Miles Kahler, “Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo,” *International Affairs* 89/3 (2013): 712.