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HOW RELIGION AND NATIONALISM FUEL CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. BUSH: Good morning. Welcome to Brookings on this nice, spring day. My name is Richard Bush and it's my pleasure to welcome you on behalf the Center of East Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings, which I direct. And the Center for Middle East Policy Studies, which I don't direct, and our two centers are co-sponsoring today's event on religion and nationalism in Southeast Asia.

That happens to be the book, the title of a new book by our good friend and former colleague, Joseph Liow. And it just happens that Joseph is here with us today. We want to thank him for coming all the way from Singapore to do what is the first Washington book launch of his new book.

He will be joined in a discussion buy our colleague Shadi Hamid, from the Center for Middle East Policy Studies. And I'm looking forward to the discussion.

Joseph is the dean and professor of comparative and international politics at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. And he was the first holder of the Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies here at Brookings. He has written widely, and including this book, and he will have a book coming out from the Brookings Institution Press soon; "Ambivalent Engagement, the U.S. and Regional Security in Southeast Asia after the Cold War."

Shadi, is a senior fellow here at Brookings, and he works in the project on U.S. relations with the Islamic world, in the Center for Middle East Policy Studies.

I was watching a new show last night, and it was revealed by someone who seem to know what he was talking about, that General H. R. McMaster, President Trump's new national security advisor, had a meeting yesterday or the day before with his staff to talk about their future together. And one of the things he reportedly said was that the United States would no longer use the term: "radical Islamic terrorism."

Now, that's a very interesting statement, and directive given the currency that term has had in the last year. Those three words, "radical Islamic terrorism" had seemed to meld together, and sort of stopping the use of that terms I think may permit a more sophisticated discussion of the role of Islam in terrorism, or not.

But it speaks to the broader question of the subject of Joseph's book, and that is, what is

exactly the connection between religion and political action, and even political violence. And it turns out, based on Joseph's book, that the relationship has actually become quite complex. It varies from case to case, and it's only by exploring a series of cases that we can understand the nuances in that relationship. It's only through having that understanding of complexity that we can fashion good policy to deal with political outcomes that involve religion.

So, without further ado I'd like to invite Joseph and Shadi to come up to the stage and take a seat, and then for Joseph to present his remarks. Shadi will then offer some comments and moderate the discussion. Thank you very much. (Applause)

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Good morning, everyone. It's a lovely morning, and I'm particularly pleased, I'm thrilled in fact, to be back here at Brookings; even more so because I got a chance to ride in on the new metro trains, and quite impressive, quite impressive.

And I would really like to thank Brookings for this invitation to come here and share some ideas about my recent book. I spent two years here, as Richard was mentioning just now, as the Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies. It was a fantastic two years; it was a great opportunity to learn from Richard, and my colleagues at the Center for East Asia Policy Studies.

But I also had a chance to interact with other colleagues, especially Shadi, Will McCants and several others in the -- the Middle East Center, and I'll just call it that; and so it's indeed a real pleasure that both have sort of combined efforts to invite me to come and speak here.

So, the book is not an outcome of the work that I was doing at Brookings, so let me sort of mention that first. That will be the next one that’s coming out, hopefully, later year. But nevertheless, it was a project that I had been working on for a number of years, and when I came over here, Richard very kindly allowed me to bring that project with me, you know. And I completed it while I was at Brookings. I think I did the last two chapters and, of course, the usual revisions and all that sort of stuff while as Brookings.

So, in that sense it is also a Brookings project, although it's published by Cambridge University Press. It's not quite Brookings, but it will have to do. And another point I should mention about the book, it was a pet project and it wasn’t exactly a policy-oriented book. I intend it to be so. But nevertheless I think there are some -- obviously some sort of policy implications that flow from some of

my thoughts, encapsulated in that book. And maybe we can, sort of, discuss that and tease that out a bit.

Now, so what is the book about and why did I write the book? A number of reasons, I wrote the book, or I thought such a book would be an interesting venture because number one, I wanted to do something that was comparative in nature. And I had been looking at Thailand, individually I'd been looking at Malaysia, individually I had been looking at Philippines individually. And then one day I woke up from bed and I thought, hmm, what if we try to make them -- what if I try to make them speak to each other? Is that even possible?

And I was a bit concerned because there is a tendency, and I'm probably simplifying it, but there's obviously a tendency in some social science, or some segments of the discipline, to look for generalities. I didn't actually want to look for generalities, I wanted to look for the nuance, for the difference -- differences but see how they sort of reflect on each other.

So, that was the first reason. The second reason, was I had already attempted comparative study of Thailand and the Philippines a number of years ago, and it was published by the East-West Center, so two issues, but this was before your time, this was more (inaudible), like a first time. I had a lot of fun doing that, and I wanted to sort revisit some of the themes and ideas in that little book.

And thirdly, if you look at the region today, if you look at Southeast Asia today, you will see a lot of discussions about religion and the role of religion in politics. Right? And you really don't have to look very far. Even in the U.S., a place where Southeast Asia is not exactly a top priority, there's a lot of -- one thing, one thing I learnt when I was in my two years here, at Brookings, was that as far as Southeast Asia is concerned for the U.S., two issues were foremost, at the top of the agenda.

Number one was the South China Sea, and the second was Burma, right, Myanmar. And as far as Myanmar is concerned we all know, and we've all been reading about all the unfortunate happenings there with regards to the minority Rohingya community. But obviously the story doesn't stop there. In Thailand and the Philippines we are told that various jihads are being waged by Muslim minorities against majoritarian prejudices of Buddhist and Christian/Catholic majority states.

In Malaysia you don't have violence of bloodshed, not yet at least, hopefully, never, but nevertheless there are some disconcerting trends in that country. And which I find fascinating because Malaysia, maybe not so much recently, but not too long ago, it was touted as sort of exemplar for

moderate Islam, whatever that means, right? You know, talk about radical island being problematic, moderate Islam is just as problematic.

But nevertheless, you know, and exemplar for moderate Islam is just as problematic, but nevertheless, you know, an exemplar for moderate Islam, but if you have a close look at what is going on there, it's quite disconcerting. You are looking at Malay Muslim majority that is essentially imposing its morals, its ideas, its norms on non-Muslim constituencies in the country.

Indonesia, those of you who follow Indonesia or Southeast Asia closely, you would be aware of the recently held elections the governorship of Jakarta. The interesting thing was across the Archipelago, there were 100-plus, 200 local elections being held but you read the press you imagine there was only one election in Jakarta. Of course, you know, Jakarta being the capital, the financial and political capital, there's good reason to pay attention to it, and in so far as attention was paid to it, it was really -- the story was really about the blasphemy trial of the incumbent who is seeking reelection as the governor.

So, you see, all these dynamics taking place across Southeast Asia, and sort of underlying this phenomenon, I think it's a common assumption -- they all share this common assumption, and that is that, many of these conflicts, whether political conflict or violent conflict, appear intuitively religions in nature, because of the use of religious narratives, metaphors language by the actors involved, right. And you see this line being repeated, being ventriloquized, in fact, in the popular media, in populist literature, even by conflict actors themselves. Even by conflict actors themselves, and officialdom, as well.

So, it creates this -- or rather it reinforces some of these concerns about religion, the sort of anti-modern tendencies in religion. It reinforces notions of a clash of civilization, cosmic wars, anti-modernity, et cetera. You find all these catch phrases, in a lot of the sort populist literature on the topic.

But I was, obviously, uncomfortable with this sort of explanation, and I wanted to sort of get deeper into some of these issues. And the reason why I wanted to sort try to push myself to get deeper into them was because I looked at lot the literature, and then I -- you know, I got the sense that when some of these scholars or analysts they try to deduce what causes conflict. There seems to be a tendency to confuse that question with another question which is why groups engage in conflict. Okay?

The two sound the same but I would submit to you that they are fundamentally different. And that leads me to my argument, you know, so when you are in graduate school, they always say, you know, in one line, what's your dissertation's argument?

So, my argument is basically, that while religion may cause contestations, and conflicts appear to be waged in the name of God, and of creed, religion may not be what the fight is essentially about. Okay? So, in other words, it may be erroneous to assume that a conflict is religious in nature, simply by virtue of the fact that you observe it being religious in manifestation.

And my key points of departure in the book, two really: the first is that the question of whether religion lies at the heart of the problem of political conflicts in cases where there are conflicts, or in cases where conflicts take on a religious guise, that's number one.

And number two, how should we conceptualize and understand the complex rule that religion might play? Because if we argue that religion is not a core driver, the reality is that it's still there. You know, it's still part of the conflict terrain.

So, you don't want to, on the one hand, be sort of simplistic and sort of brush it off. On the other hand, you don't want to -- or rather you don't want to be simplistic and sort of say that these are religious conflicts because it's manifested in that way. On the other hand, you don't want to just brush it off, because the fact of the matter is that it is that it is part of the conflict terrain.

So, it is for this reason that I decided to explore this question of how religion and nationalism are mutually implicated in many of the cases in Southeast Asia.

So, why did I choose nationalism? I ask myself that question, and I realize that what happened at one particular point, you know, in life always there's that turning point, right? So, my turning point which led to this projects was actually a conversation I had with an old friend of mine, he has passed away already. This was in 2004. I was doing research on Southern Thailand. As you might know there's an ongoing conflict, a jihad going on there, right?

And so, we were in one of ubiquitous tea houses in Southern Thailand. He as a local civil society activist, and so we were talking about the conflict, and I was asking him why, why do you think that that the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand, who have been, since the early 1990s, the recipients of very generous support by the Thai government and the Royal Palace, why do they still insist on waging

this conflict against the government?

You know, they've got educational opportunities, they've got development, at least in theory, right, coming in. And then he looked at me, and he said, this is exactly the problem with the way the Thai government approaches the issue, because it's not about development, it's not about opportunity, it's about allowing us to be ourselves, to live as Malay, to live as Muslims in our land. Okay?

So, a very -- You can detect quite clearly from the response like that. And, by the way, it's not just him; this is the kind of response you get from many of the locals you interact with there. If they trust you and are prepared to open up to you; it speaks to obviously a very deep sense of grievance, a very deep sense of history, and not only that, a sense that that history and their identity and culture has not been, shall we say, taken into account in the Thai construction of the nation.

Okay, so that is what brought me to -- led me to become interested in this nexus between religion and nationalism. And when I start doing research in the southern Philippines, you know, it was a common phenomenon that I accounted as well, as far as the narrative is concerned. So, let me move on very quickly.

So, what are some of the theoretical underpinnings to my book? I have three, sort of, general theoretical underpinnings. The first is that when you read the book -- forget about the book -- when you look at this issue of religion and politics and conflict in Southeast Asia, we need to be mindful of the fact that for Southeast Asia, religion is not just a set of creeds, or faith, or believe in God. Okay.

It's that for sure, but it's more than that. It is a way of life; it is a lived historical experience for Southeast Asia. It is a sociological and historical phenomenon for them. Okay. In Southeast Asia, religion has always been key to issues, to questions of identity. And because religion is key to questions of identify, it follows that religion will play an important role in providing a framework through which people interpret political events, and not only that, it also provides a normative language for how they respond and react to these events.

And it is, if you think about it, if you look at the history of the region, you really cannot, sort of divorce the religious and the divine from notions of political authority. I mean, if you think about pre-modern Southeast Asia, the concept of Hindu, Buddhist cosmos and kingship, turns on that exact logic. If you look at the anti-colonial movements, in Southeast Asia, they were almost -- the early ones

were entirely led by religion orders, or religion leaders.

You know, in Burma, the sangha was very important in triggering anti-British nationalism. In Indonesia, the Sarikat Islam, and Budi Utomo; in Malaysia, you have a number of Islamic movements drawing on the Islamic reform in the Arab world at the turn of the 20th Century. In Thailand as well, okay. So, you cannot divorce it too.

Even today, even today, I would submit to you, if you look at some of the rich and diverse religio-political narratives in the Indo Malay world today; captured in terms like Pancasila, Islam Hadhari, Masyarakat Madani -- what others -- Piagam Jakarta right, the Jakarta charter; Islam Nusantara, the latest effort by the Nahdlatul Ulama to sort of pushed back against, the sort of extremist narratives of ISIS; You know, all these concepts speak to a desire to use religion to reflect on the challenges of modernity. Not to escape modernity but to sort of deal with modernity.

So that was point number one. Point number two, there is distinction between the religious and the secular. Something that we take for granted in the west. I would submit to you, it's a false distinction; a product of a particular time and particular place, i.e.15th to 17th century Europe and the Enlightenment. Even then it was not a case where the secular and modernist nationalism replacing religion, that wasn't the case, the situation was how the Westphalian state was the outcome of negotiations between the church and the state.

And attempts to export this separation of church and state through the enterprise of imperialism and colonialism to, among other places, Southeast Asia collapse, it was collapsed for reasons I mentioned earlier, right; because religion, this separation church, state, or temple and state, or mosque and state, was something entirely foreign, entirely foreign to Southeast Asia.

And number three returning to those concepts I mentioned earlier, and again they speak not only about religious faith and creed, but they also present ideas of how society, a modern society, should be organized and its politics should be conducted. So, it's a very modern phenomenon. It doesn't lend itself to this assumption that some people have, you know, that religion is an archaic, cultural artifact that is best left on the scrap heap of history. Okay? So these are some of the sort of theoretical assumptions that I pursue in the book.

Now, how does religion and nationalism sot of become mutually implicated? Again, I

present three points to how I see that happening. The first is religion animates questions of legitimacy, basically. Legitimacy, as we know is a crucial component of nationalism because it poses the imperative question: by whom should one be ruled and on what terms?

And I would say that some states struggle to create a sense of "we-ness" you know, the essence of nationalism, simply because of a deficit in legitimacy, and by deficit I mean they do not, or they fail to get the buy-in of various segments of the population that feel that the predominant conception of nationhood is being imposed on them, and not able to accommodate their own notions of identities, including religious identity.

Secondly, religion reinforces collective identities. Nationalism is a process through which identifies are conceived, and constructed, and this, in the book I term this the conception of nationhood, but in studying the conception of nationhood, we have to consider the existence of competing conceptions of nationhood. And these processes of conception -- conceptualizing nationhood can and have taken place along religious lines in much of Southeast Asia.

And thirdly, religion amplifies the politics of inclusion and exclusion. This claim is predicated on the point that the political cultural entity of the nation, is not and has never been consonant with the political judicial entity known as the state. In other words, there are minorities that may not share, they may not share in the majority all-encompassing conception of nationhood, and want to push back, and want to resist it. And they do so along religious lines as well.

So, the last part: how does all this -- how do all these ideas play, these ideas play out in the case of Southeast Asia. Let me just say a few things on that. The first is, if you look at the violence in Thailand, and the Philippines, southern Thailand, southern Philippines, something that I've looked at for quite some time. And what is fascinating is that in a lot of the narratives of conflict and violence there, we are looking at, not the liberation of a transnational caliphate, you know, the labels of ISIS and their sympathizers notwithstanding, but of a historically, culturally and territorially bound entity.

You know, whether it's imagined or otherwise, okay, it's (inaudible) Dar-es-Salaam, or it is Bangsamoro. And the notion is to liberate these lands from the illegitimate hold of a central colonial state. You know, it's fascinating, you talk to the locals, the Muslims in southern Thailand, in southern Philippines, they talk about the relationship with the central government in Manila and Bangkok as that of

-- between the colonizer and the colonized. Okay? So, for them, imperialism and colonialism has not ended.

Secondly, you look at a phenomenon like Islamization and Christianization, a very interesting phenomenon in Indonesia, that has been playing out since the 1970s, basically the idea was that -- or the point was that from the '70s to the early 1990s, the Suharto administration basically co-opted and leveraged on Christian and nominal Muslim support to build up his political base against the more devout, or they call it Sentra Muslims in Indonesia.

The logic, as it extends to contemporary times, is that the pendulum has swung back in favor of the Muslim, the activist Muslim community, and the anti-Ahok Riots. Ahok is the nickname of the Basuki Purnama, the candidate for the governorship, right. He's a ethnic Chinese Christian and, you know, by the account, many have wanted to dismiss him as a candidate really, and the -- I won't go into the details of that whole blasphemy thing, but essentially the way that is playing out, it's quite possible to see that in the same light of this tension between the Christianization and Islamization in Indonesia.

In Malaysia, as I mentioned earlier, it's equally if not more disconcerting, I think, because what you have are Malay Muslim ethno-nationalist with commandeer -- who now commandeer the levers of state power, and have brought that to bear to impose their conception of -- their distinctive conception of nationhood and legitimacy on minorities, you know, on the grounds that Malay Muslim dominance is the sine qua non of the Malaysian nation state.

And finally, in terms of the politics of belonging, I think this phenomenon has been captured in a lot of the discourses and narratives of difference of who is in and who is out of the nation, vaguely familiar kind of tension, I think. You know, in Malaysia, you might be having it now in Southeast Asia, they've been dealing with this for a long time, and it still hasn't died down.

In Malaysia, if you look history textbooks, at the secondary, that would be high school, or middle school level, you have references to ethnic Chinese, and ethnic Indians as "penumpang," right, which is Malay for visitors, or temporary stayers. And so that as opposed to the citizens, the locals, right, in Thailand you still have Thais referring to Malay Muslims as Kack, which is a derogatory term for foreigners, especially those with darker skin.

In Myanmar, we didn't talk a lot about Myanmar, primarily because I think I didn't cover in

my book, because I'm nowhere competent -- near competent on Myanmar. But you have Bengali Kala, again, you know, the notion that this community -- they use this to refer to the Rohingyas, who they deny citizenship to, they are denied a status of being a Myanmar citizen, too, on grounds of, again, their color and their distinctive religion, distinct from the dominant Buddhist religion. So, you see all this playing out.

So, in conclusion, I think that the point I will emphasize again is that the book really was interested, not in drawing generalities, although of course, you know, I encourage anyone who is a game to try to do that, but I was really more interested in the nuances which was, you know -- who was on one hand, thrilling and professionally edifying to identify and sort of articulate and unpack, but given that I also have a think tank hat, it was quite unnerving as well, you know, to see both -- and it's an interesting tension there now.

And I'll end on that note, both the sort of resilience of religion which, in and of itself, is not a problem, bit how it can easily be manipulated on the one hand, but on the other hand, to look at how dynamic and -- or to appreciate how dynamic and how important religion is to the sense of identity and belonging to Southeast Asia. And I think the trick from the policy angle is to balance the two in a way that can reinforce the one without encouraging the other. And I will end on that note. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. HAMID: So, let me just start by saying that when I agreed to be on this panel, a couple months ago, I hadn't read the book, so I assumed it would be great, because I know Joseph. And he really is the preeminent scholar of Islamism in Southeast Asia, but there is still a risk involved, if you haven't read the book yet, right?

But then I did read the book and I can say that it's excellent, and I was reading it over the past few days, and I have a lot of highlights, I scribbled a lot of notes, and I've been processing a lot of the ideas. And I think Joseph alluded to this at the very end without saying the person's name, but even as I was reading the book, I thought to myself, this is not just relevant to Southeast Asia, or the Muslim world, but it's relevant to our own debates here in this country, or really in any country that is debating ideas around nationhood and statehood.

So, as I was reading, I was like: hmm, Trump. Hmm, Trump. But that’s the kind of world that we live in, where he's always s on our mind, I guess. So, I would encourage all of you to consider buying the book, and reading it, it really is a useful and edifying read, and enjoyable.

And so, one thing I like a lot in just terms of framing out discussion is as Joseph said, finding this middle ground. I mean, too often we hear one side of debate that says that religion is everything, and we hear that today from some in the White House. On the other hand, we hear sometimes religion is just a mode of discourse. It's being used; it's being instrumentalized as if the people who are instrumentalizing it don't believe in what they are instrumentalizing.

Or, that the people who are at the receiving end of these kinds of appeals are suffering under some kind of false consciousness, and I think we have to find a middle ground where we say -- where we take religion seriously, but we also acknowledge that it interacts in very complex ways, with the political and economic factors.

And there is a reason that especially in Southeast Asia, and in many Muslim-majority countries, why religion offers such a powerful mobilizational frame; because it resonates with people. And why does it resonate with people? Because people, by and large, in these religiously conservative societies care about religion.

And I think the book does a very good job of unpacking what that means in practice. I think sometimes and this occurred to me especially in the theoretical chapters, we, as Americans, or English speakers, more broadly, I wonder sometimes if we even have the right vocabulary to talk about this in the right way. Because even when we say the role of religion in politics, it presumes that religion is something, and politics is something else.

When you actually spend time during fieldwork in these countries, and talking to either conservative Muslims, or particularly Islamists, you find that these categories are endlessly intertwined, and in their minds, they can't even separate what is religion, what is politics, what is the sacred, and what is the profane? And I think we have to be very much attuned to that.

And what I like a lot though is this sort of idea that debates about religion are sometimes really debates about nationhood, but it's also vice versa. Debates about religion -- or debates about nationhood can be debates about religion. So there's a kind if feedback loop there in understanding the role that religion plays in the construction of a nation, is very critical here. Because religion does have something to say about building a nation, because what does religion deal with? It deals with belonging, with we-ness, with legitimacy, with loyalty, and those are all things that, becoming a nation, or being a

nation deal with.

So, naturally there is going to be quite a bit of overlap. And just the last thing I will say before just posing a couple of questions to Joseph, is I think was we see in these cases in that -- well first of all we know religion is a constant to some extent in the sense that people care about their religion in, say, Malaysia or Indonesia, over the course of many decades, but we see religion flaring up in politics, in particular moments. And we find that religion flares up when people are having contentious debates about who is part of the nation.

So, that by itself tells us something. And we see this also in the Middle East that, in the post-Arab Spring context, people are debating, really for the first time in decades in some cases, who they are, and what it means to be Egyptian, Tunisian or Jordanian. And they have the chance to talk about these issues openly, and then that's where these issues really come to the fore and become polarizing.

So, with that, Joseph, and then we'll open it up to all of you, there's a couple things that are maybe a little bit more specific, that I just wanted to get your thoughts on.

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Yes.

MR. HAMID: And I was very struck that I believe it was in the case of Malaysia, 1981 where the ministry of home affairs bends not just the publication of the Bible, but also its distribution, and for someone who works primarily on the Middle East, it's hard for me to even imagine that happening and say, Egypt or Jordan, but the fact that it happens in what we consider, often, a model of tolerance and pluralism, and at least democratic politics, it's interesting that such aggressive would be considered that long ago. It's not even recently.

It's in the early 1980s, and also even the debates over Christians using the word Allah, where there have been efforts to essentially ban Christians in Malaysia from using the word Allah, which is, it's hard for me to, I mean to just process that for a second. And then that kind of fits into this issue also of Malay lordship, it's very kind strong ethnic Malay identity, which I think, as far as I got from the book, is very much tied to fears of the Muslim majority. For some reason, even though there are 60 percent plus, of the overall population, there is this very strong fear of being undermined by relatively small Christian minority.

So, I'm just wondering, if you could maybe unpack some of those issues. Where does that fear come from really? Do you want to -- Yeah, yeah, okay.

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Sure. Thanks, Shadi. First thank you very much for your very encouraging reactions to the book, I should have asked you to write a blurb. (Laughter) But as specific to the question, I mean, when you were asking about the issue of the banning of the Bible, and the use of Allah, it reminded me of a visit I made -- So, I was attending a conference in Jerusalem, in I think it was 2011. And then I had of this, because it was my first trip there, and so I decided to get a driver who was a Palestinian, to bring me over to the West Bank.

And then, of course, you know, the West Bank is a stone's throw away, no pun intended there. But then we had to go one big loop right around the wall. So he got me to the West Bank, saw the sites and all of that; then got me to have tea with some of his friends. So, I was in there having tea.

Then I asked him, I asked him the question, and I asked him a question because of what was going on back in Malaysia about this controversy of who has proprietary rights to the term Allah, right? So I asked him, I said, so in the Middle East do non-Muslims use the term Allah?

And they looked at me as if I was, you know, from another planet. So I had to repeat the question again. you know, maybe it was a language statement. Then they said, yeah, everyone uses it. Including non-Muslims? Yeah. Including Christians? Yeah.

And then they asked m; why did you ask that question? So, I said, oh, it's interesting because in part of the world, in Malaysia, they've basically banned non-Muslims, Christians, from using the term Allah, and saying that it is a distinct to the Muslim community. And then he laughs. So, I asked him, why do you laugh? And then he said, oh, you know, in the Middle East everyone uses the term Allah. Anyway, we have more important things to worry about, than who can or cannot use that term.

But, you know, that was interesting because, again, this issue of who gets to -- who gets to use that term. Who has proprietary rights to use that term? Speaks to the second issue, which you alluded -- which you asked about, this notion of Malay lordship, because it speaks to the sense of insecurity, a very paradoxical sense of insecurity and vulnerability of the Malay Muslim community in Malaysia.

And I always wondered why that is so. I mean, there are a number of reasons that one

can posit. For one, the ruling of no party because of the birth of any other agenda, has split up this -- for decades have been playing this agenda of Malay dominance, and those of you who know Malaysia, you will know how ethnic identity and religious identity are essentially conflated in the country.

You know, and is constitutionally sanctioned, where, if you are Malay, constitutionally, you are a Muslim. Again, it's in Article 3 of the Malaysian constitution. And that, as you can imagine, creates a lot of problem, not least of which is this issue of how you reconcile that with Article 11 of the constitution, which allows for freedom of religion, you know.

So, can you -- the sort of question, you know, that arises is, can Muslim lead the faith. After all, if you believe in freedom of religion, *ipso facto* you can, you know, not to make light of it, but hop from faith to another, right, for whatever reason you what. Not so easy in Malaysia, quite complicated, in fact it's illegal.

So, back to the sense of -- you know, again sometimes I'm tempted to call it this bipolar complex, between a sense of superiority and a sense of insecurity of the part of the Malays. A second reason possibly for that, quite interestingly, could be demographics. You tend to have this sort of contradictory dynamics of supremacy, and insecurity when you are a -- when you are a majority but barely a majority, and that could be the case in Malaysia because the Malay Muslims -- you know, so Malay, specifically Malay Muslims, not Southeast Asian Muslims, Malay Muslims constitute about maybe 50 -- between 52, 55 percent of the population.

And why I think that is interesting, although I've never done any sort of quantitative research on this. If you go to Kelantan, which is a northern Malay state, which is 95 percent Malay, they don't buy into this insecurity complex. You know, and they have no problems with non-Muslims using term Allah. But it is, you know -- but that’s an exception. Across the rest of Peninsula Malaysia, there is this tension. So, something tells me that demographics has something to do with it, as well.

MR. HAMID: Great! So, I want to make sure we have enough time for questions. I want to start with Richard, if you want to start us up, whatever is on your mind, and then we can kind of open it up to the rest of you.

MR. BUSH: Thanks very much, Joseph, for your presentation; and Shadi, for your comments. I want to ask a parochial Washington question based on what I was saying before. And that

is, you know, if you had 5 minutes with General McMaster, what would you say about this issue? What would you tell him about Southeast Asia?

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Okay. I'll give you the parochial, Washington response. Number one, Southeast Asia is important. Don't take your eyes off Southeast Asia. But specific to this issue, I think that the -- sort of the policy narrative as it has evolved in the Trump America, is going to be most unhelpful, you know, because it's a very simplistic, it's a very Manichaean, a very Bannonish kind of world view, that is going to create far more problems that it's going to solve.

And the reason, why, again, is if you look at Southeast Asia, the dynamics of the interaction between religion and this gamut of -- this set of, you know, other issues and other identity markers and signifiers is so complex, that simplifying it would be a very big risk and what's worse if certain policies flow from it, you know, if the simplification lends itself to certain policies, that is going to create even more problems.

I've met him before, and I think he appreciates that, and as you mentioned earlier about the this thing about radical Islam, but I think the people who really need to appreciate it, don't appreciate it and don't have time for it, so that would be a concern as far as the region goes.

MR. HAMID: All right. Okay, so we have a few questions, so I think we'll start by taking two at a time. And if I could just ask all of you to just say your name and your affiliation, so why don't we start with you, sir, here?

SPEAKER: Chattou Asan, independent researcher. When we think about Islam and nationalism, actually we see that there is only one nation in Islam, and that is ummah. That's Allah preferred everywhere. That's why all Muslims, whether they are Chinese, whether they are French, of German, or Turks or Persians, they pray in Arabic. So, ummah is the notion, is the idea and it's practiced everywhere. I mean, the only language that they use is Arabic in Islam. So, the question is, what is the rationale of other nations to this idea of one nation, which is the ummah? Yeah. Thank you.

MR. HAMID: We'll take another. Right here.

SPEAKER: My question kind of builds on that, and that is --

MR. HAMID: Who are you?

SPEAKER: Oh. Sorry. My name is Jake, I'm, sorry, with the Hindu American

Foundation. And if you look at history though, like with the fall of the caliphate and which essentially created Turkey which was done by the British Empire. And then fast-forward 20 years later, and you have the partition of the subcontinent, in which the Muslim League of India then said, that we cannot life under rule of anyone, but the ummah, or the Muslim, and thus created Pakistan East and West.

And do you figure your research into that phenomenon that across, you know, Southeast Asia, which is essentially the majority of the Muslim world that they -- that Pakistan was created out of this assumption, that Muslims could not live under anyone but Muslim rule?

MR. HAMID: Do you want to --

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Okay. Sure, sure. Okay on the question of Islam and nationalism, I think -- you know, I agree with you when you mentioned the universal principles, right. The notion of the ummah, the hash you know, where everyone comes regardless of nationality, at least in theory, you know, but they still fly on national airlines, and you quotas and things like that, you see.

So, even then the nation state impinges on the presumed universalism of Islam. But the use of the Arabic language as wrong, you are absolutely right, as far it being the language of the Quran, right. But we also know that through history, since the passing of the prophet, if you want to find a sort of -- and I take the risk of simplifying here. But a common theme in Islamic history from that point all the way until today, is this notion of the fragmentation of the ummah, and attempts to rebuild it.

You know, I see that as a common theme through the years. And if I just -- you know, we don't want to get into -- stray too far afield into a sort of Islamic history, if I just talk about Southeast Asia; I'll give you a concrete example of this. When I did work on the Muslims in southern Thailand, the interesting thing, number one, is obviously Thai Muslims don't just live in southern Thailand, they are strewn across, you know, in the north in Chiang Mai, in Bangkok, the plains areas.

When you talk to them about the so-called jihad going on in the south, it's very interesting because their view is that it's illegal, you know, they shouldn't be doing this. It's un-Islamic to do it. You know, we support what the government is doing. We do not support the violence. And then you go down to the south and they believe that not just their religion is at stake, obviously they believe that, and they are fighting for their religion, but obviously not just, it's their own lives is at stake.

So, here, I mean done even talk about the universal transnational notion of the ummah,

just within the territorial nation state. You see basically very different views of how religion should or can be mobilized in the service of a particular course, right. So, my point basically is that, in theory the universalist principles is what all Muslims strive to attain. But I suppose in practice, you know, we are -- Let me put it this way, we are all human, so this part of paradise we are not going to achieve that; right?

So, with that we'll have to be something better left to the -- you know, when we cross the rainbow bridge, as my daughter calls it.

SPEAKER: -- Arabic, is actually on Arabic nationalism, because --

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Only the language.

SPEAKER: In language, yeah, because all Muslims are supposed to use Arabic in their prayer. So, this -- so triggers of language, do you think we can conclude that as only the Arabic nationalism, and other nations' language and culture is undermined?

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: I don't think that we necessarily have to look at it in that way, you know, because it is -- yes, it is the use of a particular language, but there are other aspects of worship that come into play as well. So, I think it would be probably a bit too -- I will say carefully, a bit too simplistic to just say that, because Muslims worship in Arabic, and because Arabic is the language so, you know, supporting nationalism.

And I'll give you another example, in Southeast Asia, they can recite the Quran in Arabic, they have no idea what it is they are reciting. That is a perennial problem. The Hoopa is not in Arabic, so for them, the form is Arabic, but the substance is in their local language.

MR. HAMID: No, no. We have to move one.

SPEAKER: Just one more.

MR. HAMID: No, no, no. I just want to make it clear now --

SPEAKER: We can talk after?

MR. HAMID: We can talk after if you want to -- you know, no, we have to -- Sorry.

SPEAKER: Sorry.

MR. HAMID: But Joseph, I just to piggyback on this.

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Yes.

MR. HAMID: So, if someone reads your book and comes out of it and says, well, hey, it

doesn't seem like nationalism mixes well, with Islam, or Islam mixes well with nationalism that, in a sense, they both kind of speak to the in-group identity, and when you put them together they can reinforce each other, or exacerbate certain issues.

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

MR. HAMID: So, if someone comes to you and says, hey, that's a problem. I'm just curious, how would you sort engage with that?

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Sorry. That's a problem in what sense?

MR. HAMID: That if nationalism is in some ways inherently exclusionary, and religions have an exclusionary aspect in the send that believer can be at least, sometimes prioritized over non-believers. And you put them together and that it -- So, I mean I came out of it wondering; hey, these things don't mix very well together.

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: I mean, there is obviously the opportunity and the impetus to use religion as a means of building inclusion, right. And this is why, you know, whether Islamist or even nationalist, or Muslim nationalists use that. But at the same time, I think that, number one, it automatically excludes, and that's why religious nationalism is quite potent because of this sort of tendency to not just include but also to exclude on religious grounds.

But secondly if you want to -- if you really want to use religion, then you are going to have a problem also, and the problem is basically this; we all know that religion is not monolithic, right? So, in the case of Indonesia which is a fascinating case, what do you do -- or Malaysia for that matter -- what do you do with jihad Muslims who are constitutionally deemed -- Shi'a Islam is legally banned in Malaysia, which is interesting because Rouhani visited Malaysia in November last year, and they find a whole string of (inaudible) views, you know, but Shi'a Islam is bent, you know, and the Sunni-led government cracks down on Shi'a Muslims, the Ahmadis, the Ahmadiyya, you know, the fate of the Ahmadiyya.

It is interesting that the -- that the Ahmadiyya question is interesting because you know they've been at the receiving end, right, in Malaysia and Indonesia. In Singapore I once asked the leader of our Religious Council, we have Ahmadis in Singapore, are you concerned, given what's happening what's happening in Malaysia, in Thailand? He says, no, no, no, we are okay.

So I said, why, why -- you know, what's the basis for saying you are okay? Oh, they are

not Muslims, and they know they are not Muslims, so they accept, in order to claim -- in order to be part of -- in order to be citizens of Singapore, they have to reject their religious identity, which they are prepared to do I supposed for the reasons of survival, because obviously Indonesians, the Ahmadis in Indonesia don't reject that.

And Indonesia is very -- and I'll end on that note -- Indonesia is very interesting with regards to the Ahmadi, because in Indonesia you have to declare -- you cannot be an atheist, right. You have to formally declare one or five or six religions. And then as far as Islam is concerned there's only one. Right, Islam. There is no Shi'a or Sunnis, and so a Muslim, you have to a Muslim.

So, the Ahmadis declared themselves Muslim, you know, and the Indonesian Government has no choice but to recognize them as Muslims. So, on the identity process, under citizen -- under religion they are Muslim. So, legally they are Muslim, but socially and culturally and religiously they are rejected by the main stream. You know, the receiving end of numerous (inaudible), but when they flash the identity card, you know, they are Muslim.

MR. HAMID: Okay, I had another --

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Can you repeat that question again --

SPEAKER: Essentially I want to know, how does what is happening in Southeast Asia, compare to what has happened and is currently happening in South Asia where you had a partition of a sub-continent based on the identity of religion, and that was because the Muslim (inaudible) declared that we could not live under a Hindu rule. So how does that compare to what's happening in southern Thailand and Philippines, et cetera?

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: I think a lot of dynamics, certainly in Thailand and Philippines, they resonate, and they draw on this pint basically that on religious, we have seen this before, that communities on the grounds of religion break away and form a separate entity. Which is why you continue to have separatism in the southern Thailand, and I would say, still, in southern Philippines, precisely along those lines, that logic what we cannot live under anything but religious law. You know, how the law is implemented, and that's a separate issue. So, in that sense I think there is quite resonance.

MR. HAMID: Okay. I have a lady behind. So you are right here, and then just raise your

hands, and then I'll also take you back here, yeah.

SPEAKER: Good afternoon. My name is Theresa, I come from Japan, and now doing in internship in U.S., at Petterson Institution, but actually I'm Indonesian. So in this case I'm quite interested in your opening the Obayaho case, because for us, the minority Indonesian, what we see here is not about, like how religion fail the politics in Indonesia, because the Indonesia case is quite different with Malaysian case because the ethnic minority and the Islam dynamic in Indonesia is quite challenging and always changing especially after democracy.

So, how do you see the Obyaho case here, especially from the point of view, how the political landscape that affect the religion, instead of the religion that failed the politics in Indonesia? As you said before, the religious -- that failed conflict actually is religion in nature, as we see the religion in Indonesia mostly is the political vehicles, for samples or holders in Indonesia. That's all. Thank you.

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Yes. And we can also take the fellow in the back, behind afterwards, yes.

SPEAKER: Renee Duvall, Department of State. You talked a lot about how nationalism can be linked to religion and ethnicity and identity in a way that can -- you know, create both we-mess and other-ness. But what factors are leading governments in their region, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia, to look at a more inclusive discourse on nationalism? One that could incorporate, you know, a broader range of people. Thanks.

SPEAKER: And then just quickly. So I think this is a very good example of how religion and nationality kind of work where you have meeting points of a minority and a majority, but do you think this also exists kind of an in-group discussion. So the Ahok case not necessarily Christians and Muslims, but what kind of Islam are practicing in Indonesia? Is it Islam Nusantura? Or is it some kind of Salafi? You know, in Thailand when you have the Red Shirt monks, and the Yellow Shirt monks, and Yingluck is a good Buddhist, Yingluck is a bad Buddhist, you know, before the coups, how does that play out within groups?

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: That's a very good point, and I will use that actually as a point of entry to your question. Because, as far as the news media is concerned, there's this, you know, the Ahok case is simply an example of a -- okay, first, I think -- and not everyone may know that -- this, what we are

talking about. So, basically what you have is Jakarta is having elections for the Governor.

Okay, the incumbent is an ethnic Chinese Christian and he -- so basically long and short of it, was during a campaign he made a remark to the effect that you shouldn't be persuaded by some arguments -- or argument made by some ulama that you should elect a Muslim to be governor, right? And he selected --

MR. HAMID: You should not elect a non-Muslim?

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: I'm sorry, a non-Muslim, elect a non-Muslim to be governor, and because they cite the Quran to do that, and then he countered with -- I think he countered with his references to Quran. So, that's what he did. Then there was a huge uproar that he had blasphemed against the religion by virtue of saying, and basically the whole thing cascaded and you ended up with huge; very huge -- two very large rallies, in Jakarta in November, and in December, calling for basically his conviction, because he was put on trial for blasphemy. Right?

So, the results are later this month, I think, so the interesting thing is despite this, he managed to come up tops in the election. Although he didn't win enough outright, so there's going to be a second round next months, but he won, like, 43 percent. And of the reasons why he won was because during his trial he was not -- Okay, I would say that during his trial he was somewhat contrite. Or, well, he certainly toned down and he didn't sort -- he wasn't defensive, and he didn't take an aggressive sort of position.

And I think that turned a lot of pubic -- some of the public opinion, Muslim public opinion around. But how I want to use his point to answer yours is that, forget about this issue of, you know, him being a Christian or Chinese and all that. What is equally interesting, if not more so, is to look at the dynamics within the Muslim community in response to the Ahok case. Because not everyone took to the streets, right? Even those who took to the streets were -- you know, had very different reasons for doing it.

Some have friends who did interviews at the protest, and then you have anomalies where they didn't think that he was guilty, but we won Islamic law. And this is why I'm on the street. Do you know? So, it was an opportunity for them to come out to express, but beneath that is this tension within Indonesia and Islam. And I think if you look at Ahok, if you look at ISIS, you know, the phenomenon of

ISIS in Southeast Asia today, beneath it is basically this debate within the Muslim community in Indonesia, about what it means to be an Indonesian Muslim.

So you are exactly right, it's not just about us and them, but within the us group. So, again to your points about the universality of Islam while it's there in theory, the reality is in practice, you know, it's far more complicated, far more complex.

To you your question, ma'am, about a more inclusive kind of national culture, I think in Malaysia, unfortunately, you are not going to see that any time soon. The simple reason is because the prime minister is fighting for dear political life, and they have one tried, tested, fail-safe formula, and that is to play up race, to play up religion. You know, and I find that very disconcerting and very unfortunately, and I elaborate about that in my book.

But Shadi also mentioned it, because politicians may be opportunists and do that but by letting the genie out of the bottle, you know, you really -- because the people on street could well be believers and many of them are, you know, and therein lies the problem, you can't put -- After you win the election, you can't put the genie back in the bottle. Indonesia hasn't reached that point yet, but like I said, you know, the situation there is really soul-searching within the Muslim community.

MR. HAMID: But that's the way that you win elections. And we'll just take one more round. I mean, if that's the way that you win elections in the current atmosphere, is by playing up nationalism or religion, and naturally that's what politicians are going to do, and we see the same thing with the right-wing populism in Europe.

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Yes. I agree. Exactly.

MR. HAMID: And so I mean what do you do about that? If it's effective and as long as it's effective, people will do it.

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Yes, yes. I think in the case of -- in the cast of religion, and in the case of Islamist of all stripes in a place like Malaysia, I think what you need to do, and what was attempted, as you know very well, but it hasn't quite succeeded, is to sort of have Islamist operating in the context of a mainstream discourse which is one that is pluralist.

Do you know what I mean? So in the case of Malaysia, you are talking about all the various political alliances, but unfortunately, you know, it looked good, it sounded good, but they haven't

been able to pull it off. Malaysian political history as you know has strewn the graves of political alliances, right, of different names and stripes. Okay, yeah.

MR. HAMID: Okay. We'll take two more. Or I don't want to disappoint well -- Okay if you can make is short. I'll take, maybe, more than two, but just keep your questions very short. I have right here, and I want to make sure I'm not forgetting the people in the back. So, the two folks in the back; and then, lastly, you. And I'm sorry, that's the most we'll be able to take, yes.

SPEAKER: Satu Limaye, East-West Center. Thank you both, for a terrific discussion. Joseph, would you say that -- Are there any other forms of nationalism that compete with religion as a bases for Southeast -- I'm thinking of, you know, is the sovereignty nationalism possible in contested territories? Sovereignty nationalist that would maybe run against the religious nationalism, or that would be a rallying cry? Is there an economic basis?

And do you think that the democratization elements that you've talked in Malaysia, and the way politics is played, or Indonesia, makes the temptation to use religion even much greater than it did under authoritarian rule?

MR. HAMID: And the two in the back.

SPEAKER: Hello, Joseph. My name is Paz, I'm a graduate student at American. You mentioned how in Malaysia, the Chinese and Indians were considered visitors. But in Thailand there's a large Chinese minority too. And from what I understand they have assimilated with mainstream Thai culture, and I would like to ask how did that happen in Thailand? Thank you.

SPEAKER: Hi. I'm Yvonne Tu, I'm a Law Professor at Georgetown Law Center. So, I'm intrigued by when you said, that religion and secularism is a false distinction, and some imported too, with Southeast Asia, from western colonized -- in the western colonization sense. So then how would you characterize the religion state relationship in somewhere like Malaysia, where as we've seen, like since the sort of secular liberalist who are trying to argue for individual rights, or religious freedom using the language of secularism, right, because of the growing Islamization. So, if secularism is the rhetoric that you want to avoid, or that you think is a false distinction, what is a country like Malaysia then? Is it an Islamic state already as Prime Minister Mahathir famously said? Or is it secular, is there some other hybrid, and if so why?

SPEAKER: John Haley, I teach international relations, and religion at Catholic University. My question has to do with the Philippines. Did you envision any growing dissention by virtue of the new administration in the Philippines, and the reaction of the new President Duterte, towards the Catholic Church? Do you envision that play any role here?

MR. HAMID: Great. So I'll only be able to take (crosstalk) --

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: The gentleman here, of course his hand was up for long (crosstalk); the last question?

MR. HAMID: Last, yeah.

SPEAKER: Mike, with (inaudible) Journals. This sort of plays off your question, and I know this broad, because you are talking a bunch of different countries, but would you define at the moment the role of Christianity in these places as more on the defensive, or offensive dynamic? And then to throw one more loop in, is that dynamic going to change in the coming decade and China becomes the world's largest Christian country?

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Ooh! Okay. I'll try my best, yeah. And lunch beckons. Okay, the first question, sovereignty, what to call it, other forms of nationalism and how that may sort of speak to religion and that sort of stuff. But Malaysia will be an interesting case, and I'll tell you why. Very simply, as I mentioned earlier, the incumbent has a failed proof formula for winning votes, and that is play up racial identity, play up religion, like the non-Muslims, like the Chinese.

Therein lies the intrigue because the current Prime Minister has a huge war chest for the election, the upcoming election that is essentially funded by China. You know, so you are going to have a situation where China is going to be underwriting, the undermining of overseas Chinese in Malaysia, and I am just waiting to see what plays out. Well, I hope it's -- you know, it may not be, you know, nice, but I think that’s a very interesting phenomenon, and --

MR. HAMID: But also the prime minister is from an ostensibly secular party, I mean, part of that --

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.

MR. HAMID: -- that’s part of the irony here, I mean we are not talking about an Islamist party here?

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: No, it's not quite an Islamist party, but it's almost like a sort of convert phenomenon, they have to be more Islamist, because they are not Islamists, you know. Under the Chinese minorities in Thailand, it's been a -- it's a long process, and I think the Thai society or Siamese society, was culturally more amenable to the integration in the first place. And also the Thais were seen -- or sorry, the Chinese, because of their economic networks was seen as very important contributors to the development of the Thai state, and then if you take into account, the relations between the Siamese kingdoms, especially under Chi Luang Koon, that established with China.

This sort provided a more sort of stable sort of environment for the integration of Chinese minorities which you don't find in other parts of Southeast Asia, primarily, island Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia. And in Malaysia's case a lot of it is, if I may say so, the fall of the colonizer, and the policies that they had enacted.

Malaysia, the religion and nationalism, the use of the language of -- the use of secular language; I think, you know, it's not the case that some of these concepts that we associate with secularism, are the sort of, again the prerogative of secularism. Again, you know, in the sense that human rights, human dignity, democracy, there are elements of it, that can be found in the -- not just in the holy scriptures, but in the various creeds, the various hadiths, that have come out from Islam, from Christianity, from other religions that also speak to these issues.

So, again, I don't see it as a very as a very sort of a clear demarcation between the religious and the secular. In the case of Malaysia you also see something vary fascination, which is attempts by Islamists and non-Muslims, basically, to work together, and they are working together on presumably these sort of -- I wouldn't say secularist principles -- but universalist principles, right, anti-corruption, democracy, freedom of speech, human rights and that sort of stuff.

The Philippines and Christianity, maybe I'll take the two together. Yes, you are seeing tension between the Duterte government and the church. In fact, you are seeing tensions between the two Duterte government and a lot of other people, except the Chinese, as it turns out. But actually, we depends on (inaudible) certainly the heavy tension there is sort, again, over the South China Sea. Christianity, in Southeast Asia, unlike Islam, unlike Buddhism, Christianity has distanced itself from mainstream politics.

Even in the case of the Philippines, the Catholic Church, over time has, since the 1986 coup, and the passing of Cardinal Sin, it has distanced itself from comments. And I think in the Philippines case, one particularly hot-potato issue was family planning a few years ago, when Dan Kino administration wanted to introduce and elaborate family planning, contraception basically, and the church opposed it. But eventually they sort caved in as well. But Christianity overall, has been apolitical in Southeast Asia.

But there's a caveat there, and the caveat is this, there is a sense that in -- especially in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, even Singapore, that Christians are usually better educated, middleclass, and better at mobilizing. So the mobilizing potential of the church, it hasn't been activated, but the mobilizing potential of the church, and hence, you know, the possibility of it playing a political role in these countries, is something that we need to bear in mind. And certainly those involved in politics in these countries, are bearing that in mind as well.

MR. HAMID: Great! Well, thank you so much, Joseph, and great to have you back at Brookings. Did you want -- Richard, yes?

MR. BUSH: Those were great questions. Thank you, Joseph for making the long trip. Great to have you back. Thanks, Shadi, for leading the discussion. And the book is "Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia" and it's --

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: That's all.

MR. BUSH: Thank you. (Applause)

MR. HAMID: Thank you.

MR. CHINYONG LIOW: Thank you. Thanks Shadi.

MR. HAMID: Yeah, thanks this is great.

* * * * *

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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