REAL SECURITY:
GOVERNANCE AND STABILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD
LAUNCHING A WORKING GROUP REPORT OF
THE MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY TASK FORCE

Washington, D.C.
Monday, November 21, 2016

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Welcoming Remarks:

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Introduction:

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Panelists:

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PROCEEDINGS

MS. MALONEY: Good afternoon. And welcome on behalf of the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Program, and on behalf of the Atlantic Council. I'm Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director of Foreign Policy at Brookings.

I'd like to extend a special welcome to my counterparts from the Atlantic Council who joined us here today, including Mirette Mabrouk, also Deputy Director; and Ambassador Richard LeBaron. I would also like to extend a special welcome to our distinguished guests from the diplomatic community, including His Excellency, Ambassador Gouia.

We are here today to launch a report commissioned by the Atlantic Council's Middle East Strategy Task Force, and written by my colleague, Tamar Wittes, who, over the past year has convened the Task Force's Working Group on Politics, Governance and State Society Relations. This is one of five such groups organized by the Middle East Strategy Task Force, so a bipartisan initiative launched in February 2015. Brookings Foreign Policy has been proud to contribute to the Task Force Project. Not only via Tamara's report, but also through the Security and Public Order Working Group, whose report was authored last year by our Brookings colleague, Kenneth Pollack.

The report that you have here before you today is informed by Tamara's many discussions with the working group and reflects her own analysis. It helps to explain the collapse in the Middle East state system, take stock of where we are now, and offers recommendations for tackling the crisis of governance in the Middle East in a post-Arab Spring environment. Tamara situates today's breakdown of the regional order within a broader reality. That of years of deteriorating state society relations.

Tamara argues that for the region to develop societies that are resilient to terrorism, and institutions that are effective and responsive for the long-term, there must be a concerted effort to repair trust between governments and their citizens. Dialogue is needed, as is patience and sustained efforts on the part of the regional and...
international actors, including the United States. These are words of wisdom that I think echo very broadly in Washington here today.

As the title of this event suggests real security and stability in the Arab world will be determined by the quality of governance that takes hold there. I encourage you all to read the report, and to share your thoughts on the report and on today's discussion via Twitter, using the hashtag, #MENAGovernance.

The report that we are launching here today was co-chaired by two of today's panelists, Former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and Former National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley; two individuals who need no introduction, two individuals who know more than just a little about real security. We are delighted to have them; and our third panelist, Amr Hamzawy of the Middle East Program, and Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment, to join us here today, to speak with Tamara about the report.

Secretary Albright will present some introductory remarks, and then we'll turn it over to the panel. And finally, we will invite the audience to contribute and to ask your questions and to engage in the discussion. Thank you so much. And welcome, Secretary Albright. (Applause)

MS. ALBRIGHT: Thank you very, very much, Suzanne. And it's a pleasure to be here, and to have the opportunity to share this with Brookings, and thank you very much, for hosting this. I think, as you pointed out, one of the things that really distinguish the Atlantic Council's Middle East Strategy Task Force, is the way in which we were really able to partner with other institutions and scholars in Washington and Europe, and in the region. And it truly is a collaborative effort, and I think that as we talk about it today, I think that will become even clearer.

But it truly was terrific in terms of just working together, I enjoyed it very much. I think, also, just as we engaged a multitude of institutions in the project, we also tackled an awful lot, a multitude of issues in the working groups that we established, and
the working groups did produce the papers, and so today, we are releasing the fifth and final one, on governance. And lest you think that this completes our work, I want to announce that after we all take a break for turkey eating, and cooking, in my case; Steve Hadley and I will be publishing our Final Co-Chairs’ Report next Wednesday.

And that report is going to attempt to knit together the topics tackled by each of the working groups into a new long-term approach for the region, based largely on ideas from the region itself. Our sense really has been, is that we have all spent a lot of time looking at the region, but a lot of it has been kind of fire grills and Band-Aids, and that the basis of what are doing is really taking a much deeper and longer look.

While we have time next week to address our broader strategy, today’s discussion really involves one of its most important components. And we are going to be talking specifically about how, in order to find a way out of the crisis in the Middle East, the states in the region will need to address failures of governance. And of course the problems brought about by the lack of accountable, responsive, and effective state institutions in the Middle East as is so well known to people in this audience.

I think the role these failures played in the breakdown of the region order has in fact been downplayed, and so what you will hear from Tammy is that governance is, in fact, a central cause of the turmoil in the Middle East, something with which I heartily agree. Because as she puts it, the appending of the region didn’t come from outside intervention, nor did it come from the top. It really did come from below, from millions of frustrated people whose expectations far exceeded the opportunities that were available to them.

As we’ve seen over the past five years, it’s far easier to identify the cause of turmoil than to find a solution, and not for lack of trying, but I really do think we have to keep that in mind. And the first challenge in any journey is to have a destination in mind. For the people of the region, I’m convinced that this destination is governance built on a foundation broad and stable enough to last, and that, by definition, governments that
have the trust of their citizens respect their rights and respond to their needs.

And as Suzanne mentioned, Tammy's paper offers a framework for how the region can begin building toward such a model of sustainable governance, and it argues that this work has to begin now, no matter what else is going on. There are many in the region and in the United States who do have a different view, and they argue that these questions of political development can only be addressed after nations achieve security and prosperity.

I happen to believe that political development and economic development need to go together. I know that all of us in various forms of graduate school would argue, which came first, and which came second. And the reason I say that is because people want to vote and eat, and so the governments have to deliver. And they also want to live in peace.

One of Tammy's main arguments is that the region's security, and by extension our security, depends on inclusive, transparent, and responsive and accountable governance, and this raises some tough questions about U.S. policy, including whether we still have the ability and the responsibility to exert leverage on these issues. With the transition underway in Washington, the answers are more uncertain than they have been in the past, and it's worth pointing out that for more than a century, stability in the Middle East has been understood to be the responsibility of an external power, whether it was the British Empire or the United States of America.

Yet according to the President of the United States, until stable -- and I quote, "Until stable governments are set up and supported locally, the Middle East will never calm down." That pronouncement came from the White House, not Barack Obama, but of Dwight Eisenhower in 1956.

Over the decades, we've learned not to expect miracles -- even though that's where they are supposed to come from in the Middle East -- we've also learned not to give up. While the United States remains, in my mind, the indispensable nation to the
security of the region, I'm always quick to point out that there is nothing in the word indispensable that means alone. So, after a time in which the United States has been accused of doing too much and then into little, we need an honest discussion about our role, and our relationships and responsibility, and that's why I am so pleased to be part of this Middle East Strategy Task Force with my very good friend, Steve Hadley.

It's been an extraordinary learning experience for both of us and an opportunity to work with some truly wonderful people. One of them is Tammy, and it's now my pleasure to invite her, and the rest of our panel to come up on stage. (Applause)

MS. COFMAN WITTES: Let me begin by thanking my two fantastic Co-Chairs, Steve Hadley and Madeleine Albright. When we started this project off, Steve and Madeleine told each of us, Working Group Chairs, not to be afraid to ask the big questions and to challenge our assumptions. I think recognizing that in the Middle East, this is a moment of truly historic transition, and I think the questions both for the region and for those of us outside who care about the region and have a stake in the region, that questioning of assumptions is even more important today than it was when we started the project. So I really want to thank you both for a fantastic process.

I also want to thank my fellow Working Group Members in the region, and all over the U.S. and Europe we managed to meet virtually and in person, and I learned a great deal from all of them, and they are listed in the report, so I hope you will take a look and share my appreciation.

Now, look, it may seem as though today's topic is an odd choice for focus, maybe it's not a propitious time to talk about governance in the Middle East, after all, we are dealing with a region in violent turmoil, beset by a vicious civil war. The U.S. and its allies are now invested in a new military conflict in Iraq and also in Syria, fighting ISIS. And indeed, I just came back from an International Security Forum up in Halifax, where the only discussion of the Middle East there was framed around terrorism, ISIS, civil war, and refugees.
And these are the urgent problems seen by many governments around
the world as a threat to international security, deservedly so, and that are drawing
attention to the region. But it's precisely because of those urgent challenges, that I think
it's valuable to focus, in this report, on governance in the region, but it's precisely
because of those urgent challenges that I think it's valuable to focus in this report on
governance in the region, because to my mind, ISIS and the civil wars are symptoms of
something bigger. They are symptoms of a broader breakdown in the region. They are
not the disease. And what we have seen beginning in late 2010 was the breakdown both
of individual states and of a state system in the Middle East that had lasted since the
Eisenhower administration.

A state system that had advantaged American interests, and those of our
regional partners, a system that the United States sought to defend, and it's that
breakdown of the Middle East Order that has led to the civil wars in Libya and Yemen
and Syrian, and the rise of ISIS.

And so understanding why and how this regional order broke down, I
think it's necessary to understand how we effectively deal, not just with the symptoms of
that break down, but with the challenge of restoring lasting stability to this region, and that
is the premise and the driving question of the report that we are releasing today. So let
me focus on just three things about that breakdown, but I think it's important for us to
understand and what they suggest about the path ahead.

So the first thing to understand is, as Madeleine noted, the Regional
Order broke down because of things that happened inside states, inside societies,
because of pressures that built up over many years, and the first part of that story, is the
story I told in the book that I published in 2008, Freedom's Unsteady March. That's the
story of how the bureaucratic authoritarian model in the Arab world began to weaken,
how the clientelism, the ideology, the coercive mechanisms that these states relied on to
survive, were becoming less and less effective in a globalized world.
They rested on a certain kind of social contract, a clientelistic contract, or a corporatist contract, or a patronage-based contract, and over time, these systems became more and more inefficient on their own terms, and then they were challenged both from within and without from a demographic bulge of young people on the cusp of adulthood, from the effects of a globalized economy, and from a radically-new information environment, prompted first by satellite television, and then by the worldwide web, 1.0 and 2.0.

And so the effect on citizens in these countries was that the expectations created under the old social contract could not be fulfilled in these changed conditions. And just to give you a couple of indicators of this, the Egyptian Government, dating back to Nasser, had promised that university graduates would be able to get a civil society job. By the early 2000s the wait time for those university graduates to get that civil service job was on average eight years.

So, that's eight years of pushing a food cart, or driving a taxi, or twiddling your thumbs, waiting for your life to begin. And in the meantime, you can't afford an apartment, you can't afford to get married, you can't afford to become a full adult participant in society.

The second thing to understand about the why and how of the breakdown in the Middle East, is that no one in the run up to the Arab uprisings was unaware of these challenges, and that's a very important thing I think, to understand, is how governments dealt with these challenges, actually ended up in many cases, exacerbating the problems, rather than resolving them.

And we had a lot talk, and many efforts in the 1990s and 2000s to promote reform of governance and reform of the economies in the Middle East. But when many Arab governments sought to address that social contract, they ended up, instead of developing a more inclusive social contract, negotiating adjustments with political and economic elites, whether it was elites within their own country or external
institutions like The World Bank and the IMF. They reduced government hiring without really liberating the private sector to create growth.

They brought new business cronies into their ruling parties instead of opening up politics more broadly, and the result of these kinds of adjustments exacerbated inequality, further empowered some groups at the expense of others, and really increased the grievances rather than resolving them. And so dissent increased, governments' tools to manage politics were weaker, and the protests broke out.

And this brings me to the third thing we have to understand about how this all happened. The consequences of how certain states broke down. When the protests came, many governments responded poorly, in ways that exacerbated divisions, collapsed state institutions, and some governments responded with violence in ways that generated demand for more violence. And so it's no accident in this analysis that Syria and Libya are the places in the region that are most violent and most disordered.

These are the places where leaders ruled in the most personalized manner, where the destruction of civil society and community institutions, were the making of those things subservient to the state was the most complete. And so having failed to act in a manner that could have prevented these uprisings, when the uprisings came, these leaders sought to repress their people through the use of force. And when basic governance and order broke down, those with guns to impose their will gained power; and when the state use violence against its citizens, it created a market for others with guns to defend those citizens against the state, and that allowed the emergence of identity-based sectarian militias, extremist groups with horrific agendas.

So, by the time these governments had broken down, the social contract had broken down over a long period before, and social trust, the basic trust between people in communities had eroded, and there was very little left to manage peaceful politics. And this is the challenge we confront today in the Middle East. Beyond the geopolitical competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, beyond the threat posed by
extremist terrorism or weapons of mass destruction this, to me, is the biggest challenge in rebuilding a stable order in the region, is the breakdown of trust within societies. It's a consequence both of the way they were governed and the way they broke down.

And the paper goes into detail on all these subjects and offers some specific priorities and approaches on a way forward to tackle that problem. Let me just give you a few highlights here. First, the future of the region will be determined not by the mere existence of governance, although that's what many are focused on in the midst of this disorder, but on the quality of that governance, because if we don't have more accountable, responsive, transparent and effective governance, it will not be sustainable governance. It will face more challenge, it will break down again. Conflicts that are suppressed will reemerge.

So we have to think about the quality of governance, not just the fact of governance. And it's probably no surprise to any of you that I think liberal democracy is far more likely than any other regime type to generate accountable, transparent, responsive and effective governance, but the path between where the region is today and liberal democracy is neither swift nor linear. And Ambassador Gouia can testify to that, although I think Tunisia has made impressive progress along that path.

The paper lays out a few practical ways to begin rebuilding the basis for that kind of sustainable governance. And let me just mention two tea insights. First, I don't think the question we face regarding how to build this new order is about territory, or state borders, or where lines are drawn on a map. It's about what happens within those lines. Remember, it's about social trust. There is no line you can draw between Shi'a and Sunni in Iraq that will not be fought over.

And just as the creation of South Sudan did not magically resolve the conflicts inside Sudan or South Sudan, division will not automatically resolve the conflicts within Iraq or Syria. It's also not about institution building. You know, after our military victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. and our allies spent a lot of time standing up
new institutions: parliaments, courts, political parties, central banks, and the idea is that you build a machine of government and you populate it, and you start the gears turning and it should go.

But I think we learned from these last 15 years that building institutions is not enough. It matters how those institutions are populated and by whom. Are they inclusive of everyone with a stake in the process? Do they have a process that people think is fair and transparent? And that brings me to the other insight that I want to leave you with before we have a broader conversation, which is that what's most important to effective, sustainable governance, to effective, sustainable institutions in the Middle East today is dialogue and conflict resolution. It seems like an obvious thing to say, you know, the old line that war is a continuation of politics by other means, but it is true.

And I think it's a basic beginning aspiration for the future of the Middle East to shift conflicts that are now underway in a violent channel into a nonviolent channel, and also to pay special attention to those places where political conflict is being suppressed, where dialogue is being suppressed, for fear that those places may become violent, if there's no room or capacity, or no institutions and forums for peaceful dialogue and peaceful politics.

Finally, it suggests to me that sustainable governance in the Middle East in the future will be much more decentralized than it's been in the past. Because you don't rebuild social trust from the top down, you rebuild it from the bottom up. There is a broader need to build governance in a way that citizens can see and feel and buy into. I think we already see a number of experiments across the region in more decentralized governance, whether it's the empowerment of elected councils in Morocco, or the way the Lebanese have managed their governance needs in the absence of a President until very recently.

Or, the way the government in Baghdad is struggling to set conditions for locally-effective government in the areas that are about to be liberated from ISIS. So, I
think local governance is what we need to focus on if we want to replace violence and mistrust with something more sustainable. And what that let me stop, and look forward to our conversation.

MR. HADLEY: Let me just say a word. Thank you, Tammy, very much. It's a great paper, and I really do urge you to read it. Here is what we are going to do for the rest for the time. Amr is going to speak for about 10 minutes or so. Reacting to the paper, giving you a little better sense of what's in it. And then we are going to have a conversation up here with some broad questions. And we'll go probably till about 3:55 or 4:00 o'clock, we will then throw it open for questions, comments from the audience, and we will end promptly at 4:30. So that's how we plan to use the time available to us. Amr, over to you.

MR. HAMZAWY: Sure. Thank you very much, Steve. It's a pleasure to be here. Thank you very much, Tammy, for having me on the panel, and that's it's a pleasure to join the panel with Madam Secretary being with us today. It's a great paper, I would like to congratulate you, Tammy, and the working group on a spot-on analysis, and great insights on how to look at Arab politics, Middle Eastern politics, and political dynamics as they appear today. so, I'm going to follow Steve's recommendations and really recommend everyone to take a look at the paper. It offers a detailed analysis, and it does not stop where Tammy stopped, because of time, and to engage you, of course.

It gives us a great overview of what has been happening in the region since the 1960's all the way to 2011 and beyond 2011. In that spirit, to engage the paper, I'm going to underline three points which I feel are relevant in building on the insights and recommendations of the paper. Number one is, and here I truly share your analysis with regard to lost trust between state institutions and citizens in the region, and it's across a very wide spectrum.

All the way from North Africa to the Gulf, all the way from republics to monarchies, all the way from countries which have been doing relatively better
socioeconomically, and countries which have been suffering from poverty, unemployment, grand corruption, and so on and so forth.

So, yes, clearly we have been having loss of popular trust in state institutions, and that has been happening and unfolding in the background of Arab societies, Middle Eastern societies lacking alternatives. It's not that they only lost trust in state institutions, they did not fashion alternative in institutions, credible alternative institutions were not put on the ground.

We did a bit of ideological contestation between religious-based visions and secular visions. We did see a bit of political contestation based on social and economic preferences, networks of patronage which you really offer a very great analysis of, and conflict between the haves and have-nots. But in total, this did not add up, prior to 2011, to an alternative vision for state society relations, an alternative credible vision for a new social contract.

So what we were looking at where old social contracts which were collapsing, and new social contracts which were yet to be found, to shaped, articulated, found, legitimated and pushed through. The number one, and I believe this picture has not changed in the last five years. And the very fact that we are still looking at autocracies in return, reviving autocracies, or apart from the Tunisian case, or stable autocracies, or limited liberal experiments as we have always been, be it Morocco or elsewhere.

The very fact that we are still at a region, in spite of the dynamics of the last five years, where we do not have credible, new social contract, legitimate new social contracts attest to that. So, number one is how to bridge the gap between state institutions and citizens, groups, segments of our populations which have lost us. The first key point I believe we really need to look at is the question of social capital. So I just would like to rephrase it away from trust, to look at how societies generate social capital. And social capital never comes top-down; it always has to be bottom-up.
Now when we look at the fabric of Middle Eastern societies, and I'm really focused on Arab societies, I'm not an expert on Iran, when we look at Arab societies as of now, the only way to imagine social capital emerging, leading to new social contracts, redefining the relationship between state institutions and populations, state institution societies, is to focus on civil society.

If we are looking at state institutions, away from the collapsed cases in Syria, Libya, where trust has been lost, legitimacy is questioned, pluralist deliberations are not out there, and if we do not have, apart from ideological contestation, political actors which offer visions for state, society relations, we will not have viable political parties in most Arab countries. We do not have viable political movements in most Arab countries, once again with the exception of Tunisia, because it’s unfolding in a different manner.

It comes down to civil society where, as well in Tunisia, civil society has been a leading force, one of the leading forces in pushing the country forward toward a true experiment of democratic governance.

So, the question is: How can we empower civil society organizations, civil society actors in the Arab world? What are the conditions available, present in different environments across the region which can help civil society prosper? What are the conditions which are available in some countries which undermine civil society? And here, I would like to highlight two key points.

One is the very fact that we, in most Arab countries, we are still looking at constitutional and legal frameworks which, in fact, do not safeguard the autonomy of civil society actors, which undermines our autonomy and independence of civil society actors and subject them to a great deal of state control, typically security-led control.

Secondly, because of freedoms of association, organization, constituency building are not safeguarded in most Arab countries, civil society organizations, as of now end up being urban-based, focused on small segments of the
population, and do not have a comparable outreach to civil society organizations in any democracy. Be it western democracy or a non-western democracy.

So, two key issues which we have to look at if we are -- Once again, I share the analysis of, we will not get to real security if we do not fix governance issues, if we do not get to viable, stable democratic governments, or democratizing governments. So, two key issues which we have to look at, are how to put in place the real and right conditions for civil society organizations to prosper, for civil society organizations to represent people's interests, different segments of the population, and to articulate a new social contract, which is badly needed in most Arab countries.

Secondly, how to safeguard freedoms, key freedoms, which no one -- where it's no longer fashionable to talk about freedom of association, freedom for organization in the Arab world, and in spite of the fact that this is one of the regions which suffers most from violations of freedom of association and organization.

The second point I would like to underline is, and once again going to a great insight, which you offer, Tammy, in the paper and for working group, on prioritizing justice. I really liked -- it's one of the recommendations which Tammy articulates toward the end of the paper, prioritizing justice, is the way I understand the report, failing to it is to prioritize reforming security sectors, prioritize reforming judicial institutions, court systems, as well as the paradigm of law enforcement.

And why? Because this is one of the key reasons why citizens lost trust in state institutions. Sometimes, we politicize the debate about human rights violation and abuses, away from citizens. It's not how the great political impacts of having regimes or governments which violate human rights and freedoms. No. It's about citizens, and how you look at state institutions. It's about citizens, and how you look at state security in institutions. How do you look at police stations, how do you look at police officers, how do you look at, in some places, as in Egypt, at the military security in institution governing the country?
Prioritizing justice means, in fact, to my mind, and here once again to build on the analysis in the paper, means to my mind, number one to -- and here not only internal actors can help, our civil society actors, but once again, nongovernmental organizations operating outside of the Middle East can offer some help as well, because we do have expertise on how to do that. Number one is to look at Arab institutions, and laws in place governing judicial institutions, security sectors, military establishments, and try to push them to reflect two key values of what democracy is all about: accountability and transparency.

If you follow Egyptian events, for example, throughout the last days, we have been hearing about citizens, at least two, who lost of their lives in police custody. This is not a new phenomenon in Egypt, it keeps happening. What I'm referring to, the two cases are, in the last 48 hours or 72 hours. And this, once again, is a testimony to, as long as we are going to lack accountability and transparency, insecurity in institutions, in relation to law enforcement, citizens will continue to have no trust in governments, even if they are elected, even if they are democratically legitimated.

And here, international expertise can help, how to push lawmaking, legal and constitutional frameworks, in the direction of greater accountability and transparency. Secondly, and once again, her Arab civil society actors need help, because in some countries they are facing, not only the closure of public space, as in Egypt, but in a place like Bahrain and elsewhere, but they sometimes feel a complete collapse, and they have to -- they are evacuated of the respective country.

Egypt's civil society is not only a domestic set of actors, it's to a great extent a displaced set of actors which operate in Europe and elsewhere. So here, a degree of international cooperation, it doesn't have to be government to nongovernment, it can be a nongovernmental to nongovernmental organizations, to help these actors facing displacements, facing a world of extinction, facing a world of evacuation to endure.

Final point, and once again, maybe it's not fashionable in the region, but I
believe it is, and it will hopefully stay fashionable in the U.S., at least for some time, and here is the difference between civilian and non-civilian politics. And I guess one of the reasons, when looking at questions of governance in the region, why it's important to differentiate and spend some time comparing Tunisia to Egypt, or comparing Algeria to Morocco, or comparing different countries where military establishments are dominant actors in politics,

And other countries where we civilian politicians, and civilian political elites, or civilian elites, managing politics with all the shortcomings of their political arenas, is the very fact that pushing forward compromise, pushing forward consensus building, pushing forward cross-ideological alliances, pushing forward the new social context where citizens can hold the governments accountable, is not all that -- is not easily done if you have military governments in place, or if you have governments dominated by military security establishments in place.

So one key distinction, when you look at Arab countries in 2016, is to differentiate between countries where the military security establishments are the dominant players in politics, and countries, once again, Tunisia, and Morocco, and elsewhere, where civilian political dynamics and civilian groups are in charge. We have a track record of civilian groups accepting more inclusion, accepting more compromise as opposed to military security establishments. So here, too, this had been a focus when we look at governance, and how to push forward democratic governance as your paper suggests. Let me stop here.

MR. HADLEY: Amr, thank you very much. I want to ask one technical question because I was, I think, misled by it, and I want to make sure the audience isn't as well. You used the phrase "privatizing justice" and of course I had the notion of, you know, the private sector taking over the police. But I think what you mean is a transparency and accountability that allows citizens to hold those institutions to account.

MR. HAMZAWY: Right. Exactly.
MR. HADLEY: Have I got it right?

MR. HAMZAWY: Sure. Sure. We can say citizen accountability and (crosstalk 00:39:27).

MR. HADLEY: All right. We've talked about, and Tammy, I want to pick up on something Amr said at the end, and you said at the beginning, you talked about how the failures of states to govern effectively led to the collapses or civil wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. And so one question is, are other states in the region at risk? Have we seen the last of the dominoes or are there other dominoes that potentially could fall? And if so, what will bring that about?

MS. COFMAN WITTES: I think that's a crucial question because for all that, our international attention is focused on the eggs that have already fallen off the wall. There are others that are up there wobbling, and there have been another of analytical attempts to sketch out: What did those broken eggs have in common? And you've seen some arguments about republics being more vulnerable than monarchies, for example.

What I see in the places that I would say, are today still vulnerable, it's those places, where, as we saw in Egypt, you have an aging leader with no clear succession plan, and certainly no transparent, accountable, responsive mechanism for determining succession. Those are potential crisis points for any government and, you know, we've just been undergoing our regular exercise in the peaceful transition of power here. It is always a delicate moment, even for the most established democracies, but in those places that don't have established traditions, it can be a very dangerous moment.

So I would look, for example, at Algeria, where you have an aging leader who has been in place for a long time, and no evident successor, and no evident process, no evident consensus on a way forward. I think you could say the same about the Palestinian authority today. So you have a looming succession crisis and no connection, as Amr was highlighting, between citizens and government, where they don't
feel like there is any channel to weigh in. That's a boiling pot.

MR. HADLEY: Amr, would you agree with that, and anything you'd want to add?

MR. HAMZAWY: Yes. He's, very much. I mean, Tammy is right in pointing out the historical precedence, which we did have in the region prior to 2011. Egypt was in a succession crisis, where prior to 2011 the talk of the country was: who is going to succeed Former President Mubarak? I guess she is right in pointing out Algeria, but Steven, when you look at it, what is missing is not only ruling establishments putting forward a succession plan of sorts, what is missing as well, is how to tackle the lost confidence in any arrangement between governments and citizens.

In Tunisia, confidence is on the rise, because Tunisia managed to put institutions in place, different shortcomings are out there, everyone is talking about them, and analyzing them, but you still have a constitution -- and institutional framework in place, which makes sense. What is missing in Egypt, when the autocracy was back in, is that these constitutional and institutional arrangements which people attempted after 2011, were thrown away and we are in between reviving what existed prior to 2011, and maybe going back to very dark moments in Egyptian history. And the same goes for a place like Algeria, once Bouteflika is no longer there, no one knows what will happen.

MR. HADLEY: Yes. Now, this leads to another place, and I'm going to ask Madeleine to start on this one. It's interesting because the places you picked were Algeria and the Palestinian authority. Those are not traditional monarchical societies. And one of the things you may remember when we started this project, we said this is about a crisis of legitimacy in the Middle East, and we said of course legitimacy comes from the consent of the governed and the ability to lead services.

And a number of people said, wait, wait, that isn't sophisticated enough. There are other forms of legitimacy in the region based on tribal associations, religious affiliations, revolutionary ideology, there are a range of forms of legitimacy. So how do
you square that? As we look at the Middle East going forward, past 2011, what do we say about legitimacy? And what do we say to these regimes that may be teetering on the shelf but have not fallen off? What in the post-2011 world, what is the way? What would we recommend to leaders as to how to enhance the legitimacy of their regimes before they go through what these other countries have gone through?

MS. ALBRIGHT: Tammy mentioned social contract a lot, and I think we have to remember what it is. I think people think of it as a Western concept, but basically people gave up some of their rights to a state in order to get protection and security in some form. And obviously that is different with a monarchy. But still, there is that same responsibility of: What is it that the leader owes his people? And I think -- when you were asking about different countries -- I think those were interesting ones that were picked, but I would say that this is almost like a virus, and one of the things we have not talked about enough, is the influence of technology.

One of the things that really did bring up -- I mean it starts a man in Tunisia who immolates himself, and the news gets out and all of a sudden it spreads. And I think that, clearly what happened in Tahrir Square with social media, and so I actually think no place is inured to it. And so, one of the questions, and I kind of hate to finger any country, but if you look at a country like Jordan, for instance, that is a monarchy, a frontline state in one of the most difficult refugee situations. Not a rich place, and a King who is trying to figure out the various coalitions; and kind of a transit point, and it goes to the very point as to whether the state is providing a livelihood to the people.

And I think that one of the things, and really, you write about this a lot, Tammy, in terms of: what is it that the state owes the people? And initially, in all of these countries, they were the employer of first resort. And when that is not possible anymore, then that puts in question the issue, and so legitimacy to a great extent, I think in this day and age, depends on whether the old leader, the new leader, the King, the Deputy Crown
Prince, or whatever, actually is delivering, because technology has made it possible for people to know what people in other places have. And especially, just to bring another point, what you said about the younger generation, they are, technologically, adept.

By the way, I have been talking about -- this has been a peculiar 10 days -- but basically in addition to the thing you think I'm talking about, is that I just spent time with a group of Former Foreign Ministers in Silicon Valley, talking about technology and governance. And what it has done in terms of providing people information as the weather they have a legitimate government.

And it has disaggregated voices in a way that makes some of the organizational things you are talking about, hard. Some of you heard me say this, and I always admit that I stole this line, but the thing that is interesting is people are talking to their governments on 21st Century technology. The government listens to them on 20th Century technology, or hears them but may not be listening, actually, and provides the century responses. So that disconnect is what we are dealing with. It's very evident in Egypt and the question is -- I mean, I think anyplace could be subject to this, despite the fact that the ones you chose our very specifically so. But legitimacy is, what is the government supposed to be doing, whether it is a king or a dictator?

MR. HADLEY: Got that. And we just want to push it one more to you, Tammy, and that is this. Clearly, what is a government supposed to be doing? What is it delivering for its citizens? And you talk a lot about transparent, effective accountable, inclusive states. Does encouraging states to move in those directions, in fact, is it complementary to, or supplementary to other traditional forms of legitimacy that, for example, the monarchical states are dependent on?

Or, does it in fact risk undermining those other sources of legitimacy? Because it seems to me you have to be able to answer that question if you go to a monarch and say: you need to move in the direction of legitimate, transparent, responsive governance. That monarch has to have some understanding that that they
can be supplemental to, and doesn't undermine the traditional sources of legitimacy on which the regime is dependent.

MS. COFMAN WITTES: Sure. So, I actually think that there is an important switch in language that I would I would recommend in order to answer this question. Which is, it's not about what governments owe citizens, I think that it's really about what citizens expect from their government. Not what they need, but what they expect. And that's part of what's changed, and that's part of the impact of technology that Madeleine was describing.

And one of our other Working Group Co-Chairs, Chris Shrider (phonetic), really put his finger on this in his paper, which is that part of what's happened in the Arab world and around the world, among this younger generation, is what he calls a participation revolution. That citizens, because of technology, but just because this generation of Arabs, more highly educated, healthier, more engaged than any generation before. I mean, let's remember that parts of the region, two and three generations ago, didn't even have secondary schools. Okay?

So the developmental leaps here are tremendous. And this rising generation has a different set, globalized set of expectations. That means it's not just about making sure they have a job. They expect to be able to participate, they expect to be able to set their own path in life and not just have it directed for them by their monarch, or their father, or their uncle, or anybody else. And at essence, what they expect is the thing that liberal societies are best structured to provide, which is the opportunity for every individual to find their own path to human flourishing; okay, if I can put it in philosophical terms.

Governments can't get away with just, you know, offering enough jobs, or enough health care, or enough free education; check the box and they are legitimate. They have to meet that set of expectations. They have to give people opportunity to find for themselves a pathway. That means they have to be more open, they have to be more
Now, to the point of congruence retention, it is a mental shift. If you are a very traditional leader who believes that the only way you can help your society grow is by directing it from the top down, but that is not the only form of legitimacy, even for a monarch. So, the traditional pathway may be, I am the source of social goods, I distribute them, but you can also be the source of opportunities. You can be the source of dynamism. And that is a shift in mentality, but it's entirely possible.

MS. ALBRIGHT: And I think one other thing, though, that has to be put in the mixture, and again, Egypt is a perfect example, is, to what extent is it, the freedom of disaggregated voices in Tahrir Square or order, at a certain point, although I've been saying, for instance, that young people in Tahrir Square were all having an incredibly interesting time, having gotten there by social media. And the older man who cannot get to his stall in the marketplace says, I can't stand this anymore, I need some order. So I think one could actually be persuaded that Sisi was elected, that there was really a movement to have that happen because people were fed up with the chaos. I think the hard part is how inclusivity and getting what you see, you know, participation, whether people are tolerant enough to go through the chaos time until they get to the proper time.

MR. HADLEY: And I want to go to Amr on that. I want to rephrase it a bit, and that will be our last question, and then we'll go to the audience. If you remember, Lawrence of Arabia, at one point one of the figures says, I am a river to my people. And that's a sort of an old traditional form of legitimacy. What you are really saying is, a legitimacy based on satisfying what the people expect from their government, and increasingly that includes participation in a role in fashioning their own future. I get that.

So, let's go to Sisi. You've probably -- I've spent three three-hour sessions with him in the last 12, 14 months, and I tried to make this argument, that this is a source of legitimacy. This is what he must do, if over the long-term he's going to be able to bring stability and prosperity. And I have not yet made the sale. What you hear is
what you would expect someone, given the trauma that Egypt has been through, it is, I understand what you are saying, but you need to understand this is a difficult time, there is extremism at the door, and we cannot -- the Middle East cannot stand a breakdown in order of a country of 90 million people. If you think refugee flows are bad now for Syria, you just wait if Egypt breaks down.

So, what is the argument you make to el-Sisi, who sees himself as defending his country and the region against extremism, that that is his vocation, one in which I think he sincerely believes, and in which he is risking his life; how do you make the argument to him that actually this is where he's got to go, if he is going to bring long-term stability to his country?

MR. HAMZAWY: This is basically the debate we are having in the region, not only 2011 but even earlier on. And we do have enough historical precedence, and enough cases across the region to push forward a very clear, clean, not only argument, for autocracies cannot provide for long-term stability. They never managed to do so. Now Egypt was governed autocratically before 2011, and what happened after 2011 starting -- In fact to be accurate, it did not begin simply on January 25, 2011, we had years of protest activism.

Young people, primarily protesting and demanding that their voices should be heard, their concerns should be addressed. And again, as a background of a failing government which cannot address these concerns, people took to the streets. And I beg to differ, because these were not only young people, maybe in the beginning they were young people, but increasingly, people with grievances. Which, you do a great job in the paper highlighting and outlining socioeconomic grievances and the impacts. In a country where you have a 30 percent rate of poverty, unemployment among young people, over 40 percent among female, young female citizens, over 45 percent and more, grievances did bring people to take to the streets, and go to Tahrir Square and elsewhere.
So the argument is, autocracies never managed to provide for long-term stability. I take it very seriously, that there are risks, security challenges, not only terrorism, but different security challenges in the region that need to be accounted for.

Now, the question is: how to get governments and the only way to get them is by listen to civil society actors? So we need an organized presentation of citizens to get governments to listen to how to do it right.

I believe Egyptian civil society actors offered some solutions, you do not have to undermine more trust among citizens, by harassing, violating key human rights, by imprisoning and by killing citizens in police custody and elsewhere, and not provided enough, even social and economic solutions, to improve the living conditions. If they listen, if rulers, governments listen to their constitutes, not only their military and security establishment, it’s not only their business elites which benefit and thrive on the patronage system that do exist, is if you listen civil society actors, they will find solutions.

Finally, the irony of Arab modern state is, in fact it was the Arab modern state which pushed forward the developmental leaps you were referring to. It’s a creation of the 1950’s or 1960’s. This was created by the modern state, and in a way the modern state enabled developmental work to happen, enabled leaps in education, and health care and elsewhere. And yes it is the healthiest most connected generation of young Arabs we are looking at, but in a way these governments have anachronistic, they no longer address the concerns, and they’ve got to listen to what these voices are demanding, in different matters.

MR. HADLEY: One last comment and then we’ll go to the audience.

MS. COFMAN WITTES: Will do. I think that it’s a false choice between mass mobilization at Tahrir Square, and authoritarian order. And I would say, it’s not that a leader is a river for his people, but the people are a river, and like water they are going to find outlet. So, the challenge is whether you can create channels and mechanisms and pathways for people to have the influence they want to have over their own lives and
their communities, or whether, left with no alternative, they will spill into the streets.

And the failure of reforms in the period leading up to the uprisings is:
what compelled that mass mobilization? So what we see in Egypt today, that troubles
me very much and that, I think, itself is quite destabilizing and dangerous, is a leader who
believes that by putting a lid on it has lowered the boiling pot. And as you all know, when
you put a lid on a pot the boil increases. And that's what I think we've got in Egypt right
now. We have no civil society channels, we have no effective political channels, because
parliament and the party system are so tightly managed, we have no free speech
channels. And so, that pot is boiling very fast, in a way that I think is far more dangerous
in many ways, than the situation that Egypt was in before the uprising.

MR. HADLEY: I love your phrase, the leader isn't a river to his people,
the people are a river, which, if the leader does not channel will spill over into the streets.
And that's not a bad way to summarize this.

MS. COFMAN WITTES: Try it on Sisi and see how it works.

MR. HADLEY: I'll wait till Madeleine is with me. Do we have
microphones, or are just going to ask people--?

QUESTIONER: Yes. We have microphones.

MR. HADLEY: Yes. Microphone is good. Yes, ma'am, right here in the
in the front, in the fourth row. Please notify yourself. So we can get a lot of questions in,
if you'll keep the questions short, we'll keep the answers short, and we'll get a lot more
questions done.

QUESTIONER: Short questions but long answers. (Inaudible), at the
University of Washington, and my research is on civil-military relations in Turkey, Egypt,
and Israel. And I think, listening to you, it's fascinating how you are describing,
analytically, Egypt and the Arab world, but a lot of what you were saying actually applies
to other cases on the periphery of this Arab world, or the core of the Arab countries, and
Turkey in particular, I argue it is going through a regimist turn where it's turning into the
making of the Mubarak regime, where all the stifling of civil society and places of expression and all that.

So, it's as if there is a ping-pong kind of regional order, some equilibrium of imitating one another. So, I guess I wonder -- because I haven't read the report in depth, is there a center for Middle East policy? Is there peripheral vision to other countries within the region, including Turkey, including Israel, of course, and the crackdown on civil society in Israel as well? The laws that, you know, you have to account for who is funding you internationally. So a lot of what you have been describing seems to me like bits of conversation everywhere in the region at large. And is that part of the framework you would encourage adopting? And not just looking at the Arab countries, but also other countries in the entire neighborhood, if you will.

MR. HADLEY: Tammy, do you want to take that one?

MS. COFMAN WITTES: Sure. Well, first I would say, yes, because politics is politics. While every region and every country has its own history and culture that shape the way that politics is expressed, there are certain common features. Right?

And, yes, there are demonstration effects both positive and negative, and in the paper I talk about the competing models for governance in the Middle East today, the fragile democratic experiment of Tunisia, the effort at renewed authoritarianism symbolized by Egypt, and the brutal, savage order of ISIS, which is also a model competing for adherence in the region today.

And that's part of what's at stake is, you know: what are people going to embrace in the midst of this turmoil? I do think it's having an effect on those on the periphery of the region, but I also think some of those dynamics, for example, the global pushback against civil society in association of freedom, it didn't start in the Middle East, and it hasn't stopped in the Middle East. We see it in Russia, we see it in India and elsewhere.

MR. HADLEY: We do, indeed. Yes, sir.
MR. RUGE: Boris Ruge, DCM, German Embassy. Congratulations to the Task Force and to the Working Group for completing this. My government, I think, finds a lot to agree with in this report. We think it addresses a key, key aspect. Implementing it is going to be hard work because I do think that someone who has worked in the region until recently, a lot of people are afraid of challenging the order because there's such a level of chaos and disintegration around them. And I think that's something that needs to be looked at.

But I would go a step back, and I wonder whether you address it in the reports. In a sense to me, the most basic point is: Are we doing enough as governments, we are taking an interest in the region, but not part of the region to stress the importance of human rights? For example, bringing out arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, these kinds of things which come way before, in a sense. We talk about freedom of association. Freedom of association is very important, and we would absolutely support that, but the human rights and the rule of law part, to me, is absolutely fundamental, and that's where we see such grave misbehavior and violations all around the region.

MR. HADLEY: Madeleine, would you take --

MS. ALBRIGHT: Let me just say, I believe we do, or at least we try, but I think that the problem comes, having tried it -- I won't say in which country -- that we can't help you if you don't really do something about your laws and human rights. That was kind of: mind your own business. But I do think that we have to do that, even if it is not received well, and it is argued that it actually -- by those who don't want to do it -- that it adds to the chaotic situation.

The question is, and this has come up over and over again is: Are human rights, democracy, participation of people, a Western concept, or is it a global concept? I have argued it's global, we are all the same. People want to make to be able to make decisions about their own lives and they want to have absence of arbitrariness. But it's not an easy message to deliver. And frankly, if it's not delivered alongside with
practical assistance, whether it's to their security or aid programs, but it does have to go
together. And if we don't do it, your country and ours, then we are not fulfilling our
responsibilities. But it's not happily received. Steve can testify to that.

MR. HADLEY: If I could say one thing that, you've touched, it was a very
important point. Those countries that are making steps in the direction of what Tammy
has talked about, and you see it in the UAE, most of all. You are beginning to see it in
Saudi Arabia with Saudi 2030, Jordan has tried some, certainly Tunisia is doing it. It's
hard to do that and keep your society together in a benign security and regional
environment.

Think about the environment in the Middle East today, and to say to the
leader, we need you to take the risks of reform and moving in this direction in a region
that is, in many respects, melding down. This is a hard thing we are asking of leaders,
and we have to recognize it. One of the things we say is though, that the attitude of the
international community ought to be, if you are willing to make those hard decisions we,
the international community, will support you financially, diplomatically, with technical
assistance. If you don't, we won't. Not because we are being punitive, but because of
our judgment, it would be a bad investment.

That the good investments are going to be those states that are willing to
make these kinds of steps on behalf of their people, because we think they are the most
likely to result and achieve a long-term prosperity and stability. But I think we have to
recognize the difficulty of what we are asking, and we have to be engaged and be willing
to really step in and support those countries that are willing to make the right decisions.
Yes, ma'am.

QUESTIONER: Hi. Jenna (Inaudible); I was a Legislator for Senator
Leahy; worked at the War College, and then lived in Saudi Arabia from 2009 to 2013.
I've got just two quick comments on two parts of the report. One is the issue of trust. In
my observation, obviously based on my experience in Saudi is, one of the issues to think
about is trust among people themselves. They have the freedom to express to each other how they struggle with these issues.

So it's not just government people, but it's the key issue of trust. How do you proved a comfort level where Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, can talk to each other without fear? And the second related issue to me, is that some of the most moving conversations I had, starts with the premise of finding the political philosophy, foundation within Islam, within the region, within the culture, that ask two questions, especially, obviously among Muslims is: What are the values and Islam that have the deepest meaning to you? And that's a conversation, which is your dialogue issue.

And the second part is: How do you want to see them expressed in society? And to me, when you are then grounded within the culture, and something has grown -- as you mentioned, things that come from the bottom up, the cultural component and the religious component, obviously key to this, but those issues combined, I think, are a different take on what's the report. Thanks.

MS. COFGAN WITNES: Thank you. Just a quick reflection, Jenna (phonetic), on a very, very thoughtful comment, which is that, absolutely, and I do in the paper talk about social trust within and between communities, not just between citizens and government. If you are thinking about a case like Libya and Syria where the society has truly collapsed into a sectarian civil war, or tribal civil war, you have to think about that.

And there are things that can be done even now while these conflicts are ongoing to build forums and platforms for dialogue, for trust building, for conflict resolution. There are successful programs including some USIP programs that were done in Iraq, where, communities came together around dialogue so that the IDPs were brought back into a town, so that the IDPs didn't have to immediately justify themselves, or feel themselves under threat on their return in the communities could feel comfortable with their return. So, I think there are examples we can build on and programs we can
do.

One-half sentence on the previous point from our German colleague. And I wanted to echo something my colleague, General John Allen, has said a number of times. Which is, from his perspective, as someone who spent the last years of his military and then civilian career fighting terrorism, if we -- external actors who have invested so much in the military fight, if we do not also invest in the governance peace, we are essentially going to be playing whack them all with the extremists on a global scale.

MR. HADLEY: Yes.

MS. COFMAN WITTES: Because this problem will recreate itself again and again.

MR. HADLEY: Other comments, questions? Yes, ma'am?

QUESTIONER: Hi. I'm Daria Datoni (phonetic), I'm with a private firm now that works in the Middle East. And my question is actually expanding on the notion of social trust. And I think you framed it so well in talking about the breakdown in the Middle East, and particularly when we think about the relationship that a government has with its citizens and the expectations or relationship that a citizen has back with its government -- that citizens have with their government. One could certainly argue now, not just with the Middle East, but here in the United States that we are beginning, to some extent, in an erosion of social trust with groups who may be feeling more marginalized or more uncertain with relation to their government. And I would just ask if you can comment about: What can a citizen do in terms of rebuilding social trust, and how would that be most effective?

MR. HADLEY: Why don't you take that and comment on the other earlier question too?

MR. HAMZAWY: Sure. To the region, I'm not commenting on the U.S. It's striking that the two countries which witnessed the emergence and the explosion of
tribal conflicts, multiethnic conflicts leading to civil wars, Libya and Syria, are the two countries where dictatorships, crushed all intermediary organizations between governments and citizens. Now the big difference between a place like Tunisia and Egypt, as opposed to Libya and Syria is, we were approaching 2011 Tunisia and Egypt having an established civil society arena, in Tunisia, with trade unions, labor associations, professional organizations, civil society, civil society actors, human rights defenders, and a bit less in Egypt, in terms of their autonomy and independence.

But in Libya and Syria, dictatorships crushed these intermediary layers between citizens and the state. So in way, citizens woke up to dictators who did not feel like departing the scene, and the only way citizens to organize was unfortunately to listen to radical, militant ideologies, because there was no alternative given to them by civil society actors. There were no other channels.

So, once again, I believe the question of social trust when we look at it, and wide feeling that's what's happening in Libya and Syria should not be happening elsewhere in the region. The key response to it, is not to trust in the might and power of adrenaline, or of an autocratic leader, but to enable governments to take -- creating channels between citizens and government seriously, to enable society to exist, to enable civil society to strive. This is the only way to manage multiethnic tensions.

So, why is it that Morocco, for example, and this is not a full-fledged democracy, it's a multiethnic society. Why is it that we are not hearing much -- of course thank God -- about any civil strife in Morocco? It's because we do have an established arena for civil society interactions where citizens can bring their grievances, their difficulties, their demands from the government, and they feel that they are listened, at least to an extent.

MR. HADLEY: Other questions, comments? The gentlemen way in the back, and then we'll take the two women, here.

MR. AFTANDILIAN: Thank you. Greg Aftandilian with American
University. My question is for Amr. I really appreciate your comments on civil society, and the need for civil society organizations outside the region to help those inside the region. But as you know, especially in Egypt, the government portrays as a foreign conspiracy and will say -- it played up the hyper-nationalism, and prevent that type of assistance. So, how do you get around that problem, to have civil society in the United States or in Europe, helping those on the ground in Egypt? Thank you.

MR. HAMZAWY: Thank you, Greg. Very briefly, I believe (a) we do not need to shy away from pushing forward the counter narrative, and we do not need to submit to hyper-nationalist type of populist narrative off: Oh, what happened is a conspiracy, it was not, it's not, and if they would like to look at themselves, government they should recognize the failures, deficits, would they have been sustaining and have been doing for a long time. So (a) you should push forward the counter-narrative way we've privatized civil society, not only vis-à-vis governments, but to enable citizens to create trust among different segments and groups of population.

Secondly, there are cases, where it's very difficult to operate, as in Egypt right now, there are cases which are less difficult, Tunisia, Morocco, even for odd reasons, some Gulf countries as opposed to Egypt.

Finally, once again, this is question of the battle over narratives. What is it? What does it take to fix this region? It's not only security, it's not only autocracy, it's to enable civil society to exist, to thrive, and to represent citizens, and then for their demands to be addressed, to be responded to by accountable governments.

MR. HADLEY: So, we are running shy on time. so what I'm going to do is, I'm going to take the two women I pointed to here, and then I'm going to take two from this side, and we are going to just go through those questions, and then we are going to try to answer those four questions in the panel, and then we are going to be out of time, I'm afraid. So, ma'am, you had one? The woman -- two behind you; and then, we'll take you, ma'am, afterwards.
QUESTIONER: Hi. I'm Marissa Harma (phonetic), I'm a Jordanian Consultant in development with a focus on governance. Going back to the gentleman's question regarding civil society, I have a lot of hope in civil society, but in the absence of the political will on the part of governments, this space is very limited. And, Amr, you discussed options beyond foreign governments assisting, but also, perhaps, nongovernmental organizations.

I want to throw another group out there in the mix, and perhaps this could be one other way of looking at it; the role of Diaspora communities, there have been case studies in economic development, but what about also, promoting and strengthening governance. Thank you.

MR. HADLEY: And then two rows up.

QUESTIONER: Hi. Zana Blahi (phonetic), a concerned citizen from Texas. The social contract, what Secretary Albright was speaking about, seems impossible without dealing with all the corruption. To me, that seems like such an underlying problem, if you can't trust your police or your judges, and buy them off -- if you can just buy them how do you even trust anyone? And I think why there's so much discontent. So then, how to deal with that?

MR. HADLEY: Yes, ma'am? Right back there, three rows from the end. Go ahead.

MS. GOOD: Hi. Allison Good with U.S. Department of Energy. So, you definitely don’t agree to all of the dressings or the political governance issues. But it seems to me that there are these bigger, macroeconomic issues that cannot be solved by nations themselves alone, such as pegging oil prices, and currency crisis. And how do you all see the U.S. and the rest of the international community, how can they best serve these countries in helping them to bridge that gap to foster better governance?

MR. HADLEY: very good question. One more from this side? Yes, sir.

MR. HURWITZ: I'm Elliot Hurwitz, Former State Department, World
Bank and Intelligence Community person. I want to thank the panel for a great presentation. I have not yet had time to read the report. On the periphery of the Arab world, the only Arab country I have been to is Yemen, which no one has mentioned, and it's particularly pertinent to U.S. policy. So, I would like anyone on the panel overall to comment on Yemen and/or U.S. policy toward it.

MR. HADLEY: So, we've got four issues: the world of Diaspora, corruption, macro issues and their impact, and then Yemen. Any takers?

MS. COFMAN WITTES: I think Amr will do Diasporas -- And should we just go this way?

MR. HADLEY: Amr why don't you start? And let's do it quickly, sort of one-minute answers and we'll get people out on time.

MR. HAMZAWY: Right. I mean, spot on, yes. This is, one of the spaces with we still have available in countries where the public space has been closed off. Yes, very well, so the question becomes how to do it in a manner which does not undermine the credibility, the legitimacy of domestic actors. The question becomes how to do it away from government-to-government relations. I trust that it's more powerful if it's done at nongovernment to nongovernment actors.

Finally, once again, how to justify the interest, not from a moral perspective but from a political perspective for Arab Diaspora communities to get interested in what's happening in domestic politics in Arab countries, you need to fashion the narrative. This narrative cannot be exile opposition, I believe because it has been tried out in the region and failed completely, so we need a smart narrative to push it forward. But, yes, this is one of the key spaces.

MR. HADLEY: Tammy, do you want to do corruption?

MS. COFMAN WITTES: Yes. And, you know, the headline here coming out of the report, I would say, is sunshine is the best disinfectant. One of the reasons why I focused on transparency is because it's an important antidote to that kind of
behavior. But more broadly, corruption exists typically because those in power, those with power are trying to solve problems that they have, they are trying to grease the wheels of their own lives, or the people above them in the chain.

And so you've got to look at how to fix the political dysfunctions that create incentives for corruption. Whether that's paying policemen higher salaries, or making sure that there are expectations from outside as well as from inside, and this goes to the point on globalization, I was going to highlight for you. There is a sidebar in the report on economic globalization, and its impact on state sovereignty. It is a problem for every state, but there is a reason why Arab States were and are, I think, particularly ill-positioned to deal with the effects.

MS. ALBRIGHT: Well, I'm not an expert on Yemen, but I have to say this, is that in many ways, it's the country that is a victim of all kinds of meddling. One, in terms of North and South Yemen being united when they actually were not very excited about it, but it was pressure coming from the neighbors. Then the fact that it was on its way in terms of looking through some governance work, when then it became the playground of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

And so that is what's going on now. And it is really -- it's a victim country, is the only way that I think it can be described, and very hard for the outside powers that would like to do some good there, to actually get any purchase on it, in some ways, because it's not big enough, and it is, in fact, absorbing a lot of the problems that can't be dealt with somewhere else.

MR. HADLEY: We've come to the end of our time. I want to thank you, Tammy, for a great paper. Thank you all for coming, and for your questions. And please join me in thanking the panel. (Applause)
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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Expires: November 30, 2016