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Introduction:

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Opening Remarks:

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MR. TALBOTT: Good morning, everybody. I'm Strobe Talbott. I really appreciate the turnout here this morning.

I'm going to start with a question and a show of hands. How many of you in this room have over the last week been inundated by phone calls and e-mails from friends and colleagues in Europe? (Show of hands)

In some ways, the only introduction that I could give, but I want to do a little bit more. The essence of their concern, I suspect, is that in many, many cases, they are worried that the next American administration is going to side with nationalists in Europe, thereby accelerating the disintegration of the European Union, the European Project, that is already, alas, underway. NATO, too, is in danger, given repeated comments during the campaign.

The political West, a trans-Atlantic project of 70 years, now involving more than 30 countries, is in crisis. Many statesmen in Europe say existential crisis, and more so now than eight days ago.

That is not, repeat, not a partisan phenomenon, nor is it a partisan observation on my part. The United States has had 12 presidents since 1947, six Republicans and six Democrats. Every one of them supported the institutions, policies, and goals that have bound us together. Every one of them was in effect the commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Alliance.

As the headlines today make very clear, the new administration is in the early and rather uncertain stage of transition, a transition that it did not expect.

As Brent Scowcroft said on Monday publicly during a ceremony honoring him, they need help.

There are among you in this auditorium representatives of policy organizations like Brookings. I hope that this morning's discussion will lead to collaboration in our sector.
My friend and colleague, Constanze, who put this panel together, will have the first word as the panel begins. My last word will be a quotation from the leader of her country. Chancellor Merkel said in her congratulatory message to Mr. Trump the following, and it is only two sentences:

“Germany and America are connected by values of democracy, freedom, and respect for the law and the dignity of humankind, independent of origin, skin color, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and political views.”

She then added “I offer the next President of the United States close cooperation on the basis of those values.”

Constanze is one of more than 100 scholars that we have here at Brookings. They are a diverse, fiercely independent, sometimes very strong-minded bunch, but I believe all of them, and I’m guessing probably most of you, would subscribe to the Merkel doctrine as we work with the new Administration as well as working with the other liberal democracies to save Atlanticism and our community of values.

Constanze?

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Good morning, everyone, and thank you for coming out in such large quantities for a topic that indeed couldn’t be more current.

I never correct my boss except on one point. This is a Center on the United States and Europe event that the entire center pulled together, and I’m standing here and speaking here on behalf of its director, Fiona Hill, who otherwise would be standing here in my place.

Thank you for your kind words about Germany’s chancellor. I would just remind you that I think many Germans feel those are values that we learned from you or relearned from you, America, after 1945. There is an intimate connection there, and it goes back a long way.

For those of you who have studied American constitutional history, actually that interconnection, that inter-pollination, goes back to the 18th century.
I am not going to give a talk. I'm going to introduce our distinguished speakers here today. The first one is my colleague, Bill Galston, who has the Ezra K. Zikha chair and is a fellow in the Governance Program. Thank you for coming, Bill.

Julianne Smith, an old friend, senior fellow and director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program at the Center for a New American Security, and a former Obama administration official in the DoD and the vice president’s office, lastly, as deputy national security advisor to the vice president.

Finally, Ralf Fücks, who is the president of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. I would like to offer a special note of thanks to him because he is departing this job after a decade long tenure, a very distinguished tenure in Germany, and we have benefitted for many years from the generous support and collaboration of the Heinrich Boll Foundation Office in Berlin, support that has enabled us in doing our research and holding many events of interest to the Transatlantic community here in Washington.

I would also like to reiterate Brookings’ commitment to independence and underscore that the views expressed today on the record are solely those of the speakers.

With that, I’m going to hand it over to our moderator, Julian Borger, of The Guardian, who will take us through today’s discussion. Please, if you could all come up to the podium. (Applause)

MR. BORGER: Good morning, thank you very much to The Brookings Institution for having me here to take part in what addresses perhaps the biggest question we face now in the aftermath of the U.S. election.

I’m going to start off by asking a few questions from the podium, and then we will open it up in the last 45 minutes or half an hour to questions from the floor.

To start off, at midnight on the night of the U.S. election, Gérard Araud, the French ambassador, tweeted out what must have been his gut reaction, which is “This is the end of an era, that of neoliberalism, it remains to be seen what will succeed
it.” He followed up with another Tweet. “After Brexit and this election, everything is now possible, a world is collapsing.” He said it was dizzying.

Not long after, Florian Philippot, who is the strategist for the National Front, tweeted out a reply saying “Their world is collapsing, ours is just being built,” which was very chilling to read about 1:00 in the morning when this was happening.

I wanted to start off by asking everyone on the panel whether Ambassador Araud’s first gut reaction was right. In a way, how resilient is this liberal order. Julianne, maybe I will start with you. What is your gut feeling about this?

MS. SMITH: Sure. Thank you for the invitation, thank you to Brookings and Constanze and Strobe for the opportunity to be here this morning with all of you.

I guess the bottom line, the short answer to your question is we don’t know. It’s a black hole. I’m not sure Trump and the folks surrounding him actually know the term “liberal order” and understand what that entails and what that means. There has been a tremendous amount of learning on the job already we have been witnessing in real time.

We have seen the President-Elect back paddle on a number of campaign promises already, including the wall, which was a key feature in his campaign rhetoric.

While I, too, was sitting there on Tweeter and with a glass of wine, through my tears, feeling some of the same sentiment, that this actually is horrible news for those of us that are advocates and support the liberal order, and actually have ideas on how we have to adjust that liberal order and reform these institutions and prepare them for 21st century challenges and launch them into this kind of new world that we find ourselves in.

We are now faced with a different question, and that is will it exist at all. Again, it’s a very hard question to answer because it will depend on the people that he selects, and we have seen there have been a lot of changes in the last 48 hours.
Some of those changes worry me even more, and we can get into that, but I think there is a great deal of uncertainty about the Cabinet members, and then the people serving underneath them, civil servants, and the impact Congress will have, the impact our allies will have, the impact cities across the country will have, the private sector, media.

There are so many different dynamics to this debate that even let’s say the cast of characters at the Cabinet levels felt kind of doom and gloom for the subject we are here to discuss today, I think there is still some open-ended questions about how the world responds, how the institutions respond. Again, the whole orchestra of players.

Again, the short answer is to be determined, TBD, but personally, I worry a great deal.

MR. BORGER: Ralf, if I can turn to you, you wrote a paper very recently called “The Battle for Modernity,” and you opposed the one view, the Cold War view, of this being the end of history back in the optimistic 1990s, to the Huntington clash of civilizations. Is Huntington right here? Are we in a clash of civilizations, and are we losing?

MR. FÜCKS: In another way, he himself postulated about the clash between the West and the West is a clash within the West. I would agree. To a certain extent, it is a kind of cultural battle.

I have to confess, I was following the presidential votes in Berlin, and I didn’t sleep that night. For me, it was kind of an event -- asking about gut feelings -- the kind of event like the fall of the Wall or 9/11. This could be a turnaround moment, a historic turnaround moment.

It’s not just in America, it is part of the much broader story which I try to coin as a crisis of liberal modernity, and it is about the very basic ideas and policies and institutions which over the last 20 years shaped our world.

It’s about globalization and an open globally interconnected economy,
which is perceived increasingly by large parts of our societies as a threat, and which is altered with a new wave of economic nationalists and protectionism.

It's a crisis of the whole idea of open societies, also for newcomers, for immigrants, for refugees, the liberal concept of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, again, it is perceived by large parts of our societies as a threat, not only in terms of social and economic competition, but also a cultural threat to their way of life and their beliefs and their self-perception.

A third element, of course, it's connected to the whole concept of diversity and gender equality and acknowledging the equal rights for sexual minorities, a new understanding of what is a family about, all these things which maybe most of us felt would be more or less for sure now are put into question.

This is not only an American issue; it is really a Transatlantic issue. I think we have to be ready not just for a battle of ideas but to rethink the concept of globalization and to rethink the concept of open societies because we have to be more careful about social coherence and about social inclusion.

This is especially a challenge to the liberal, in European terms, the liberal left. I think we have to rethink what went wrong.

MR. BORGER: Bill, if I can turn to you. Among the many things you have written, a book on liberal pluralism, and then one on the practice of liberal pluralism, if you were to make it into a trilogy now --

MR. GALSTON: The collapse of liberal pluralism.

MR. BORGER: I was wondering to what extent could this be an inflection point where after this, because of the policies pursued, things get worse, and then the politics get even more extreme and we end up in a downward spiral.

MR. GALSTON: Well, a very thoughtful man by the name of Ruchir Sharma just published an important article in the New York Times this Sunday based on a much longer book that he wrote, in which he did a historical analysis of long cycles of
globalization.

He started out with a deadpan paragraph of developments that sounded like the developments of the past 20 years, but were in fact a summary of the developments of the 20 years that preceded 1914.

He hypothesized that taking a long view, that 2008 may turn out to be our 1914.

MR. BORGER: The financial crisis.

MR. GALSTON: Yes, exactly. What that suggests is that we are in a long cycle where a certain set of forces are on offense and the set of forces that were previously dominant are now called upon to play defense and to play it much better than they have over the past decade.

If I may, let me just offer a couple of additional remarks along those lines. Ralf has offered what I would call the idealist explanation of these events, and let me counter with a materialist explanation of these events.

I’m not a debatee of the Frankfort School, the dialectic of enlightenment, modernity generating its own opposition, et cetera. I think what we have is a series of grave political misjudgments. It’s not modernity but the excess of modernity that is leading to a backlash.

Modernity is perfectly compatible with strong national sovereignty. Modernity is perfectly compatible with reasonable control of national borders. Modernity is perfect compatible with the regulation of globalization in the same way that in the 1930s it was perfectly compatible with the regulation of markets, indeed, requires it.

So, I think there was an assumption, a progressiveness assumption, that there is a one-way flow of history, it is an assumption to which the American Administration, the outgoing Administration, has fallen prey repeatedly.

One familiar phrase from the President to the Secretary of State is that X would be on the wrong side of history. There is no side of history. There are political
decisions that can be made either well or badly, and there is contingency.

Who knows what would have happened if the butterfly ballot in Florida had worked out differently, and Al Gore had been inaugurated, would he have gotten us into the war in Iraq? I rather doubt it.

Let us not turn political decisions and the contingencies of human affairs into grand necessitarian theories. We face a political challenge, and we must meet it politically.

MR. BORGER: Vladimir Putin will say, and he is a zero sum kind of guy --

MR. GALSTON: Yes, he is.

MR. BORGER: He is going to see this as a victory. What really stood out for me during the debates was that Trump would not criticize, and the one constant in everything he said, he would not go anywhere near criticism of Russia, like they had his first-born hostage or something, like a third rail that he would not touch.

How did you interpret that? What do you think it means now in terms of if there is one clash, it is the East-West battle for influence going on now? Julianne?

MS. SMITH: It seemed to the extent that NATO was in the process of kind of carving out a future for itself, that future revolved a great deal around two challenges, the challenges stemming from the South, instability in the Middle East, whether it is Syria, Libya, anywhere else you look, or aggression from Moscow.

Now, for the NATO Alliance, there is so many open-ended questions. Will NATO, our NATO allies, find a partner in the United States in trying to move forward with additional measures of deterrence and reassurance? Will instead President Trump try to cut some kind of grand bargain with the Russians over Ukraine?

Will President Trump even come to the next NATO summit, which is scheduled for next summer, and there was some talk about moving it up and having it in the spring. Would he send a Cabinet member or an undersecretary, assistant secretary?
There is a whole array of questions here, but fundamentally, the world is watching, not just the region, not just Europe, Eurasia, Russia, the world will be very interested to see how Trump develops a relationship with Putin, and what it means for how he looks at those types of leaders around the world, and what it means about U.S. leadership, U.S. values, the West-Transatlantic relationship, the list goes on and on.

Everything I heard from Trump vis-à-vis Russia for me was deeply troubling because it turned so many assumptions on its head, and while the Transatlantic partners continually have disagreements about an array of global challenges, the one thing we were not disagreeing all that much on was the need to stay together in opposition to what Russia is doing around the world, and that's now fundamentally been called into question.

MR. BORGER: Ralf, do you want to comment?

MR. FÜCKS: I am worried if Mr. Trump and the new Administration will try to return to that kind of grand bargain policies at the expense of the Ukraine, I would say Central, Eastern European countries, which are very dependent in their development as democratic European countries, they are depending from this kind of security shield, which is provided by the United States.

This must not be put into question. This would really be a dangerous dynamic for the European East. We are concerned if the United States would be ready to look to a new arrangement with Russia, in the sense of influence, and this would be a dramatic fall back into everything which happened since 1989.

The Russian issue has another dimension because Russia is no longer just an internal challenge, for a long time it has become a player within our societies and within the European Union, and as you experienced now in this election, it also has become a political player in American policies.

We have this kind of interconnection and interplay within our societies and Russia, a new anti-liberal international.
MR. BORGER: Bill, to what extent do you think it was a win for Putin, or was he just sort of messing around on the outskirts of something that was going to happen anyway? Also, are there sufficient countervailing forces in the Republican Party and Congress to stop the kind of grand bargain that Ralf was talking about?

MR. GALSTON: The honest answer is I don’t know. Earlier this year, I entered my eighth decade, and I have never been more worried, never. I say this for all sorts of reasons.

Anne Applebaum wrote a marvelous piece just a few days ago, the arresting title is “Is America Still the Leader of the Free World?” You couldn’t read that article without coming to a negative conclusion about her question.

Here is my fear, let me be very concrete. First of all, given the President’s powers in foreign policy under Article II of our Constitution, a really determined President with a clear view of what he wants to achieve can move policy all by himself even if the bureaucracy is not happy about it. That is especially true when you are talking about the conduct of alliances.

Let me be very concrete. We can have a long debate about NATO expansion over the past quarter century, but it is a fact on the ground, and now the President-Elect has called into question the viability of Article V of NATO.

I would predict that he will be confronted with a very early test. Will we fight for Talon? Will we fight for Rica? If you look at American public opinion, it has been so long since any American President has explained NATO to the American people, they have no idea that we are committed to the common defense of the entire Alliance. They have no idea that an attack on one is regarded by the Alliance as an attack on all.

I am by means confident that the President-Elect would give an affirmative answer to those questions I just posed. If he does not, I think the Alliance will be a hollow shell and may well collapse. People make accommodations with superior power. That is just part of human nature. You can see it going on right here in this...
Nation's Capital.

They accommodate themselves to power that seems to be waxing as opposed to waning, they turn away from power that is waning, not waxing. This is very high stakes, and the test, I think, will come earlier rather than later.

MR. BORGER: Julianne, you were in the Pentagon and dealt with NATO. What do you think?

MS. SMITH: I’m terrified that you might be right, and what we heard during the campaign was this concept of if you’re not paying your dues, then we’re not going to come to defend you should you get into trouble, but again, let’s see who surrounds him, what kind of learning on the job takes place. I suspect he does not know terms like “host nation support,” what the U.S. gets by having troops based overseas.

I don’t think anyone in his immediate circle also understands all the changes that have occurred since 2014 inside the NATO Alliance. There are a lot of changes and trends are moving in a better direction on defense spending. We’re not there yet, we don’t have even a third of the members paying two percent of their GDP on defense, but many of them will get there in the next couple of years.

Let’s see how he copes with all these questions and again how the people around him deal with it. I do worry that a test could come early before that learning on the job occurs.

If I could, I just want to make one other point about the European Union. I think for folks sitting over in Brussels, the assumption was well, if President Clinton were to arrive in the Oval Office, we would find a partner that is interested in joining us in saving the European Project, even though the United States is not a member of the European Union, we would be able to count on a President that is familiar with the European Union, that is dedicated to it, that understands the value of it, despite all of its words, and would definitely try to strengthen EU-U.S. cooperation.

Now, we have to turn that on its head. We have President Trump who
has deep unfamiliarity with the EU, and now is starting to surround himself with people or we suspect he is about to surround himself with some people that are on the record as saying they do not value this institution, that they would like for it to go away, they would like the Euro to disappear. They certainly don’t want the EU to develop any sort of foreign policy or defense policy capabilities, and move completely in the opposite direction.

On the Russia piece, the interesting question for Brussels and the terrifying question for Brussels is will we find ourselves in a situation where Russia actually aligns with the United States in trying to divide the European Union and split it internally and weaken that institution.

That is a pretty horrifying thought, particularly in light of the fact that Brussels relies on its relationship with the United States to bolster its resistance and develop more robust policies vis-à-vis what we are seeing coming from Russia now.

MR. BORGER: In the early days of the Trump Administration where they still haven’t got their act together and no one is confirmed, and Putin made a play for one of the Baltics or even took a town on a border, on the Estonian border, say, is there something automatic in Article V, battle plans, war plans, they are going to move, whatever it is called, a very fast, rapid reaction force, is that automatic or does it need a new sign-in, buy-in by national leaders?

MS. SMITH: The policy decision is not automatic. We have a commitment to fulfill our security commitments. The military does not go away. It will still be sitting there and be ready to move. It needs someone to direct it to move.

The test could expose this gap between the folks sitting in the White House and the rest of the U.S. government. What would be even a worse scenario -- it is one thing if Russia rolls tanks across the border of say Latvia, I think there is a little bit more clarity on how that goes down and maybe some wishful thinking on my part in terms of how the U.S. responds, but I agree there is some uncertainty.
A more challenging situation would be if Putin just does something again slightly under the threshold of Article V but still terrifying, so he kind of slips in de novo and slips back out, or there is a really devastating cyberattack somewhere in a NATO member’s territory, or little green men. We can go on and on.

Any of these asymmetric tactics being put into play, but in a way where even the Alliance itself is a little bit uncertain about whether or not this merits an Article V response, and turns to Washington for leadership and guidance and no one is home, that’s also pretty scary in terms of a scenario.

MR. FÜCKS: If I may, I would like to continue thinking about the rippling effect it would have on the Transatlantic Alliance if there is any insecurity concerning American guarantees. If the President-Elect will not rapidly reaffirm American obligations and American commitment, you will see very concerning dynamics like in Europe.

They already have the strong political forces which are looking for a new arrangement with Russia, who more or less are going to say forget about the United States, and if the United States would turn a blind eye to Europe and turn their back to the Transatlantic Alliance, it would encourage political forces, partly already in government, partly there are strong political parties calling for reorientation of European politics and kind of creating a grand alliance with Russia. This would be the future of Europe.

Then the Central Eastern European societies, you would encourage people to say we can no longer rely on the assistance and protections from the United States, we will have to look for a new deal with Putin and the Kremlin.

In Bulgaria, a new pro-Russian President was elected. You have it in all these societies. You should not underestimate the effects of the American position on the Transatlantic Alliance will have on Europe.

Two formal NATO Secretary Generals were doing a conference call yesterday, Rasmussen and de Hoop Scheffer, and both were saying we have to have a
summit really quick, but then they thought, who with, if there is no new Administration and we have to wait for confirmation, that could take a long time, so we will have to put it off until then. You can see how that gap might open up.

I was wondering about potential next dominoes. We have elections coming up in Germany and in France. What are the chances that Merkel would decide to pack it in, is she safe, and what about the chances of Le Pen in a second round in France?

With France, you may remember the essay of Applebaum in April when she said the West is just three elections from its self-destruction - Brexit, the American presidency, and the elections in France. They will be the final blow.

Definitely it would be the final blow to the Transatlantic Alliance, still as far as you can make any predictions after the experience of the last month, I'm still convinced she will not win, for sure she will get into the second round of the presidential elections.

If Juppe is the nominee of the conservatives, I think, he will for sure make it with a grand majority. If not, it could be more close, but even if Le Pen will end with let's say 40 percent, it would be a landslide, a political landslide. What will that mean for the future of French politics.

I don't think the worst case will happen in France, and in Germany, it's interesting if you're going around a little bit in Europe and other places, people are looking at Angela Merkel as sort of the last woman standing. I would say she unintendedly and unwillingly has become really a key player for keeping the European Union together and trying now to keep the Transatlantic relations on track.

She will run, yes, I'm quite sure. We will have a six party system. It will be difficult to create alliances. I think probably she will be the next Chancellor, and at the moment, I'm not happy with that, and the social Democrats are not happy with that, too. It looks like the so-called grand coalition which not so grand.
MR. BORGER: Bill, do you share that analysis? Would that be enough to sort of hold the center in terms of Transatlantic?

MR. GALSTON: Well, it's certainly better than the alternatives, and one of the things, taking a longer historical view, it would be worrying if Germany were left to stand alone. An historic German fear is encirclement by an agreement between the United States and Russia, and there are respectable and less respectable ways of expressing that fear, perhaps the least respectable way is what Martin Heidegger had to say in his book, "Introduction to Metaphysics," where he said there was no difference between the United States and Russia.

There is a long tradition here, and I would like to believe that Germany would respond by standing even taller in defense of the proposition that Brookings’ President, Strobe Talbott, ended his introductory remarks with, by putting it on the table.

I think at least in the short term, that would be likely. In the longer term, when a great nation feels encircled, there is no saying how it will respond.

MR. BORGER: Maybe to take it on, does the center, the forces of liberal democracy, have the resilience and adaptability now to respond to this, does the democratic party have a chance to respond, remake itself? Is the prospect of political realignment around the center to fight back and claw back?

MS. SMITH: I think I’d have more confidence in the center if we weren’t dealing with such a complex landscape. We don’t have particularly strong economies on the other side of the Atlantic. There are a number of threats that Europe is facing externally. The terrorism threat alone can be all consuming. If Europe weren’t coping with Brexit for the next two years, if Europe weren’t trying to deal with challenges from within, politically, but also what Russia is trying to do again to divide Europe from within, the institutional challenges.

It’s just unfortunately any way you look at it, the stars are not aligned. If we had stronger growth or we had TTIP out on the horizon as a real prospect, which of
course now it’s really not at all. If we had just a couple of things moving in the right direction, the problem is everything our societies need to right some of these disturbing trends aren’t in ready supply because so much is at play right now.

It’s hard to bolster international institutions or it’s hard to rely on democracies and democratic movement’s ability to kind of reinvent and reassert themselves and push back on some of these head winds.

I don’t feel particularly optimistic, and it is not just the French and German elections. There will be plenty to watch in the months ahead. There is the Italian referendum, the Dutch election. We can kind of paint a pretty rich calendar of what’s going to go down within the better part of a year.

I hope it doesn’t end up just being this cascading bits of bad news at every turn. We will see.

MR. BORGER: Do you want to comment briefly, and then I have a question for Ralf.

MR. GALSTON: Just very briefly. I want to return to the proposition I put on the table at the beginning. We are talking about political decisions that can be made either well or badly. I absolutely agree with you that the absence of robust growth in Europe and the United States makes every hard question harder.

That is not written in the stars. Here, I’m afraid I’m going to have to criticize Germany. I do not think Germany’s economic doctrine preached consistently since 2008 has been a success for Europe. It hasn’t worked out badly for Germany. It has not been a success for Europe.

One of the most interesting developments in the U.S. is that a period of fiscal austerity and monetary accommodation is being flipped on its head by the new Administration, and that may very well have positive consequences for economic growth at least in the short term.

If Frau Merkel were to give me 30 seconds of her time, I would say that
an international economic policy rooted in the hyperinflationary fears of the 1920s is very poor for the next decade of European economics. It had better be changed very quickly.

MR. BORGER: When I raised the question, can the center hold, maybe the center is not the answer to what ails the West. There was an argument that the center has failed, liberal democracy has failed, because it has failed to redistribute the benefits of globalization, and what you need now in response to this is a shift to the left and parties and leaders who are prepared to make that redistribution of those benefits in order to stabilize.

MR. FÜCKS: To a certain extent, I would follow on the degree that redistribution has become a biting issue, a burning issue, in Europe, I think, much more than in the United States. For me, as an observer, it was very interesting as far as I got it, the redistribution didn’t play a role in the campaign.

You have it all over the place that now right wing parties have become the working party, the workers’ party. They are assembling the majority of the working class people, not with the call for redistribution but for protectionism. Protectionism has become the political offer to the working class people, and of course, this is completely self-defeating. It will not play out to the benefit of these young people.

If you’re looking to the liberal and left wing section, it’s not just about spending, deficit spending, and it is also not just about redistribution in terms of tax policy. I think we have to restructure and modernize economies. This is a different approach.

Decoupling economic growth from environmental destruction and environmental degradation, this could be kind of a win-win concept in economic and environmental terms.

I agree it is a little bit preaching to the converted that this one-sided authority policy was misleading, and we have to put more emphasis on investment, public and private investment, to modernize our infrastructure, to rebuild our transport systems,
rebuild the cities, but again it is not only about increasing spending, it is about which kind of investment, which kind of technologies and innovation that will bring us to the need of the 21st century economies.

MR. BORGER: I am going to open this up. We have half an hour left to talk. If people have questions from the floor, I can see there are microphones. When you ask a question, if you can say very quickly who you are and where you are from, and make them brief questions. Maybe we will do it in groups of three.

MS. BIBLIN: My name is Contessa Biblin, from the New York Times. I’d like to ask the panelists what is your view on the European Union stepping back on imposing sanctions or stronger sanctions against Russia for banning civilians in Aleppo? What should be the strategic Transatlantic approach that you can recommend to President-Elect Trump?

MR. BORGER: Pass it to the gentleman in front of you.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks very much. Eric Mitchell, I write the Mitchell Report. I want to ask what is probably a question that Bill Galston may be the most obvious one to deal with it, but I would welcome the others.

As the saying goes, we are where we are and it is what it is. We are about to find out what it all means. The question, it seems to me, is what is the best counsel that can be given to the so-called loyal opposition about how it deals from day one, starting with appointments with the new Trump Administration? Is it a question of stand and fight? Is it a question of roll where it’s distasteful but not necessarily destructive?

MR. BORGER: The third, the gentleman in the glasses.

MR. BISSETT: Mike Bissett, PBS Online News Hour. Picking up on a point Mr. Fücks made over to Bill, and get this to your turf, what prospect is there for previously left parties, like the Democratic Party in the United States, to get back the working class vote?
Without it, you are just going to see this continued drift to the right, and you would lose the left parties that supported internationalism, like the labor party of old and the Democratic Party in the United States.

MR. BORGER: Okay, three questions. One is what can be done if there is to be sanctions for what is going on in Syria and the bombing of Aleppo, what should the loyal opposition do, fight or accommodate, and then how does the Democratic Party get back the working class vote in this country.

Julianne?

MS. SMITH: I'll take the sanctions' piece and leave some of the other ones to other folks on the panel. Personally, I have been appalled by Russia's actions in Syria. I was holding out hope that the Transatlantic partners, Europe and the United States, would find a way to show unity in responding to that. I was hoping that would lead us to additional sanctions, and I applauded those in Europe that stood up and suggested that was a viable way forward.

I'm not naïve. I know that for Europeans directly engaging above and beyond what's already being done as part of the Counter-ISIL Coalition is unrealistic.

I would assume that turning to economic statecraft would be appealing to our friends in Europe, but unfortunately, they were not prepared to take the decision when it was raised most recently, and I had hoped we would have that discussion again under President Clinton.

Now, with President Trump, all bets are off. He may not want to pursue the existing sanctions. While we may have a renewal in December, on the other side of the Atlantic, coming out of Brussels, that decision may be met just a few weeks later with some announcement by the President that he is interested in unwinding the sanctions that we laid out to date.

My personal hope that we were going to double down and exert more pressure on Russia in light of their actions in Syria, particularly in Aleppo, that started up
again yesterday in a really significant way, I think that hope now is forever lost.

I guess I can hold out hope that again perhaps our European allies can make the case to the President about why it is important and Congress can make the case, and those of us on the outside can try to make the case, and those that feel strongly they should remain in place can make the case, but again, we will have to see what the cast of characters looks like, what the team looks like, as they get settled into office.

MR. BORGER: Bill, you tackle the loyal opposition and the Democrat questions, if you can.

MR. GALSTON: First, one sentence on Aleppo. I believe that the most immediate and obvious policy consequence of the vote late Tuesday is that President Assad will survive. There is no longer any American will to remove him from office.

The duality of American policy over the past few years, I think, has been understandable, but ineffective, and what President-Elect Trump has said very clearly is he does not intend to invest an ounce of U.S. diplomacy or military power or even economic sanctions in order to uphold the proposition that Assad must go. He has survived, and we now have to make policy on that basis. That's my belief.

With regard to the working class vote, here's a fact. Working class voters who supported Mr. Trump were asked what was the single most important issue in determining your vote, and the answer to that was not immigration, it wasn't drain the swamp, it was trade.

The narrative that Mr. Trump repeated very coherently and consistently during the campaign, a narrative, by the way, that he has embraced almost unchanged for the past 30 years, this was not a campaign invention, and a very good looking scholar by the name of Thomas Wright has written a long piece demonstrating the other consistency in Mr. Trump's views on trade, immigration, and a number of other issues. I think we assumed he was a con man, he is not. He's a man of fixed views.
The single biggest failure of liberal elites during the past generation was to deal with or even recognize, deal with or even recognize the obvious negative consequences that the forces of globalization were imposing on the American working class.

China's succession to the WTO was a catastrophe for the American working class. I can prove that. Nobody predicted it, or least people who predicted it surely kept quiet about it.

I don't think we can go on as we have been going, which is not to say we should do what Mr. Trump is recommending, but we can't keep on doing what we have been doing. That's the second point.

Loyal opposition in the United States, we are all Americans first. Democrats have a civic duty to oppose the unconscionable, and to cooperate with policies that could conduce to the national good if they were executed properly.

We should fight to the teeth if not the death to oppose infringements on the constitutional order or on civil liberties. On the other hand, if Mr. Trump wants a massive infrastructure program, there is no reason why Democrats couldn't meet him halfway.

MR. BORGER: In the back of the room, and two guys in the front row.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. I have a question regarding Congress. It hasn't really been mentioned in the panel so far. Obviously, the President would have far reaching powers in terms of foreign policy, but still Congress controls the strings and already we see some push back from Senator McCain, for example, on Russia and Asia policy, but also from Senator Rand Paul regarding confirmation.

What is your take on the role Congress will play in the coming at least two years?

QUESTIONER: (Inaudible) I was wondering if actually there were even some more terrifying scenarios than the ones you described. In particular, the issue of
nuclear proliferation hasn’t really come up so far. Trump has threatened/promised to
dump the Iran deal, but also the uncertainty about U.S. security, nuclear, in particular, it
does raise the real possibility of nuclear proliferation around the world. I wonder if you
could speak to that.

QUESTIONER: (Inaudible) A couple of days after the Brexit referendum,
the Spanish conservatives, I think quite surprisingly, did pretty well in the Spanish
elections, and they were now finally able to form a government, and some people argue
that the shock of Brexit is driving the pound and the London Stock Exchange problems,
and probably shook some people in Spain into the realization that you don’t simply play it
like that.

Do you think the Trump election might be a big enough shock for people
in France, the Netherlands, its lead to support the Brexit referendum -- many of these
people are aligning themselves with Trump, but Trump is not really popular in Europe,
and people are scared.

Is Trump a big enough shock to sort of turn the ship in the right
direction?

MR. BORGER: Thank you. All right. Let’s start with that last question,
whether the shock effect will have a reverse effect in Europe. Ralf, if you could take that
one.

MR. FÜCKS: My guess would be there will be a contradictory effect. On
the one hand, it’s encouraging, the populous movements and parties. On the other hand,
yes, I think it will trigger a process of free thinking and looking for a more responsible way
to deal with European politics.

I think slowly people are getting conscious that we are really in a very
serious moment, and we can’t just go on with business as usual.

This is easy to say, and it’s difficult to do if you look to the weakness of
most European governments, there is not much self-confidence to act in a more
determined way. I think it will take some time, but I hope it will create a willingness to cooperate, to defend our values, to continue with European integration, but to figure out how, and how to gain more public support. This will take some brain and time.

MS. SMITH: Just one thing on predictions. I think I'm personally done with predictions. I've gotten everything wrong. I thought Trump would be out. I didn't think Brexit would happen. I thought the deal in Columbia would hold. I thought women would show up for Hillary.

I don't know. Of course, the logic, it sounds okay, you know, to be kind of horrified by this prospect, but maybe people are inspired by it. I don't know. I'll reserve judgment on that.

On the congressional piece, one thing I will say is I've been doing some work at CNAS over the last year, plus bringing Republicans and Democrats together to talk about an array of foreign policy challenges and trying to see if they could walk away from the table after two hours and agree on kind of a core set of policy recommendations, whether it's ISIL, Russia, China, non-proliferation or whatever.

We found during this experiment, it actually wasn't that hard at all. I think there will be some really natural alliances built up among traditional realists, Republicans, and Democrats on a whole array, Russia is the first one, but nukes, non-proliferation, and the importance of NATO, there is a whole array of topics where I think you could see some real positive and encouraging signs of bipartisanship.

Where the doom and gloom comes in is it's not -- the challenge is not trying to bridge the divide between the right and the left, in traditional foreign policy circles.

The challenge is now going to be that community separation from the rest of the country, so this town -- this type of conversation, I enjoy -- it is not going to be enough. We ought to have this conversation in Missouri and lots of other places.

I am even thinking about for me to tap out another 3,000-word report at
CNAS just isn’t going to cut it in terms of the challenges that now sit before us. So, the divide between all of us and the rest of the country is one thing, and then the bipartisan consensus on the Hill on an array of foreign policy subjects, and their views, as separated from the views of the White House, will now become another divide.

Congress will play an important role, but whether or not it can play a strong enough role to alter the views of both those that will soon sit in the White House and the views of the folks out in the so-called heartland, I think that is the bigger question.

MR. BORGER: On the nuclear proliferation part of this, is that a strong possibility, you find South Korea thinking we can’t rely any more, if Iran feels the agreement is not --

MS. SMITH: Yes, there have been countless studies. I remember years and years ago, I worked with Bob Einstein at CSIS, he had traveled the world trying to determine what countries would do in the face of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Lots of judgments. Again, it is a different world now. It is years later.

There is lots of good work being done and analysis, and it points to a very troubling scenario. I agree this is one of the most terrifying scenario’s, because it seems like it is going to be open season for any country to go out and grab whatever they want, particularly in light of the fact that the United States may be backing away from all these security commitments. Of course, they are going to make these judgments, they are going to be radically different from where they sit today on the question of nuclear weapons.

I’m right there with you. That one can keep us all awake at night for sure.

MR. BORGER: Bill, on the question of Congress.

MR. GALSTON: Actually, I find it difficult to improve on the answer Julianne just gave. I won’t try. I will predict that the Republican Party will hold together, at least for the first 6 to 9 months, on a whole bunch of momentous domestic issues, and
if we had time, I could tell you exactly what they are going to do and how they are going to do it.

I don’t think that any bipartisan coalition will be able to stop them or substantially modify the early steps they are going to take on domestic policy.

Just one word on nuclear proliferation. I’m not sure whether there is a ray of sunshine or not, but I wonder what is going to happen when Mr. Trump discovers that the Russians are strongly in support of the Iranian agreement; right?

MS. SMITH: Right.

MR. GALSTON: Then he will have to make an interesting choice, because he clearly wants to, if I may use this verb, “reset,” relations with Russia more momentously than anybody in the Obama/Clinton Administration ever dreamed of, but what’s going to happen if he realizes that not only will he be deserted by everybody in Europe if he turns his back on the Iran agreement, but he will probably poison relations with Putin.

MR. BORGER: There is a lady in the back.

MS. VICINI: Hi, Caroline Vicini from the European Union Delegation. My question is on Mr. Pence, the Vice President, who has all the experience from governing and from Washington, and who is a traditional Republican, even a very conservative Republican, in a world where we really don’t really know where Mr. Trump’s thoughts are on foreign policy, which role will he play?

MS. BENEFORE: Hi, Malti Benefore, I’m here at Brookings. I’m a millennial, but I’m also French. I spend time in New York. I see the importance of the relationship. How do you sell Europe to millennials who frankly see Europe as a place with stagnant growth, constant disorder, causing damage in the relationship with Russia, and I can say this because I’m French, very snobby? How do you sell that?

MR. WORKMAN: Hi, I’m Garrett Workman with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. I was wondering about how does this affect Brexit? Will the U.K. sort of
reach back out to the EU, given an uncertain partner on this side of the Atlantic? Will the U.K. actually turn more towards us, poisoning its relationship with Brussels? How do you see the Brexit dynamic playing out in light of this election?

MR. BORGER: Ralf, your turn. How do you sell the idea of Europe to millennials?

MR. FÜCKS: I think it's not a matter of marketing. We have to get our acts together in Europe and make Europe more attractive again. This is very much about modernization of our economies and developing, I would say, a new model of growth, but it is also a matter of culture.

I think sometimes when we are licking our wounds, we forget that we have this really rich tradition of liberal modernity, in terms of enlightenment and civil society and all these cultural diversities, which is an asset. I still believe it is an asset, and is still something billions of people all around the world are dreaming of.

A little bit more self-confidence, not self-righteousness. This is something different. A little bit more self-confidence also in these doom and gloom days, I think, would be quite good, in a rapidly changing world, with the new right of authoritarianism, a very self-assertive authoritarianism, if you are looking to the way China is globally acting, how Russia is now globally acting. Also, Iran is reaching out in Asia and Africa.

I think the democracies have to remind themselves what are we standing for. Yes, especially the young ones, it's your future, and defending democracy and the idea of human rights and citizenship, it will be a Transatlantic effort or it will not happen. Either we do it together or we will lose strength.

MS. SMITH: Thanks for your question. I think it's not that difficult to make, it's just we haven't been making it. It's pretty basic. The world is a scary place, and anywhere you look, challenges are coming at us from Asia, from Middle East, from Europe, or Russia.
Regardless of what keeps you awake at night, whether it is global pandemics, climate change, ISIL, name your threat, we can’t do it alone. The best place to call is Europe. It’s not Cambodia. It’s not Indonesia, it’s not even some of our partners in places where you would expect we would have strong -- we have global alliances, but our strongest global alliance sits with the Europeans, and it’s complicated, and we disagree, and we have defense spending issues.

Europe has a very capable military and has tremendous strength abroad, it shares our values, by and large. We will see what happens under President Trump.

When something goes down, the place you want to call is in Europe, whether it is Berlin, Paris, London, one of those cities, it’s just not going to be another capital, at least in the short term.

Yes, it’s complicated. It’s imperfect. It’s ugly, and it’s frustrating, all at once. You feel much better when you are in the face of a crisis when you can get on the phone with your partners in Europe to say what are we jointly going to do about this, and they bring capacity, despite all the headlines about a weak Europe and declining defense forces.

Look anywhere else, they still out shine everybody else.

On Pence, it’s a fascinating question. I have this moment where I was watching the vice presidential debate, and I thought, uh, this is interesting, on Russia, he is actually not lined up with his boss, so how is that going to play out? Maybe his view will prevail.

Then you remember the next day, Trump threw him under the bus, and completely backed away, like we didn’t talk about that, I have no idea what he’s talking about.

I don’t know how that is going to play out. He’s not a big foreign policy hand. He seems very well versed in some of the issues. Frankly, some of the things he laid out were not that far away from what Clinton was proposing and Kaine.
I guess the fundamental question is what does the relationship look like with Trump, will he in fact end up governing and kind of really running the show, and then if he does, what kind of team will they want under him? Chaney, of course, moved forward with a very large national security team during his tenure, and Biden kept that, shrunk it a little bit, but has had a pretty sizable team, of which I had the honor of being a part.

Now, the open-ended question is will we see a super sizing of Pence’s office on all issues or will he rely on the National Security Council, or will that all diminish because in fact Trump and company will run with it at the end of the day.

MR. GALSTON: First of all, I think Donald Trump has demonstrated over and over again that he’s not someone who can be run by anyone else. This rather remarkable purge that he just executed in his own transition team is one more piece of evidence that he is determined not to be run by the people around him, and I think that applies to Mr. Pence as well.

On the millennial question, if you look at Europe, the generation that most strongly supports the European Project is the millennial generation. I don’t think this is a generational issue.

In part, it’s an issue of classic American insularity, which is shared across all of the generations. How are you going to sell millennials on Europe? How do you sell anyone in this country on Europe?

Our geographical myopia is second to none. I will say this to U.S. millennials, if you happen to care about climate change, you had better care about Europe.

There was a third question having to do with the relationship between Brexit and the EU, this is an arrow shot into the air. I have no idea if anybody is listening. At a time where Western integrity, unity, solidarity, is so important, I think it’s time for the European Union to relax some of its dogmatic attachment to principles that may be very
good in the abstract, which are having concrete effects, specifically in the name of European unity, I would plead with the EU to relax its dogmatic insistence on free flow of peoples.

We cannot have a strong relationship between the U.K. and the EU on that basis. If you want to create a situation in which the worse of all possible outcomes, the chances of that are maximized.

MR. FÜCKS: I would agree with the general advice that the European Union has to become more flexible, and have to move to a bigger internal differentiation, not one size fits all policies for the European Union.

The freedom of mobility for European citizens, this is really one of the cornerstones of the European Union. We are talking about European citizens or people with residence status within the European Union. We are not talking about refugees or migrants. We are talking about the freedom of European citizens to choose their place to live if they are able to find work and to make a living, and we should not put that into question, that would have a devastating effect on the European Union.

In other areas, I think yes, we have to become more flexible, we have to find different solutions, pay tribute to the real diversity, the economic and cultural diversity of the European Union, and that would allow us to deal with the conflict and deepening the integration.

MR. BORGER: On Brexit, I would say there is an enormous amount of relief. There is also relief that now there is another country that stood themselves up even more than we have.

I think that's it. We are out of time. Thank you very much everyone on the panel. (Applause)
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