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REYKJAVIK AND ARMS CONTROL IN U.S.-SOVIET/RUSSIAN RELATIONS

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PARTICIPANTS:

Panel 1: The Reykjavik Summit:

FIONA HILL, Moderator
Senior Fellow and Director, Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution

KEN ADELMAN
Former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Author, *Reagan at Reykjavik*

STROBE TALBOTT
President
The Brookings Institution

MARVIN KALB
Nonresident Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

Panel 2: Arms Control in the U.S.-Russian Relationship:

ANGELA STENT, Moderator
Director, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies
Georgetown University
Nonresident Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

STEVEN PIFER
Senior Fellow and Director, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative
The Brookings Institution

STEPHEN RADEMAKER
Principal, The Podesta Group
Former Assistant Secretary of State

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. HILL: I'd like to welcome you all to Brookings. I just would like to let everybody in the audience know that you're on live TV. We have colleagues from C-SPAN 2 over here, so please be on your best behavior. I will certainly try to be from up here on the podium, as well.

We also have some colleagues from Iceland TV, as well, at the back, who we're very pleased to have here because this is obviously a very special event to mark the 30th anniversary of the Reykjavik Summit in Iceland.

I'm Fiona Hill, the director of the Center on the United States and Europe, and it's my great pleasure to be here today and to have the opportunity to moderate a panel of three extremely distinguished people who all have their own connection to this summit 30 years ago.

Thirty years ago, I was just starting off in university, watching all of these gentlemen on television and wondering how this was all going to turn out, so it's quite a -- for the younger people in the audience, just think where you might be in 30 years' time. You just never know.

We are actually also using this occasion to also get ahead of another big anniversary that will be coming up at the end of this year, which is the 25th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union. We can be sure there will be lots of events related to this, and also the independence of all of the former republics of the Soviet Union, including the Russian Federation, after the end of this year.

But we thought that Reykjavik was actually an extremely important anniversary and we'd like to welcome here the ambassador of Iceland, Geir Haarde. We're very pleased that you could be here with us in the front of the audience because Reykjavik was one of the key events that led up to the end of the cold war. It was one of the key meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union in the whole succession of events that proceeded the fall of the Berlin Wall.

And so we're going to do a two-panel event today. This first panel will

focus on the significance of the summit itself with three people who were there and the importance of the bilateral U.S. and Soviet effort to walk back from the brink of nuclear confrontation.

The second panel, which is going to be moderated by our colleague Angela Stent, is going to hone in on the general issue of arms reduction and arms control after Reykjavik and assess the merits of using nuclear arms control as the basis for a new relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, and then between Russia and the United States over the last three decades.

Now, obviously, developments over the last couple of days have put that back on the agenda again with Russia pulling out of the Plutonium Disposition Act. We did not know this was going to happen, although sometimes I think that my colleague, Steve Pifer, is a little bit prescient of this. He insisted on us holding the event on this day of October 4th, and I'm wondering if he knew that something else was going to happen on October 3rd. So it actually puts the whole agenda of arms control on the confrontation between Russia and the United States, sadly, back at the top of the agenda and the news again.

So I want to just begin the panel with a little bit of scene-setting. Not everybody in the audience will remember these days as well as our panelists of the 1980s. Some people in the audience were probably not born then, but it's worth reminding us that the 1980s were years of heightened Cold War confrontation and there was a real risk of nuclear war. And I just want to go through a few quick points and then turn over to our panelists for a discussion of this.

We had, of course, détente between the United States and the Soviet Union and Europe and the Soviet Union in the 1960s and the 1970s, but by the 1980s, the Soviet Union was actually convinced that the United States had become a clear and present danger. They were spending all of their time pouring over U.S. defense budgets, global U.S. military exercises, American and NATO air probes near sensitive Soviet borders. That sounds a little bit familiar, like some of the problems we're seeing today.

Statements by top White House and Pentagon officials, like Ken Adelman, and increased operations by the CIA in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and by 1981, the Kremlin leadership was thoroughly convinced that the United States was a nuclear threat.

March 1983 was a full-scale war scare. This was just after U.S. President Ronald Reagan had announced the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars, the land-based anti-ballistic missile defense system that was supposed to shield the United States from a Soviet nuclear strike, and Yuri Andropov -- who had just moved from leading the KGB to then rather briefly becoming the general-secretary of the Soviet Union, head of the Soviet state -- in 1982 accused Ronald Reagan of plotting a nuclear holocaust.

The tension was palpable throughout Europe, as well as in the United States. And during a British war game to test NATO's preparations for a Soviet nuclear strike -- as we now know, thanks to the declassification of British archives -- Queen Elizabeth II actually drafted a World War III speech. She had an address that was filed away in the archives and only revealed a few years ago that was basically urging Britons, as one might expect, to remain united and resolute against the madness of nuclear war.

And this was drafted at almost the same time as President Ronald Reagan made his very famous "evil empire" speech, on March 8, 1983, about the dangers posed to the United States and the way of life in the Soviet Union. So, things were pretty bad in 1983; they got worse at the end of that year. People might remember that Soviet warplanes intercepted and shot down a South Korean Airlines plane, KL007, believing it was a U.S. spy plane, as it was flying from Alaska to Seoul. And the whole idea of an impending nuclear World War III was reverberating around in pretty much every world capital.

August 1984, just as we run up to monitor these events, Ronald Reagan frightened everybody -- just be careful because we're on live mics -- with one of the most infamous hot mic incidents in international affairs when he joked on U.S. National Public

Radio, just before a live broadcast in California, “My fellow Americans, I’m pleased to tell you today that I signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.”

As we now know from declassified Soviet archives, nobody got the joke there and complete panic set in, in Moscow. So it was only when these gentlemen all came along, after March 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev came into power to replace Andropov as Soviet general-secretary, that things started to calm down.

In November 1985, in Geneva, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan held their first meeting between a Soviet and an American leader, it was the first meeting in seven years. And then they began the whole process leading up to Reykjavik that would start to put a rest to all of these tensions and the war scares of the early 1980s.

So, the Reykjavik Summit 30 years ago was a key part of that process. It would ultimately lead to the signing of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the INF Treaty -- which is, of course, under something of a cloud, also, at the moment -- and laid the ground for the 1991 first START Treaty.

Initially, as we’ll hear from our panelists, the summit seemed to be a bit of a failure. In its immediate aftermath was, again, another one of those Cold War familiar scenarios of tit for tat spy expulsions from the U.S. embassy in Moscow and the Russian embassy here. Steve Pifer, who will be on the next panel, was actually in the U.S. embassy in Moscow then and spent most of his time having to fill in for vital personnel staff who had been expelled, like driving a truck instead of doing his analysis on Russian political and military affairs. And, of course, U.S. journalist Nick Daniloff, who later on became a professor at Northeast University of Journalism, was actually arrested and imprisoned in a Soviet jail.

So that was all that was going on. But behind the scenes at Reykjavik things were actually quite different, as we’re now going to hear from our panel. So, first of all, we have to kick us off Brookings President Strobe Talbott, who was covering Reykjavik in his capacity at that point as Washington bureau chief of *Time Magazine*. We

also have our good colleague and friend Marvin Kalb, who was the veteran CBS and NBC news correspondent -- I believe then that you were the anchor for *Meet the Press* --

MR. KALB: Yes.

MS. HILL: -- as well as many other capacities at that time, Marvin. And then we have distinguished American diplomat and author Ken Adelman, who has just published a new book, *Reagan at Reykjavik: 48 Hours That Ended the Cold War,* and it's on sale outside the auditorium. You probably saw it at the very beginning. Already fans of Ken are running up with books to be signed.

And Ken was there with President Ronald Reagan behind the scenes, with the Soviet general-secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, and after we've had some of the atmospherics and observations from Strobe and Marvin, is going to tell us what really went on behind closed doors.

So thank you very much for joining us. It's very exciting to have such a great panel and to actually have people who were present at the events and we're very much looking forward to hearing what you have to say. Strobe, over to you.

MR. TALBOTT: Thanks, Fiona. That's a terrific setup for a really quite important story. And I think those of us who were there, including of course Marvin and Ken, knew that there was some possibilities, but I don't think any of us had even an inkling of how far these two leaders, Gorbachev and Reagan, would actually go.

Ken is the only person probably in the room, but certainly on the podium, who was behind the closed doors. Marvin and I were trying to listen through keyholes, if we could find any. And I'll come back to that in just a second, but just to fill out a little bit of what Fiona just said, this was still fairly early in the blossoming of the personal relationship between the President of the United States and the man who was the general-secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

There were signs that things might warm up. The Geneva meeting that happened the year before, the atmospherics were pretty good, and they certainly were better than the relationship -- or the non-relationship -- between President Reagan and

Andropov, not to mention Chernenko. But we had no idea as we got onto the press plane and headed to Reykjavik, of all places -- if I can say that, Mr. Ambassador. (Laughter)

And by the way, the site was actually picked because it was more or less halfway between Moscow and Washington. So neither leader had to go too far in the direction of the other, that was sort of the idea. And it was October, obviously. It was blustery. The little house -- can we see that and they can't?

SPEAKER: Yeah.

MR. TALBOTT: Okay. Hofdi House -- I checked this with the Ambassador before, who confirmed that it was reputed to be haunted and that's where everything went on. (Laughter) As the weekend developed, we began to get briefings from -- Ken, I can't remember if you did any of them yourself?

MR. ADELMAN: Larry Speakes.

MR. TALBOTT: Pardon?

MR. ADELMAN: Larry Speakes.

MR. TALBOTT: Yeah, and I think actually Secretary Schultz came out at one occasion while things were looking pretty good. And it sounded as though it was going to be, actually, not just a placeholder for a more substantive summit later in the year, but big things were going on in the house.

And we at *Time Magazine* usually closed our weekly magazine on Friday night, so that it could come out on Monday morning, and all of the signals were positive. So we had a number of photographs of Reagan and Gorbachev smiling and looking triumphant, one of which was -- I think David Kennerly took it -- was all ready to go. I had written the cover story, my editor -- somebody you may have heard of, Walter Isaacson -- back in New York was helping me put the finishing touches on it. About 4:00 in the afternoon of that Sunday, when the magazine was supposed to hit the streets the next morning, George Schultz came out into the press room, and you could tell from his face, you could tell from the tears that were in his eyes that the whole thing had collapsed.

This led to one of the more exciting moments in my journalistic career. I had to get on the telephone and immediately call Walter back in New York and said the equivalent of, Baby, get me rewrite. And I started dictating what we were hearing from Schultz and others who told us why the talks had collapsed. The word "laboratory" kept coming up, and I think I'll save that for you, Ken.

And so we managed to flip a happy story into an unhappy story. We found an unhappy picture of the two leaders (Laughter) and we got *Time Magazine* into your hands about 7:00 the next morning.

t that's not really anything more than background and color. What I think is really important about what we're going to be talking about in the next little while is that while it was a busted summit, it showed the degree to which these two men -- getting, by the way, a lot of pushback from their military and their political advisors -- these two men were determined to, rather than having the United States and the Soviet Union constantly looking over the brink that would take us into a global thermonuclear war, they were serious about not just arms control, but massive, massive reductions of the arsenals of the two countries.

And even though the Reykjavik Summit didn't achieve for reasons having primarily to do with SDI, it did create a kind of a -- if I can put it this way -- a launching pad for the arms control agreements that were reached during not just the years, but the decades that followed, which will bring us to a melancholy present where so much of that progress, unfortunately, has either been stalled and is going to be very, very hard to pick up on.

So, with that I will turn it to my traveling companion back in those days, who always was wearing a red tie, by the way. (Laughter)

MR. KALB: Same red tie.

MS. HILL: Is this the red tie?

MR. TALBOTT: I just put on a tie for all of you, and certainly didn't have a tie on when I was rewriting the story over the telephone with Walter. So, over to you,

Marv.

MR. KALB: Thank you very much, Strobe. And it's a pleasure to be with you guys on this panel. I have covered many Soviet-American summits. It was my great pleasure to do so, they were great stories. And for someone who had spent much of his life either in Russia or studying Russia, I was fascinated by what was going on, most especially with the arrival of Gorbachev on the scene.

And Reykjavik for me was an enormous disappointment. I think it was a summit, you could almost say, that shouldn't have happened. And I appreciate what Strobe was saying, that it set certain things up, but two men were that close to something that was truly historic and could not pull it off. And when you looked at Secretary Schultz' face when he walked out, it seemed as if he had just been informed that his wife and children had died in an automobile accident. He looked awful.

And as a reporter you looked at that and you knew, if you had done any advance work at all, you realized that Gorbachev was trying to reach out to the West. He was aware that three of his leaders had died within the previous four years. He was a young man and he thought he could do something different with Russia. And so, very quickly, he initiated a program that was called glasnost, perestroika, the idea of reforming Russia. And his vision was that you can hold on to Communism if you could somehow reform a system that was broken. The truth of the matter is, it was so broken that you could not continue and reform wouldn't work, but he didn't know that then.

And he started, in January of that year, floating the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. A number of people in this city, I remember -- I will not mention names -- but some of the people said it's a lot of propaganda, it's a lot of nonsense. And that might have been the truth, but that's what he said and he put that out there. And then the following month, out of the Soviet foreign office came word that the linkage that had been a Soviet requirement on all of the agreements -- you had to have all or nothing -- they pulled back from that. They were saying maybe you could get one.

And then behind it all was the awareness that Afghanistan was a monstrous headache and an obvious defeat. And how does a Soviet leader acknowledge that to his people? Thirteen thousand soldiers had been killed. How do you acknowledge that to the mothers and the fathers? That was a tough thing and he began to pull out. When he first came in he said, this is a bleeding wound and we've got to end it.

So he was aware he was under incredible pressures. He was trying to do something different and the stage was Reykjavik. And for a reporter there, you realized this was a big deal although we were being told by our briefers -- not Ken, others -- that this was just a setup for what would be a Gorbachev visit to the United States, followed the following year by a Reagan visit to Moscow. And yet, behind the scenes, as we will hear, they were discussing things that were unbelievably important to the world and to the two countries.

Gorbachev was there with that idea in the final analysis of eliminating nuclear weapons, all nuclear weapons, by the year 2000. The President was fascinated by the idea. Reagan, despite the image of being the conservative who wouldn't get along with Russia, Reagan wanted to get along with Russia. He wanted to get along with everybody, but more or less on his terms. And Reagan had a romantic attachment to SDI, to what we in the press called "Star Wars." And that romantic attachment was complete, it was total.

And if you had a choice at a certain point in that negotiation of saying, maybe we could both agree on eliminating all nuclear weapons by the year 2000? But Gorbachev wanted, first, the elimination of the idea of SDI. That didn't work. And then there was a possibility of a compromise. Reagan wanted the ability to test not only in the laboratory, but also in the skies, and Gorbachev was prepared -- so I was told by Russians whom I trusted at the time -- to accept the idea of testing in the laboratory, but not in the skies. But the President would not accept that.

And so, at the end of the day, what was explained to us by Secretary

Schultz, and by others later, was that, yes, this was possible, but the President would not yield on SDI and, therefore, nothing was possible. And that to me is -- I mean, as someone who has given up journalism long ago, I just think back upon it now, absorbed with writing about the history of Russia and the Soviet Union, and about ourselves and our dealings with Russia. If you think back to that time, my god, we've had nothing quite like it since or before.

And how fantastic it would have been if one or the other had been able to make that final break with advisors who kept saying, no, easy does it, boy. Don't go too fast. Don't go too far. And a President who really wanted to do it. Everything Hollywood in him moved him to make a big sensational statement, but he was in love with SDI and, therefore, he couldn't pull it off. And that sounds to me like just a sad story and I'm sorry to have to report it. (Laughter)

MS. HILL: Well done, Marvin, with tears in your eyes, as well.

MR. KALB: Yes, yes.

MS. HILL: I suppose another of the issues we should have mentioned that framed the summit was, of course, Chernobyl.

MR. KALB: Yes.

MS. HILL: And Gorbachev had just come straight out of having to deal with that as secretary-general early in his term.

MR. KALB: Absolutely.

MS. HILL: This devastating accident in the civilian nuclear complex which had had very large effects in Iceland. In fact, like many of the countries in northern Europe, had been under the plume of radioactive material that emanated from Chernobyl.

MR. KALB: Yes, very much so.

MS. HILL: So that would also, it certainly would seem, certainly for Gorbachev of thinking about this in a different way.

MR. KALB: A very good point.

MS. HILL: So, Ken, Marvin has portrayed some of the motivations and

ideas of Reagan. What was it like behind the scenes?

MR. ADELMAN: Well, Marvin was saying it was a very sad event. I'm going to tell you why it was a very happy event and Strobe told us why it was a very amazing event. The most amazing is to see, on Monday when we got back, there was *Time Magazine* with David Kennerly's picture on the cover, and thinking, my god, this is a printing, distribution, and editorial triumph of the first order. That it was flown out there.

MR. TALBOTT: There were some grammatical errors in the piece. (Laughter)

MR. ADELMAN: I thought there were errors of view rather than the dramatic I overlooked as rather minor. But, as Marvin said, Gorbachev on the scene was an amazing change. Starting in 1983, there was Brezhnev's death and then he was replaced by Andropov. And then 14 months later, because of a bad kidney, Andropov died and then Chernenko was there and helped with two armpits into every room, and then he died. Carol and I were very good friends then of the Italian ambassador and he was telling us he was going to Chernenko's funeral and I said to him, why are you doing that? He says, I bought tickets to the entire series. (Laughter) So he was used to going back and forth from this.

So I thought that to give a happy story, Marvin, and to cheer you up, which has always been one of my objectives in life, to cheer you up.

MR. KALB: You have been an utter failure. (Laughter)

MR. ADELMAN: All right. I just wanted to cheer you up for a few minutes, all right?

MR. KALB: Okay.

MR. ADELMAN: I want to do three things, and Fiona, you were great to give us the background of that. The three things I want to do is, number one, in a jiffy way tell you what actually happened at Reykjavik. Number two, telling you the significance of what happened at Reykjavik. And number three, telling you how my views differ with the views we heard, in some respects, from the moderator and the two

participants, okay?

This is the Hofdi House, amazingly isolated, as the ambassador knows, thought to be haunted -- it even now is called The Haunted House -- and a very small and beautiful house right on the outskirts of Reykjavik. It's very exciting because Carol and I are going there on Friday. Iceland is doing a big event for the 30th anniversary, so it'll be terrific to go back and see it where -- I know my wife doesn't like me to say this -- but it was the greatest weekend of my life. And it was with the ups and downs and ins and outs and the thrill and the misery, even before I saw Marvin out there. (Laughter) But it was wonderful.

Okay, real quick. This is the *Time Magazine* that Strobe wrote about in 1983. In Aspen, we have a collection of all the *Time Magazine* "Men of the Year," and we have this on the wall -- you'll be happy to know -- with Reagan's signature. It's Andropov and Reagan looking like they're --

MR. KALB: You didn't get Andropov's signature.

MR. ADELMAN: No, I did not get it. He died too quickly. (Laughter) But it's like they're in a duel. Instead of shooting each other with pistols à la Hamilton and Burr, they are going to go after each other with thermonuclear events. And it was a very scary time, as Fiona pointed out, and as Strobe wrote out in this cover story, "Man of the Year." And they're looking very somber on that.

This is the Hofdi House, you see the size of it from right there. I'll give you a quick tour. The upper left chamber was the American chamber where we were waiting with the President, or we were waiting and met with the President; you'll see the inside of that in a minute. The upper right bedroom was the Soviet parlor, and that part in between was the DMZ, the Demilitarized Zone, between the two. The window on the left on the main floor is where the two met. They met for 10-1/2 hours.

MS. HILL: Wow.

MR. ADELMAN: I don't know about you, but I've never met anybody for one weekend at 10-1/2 hours. And this is virtually without notes, without memos, without

talking points, this is the most genuine either man was in office. In office, when you're the President of the United States -- but I assume when you're the general-secretary of the Soviet Union -- you have all these kind of scripted meetings that you go through and everything with talking points and with memos, and do this and don't do that, and watch that, and all of that. None of this. This was a come-as-you-are summit. This is a free-floating kind of thing, the likes of which will never be repeated.

We got into the bubble there and it was the smallest bubble ever made, which is the room within a room for secret talks. And there were eight of us in the bubble, jammed in shoulder to shoulder, knee to knee. And all of a sudden, the gigantic doors open and it's announced the President of the United States is there and so all of us stand up and we're belly to belly, right there. And I thought, if I am going to stay in this bubble -- and I am going to stay in the bubble -- I better give the President my chair. And so I said, sit here, and for the next 40 minutes I was leaning against the presidential knees as we had the first look at what Gorbachev wanted to do. It was a very exciting time.

To help you out, this is Miss World, it's not Miss Universe. (Laughter) She was not the worst Miss World in the world, but I thought that she had been from Iceland and just crowned the month before, and I thought this would make a great cover for my book, help sales, but somehow the publisher thought it was little off the subject. "Fifty Shades of Ice" or something? I don't know. (Laughter) For search engines that's what I really wanted.

Okay, this is the prime minister of Iceland in his bathing suit, right there, talking to a young Tom Brokaw. They wanted to do interviews and Iceland was ill-equipped to handle the world's attention. They thought there were going to be very few press there. On the opening of the summit there were 3,167 members, like Marvin Kalb, accredited to the press.

And the prime minister, I don't know why his press guy on the far right didn't give him a towel or something, but he's doing an interview. Here's the room that I showed you. It's a very small room. You have Shevardnadze starting to sit down right

there, across from him George Shultz. Schultz is still alive at 92, 93, doing great. He was so nice, he came to a book party and spoke for 45 minutes about Reykjavik and it was just wonderful. The President and Gorbachev, and then you see the two translators. So it was kind of simultaneous, it was not sequential, and a note taker. And the note takers are important because George Washington University, and thank you for that, has put the notes online. And these are the American notes and the Soviet notes from the summit. And that's something we didn't know -- I didn't know at the time.

We heard the President give a kind of garbled 10-minute recap of what happened for an hour and a half, but until you see these notes, you don't see the back and forth. And they're very, very interesting on that 10-1/2 hours of those notes.

This is the Hofdi House where we met Saturday night. I was kind of disappointed because Joan Baez was giving a concert downtown, it was a street festival, and I was looking forward to that, but we went to the Hofdi House. Akhromeev was in charge of their group. Richard Perle, who's back there in the audience, was part of our group and a very important part of it. We met at 8:00 at night, we took a break at 3:15 until about quarter to 4:00, we then adjourned at 6:20 in the morning. I don't know about you, Richard, or others, but I'd never done an all-nighter before, even in college. I'd missed that ritual.

And we had by our estimation accomplished more on the strategic realm in that one night than we had in seven and a half years of negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva. More in one night than in seven and half years. We did not do much on INF besides go back and forth on our positions. We did not do much on SDI because the two presidents not only liked to talk about SDI, they loved to talk about SDI. And that was one of the remarkable parts of that 10-1/2 hours.

The more one jacked up the other on the SDI threat from Gorbachev and promise from Reagan, the more each other believed it. And it was just flights of fantasy, if I may say, on both sides, but they did us well. This is Akhromeev on the left, right there, who later committed suicide actually, when the Soviet Union fell. I kept up with him

over the years and it was quite a shock when that happened.

This is Sunday afternoon. This is, I think, the only -- Strobe, correct me if I'm wrong on it -- I think it's the only summit, certainly U.S.-Soviet, U.S.-Russia summit that's gone into sudden death overtime. It was supposed to end at noon on Sunday. They decided because they were back and forth that they would go into overtime. The President comes up about 3:00, 3:30 in the afternoon on Sunday, sits in the corner and says, I'll go down one more time, but that's about it. I promised Nancy I'd be home for dinner tonight. (Laughter)

We explained that Nancy's going to know where you are, it's not like you stopped in the bar on the way home. (Laughter) There's 3,127 journalists there, there's one story in the world -- as Marvin will tell us -- and he says, I know, but I told her I'd be home for dinner. And so we're going over that and you can see Paul Nitze on your left, who did the all-nighter. Don Regan, the President, George Schultz, Poindexter, myself, and here is -- circle that good-looking guy who's really showing his best side right there between me and Schultz -- Richard Perle. And let me just say, you've never looked better, Richard. (Laughter)

That was before I dyed my hair white, to tell you the truth, so I looked distinguished. But anyway, he was trying to come up with words that would bridge the gap, and the gap was a fundamental one. It was that Gorbachev wanted to confine SDI to the laboratory and Reagan did not want it confined. We were agreed to keep within the ABM Treaty and confined SDI in that way for 10 more years, until 1996, but not in the laboratory on that.

The myth came up, as Marvin mentioned, that the advisors were all over the place. That's not exactly what happened because Ronald Reagan knew what he wanted. He did not want to give up SDI, and so I don't think there was one time over the weekend where he asked any of us what we thought. He knew what he thought and that was good enough for him. It didn't work. They went back and forth. It's wonderful to read the notes of the American and Soviet note takers because what's wonderful is -- and

it's really a case study in leadership -- the last half-hour they were both trying to bridge this gap. They know how important it all was and they started talking about seeing the situation in each other's shoes.

Reagan was talking about the problems that Gorbachev might have at the Kremlin, Gorbachev started talking about the problems that Reagan had. It was just a beautiful, beautiful kind of thing and they were kind of pleading with each other, come on, can't you do this? Can't you do this? Ronald Reagan was the maddest we've ever seen. We went back to the ambassador's house, where he was staying -- minus the ambassador who had been kicked out for the weekend -- and he was just walking back and forth and back and forth, and absolutely furious about what might have been.

His handler, the fellow who was with him, Jim -- I forget his last name -- for eight years in the White House, just to handle where he goes and stuff like that, gave at the Miller Center in the University of Virginia, said basically he'd never seen the President so agitated as at this time except when Nancy was going into surgery. And he was agitated.

Strobe, there's the picture you chose, the Kennerly picture, and that, "No Deal, Star Wars Sinks the Summit." I didn't think that was exactly fair. I thought that Gorbachev's tying of Star Wars to the end of the summit -- that was not done until Sunday morning -- really sank the summit, but, Strobe, you were absolutely right that Star Wars was at the center of the controversy, for that, and it was all a failure. It was one big failure. And so that's basically what happened.

A lot of details can be filled in, but you can buy many, many copies of the book and give them out. (Laughter) Halloween is coming up, it's a great Halloween present. Thanksgiving, the whole family would be happy -- no. Anyway, you can see that.

Now, second part, what came out of it? Three things came out of Reykjavik, okay? Number one was the arms control track, this is signing the IMF agreement, the Intermediate Nuclear Force Agreement in the White House in December

1987, for the summit right there. What it did was basically, the zero option that had been Reagan's opening bid for the negotiations back in 1982, and it eliminated this class of weapon system from both the Soviet side and the American side. It was a great deal because by then the Soviets had 5,500 warheads facing at all of the capitals of Europe. It was the number one issue of NATO when Reagan came in office. And that was eliminated, the number one issue of Reagan. And that was signed in the East Room of the White House, right there.

Number two, that's on the INF level. On the strategic level it started on the basis of just exactly what Strobe said, on the basis of what we agreed on that all-night negotiations with Akhromeev was down to equal levels. Real reductions for strategic nuclear weapons, okay? And this was important because every other previous arms control, the SALT I and SALT II -- both of which I thought were bad ideas, to tell you the truth -- had limited the growth of nuclear weapons. No one until Ronald Reagan had really started to have a decline in nuclear weapons. That's why we changed SALT -- he changed, I didn't -- the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to START, Strategic Reductions Talks, and it was a very big move.

Right now the Russians have about one-fourth of what they had in terms of nuclear stockpiles at the time of Reykjavik. So that's the second on the strategic route. It didn't come during Reagan's time, it came during George Herbert Walker Bush's time. And then it's continued for George W. -- the Clinton years, the Bush years, Bush II -- and then Obama's latest one. And we'll hear about that more on the second panel.

The third thing I want to do is the most controversial and that is, did Reykjavik contribute to the end of the Cold War, okay? There's a lot of argument about this and the simple answer is, you can't say because causation in history, in social science, in any case, is always a mystery. You can tell about causation. I personally believe that Reykjavik did several things.

Number one, it legitimized the no-nuclear cause in a very big way. It is remarkable to think that before Reykjavik the idea of abolishing the bomb, the abolition

was something to have folk singers to sing about and naïve people write about and Nobel Laureates in physics talk about and things like that. It wasn't mainstream.

It is amazing that after Reykjavik, with Ronald Reagan as the poster boy, the number of key participants at Reykjavik who bought onto the no-nuclear, the abolition, the Ban the Bomb movement, that includes Ronald Reagan; it includes George Schultz, that's made him a centerpiece in his life in government; that includes Paul Nitze, who knew more about nuclear weapons than any of us; that includes Max Kampelman who devoted his life to the cause; it includes Bill Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time; it includes Jack Matlock who was an American ambassador to Russia; and then just a lot more: Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry. It became a respectable movement after Reykjavik and because of Reykjavik.

Now, the main argument I would make is the end of the Soviet Union. How did that happen? In my mind, Reykjavik contributed because Gorbachev saw that there was no way Reagan was going to give up SDI and the only thing he could do to get SDI, which he thought was absolutely the most threatening weapon system to him and to the world. After learning about it, he grew it way out of proportion. He gave the first address for any Soviet leader gave after a foreign meeting to the Soviet people.

On the night he got back from Reykjavik said explicitly, and I think I quote him pretty exactly, "SDI is a threat to the very existence of our country. It's a threat to mankind everywhere in all time." I mean, this is a little research program in the Pentagon that may someday show some promise, but a little pimple on the Pentagon budget. Less than that, half a pimple on the Pentagon budget, and he's blowing it up as a threat of all time.

He could get Reagan to give up SDI if he made the offer on the reductions of nuclear weapons good enough. He tried that at Reykjavik, it totally failed, and then the only alternative open to him was to reform the Soviet Union so that it could compete technologically. And once he started the reforms, which started before Reykjavik, but were vastly accelerated after Reykjavik with the Central Committee

meeting first, then with the Party Congress and then the next with the Party Conference, the first one since Stalin that implemented these reforms, so sweeping, and the reforms smashed the Soviet Union.

That's my thesis and I know that Strobe and probably Marvin will disagree with that, but we can talk about that later.

Two or three little points I would make on the opening remarks of others. Fiona, I think you gave a great background. One of the things I've learned in debates over the years is never pick a fight with a moderator. You can pick a fight with everybody else.

Fiona, there's one thing I would disagree with. When you say it's absolutely that the Soviet Union feared an American nuclear attack during those years and, because of the succession of provocative statements by Reagan, and actions, that's an argument that I used to deal with every year because I shared a birthday with Robert McNamara. He would invite me to breakfast and he would have the same argument every year until I gave up the breakfast.

And I made the same point every year, which I suppose shows you how effective I was on the point. I said, you know, I understand -- he had just always come back from Moscow just for this. Not for our breakfast, but he had been going back and forth there and he said, basically, that the Soviet Union was scared out of its mind about us, an American nuclear attack. And I said, well, the last time I checked, all of their bombers are lined up on the airfield right there, and over 90 percent of their submarines are in port at any one time. We never had 50 percent of our bombers on any airfield at any time; 50 percent had to be in the air. The submarine port was -- I don't know what the numbers were, but way over half had to be at sea at any one time.

If he was scared to death, why didn't he do something about it? Why didn't the Soviet Union do anything about it? They were there talking about getting attacked by nuclear weapons, but they had no easy actions that we could have done on that.

On the point you made, Marvin, about Gorbachev wanting to abolish nuclear weapons and some people in the hard-line administration saying it's all propaganda. I was one of those people. The fact is that Khrushchev had said it all during the '50s. It had been said by all the dead Soviet leaders before that. It was pretty standard fair. I didn't believe it for a minute. I didn't believe it until Reykjavik, to tell you the truth. And I believed he was really sincere after Reykjavik.

Looking back now, I was wrong in thinking that was just propaganda at the time because Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to believe that. But the fact is, at Reykjavik it wasn't the no nuclear, it didn't come from Gorbachev. It came from Ronald Reagan. The transcript is quite clear on that, the notes are quite clear, that Reagan comes up with the idea and Gorbachev says, well, I guess I can buy onto that. But Reagan is the pusher. And I don't know about Richard, but I never suspected that Reagan was so anti-nuclear, and it turns out he really, really was.

The last point I would make is on why Reykjavik was a failure, despite what came from it, from arms control, from the no-nuclear movement, and thirdly from the breakup of the Soviet Union. It was a failure because on Sunday morning, unlike on Saturday night when we had all of these reductions on strategic arms, Sunday morning Gorbachev surprised all of us with two things, neither expected. But nothing was expected there, to tell you the truth.

Sunday morning, he announced that, yes, they could go to zero on INF systems in Europe -- which all of us said, holy cow. This had never come up before without counting British and French. And number two, all of the strategic gains we had made all night were tied to agreeing to SDI in the laboratory. That was never discussed at night at all, but this was his idea of trying to get that done.

So it was good news on the INF front, disastrous news on the strategic front, unless you went along with confining INF to the laboratory, and that's what sent Sunday into a total tailspin.

MS. HILL: Well, thanks very much, Ken. I think we might have actually

run the risk in going a little bit too far in all of your vivid descriptions because you're leaving not too much for the book. Hopefully, there's a lot more in there because I think you've really given us -- I felt like I was in a blow-by-blow of the whole summit there.

Strobe and Marvin, I'm sure you've got some comments on this. Just one quick thing on the war scare. We actually do know that the Soviet Union was pretty freaked out by all of this, just to put it very bluntly, because there's an awful lot of material that has now been released from Soviet archives. And, in fact, a lot of it is an open source on the websites from the CIA and the Institute of Intelligence Security Studies. And some of those include the archives of the famous East German spymaster, Markus Wolf, who reports on how his KGB and Soviet counterparts were constantly hounding him, looking for any kinds of signs that the perfidious capitalists in the West might be preparing for a nuclear war.

So though, as you say, they still had all of the planes and ships out there in plain sight, they were constantly scouring for any piece of evidence that the United States might be preparing for a nuclear war. And, again, we can see all that material out there. It might not have seemed so at the time, but now we know 30 years on that was actually the case.

MR. KALB: I'm not a question that the material existed, I'm questioning whether it was sincere.

MS. HILL: Well, I think there's an awful lot of people who do believe it was sincere.

MR. KALB: Right, but why don't they actually take some action to show that this could happen? If everybody was saying in my neighborhood, you know, there are a lot of robbers around here, you've got to be careful around here. You've got to be careful because the robbers are up around here. You know what I'd do? I'd lock my door.

MS. HILL: Well, the Soviet Union actually did do something like that, they launched their own operation at the time; again in the files. I don't want to turn this

into a kind of a back-and-forth on this particular issue.

MR. KALB: Okay.

MS. HILL: Because I do think it's very important, just to get to Reykjavik, that it was really ending -- it appeared where there were real genuine fears of a nuclear war.

MR. KALB: Yeah, that's true. I agree.

MS. HILL: Which you yourself said, certainly in the West, but it was just as real in the Soviet Union. So this is what I would think makes this such an important summit.

And Strobe, the questions about where Reykjavik led are, I think, very important. And I know you've got something to say on this, as well?

MR. TALBOTT: I think that within five minutes or so we're going to turn to the future, and I don't want to rekindle the argument about the past. But I do want to put, as it were, on the table for this discussion a very important piece of background that goes back even before your preface. And that is, one of the reasons for the neuralgia of the Soviet Union about a robust anti-ballistic missile system was that we, the United States, in the person of Lyndon Johnson, had to beat Alexei Kosygin over the head at the Glassboro Summit on why the seemingly perverse principle that defense is bad and defense is destabilizing is actually critical to the U.S. position for a long time that we had to limit our anti-ballistic missile systems. And the Soviets bought that.

And I think while President Reagan sincerely believed that that was either out of date or just plain wrong, many of his advisors, including some who were there with him in Reykjavik, just didn't believe, A, that SDI would be stabilizing; and, B, that it would work. And that was part of the background.

MS. HILL: Marvin?

MR. KALB: Oh, just quickly. My sense is that the Russians were concerned about SDI in the sense they were -- they tried to head off the sudden appearance of an SDI system. It wasn't that this was something that could have been

developed over time. Their concern was what was really in the mind of the Americans at this point.

It's interesting to bear in mind, I mentioned before Afghanistan taking place at roughly the same time. Russia was at that point losing the war. That was obvious to the Russians and the rest of the world. And what did the U.S. do at that point? Make it easy for the Russians to lose or make it more difficult? The latter; an investment of $10 billion in armaments to build up the mujahideen who today, as you all know, are among our best friends in Afghanistan.

A point also about the SDI. Where is the SDI today? Anybody keep track of SDIs? Huge important issue, right? Right? My sense is that if I go back to a point -- but I have to go back to it because it means a lot to me, and they to you -- if these two men actually discussed, and they did, the elimination of all nuclear weapons with a timeframe of the year 2000. At the end of the day, you couldn't do it because of the difference, whether in laboratory or out in the air: testing of SDI, a system which since then has meant nothing, nothing whatever, in the U.S.-Soviet relationship or, for that matter, in terms of arming the world for an Armageddon.

And Reagan was the one who used that term "Armageddon," by the way, in 1983. And it was sort of in his mind, and in the '84 presidential debate I, in fact, asked him about that. And he sort of backed off and made the point again and again that, "A nuclear war cannot be won and ought not to be fought."

MS. HILL: Uh-huh.

MR. KALB: He was very much opposed to it, but he couldn't quite bring himself at the end of the day to take that extra step on SDI. And historically -- and forgive me for going back to my disappointment -- that to me stands out as a huge moment when we could have gone one way, but ended up going another.

MS. HILL: Well, thanks, Marvin. I think in the next panel we'll be taking this discussion somewhat further because, of course, there's been the issue of not SDI, per se, but certainly of missile defense --

MR. KALB: Yep.

MS. HILL: -- that has suddenly come up during two other administrations of Bush and Obama.

MR. KALB: Uh-huh.

MS. HILL: But it's also colored in many aspects the relationship between Russia and the United States.

I would like to bring in the audience just quickly for a couple of questions, because we are going to pick up these questions in more detail in the second panel. Over here, please? I'll just take two or three and then we'll come back for some more comments. So, if you could just identify yourself? Thank you.

MR. WALLACE: Hello, Steve Wallace. I'm retired from the U.S. Government. I remember that after Reykjavik, *The Economist* ran a cover showing Reagan and Gorbachev dressed as peace demonstrators with peace signs, love beads, the whole thing, and No Nukes signs. And underneath, it was titled "A Spectre is Haunting Europe."

And the theme of the story was that abolishing strategic nuclear weapons, as they argued, would make a higher risk that there would actually be a war in Europe, either conventional or a limited nuclear war that would be confined to the battlefield. And then, about a year later, Fred Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter published their report on discriminant deterrent, which gave concrete expression to those fears. So, what I'd like to ask is, what role did the Reykjavik Summit play in raising these concerns about the credibility of extended deterrents and heightening this sort of debate over both INF and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe during the remainder of the 1980s?

MS. HILL: That's a great question, thanks very much. I think Richard Perle obviously was at Reykjavik and would like to -- a question or a comment? Thank you.

MR. PERLE: Just one quick point because I think it bears on the question of how we should now regard what happened in Reykjavik. At the very last

session, the session that ended without agreement, there was a proposal on the table and it had been put in writing and in this matter, proposals in writing have to be given precedence over the chatter that surrounds it. That proposal, which Gorbachev couldn't accept, it was an American proposal. That proposal called for eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles over a decade.

And at the end of the decade, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, both sides would have the right to deploy a defense, if they had a defense capable of deploying. The reason why this is so important is that if you want to claim that SDI sank the summit, you have to explain what the objection to SDI would have been after the missiles that it was uniquely tailored to shoot down had been eliminated?

And it was this flaw in the Soviet argument -- and I had this discussion a dozen times with Shevardnadze -- the Soviet side could never give an adequate explanation for why SDI was relevant in the absence of offensive nuclear weapons.

MS. HILL: Thanks for that point. There's a lady over here, and then at the front. Yes, please? And then we'll go back to the panel to wrap up.

MS. MANZIAT: Marvel Manziat, University of Washington. Marvin, you talked about the importance of two men coming to change the nature of the confrontation, really, but how there was a pushback from their respective militaries and the political advisors. And I think this is very important to highlight civil-military relations in both countries. If you can reflect a little bit more, the three of you, on how much there is in print for individual presidents in the United States on national security and foreign policies versus an institutional continuity that probably comes from the military having their own views of what is important, what is not important, and SDI being a case in that. If you can tell us more, a little bit, about what the military, having a small research program, you said, what they saw in that, or the political advisors, as well? So some civil-military relations?

MS. HILL: Thanks a lot. Let me take just a few more comments because we've only got 15 minutes left. Garrett, and then I think Bob Einhorn, and then

the most --

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks very much. I'm Garrett Mitchell and I write *The Mitchell Report.* And I want to say, first of all, that this discussion is, to me, an important reminder of the power of oral history. Listening to the stories from the participants is powerful. This is not something, I would say, anybody in this auditorium is going to forget soon, and so I really can't thank you enough for that.

MR. TALBOTT: Stop right there, it's good enough.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. (Laughter)

MR. TALBOTT: Why would you want to go on?

MR. MITCHELL: Ken, I've got a list of things here that I want to discuss. (Laughter)

This is probably a rhetorical question, but let me pose it anyway. But what's so powerful to me about this, among other things, is these two people in a place called Iceland, in a very small building, managing the future of the world in the course of a couple of days. And I say to myself, is that ever going to happen again? And can that happen in the age of Twitter, et cetera? And that's really what you have left me with. Thank you.

MS. HILL: Well, that's a big question. I'm being told we can have a little bit extra time here, so I'll go back to the other questions and comments and just say if there's anything because I know, Strobe, you would like to add something.

MR. TALBOTT: Richard, thank you very much for being here. And thank you very much for being at Reykjavik. I think you have made an important point and reminded us of why the Soviets were so scared of SDI and why they were not ready to sign up to the elimination of all ballistic missiles. They saw American technology in general, and military technology in particular, as a black magic that we had and they didn't.

They felt inferior in their technology to thwart SDI. They never thought that they would get an SDI anywhere near as capable as the American SDI. And with

regard to the prospect of eliminating ballistic missiles, that would still leave the United States with non-ballistic delivery systems, such as cruise missiles with stealth. And for years afterwards I heard that from Russians, and I wouldn't be surprised if you did, as well.

MS. HILL: Marvin, do you want to add something?

MR. KALB: Well, the young lady raises the point about the military budget and the role of the military. I cannot but remember President Eisenhower leaving office, making a very specific point about the power of the military-industrial complex. And here it comes from a man who was a general who fought in a war, so he didn't catch a cold when he dealt with military people. He knew them.

And yet, in terms of the relationship of the military as a power in the United States measured up against the diplomacy and the Congress and even the President, there is an enormous strength there. And there is a kind of not fear, but awesome respect that people have when a guy in a uniform walks in and he's got a lot of medals around him. So, if two men had an opportunity -- as Garrett was saying before, they're sitting in this house, if two men had an opportunity to do any number of things with arms control, but one of them was the possibility of both of them addressing that single issue, then you get to a point where SDI becomes terribly important. It isn't today, but it was at that moment.

And you say to yourself, what is the Russian position on this? They were ready to buy in-lab and we wanted both, lab and outside. Think about it in terms of proportionality, think about logic, think about the power of history and the lessons of history.

I still go back to that moment, and I know that Ken will be unhappy with my saying this, but Reykjavik had very little to do with the end of the Soviet Union. The end of the Soviet Union was created by the system itself. It was dreadful. It died because it deserved to die.

It had very little to do with Reykjavik, but if diplomats feel good having

participated at Reykjavik saying, wow, we held off a fantastic Russian adventure, they might have done awful kinds of things. They were falling apart and we should have recognized that at that time, but our intelligence was woefully inadequate on the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thank you.

Ken, I love you anyway.

MS. HILL: Well, Marvin, I was going to also ask you, because Steve asked this question about the credibility of deterrents after Reykjavik, what's your sense of that? Whether Reykjavik and the idea those people could have learned later, that there had been this move to get rid of nuclear weapons, getting back to Richard Perle's comment about --

MR. KALB: Well, this business about getting -- Ken mentioned all of the people who were at Reykjavik who now believe, those who are alive, that getting rid of all of the nuclear weapons really is a fantastic gain and we all ought to do that. And they are now pledged to do it. Why didn't they do it then? What was it that was so important about that extra moment of SDI that you couldn't make that extra -- I still don't understand. I don't. I'm sorry.

MS. HILL: Well, Ken, do you understand it better now 30 years on?

MR. ADELMAN: I do. And let me just start with the last point the Marvin made because I think it's the most important point, to tell you the truth, and then get back to SDI and the talk of no nukes.

The relationship between Reykjavik and the end of the Cold War, the end of the Soviet Union, Marvin makes the point that Strobe has talked about in the past and I think it's conventional wisdom right now the Soviet Union collapsed of its own weight. As Marvin said, it was a lousy system. They were very poor, it had to collapse. Why did it have to collapse? We've had poor countries for a long time, they don't collapse.

Carol and I lived in Africa for two and a half years, go around from country to country, they're not collapsed. North Korea is now on its, what, 85th year?

People are eating grass and bark. There's no revolution there, unfortunately. It's not collapsed. Cuba has been under the Castros since 1959. It gets poorer and poorer, there's no collapse right there.

Gibbon ends his *Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire* with a wonderful line, "This intolerable situation lasted only another 300 years." It was intolerable. It was bankrupt and it lasted 300 years, okay. When you look at the data, too, that what was going on in the Soviet Union then.

Now, I'm going to open up a whole can of worms of controversy here, but the CIA estimates in 1986, at the time of Reykjavik was that the Soviet economy was growing at 2.5 percent, okay? Now, Marvin, I know what you're going to say.

MR. KALB: No, that's my point.

MR. ADELMAN: Okay, they could have been wrong.

MR. KALB: You're in left field.

MR. ADELMAN: Okay, they could have been wrong, they could have been right. It wasn't a desperately wrong estimate. People weren't making fun of it at the time, maybe you were. But it was thought to be respectable that they were growing. You can talk about the ruble-dollar conversion all you want, and that's a very hard thing of knowing how much it would have cost them to build the military, and there's a whole wilderness of data on that.

But I think the CIA was better doing relative prosperity, relative decline of the Soviet Union during those years than it was U.S. Soviet comparison. And anyway, the CIA was reporting in 1986, '87, until the reforms really got underway, that there was a growth between 2.5 and then it jumped to 4 percent, and then it came down to 2 and 1 percent of growth. But this was not a precipitous decline, this was not depression, this was not one-third reduction.

And at least in terms of, again, the CIA estimate, per capita wealth in the Soviet Union, Soviet citizens, at that time it was higher than where Americans go to vacation every year. It was higher than Israel, it was higher than Italy, it was higher than

Ireland. It had a per capita income of $8,000 or something like that.

So this idea that the Soviet Union was so poor and so out of it and getting poorer all the time, and empires that are real, real poor have to have a revolution, they have to have a total disillusion, like the Soviet Union, I just don't buy it. And I don't think that you can see any evidence in history. The Ottoman Empire lasted years, decades, in decline. People decline and they go on in decline.

MR. KALB: So why did it break up?

MR. ADELMAN: It broke up because Gorbachev wanted to compete with the United States in terms of technology and, just what you said, there was no way the high-tech of SDI could be matched by anything in the Soviet system and, therefore, he had to change the incentive and he had to change the way the whole system operated. And that's perestroika, as Marvin said, that is glasnost. Perestroika was a mess because he could not imagine how you reform, and I don't blame him, to tell you the truth.

At that time, we had about 30 countries who had gone from capitalism to Communism, but not one country had ever gone from Communism to capitalism. There was no roadmap for something like that. He wanted, as Marvin says, Communism with a human face; just like Dubček in 1968, there is no Communism with a human face.

Perestroika was a mess. He had no clear idea of his path. Glasnost was a raging success, and much to his detriment. It was a raging success because they opened up, as he said, the closed pages of our past. And when you open up the closed pages of the Soviet past, you have two big headlights right in your face. One is called Lenin and one is called Stalin, and neither one is very pretty at all.

MS. HILL: I hate to intervene, but I feel actually I have to. Actually, the party intervention is one of the reasons the Soviet Union collapsed. You've got, actually, on your last picture here that isn't on the board, but is on the slide -- which we might be able to put up -- a reference to Boris Yeltsin. I mean, Strobe is a man who has written a considerable number of books and articles on Boris Yeltsin, as others have, and you've

actually got several people sitting here in the audience who are scholars of Russia and the former Soviet Union who were shaking their heads as you were beginning to speak.

Because one of the precipitating events -- there's always a precipitating event that brings something down -- was really a decision, first of all, by a group including Akhromeev, who you mentioned, to launch a coup against Gorbachev. Not because of anything that he did related to Reykjavik, but because he was trying to have a new union treaty which would decentralize the Soviet Union.

MR. KALB: Yeah, yeah.

MS. HILL: And then a decision by Boris Yeltsin and another of other Republican leaders within the Soviet Union -- but mostly Boris Yeltsin -- to actually get rid of the Soviet Union behind the scenes.

MR. KALB: I agree.

MS. HILL: Now, they made those decisions for all kinds of different reasons. I'd like to try to get us back to Reykjavik because I do think it played something of a role because many people in the military and elsewhere weren't very happy about Gorbachev negotiating with the United States in such an open front way, as well as many other things that Gorbachev was doing.

And Gorbachev resigned, he signed himself -- as it says on your sheet -- into history, but others also signed him into history with a palace coup, two palace coups, in fact, behind the scenes.

MR. KALB: Thank you for mentioning the coup attempt. I think that was very good.

MS. HILL: Well, I think what I'd like to do very quickly because there was a couple of other important people in the audience, including Bob Einhorn, who's been very much steeped in arms control who wants to say something. So I just want to bring in the last couple of people -- a gentleman here and one here -- who I'd like to cite to bring back and then let's close and get into the next.

MR. TALBOTT: Great.

MR. EINHORN: Thank you, Fiona. I'm Bob Einhorn from Brookings. Ken, could you tell us a bit about the reaction of President Reagan's principal advisors to what was on the table? I mean, Richard Perle, I think alluded -- in his comments suggested that the delegation tried to come up with variants that probably some of the strategically minded advisors thought would be less destabilizing and more advantageous to the United States than simply giving up all nuclear weapons.

MS. HILL: Thanks, Bob. The gentleman here. So we'll get the microphone back to you.

SPEAKER: I was a young Italian Moscow correspondent in Reykjavik. In your very interesting discussion, you didn't mention Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl, Julian (inaudible), all the Western Europeans that were very seriously enemies of any kind of miracle in Reykjavik. Maybe they were much more conservative than General Akhromeev and they were conservative to any change of the system in Europe at that time.

I just remember Julian (inaudible) two years after, he said that we laughed so much at Germany that we do prefer to have two Germanys, rather than one. So could you put on the framework also that the Europeans, they wanted to keep the nuclear? Thank you.

MS. HILL: Well, that's a very good point. And then the gentleman just behind you, and the we'll come back to the panel, as the last question. Thank you.

MR. SCHADLER: Thank you so much for a very stimulating discussion. Bob Schadler, American Foreign Policy Council. One of the things that came to mind with the discussion was how much people got it wrong throughout. And at the time I was at the U.S. Information Agency and the job we had was to explain to foreign publics who Reagan was and what he was trying to do and what Reykjavik was all about.

And it also has -- I guess I'm trying to connect the dots of this year where it seems every intelligent, informed person has been wrong about most everything regarding our domestic politics, so it shouldn't be surprising that most everybody,

including Reagan's closest aides and his worst enemies in the press and elsewhere, got things pretty much wrong both about what Reagan wanted to do and what was going to be the result of Reykjavik.

I'd just ask for some reflections on how the informed audiences should try to screen out the quick impressions of people who are very close to what's going on, and highly intelligent and informed, as they try to inform the rest of us in the way that USIA, when it existed, was supposed to do. And how should we try to screen out what is going to be terribly wrong, such as how long the Soviet Union is going to exist? I happen to have a very thick volume of testimony in early 1989 before Congress of almost all of the Russian experts and almost nobody saw a glimmer of its demise.

MS. HILL: Well, thank you. That's a very important last question. As a student of that point I decided to do a master's on the Soviet cities and was very upset in December of 1991, when my newly minted degree that Marvin one (inaudible) just disappeared on me. I decided it was always best to study history.

Strobe, on the European front, as our colleague who was also there from Italy noted, there was quite a different view on the part of the Europeans, and I'm sure they would not have been very happy about the Sunday morning proposals on Europe.

MR. TALBOTT: Yeah, just a sentence. You're absolutely right. We all remember who were there and traveling in Europe at the time, had the deal gone through, our European allies would have seen basically the nuclear deterrent posed by the United States collapse. That simple.

As for your speculative question. I've occasionally -- particularly in preparation for this conversation -- gone back and seen how close actually it did come on several occasions, including I can imagine the Soviets actually picking up the last or maybe even the second to the last American proposal that might have, if the President had allowed it, if Reagan had allowed it, to keep the ABM Treaty in place for another 10 years while SDI was developed.

Imagine what the world would be like now if that had gone through? And

by the way, there would have been a great deal of angst on the part of our allies and our nuclear priesthood, but the two presidents had the ability to sign a treaty like that and it would have been the fact, with a whole other set of anxieties and controversies different from the ones that we're dealing with here.

MS. HILL: Marvin?

MR. KALB: That's a fascinating question, Strobe. If they had signed it and the French and the British had established that they wanted, their independent nuclear force, what would we have done? It would have been very difficult to persuade them, but that idea that the two big boys signed it, then how does the rest of the world adjust to that signature? And would they have objected and done all kinds of horrific things? Maybe.

The likelihood is they would have come on board eventually, but these things happen in stages. The gentleman who raised the question about how you get this information out, keep reading history because you're not going to get it up front very often. (Laughter)

You get headlines and that's what we journalists do, we write headlines and we do it day by day. And after a while, actually, we do describe what has happened, but it's with perspective -- you can rarely can pick up things, and biography. And what do these two men really think?

The Gorbachev story is still one, having read his book and books about him, I still have a feeling there's a great book there to be done.

MR. TALBOTT: And, by the way, if Gorbachev had accepted Reagan's proposal, Akhromeev would have gotten on a separate plane and flown back to Moscow and you would have had the Pop Palace Coup then maybe. (Laughter)

MS. HILL: Well, we're going to talk about I think also third nuclear powers in the next panel. Our colleague Steve Pifer has written an article about that recently. It's still out there playing as an issue and, of course, we have now the North Korea dimension that was not on the agenda at Reykjavik.

I'd like to thank our panelists very much for their time. Ken, in particular, for giving us really just the most spirited and vivid recollection of the period. Again, your book is outside. I hope you've left plenty of other stories for us to read in the book and good luck to your trip to Reykjavik. I'm sure the ambassador and his colleagues will be putting on a good reception for you there. And are you going to get a chance to stay another night in the Hofdi House?

MR. ADELMAN: Yeah, yeah.

MS. HILL: Well, come back and let us know who it's haunted by. That would kind of be interesting to find out that dimension. (Laughter)

And thank you very much, obviously, to Marvin and Strobe for also --

MR. KALB: Thank you.

MS. HILL: -- for also giving us their real-time recollections. And I hope that people will get coffee and come back for the next session, which is going to take the story onwards right up to the present day. This story never really stops.

MR. ADELMAN: I think the house is going to be haunted by Gorbachev and Reagan. (Laughter)

MS. HILL: Thank you very much everyone. Thank you. Thanks a lot.

MR. TALBOTT: Well done.

(Recess)

MS. STENT: Welcome to the second panel, ladies and gentlemen. We had a very interesting and enlightening first panel.

I'm Angela Stent. I'm the director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies at Georgetown University and also a senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution. And I have to say I'm very tempted before we get into the question about what's happened since the collapse of the Soviet Union to make two brief remarks about 1986.

One of them is, or maybe looking forward, when Gorbachev -- on the

question of why the Soviet Union collapsed. When Gorbachev came to the United States in the early 1990s after the Soviet collapse, he gave a talk about the Library of Congress, and Jim Billington, who was then the librarian of Congress said, "What was your biggest mistake?" And he said, "I underestimated the nationalities problem."

So I do want to come back to what Fiona Hill said at the end. The proximate cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the inability to work out an agreement between the Center and the different Republics of the Soviet Union, and that was related certainly to Glasnost and to Perestroika, but that was the thing in the end that brought the Soviet Union down.

And the other brief reminiscence about 1986 to show how Gorbachev had already been through a major transformation before he met President Reagan in Reykjavik was I arrived in the Soviet Union in Moscow three days before the Chernobyl accident. I had a fellowship for one month at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, and I had with me a one-year-old son, and that's relevant to what I'm going to say about Chernobyl.

So I had been there two days. I'm listening to the BC radio, and then I realized that some catastrophe has happened in terms of a nuclear accident. And the next week, a few days later, I gave a talk at the institute and I was trying to be forward-leaning and talking about the importance of improving U.S.-Soviet relations, and the person who hosted me, the chair of my panel, then started attacking me for the "lies" that the United States was telling about Chernobyl. There had been no accident. No one had been killed. So that was one vision of it. And by the way, after my talk I had people privately come up to me and say, you know, what's really going on.

Anyway, in the three subsequent weeks, Gorbachev had a complete turnaround after first of all denying that something had happened. He went on television. He admitted that something had happened. Unfortunately, by then it was too late for some of the children, for instance, who had been playing soccer on May the 1st in radioactive dust places in Kiev and other places in the Ukraine.

Anyway, just before I left the Soviet Union, on my last day, the very man who had attacked me when I gave my talk at IMMO, came up to me and said, "You know, thank you very much for being here. A terrible tragedy has happened and we have to work together. We have to cooperate, the United States and the Soviet Union, to make sure that this doesn't happen again." So this was really a transformative moment. Unfortunately, when you hear some of the things that emanate today from the Kremlin about who's responsible for what in the world and the downing of the Malaysian airline and everything else that's happening, it sounds a little reminiscent of what it was like in 1986 before Gorbachev admitted what had happened at Chernobyl.

Anyway, so I think the first point I wanted to make after having listened to this fastening panel is Reykjavik, even though we know that it didn't succeed completely, it was obviously the beginning of a very important process. And something like that, it's hard to imagine that something like that could happen today because it was so much based also on the personal relationship between these two leaders who despite all their differences got on rather well. And we're obviously at a point today where U.S.-Russian relations are worse than they've been since any time since before Gorbachev came to power, and obviously, the personal relations between the two presidents are almost, I would say, poisonous, but they're very negative relations. And of course, we know that yesterday, and Fiona Hill again mentioned this briefly in her introduction, the president announced, President Putin announced that Russia was withdrawing from this agreement that it had with the United States on the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium. And the United States was, of course, blamed for that, and Putin, when he announced this, said that the reason Russia was doing it, and I'm quoting now, "the emergency of a threat to strategic stability and as a result of unfriendly actions by the United States of America against the Russian Federation."

And he's now tied Russia rejoining this plutonium agreement to three conditions. One of them is that NATO should withdraw forces which are in Russia's neighborhood. We've been beefing up our forces obviously because of what's happened

in Ukraine. Secondly, we have to end the sanctions that were imposed after Russia annexed Crimea and then launched a war in the Donbas region. And then thirdly, Congress has to abrogate the Magnitsky Act. And this, again, I think shows a continuing lack of understanding in the Kremlin about the separation of powers of the United States or how our system works. Anyway, those are three conditions that -- I mean, they won't be met, obviously, so Russia will now have withdrawn from this agreement.

So the purpose of our panel today is to ask why is it being so challenging since the Soviet collapse to reach and then maintain and increase arms control agreements between the United States and Russia? You would have thought that with the collapse of communism, the end of the Soviet Union, it would have been easier to reach such agreements. And as has been pointed out, in every presidency since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the presidents have started out rather hopeful about arms control agreements, and in the second terms, if we're not talking about now the George H. W. Bush Administration, but in the second terms of Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama, these arms control agreements have really stagnated, they've been frozen, and they haven't been able to proceed.

And this is tied to a broader theme, which is that in the past 25 years, each American president has come into office, or in George H. W. Bush's case, he was already in office, seeking to improve relations with Russia. There have been four different resets trying to have a more productive relationship. All of these have ended in disappointment because obviously we have a very different understanding of what a productive relationship with Russia would look like.

What has worked in the past 25 years has been issues where Russia feels that we're treating it as an equal, and where it feels that its interests are respected and where our interests and those of Russia rather narrowly defined have coincided. One of those has been what happened in the fall of 2001, the cooperation with Russia in the first phase of the war in Afghanistan and the initial defeat of the Taliban where the Russians were really helpful and really cooperated with the U.S. because we had very

much a common goal.

And there are some more examples. U.S.-Russia cooperation in disarming Syria of its chemical weapons in 2013, the discussions we had that find it into the agreement on Iran, and the arms control agreements, because in arms control in general, this is a field, a sphere, where the U.S. and Russia deal with each other as equals. We are the two nuclear superpowers, and Russia usually feels that it is being respected as a world player because we come to the table as equals. So all the more reason to question why it's been so difficult to complete and to sustain these arms control agreements.

Now, we have two excellent speakers. We couldn't have any better speakers to discuss that with us today. I'll be turning first to Steve Rademaker. He's a principal in the Podesta Group. He's a former assistant secretary of state dealing with arms control issues in the George W. Bush Administration. He's also worked on Capitol Hill, a rich experience in dealing with these issues. And then, of course, Brookings's own Stephen Pifer, former ambassador to Ukraine. Having dealt at various levels in the State Department and the National Security Council with arms control issues, he is, of course a senior fellow at Brookings and he's the director of the Arms Control, a nonproliferation initiative, and has written widely on all of these issues. And I'm sure that he will have a great deal to say about all of this.

So I'm just going to say a few words about the background to when George W. Bush came into the White House about what had happened during the Clinton Administration in terms of arms control agreements and then we can move on to see what happened since then.

So when President Bill Clinton took office in January 1993, he inherited two nuclear arms control agreements from the George H. W. Bush Administration, START I and START II. And we heard a little bit about the background panel.

START I reduced each side to no more than 6,000 strategic warheads on 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and START II, which had just been

completed before the first President Bush left office, went further. It reduced each side to no more than 3,000 to 3,500 strategic warheads, and also from other U.S. perspective, very importantly, it was supposed to ban all heavy ICBMs and all ICBMs with multiple warheads.

Now, START I's entry into force was then held up by an issue that we're reminded of very much today again, and that was the question of Ukraine and its readiness to give up its own nuclear weapons. So, of course, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine was the third largest nuclear country in the world, and the Clinton Administration, and before the George H. W. Administration, worked very hard on trying to ensure that Russia would become the only nuclear successive state on the post-Soviet space. And that involved Ukraine. Also, Belarus and Kazakhstan, but mainly the Ukraine, being willing to transfer their nuclear weapons to Russia.

Anyway, I give great kudos to the Clinton Administration. They managed to do it. Both Ukraine and Russia were ambivalent, were reluctant for different reasons, and they signed the agreement in 1994. But, of course, that was tied to the infamous by now Budapest Memorandum, which gave Ukraine assurances that if it relinquished its nuclear weapons, its territorial integrity would be guaranteed, and it had security insurances from the signatories which, of course, included the Russian Federation.

In 1996, the Senate finally ratified the START II agreement, but then there were problems with Moscow. So this is now a tale in the 1990s of the difficulties of implementing these agreements because of the deteriorating political relationship, and particularly, in the latter part of the '90s, the Russian military was not happy about giving up on the multiple warhead and heavy ICBMs.

And then, of course, you had the beginnings of disagreements with Russia about NATO enlargement in the latter part of the 1990s, and then, of course, in 1999, with the NATO actions against Serbia over Kosovo with the bombing, et cetera. And so the Duma then delayed ratification of the agreement.

So the Duma finally did ratify a START in 2000, but it tied it, and this is

where we come back to Star Wars, and I know we're going to hear more about the "son of Star Wars" or "son of SDI missile defense," but where the Duma then tied it to saying that the Senate had to ratify the 1997 agreement on the ABM systems, the antiballistic missile systems.

Star II then, which had been ratified, which had been signed into law by President George H. W. Bush, was then pulled back by Vladimir Putin when the United States announced that it was unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM Treaty at the beginning of 2002. So by then, of course, you have all these missile defense issues which are now intruding on the arms control agenda.

So with that brief background, I'm going to turn to you, Steve Rademaker, and we will look forward to your discussion of arms control in the George W. Bush Administration. And whether you have views about why discussions on arms control did or didn't impact on the ability of the United States to cooperate with Russia on other issues, too.

MR. RADEMAKER: Thank you, Angela. And thank you for inviting me.

I guess I want to throw an idea on the table before I actually get into my discussion of the Bush Administration.

In 2009, I wrote an op-ed that was published in the Wall Street Journal. They gave it the title "Why Democrats Fail at Arms Control." That was their title, not mine. But the issue that I looked at was this paradox that by reputation, republicans are deeply skeptical of arms control and democrats are deeply enthusiastic. And yet if you look at the history of bilateral strategic arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union and now Russia, you know, the scorecard is kind of astonishing. Republican presidents have a lot of accomplishments they can point to. And when I read that article in 2009, it was the case that no democratic president had negotiated -- had ever negotiated and brought into force a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union or Russia. And why is that? I mean, how can it be that the guys who are skeptical seem to have a lot more success at this than the guys who are so enthusiastic. And you

know, you can offer theories. One theory would be some of the democrats have had bad luck. And I think maybe with Jimmy Carter, you know, it's not his fault that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, so maybe you can excuse his inability to bring about the ratification of START II. But in my article I sort of put forward a different theory, which was that, you know, it's kind of common sense among people, among all of us, that in a negotiation -- and we negotiate in our personal lives all the time -- excessive enthusiasm usually is not conducive to getting the result you want in a negotiation. You know, you're buying a car. Even if you find a car that you really want -- or I guess I should say especially if you find a car that you really want, I think you all know the last thing you want to do is to convey to the seller that you've made up your mind it's that car and no other. Because if you convey that, if the seller becomes aware that your demand curve for that car has become really inelastic, what happens? The price goes up. The negotiation becomes prolonged because the seller thinks, I'm not going to leave any money on the table. I've got somebody here who is really enthusiastic about this car. I'm going to get as much out of this transaction as I can. And I mean, that's just common sense in our personal business transactions.

For some reason, I think some of our presidents -- not just democrats. I mean, I think George H. W. Bush, for example, at the Chemical Weapons Convention, was a little too enthusiastic and ended up getting a bad deal, too, but for some reason many of our presidents have failed to translate what is common sense in any sort of business transaction we might negotiate at a personal level. They don't understand that the same applies between nations, and in negotiating with the Russians, you know, conveying excessive enthusiasm can actually backfire. That was my thesis in this piece that I wrote. And that was in 2009. Now, you know, President Obama did succeed in 2010 in negotiating his arms control treaty with Russia, though I would say -- I would argue that negotiation became prolonged again because of excessive enthusiasm on his side.

But with that background, I want to turn to the Bush Administration,

which has been accused of many things, but never been accused of excessive enthusiasm for arms control. So what was the record of the Bush Administration? As an administration that came to office, more or less committed to abolishing the ABM Treaty, because it had become an obstacle to the deployment of missile defenses, and also, given the security environment that existed at that point, committed to reductions in nuclear force levels, but not at all committed to the idea that this needed to be negotiated and agreed between the United States and Russia.

So the first thing the administration did was, in December of 2001, it abrogated, or provided notice of abrogation, notice of termination of the ABM Treaty. Now, for approximately the preceding decade, every single issue of the magazine Arms Control Today had run an editorial about how the ABM Treaty was the cornerstone of strategic stability, that without the ABM Treaty the entire architecture of arms control as we know it would collapse, that the inevitable result would be a new arm race between the United States and Russia.

So in December 2001, this theory was put to a test. Bush provided notice of termination. Five months later, he signed an arms control treaty with Moscow, providing for reductions -- I think the force level under -- the nuclear force level under the existing Start Treaty was 6,000 warheads per side. It was reduced to no more than 2,200 under the Moscow Treaty, what is sometimes called the SORT Treaty.

So, I mean, first of all, this theory without the ABM Treaty you couldn't have arms control was disproven within five months because actually arms control had -- I mean, there was the first successful strategic arms control negotiation between the United States and Russia in more than 10 years that took place in the wake of abrogation of the ABM Treaty.

But I think also the background to the Moscow Treaty is interesting because it was not your traditional arms control negotiation. I mean, what happened was the Bush Administration did an internal review, a nuclear posture review, and determined a new nuclear force level that it thought was appropriate in the security environment.

And announced unilaterally that the United States was going to reduce its nuclear forces to this new level.

And the Russians at that point basically came knocking on the door and said, "You know, we're very happy that you're reducing your nuclear forces, that you're doing that, but we really need a treaty. Because it's very important to us psychologically to lock in these reductions and make them mutual." And true to its complete lack of enthusiasm for arms control, the reaction of the Bush Administration was, "No, we don't need a treaty. It's really just not important to us." And the Russians said, "No, no, it's really important to us. We really want this treaty." And so basically, the Bush Administration said, "Well, look, if it's that important to you, I guess we could sign the treaty. But, you know, here's what it's going to have to say because we're just not interested in years of negotiation and wrapping in all these other issues. This is kind of it, take it or leave it. You know, we'll sign this." And the arms control industry mocked the SORT Treaty, the New START Treaty. I think somebody actually printed it on the front and back of an index card to show how barebones it was because it was a really short treaty, unlike Start and the New START which ran thousands of pages with their annexes. This was a treaty you could print on an index card but it did require reductions by both sides to no more than 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

So it was interesting that confronted with an administration that was basically indifferent to whether we got an arms control agreement or not, suddenly the Russians were not the obstacle to an agreement; they were essentially insisting on agreement, and the U.S. was in the position of saying, well, okay, but it's got to be on these terms and in the end the Russians said yes to those terms.

So it was actually the first success in arms control in more than 10 years, and maybe in the Q&A we can talk about why the Clinton Administration, it didn't necessarily want a very large U.S. nuclear force. It was prepared to do reductions, too, but it had some problems getting agreement with Russia on what it wanted to do. It basically got itself completely wrapped around the axle on trying to preserve the ABM

Treaty, and the Russians took advantage of that to bollix up any effort to negotiate arms control agreements during the Clinton Administration. It was only by terminating the ABM Treaty that the ground was cleared such that a bilateral arms control agreement was possible.

Now, you know, that's how we started in the Bush Administration. Things, as you suggested Angela, things kind of went downhill, especially towards the second term. And I think there were a whole bunch of issues at work there. Paul Saunders over at the Center for the National Interests did a very interesting paper on sort of where did things go wrong. You know, I was actually astonished. He interviewed lots of Russians. Near the top of the list of Russian complaints about the Bush Administration was the Kozak Memorandum. I could ask for a show of hands. How many people here know what the Kozak Memorandum is? It was an effort to resolve the disagreement in Moldova about Russian armed forces in Moldova. And the Russians were deeply embittered by the way the Bush Administration handled that.

So I know the traditional answers are, you know, NATO enlargement, you know, the decision to deploy missile defenses in Poland, supporting the Georgian government under Sakofili. These are the traditional answers. But it's actually much more complex than that because an important part of the puzzle is the Kozak Memorandum, believe it or not.

So I think it became difficult to maintain that momentum and I think it had a lot to do with President Putin and his effort to return Russia to something like the role that it had played in the past.

Anyway, maybe I'll stop there and --

MS. STENT: Okay. Thank you.

Steve, do you want to take up the story?

MR. PIFER: Sure. We'll save the Kozak Memorandum for the Q&A.

I think if you look at how arms control has played in the Obama Administration and its relationship with Russia over the last eight years, I guess I'd say

that there were sort of three phases. And the first phase was the reset from 2009 to 2011. And it was pretty clear that when Barack Obama became president, I mean, he actually wanted to do something bit on nuclear weapons. And we saw that in his speech in Prague in April of 2009 where he embraced the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Also being a bit realistic and said, "Look, this may not happen in my lifetime. As long as there are nuclear weapons, we have to have a deterrent that's secure, that's safe and reliable." But in some ways I think he's actually, going back to the first panel, you know, Obama and Reagan were the ones who, I think, had a passionate belief about really doing something significant about getting rid of nuclear weapons.

You had in those first months -- and Rasha Reese is here who helped negotiate it -- the New START Treaty, early progress on New START so that when the president went to Moscow in July of 2009 with then-president Medvedev, they already had the guidelines for what a New START Treaty would look like. And that reflected, I think, a return to a more traditional approach that the Russians were more comfortable with. I think complaints that I heard about the Bush Administration when I was out of government talking to Russians, they said, "Yes, we understand the American desire to limit warheads only, but you limit deployed warheads; you don't limit reserve warheads and you don't limit missiles and bombers, and how does that not create a huge breakout potential? And so I think the Russians were more comfortable when the Obama Administration indicated early on it was prepared to go back to that more traditional approach of eliminating both warheads but also strategic vehicles, missiles, and bombers.

And in that early months, New START had a boost from Reset, but I think also New START gave a boost to Reset. I mean, early progress was good for the broader U.S.-Russia relationship.

I made just a comment on Reset. I'm in the group that still thinks actually Reset was a success. I think we're a small and decreasing number of people, but I see it as a success in terms of what I understand its original purpose was, which was not to get

the U.S.-Russia relationship to Nirvana, but to get out of the hole that we were in with Russia in 2008 and get the Russians to be doing things that the Obama Administration early on defined as a U.S. interest. So it was a Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Agreement. It was more Russian help on ending the Iranian Nuclear Program, and it was Russian help on Afghanistan logistics in terms of getting supplies and forces easier to Afghanistan.

And on those raised in the first couple of years, I think the Obama Administration, they can look back and they achieved important things. Now, by 2011, maybe May or June of 2011, it was pretty clear the Reset had run its course. You know, maybe they should have declared Reset a success and come up with a new term and then that term would have failed.

But looking after the New START Treaty, it was also very clear, and the president made this public, you know, he wanted to go beyond New START, and not only negotiate further cuts in strategic weapons but also bring in nonstrategic nuclear weapons. And so for the first time this idea that you might have a U.S.-Russian negotiation that was looking at everything. And then early on you begin to see the Russians I think held back, and trying to figure out why is an interesting question. And we can speculate. It was pretty clear the Russians were content with New START, and at least at that point in time were not prepared to go beyond it. I think part of the reason was the Russians look at nuclear weapons as political tools above and beyond their strategic value and it gets into Moscow's self-perception of Russia as a super power. And really, the only way that they can compete in the world and claim super power status is lots of nuclear weapons.

Another part of it is, and this may be changing, but certain in 2010, the Russians still saw themselves with significant gaps vis-à-vis NATO and other conventional military forces, and they saw nuclear weapons as part of the answer to that gap, which of course was NATO's policy during much of the Cold War. But part of it also was missile defense. And the conversation that came up in the first panel about just how

much the Russians feared SDI. And I was actually posted at the Embassy in Moscow from 1986 to 1988, and when I got there and you would talk to Soviets about SDI, there really was this palpable fear that in 10 years the Americans are going to put us out of the ballistic missile business; that American -- it really is kind of interesting how much faith the Soviets and the Russians have in American technology.

Now, I think in '87, people like Roald Sagdeev, who was then the head of the Space Research Institute and a close advisor to Gorbachev began saying, "Look, boss, this is really rocket science. It's hard to do." And as the leadership in Moscow understood it, that I think made possible the Dialinki net you saw where the Soviets were prepared to go and do the INF Treaty and do the START I Treaty when there was really no give on the American side on defense and space questions.

But I think that faith in American technology on missile defense still applies today. And I go back to a comment made by a Russian deputy prime minister when he was talking about the European phase adaptive approach. And he says, "Yes, phases one, two, and three aren't a problem, but we know there's going to be a phase four, five, six, and seven." And so there is, I think, in Moscow this fear that somehow the Americans are going to be clever enough to come up with something on the missile defense side that really will change the equation.

But our missile defense, one of the interesting things was it actually started out as fairly a positive issue between Washington and Moscow. In September of 2009, the Obama Administration announced a reconfiguration of missile defense plans for Europe, replaced the Bush plan with the European Phase Adaptive Approach, and originally that seemed to win approval in Moscow. I mean, it seemed in 2009 that missile defense had been diffused as a U.S.-Russian issue. And so at the end of 2010, you even had a NATO-Russia Summit. Medvedev met with NATO leaders and they agreed, let's see if we can come up with a cooperative NATO-Russia defense for Europe.

And in early 2011, what I heard from both American and Russian participants was there was actually a lot of convergence and thinking. They agreed there

can't be a single system because NATO doesn't want to work for Russia, and Russia doesn't work for NATO. But you would have two systems that would interact through some jointly manned centers. One would be a data fusion center where you'd take early warning data from NATO sensors and from Russian sensors, bring it together, combine it, and send the enhanced product back to both sides.

And then a second center, planning and operation center would talk about what's the threat to Europe and how do you deal with it? But kind of impelled with it, so the Russians then also begin talking about they wanted a legal guarantee, a treaty that American missile defenses would not be oriented against Russian strategic forces. And then they said, well, and it has to have objective criteria. And when you ask, "What is objective criteria?" "Well, we want limits on numbers, velocities, locations." I mean, it really was a resurrection of the ABM Treaty. And the Obama Administration didn't even pursue that, recognizing that there was no chance that that kind of treaty would have a voting consent to ratification on the Hill.

And so then I think in (inaudible), that second period, where arms control begins to drift a bit, you see the Russian position on missile defense begin to harden, and then the Russians begin to bring other questions. They say, well, you can talk about nuclear reductions, but there has to be a solution on missile defense. We have to deal with advanced conventional strike weapons, conventional arms control in Europe, third-country nuclear forces. And they begin to sort of make all these linkages that make it very hard to unravel that ball and move forward on nuclear reductions.

And then you have two things happen. Both in Russia and the United States, you have presidential elections. And arms control kind of goes on hold during that period from late 2011 to 2012. And the result of that is that instead of Obama and Medvedev, where I think there was something of a chemistry, you have Obama-Putin after the Russian election. And the chemistry there is there but it's not good chemistry.

And there was on the part of the Obama Administration in 2013, can we reinvigorate arms control? They put forward a new idea on missile defense

transparency, but it really got no traction from the Russians. And I think part of the problem here was in Moscow, the contacts have changed. Vladimir Putin, when he came back, when he announced he was going to run I think in September 2011, that really was I'm going to run but he was also going to be the president; the election was merely a formality. But Mr. Putin really then began to talk in terms of things like Russian nationalism, Russia is a great power, Russia reasserting its place and voice on the world stage. And a significant bit of anti-Americanism mixed in with that. And it looked like that really is a big part of now how Russia looks at itself in terms of regime legitimacy. So you have domestic politics now driving a more adversarial stance toward the West, and arms control doesn't really fit in well with that, so that becomes a problem.

The third phase then comes really after 2014. It follows Russia's illegal seizure of Crimea, the support for arms separatism in Eastern Ukraine, and at that time you really have U.S.-Russia relations crash the lowest points since the end of the Cold War. Now, the administration here moved to isolate Russia politically, worked with the European Union to apply economic sanctions on Russia, and also generally ratcheted down normal diplomatic business. But it did hold out. There was a carve-out. Exempted was arms control, but there really was no movement, no engagement on that.

Also, in the summer of 2014, you had the questions arise over the treaty on intermediate range nuclear forces when the U.S. Government concluded or made public its conclusion that Russia tested a ground launch cruise missile to intermediate range in violation of the INF Treaty. The Russians responded with their charges of American violations. So here, arms control now is becoming a problem on the agenda. And again, you hear, I think, more and more Russians complaints about missile defense.

So arms control, which at the beginning of the administration was a positive and contributed to a better relationship, by the last couple of years has become a negative. And I think in some ways, just to close up, it seems to me that this is something like both the Clinton and Bush Administration's experience; is at the beginning of arms controls, and even though Steve, as you say, arms control wasn't on the top of

the George W. Bush list of things to do, it did do some things in a way that were positive early on in terms of the U.S.-Russia relationship. In the second term, in the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration and in the Obama Administration, arms control issues, related questions like missile defense have become problem issues that have, in fact, contributed to a more difficult relationship.

MS. STENT: Thank you both very much.

Before I go to questions, I wonder if we could just say -- if both of you would like to say a little bit more about what happens if we've now decided that the Russians have violated the INF Treaty and its sort of dead. What are the implications of that?

MR. RADEMAKER: We have pointed a finger at the Russians.

MS. STENT: Right.

MR. RADEMAKER: In the State Department Compliance Report.

MS. STENT: We saw Gorbachev signing this. Right.

MR. RADEMAKER: We've determined that Russia is testing missiles that are in excess of INF range, and therefore these tests are illegal. I'm not aware we've made a finding that they're actually deploying those kinds of missiles, although one would suspect if they're testing, they're certainly holding out that action of deploying them.

Going back to my time in the Bush Administration, I had conversations with Russians where it was very clear they are unhappy with this treaty. And in fairness to the Russians, I mean, they have some legitimate complaints. This is a treaty that forbids missiles of a certain range, but the only countries that are subject to this prohibition are the United States, Russia, and several of the other successor states to the Soviet Union. You know, Iran is not subject to it. North Korea is not subject to it. China is not subject to it. India, Pakistan are not subject. So, you know, if you're Russia and sort of on your periphery are all these countries that are free to deploy these missiles, and some of them are deploying, you start to wonder how are we supposed to respond? We're forbidden by this treaty that is from a different time with a party that's pretty far

away from us. You know, is this really durable over the long term? I guess relations are getting better with Cuba now, but if Cuba were deploying INF range missiles, how much patience would the United States have with the idea that, well, we can't reciprocate because we've got this treaty with Russia from 1988.

So it's been my sense for a long time that at some point the Russians are going to pull out of this just because they're going to say this treaty is an anachronism. And it seems to me that what we're seeing here is them taking steps in the direction of getting ready to do that.

I guess my advice would be let's not do the Russians a favor of terminating the treaty ourselves if we can avoid it. You know, they just terminated the Plutonium Disposition Agreement -- was it yesterday? Or this week? So, you know, they took the hit on that. Let them bear the onus for that decision. And likewise, on INF, should they proceed to deploy IMF range missiles in violation of the treaty, I would hope that they would terminate the treaty in accordance, in respect of that decision. If they don't, I guess at that point maybe our hand is forced, but I don't think we should make it easier for the Russians to deploy INF-range missiles. In the meantime, I'm all in favor of talking to them to try and persuade them to step back off the ledge, but I do think as long as the rest of the world is free to deploy these kinds of missiles, and lots of countries are moving in that direction, it's probably not realistic to expect the Russians to continue to live under the INF treaty over the long term.

MR. PIFER: I think I'd agree with a lot of Steve's points. I mean, I did somewhat understand the Russian position where you look at the countries that are developing intermediate range missiles now. They're all much closer to Russia than they are to the United States. But having said that, the point I made to the Russians is, well, when you look at the panoply of other Russian forces, their strategic forces, their conventional forces, it's not like they really need an intermediate range missile to match what the Chinese have or the Indians have. That would be the first point.

The second point, and I agree with Steve here, if the Russians decide

they really have a problem, the way to do it is not to cheat on the treaty; it is to exercise the provision which was built into the treaty, to withdraw from it. And I think Steve's right. The Russians don't want to do that because they don't want to bear the political responsibility for killing INF.

Just a comment on the Obama Administration's response. So far, the charges that Russia has tested but not yet deployed. And I think as long as they haven't deployed, a cautious response makes sense. If they do actually begin to deploy these missiles, it is going to change the game. But one of the reasons why I believe the Obama Administration has been relatively cautious, at least on the American side, there's not a specific military requirement at this point in time for building an American intermediate-range missile. And if you wanted to build it as a response to the Russian violation, you'd have to put it someplace other than the United States. Having gone through the dual-tract decision in the early 1980s when we did deploy Pershing 2 and ground launch cruise missiles -- Bob Einhorn was along with that, as well as some others here -- it was a pretty painful process. I mean, we ended up doing it and deploying those missiles in Europe was one of the key reasons why we got the INF Treaty. But I don't know anybody on either side of the Atlantic who would really want to go through that experience again.

And so the question is, if we wanted to build an intermediate-range missile, where would we put it? I don't think we could put it anywhere that would actually allow it to reach Russia, so our options are somewhat limited in terms of response.

MR. RADEMAKER: There's also the missile defense response. Deploy systems that would shoot down an intermediate-range missile.

MS. STENT: Exactly. Now, before we go to questions, I am going to exercise my chairman's right, and if you don't mind, call on you, Professor William Hill, as the great expert on the Kozak Memorandum, since you've written a book about this. I think a lot of this is a red herring, but I would like to hear your comments, if you're willing to, about was this a major issue that really scuttled --

MR. RADEMAKER: You're going to make me sorry I mentioned the Kozak Memorandum.

MS. STENT: And could you give Professor Hill a -- and have students here from my Russian Foreign Policy class that I'd normally be teaching at this time. I want them to listen to this, too.

MR. RADEMAKER: There may be a quiz.

MR. HILL: You know, thanks. Or maybe I don't know, congratulations or commiseration. You know, the argument in the book is that the Russians took the -- what they took as disrespect and really embarrassing their president.

MS. STENT: Could you maybe just explain to people what happened with the Kozak Memorandum briefly?

MR. HILL: The memorandum was a memorandum negotiated by Putin's deputy chief of staff, Dmitry Kozak at the time sent down to parallel the OSCE negotiations for Transnistria settlement, the negotiations that I was heading. And I talked with Kozak and couldn't get him to join the efforts, and Kozak complained that the Moldovans wanted to do it separately. The Moldovan president told me that the Russians wanted to do it separately. The key was probably that the Russians really desired to keep a pretty meaningless troop presence in Transnistria as a political hook, both on Moldova as a whole and on Ukraine, being down southwest of Ukraine.

But they rushed through the memorandum just ahead of the OSCE presenting an agreed memorandum to the two sides, and the one that they showed to me to get western approval did not have three key articles in it, which had to do with a long-term Russian troop presence in the country. When the version with the troop presence was leaked to me, I sent it back to a couple of places and the U.S., the time zone meant that the U.S. ambassador had to go in and make the demarche. Solana was able to call himself real-time. I think his words to Voronin were you can kiss European integration -- or you can kiss Moldova's European future goodbye if you sign this. Voronin agonized the night before Putin was to come to the country and sign the memorandum and called

him about four or five in the morning. The Russian press was already on the plane. Putin was preparing to fly down. And this happened two days after Chevrad Natze was carried out of the Georgian Parliament on live TV, and there were Moldovan citizens protesting with nooses and trees outside the Presidential Building in Chisinau.

In any case, the Russians took it very seriously. The point of the book is that the Russians take the near abroad much more seriously than we do. Think missiles in Cuba or Russians in Cuba. You remember the Cuban Brigade in '78, '79 when that broke. I think that had been there -- anyway, the fallout, it was about that time, and whether it was Georgia, whether it was Moldova, whether it was all of them together, it was a clear turning point in what had been, in my perception, on the ground out there from my own foxhole, of a Russia that we were able to cooperate with at some point or on some things, and Russia that was more suspicious and less willing to let westerners of various sorts in.

The attitude, whether this is accurate or not, but certainly a week later, Igor Ivanov screamed at us from across the table at the Mostric meeting stating, "When you intervened in the Balkans, we didn't like it, but we didn't stop it. And then we get an agreement and a settlement in our area and you wreck it." Things went downhill from that time. But, you know, as you've pointed out, they go up and they go down again. They go up again and they go down again. But they remember it far more than we do because it is really in their backyard. The position of Kozak at the time was equivalent to Steve Hadley, and so you can imagine what would have happened had there been an appropriate mirror image.

In any case, you know, it's part of an area that's sensitive to them, remains sensitive as you and others have noted, and one that we sometimes don't appreciate the importance that they attach to these countries. And we saw that again in Ukraine in 2013-2014.

MS. STENT: Thank you very much.

MR. PIFER: Can I have a footnote?

MS. STENT: Yes, you'd like a footnote.

MR. PIFER: I was actually the deputy assistant secretary who signed out the instructions to the American ambassador Moldova responding to the Kozak Memorandum.

The way President Voronin came to us was he told our ambassador, "I have this memorandum, the Kozak Memorandum. I propose to sign it. I would like an American endorsement." And I think he was asking the Europeans to do the same thing. We took a look at the memorandum and our conclusion was it's unworkable because it basically gave Transnistria the breakaway piece of Moldova, the ability to veto foreign policy, security policy. Had Moldova said we want to draw closer to the European Union, Transnistria could veto it.

So we went back to Voronin. We said, "Look, it's not our place to tell you not to sign this. You can sign this but we're not going to endorse it." And the sense of the embassy was Voronin wanted to be able to go to his population because he thought there would be domestic pushback and say the Americans and the Europeans are making me do this.

MR. HILL: But the thing is the first version is the one you looked at and came back and we told him -- the OSCE did the same thing -- told him that we couldn't support it, but we felt if he was going to sign it we couldn't steer him off because you had not yet seen the portion or the articles with the troop presence. There was a two-part thing. He definitely wanted western, both U.S., OSCE, and EU approval of doing it. He had told the Russians this, allegedly. He told me later that the Russians told him that the OSCE had approved, which was not the case. But it's clouded in stories of each participant who claims that they did it one way or another. The point is, at the end of the day, with Putin sitting in Moscow, Kozak at the airport really angry, and Voronin wondering what he had done, you had resentments on all sides of something that had been that close to settling one of the things and had failed spectacularly, sort of like other things that are being talked about.

MR. PIFER: Believe me (inaudible).

MS. STENT: Well, here we have the dueling narratives problem vividly explained.

All right. We do have time for questions on arms control and other aspects of U.S.-Russian relations responding to what you've heard, so. All right. We'll start off with you. Yeah. Identify yourself.

MR. HAHN: Hello, my name is Jeff Hahn. I'm a master's student at American University.

In the last panel they discussed the Reykjavik Summit in great detail which was very fascinating, and I was wondering about the legacy, specifically of Gorbachev and his warm relations with the United States and the impact it has on Putin and any future Russian leader because Gorbachev is so widely despised in Russia today, and I believe any other future -- any future Russian leader would fear looking weak, especially on the subject of arms control. Do you feel that this negatively impacts future negotiations?

MS. STENT: That's a good question. Who would like to take that up?

MR. RADEMAKER: Well, I don't have any great insights into the sort of Russian psyche on that issue, but I do think we need to understand, you know, Russia is going to do -- it's a great nation. Okay, Russia is going to do what's in its national interest. And conventional wisdom is that countries that feel weak on conventional terms, you know, in terms of their conventional forces, you know, often fall back to nuclear weapons as the safeguard for their security. That was what we did during the Cold War when we felt that we were inferior conventionally in Europe to what the Warsaw Pact was able to deploy.

Today, clearly, the roles are reversed. The Russians think they've lost most of their allies. They feel weak relative to NATO. So I hope this doesn't come as a shock to anybody, but you know, like Obama's agenda of we're going to abolish nuclear weapons from the face of the earth, you know, that's a nice aspiration but I think you will

find zero support in high levels of the Russian government for moving in that direction.

So if that's our objective to negotiate the abolition of nuclear weapons, like apparently was on offer in Reykjavik, I don't think we're going to find takers in Russia. Now, is that because of the Gorbachev legacy? No, I don't think so. I think it's a hard-headed calculation by the Russian leadership of where their national interest lies in the current global security environment.

And maybe I'll just go further. I think a big part of Obama's problem in negotiating with Russia is he has set this grandiose objective, and it's his objective. It's not, you know, Putin hasn't embrace this as his objective, but Obama's success is certainly being measured with reference to how much success he achieves in realizing this objective. To make progress, he needs to sign agreements with Russia. So, you know, if you're the Russians, that's a source of leverage; right? I mean, Obama wants something, you're not really enthusiastic, it's sort of the flipside of what we faced during the Bush Administration. They were the enthusiastic ones for agreements. We weren't and so we got to impose our terms. Today, what Obama faces is he's the one who has this political need to sign new arms control agreements with Russia and the Russians don't really have that need. I mean, I think they're basically satisfied with the current arms control regime. I mean, New START will expire and we can deal with that later. I don't think the Russians want a nuclear arms race but they don't need nuclear reductions. To make Obama happy they'd probably be prepared to agree to some for a price. But, you know, it would be a price that we would not, not a price that they would pay. And that's Obama's frustration, of course, is that the Russians are trying to make him pay a price. You know, I think he might have actually more success if he hadn't set this grandiose objective and, you know, hitched his own political fortunes to his success and trying to achieve it.

MR. PIFER: I think the Reykjavik legacy was actually much more in the short term, whereas despite the initial sense that the summit had failed, you know, within, what, just a little bit over a year you had the INF Treaty for the first time banning an entire

class of nuclear weapons. A couple of years later you had the START I Treaty. So pretty significant achievements.

Now, and it did, as I make the point as I think Ken Adelman said, it did make thinking about going to zero respectable. I personally think -- I support the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. I think it makes sense as a U.S. policy goal, although I don't know how we can get there. But that's based on two reasons. One is I worry that nuclear deterrence, while it succeeded during the Cold War, a couple times came very close to breaking down, and the result of a breakdown would have been 400 million dead. So the question is do you want to live with that risk? I think actually given -- if you could have a verifiable nonnuclear world, for the United States, given geography, given alliance structures, giving American conventional power, the risks in that kind of world are less than a nuclear world. I think Mr. Putin though doesn't buy into that at all. He looks at his situation and says, "Wait, you know, I am the leader of a declining power with a stagnant economy. I have one and a half billion Chinese next door. Nuclear weapons are about the only way I secure my security. And that's going to be, I think, why getting to or even moving in the direction significantly of a nuclear weapon is going to be difficult because the Russian perception, from their secure interest, is just very, very different from the way we would look at it.

MS. STENT: Okay, yes?

MS. BACHMAN: Hi, I'm Kate Bachman. I'm a master's student up at Georgetown University in Dr. Stent's class.

I got the impression from your particular comments about the INF Treaty and the possibility that Russia may, in one way or another, find itself outside of that treaty or, you know not necessarily back out because of the political consequences, but break it. And it seems to me like then it does have -- Russia does, in this case, have an interest in maybe an update of the treaty as opposed to backing out of it, an update to include the circumstances of today's world and the presence of nuclear weapons and other actors that are not included in the treaty. And it seems like on this particular issue, they may

have more interest than some of the other areas. And I was wondering if there's any possibility that that could come about.

MR. RADEMAKER: Well, in terms of modifying the INF Treaty, the one idea you'll often hear suggested is instead of getting rid of the INF Treaty, why don't we globalize it? So in other words, address Russia's concern by expanding the group of countries that are subject to its restrictions. In principle, that sounds like a great idea but I think you need to talk to the Chinese, the Indians, the North Koreans. How many of them are actually interested in doing that? I think opponents of that idea argue that proposals to globalize -- proposals to mount an effort to globalize the INF Treaty will probably translate in practice to the abolition of the INF Treaty because the effort will be mounted, it will fail, and then those who tried to globalize it will have a good excuse for explaining why they've decided -- since the rest of the world has expressed no interest in this treaty, why should we keep it? I mean, that would be a conclusion one could draw if efforts to globalize the INF Treaty collapse.

Short of globalizing it, I'm not sure how you adjust it to -- maybe you could try to come up with geographic, you know, in certain areas Russia could have INF-range missiles but not in the European theater. I mean, that idea, I'm sure, was discussed at the time the treaty was originally negotiated but, you know, missiles of that size are mobile, so if Russia has them in one theater, they could move them to another in a crisis. So I'm not sure that would be a modification we would be very comfortable with.

MR. PIFER: I think in the second Bush term, I think in either 2007 or 2008, the Russians made a proposal at the UN, which the U.S. Government supported, to globalize the INF Treaty. There were no takers, so it hasn't been pushed really since then.

MS. STENT: Okay, yes, over there. The lady in red.

MS. MCALLISTER: Christina McAllister. I've supported the U.S. nonproliferation program for about 10 years.

I was just curious, with the elections coming up here and recent Duma

elections in Russia, what nonproliferation arms control goals would you recommend for the next administration?

MS. STENT: Good question.

MR. RADEMAKER: I guess you've had enough panels about the Iran nuclear agreement, so maybe I shouldn't take us there.

MS. STENT: You can take us wherever you want.

MR. RADEMAKER: With Russia, I'm not optimistic that great progress is in prospect. In fact, I honestly think the United States looks kind of ridiculous coming and asking for deeper reductions in nuclear weapons when Russia is sort of on the margin in places like Ukraine. I mean, Russia must look at us like we're from another planet and we don't quite get what's going on. So I'd set aside Russia for the most part. You know, the big problems on the horizon are Iran and North Korea, and you know, I think, especially if it's a Hillary Clinton Administration, I think there may be consideration given to some sort of new diplomatic initiative to try and replicate the perceived success achieved with Iran on the Korean Peninsula. You know, personally, I'm skeptical. I mean, any negotiation with North Korea basically involves bribes that we will give them to stop doing bad things, and I think the history of the last 25 years demonstrates that the North Koreans are very happy to accept bribes. They're not actually happy to deliver on their part of the bargain, so I don't know why we would expect a different outcome. The Clinton Administration tried that. The Bush Administration tried it. To its credit, the Obama Administration hasn't tried it. I think they recognized that, you know, fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me. Fool me a third time, you know, I don't know what you say about that. But that's basically where we are. If start trying to bribe the North Koreans again to give up their nuclear weapons program. Iran, lots of people celebrating how we solve that problem. I personally think we put it on hold for 10 years and it'll be back in much more virial form with us having signed off on a much more robust nuclear weapons infrastructure if that's what they want to have. And basically no ability to restrain them should they wish to break out in 10 or 15 years.

MR. PIFER: I think the next administration in terms of arms control and nonproliferation, the urgent issue is going to be North Korea. Thus far, Russia is really kind of a bit player in that. I mean, it's not that they have huge influence with the North Koreans, so I'm not sure that figures in a big way on a U.S.-Russia agenda. If you got back to some kind of a dialogue between the United States and Russia on arms control, if you wanted to move forward, you'd have to reconcile, I think, what are two very different approaches, which is what has been, at least in the last eight years, an American desire to move to further reductions, but also bring in nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and the Russian desire to focus on issues like missile defense advanced conventional strike, third-country systems. Now, there may be ways to bridge those differences, but it would take quite a bit of work.

MS. STENT: Yes?

MS. MAZIANT: Mara Maziant, University of Washington.

I was fascinating by the way you talked about how negotiation and enthusiasm and that element affect the negotiations. I would like you to reflect a little bit more on the moment of unilateralism at this period of time, and unilaterally, the United States decides one thing and the way you're narrating it, that Russians would come and say, "Let's put it in a treaty, please. Treat us as equal almost." And then how numerated, that somehow there is a change in the context in Moscow, the national context in Moscow. And that there is more aggression moving forward.

So if you can piece these two episodes together, do you see that that moment is actually a reflection or a response to a moment of more strengths on the United States' part, affording unilateralism, and now this is the time to pay the price you were talking about. But kind of a justified or rationale price.

MS. STENT: Do you want to start?

MR. PIFER: Yeah, no, I think if you look at how Putin looked at the United States, there's pieces -- part of what is driving him is domestic politics. And it goes back to 2000-2008, Putin was good on economics because the price of oil went up

and the economy grew and living standards rose. And that as sort of, you know, this is what regime legitimacy is about. When he came back to the presidency in 2012, the economic situation was much more complex. And that's where you see, I think, this appeal now to Russian nationalism, restoration of Russian great power. And that's been a big part of it. But I think another part of it goes back, and this goes back to both the Bush Administration and also the Clinton Administration, is Putin has this huge chip on his shoulder, this sense of grievance, that the United States of the west mistreated Russia. And he starts NATO enlargement. His version of NATO enlargement is NATO enlargement was organized by the United States, written in Germany to contain Russia, to bring military force up to Russia's borders. I think it was very different. It was designed to respond to appeals by Central European countries who basically said, "We want to be full members of Europe."

Likewise, if you look at the way he talks about the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Maidan Revolution, these aren't manifestations of populations that say, wait, our election was stolen or we're unhappy with bad governance. Again, and the way Putin describes it, these are Western plots, usually American plots, again, designed to promote regime change, and the ultimate target is regime change in Moscow. And he talks about it so much that in some sense I think he actually believes it.

Now, I think the reality is very different, but from his perspective, he has a sense of grievance. He has this sense that he's defending against an encroaching West, and that may explain things why he's less interested in arms control, why he worries more about missile defense, because he has this perception that I personally think is wrong but perception, you know, can be a reality.

MS. STENT: Steve?

MR. RADEMAKER: You use the term "unilateralism," and since I served on the Bush Administration, when the term is thrown out in connection with the Bush Administration it's usually a criticism. But the unilateralism that's criticized was not ever

the decision unilaterally to reduce nuclear weapons or other unilateral decisions perhaps that were criticized.

MR. PIFER: He used the term.

MR. RADEMAKER: Well, it was unilateral. I mean, it was not a negotiated nuclear reduction; it was a unilaterally U.S. decision about reductions that we decided to make. I mean, there was precedent for that. George H. W. Bush for nonstrategic nuclear weapons announced unilateral U.S. reductions that were then reciprocated by President Yeltsin.

And I think basically the Bush vision, the George W. Bush vision or the hope was that in announcing nuclear reductions on our side, strategic nuclear reductions, that the Russians would match them unilaterally as had happened with the nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but in the end, the Russians wanted a treaty. And I think they were probably -- in fact, I'm sure they were frustrated because they like using the treaty negotiating process to try and leverage the U.S. on other issues like missile defense and conventional strategic weapons. They have a whole list of things that they want to try and slowly advance their interests by taking arms control negotiations hostage, and that was the history of -- the New START negotiation took much longer than it really should have and that was because the Russians kept trying to link it to other issues to see whether in Obama's enthusiasm to get this treaty he'd be prepared to make concessions on things that previously the U.S. hadn't been willing to talk about.

MS. STENT: Richard Pearl. Do you want to give him the microphone over there? It's coming this way. No, no, there's the mic.

MR. PEARL: Can I encourage the panel to comment on the proposition that the intellectual architecture of arms control as we knew it during the Cold War is, in fact, an anachronism today? And arms control as we have understood it in the past is not very important, not very relevant, and no matter whether we attempt agreements or choose not to attempt agreements, it isn't going to make much difference.

MS. STENT: I think we'll start with Steve Pifer first.

MR. PIFER: Well, you gave me the supporting argument idea.

MR. RADEMAKER: I think that's largely true. I mean, the history of arms control was we were in a nuclear arms race and that was the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon Administrations, and the first goal of arms control was to stop the arms race. And then under Reagan they moved to trying to roll back weapons levels.

But I think we do face a different security environment today and, I mean, there's no nuclear arms race that's a prospect. I mean, no country is going to spend billions of dollars, maybe more than billions of dollars, to try to gain nuclear advantage in the current environment. And I think in a lot of ways arms control can be actually an obstacle to improved relations because you set up these processes. I have some sympathy for the Russians. They are playing a weak hand. That's what we're facing. They are playing a weak hand and they are -- what do you do when you have a weak hand? Well, you better play it pretty well because you don't have much margin for error. So they use these processes to try and gain advantage, to create linkages, to achieve concessions in other unrelated areas. And I do think it often ends up bollixing up the relationship and I think sometimes we're much better off, as we were during the Bush Administration, saying essentially we're indifferent to these negotiations, arms control agreements. We'll do one if it makes you feel better but we're not going to spend six years in Geneva hammering one out and letting you, you know, roll all these other issues on the agenda that we don't want to talk about in Geneva. You know, take it or leave it. Here's what we're prepared to agree to.

And I think Obama's problem is he's got this agenda of abolishing nuclear weapons so he needs agreements to make progress toward his objective. And like I said earlier, that invites the Russians to make him pay a price for doing that. That's what they need to do with the weak hand of cards that they have to play.

MS. STENT: The case for arms control, Steve Pifer?

MR. PIFER: I think that there still is value in using arms control as a tool to reduce the number of nuclear weapons that could strike the United States. You've got

to be smart about how you do the negotiations. But I think bringing the numbers down does make sense.

Also, arms control agreements often produce a lot of transparency. I think the joint chiefs, their support for New START was based on the idea that you get notifications, you get inspections, you get data exchanges, so you know a lot more about Russian nuclear forces than you would know just using your own unilateral means. So I think there still is a place for it.

And I guess on the unilateral side, Steve, I think the Bush Administration did make that, yes, we're going to go down to 2,200 nuclear weapons and we're fine. You do what you want. It would have been interesting to see the reaction had the Russians come back and said, "Fine, we're going to stay at START I, we're going to stay at 6,000 weapons." So I do think that there is a continued place for arms control in terms of containing a competition that I think is potentially dangerous. I mean, the risk is -- the risk is small in a breakdown, but if you do have a breakdown in nuclear deterrence, the results are catastrophic. And I do agree with the Obama Administration's conclusion in its nuclear posture review that to the extent that we can decrease the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy and shift it more to conventional weapons, I think there actually are significant U.S. advantages, that's in our interest.

MS. STENT: Yes? Give the microphone over there.

SPEAKER: My name is Nadia Ton. I'm an undergraduate student at Georgetown in Dr. Stent's class.

So from this panel I got the sense that great difficulty facing future arms control agreements is the fact that Russian perceives threats from its nuclear neighbors, which is not a reality that the U.S. has, so obviously, you want to avoid making concessions from the U.S. perspective. So how would one approach future negotiations to ease Russia into the idea that making and reducing these arms numbers is important, but from their perspective that they don't want to do this?

MR. RADEMAKER: As I said earlier, Russia is a great power with lots of

intelligent people in leadership positions. They are perfectly -- in fact, nothing makes the Russians angrier than to be lectured by an American about what's in their interest. They really get mad when they're lectured b Americans about what's in Russia's national interest. So the idea that we're going to educate them about how to better deal with the Chinese nuclear threat that they perceive or how to deal with Iran, you know, we need to be really careful and we need to be realistic about what can be achieved. Progress will be possible on arms control when Russia concludes that it's in Russia's interest to do an arms control agreement. I think right now they're basically happy.

Steve was talking about the transparency, the verification aspects of arms control. I do think that's important to the U.S. It's almost important -- frankly, it's more important than the Russians because we have much better surveillance, you know, satellite surveillance capabilities.

We have a much clearer idea of what's going on the ground in Russia than they do in the United States.

So the transparency under these arms control agreements, it's important to both sides but I would argue even more important to Russia than the United States. And that's why it's astonishing, actually, when you look back at the negotiation of the START I treaty, which what the Russians kept trying to do was pare back the verification because they were -- it was a way of sticking it to the Obama Administration and they were trying to take away things that they thought were more useful to the U.S. than to them.

I think it's a tribute to the way the U.S. sort of backed into that negotiation, and President Obama needed that deal more than they did politically, so they were able to try and bring in all these other issues and also pare back the verification. But at the end of the day, it's in their interest to have verification. I think if we approach negotiations with them in a less enthusiastic, you know, less breathless manner, we'll actually get a better result.

MR. PIFER: I guess I'd go back. Under the New START Treaty, Russia

is going to have 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and the Federation of American Scientists estimate that Russia has a total arsenal now of somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 total nuclear weapons. I think that number allows them to feel pretty comfortable against North Korea or India or Pakistan or Saudi Arabia or around countries that have intermediate range missiles. They don't need to sort of insist that there be some involvement by these other questions.

Now, there is a question. I mean, the Russians have now said there has to be some kind of a multilateral aspect to the next negotiation. What the Russians haven't said is how they would envision a multilateral negotiation going. And they haven't said that because when you try to think it through it's very, very difficult to come up with a negotiation that doesn't either ask that the United States and Russia come down to the levels of Britain, France, and China, or ask that those countries accept unequal limitations which they're unlikely to do in a legally binding treaty.

Maybe you could begin to get to a notion where if the United States and Russia were to do another agreement going beyond New START, maybe you could ask Britain, France, and China to make a unilateral commitment that they won't increase as long as the United States and Russia are coming down. But you're not going to get much in terms of third countries when there's this huge gap with the United States and Russia, each with maybe 4,500 weapons and nobody else above 300.

MS. STENT: Jill Dougherty, you've got the next question.

MS. DOUGHERTY: Jill Dougherty. I'm a fellow with the Woodrow Wilson Center and also a former student of Angela Stent.

And I just had a question. Not necessarily on arms control but on the modernization of nuclear weapons. You know, we have President Obama who talks about reducing the numbers, and yet we're looking at this proposed $1 trillion, I believe, that could be spent over a number of years on modernizing the United States' nuclear weapons potential for nuclear armed cruise missile, et cetera. Could you bring us to the Russian perspective on this? I know they've been doing some modernization of their

own. But what is their $1 trillion plan? Are they going to match this? What's their view?

MR. PIFER: Well, the Russians announced a -- I think it was a $700 billion plan to modernize all of their military forces. And what they've talked about specifically on the strategic side is, and over a 10-year period, and we're now about halfway through it, I think it was building 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launch ballistic missiles. And if you look at the force that it looks like Russia wants to have within the limits of the New START Treaty, that looks like about the right number. Part of what the Russians are doing, like what we'll be doing in the 2020s, is they're building new missiles to replaced old stuff. There's a lot of, I think, missile in the Russian inventory now that had they had the money back in the 1990s or the year 2000s, they would have replaced 10 years ago. So a lot of it is just replacing old stuff, and it looks like they are now sizing a force within the level of the New START Agreement.

There will be a similar process on the U.S. side. I think, you know, one of the things, modernization is always hard to talk about sometimes because we're never in sync, so we're doing a lot now. They're building new submarines, new submarine launch ballistic missiles, new intercontinental ballistic missiles. Ten years from now they're going to be done, we're going to be able to be building new intercontinental ballistic missiles, new submarines, and a new bomber. A lot of it, again, I think is replacing old stuff, and it's necessary. I do though, when I look at the U.S. strategic modernization program, I would question certain aspects of it. And what does remind me is when you have the Pentagon saying, "Here's our plan. And by the way, nobody in the Pentagon has the faintest idea how we're going to afford to build this." We're kind of leaving a time bomb for whoever has to manage that problem 10 years down the road, and maybe we ought to think a little bit more in a long-term sense about are there ways that you could design a modernization program, and I think we should continue to maintain a triad. I would adjust some of the numbers. I do question the lead for new long-range cruise missile when you're going to spend $80 billion to build a new bomber that supposedly has stealth and advanced electric. But, you know, we're going to have to

come to grips with this, and I think the newt administration is going to have to deal with those questions; otherwise, it's going to find itself in a position around 2025 where it's talking about do we build new intercontinental ballistic missiles or do we buy F-35 aircraft, or do we buy frigates? And I don't think the Pentagon has come to grips with that. And the next 10 years we're going to have to do that.

MR. RADEMAKER: I'd simply say if you're with President Obama and you think we're on the cusp of the abolition of nuclear weapons, you know, hopefully during his lifetime -- that was the yardstick he put out -- then yeah, I mean, these investments make no sense. Why spend all this money to produce weapons that we'll then dismantle?

But if you don't actually think that that goal is likely to be realized, and that's sort of the category I'm in, then of course you have to spend the money because we're going to be in this business for a long time to come. And weapons systems, you know, B52s built in the 1950s, you know, they're not going to last forever. And they need to be replaced and the replacement is going to cost money. And I do get exasperated at this trillion-dollar figure. You know, that's the figure year cost estimate. I don't know what the 30-year cost estimate was for Obama Care but, you know what? We never heard it during the debate because, at least from the proponents of Obama Care, because it would have been such a no enormous number it would have scared people off. When you start quoting 30-year numbers it's with the intention of scaring people off. I mean, the right number to look at is the annual cost. You know, you don't look at how much you're going to pay over the lifetime of the mortgage. If you've ever done that, you would never sign a mortgage. So what is the annual cost of making these investments, and how does that compare to the sums we've spent in the past on the nuclear enterprise? And the reality is it's a lot less money than we've spent during the Cold War on nuclear weapons, and we somehow got through, you know, we managed to fund the national defense throughout the Cold War. So, you know, the number are not quite as daunting as the critics would have us believe.

MS. STENT: We've been agreeing too much so let me push back on two points here.

MR. PIFER: All right. Let's end on a controversial note. Actually, I disagree. I think President Obama in Prague put out this notion of a world without nuclear weapons. But I disagree. I don't think it really has been operationalized. If you look at the Strategic Modernization Program that the Obama Administration approved, I mean, they're talking about 12 ballistic submarines. They're talking about 640 intercontinental ballistic missiles, a new cruise missile. I mean, they're basically, you know, he's going along with everything that the Pentagon would have wanted. So I'm not sure I see in that program, and I don't think I see in the absence of some unilateral things that the Obama Administration could have done the last four or five years, that he's wildly pushing towards that vision. And again, I said I agree with the vision. I'm not sure we can get there; probably not. But I think he did put down qualifiers in Prague when he said, you know, as long as there are nuclear weapons here, we have to have a reliable deterrent.

The other point I guess I would push back is on the cost question. And I think, yeah, once you talk about 30-year numbers, that's difficult. But if you look at the current budget environment, and if you look at projections for the growth in Social Security, Medicare, interest rates, I really think it would be unwise for the Pentagon to make an assumption that 10 years from now a pot of money is going to appear that is suddenly going to allow them to avoid hard choices between building intercontinental ballistic missiles and F35s and things like that. And if we think like that, my guess is what we're going to do is we're going to start spending a lot of money on programs and then curtain those programs after we've done the development, after we've bought the first 20 units that are at this cost but before we get down to where the cost becomes cheaper, and we're going to end up with, I think, a less effective defense establishment overall.

MS. STENT: Well, we'll obviously have to reconvene in a few years and see whether that's true.

Please join me in thanking our panelists for a very informative panel.

Thank you.

(Applause)

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