THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

FALK AUDITORIUM

COMPETITION OVER SOFT POWER IN EAST ASIA

Washington, D.C.

Thursday, September 29, 2016

PARTICIPANTS:

Welcome:

RICHARD BUSH
Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies,
Senior Fellow, and Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution

CHU YUN-HAN
Distinguished Research Fellow, Academia Sinica
Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University

Panel 1: How East Asians View the Influence of the United States versus China

Moderator:

RICHARD BUSH
Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies,
Senior Fellow, and Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution

Presenter:

CHU YUN-HAN
Distinguished Research Fellow, Academia Sinica
Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University

CHANG YU-TZUNG
Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University
Director, Center for East Asia Democratic Studies

MIN-HUA HUANG
Associate Professor of Political Science
National Taiwan University
Discussant:

ANDREW NATHAN
Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science
Columbia University

BRUCE STOKES
Director of Global Economic Attitudes
Pew Research Center

Panel 2: The Competition Over Soft Power in East Asia

Moderator:

ANDREW NATHAN
Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science
Columbia University

Presenter:

BRIDGET WELSH
Senior Research Associate
Center for East Asia Democratic Studies
National Taiwan University

HUANG KAI-PING
Assistant Professor
National Taiwan University

JIE LU
Associate Professor, Department of Government
American University

Discussant:

CONSTANZE STELZENMÜLLER
Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe
The Brookings Institution

* * * *
MR. BUSH: Good morning. I’m not sure you want to hear me, but you have no choice at this point. I’m Richard Bush. I’m the director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies here at Brookings.

It is our great privilege today to co-sponsor with the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica in the Republic of China, and the Center for East Asian Democratic Studies at National Taiwan University on the program, competition over soft power in East Asia.

There is a lot of talk these days about the future of the East Asian order, and the changing balance of power and what it means. Most of this talk takes place in foreign ministries, defense ministries, think tanks, other places like that. It’s by elites, for elites, and of elites. Very rarely does anybody ask the people of the countries concerned what they think.

Fortunately, there are a couple of organizations that do that. One is the Pew Research Center, which is represented here today by my good friend, Bruce Stokes. The other is the Asian Barometer Survey, which does a lot of good work on the state of democracy in East Asia, but has also focused more and more on how East Asians view the rise of China and what it means for the United States.

The Asian Barometer Survey has just completed their last wave of surveying in 14 East Asian countries, and it is our great pleasure to provide a platform for Chu Yun-han to present these findings.

So, without further ado, Yun-han, why don’t you come up and make some introductory remarks?

MR. CHU: Good morning, everyone. Thank you for coming to this forum. I have collaborated in different capacities with Brookings, more specifically with
Richard Bush, over many years, but this is my second time in my capacity as a coordinator of the Asian Barometer Survey, that we co-sponsored this event.

I still remember we did that the first time three and a half years ago when we just concluded our wave three survey across East Asia.

I think before we get started with the first panel, let me say a few words on behalf of our team. The Asian Barometer Survey is actually a research network that involves I would say more than 50 scholars across Asia, and we also have many collaborators who are U.S. based, including Andrew Nathan of Columbia, he will also speak on the first panel, and people like Larry Diamond at Hoover Institution.

This network was established as early as 1999, at the turn of a century. Initially, the network covered only eight countries and territories in East Asia, but since our second wave, the survey has been expanded to include virtually every important part of the region except North Korea, Laos, Brunei, and East Timor. Pretty much, I think we have covered really the bulk of the region. Also, we have a partner in South Asia, and they are able to extend the survey to five countries in that part of the world.

In addition to that, there is the next layer of collaboration, among the Regional Barometer Survey. I’m talking about Latino Barometer, Arab, Afro, and Eurasia, so the five regions barometered together, we will also be able to collaborate at a global level under the auspices of the Global Barometer Survey.

The Asian Barometer Survey, ABS, was principally founded by Ministry of Education, and also the Ministry of Science and Technology, as well as Academia Sinica.

It is actually very much an academic project, run by the scholars and senior members of the academia community, but also I think the findings for our survey is of great relevance to many other stakeholders, including foreign policymakers, the mass media, NGO leaders, and also donor organizations.
Over time, we were invited by EU, by World Bank, also by UNDP and the State Department from time to time to do the briefing, to share the data with them, and also data is always released into the public domain after an 18-month embargo.

Many, many scholars and experts have benefitted from the fact that we have been able to deliver such rich datasets, and also all the data is collected through face to face interviews, and based on probability sampling that covers the entire country, which means these surveys are very expensive. It is very, very cumbersome. It can get complicated. You also have to handle the challenge of censorship and other factors.

Without further ado, I am really looking forward to what we will share with you the first time, after we concluded the survey, and I hope the things that we are going to report to you will be useful and enlightening. In particular, we do think a bigger challenge for the next U.S. Administration, whoever gets elected in November, is how to pick up where Obama has left off in terms of Asia.

We do think the data we are going to share with you will be very useful and critical data for the next Administration to formulate their priorities in that part of the globe.

Thank you. I look forward to a wonderful symposium today. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. BUSH: You get me for one more minute. My job at this point is to introduce the participants in the first panel. I will moderate. Chu Yun-han and our old friend, Huang Min-Hua, will present.

Chu Yun-han is a distinguished research fellow at Academia Sinica. He is a professor of political science at National Taiwan University. He is also the president of the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation.

Min-Hua Huang is associate professor of political science at National Taiwan University, and a few years ago he was a visiting fellow here at Brookings in my center.
As discussants, we have Andy Nathan, Columbia University political science professor. He and I prefer not to talk about how long we have known each other. (Laughter) Bruce Stokes of Pew Research Center, whom I have already mentioned.

We are going to start with some PowerPoint presentations. If the presenter would come to the podium.

Chang Yu-tzung is a professor of political science at National Taiwan University, and director of the Center for East Asia Democratic Studies.

Yun-han, do you want to start?

PANEL 1: HOW EAST ASIANS VIEW THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES VERSUS CHINA

MR. CHU: Thank you. For the first panel presentation, I would divide up the tasks between me and Min-Hua. I will provide the overall analysis, and Min-Hua will dig deeper into the data, give you a more penetrating understanding of what the data has shown us.

Specifically, what the survey has done is to collect data from the region, and we asked not a whole lot of questions. It’s very demanding questions when it comes to international affairs, foreign policy, so all the questions have to be crafted in a way that most people can understand, and they can actually provide a meaningful answer to the questions.

For specific questions, we would like to offer some empirical data. Number one, which super power, the United States or China, is perceived to be more influential in the region. Number two, which super power, the United States or China, is more welcome and better appreciated in terms of its leadership role, its impact in the region. Number three, how has Asian perception changed over the critical juncture of last four to five years.

This juncture pretty much is marked by two very important transitions, one is from Obama’s first term and then to his second term. He announced a pivot to
Asia during his first term, but nevertheless, I think the pursuit of this new priority has gone earnest, far more concentrating some effort and energy during his second term. This strategy is the conclusion of the TPP negotiations.

There is another important transition, even more significant that also happened during this period of time, the transition from Hu Jintao as a top leader of China, to Xi Jinping. Everyone will agree with me that Xi’s leadership style and his approach is very different from his predecessor.

The last question we wanted to deal with is what drives Asian people’s view to a rise in China? We did ask similar questions about the United States, but I think this would be the much more interesting question.

Let me offer you some background of how we size up the leadership, Xi Jinping, when it comes to foreign policy agenda. I think he governed over a more resourceful China, so the foreign policy, enjoyed many, many more resources in terms of economic shifts and administrative shifts, things like that, and more assertive, more ambitious, and more aggressive.

To just give you a few highlights in terms of why China became more resourceful. China is ever bigger as an economy. It has been nowadays a major source of foreign investment throughout the world. In 2015, actually, the per capita export is bigger than how much foreign investment they are attracting from abroad, and also China became the number one source of tourist spending in the world, but also in particular, in Asia, just to give you some sense of how China became more resourceful.

Also, apparently under Xi Jinping, China’s foreign policy became more assertive. China now when they talk to other foreign countries, you have to respect our core interests. That list of core interests keeps expanding. That includes not only security but also the issue of Tibet, Taiwan, things like that.

Also, China is more assertive, they put a lot of energy into projecting their own sub power, in particular, and also due to their own TV, 24-hour news channel,
things like that. Also, China wants to actually drive the agenda when it comes to U.S.-China relationship by promoting their own concept of power relations, and more recently, you can see that China has been very assertive in exercising leadership over the global agenda, for the G20 summit that has just been held. They pushed vigorously for this document.

Also, have launched many, many very ambitious global and regional strategies, which was not even conceivable a few years ago. For instance, really ambitious, you can even say visionary, and to set up this Asian infrastructure investment bank, and in the end, more than 57 countries want to become a founding member of this multilateral lending agency.

This is the first since Bretton Woods that the United States was not involved. This really opened up a new page in history, and also enlargement of cooperation relation by inviting both Pakistan and India to become formal members of this regional security organization.

Lastly, what I characterize as more aggressive, China is upgrading its arsenal, it already has one aircraft carrier, another is under construction, three more on the blueprint, not to mention construction of those manmade reefs in the South China Sea as a way to project its power over this very controversial territorial dispute, and many other developments conveying this similar kind of message.

Obviously, the United States, I think, has responded to a more assertive and more ambitious Chinese foreign policy in various ways. One of the hallmarks of Obama’s presidency is his pivot to Asia. This new approach has gone in earnest during this second term.

The United States also launched its own U.S.-ASEAN summit since 2013. The United States has improved its relationship with virtually every Asian country except Thailand, in particular, the relationship with Vietnam and Yemen has been much improved over the last few years during his second term.
Also, the United States tried to regain its economic leadership concluding the TTP negotiations, although the fate of the trade patents is still uncertain.

I also note once it puts itself out of Afghanistan and Iraq and become more concentrated and focused on Asia Pacific, it has upgraded, there is a secure relationship with Tokyo, with Australia, and also the announcement of rebalance to Asia, not to China, and with the deployment of Marine troops in Australia, that hasn’t happened for a long, long time, and also the United States is the only country probably in the world, maybe you might include Japan as well, that is willing to stand up to China over the South China Sea dispute.

This is the larger context, when I talk about the critical juncture over the last three or four years.

Now, we want to share with you some data, how Asian people perceive those changes, how they evaluate the leadership role of the United States versus China in the region.

Also, I have to tell you that there are not that many reliable empirical data, especially data, you know, they are designed around standardized instruments that have been standardized in every country and also being able to administer in many Asian countries.

Obviously, the Pew survey is one of them, but to my best knowledge, Pew doesn’t cover every country in East Asia. It is very expensive, especially the ones that do face to face interviews.

Although the wording of the item is not identical, I think they are functionally equivalent and actually the findings from Pew and ours is quite consistent, as far as those countries covered by both surveys.

The Asian Barometer Survey fills a very important void, we do need reliable data, and systematic, you know, data being collected in a scientifically and reliable manner.
This is the survey that we have done in those countries during wave three and wave four. Roughly, a four-year interval between the two surveys, and most surveys, they are not entirely synchronized, but they are able to be conducted roughly within the time frame of 18 months.

For the latest survey, some were conducted in the second half of 2014, but most of it took place in 2015, and the latest was just concluded in the early part of this year, but this is a very large scale operation. It took a lot of time for us to do data, consistent check, quality check.

Only until August of this year, the data became really, I should say, available, in terms of analyzing it.

Let me give you the first chart. This is a question about which country has the most influence in Asia now. The data, we have both wave three and wave four, the bar in Y is from wave three.

This is a picture that in most East Asian countries or countries who are immediate neighbors to China, the growing influence by China has been more intensively felt by people in those countries, like Vietnam, Taiwan, Mongolia, Japan, and Singapore, although it is far away, the cultural and linguistic distance between Singapore and China is very close, and Korea, and so forth.

In those countries, the great majority during both wave three and wave four, they all think China now has the most influence relative to the United States, in the region. This is their observations.

The story is somewhat different when it comes to Southeast Asia, except Singapore as I just mentioned. A large number of respondents still consider the United States, at least more people in those countries consider the United States is the most influential power in Asia.

Also, you see some not a great deal of changes, but some interesting fluctuation over time. Northeast Asian countries, the number of people who believe
China is most influential is already very big, the overwhelming majority. It didn’t stay that high. It came down a little bit between wave three and wave four, which means between roughly 2011 and 2015.

However, the perception that China is the most influential country has made some gains in ASEAN countries. There are slightly less people in a country like Cambodia that still believe the United States is the most influential, and slightly less in the Philippines as well.

The only country where the majority of people still believe the United States is the most influential, as recent as wave four, is only the Philippines, the only country where the United States, in terms of this kind of objective assessment, still enjoys the upper hand.

Although the number between the two charts, they don’t necessarily add up to 100 percent. Some people say I don’t know, difficult to tell. Some might say Japan is the most influential, but this is real exceptional. Usually, people either say China, the United States, or I don’t know, or hard to tell.

If we ask the question which country will have the most influence in 10 years, projecting into the future, then I have to say even a greater number of people, overwhelming majority, especially in Northeast Asia, they tend to think China will become the most influential country in the region versus the United States, and fewer and fewer people think the United States will remain the most influential in the region, except in the Philippines. Even in the Philippines, the number has come down from 65 percent believing the United States was the most influential to 57. This is by and large what has happened over the last four years.

However, there are a lot of people who perceive China is more influential than the United States, but which country is more welcome, than the picture is very, very different.
This is good news for U.S. policymakers. The blue bar is people who think very positively or favorably about the U.S. impact on the region. In the Philippines, 92 percent, overwhelmingly. Yemen, 86. Cambodia, 85. Korea, 83. Mongolia, 80, and so on and so forth. However, I do want to register some qualification, it is not the case in the two Muslim countries, predominately Muslim countries in the region, Indonesia, only 45, and Malaysia, only 50.

I think it does have something to do with the U.S. Middle East policy and the troubled relationship between the United States and the Muslim world in general. That would be my interpretation.

On the other hand, it is not always a zero sum game. Maybe in Japan, it is. In countries like Korea, obviously, Koreans think China and the United States, they are all welcome for their influence. The same thing can be said about Thailand, even in Taiwan, although obviously there are people who favor U.S. much more, 73 percent, but there are still 55 percent who think the impact of China on the region is largely favorable or welcome.

We have a question about the impact of the United States or China on their own country. The first one involved only the region. Pretty much a similar picture. The United States is still favored by a great majority of Asian citizens, even among Malaysia and Indonesia.

There are four countries and territories where China is slightly more favored than the United States, Thailand, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Otherwise, the United States is still favored by Asians.

We can tell you a little bit about the changes between the two surveys when it comes to how they view the Chinese influence on the region. Obviously, people in China felt very good about themselves, right, their influence on the region, almost 100 percent say it is positive.
You can tell the more assertive, even more aggressive approach does cause some erosion, and substantial erosion of its soft power in the region. Look at the Philippines. Between four years, people who have a favorable view about China’s role in the region have dropped from 73 percent to only 41 percent. This is very dramatic.

Japan, China is the least liked country among the Japanese, right. Around 2011, only 19 people think positively about China, and now only 11 percent.

In Yemen, this was the first time we were able to do a survey in Yemen, just recently. Not that many people have great admiration for Chinese leadership in the region, but it has probably something to do with -- this survey was conducted before the last general election, so I think the resentment towards China has a lot to do with their resentment toward the military regime, because they believe China is actually the principal backer of the very unpopular regime, military regime.

On the other hand, there are a few cases that the Chinese’s favorable image has risen, in the case of Thailand. As I mentioned, Thailand is the only country that did not improve its relationship due to the military coup, and the data was collected after the coup. Thailand had been much more, you know, I should say, disfavored by many, many western country -- the coup and also the violation of human rights and other deployable things.

Korea. I have to caution you that although the image has improved a lot between 2011 and 2015, I don’t know, there is this huge tension, whether this high favorable image can be sustained. I don’t know. We need in the next survey to find out, so anyone who wants to pay for it, we are more than happy to do it.

Nevertheless, I would say China does pay some price over the territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

I don’t know how good I am doing time-wise. Good.

Let me just share a few other charts with you, and then I will hand it over to Min-Hua. This chart just compares our findings in the four countries that we overlap,
Japan, Korea, Indonesia, and China. I didn’t include the latest survey, but we will do that later.

I can say the items, the wording is not identical, but they are functionally equivalent. Japan is where China was least favored, and so on. This corroborates in terms of validity.

Min-Hua will give you more as to what drives people’s perceptions about the role of China.

Let me just share this one chart, which is crystal clear. This does give you some sense that for people who -- this is how they perceive positively the role of China versus the percentage of people who think the country is doing great economically, they are doing find economically.

What this chart tells you is in Japan, a great number of people don’t like China but also a great number of people don’t think the economy is doing well. This actually has a very interesting linear relationship. For countries that favor Chinese role in the region, also at the same time they have a large number of people living in the country that think the economic conditions are quite good or has been improved over the last few years.

This has to be qualified if we bring in other considerations, geostrategic consideration, etiological consideration. I would say the risk and benefit brought about expanding economic ties with China has been very uneven, especially in Northeast Asia, where the income is much higher. In many ways, they are pressured under the Chinese.

The popular view over the nature of the China impact -- especially in Northeast Asian countries, labor, farmers, office workers feel the economic squeeze more strongly.

Also, something I already mentioned, China’s growing influence in the region is more intensely felt by countries that are geographically or culturally proximate to China, especially in Northeast Asia.
Also, there is some significant change over time under Xi Jinping, but also you can readily pick up the perception of the declining influence of the United States is becoming more widespread in Thailand and Malaysia, but China has lost a lot of ground winning the approval in the case of the Philippines and Vietnam.

Let me say just a few words about the Muslim perception towards the United States. This is the breakdown between the three ethnic groups in Malaysia. The ethnic Chinese, the Malay, and Indian. The Chinese Malaysia usually more likely to think China is more influential than the United States, more so than Malay. Also, they have a very favorable view about the role of China in the region.

However, it is among the Malay who consider the role of the United States sometimes doing more harm than good, and more so than ethnic Chinese, much more so. This simply backs up what I had said earlier that the image of the United States among the Muslim populous in the region, primarily Malaysia and Indonesia, is not very encouraging.

Since I’m from Taiwan, the project is headquartered in Taiwan, I have to say something about the distribution of the popular view in Taiwan. We have the three camps, right, the blue camp, the green camp, and the independent.

Obviously, the blue camp voters are more likely to consider China is the most influential, more so than the green and independent. Still, even among the green, I have to say, the majority believe that China is more influential than the United States, even among the green camp.

Also, their view about the role of China and the role of the United States, the blue camp, they tend to take more favorable assessment about the role of China, and obviously DVP and the green camp followers, they definitely much more welcome and appreciate the role of the United States.

Under this kind of popular opinion, I would try to maintain good relations with both, with China and the U.S. They are both favored. It is not the entire story for the
Tsai Ing-wen, only one-third of her camp favored China but three-quarters of her camp favored the United States. Different approach undertaken and is fully understandable.

Lastly, as I mentioned earlier, it is not necessarily a zero sum game. In a lot of countries, a lot of people say United States and China at the same time. Maybe that is the case in Japan or even Mongolia, but not in many other countries. The two measures, favorable and unfavorable and positive and negative, they are actually correlated between how they view China and how they view the United States, which means some people tend to take either a benign view about both powers or they might take a skeptical view towards both.

I’ll give you one example when it comes to economic openness. They don’t view the United States very favorably. The United States would be blamed for that overarching framework, opening up the market, globalization, but China will not be viewed favorably either because China is the source of the competition. They squeeze them out, exports, things like that.

So, this is a complicated story. Nevertheless, I would say, in concluding, the challenge or opportunity for the next President of the United States, I think to exert its leadership role in the region, the United States is facing the head wind of the widespread perception of the declining influence of the United States versus China. This is one fact, objective obstacle, that the United States in the region has to overcome. The expectation, if it cannot be reversed, will make U.S. policy less persuasive or creditable.

However, I do want to give some credit to Obama’s pivot to Asia. I think the kind of effort and priority he has given to Asia has sorted the trend in perception, but not going to reverse it significantly, but at least sorted the perception. The opportunity for the United States is great, the United States’ role is far more welcome and appreciated in a great majority of Asian countries with the exception of Thailand and Muslim countries, and also with the growing apprehension of China’s strategic intent, the U.S. role might
even be viewed as indispensable in some cases, pushing China’s closest neighbors into the arms of the United States.

Thank you for your attention. (Applause)

MR. HUANG: My name is Min-Hua Huang. I am a colleague of Yun-han at the National Taiwan University in political science.

My job here is within 10 minutes to give you some kind of causal analysis to explain why people think the U.S. or China has the most influence. When I was sitting, I had a lot of thoughts about how to condense my presentation. I’m going to give you a very brief story.

Basically, our legal framework has three parts. One is about geopolitical security considerations, but a lot of this, actually for the past four years, not changing that much if you look at the factors that were enumerated, but there is one factor I want to put here, which is what we call the “democracy factors.”

Later on I will tell you in terms of political aspects, the competition of the political system, these kinds of factors are very important to the advantage of U.S. presence in Asia. The U.S. needs to think about in what aspect they want to put more resources in the presence of Asia, is it an economic aspect or a political democracy aspect.

The other is economic consideration. Later, I will tell you China understand their advantage and their powerful influence over all neighboring countries in Asia, and their economic strategy actually works to sway people’s more positive view about China. In that regard, so far, I don’t see the U.S. trying to increase their presence in Asia, and there is a lot of resistance now in Congress and maybe the next President. In that regard, it is really troublesome for the United States.

The rest will be cultural consideration. We should not underrate the cultural factors as well. Later on I will show you in the PowerPoint slides actually the cultural proximity. Those Asian neighboring countries tend to give credit to China’s rise.
They tend to have a little bit more open eye or at least they are willing to trust the benign nature of China’s rise.

The three factors conclude how we should compare how China and the U.S. are being perceived in Asia.

I'm going to skip a lot of this. I just want to show you some figures illuminating my points here. This figure is very simple. This is what we call democratic distance. This actually is we are asking respondent how you rated China’s democratic level and rated your own country’s democratic level.

In this table, mostly China will be rated the least democratic country in all of our survey here. Here, you see there is a relationship, which means if they are rating for China not negative, much more democratic than other countries, then they will tend to have a positive view about China’s perception, China’s influence.

Which means in a country which is not that democratic, they rated China -- they tend to have positive view about China.

This is what I am telling you, the democracy, the competition of the democratic system actually is important because when people living in much more authoritarian counties, they tend to have positive view about China, but this is wave four. This one is wave three. This is wave four. It is changing.

Why is it changing? If you actually look at the right bottom figure, originally negative relation should not become flat, which means no more. This kind of consideration toward China is now not that relevant in terms of democratic perception, but on the other hand, the U.S. still have an overwhelming advantage in the upper left figure here, telling you -- the U.S. democratic level in all our ratings or country ratings is much higher, everybody think the U.S. is more democratic than our own countries.

In the context where people rated U.S. much more democratic than their own countries, they will have a much more positive evaluation or perception about U.S. influence.
The suggestion here is that the U.S. should maintain this kind of strategy. They have a relative advantage in terms of their democratic system. People still view the U.S. as a role model in terms of democracy. That is really important to increase people’s perception, positive perception about U.S. role in Asia.

This story is about transitionalism. The vertical line here is actually labeled wrong. The higher means they are more modern. If they are lower, it means they are more transitional. Here, you see China is very transitional in our measures here.

In terms of transitional, in which they are culturally proximate to China, you would see much positive image or perception about China, which means culturally, proximately, actually favor on China’s side. In terms of U.S., this very slight positive is not significant at all.

Culturally speaking, China still has advantage to win the hearts and minds of people who have trust in China’s benign nature in terms of their rise.

Then we turn to economic factors. It is very simple. For whoever support economic openness in terms of country level, you will see positive perception about U.S. as well as China. It is all positive, at nearly the same rates. Economically speaking, no matter which countries, if they agree one more economic openness, they will tend to rate China as well as the U.S. more positively. It’s economic as well.

This one actually is also about economics. This was economic conditions, about how well you are in terms of your perceived economic conditions. It is all positive. This one is economic openness, positive. In this figure, if you actually look closely, China’s slope is much steeper than the U.S., which means China’s economics in this regard has even more influential role to swaying people’s perception in positive directions. Economy is the key, and China in this regard has the advantage.

The last one here actually is about democratic value. This one is about respondents, they have a lot of views about value, right? If they are more liberal, it will be
in much higher vertical places. If they have lower, they are not that democratic, they will be in the lower parts.

It doesn’t matter whether in this country they are more democratic or not democratic in their value system, it doesn’t matter.

I’m going to give you a picture, a finding, but it is a little bit technical. If you actually look at the results of our findings, it is about the U.S. macro factors, trade with China or cultural distance, whether it will affect people’s view on U.S. impact. No, nothing, you don’t see no factors, no relationship at all.

If you look at China in wave four, you will see trade and cultural distance, the impact, compared to the third wave actually is -- the negative relationship is going down, which means originally if a country had much greater volume in terms of trade with China, they will view China’s rise more negatively, but that kind of relationship grows weaker. Nothing.

My story here is very simple, and I need one minute to conclude. It is very simple. It is again about the competition of political system, versus competition about economic influences. At this moment, I don’t think the U.S. understand their economic presence in China is the key and is very important. I am not sure whether the U.S. knows they need to maintain -- they have the most democratic perception still being perceived in Asia, and that is important, too.

I know China, they don’t care about competition of political system. They know they can keep on playing the game of economy. They are swinging more positive view in their favor, but there is a footnote here. We have some case studies showing once you push too far, they will have backlash.

For example, in Myanmar, used to be there were big economic projects, you see the hydropower plant, soon there will be an industry, gas and oil pipeline, it is not working that well. Why? Because there are a lot of Myanmar people that are thinking
China’s presence is predatory, is not helping Myanmar to become better, is actually more predatory, and they team up with the higher military dictatorship.

In that regard in Myanmar, it is a bad case, but I’m just telling you generally speaking, China knows what they are doing and they are doing well, and our data has shown this, and I hope the U.S. knows how to compete with China in the Asian Pacific region, where still Asian people believe U.S. is the most democratic country in the world, and should not throw out a lot of policies, hurt their feelings, and think the U.S. not a democratic.

The U.S. needs to consider, to put more resources, instead of military presence. Of course, we need that, but not that much. You need to economically engage with Asia, have more relations in competition with China. Thank you. (Applause)

MR. STOKES: Thank you very much. That was great. I am part of the Asian Barometer but I haven’t participated in the design of these questions or the analysis, so this is all a surprise to me. I know we are running short of time.

Let me just make a few short points. First of all, whenever you design surveys, you face the problem that there isn’t enough room in the survey to ask all the questions that you would like to ask, so I think here we have learned a great deal and we want to know more.

I think what I want to know more about, and I know we don’t have space and we’re not going to do this in the survey methodology, but this dependent variable of favorability, you are forcing the respondent to condense probably a very multidimensional and ambivalent set of attitudes into one answer. You have to do that in a survey, I understand that.

We seem to have two dependent variables, at least that were reported here, who has more influence, which is also multidimensional, but more so the favorable. A person may feel that it is favorable impact from many different angles, whether it is as
you have pointed out correctly, strategic, economic, cultural, political, and so forth. When we have that DV, the respondent is condensing all of these things into it.

The use by the analysts of all the independent variables that over the years since we have done the four wave, we have built up all of these independent variables, some of them are obvious, gender, how favorable is your economic condition, country, family, and all that stuff, that we have built up for other purposes, the traditional social value battery, the liberal democratic value battery, that Min-Hua is using as independent variables, great, very creative how you have done that. I love that.

One of the big picture things that I came away with, not having even seen all of Min-Hua’s, as we all did not see, all of his slides because of time, I came away with several bottom lines provisionally, depending upon studying this stuff more closely.

One is that Asians want both. These are not surprising. I think they sort of support conventional wisdom, that the countries around China want a balance of power in Asia between China and the United States. They want both. They don’t want either one to be dominating. I think we kind of already knew that.

A second thing I came away with is this confirms an impression that I think we have gotten from other sources, that Asian people see the handwriting on the wall, which is China’s economy is growing even though it has slowed down and continues to grow, and the United States’ growth is much slower.

Whether you like it or you don’t like it, China is going to be a big factor and has been and will continue to be a big factor in the economies of Asian countries.

One of the questions I think Yun-han alluded to, and I’m sure Min-Hua can analyze it, what you have shown us is countries as units of analysis on these charts, but if we go into the country and we look at the individual, like you said in one of your slides, what is your job, what is your particular income and your particular economic optimism or not, you are going to be able to see the cleavages within each country, and you did it with the Malays, Indians, and the Chinese or Muslims and others, within each
country, with respect to their economic interest in the impact of this country or that country or simply openness.

As you said, both China and the U.S. are associated with openness in all these countries. Those who are against openness will be against both.

Anyway, in general, Asians would like a balance of power in the region. They see the economic handwriting on the wall. One of the things that isn’t as clear to me now, and I think we can get to it, is the strategic position. The long term strategic position is at least since 1975, people in Asia have doubted the U.S. strategic commitment to the region because the U.S. is far away, China is nearby.

The U.S. commitment to Japan and South Korea depends on this kind of implausible thing called the nuclear umbrella, which nobody has ever quite fully believed in anyway.

So, doubts about the U.S. and the knowledge -- the thing is as the strategic friction, the strategic ballet goes, like the South China Sea, these are very fast moving things. How fast do Asian attitudes respond, you know, to Marines in Darwin, Australia, little things like that. Does the public pay attention to this, I think it is difficult to know how much impact it has.

The final point I want to make is Min-Hua emphasized -- I think it was Min-Hua who emphasized the importance -- both of you -- of political values. I think what you were saying is the American democracy image has an appeal. Leaving aside the current election and the mess of that (Laughter) that is important, but leaving that out for a moment and let’s say, let’s hope that the image of the U.S. as a functioning democracy would persist, here is a problem.

If we have a good image, if democratic values have an appeal, how to build on that. Yun-han said this in one of your challenge and opportunities slides, this is a positive asset. How can that asset be put to use? I really don’t know. Is it more like propaganda, VOA, RFA. Is it more educational exchange or something?
I'm on the Board of the NED, as well, and it is something that the NED -- NED is not involved with promoting the image of the United States, but it is involved in the project of trying to advance democracy. There is some overlap here with this puzzle, how do you do that. That is very fascinating, and you opened up that for our discussion.

Thanks.

MR. NATHAN: I, too, really appreciated both of these presentations, and I think as was mentioned, one of the strengths of public opinion research is not to have a single survey, but to have multiple surveys, and then make comparisons, and see where they compare, where they don't, try to methodologically figure out why they might differ. It may be timing, it may be other things.

Certainly, I think the complimentary of the Asian Barometer and the Pew Research Global Attitude Project reinforce each other, not the least of which because we ask slightly different questions sometimes, so that allows us, I think, to tease out some of these differences between countries.

I certainly applaud the Asian Barometer because you do cover more countries than we do. I think that is terribly useful. I wish we could.

We have asked some of the same questions. We find that about 6 in 10 Asians in the 10 countries that we have surveyed have a favorable view of the United States, but this can vary widely across countries. What is interesting is the Chinese perception of the United States is higher than the U.S. perception of China, which I find quite interesting.

We didn't get into some of the generational differences, but we do find, and I find this very interesting, that both in the perceptions of the U.S. and the perceptions of China, young people in most countries have a more positive view of the other. In other words, young Americans have a more positive view of China than older Americans do, and young Chinese have a more positive view of the United States than older people in China. You see that in a number of other countries.
It does raise interesting questions, it seems to me, to pursue about are these generational differences really the reflection that young people are naïve and idealistic or is it that they are just more accepting of the world than people of my generation. They have no memories of the Cold War or the Bamboo Curtain or whatever, Red China. As a result, there is a potential here for greater complimentary working forward.

China is not as well favored around Asia, at least in our surveys, but still, a median of 54 percent have a favorable view of China, again, it varies widely. The Japanese are off the charts in terms of their unfavorability towards China. We find some of the same findings you did, that a majority of the publics that we surveyed think China’s impact on the economy of their country is a good thing. The Vietnamese don’t think that, for example. The Indians don’t think that. For the most part, people do.

Although I can tell you we just released last week a new survey, the 2016 survey, of India. What was striking is almost every aspect of China that we asked the Indian public about, they saw negatively, very negatively. The numbers were so consistent, I think China is just a dirty word in India right now. I think if we asked people in India do they think the Chinese helping the sun come up in the morning is a good thing, people would be against it because China was in the question. (Laughter) It is quite fascinating to get that kind of negativity in India of all places.

Basically, overwhelmingly, people in Asia do not see China’s rise militarily as a good thing. That ranges from 96 percent of the Japanese to 68 percent of the Filipinos. It is really quite widespread.

I’ll leave you with two things in our surveys that I think are most troublesome and also thought provoking. We asked people about territorial disputes with China, and do you think this would lead to military conflict. I can tell you we have asked this question twice all over Asia. One was do you think it is a serious problem, and people overall said yes, so we toughened the question the second time, do you think this
will lead to military conflict, and again, people overwhelmingly said yes. By
“overwhelmingly,” I mean 85 percent of the Japanese, 83 percent of the Koreans, 72
percent of the Indians, 84 percent of Vietnamese. Everyone is worried about this.

I must say one of the more disturbing findings in this question was that 6
in 10 think it’s going to lead to military conflict. Now, my guess is, again, one of the
limitations of survey researchers, you don’t know what the respondent is thinking when
you ask them a question. They may see themselves as a victim of that. Somehow
benign intentions are going to lead to military conflict. Nevertheless, the Chinese are
also worried, the Chinese public is also worried.

On the U.S. question, we have asked people a number of questions both
in Asia and in the United States about the U.S. commitment to Asia, in our three main
allies, Japan, South Korea, and Philippines. The majority of the population does believe
that the United States would come to their defense in a war against China.

We can debate whether that in fact would actually happen, but the
publics have drunk the Kool-Aid. They believe that. They also welcome the U.S.
defense pivot to Asia. Majorities in almost every country welcome it. Interestingly, not
the Malaysians, which I find fascinating, but the Filipinos, the Vietnamese, the Japanese,
the Koreans believe the pivot to Asia, however you define that, because obviously it is
fairly ill-defined, it is positively received.

I can tell you we asked Americans would you go to the defense of our
Asian allies if they were attacked by China, and a majority of Americans say they would.
I would caution you, it is a majority of Republican Americans. It’s not a majority of
Democratic Americans. We find this from NATO as well, by the way, where Republicans
are much more willing to go to the defense of NATO allies than Democrats.

This suggests to me what we are really getting here is a Democratic and
Republican split on the use of military force, but we can’t prove that.
Finally, what is interesting is how the Chinese perceive all of this, and basically the whole question of containment, is America really out to contain us, we don’t use the word “containment” in the question, but we have found that a majority of Chinese say the U.S. is trying to prevent China from becoming as powerful as the U.S.

There is this sense that the American pivot to Asia has made China a victim inside China. I think that is another very interesting finding to contemplate.

Thank you so much. (Applause)

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

MR. BUSH: Thanks to all of you for great presentations. We have about half an hour for questions. Please identify yourselves, and wait for the mike, and ask a brief question. If you want it to go to a specific person, that’s fine. Bruce Stokes, Andy Nathan, Min-Hua, Yun-han, and Professor Chang are all targets here. I think that is Jonathan Pollack in the back.

MR. POLLACK: This is Jonathan Pollack from Brookings. My question is actually to Yun-han. I hope it doesn’t seem too obvious. You used the term “influence” or “influential.” Could you, as we say, unpack that a little? What do you mean by influence? Is there an operational definition? Is it what different Asians think of, the first thing they think of in the morning when they wake up? What is influence? Even though we recognize, obviously, influence comes in a variety of forms.

MR. CHU: We don’t have operational definition. This is an issue of perception. You cannot program your respondents, so you have to understand the term this way rather than the other way. It’s not doable in a survey.

We think there are a number of other choices, like more powerful, or exercise more leadership, things like that. Eventually we settled on which country had the most influence in the region. We think this expression is most neutral. It is easy to be understood by the general public, although I think as Andy said, there is only so much the survey can do.
You can obviously design a much wider set of questions, different components, different aspects of their overall impression more deeply. I think for research, usually asking more generic questions and using common sense language is better.

The relationship that we have identified makes so much sense, people don’t actually misunderstand our questions, they do by and large capture what we tried to measure.

MR. HARE: Paul Hare, most recently from the MIT Center for International Studies. If I could briefly ask two questions. There was a lot that was said about the U.S., perceptions of the U.S. commitment. Does the data or comments from other members of the panel, allow us to distinguish between regional perceptions of our commitment and regional perceptions of our capacity in terms of resources and attention span to sustain it over the long term?

My second question is it correct to interpret Min-Hua’s comments as leading to the conclusion that the economic factor is becoming over time more decisive than the political one?

MR. CHU: We didn’t ask question about credibility, we wish we had, especially if we can do a more focused survey on this issue alone, but unfortunately, given our resource constraints, we had to allocate space for so many other important questions that we wanted to collect data on.

But we do ask about capacity. I think the influence question is about capability, overall speaking. The question about how they evaluate the impact of the United States on the region, they do much good than harm and somewhat more harm than good, and much harm than good, it gives you a thermometer measure, favorable, whether they welcome or appreciate leadership.

Again, those are the two angles we can offer you, but it’s not about credibility. Nevertheless, I think if a great majority of people in Asia perceive the U.S.
relatively speaking has a declining influence, it inevitably will lead to the next question, how credible the U.S. commitment is to the region.

MR. HUANG: Short answer. The reason is I think for the past six years, our findings are actually showing the economic factors driving more changes in terms of how the perception is changing, relatively comparing to other factors. I also would add a footnote, too much economic influence probably will bring negative backlash as well, so I don’t think in most countries now -- still, China’s influence is growing in terms of economic aspects.

MR. BUSH: It’s my impression that the influence of Chinese investment in a country is usually positive. The influence of Chinese exports to that country is often negative.

MR. NATHAN: Both of these questions have to do with the dependent variable, and I’d like to ask Bruce. As you ask more and more specific questions like Jonathan said, if we were to ask people -- I didn’t design these questions -- something like how big is the U.S. economic influence, strategic influence, this influence and that influence, capacity influence, and so forth, respondents’ answers become less meaningful because they don’t know, most people. They don’t think like people think in Brookings. (Laughter)

So, I wonder what your experience has been about how far you can drive the DV and still get a meaningful -- people when they answer surveys, they make up answers. The next day, they give the opposite answer because they don’t remember. (Laughter)

MR. STOKES: I think it’s the dirty little secret of public opinion research. We all as consumers of public opinion research, and let’s face it, you wouldn’t be here if you weren’t a consumer of public opinion research, and frankly, you’re too rational, you’re not an average person.
We're talking about knocking on the door of some farmer in rural Philippines and saying do you know anything about the United States. It's not like he is lying awake night thinking about well, if somebody comes to my door, what am I going to say. (Laughter) About the credibility of a U.S. Navy.

As Andy says, studies have shown people often will give you an answer because they don't want to appear stupid and they want to be congenial to this stranger that came to their door, but they don't really -- they have never thought about it before.

On the one hand, you ask two general questions, you get mush, and you can get answers that when you get it back you say my, God, what does this mean, I have no idea what this means.

One of the problems with -- I'm sure you guys would agree. One of the problems with influence is do you think that is a good thing or a bad thing that China has rising influence. That is why you have to dig down a little deeper, but you’re right, if we try to dig down too deep, you will either get really high don't know or you will get answers that frankly you are suspicious of because people cannot have firm views about these things, especially on these international issues.

The reality is, as we know, when you ask people about problems in their country, everybody has an opinion about the problems in their country. Everybody will have an opinion about the leadership of their country, the direction of the country. Those are big issues that everybody has an accurate or inaccurate view on.

We have been doing a series of surveys in Asian countries about how people in those countries see their place in the world, because we want to compare that to how the Europeans see their place in the world, how the Americans see their place in the world.

While we think it is terribly important to begin to do this, on some of these questions, you get really high don't know because the average person isn't quite maybe
not even sure they are in the world, right? There is that real challenge. That is the limitation of public opinion research.

MR. BUSH: There is a question in the back, and then I'll move up to the front.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. My name is (Inaudible) from Japan. Going back to the influence issue, I think at least we need to kind of clarify, simply speaking. Can we assume for most people, Chinese economic influence is a reality, undeniable, and maybe fathomable, but political influence is quite different, maybe cautious or unfathomable.

If this assumption is right, how do you think we should deal with that situation? Thank you.

MR. CHU: On the one hand, you definitely can ask those kinds of questions, you know, economic influence, political influence, military influence, but I have to caution you, as Andy just said, ordinary people, they don't necessarily perceive things in those terms, political, what do you mean by political, a state visit, whether China can dominate the U.N. agenda. For elite, they can come up with some consistent coherent view of those things.

On the other hand, I do want to say that if you do want to ask questions about any particular country, their influence, their role, I would say the United States and China are the only two -- maybe Japan and maybe in the future, India -- that do have a certain view on it. It's everywhere. You turn on your TV, you have news about the United States and China, and you have tourists, and so on.

I say a great power, especially China and the United States, if they are visible, common people do have some kind of impression. I showed you a chart between 2011 and 2015, how big a drop the favorable view toward China had occurred in the Philippines, which tells you that people do react to the changes in the overall political environment.
MR. HUANG: I want to add a footnote here. I think our analysis generally reflect that people really think China's economic rise is opportunity, and that can be in their own favor, but a lot of people in places also understand with all the Chinese economic influence behind there is a political intention attached. It doesn’t matter whether that kind of political intention people can really identify, know what it is, and know whether it is a threat or not.

Let me give you a case. For example, in Myanmar, in Taiwan, people are really suspicious about that kind of economic influence will have serious political implications, but in other places, probably not, for example, like Thailand, U.S. support is reducing. They don’t really care about China’s increase in economic influence because so what, that’s good, someone support us, military-wise and political-wise.

What I am saying is I think generally people do understand that kind of political intention attached, whether it is good or not. If they cannot tell, then usually they will treat it as benevolent. I think I answered your question.

MR. TEBILUCK: Romar Tebiluck, Korea Economic Institute. This was not covered in your data, but I’m curious to what extent public opinion is influenced by what the governments tell them it ought to be. To be cynical, is it better for the U.S. to try to influence the public or is it better to have a government say nice things about the U.S.?

MR. CHU: Obviously, it work both ways. The public opinion view over international affairs, many studies have shown heavily influenced by their leaders, by the policy of the government and also by leaders. At the same time, I would say with cyberspace and the Internet, the reverse might still be credible, which means people can spread all kinds of views, and then the leaders also has to respond.

For instance, some NGO groups, the grassroots movement in Taiwan and Hong Kong and in Japan as well, often times they rallied the mass and drove the agenda, and the government had to respond, to avoid being looked down upon by the general public. So, it works both ways.
MR. STOKES: My sense is more broadly, you can rent goodwill but you can't buy it. (Laughter) Individual events that often involve the government or the leader can change favorability one way or the other, but they tend to return to some kind of norm that there is reason to believe or driven by underlying things.

For example, the favorability of the United States in India jumped dramatically when Modi came to the United States and was received lavishly, and Obama went to India and returned. Then it returned to where it had been for the two previous years. It does seem to me that one shouldn't over interpret that because there is probably some underlying thing going on there.

QUESTIONER: (Inaudible) I'm currently retired. I'm somewhat confused about whether you are talking about hard power or soft power. Soft power in my mind is many people would like to immigrant, there are people who would like to send their children for education. Can you elaborate on that a bit?

MR. CHU: Can you wait until the next panel? We will come to that.

MR. BUSH: Mike Fonte, and then we are going to this side.

MR. FONTE: Thanks, Mike Fonte. I'm the director of the DPP's Mission here in Washington. Thanks for a great panel. I'm going to jump a little bit out of your data point of 2014, a lot has changed in Taiwan since with the elections. I think when you talked about President Ma having kind of equal balance between blue and green and he should lean each way equally, I think some people in Taiwan didn't think he did that, but that's a different question.

My question is do you think Tsa Ing-wen's attempt to bridge the blue and green, which is what her stated objective is, is going to work given your data? I think she is trying that. I think she is trying that in her appointments, her work with the cross-straits relations, and her work with the United States. I wondered what your opinion was of that. (Laughter)
MR. CHU: I think it’s going to be challenging for President Tsa Ing-wen. The political landscape is very much polarized, but I want to say up to this point she has been very, I should say, cautious, very prudent, and avoiding any kind of unnecessary provocation. Nevertheless, Beijing can also drive the wedge, right, creating tension within Taiwan by offering different carrot sticks. It is not entirely something that Tsa Ing-wen can really control over.

At the same time, and I know this is beyond our topic, I think there are other policies that might create a bad feeling from the blue camp. I know this has nothing to do with our surveys. It’s difficult in that kind of political setting to try to be above politics. I know how difficult it is, in this country, too, right?

MR. BUSH: Professor Chang or Min-Hua, do you have a comment on this?

MR. CHANG: No.

MR. HUANG: No, that’s fine.

MR. BUSH: Ray Burghardt.

MR. BURGHARDT: Hi, Ray Burghardt from American Institute in Taiwan. I was fairly interested in the finding, if I heard it correctly, that the younger generation in China has a more favorable view of the United States than the older generation.

MR. CHU: Also, we have similar finding we can show you.

MR. BURGHARDT: It’s contrary to a popular impression, at least, that all the young millennials are extremely nationalistic and would be the first people to suggest sending ships across the strait or going after the U.S. in the South China Sea. (Laughter) Maybe it shows all that is simply a popular impression that has no basis in fact. Any further surveys or observations to comment on that?

MR. CHU: Ray, thank you for bringing up that point. I think that is the value of doing probability sampling, country-wide surveys. You monitor what had been
talked about in cyberspace, sometimes it can be very much misleading, simply follow the view of those overzealous, the nationalists in China or any other place.

MR. STOKES: Also, I think it is the value of repeating the survey year after year. Those are the findings that we find year after year. It’s not just in one year, for some reason, we can’t describe this is the case. It is the case over time.

I would warn you, we don’t know why that is really. I think it has to do with the fact that young people all over the world came of age when globalization and internationalization is just a fact of life, and they are young and romantic and naïve. (Laughter) Maybe when they are middle aged or older and they have had to live through, I don’t know, trade wars or confrontations and other military issues, they will have a different view. We just won’t know.

I think it is safe to say that people my age, we can kind of explain why their negativity might be there, based on their life, what we know about their life experiences.

MR. BUSH: I’ve gone even further by stating what essentially is a hypothesis, that millennials in various countries, whether it is Taiwan or China or the United States or European countries, have more in common with each other than they do with their parents’ generation in each country.
American millennials have more in common with Taiwan millennials than each of them has with their parents. It’s just a factor of our modern world.

QUESTIONER: (Inaudible) I would like to ask Professor Chu, if I understand correctly, your surveys show that more Cambodia people believe the U.S. has more influence in the region than China, and more Filipinos believe the U.S. than China.

I think it would be very interesting if we compare it with the South China issue. (Inaudible) A better relationship with China. How we should understand this difference between (Inaudible). Do you have any survey on how the presence of the
United States or China in the region or in countries will influence general voting action?
Thank you.

MR. CHU: We know the newly elected president in the Philippines is going to visit China. I think it will be a very important event. Aquino, obviously, during his administration, the tension between the two had escalated. China, obviously, should take the blame for their very mutually speaking very assertive or even aggressive action in the region.

On the other hand, I think maybe the new president might take a different approach, and whether this tension will continue to escalate or reach a peak, and then the two might look at other areas where they have potential opportunity for cooperation and engagement. It is something worth waiting to see, and also how the next president sitting in the White House will pick up where Obama has left off.

I think these are the most important factors shaping, not only the relationship between the Philippines and the United States or for that matter, Cambodia as well.

I think for countries which are not, as I mentioned, immediately adjacent to China, usually the intensity of the growing influence of China will be less, proportionally. That is probably the reason why countries like Cambodia and a few others still view the United States as more influential, that the United States has really been the dominant power, security, for more than half a century. This lingering impression still has long staying power. It won't be attenuated dramatically. It might in the long run.

MR. BUSH: One last question right here.

MR. BATISTA: Hi, Fernando Batista, InvestUSC. This is mainly for Min-Hua. The economic slide that you showed, if in the absence of the United States participating in TPP, how do you see that relationship?
MR. HUANG: I think different countries have their own economic situations, some are influenced -- they are eager to have this kind of impact, some have already -- whether in each condition, they all know that China is indispensable for their territory to continue to grow. They need to piggyback on their chances to have a relationship with China.

On the U.S. side, for example, like Taiwan, it is too difficult, too hard to earn that kind of commitment, so there is a lot of growing frustration in my understanding inside Taiwan. I’m just giving you a case like this.

I’m just thinking that the U.S. needs to look at their economic relationships in the East Asia and Pacific to understand in which country we can actually have more influence.

Taiwan, I don’t think it really matters, because Taiwan needs U.S. military security support a lot, so in that regard, it overwhelms the economic concern. In some other places, I think economy is really important.

The U.S. does have the political support of Myanmar recently, but in the economic sense, it is China overwhelmingly in Myanmar. Although China’s influence now, in my understanding, is mostly perceived as negative, but up to the point, I’m not sure how Myanmar will view that once China becomes really indispensable and it really depends on China.

What I’m saying is I think the U.S. really should look at each of those countries to evaluate what influence they can put from an economic aspect, what kind of benefits or costs entailed by these kinds of economic impacts.

MR. BUSH: I’d like to thank all of our panelists for great contributions. I’d like to thank you for your excellent questions. I think we have some really rich data here that has rather profound policy implications, and I think we will be discussing these issues and how Asians view these issues for some time to come.
We will take a break for 14 minutes, and then reassemble here at 11:00, no pressure. There is coffee and other things out in the corridor. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

(Recess)

MR. BUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, if you could take your seats we're going to get started. Andy Nathan is going to moderate the second panel and I'd like to invite him to the podium

MR. NATHAN: Thank you, Richard. Everybody sit down. (Laughter)

So let's get started. This panel we have Bridget Welsh, who's been an active member of the Asian Barometer Survey for a long time, and she's a Senior Research Association, Center for East Asian Democratic Studies at NTU, and has a variety of other affiliations and teaching capacities. And then we're going to have Kai-Ping Huang, who has also been with the Asian Barometer for a long and now teaching at National Taiwan University. Then Lu Jie, who is an Associate Professor at the Government Department in AU here in D.C. They will present in that order and then we're going to have Constanze Stelzenmüller, who is a Fellow here at the Brookings Institution, expert on U.S.-Europe relations. And then we will all come up here and have the discussion.

So, Bridget.

MS. WELSH: Good morning, everyone. It's a pleasure to be back here in Washington, D.C. and Brookings. And we'd like to thank Richard Bush and the Center for East Asian Policy for their kind invitation and sponsoring this along with the other sponsors of the program. When Andy is introducing people a long time, as you get older that takes on special meaning, as I'm sure you know. So one starts to feel one's age.

But here we go, as the slides eventually do come. So today we're looking at a whole range of questions in our survey of the Asian Barometer. And earlier on in the earlier panel my colleagues focused specifically on the questions that looked at favorability of the U.S. and China and the narrow range of those questions. We have
another question that we're going to focus on today with Kai-Ping and myself, and that looks specifically at a measurement we think is a good proxy, although not the only proxy, for looking at assessments of soft power.

We ask in the survey which country do you think you should follow as a model for development. And what we're doing in the sessions in the next few minutes is to look at the answers of those who chose the United States and those who chose China, essentially, as two different proxy measures, for the level of soft power of these two respective countries. And they can choose other countries and they have, they choose Japan, they choose Singapore, they choose their own country. But we are focusing specifically on the differences in those who chose the U.S. and China because we think when you choose that as a model that really indicates that you have a lot of attachment to that specific country and that it's a very I think interesting and very useful measure for questions of soft power.

Now here are some of the questions that we're looking at. I need to actually switch because I think what's happened is that they've put my Kai-Ping slides up first. Let me find them. My slides don't seem to be here. So in our slides what we find is that we actually find some very interesting dynamics. First of all, the thing that we find is that U.S. still remains the dominant choice compared to China in terms of issues of -- it's the slide that says contesting soft power. The other thing that we find in looking at this issue is that there are certain countries that are actually increasingly looking more attention to China. And that number is growing. And we compare that between the first and second wave.

(Technical difficulties with slides)

So we're looking at levels and measures of soft power. And then we begin to look in the explanations. So what I'm going to look at are the demographic dimensions, and we're going to pick up a little bit on what was mentioned earlier, which is that we see differences in perception of age and other factors. But one of the things I'd
like to get across a little bit differently compared to my colleagues this morning, and that I think that we're starting to see when we look at soft power that the U.S. is really failing to engage lots of citizens across East Asia. And there are gaps and there are shifts and changing that are taking place. And I think this has a lot to do with the way Obama's administration has actually engaged with East Asia. It has been highly elitist, focusing on having visits and trips as opposed to focusing on engagement with citizens. And we'll look at this and see where there are these gaps in some meaningful ways.

So because I think many of us think about the region, not just as East Asia, but Northern versus Southeast Asia, what we're seeing here are the answers to these questions. And so this particular graph basically distinguishes and identifies the number of percentage in those countries that chose the U.S. and China as respective models. So we know, as we've learned earlier, Japanese do not choose China. So we see that big sharp divide. But we see, for example, that Koreans do in very high numbers choose the United States. And some shares in respective actually choose China. But the interesting finding here is on Hong Kong, where in fact more people choose China as a model compared to the U.S. It's not a big difference, but it is an important difference.

Now this is the change over time between the last wave, which is carried out between 2010 and 2013 and the most recent wave. And in most of the areas, as indicated earlier, things haven't really shifted. So in Japan, Taiwan, and Mongolia we've seen modest shifts, but pretty much not that significant. But where the changes are, are interestingly in Korea and in Hong Kong. So we're seeing that more people are choosing the United States as a model in Korea compared to the previous wave, and actually in Hong Kong more people are choosing China. And this one of the big takeaways you would have I think, interestingly enough, is that when we look at places like Hong Kong we're actually seeing China in terms of its soft power gaining ground in very interesting sets of ways. And we'll come to the reasons for that I think a little bit later.

Now the second issue is looking at the same questions in the context of
Southeast Asia. And so here, this region sees much more variability. This is not a surprise. We would expect to see that variability. And in fact there are a lot of consistencies with the previous panel, which asked similar sets of questions. We see, for example, in the Philippines very large numbers choosing the U.S. as a model. One of the things I find so striking about the Philippines is that they never choose their own model, so it's really quite an interesting set of numbers. And, interestingly, Cambodia. The gentleman's question earlier. One of our findings across the board about the Cambodia findings is that there is very high support for the United States compared to China, which of course is the opposite of what the government is doing. The government has a very pro China policy. So there is a disconnect between the government's policy and the policy of the views of the citizens. So we see those different numbers.

Also Viet Nam. Look at Viet Nam. In terms of only two percent choose China as a model compared to 30 percent choose the United States. Again, sharp variations in this context. So we see strong U.S. support as one patter, then we see quite even splits. Singapore is a good example of an even split in that type of area. Similarly, we see a dynamic that is evolving -- and I think we're seeing this trend -- in places like Malaysia and Thailand where there is more support for China as a model than the United States. And the earlier conversation by Yun-han was that this has to do with the Muslin societies. I think it's a bit more complicated than that and I want to get into some of those variables in a little bit. In even split we also see Indonesia. So this gives you a sense of that. And of course in Myanmar there is a much more pro U.S. position than China as well. So variability in these three patterns.

Now here is the changes over time in the last five years. Another important takeaway that we see here is that there is a contraction of support in Indonesia. Indonesia was supposed to be Obama's success story. He lived in Indonesia. And what I think one of the implications of this is that the survey research show that there wasn't effective capitalization. By the way, he wasn't born in Indonesia. Just as a point of
clarification. (Laughter) But it is an interesting dimension because this I would say is one of the lost opportunities of the administration and I think something that is a wakeup call for the next administration because Indonesia is such an important regional power and global power. Keep in mind it is part of the G20.

We see loss of advantages in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Here, again, one of the issues to emphasize is that in parts of Southeast Asia U.S. soft power is contracting, and in many core members of ASEAN, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. This is where it's happening, and this is the battleground for contesting soft power in the region. And it's actually one that U.S., I believe, is losing. But there are some bright spots. And that is in the context from the perspective of the U.S. Cambodia and Viet Nam, we have very important gains in terms of perceptions, of choosing the U.S. as a model. And I think this is a very interesting dynamic. But not as large as the -- quite a big difference in the context of Viet Nam. And, of course, that's been exacerbated by a lot of the security concerns and China's policy on the South China Sea and other areas.

So we also asked the question, well who is it that is actually taking these different perspectives, why are they taking them. So the first cut on this is to look at demographic factors. So we see generally, as has been supported earlier, younger East Asians are more likely to choose the United States over China as a model. We're also finding that in urban areas and among wealth populations they are less likely to choose the United States. This is a very important point. That means the U.S., people who choose the U.S. as a model are in the rural areas and poorer. Not exactly the composition from the perspective of the U.S. of who you want to be supporting you as a model. And, in fact, the political classes are not choosing the U.S., they're choosing China. And ironically one of the things is that the U.S. policy towards the region has been centered on elites, on political elites. And in fact they're not winning them to the same degree, especially in those areas that we would actually -- among the urban areas or wealthier groups of populations.
And we look at this, here is the graph that looks at the issues of youth. And there are generally -- I said the trend is young people, and you can see those things go down in this direction, slightly higher youth, adult, and elderly. But the youth advantage is not huge. And in fact there are a couple of interesting exceptions, which I think I wanted to point out. The first exception is the Philippines. The Philippines has really high levels of support for the U.S. in terms of soft power. But it's not necessarily among young people. And it's interesting to watch the impact of the Duterte presidency because he won a lot of support among young people. He's using ethnic language, nationalist fervor. It's actually gaining ground, especially among young people. And it will be interesting to see how that translates. And also in Korea. Also we see that older people tend to be much more choosing the U.S. as compared to China.

So what does this all mean? What are the implications so far of this particular answer? That in the most contested region of soft power the United States is not winning, as I mentioned earlier, particularly in places like Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. And this is the shift in changes over time. That Indonesia's policy has not really translated in the citizens at large. And I think this speaks to a gap in terms of the engagement with the region. And in fact the games are the places where China is. And the implications of this is China is its own worst enemy in the sense that it's actually having backfire effects like Cambodia and in places like Viet Nam.

In Northeast Asia U.S. position remains much stronger than that of Southeast Asia. And one of the things for someone like myself who works on Southeast Asia foreign policy and issues, what we're seeing in the context of Southeast Asia is that one of the challenges has been the administrations continue to look at Southeast Asia as a competition with China, not looking at Southeast Asia itself as a region. And this is where the battlegrounds are gaining and also where we're seeing important shifts that are taking place. Citizens are not necessarily being engaged adequately. And I think this is an important wakeup call for U.S. policy and the new administration.
I'll stop there. (Applause)

MS. HUANG: Good morning. I'm going to talk about why more East Asians choose the U.S. model over the China model. And Asia, to analyze this question, Asia I think because the U.S. still outperforms China in every aspect, including politically, economically, and culturally, so here I'm not going to talk about why there are so many people choosing U.S. over the China model, but rather where there is a narrowing gap between the preference of China and U.S. model. And I think to ask this question is most sensible because what the U.S. policymakers should be concerned where the gap is narrowing instead of widening.

And so here we are going to talk about in different regions whether different factors can explain the variation across those regions. And so the first one we want to ask is about whether a trade matters. And if we look at Northeast Asia, and so you can see that actually the horizontal line is the difference trade between the U.S. and China. Actually most countries in Asia have more trade volume with China than with the U.S. And the vertical line is actually the difference between choosing the U.S. and China. So actually we know that actually more people tend to choose the U.S. over China. And so here we can see that the line -- the regression line actually is negative, which means when you trade more with China you actually will choose the U.S. less, so which means you will have a narrowing gap between choosing the U.S. and China. But the research actually is more about Hong Kong. And so as we talk about before actually Hong Kong has a very special relationship with China, if it depends a lot on China economically and politically, but if we take out Hong Kong, actually the regression line is positive, which means in Northeast Asia trade more with China actually get to a wider gap between choosing U.S. and China. So they trade more with China, but the actually tend to choose the U.S. more.

But how about Southeast Asia? So Min-Hau has already mentioned that Asia economy -- I mean that China's economic influence is actually a very important
factor in this region. But that's not the case in Northeast Asia, but it is the case in Southeast Asia. So when we look at this graph, actually when people -- I mean for countries in Southeast Asia, when they trade more with China they actually -- the preference between choosing U.S. and China actually gets narrowed. But of course we have two outliers, that is the Philippines and Viet Nam as we just discussed before. So these two countries have territorial disputes with China, and so that maybe affects that the actually tend to choose the U.S. more over China.

And so across the region actually protagonism is wide spread, but here in Northeast Asia we see that, you know, protagonism doesn't affect much between choosing U.S. and China, except in Hong Kong I think and also Japan. But in South Asia there is not much difference. The big differences only happen in Myanmar and Viet Nam and Singapore. And something interesting is for those who chose China model actually fewer of them are actually protagonist, which means actually protagonist Southeast Asians tend not to choose China as a model, and which also means maybe they think that China -- I mean China's economies might pose some kind of challenge or threat to their own economies.

So then we have to ask then why people in Northeast Asia don't want to choose China as a model. So then we look at another factor, that is whether values matter. And it doesn't matter in Southeast Asia as we just discussed. Asia trade can explain more accurately about why the preference between China and the U.S., but so in this case we can see that actually the line is negative, which means for those countries who say higher labor or democratic values, they actually -- you know, the gap between choosing U.S. and China is actually pretty narrow. But I have to point out, this line is almost due to the Philippines. The Philippines has very low labor or democratic values, but they have a huge gap between choosing the U.S. and China. So if you take out the Philippines actually you can see the line there, it's a little bit -- it's probably just a fleck line there, so which means democratic value doesn't explain much about choosing U.S. and
China in Southeast Asia.

But how about Northeast Asia? It does matter. So the regression line is positive, which means, you know, countries with higher levels of democratic values, they actually tend to choose the U.S. more as the model against China. And we have an outlier there, that is Taiwan. But Taiwan, I have to say, that Asia and Taiwan, Asia a lot of people choose Japan as the first model. So if you count the Japan as something similar to the U.S. model and you actually will see that Taiwan will be closer to the regression line.

So whether support matters, support for democracy matters, it does matter in Northeast Asia, as you can see the regression line is positive. How about in Southeast Asia? In Southeast Asia, so the line is negative but it's also again due to the Philippines. But the Philippines is a special case here. But if we take out the Philippines the regression line actually is positive, which means for countries who support democracy they also tend to choose the U.S. model more than choosing China as the model.

So I think Yun-han already covered this, so we know that positive view is usually high -- I mean positive view toward the U.S. in the region is usually higher than positive view toward China's impact on the region. And so the exception is in Hong Kong. And in Southeast Asia we can see that actually, you know, from the Philippines you have a very high percentage of positive view towards the U.S., but then toward Cambodia and then Singapore, that's still okay, but when you go to Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, then the percentage actually flips. So you actually have more people who have positive views towards China than towards the U.S.

So individual labor we also ran some analysis, but I'm not going to delve into these boring numbers. So I will just give you the summary of the findings. So trade flow matters in Southeast Asia, but not in Northeast Asia. And protagonist views were high across the region, but even protagonist is actually supporting the U.S. model. But we also have some exceptions in Myanmar, Singapore, and Viet Nam. It's Asians who
possess democratic values who are more likely to choose the U.S. over China model. It's Asians who possess traditional values who are more or less likely to choose the U.S. over the China model. There this is a very interesting finding, but we just mentioned before wealthier East Asians or urban East Asians, they actually tend not to choose the U.S. as a model. So maybe this engagement failed in those countries. And this one actually says that because we know that wealthy people, urban residents, they tend to hold liberal values, I mean transitional liberal values. So here it also indicates maybe policy (inaudible) to other dimensions. So East Asians who support democracy also support the U.S. model to a greater degree than China. And East Asians who perceive the U.S. influencing the regional positively, they also tend to choose the U.S. model over China. And so of course we have some exceptions later, but different patterns in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, these are the places where the U.S. is losing this, its soft power.

So I will pass the implications are like, you know, U.S. policy should shift away from trade because I think the advantage of U.S. is actually values, especially the promotion of democracy, human rights, and good governance to some extent in the region. And this is also the area that U.S. policy makers should consider to -- I mean besides engagement maybe they should be more non engagement in the region, especially in Southeast Asia. And so U.S. soft power cannot be taken for granted because it's shifting. So on the line factors are counting for views not being addressed adequately, so it should be addressed accurately in policy.

Thank you. (Applause)

MR. JIE: Well, thanks for the invitation. So the first panels and the two panelists of this panel generally talk about the choice between U.S. model and China model, especially among Asian people. Now my assigned job is to talk about the lure of U.S. model among Chinese citizens. This actually for me is a very important and interesting topic.
First of all, if we're talking about a competition between the U.S. model and the China model as sort of a competition of soft power, one major concern would be how do Chinese people view that, right? I mean these sort of like the big sort of most important battleground, not for U.S. but also for the CCP regime as to say how they can attract people to different camps or different ideas of governance.

The second issue has some sort of historical longitudinal implication. I believe some of you still remember the Statue of Liberty raised in Tiananmen Square in 1989 as a symbol that proposed by students as idea goal for their strive for democracy. Then after so many years people are still concerned about Chinese people’s general views of democracy as a potential model for their future development. And this not only has implications for the competition regarding soft power, but has huge implications for the so called prospect for democracy in China. So this is what I'm going to address using the ABS model collected from mainland China.

This will be the major sort of outline of today's presentation. I'm going to talk a little of debate on the China model versus the U.S. model, especially within the domestic politics content within China. Now going to show you some of the public opinion data in the models that the Chinese people prefer for the future development of mainland China. Now we're going to say what makes the U.S. model really appealing to the Chinese people. I know many of you have concerns because we talk about the China model/U.S. model sort of monolithic concept, where this is kind of black balls when they're (inaudible). But in practice it's actually very difficult to ask people why do you like the U.S. model. I mean the only thing we can do is try to infer why people like this model based on some sort of correlation analysis. For instance, if you think the prefer the U.S. model because of rule of law, then your expectation will be those people who think the rule of law in China is really bad and would like to choose the U.S. model. So use that kind of correlation analysis to try to work like a forensic anthropologist. You can have the skeleton to figure out what's the underlying story. So this is what we do with the public
opinion data by correlation analysis. So then use this kind of data to generate some kind of conclusions, implications for public policy. So that's first to say a few a words about so called U.S. versus China model. It's probably beating on a political discourse within China to say U.S. model probably been presented liberal democracy with all these key features which are (inaudible). This is a market economy and also the key proponents within China who would be the right intellectuals as a so called rogue leading party in Chinese called the (speaking Chinese), which means lead China to the U.S. model, right. Well, on the China side we see these general (inaudible) so called socialism with Chinese characteristics intentionally using some of the sort of terms used by the CCP to see it's a regime characterized by the dominance of CCP with so called Multi-Party Cooperation consultation, but some people call these parties pseudo parties. They are kinds of debates there. It's rule by law instead of rule of law. And this is actually a key component emphasized by the current administration. And the (inaudible) is being characterized as a one party regime.

And when one comes to the economy side we see this is a market economy, but with significant intervention and regulation from the state. And this is a little different from the American model where there's a key role played by the government. There are also proponents for this kind of China model for the future development, primarily the left wing intellectuals, and also we have those people who enjoy this kind of discussion called the 50 cent party (speaking Chinese). Those people won't receive 50 cents from party but volunteered to do this kind of job for the promotion.

So this is general setting of so called debate of the U.S. versus China model within China. Then what kind of responses from people? So we have two waves of surveys mainland China talking about which country you think should be the model for the future development. There are a little bit sort of differences in terms of wanting to about this, but let's show the data first.

So clearly you will see around 25 percent of Chinese people -- this is a
national probability sample -- choose U.S. as the model for their future development. And this percentage has been quite consistent and stable across years. So one wave in 2015, one wave 2011, 4 years in between. This is quite consistent. And over the years just a single (inaudible) appears to be more attractive model for China’s future development. The percentage increased from around 15 percent to 18 percent in 2015. What is most interesting is about our own models. Here in 2011 close to 17 percent of responders choose our own model should be followed for future development. Well, in 2015 it’s around 3 or 4 percent. People say, what’s the big difference? There’s a big difference in terms of (inaudible) category provided for them. In 2011 our own model was intentionally presented as a category for them to choose. Well, in 2015 that category was not real to the respondents. But if they choose we should follow our own model, we should follow our own model. Which means in 2011 our own model theoretically is the politically correct answer, right, that you should take. And so many people choose our own model. But if you drop that category, say we just cut our own model, if you volunteer and say we should follow our own model, there’s a big difference, a significant change. But a more interesting finding here is regardless whether you present China as a choice for the people, that doesn’t affect their choice over the United States. So you have two different answer categories between 2011 and 2015. But the choice of the United States as a future model for development is really stable and consistent around 26-25 percent. And what’s more interesting here -- I mean for the first panel people talk about why we should ask people, why should we ask people about different dimension, influence, there’s a huge percentage (inaudible). They have no idea, they don’t know.

This is not unique for this question. When you check many people’s responses to questions, tapping their, for instance, international knowledge, tapping their attitudes foreign affairs, generally you see a high percentage of DKs, because remember this is a national representative sample, right, as we said, that covered all people from China, from both rural areas, people with different sort of exposure to news and
information. So given these patterns, how do you explain that, why we have very persistent, robust, close to 26-27 percent of people choosing U.S. as their model. There is some sort of theoretical conjecture we can take to see why they choose American model. There is kind of argument that says they choose the U.S. model based on rational reflections of the disadvantages and advantages of different types of models. This kind of rational argument assumes, first, people have sufficient information for both models, right. You have enough information to make varied assessments of the different models, then you can choose which one is better for China. And also there are some key issue domains that we suppose these people should focus on because these key issue domains are the key differences between the China model, basically it's the U.S. model. For instance, we're talking about rule of law, checks and balances, actual politics, we're focused on political domain. If we're focused on economic domain it would be economic prosperity, including institutionalized protection, (inaudible), things like that.

And a general expectation will be if you follow this kind of rational argument those people who have more negative view of China in all these aspects we mentioned should theoretically be expected to take the U.S. model more likely. So if it's purely based on rational reflections.

The second is, it's not some fully rationalized reflections and calculations, but more likely sort of idealized the goal for future development but with very limited specific reflections. So (inaudible) like something that's ideal that we want to achieve, but for those people they have some sort of knowledge about U.S., but not sufficient knowledge for very comprehensive rational evaluations, and they do not pay specific attention to those specific issue domains that we're talking about. So their evaluation of the U.S. model is not about the U.S. performance in rule of law, constitutional rule, democracy, protection of human rights, liberty, but are more about U.S. is something good. This is called idealized goal with limited specifications. And that approach is not a concern, just a random response from people, say I just pick U.S. model. This could be
not a plausibility explain people's choice of the U.S. model. And with this you would expect those people with very limited information about the U.S. model, basically have no idea, right, what the U.S. model should be. And also there should be no specific correlates with their choice of the U.S. model. So this will be some sort of expectation based on how you model people's cognitive process of choosing the U.S. model when confronted with that kind of choice between U.S. and China.

Then let's see some sort of empirical evidence to see which one or which approach, which model may be more plausible. So this is the first thing on the frequency of Chinese people following international foreign affairs. This is the first indicator we used to try to capture people's exposure to related information for rational assessments. What you see across time, it's close to 40-50 percent of people that follow international news and foreign news quite often or all the time. You would argue that this would be the relevant percentage of Chinese people with enough information to make comprehensive and rational assessments, which means the other half of the people actually don't have that kind of information to make assessments about a U.S. model.

There's another thing about where in this question you ask people to assess the democratic quality in different countries and societies. Asking their assessment of Taiwan, India, Japan, United States, and China. These are the percentages of missing's when we are asking them for their assessment of democratic quality in these specific countries. When asked to assess democratic quality in China the missing's 20 percent, which is not huge. But a way to push to Chinese people to see how democratic do you think the U.S. is, the missing percentage is close to 55 percent. The missing in this question is, again, many people do not have enough information to make valid assessments.

Hopefully I have convinced you that when it comes to the excess related information for comparison assessments, we do not have enough evidence to support that kind of fully rational sort of rationalization based argument. So say the choice
between the China-U.S. model is based on comprehensive assessments of these two models' performance on key aspects and which one should be better for China's future. So this is the first sort of information foundation to make that kind of argument.

This is the missing values when they assess American democracy by their choice of model. For those who choose the U.S. model, there are around 30 percent do not know the quality of democracy in the U.S. When they choose all these models, close to 50 percent do not know about quality (inaudible). When they choose other models, close to 50 percent do not know about U.S. quality. So comparatively speaking, for those people who choose U.S. models they know more about the quality of democracy in the U.S., but again the percentage of missing is (inaudible). So for those who choose U.S. model, close to 30 percent of people have no idea of the quality of democracy in the United States. So this has some implications for say how people choose these models.

Now when it comes to specific reflections, we check these dimensions. For instance, how people perceived economic performance in China, in both national terms and in family terms, over the years and in the future and the concurrent. So these are current, retrospective, prospective evaluations. For the political performance, we choose people's assessments, rule of law in China, the checks and balances, politics in China, more here about sort of national people's (inaudible) of the supervising of the administrative power, and also check their assessments of Chinese government's responsiveness, as well as the effect of Chinese elections in making people comfortable.

So theoretically, if you think people's choice of the American model is based on full rational assessments of the U.S. model, all these negative assessments should be highly correlated with their choice of an American model. They don't like (inaudible) in China, they believe the U.S. model should be better, that's why they choose the U.S. model. But when we do this very comprehensive statistical modeling, the
modeling could be more complicated or have huge missing values. So we'll run this kind of selection model which is not something you would be interested in, but I'll just give you the results. If you believe me, I've been crunching data for many years, and the result is they all fail. So no matter which aspect you focus on, people's assessments of these key dimensions, statistically insignificant relationship with their choice of the American model. Which means again we do not have sufficient evidence to say these people choose the U.S. model based on comprehensive rational evaluations and assessment of the two models.

Now it comes to what really matters, right. So when it comes to the democratic assessments, we ask people to assess democratic quality in the U.S. and democratic quality in China. Then compare, which one for them is more democratic. Again the missing values are significant across (inaudible) 50 percent. Close to 25 to 30 percent that believe U.S. is more democratic than China, if you think this will be rational people. Well, around 5 to 8 percent of people believe China and U.S. are equally democratic. While close to 15 percent of respondents believe actually China is more democratic than the U.S. We can take these as some sort of indicator, if you believe U.S. is more democratic than China then you should prefer the U.S. model if you really emphasize the (inaudible) of democracy in China. If you believe China is more democratic than the U.S., then why do you care about the U.S. model? So we take a difference between the U.S. evaluations, U.S. democracy and Chinese democracy, the difference negative and positive, your negative stands for they think China is more democratic while the positive values think U.S. is more democratic. So you find those people who believe U.S. is more democratic, actually more likely to choose the U.S. model. And those people who find China is more democratic are more likely to say we should follow our own model for democratic choices.

So this is one general feeling about democracy in China may have some relationship with their choice of the U.S. model. This is one indicator we found that's
statistically significant in all rounds of regression. The other general feeling is about life satisfaction. You have a 10-point scale to measure life satisfaction, with 1 as the lowest satisfaction, with 10 as the highest satisfaction. Well, see those people who are more satisfied with their life in China actually they're less likely to choose U.S. as their model for future development. And those people who are more satisfied with their life in China are more likely to choose our own model for future development. That also has some implications, but again this measure is a very general measure about people's feelings. It's not about specific aspects or dimensions of China's performance. So we have two general feelings measures that matter. First is about (inaudible) of democracy in China, second is about life satisfaction in China.

There are some sort of information tests that also matter. This captures people's news consumption in China, primarily the mass news media. What are your findings for those people who consume news more? Actually they are less likely to take the U.S. models as their choice. This has some implications for instance for propaganda, for indoctrination, for how Chinese people manipulate this kind of information flow to shape people's understandings. What is very interesting about this information test is people with more consumption to mass media actually are more likely to choose Singapore. This is also compatible with the public discourse. But Singapore presented as one party government with high transparency, low corruption, high efficiency. So this is something they really want. And it seems that the propaganda or the information manipulation has worked to some extent. So this is one measure matters.

Another one is something with is not surprising given previous presentations, of the controlling for their life satisfaction, assessment of democracy, information pressure, young people still on average more like choose U.S. model for their future development. So we have taken away life satisfaction, assessment democracy, information assessment, excluding the influence of these factors they found that young people are on average are more likely to choose U.S. models as first choice. So this has
some implications for so called generation shift, with implications for values, (inaudible), things like that. But how to unpack that -- we need more data to do the further analysis.

Another interesting factor we have is about education. So generally you would argue -- you still remember the image of the Statue of Liberty raised in Tiananmen Square in 1989, you would -- highly educated people might prefer the U.S. as a model for future development. Actually, after accounting for all that factors you find U.S. model is more attractive among those people with primary education or less than primary education as compared to those people with higher education. For people with higher education in China, Singapore model or our own model are actually more attractive. So what does it mean? Higher education means higher sophistication for political decision making. But it also means more experience in the education system in China, which means more exposure to potential political ideological campaign education. So how that captures underlying dynamics and not interesting that we need to engage, just do not take it for granted that college students are more likely to favor U.S. over China. This is not the case according to data.

The primary conclusions, again there are many things we could do with the data, but this is based on very preliminary analysis of data saying in China we find sort of moderate preference for the U.S. model; remember, consistently 25-26 percent. But this is against percentage close to 50 with missings, right. People don't know, they have no idea which model should be chosen. And all the data suggests the very limited role of rational reflections of China's own problems. When it comes to choice of U.S. model they are not correlated with people's perceptions of key major economic political specs of China's government, but primarily related to what? General views of the U.S. APRC democratic disparity, general feelings of life satisfaction. A potential interpretation of those, those people who are not satisfied with their life in China, they want to take alternative model and that model should be sufficiently different from China. And which one is sufficiently different from China? I mean the U.S. could be a choice. That is not
based on again very comprehensive, rational assessments of these two model's advantages and disadvantages. Again, we say that a significant lack of related information for people to make assessments and to rationalize their choice.

So among those people with sufficient information you can find intriguing (inaudible) about education. Education increases people's capability for making decisions, increases their cognitive sophistication, but also in China's context, for more opportunities for propaganda and ideological campaigns. So how to tease out these kind of very nuanced dynamics within education is not an interesting thing. And they have limited rational reflections of the U.S. model, and maybe we should talk more about a potential role played by Chinese government in promoting the so called China model among China's people.

So thank you so much. (Applause)

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: Good morning, everyone. My name is Constanze Stelzenmüller; I am a fellow at Brookings in the Center on the U.S. and Europe and I am, to those of you who don't know my biography and those who do, very obviously the outlier in this workshop because I'm not a specialist on China, East Asia, or their relations with the United States. I'm a specialist on my own country, Germany, on Europe, and on Transatlantic relations. I am however a human rights and international law -- that's my background, and I used to be a journalist and worked for Die Zeit, which may be familiar to some of you as a paper once published by Helmut Schmidt, who some of you may know was very good friends with Lee Kwan Yew and therefore had very strong views on things like Asian values and collective rights and responsibilities. And that led to, among other things, my newspaper once publishing a Singaporean government initiative called the Declaration on Human Responsibilities. I don't know whether any of you have heard of that; that was an attempt to circumscribe the reach and impact of the United Nation's Declaration on Human Rights. It's the only government initiative I have ever actually as a journalist actively tried to sabotage. (Laughter) And I
won't bore you with that, but I do take a strong interest in questions of relationship with
East Asia and efforts to achieve democratic transformation and liberal governance there.

The other reason why I'm standing up here I think is that I once used to run a survey and presented it for many years. That was the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends, which began life as a European American survey. We tried very hard, including in my time, to expand it to Asia, but as has been mentioned here several times, including by Bruce Stokes, with whom we worked closely many times. That proved incredibly difficult to do. For one because the information spaces are so different because the cultural translation necessary to do this kind of this thing, to ask the same kinds of questions in these very different political spaces is an enormous and very complex undertaking. And also very simply because of the quite extraordinary costs of surveying in Asia. To those of you who have ever tried to do this, you will know what I'm talking about, but I remember there I think we were told asking three to five questions in Japan would cost us $100,000. In other words, if you're trying to do something serious, a survey with 20-30-40 questions, which is what we were doing with Transatlantic Trends, and in at least 5 countries, you really basically have to set up a meth lab somewhere (laughter) to be able to finance this kind of undertaking.

Anyway, I found this morning's presentations fascinating because I think that they show that there is a great deal of disconnect, not just in our understanding of each other's political spaces, but also between our understanding of what polls can tell us and our government policies, dare I say. The reason that I'm not going to comment on the questions on the findings or their interpretation, since I've only just heard them this morning and I think that I would need to look at them more carefully to be able to do that with any credibility, I do want to point out to you, if I may, how this relates to the kind of work that I do and that we do in the Center on the U.S. and Europe.

And the first point I want to make is to emphasize just how important doing polls is in the current atmosphere. I think that cannot be overemphasized. We find
ourselves, at least in Europe and in the Transatlantic space -- and I think from what I've 
seen this morning this is equally true for the Asian space -- in a situation of what has 
been called post factual politics where the public debate space, the agora of public 
opinion is overwhelmed by facts, pseudo facts, distortions, and outright lies produced by 
social media, but also by government propaganda and outright government interference. 
You only have to read today's New York Times story about Russian propaganda in 
Europe to know what I'm talking about. If you haven't read it, I recommend it to you. And 
the result of that is we are seeing in Europe governments on the defensive against 
populist movements everywhere fueled by this kind of overwhelmed public debate space. 
We are seeing this on the American side as well of course. You will have followed the 
debate on Monday night. And I think that this emphasizes the need for polls as a tool to 
understand social attitudes and political preferences, attitudes about each other in a 
global space that is becoming more and more integrated, where we are mobile as 
persons, where data are mobile, where assets are mobile, capital is mobile, but we 
understand less and less about each other and there is more and more potential for 
friction.

So that's my first point. I think that if I had one major policy prescription it 
would be that governments and civil society represented media foundations ought to 
invest more in polls and into their interpretation. I think that is worth all the money we can 
throw at it frankly, because I think that this would help sort through some of the 
confusion. Already much of what I've seen this morning I think would be helpful in 
elucidating a great deal of the questions that we have about each other.

My second sort of very large and general point is about the policy 
implications of this. In the economic field that I work in, which tries to formulate potential 
strategies for Europe and America to work with each other in a world that is shaped by 
globalization and interdependence, polls are important for providing the connection 
between representative governance and its policy makers and those who are
represented. Again, one of the key phenomenon that we’re seeing right now is a disconnect of understanding and communication between representative democracy and its electorate. That is, you find elites, policy making, analytical, political on the defensive against this on both sides of the Atlantic. And I presume similar things are true of East Asia as well. Because social media gives the electorate so much more power to shape the debate space than they’ve ever had that is now more important than ever. And if we want to preserve representative democracy against the Identitarian temptation and against illiberal temptations, it seems to me that that puts a premium on understanding what people want and what they think.

My final point is about the triangular relationship between America, Europe, and East Asia and all this. Europe hasn’t been mentioned at all today, but of course Europe and its constituent nations are players, and in some cases key players, in this space. And of course we occasionally collaborate with American and occasionally we are in competition with it. There is a great deal of acknowledged and unacknowledged friction, and in the end the ultimate endeavor that I think we should all be pursuing is to prevent that friction from spilling over into actual conflict or all out war, which today in some ways seems more possible than it has been for a very long time. And the best way I’ve heard the challenge formulated is oddly in a paper by two American officers who were staffers for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs a couple of years back, who described the European-American-Asian triangle as a strategic ecosystem. And I think that metaphor is useful for us to consider the implications of our actions and inactions in this field, and our ability to understand each other because what it means is that an ecosystem is I think definition something that is fragile, that needs to be very carefully managed, where balance is a precious good, and is something that needs to be worked on. And again I’m going to come back to my very general point, the beginning for that, the beginning and the end all of that is understanding each other, and that is where polls can play a huge role.
Thank you very much. I'll stop here. (Applause)

MR. NATHAN: Thank you. Those were great presentations. We have about 20 minutes. Let me make a couple of comments. I'm not a commentator, but one of the long standing themes of the Asian barometer surveys has been that respondents have different understandings of what democracy is. We know that and we've asked about that in every wave of the survey. We also asked them, I believe -- I forget who presented this particular data, but the democracy gap between China and the U.S. as it is assessed by the respondent, we just say how democratic do you think this country is, but we know that people are assessing this gap on different criteria. So the first book that the Asian Barometer Survey published, How East Asians View Democracy, and later investigations as well are exploring these different concepts of democracy.

So in this panel we're not so much using the word democracy, we're using the word model, I guess. What was the question in the questionnaire?

SPEAKER: Which country would you chose as a model.

MR. NATHAN: As a model. And here it has the same ambiguity as we discussed in the first panel. You know, when they speak of the model what do they mean like that, the political model, the lifestyle model, the economic model, and so forth. And I think we didn't dig into that, but Jie Lu has an idea that we can assess what kind of model does the individual have in mind by looking at some of the correlates of that preference. And I think that's a very promising way to go, but you mentioned economic and political attributes, but a person might have -- I liked the comment in the morning panel from somebody over here that by soft power he thinks it basically means where do you want to send your kid or where do you want to go live. That's not so much caught by your two things of economic -- it might be environment, breathing the air, it might be the educational system, science and technology. So I think that Jie-Lu's approach is promising, but it's going to need more work to tease out the idea of the model.

When he said that most of the people they just don't know, and I said to
Richard, I said that's the good news, they're choosing the United States because they don't know anything about the United States. On the other hand, perhaps from a policy point of view we don't care so much about those people anyway. And so we want to dig into the ones more who do know and see what they're choosing the United States, for what reason and so forth. And that might bring us to the slide that Kai-Ping didn't show us. The regression model that you passed over very quickly would be interesting to look at.

So those are just some quick comments.

Okay, questions? Richard.

MR. BUSH: I'd like to address Bridget's discussion of Hong Kong, which I found interesting but puzzling. First of all, it's my recollection that the level of democratic values in a previous Asian Barometer Survey was higher than what you showed. And so I don't recollect it for sure, but something is going on there.

Second, and more substantively, I think that recent events suggest that the desire for something like the U.S. model may be stronger than was revealed in the survey. The District Council elections last year and the recent Legislative Council elections this year I think were a repudiation of China's approach to democratization in Hong Kong and a vote of support for the democratic movement there. Second, I think other polling has shown that the desire for democratic institutions has been very strong for a long time and I suspect remains strong. If I can make a guess, I would say that perhaps the timing of this particular survey may explain the results that you got. And I just checked with Yun-han, the timing was early this year. And if one looks at the United States early this year, that's not a model I would want to adopt either.

MS. WELSH: Can I answer?

MR. NATHAN: Of course, yes.

MS. WELSH: I think I'd like to pick up a little bit of what Bruce said earlier this morning, at Pew, and that is I think timing only affects a marginal perspective.
So I think that I would not put as much emphasis on timing as you do, Richard. And we were not presenting democratic values, we were presenting choice of model. In the sense with the democratic values would be quite high as you indicated, that's another part of the survey.

MR. BUSH: (Inaudible; off microphone 1:07:15).

MS. WELSH: And we were looking at correlation, but we never presented the actual amounts that the Hong Kong people feel about democratic values, but we could provide that for you.

But I would say that I do think there is something very important here in Hong Kong, and that is that more Hong Kong-ers are choosing China as a model over the last five years than the U.S., despite what's happening. And the questions to ask, you have to ask why is that. And it may not, as Kai-Pei was suggesting, it's not related to democratic values. That's in fact not as a factor as it is in other parts of Northeast Asia, but I think it also could be related to U.S. policy towards Hong Kong. And in the sense of whether or not they are supporting aspects of democratic values or how they're engaging with Hong Kong. And I think that raises other sets of questions.

MR. HOROWITZ: I'm Elliott Horowitz, a former intelligence community person and a World Bank contractor. Thank you very much for a wonderful panel. I really appreciate your information.

One of the panelists stated that a country with a higher level of democratic values -- countries with a higher level of democratic values do not have more people choosing the United States. And as far as I heard there may be a contradiction in that presentation compared with other things that were said.

So I would appreciate anyone's comments on that.

Thank you very much.

MS. HUANG: Okay. So it's true, democratic values do matter in Northeast Asia, but not so much in Southeast Asia. So in Southeast Asia we see that
choosing China and the U.S. actually is determined mostly by trade values. But in Northeast Asia you will see that, you know, when you trade more with China you actually tend to choose U.S. more as the model. So in this case actually in Northeast Asia we see the trend that, you know, comes with a higher level of democratic values. They usually tend to choose the U.S., so which means trade values cannot explain why they choose the U.S. more, but democratic values do.

Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Hello, I am Yen Chi Huang (phonetic 1:09:47), a Visiting Fellow in CSIS. And my question is about the definition. It's very general. As well all know China has been considered as a developing country and in the near future I think it will still be a developing country. So what China model really means for people who live in an advance country like Japan, and what does this factor mean in your study? For the three panelists on my left.

MS. WELSH: I think it is important to unpack why Japanese or other advanced countries might choose China. It's interesting, Japan doesn't choose China, but Singaporeans do. And they have a very high level of economic development. So I think that while I agree with you that economic development might be a factor, I think different people are choosing China for different sets of reasons. And one of the challenges of survey research is we're not able to fully unpack what those reasons are. Some of it may be democratic values, or not, or the lack thereof. Some of it may be the sense that they're the regional power and they want to be with the regional power. Some of it may be about economic relationships and economic opportunities. And I think one of the steps that's necessary to complement polls, which I think are important, is to also do focus groups and other sets of analysis to interpret how some of these things are there. So we are cautious not to over interpret that.

But what I can tell you from what we see in the data, that being the status of a development doesn't necessarily affect how they view China, it's a
combination of factors. That's what we see.

MS. STELZENMÜLLER: I’d just like to add something. One point that you didn’t mention is something that people also want I think generally is stability, and improvement of their general perspective in life. And there are ways in which democracy is associated with more stability and in some cases people associated with less stability. And I think one of the things that would be worth unpicking in future waves is just what the term means for people, what they associate with it, and what they perhaps fear from it. That in fact is a prerequisite for any kind of thoughtful coordinated western policy response.

MR. JIE: I think what my colleague, Kai-Ping, has shown about the relationship between the level of democratic attitude and value and whether they relate to people, you know, with higher democratic values might choose American as a model more, I think the macro picture, you know, for ASEAN countries is not very clear cut, it’s like flat. But I think if you take further down to individual level analysis, I think a lot of countries, including ASEAN countries, actually people who subscribe more to democratic values, a higher probability that they will also choose the United States as a model. But it’s not shown at the macro level, but it has been shown at individual levels. So I just want to add that footnote.

MS. FRICK: Thank you. Hi, my name Alexandra Frick with The Stern Group. I have a question for Dr. Huang specifically on Trump’s trade policy on China. He has spoken that if he will be elected he wants to have much more harsh measures. And I think that this will only really increase trade tension and really damage trade relations.

I was curious what your opinion would be on -- of this would have a ripple effect throughout East Asia. I know you said during your presentation that trade has little impact on creating soft power, but I kind of wanted to know what the opposite would be, if Trump’s policy would really damage the soft power that we do have.
SPEAKER: So yes. (Laughter) You'll never get a visa here again, I'll tell you that. (Laughter)

SPEAKER: It depends on who wins.

MS. HUANG: Okay. So trade does matter in Southeast Asia, as we showed you. And so but we also showed you that, you know, protagonist actually can also affect whether people tend to choose the U.S. model or the China model. So I think at least right now in Southeast Asia people tend to think at least like the U.S. is a benign trading partner, not like China, because China in some way has to compare with other countries in Southeast Asia in terms of investment or something like that. And so we can see that, you know, for countries who think that, you know, China's economy power might be perceived as trade, the actually tend not to choose the China model.

So if Trump -- should I get into that? If Trump wins and he is really tough on that, and so I think that might have some effect -- I mean impact on whether people would like to choose the U.S. as the model.

MR. NATHAN: We have some questions in the survey that we call ideology about do you favor that the state is more involved in the economy, or do you -- do we have a protectionism question? We do, right? But this is a question about in our country -- like in Malaysia and Indonesia, should we have free trade or less, more. That question we're asking. We're not asking any question in our survey about should the U.S. have more protectionism. But none of these reports really exploited that battery about people's ideology.

MS. WELSH: I think while one of the challenges is that we've found that the U.S. focus on the TPP, which has been the predominant focus in the context of East Asia, especially Southeast Asia, some of the Southeast Asian countries, it's not really translated into soft power. But one has to understand, as I'm sure you do, that the relationship with trade is connected to questions of security, questions of stability, questions associated with perceptions of power dynamics that are shifting. I think if trade
policy shifts significantly, vis a vis Asia -- and that's not just China -- vis a vis Asia, it's going to have a ripple effect on all of the other factors, be it stability -- and also it's going to have a ripple effect on perceptions of competition between China and the U.S. in the region itself.

So I think one cannot isolate one element to see what the implications are. I think it would be premature for us to say what those views would be in the future because we don't know. But I think what the survey data has shown us in the past is that these things are interrelated and that they're connected. And I think that one can definitely say that they will have an impact, probably in ways that are greater than what we expect.

QUESTIONER: Thanks. My name is (inaudible 1:17:45). I'm a master's student at Georgetown University. This question occurred to me during Jie Lu's presentation, but it's definitely related to other panelists as well. And the question is you mentioned that when you do the survey asking people why is China model to them you mentioned a rule by law and regulated by -- in a regulated market. I think those two are maybe more negative aspects of Chinese government rather than positive.

I just wonder how you tease out the sort of benevolent or positive factors of Chinese government as compared to the benefits of a democratic system? One example I can think of is Chinese people they do think their government -- although it's not as democratic as the American's government, there is a huge level of trust for Chinese people towards their government and there is also accountability in China's politics, although in the absence of a very functioning democracy. So I wonder how you tease out the factors of a Chinese model?

MR. JIE: So first as clarification I'm not saying that rule by law is a positive aspect of the Chinese model, it's just in the political discourse, public discourse. These are the key features people emphasize when they talk about China model. And to identify why the people identify China model because of rule by law, and the key thing is
you ask of their assessments over the practice of rule by law in a situation to see how
they correlate, which is basic logic we use here. But we do not check to practice rule by
law, but we do check people’s assessment of practice rule of law in China to see how
that correlates with their choice of the U.S. model. So if you ask U.S. model is attractive
because of rule of law, then those people with more negative assessments of rule of law
in China should be more likely to choose the U.S. model. So that's the very
straightforward logic to argue. But if you find the data, they are not correlated. So, again,
the information presented here is in many chases their choice of preference over the U.S.
model is not based on comprehensive rational assessments of different aspects of
models, but more like sort of -- it's related to (inaudible 1:19:59) about why people
choose different models. I mean the pre-assumption we attach with that, first you need to
have some sort of dissatisfaction with the working of the model in your country. If you’re
fully satisfied with how the government performs then we just go our own way. Then the
next question is, if you are not satisfied with how the government works here what could
be attractive to you for an alternative model. So that's why we focus on people's very
negative sentiment in varying aspects of Chinese government's performance, to see
which one could be potentially correlated with a choice of U.S. model. Then you infer
that could be potential rationale for that choice.

As I said, everything is based on this kind of circumstantial evidence.
You cannot directly ask people why you like U.S. model. As I said, many people don’t
know about U.S. model. But the (inaudible 1:20:46) I think you must have -- since you're
from George Washington, Bruce Dickson has written a book on that, all kinds of
discussions about the political (inaudible 1:20:53) in China. So he may have more
regard.

MR. NATHAN: We'll take our last question.

QUESTIONER: This question is primarily for Bridget. You concluded I
think that you said U.S. soft power, particularly in Southeast Asia is contracting and that
this is a wakeup call.

My question, I guess, is what is the remedy for that? You made a reference to lack of engagement at the citizen's level, but if you could just elaborate on how we address that problem.

MS. WELSH: I think there are essentially three areas. First of all, U.S. policy in engagement with Southeast Asia has been very much at the elite level, as in we're having a number of people who are visiting, leaders, that there's been only a youth program, but that has actually been very ad hoc and not consistent across the board. And so the perception is that the U.S. government is allied with leaders. I mean Najib and Obama play golf together, you know, while Kelantan is flooding and parts of the States of Malaysia are underwater. And, you know, the perception is Obama and Najib are friends. And this type of perception has resonance in the context of Southeast Asia. The same thing, you know, Clinton and others come to visit Indonesia and the level of engagement, even in town hall meetings, is actually very minimalist. And most of the visits are very much at the elite level. And I think this is actually something -- a problem and there has been a contraction in U.S. government and in U.S. policy towards areas such as VOA, libraries, other aspects of terms of engaging citizens. The public forums are actually contracting and it's contracting even worse when you have huge numbers and resources put into Confucius Centers. So the relative different is there.

The second issue that I think is actually important is that I think the problem that many Southeast Asians feel is that they are in the competition with China, so that it's U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia is about China, it's not about Southeast Asia. And it's about the competition of trying to out China, you know, in the context of the region. And so Southeast Asians don't feel engaged as Southeast Asians. They feel that they're caught up in a battle. And that's whether or not that's in the context of the fight over the South China Sea, whether or not it's contestation between China and the U.S. over Malaysia policy. The same thing in the context of Thailand. So the second this is to
begin to look at Southeast Asia as something uniquely separate.

And importantly is to pick up on something Yun-han mentioned earlier, to not see this as a zero sum game, to see this as something that can be two sets of expanding dimensions. It's not us versus them in this particular context.

And I think the third factor, and this is that democratic values have really, with the exception of Myanmar, just evaporated from the perception of U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia. You know, the perception is that they ally with the dictators as opposed -- and they have left human rights behind. And I say Myanmar is the exception, but it's not the case. There's been very little criticism of the coup in Thailand. You know, Najib and Obama are best friends. And even if he is a kleptocrat in terms of corruption issues, it's not the Obama administration that's dealing, it's the Justice Department. And they see this as very different. So I think that the traditional allies that you have in Southeast Asia, the people who are more democratic, more open, wanting trade liberalization, are actually the ones you're losing the most in Southeast Asia.

MR. NATHAN: Well, thank you to the panelists and to the audience for your questions.

And Richard will give us a benediction.

MR. BUSH: Thank you very much. Andy, thank you for chairing. As I said before, I think we've had a very rich discussion, and as the last comment clearly suggested, raised some sort of fairly profound issues about U.S. policy. So it's a good programmatic agenda for whoever takes over our complicated democratic system.

So thank you all for coming and thanks to everybody in Yun-han's group.

Thank you, Yun-han. (Applause)

* * * * *
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)
Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia
Commission No. 351998
Expires: November 30, 2016