

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
CENTER FOR EAST ASIA POLICY STUDIES

**THE NEXT GENERATION OF KOREA EXPERTS:
SECOND ANNUAL YOUNG AND BRAVE CONFERENCE**

*The Brookings Institution
Falk Auditorium
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Washington, D.C.*

[Transcript prepared from an audio recording]

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Welcome and Introduction:

KATHARINE H.S. MOON
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KATHARINE H.S. MOON, Moderator
 Nonresident Senior Fellow
 The Brookings Institution

STEVEN DENNEY
 University of Toronto

BUHEUNG HYEON
 Columbia University

BENJAMIN SILBERSTEIN
 University of Pennsylvania

SHARON STRATTON
 North Korea Strategy Center

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 Asan Institute for Policy Studies

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 University of Michigan

STEVEN DENNEY
 University of Toronto

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KATHARINE H.S. MOON, Discussant
 Nonresident Senior Fellow
 The Brookings Institution

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 Columbia University

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 Woodrow Wilson International Center for
 Scholars

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SHARON STRATTON, Discussant
North Korea Strategy Center

DANIEL AUM
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BUHEUNG HYEON
Columbia University

BENJAMIN SILBERSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

Closing Remarks:

PAUL PARK
The Brookings Institution

P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. MOON: Good morning to everybody. My name is Kathy Moon. I am a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for East Asia Policy. My previous incarnation, which ended June 30th this year, was SK-Korea Foundation chair of Korea Studies, the first holder of this position. And for a variety of reasons I had to return to my teaching position at Wellesley College. I was commuting, actually, from Boston to Washington every week, so it was difficult, but this is a place, an institution with incredible resources, intellectual and camaraderie resources, as well, so I'm very, very happy to be back.

This is the Second Annual Young and Brave Next Generation of Korea Experts Conference. And I want to explain to you a little bit about the development of this conference. We actually even have alumni and alumnae in the audience or they'll be joining us throughout the day. I think a good three to five of them from last year's crew will be joining us. They have formed a very tight-knit community, and I'm sure that this year's participants will be enlarging that community of young folks in their twenties and early thirties who are going to take over many of the jobs that you might have right now, many of the jobs that we hold as people in our forties, fifties, sixties, seventies.

Young and Brave, we decided at Brookings to have a conference that focuses on or features people in their twenties and early thirties not as trainees, not as people who need to come to Washington to learn about Washington, but people who can teach Washington, who can be public educators and public intellectuals with new insights, new research, and new visions appropriate for their generation that will affect policy development and studies regarding the Korean peninsula in the future, for the decades to come.

As you know, if you live here in Washington, most of the time it's folks who are older who speak and the young folks, our staffers, they take notes. This time at Brookings we are the only next generation conference sponsors among several next generation organizers at various think tanks and universities, we are the only ones who feature young people as the main speakers.

What we did, also, is not choose topics and have others accommodate us, Brookings, but we asked each participant that we had sought out what he or she would like to speak about, what his or her expertise or

what his or her own passions in terms of interests regarding the peninsula are. And so we truly catered to the interests, the strengths, and the desired messages of these participants, so it is a unique opportunity to hear them and to learn from them and to engage with them.

Why young? Well, when you see them up here, you will see, I won't have to explain, why we call it Young and Brave. They're really young, okay? Again, in their twenties and the oldest is maybe early thirties or so. So, you know, the geriatric part of this panel really ends at the early thirties. And it's done on purpose.

Brave, why brave? Because, in my view, it takes courage to study the Koreas and in the future to manage issues related to the Koreas. Because the Koreas and the region are filled with such a breadth and complexity of truly life-and-death issues potentially, violence versus peace. Even in the best of circumstances of a reunified Korea under peaceful circumstances, huge dislocations of populations, huge challenge to democracy, which I hope will endure and grow on the peninsula, but there's no guarantee about any of these things, any of the achievements that South Korea has brought to fruition unless the process of unification, if and when that happens, takes place in a stable, peaceful, cooperative way. And that's wishful thinking, as well.

So it takes bravery, intellectual courage, bravery of character, and I'll explain why, bravery of character to examine unpopular views, views and approaches to the Koreas that are not in vogue or that are considered too idealistic or too unrealistic or too potentially disruptive and so forth.

As you know, Washington, Seoul, so many places in the world that actually work on the Koreas are so polarized by ideological differences. What I find fascinating and hopeful about the younger generation of scholars last year and this year, and by "scholars" I mean students of Korea in general, is that people have different views, but they are so open to exchanging them, to respecting other people's differences, and not putting up walls between one's views and someone else's views and approaches. And I think this is a vast improvement on the older generation's -- my generation and older included, we all grew up in the Cold War era with Cold War mentality where it was black or white, and this generation is post Cold War. This

generation is much more globalized and they are much more open to various types of information, various types of interpretations in ways that my generation and older were not willing to entertain.

Intellectual courage, bravery of character, and also courage to be creative. God knows, right now, we really need some creative, innovative thinking regarding the Koreans. We can't just continue with the past 20 or so years of a North Korea whom nobody knows really what to do with or how to deal with and a South Korea who's been progressing so much on the economic front, but lately has been regressing some in the democracy front. And so democracy, economic achievements, we must stay vigilant. And God knows, in the United States we need to stay vigilant about democracy, and you all know what I mean. But we're talking about Korea today. I won't get sidetracked because we know that if we all get sidetracked with the American elections, we're lost. We'll be here for the whole week.

This year's group, as an introductory remark to introduce them, reflects and advances trends among the younger generation of thought leaders on the Koreans. And I would characterize them as this way: the younger generation in their twenties and thirties, they are highly experienced even though they are very, very young. And they're highly experienced in very substantive ways. I don't mean just reading books. I don't mean just doing social networking participation and throwing their little blurbs out there. They are true thinkers and analysts.

They also are very diverse in their professional and issue areas of concern and experience. I have been amazed at the cross-fertilization and cross-ventilation that these young folks last year and this year have been partaking in. They do not belong to one professional silo, which my generation and older, we all had to choose a silo. If you're in academia, you shouldn't be messing around with NGOs or government or think tanks or media. You should just focus on your academic work and that's how you're going to be promoted and succeed. If you're in government, you have to be wary of NGOs and media, et cetera, et cetera.

The younger generations don't think that way. Almost every one of them has experiences in the academic world, starting with studies on the Koreans from their undergraduate life through, many of them, their

graduate experiences. Many of them have been contributing as writers to various types of media, both online and offline. We have editors, founders of major Korea-related online resources: Sino-NK, Korea Economic Watch, 38 North, various programs from SAIS. I find that really interesting. And also, the same person has also had, in many of the cases, experiences in the NGO world on human rights, on humanitarian issues, on a variety of issues.

So media, the private sector, academia, government experience, as well, policy worlds, think tanks, research institutes, you name it and they've already done it at the age of 25, 26, 30, 31. Again, this is a huge difference from the older generation who did not have this kind of cross-fertilization and cross-ventilation as part of their everyday existence dealing with the Koreans.

So I think this bodes well for our future. And to tell you how globalized they also are, many of them, if not most of them, have lived in various countries, and I'll name just a few: Korea, South Korea -- and I'm talking really living there -- South Korea, Germany, China, New Zealand, Australia. Where else? Sweden, Belgium. Did I miss any? And the United States and Canada. And those are just some of the countries.

The languages that they collectively share to offer you: Korean, German, Chinese, Ancient Greek and Russian, Spanish, French, Indonesian, American English, British English, Australian English. (Laughter) Did I miss any? It's an incredible group and I've been amazed at how fluid they are in their thinking, partly because they have access to different languages and they can access different sources of information. They are not boxed-in people, and I think this bodes well for the future of policy experts, of academic experts, researchers on the Koreans.

So with that, we'll start off with our first panel, which is just a conversational roundtable. And I invite the panelists to come up. Thank you. (Applause)

(Panel comes on stage.)

MS. MOON: We had a dinner, a welcome dinner last night and we had great fun, so they're also a very fun-loving lot. I'm going to make the introductions short since you have the bios in front of you. And if you don't, they're in the hallway outside, so you can read about all of their accomplishments in two

decades or two decades and a half or three decades of their life so far.

I will make very brief introductions. Steven Denney is a Ph.D. student in political science at the University of Toronto. He's also one of the founders and editors of *Sino-NK*, which is a major website. And we became Twitter friends before we actually met, which is now the way that people seem to meet, so very happy to have Steve here. He lived 21 years in the U.S., 7 years in South Korea, and 4 years in Canada, so this is already starting out to be an interesting lived experience that we'll benefit from.

We have Benjamin Silberstein here. He is a Ph.D. student at the University of Pennsylvania in history, Korean history, Asian history. You are also a co-editor of North Korea Economy Watch. And Steve and Benjamin have done lots of writing. You can find their articles, all sorts of media contributions online.

Benjamin is originally from Sweden, 16 years of his life in Sweden, 4 years in Belgium, 2 years in South Korea, 3 years in the United States. You're seeing a trend here that these are not people who are fixed in one location, and so, hopefully, they're not fixed in their mindsets either.

Sharon is from Australia, 25 years in Australia, South Korea 1 year, and 1.5 years in the U.S. And Sharon is the U.S. coordinator, I want to get it straight of North Korea Strategy -- what's the last?

MS. STRATTON: Program officer for North Korea Strategy Center.

MS. MOON: Yes, North Korea Strategy Center. I always go by the abbreviations. And she is the person in the United States, based in New York City, who manages issues related to NKSC, which is headquartered in South Korea. She has a lot of experience in dealing with NGOs, NGO work, and on a variety of issues, not just the Koreas.

And we have, last by not least, Buheung Hyeon, who is a student at Columbia. And Buheung has a fascinating history. Spent the first 14 years of his life in North Korea, 5 years in China, 3-1/2 years in South Korea, 2 years in New Zealand, 5 years in the United States. He is the first student of North Korean descent to study at Columbia, at such a fine school. He also was elected, I think it was about a year or a

year and a half ago, to be the first-ever president of the International Korean Students Association, the first president of North Korean descent to represent everyone else who was from South Korea. Speaks a lot to his leadership, his integrity, and his capabilities that he was honored in that way.

Buheung also is very active in various NGOs, in writing, in advising on various matters. And I find that his U.S. experience, also, is very diverse. He had three years in the Republic of Texas and two years in the People's Republic of New York City, in Manhattan. (Laughter)

So with that, we will start off with some questions I had provided them to engage in a good conversation. One of the things that I've noticed about your group, and this panel in particular, is this diversity of residences, language, and international experience. And so I am wondering in what ways your backgrounds, these backgrounds, have shaped and influenced your thinking. So how has your experience living in multiple countries, with different knowledge about the Koreas, and different foreign policy interests toward the Koreas, how have they influenced the way you "see" both the North and the South? You're welcome to focus on one particular country that you've lived in or multiple. You're welcome to focus on views from the outside on North Korea or South Korea or both. Let's start out with Steve.

MR. DENNEY: Thank you for the kind introduction. My research focuses primarily on identity, so I'm going to answer this question from an identity point of view. Identity is not really what you think you are or who you are, it's what others think you think you are. (Laughter) You got that? Benjamin and I were talking in the hallway just a moment ago about this and he said one thing that we learned about spending time in Korea is that Koreans have certain predispositions. Benjamin and I were talking in the hallway about this very thing, about identity, about what others think you think you are. And Koreans have certain ideas about who Americans think they are that is quite different from what Americans think they are. And I think this critical reflection upon who I am and upon who we are as Americans is something you can't learn if you don't leave your country, if you do not exit the silo, so to speak. And I think that being in Korea help me more critically reflect on the idea of being an American and an American in identity. And it's something you can't experience unless you leave.

MS. MOON: Okay. What about Sharon?

MS. STRATTON: Yeah, I think, Steven, you touched upon something that we were speaking about this morning, as well. You can't sort of get a sense of how you might be perceived when you're in the Koreas unless you get a chance to go there and unless you get a chance to leave your home country. I spent 25 years growing up and living in Australia, and now predominantly work on North Korea-focused issues.

And North Korea's not, I guess, one of the sort of priority areas when it comes to policymaking in Australia. It felt very much like a foreign and distant issue that the U.S. was tasked with leading to resolve. Having spent some time in South Korea and then coming to the U.S., and seeing sort of the shift in different countries' perception of their burden to resolve the North Korea problem was really interesting. I think it's also really important that you consider how you might be perceived by Koreans in your work and studies towards them. That's something that I think comes with experience being in the country.

MS. MOON: And Buheung.

MR. HYEON: So I was born in Korea and raised in Korea, so Korea is my country, but what I learned from living outside of the country is that even though it's my country, it is also a part of the international community. That's one thing I realized living overseas. The decisions we make for our country, both equally applied on South Korea and North Korea, actually it influences other countries, and especially like nuclear issues and the decisions made by the North Korean government. When I was there, I didn't know or I wasn't aware of how it actually influences other countries. Today, I clearly see each single decision actually creates a lot of tensions and anxiety among nations, especially in East Asia. That's something I learned from living outside of the country, when I see the country from an outside perspective.

MS. MOON: I'm curious, Buheung, if I could ask you to think about this a little deeper. Even in the United States and, of course, in Korea, you've lived in both the North and the South, what kinds of differences, let's say between Texas and New York, the two republics, did you perceive regarding the Koreas? How do people in Texas, wherever you were -- Texas is a big place, obviously -- how would you compare their views versus New Yorkers' views? And then if you think about having lived in both North Korea and South Korea, some of the similarities or differences in the way that they regard peninsular

issues. I mean, we know what we read, but beyond that.

MR. HYEON: So, actually, I've prepared that answer for the second question, but let me pull it up.

Today, I see North Korea has developed a very distinguishable culture, their own culture. So even though it is we were the same country and we shared thousands of years of the same history, it has turned out a very country. We speak the same language, but different dialect. But it's not the major point. The way people think, the way people see the government, the way people treat themselves is totally different.

The difference between New Yorkers and Texans is maybe some cultural difference or a little bit of political difference, but the difference between North Korea and South Korea is like from East to West. They don't see each other as the same country or the same -- they regard themselves as the same Korean ethnic group, but still North Koreans treat South Koreans as their enemy and still believe that they need to liberate their brothers from under the control of the United States. We can talk about it, you know, for hours.

MS. MOON: You also lived in China.

MR. HYEON: Right.

MS. MOON: And what are your impressions of five years in China, having lived there, the Chinese that you were around or the Korean Chinese that you were around, their views of the North and the South?

MR. HYEON: Okay. So a lot of Westerners, we think China is a Communist country. But when I first got to China, when I was 14, to me China was the most capitalized country. You can do -- there's nothing that, you know, you -- everything is possible, to me, in China if you have money. In a Communist country it is impossible, right, theoretically, but everything is possible in China. That's what I found out in China.

And so the way Chinese people see -- I spent most of my time with Chinese-Koreans, and they are descendants of Koreans, South Koreans and North Koreans. But today, they just want to come to South Korea and to be a South Korean citizen because South Korea is richer than North Korea.

MS. MOON: So money talks in China. Ben, you have the sole European and Asian experience. And when we say that Benjamin has been in Korea, you've also done trips to the borders via China, I assume. Right?

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Yes.

MS. MOON: Right, via China. He has a lot of experience working with Swedish and Nordic experts on the Koreas. As many of you know, Europeans, and especially the Nordic countries, are way ahead in their knowledge base of North Korea, specifically because they do have diplomatic relations. And Sweden, in particular, was the first since the 1970s to maintain diplomatic relations, and Sweden represents the United States for governmental interests vis-à-vis Pyongyang.

So based on the reality that you know of the broader and deeper knowledge base in Europe and in the Nordic countries and in Sweden, what are some observations you can make about the way that Swedes, Nordics might view the Koreas versus Americans, South Koreans, et cetera?

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Well, if I could start by turning the question around real quick and just -- because I think one of the interesting aspects of being Swedish and studying the Koreas to me is that you really have no enemies when you're doing it. You don't have the issue of, well, if you want to meet with North Koreans or travel to North Korea, you have the added problem of, well, I'm from a country that's at war with North Korea. That doesn't -- you don't have that issue as a Swedish person, so when you travel to South Korea and you speak to people who work on issues related to the Korean peninsula, you're regarded as a friend. And the same is true for when you go to North Korea usually and when you meet with people from North Korea. So that's a really big advantage.

When I travel to the border, for example, and I've tried to speak with North Koreans who are in China in a working capacity, who transport goods across the border, for example, one time I even took out my Swedish ID card to really show that, look, this is the country I'm from. I promise I'm not American. (Laughter) There is no -- and I love America, personally, but, as you all know, there's a little bit of sensitivity with meeting Americans if you're from North Korea. So that's something that I've tried to use to my advantage a lot, definitely.

MS. MOON: And the issues, the perspective on issues.

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Oh, the perspective on issues also gets very different, I think, in a country like Sweden, where in a way, yes, you're definitely part of sort of the Western U.S.-allied security community, but you're also not in an armed conflict with North Korea, which makes a big difference.

I think the range of interests might be a little more diverse, perhaps, in Sweden, where I think in America, for very good reason, a lot of the work and the research on North Korea is done from a security perspective deep down, like even if you're working on humanitarian issues, a lot of the times the core reason for the interest is security. But in Sweden, you don't really have that presumption that North Korea is a security threat. First and foremost, it's also a humanitarian issue, sort of that's -- both of those issues are on the same level, I'd say.

MS. MOON: I think that's a very important difference, there's just a wider agenda for Swedes and Nordics. But what's your sense of diplomacy? Where does diplomacy fit it? In the U.S., in South Korea, diplomacy is really, really difficult. Even to talk about having -- not formalizing diplomatic relations, but even engaging in diplomatic talks in and of itself seems like a near impossibility at times. But in Sweden, in the Nordic countries, in many European countries, the EU, people have diplomatic engagements with North Korea all the time.

What have people been learning? What was the role of diplomacy in improving knowledge, improving relations with North Korea?

MR. SILBERSTEIN: I think the most important aspect of that is really keeping the channel open. I think that's really the core interest for most Swedes who work on these issues. It's also because I guess not as much is at stake for a Swede or for the Swedes who are engaged in diplomatic communications with both North and South Korea because of, again, the lack of security-based sensitivity. But I think the Swedes who have been involved in diplomatic engagement have been able to learn a lot just only by the virtue of continuing to talk.

There is a fascinating -- I've been waiting for this moment to bring up this one person and I guess I'll just do it right away. There's a fascinating potato farmer from Sweden named Sven Erik Johansson. I know many of you have heard of him.

MS. MOON: Say that again.

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Sven Erik Johansson. He lived in North Hamgyong Province for eight years, I think, and worked on a potato farm there. And I just think that this man says so much about what you can do when you're a neutral country, neutral small country that doesn't sort of make a big fuss about itself. And I think he left only a few years ago and I would love to ghost write his memoirs for him. I think that would be phenomenal.

MS. MOON: It's also important to keep in mind that a lot of these European countries and others that have diplomatic ties with North Korea have a more consistent sense of an institutional history regarding the Nord's changes, developments -- you know, one step forward, five steps back or multiple steps back -- than those of us in the U.S. or South Korea or Japan or elsewhere, who can only get little snapshots at a time. And so anytime I've spoken with Europeans, I find that resource, that intellectual resource of a longer sense of history, a longer sense of what's changed, what's not, who are the players, who are not, very, very valuable.

Let me move on to another question and I think Buheung is waiting since he's prepared so hard for this one. This is a conference about generational differences, generational change. All of you I want to ask, but, in your opinion, what kinds of generational differences have you observed in your country of origin? And Steven, if you want to talk about South Korea, having been there seven years, that's okay, even though you're originated from the United States.

But in the country that you have lived in a long time, and you can choose, what are the generational differences you have perceived about the way people regard the Koreans? What might older and younger generations teach each other about the Koreans and about the future?

MR. HYEON: So my country of origin, so let me go back to North Korea again. The difference, first, let me talk about the difference between my parents' generation and my generation. I would say the biggest difference is the loyalty to the government. My parents' generation was born right after or during the war and they're educated during the '60s, '70s, and they got full education, under the central distribution system. And they have memories of the Great Leader, Kim Il-sung, and even Kim Jong-il, as well.

But my generation, those who were born late '80s and the early '90s, we don't actually -- we are very independent from my parents' generation, especially from the government, as well. Because when we were growing up, as we all know, the great famine took place in the middle of the 1990s, and because of the famine the government couldn't provide food to the people, so the government-run distribution system was broken.

And because of the economic hardship, my generation was forced to go to markets to make money and buy food, so we don't actually remember or have -- we have less memory or some of the younger people, people younger than me, they even don't have the memories of receiving, you know, gifts from the government. I think that that's the -- so that made us less loyal to the government. Even the government somehow, sometimes, government could be an obstacle, an obstacle to us because they regulate and impose a lot of labors on us.

And the second thing is my generation, maybe if I ask the lessons from my parents' generation, it would be don't trust the government. My parents' generation, they were loyal to the government. They were the people who made North Korea reach in the '70s, '80s, and '90s, but what they gain today is nothing.

A lot of people actually died during the starvation. So if I ask my mom or my father what lesson could you give me about the government, especially North Korea, I'm sure she will say don't trust the government. I think that's the mentality of what my generation in North Korea has today.

MS. MOON: This is interesting. Buheung's parents are also now living in South Korea as South Korean citizens, so the whole family's together. So in one sense, they had loyalty, but, in a way, they felt betrayed

by that loyalty because they were disappointed. And your generation and younger don't expect anything from the government. Is that an accurate description?

MR. HYEON: Yes, we don't expect anything from the government and we want the government to not ask us to go to field for free labor.

MS. MOON: Okay, this is very interesting. Steven, I'm curious, maybe your perceptions of generational differences in either the U.S., South Korea, or both?

MR. DENNEY: I think I'll just focus on South Korea. It's interesting that seeing as how I haven't lived in the U.S. for 10+ years, I've kind of lost touch in a way. I've lost a sense of my American-ness perhaps, and that's not such a bad thing because I've gained a sense of "ness" in other places. But it's actually a core focus of my work. And I'm going to forward an idea, my reading of some relatively recent data, which highlights, I think, some interesting generational differences and similarities.

There is a survey that's run by East Asia Institute, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and other organizations in South Korea that seeks to understand how South Koreans see North Korea. And they ask a pretty standard question: Do you see it as a friend, an enemy, a neighbor, or other? And what's interesting is that if you break it down by age cohorts or generations, you see that among those who say "enemy," those who share that opinion are the youngest and the oldest. It's about 19, 20 percent. I think that's interesting because, clearly, they're from different generations, but is it safe to assume that they will thus have different opinions? Perhaps not.

Now, I think perhaps that is something to consider that just because the conditions of our existence have changed or are different, it doesn't necessarily mean that our opinions will be different. In fact, they're often the same. But in this case, in this specific case of the way in which South Koreans see North Korea, I think it might be because of different generational experiences. The older South Koreans, the sixties, seventies, they experienced great hardship and many of them associate that with the Korean War and they fault North Korea for that, whereas younger people have grown up in times of plenty, in abundance, great

material conditions, and they see North Korea as threatening what they have, and thus they perceive it as an other, as an enemy.

And in that way, perhaps, there is some similarities between the way in which even young North Koreans see South Korea as an enemy, and the way in which young South Koreans are increasingly seeing North Korea as an enemy. I don't know what to make of that. It sounds worrying, something to be addressed, but things don't always get better and sometimes we need to recognize when something isn't and seek to address it.

MS. MOON: Excellent. Let's go to Benjamin.

MR. SILBERSTEIN: You mean, how people in Sweden --

MS. MOON: Generational.

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Yeah, generational.

MS. MOON: Generational differences.

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Yeah, yeah.

MS. MOON: And what each can teach the other based on your experience there.

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Yeah. Well, I think there are differences in the focus of people's interests. We were talking yesterday at dinner about the interest in North Korea versus the interest in South Korea. And Dr. Moon said, which I agree with, that North Korea is winning, in a way, the PR war because people just -- not because people have a more favorable image of North Korea, but because the interest is just a lot greater. And that's definitely something that I've seen in both Sweden and I really think in the U.S., as well, that when you talk about Korea and when I tell people that I work on Korea, it's not assumed that that would be South Korea necessarily. People always ask North or South, which is a perfectly valid question. And my sense is that greater interest is definitely sparked by North Korea rather than South Korea just because North Korea is perceived, obviously, as more of a sort of mysterious enigma, so for better or worse.

And if I would think of generational differences in Sweden, I think the older generation was very much

colored by -- I think among the people who actually care, which, sadly, are not the entire country, but a lot of those who cared deeply in the older generation were veterans from the Korean War. Sweden was a participant on the U.N. side in the Korean War. And whenever I write about Korea in Swedish papers I often get letters, sometimes emails, from people who participated in that effort. And there's also the -- my sense is that adoption used to be a much more central theme for people who were interested in Korea in the older generation. A lot of them were people who adopted children from Korea, whereas now it's more of a general audience that's interested in knowing what's really going on in North Korea.

MS. MOON: You bring up an interesting point, that Nordic countries had adopted large numbers of Korean War orphans, post Korean War orphans, et cetera. And so there is this contingent of people of ethnic Korean descent who are Swedish. And, you know, it'd be a curious thing to study what role do they play, if any, in featuring issues related to the Koreas in the Nordic countries.

I'd like us to move on to the -- I have two questions remaining that I have been curious about and you're welcome to pick up any one of them or add to any of the comments that your colleagues at the table here have stated. One question is about how international should we be looking or regarding issues related to the Koreas versus regional or versus alliance-driven?

And by that I mean that most policymakers in the U.S. take a regional approach to the tensions on the Korean peninsula. Most people assume that the U.S. is the major player when it comes to peninsular issues. Japan, South Korea, certainly have this view. And China, of course, considers it its own regional issue different from the U.S.'s.

And in Europe, I think there is a sense of ceding ground, ceding a certain ground, or ceding a certain kind of respect to the United States as the great power in the region to manage Korea-related issues, but I say this out of genuine concern. In my view, whether we have conflict or we have a stable, formal peace on the Koreas in the future, there are going to be so many issues related to even the best of scenarios in unification dealing with migrants, dealing with economic need for integration, dealing with political guidance for how to bring 25 million people and 50 million people together. A South Korean society that

is no longer ethnically homogeneous versus a North Korean society that has been inculcated in xenophobia, what do we do with all of these issues?

And so I'm curious what are the roles that the international community, that different countries around the world can play? Why shouldn't the stakes be theirs? Why shouldn't it be -- you said the stakes aren't as high before for the Nordics versus Koreans, Japanese, Chinese Americans, but why shouldn't they be higher? What can the international community do? What should it be doing now to think about future scenarios regarding the Koreas? Let's start out with Ben.

MR. SILBERSTEIN: So I agree that the stakes should be higher for the international community. I think just pragmatically speaking it would be very hard for me to imagine Nordic countries that have -- I think Sweden has combined an amount of five soldiers permanently stationed on the Korean peninsula. That really matters, I think. I think concrete connections and concrete interests, whether we like it or not, really do drive these processes.

What we can do to change that? I don't know. I think going back, again, to the specific case of Sweden, Sweden likes to call itself a "humanitarian superpower," which I think is sometimes a little braggy and not entirely true in all cases. But I think I wouldn't worry too much about a country such as Sweden being there on the humanitarian front if need be one day with the Korean peninsula.

Sweden does do quite a substantial bit of humanitarian work in North Korea, not as much as I think Swedish NGOs would want to do, but, yeah, I don't have any clear answer advice, I'm afraid, on that.

MS. MOON: Well, I think it's something we need to keep in mind for the future that we need to pool resources from all over the world to assist the Koreas if and when. And of course, the scenarios we can leave as question marks. Sharon, do you have any thoughts on that?

MS. STRATTON: I think I'm probably sitting in kind of the same sort of thoughts as Benjamin. A couple years ago when I was living in South Korea and I was trying to get a sense of what civil society and NGOs

in South Korea were doing with regards to the North Korean problem, I had a South Korean friend, an older male, say to me why are you so interested in North Korea? Like why do you care so much? It's a Korean problem, it's not your problem. You don't have to care about this. And I didn't have a good answer at the time. I thought North Korea's always been, I guess, a fascinating area for me as a student of international relations. And I didn't have a good answer at the time. Coming to work with an NGO that's working on what I consider to be quite an exciting area of North Korean affairs, which is increasing access to information in North Korea, I think that we can look beyond sort of state-based and state-led approaches to resolving the North Korea issue. And we have opportunities now to engage civil society actors all over the world.

We worked with a lot of European NGOs who are very proactive in supporting initiatives that focus predominantly on, you know, affecting and impacting North Koreans in North Korea, the people and not necessarily the government. So, yeah, I guess I still don't really have a good answer to that question, but yeah.

MS. MOON: I asked the question because people don't have good answers, so we need to collect the bits and pieces and try to put them together. Steve, you have any thoughts on that?

MR. DENNEY: I was thinking of Wada Haruki's latest book, his updated book on the Korean War, and it's entitled *The Korean War: An International History*. And he focused on the number of international actors who were involved in the conflict. And I think sometimes people tend to forget the international nature of Korean affairs and the responsibility for the international community to ensure that a similar conflict doesn't arise once again.

I feel sometimes a bit preachy when I'm asked my opinion about Korean affairs as an American. America has played an enormous role in the region and continues to do so.

I think sometimes the best answer might be, too, not let Koreans deal with it themselves entirely, but to look more resolutely at what Koreans are doing to resolve the problem themselves because they're doing a

lot. I will talk a bit more about it during my presentation, so I hope everyone stays for it, but South Koreans, government, civil society actors are aware of the changing demographic makeup of their society and they've done a reasonably well job at making adjustments to accommodate or to try to accommodate newcomers from North Korean migrants to wives who are resettling from Southeast Asia with farmers in North Jeolla Province.

And from what I've learned, they're doing a pretty decent job, so perhaps we could turn the tables a bit and ask in a world which is increasingly becoming more xenophobic, where the discourse of sort of dislike, discomfort, or mistrust of others in society has been normalized by some individuals -- thinking of one in particular -- I mean, what can we learn from others who are facing similar transitions? So I would like to maybe -- is it turning the tables, challenging the presuppositions, as someone how is both young and brave to say what can Korea teach to us?

Twenty-nine thousand North Korean migrants live in South Korea. And there are problems, of course. Social tensions arise, et cetera. But they're doing pretty well. Why? I wonder if anyone can actually answer that question because there are answers and they're there if you want to find them.

MS. MOON: Thank you. So my last question, this is your personal views here. Based on your experience with young people who study and work on the Koreas, what is the most encouraging or positive thing your generation can offer to the future? Buheung?

MR. HYEON: I think you skipped the third question. (Laughter)

MS. MOON: Oh, if you'd like to.

MR. HYEON: Because, okay, I prepared, so. (Laughter) Let me say a word --

MS. MOON: He's truly a good Korean, he does his homework. (Laughter)

MR. HYEON: So what is the role of the international community, you know, can help play on Korean issues? Their role could be reconciliation between North and South Korea. Since South Korea and North Korea, we have tensions between the two countries for a long time, it's harder to talk to each other. As we

sit today, you know, there is no higher official talk between the two countries or no exchange of information or culture between small organizations, NGOs. So this work, you know, the international community, like Sweden or New Zealand or Australia, those countries could take this role in favor of Korea, two Koreas.

And also, what we can do is to prepare the unification, my friends and I are really willing to, you know, devote our lives for our country, both North Korea and South Korea. So I hope to see North Korean defector young professionals in a variety of different fields in South Korea and in the United States, like politics, economics, or culture. That's the way that we actually -- that can be my or defectors' contribution to our nation. But, at the same time, I believe that it will be beneficial to both Koreas and the world elsewhere.

MS. MOON: And with international support and participation, I assume you're saying. So why don't you continue and tell us. Based on your experience with young people who study and work on the Koreas, what is the most encouraging or positive thing your generation can offer to the future regarding the Koreas?

MR. HYEON: I was struggling with this question at least, you know, over an hour because I couldn't -- it's a very good question, but I couldn't get something to tell. But what I just decided to share is, I think my generation in South Korea and even in North Korea are very open-minded. And that open-minded perspective, we don't know what we could offer for the future, but we actually -- you know, the open-minded perspective could encourage us to start our own venture for the future.

MS. MOON: Okay, thank you. Ben?

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Yeah. So I think the most encouraging thing with people in our generation who study and work on the Koreas is that people are bothering to learn the language. I really think that matters more than anything. I think there was a time when maybe studying the Koreas was such a new thing that you could write very interesting stuff that hadn't really been written about before not knowing

Korean. But I think we're at a point where that's kind of -- it's getting harder and harder to do. And I see more and more people who are working in this field, who realized that you have to do at least a couple of years or so of hard work in Korea in order to be able to do what you want to do ultimately. So I think that's the most important thing and something that is very encouraging.

MS. MOON: And we do have the Washington representative of the Korea Foundation here, who happens -- the Korea Foundation, as many of you know, fund many programs around the world to encourage the learning of Korean language, Korean culture, sponsoring folks to go to Korea to learn about Korean language and culture, et cetera. And I would add as an academic here, I find this absolutely necessary. This is the fundamental need, to learn Korean, learn Korean in Korean context, but also in diaspora context because Koreans -- being Korean or learning about Korean -- by "being Korean" I mean in a global sense -- it's not just about living in Korea.

There are diasporas all over the world and, in a way, different Koreas all over the world. And so that is important and I think having the language, getting Korean history, Korean culture, Korean literature, political science, social sciences regarding the Koreas, it actually equips scholars and analysts to be very, very deep in their knowledge base and very confident in their policy, critiques, and ideas.

My generation and older all came to the study and policymaking toward the Koreas via China or Chinese studies, via Japanese studies, via Russian studies, or via international arms control studies -- anything but a focus on Korea. And I think that is such a promising thing for the future generations that this generation and younger -- hopefully, with more funding from various organizations -- will continue to really solidify their language and their historical and their cultural understanding.

And then, of course, the challenge is in the future we also need to have an open mind to learn about North Korean historiography, North Korean customs and cultures in the different regions, the dialects in North Korea. Many of the defectors who come to the South don't understand South-Korean Korean any longer, partly because it's so Americanized. Right? So we're going to have to do new kinds of learning about the Korean language and Korean culture in the future as we see the inter-Korea relations unfold, but I think

this is an excellent point. Sharon and then we will have Steve with the last comment on this question.

MS. STRATTON: Sure. So I think that we're lucky that we, I guess, haven't been doing this long enough to be fatigued and cynical, especially when it comes to working with North Korean issues. I work with a lot of young college students who are just so enthusiastic and passionate. And they're not just learning Korean anymore, but they're also aware that they need to pick up another language in the region, so they're learning Chinese, they're doing Japanese, they're doing Russian. It certainly makes me feel a little bit inadequate.

And we've really gained from that. I distinctly remember we had an intern who was proficient in Chinese and we were doing a research project on meth abuse and trafficking in North Korea. I wanted to look at Chinese sources, but I can't read Chinese or understand it, so with his help we were able to pull up these really interesting primary sources that referred to China's official response on North Korea drug issues.

So that's really exciting. I think, yes, the language cannot be underestimated. I think, also, there's a hopefulness and a deep compassion that comes with a lot of young people's interest in the Koreas. And I think you really need to bring that into your work, especially when you're working on something as challenging as North Korean human rights issues, which can feel enormous and sometimes insurmountable.

MS. MOON: Thank you.

MR. DENNEY: I think I want to plug SinoNK.com again. It was mentioned previously, but there's a point here and it's not just about Sino-NK, it's about similar organizations. There's a greater understanding of the value of collaboration today, I think, than there was in previous times or generations; that young scholars are more willing to work with, write with, and travel with people who are not in their department, who are maybe not in their country. I would consider my core group of colleagues to be those who are affiliated in some way with Sino-NK, to a large extent, including a lot of people up here and some in the audience here today. And they hail from many different countries, different backgrounds, different

departments, and they bring different skills to the table, methods, languages, predispositions about how the world operates, and a different approach to understanding our social world.

I think that's different. And I'm kind of repeating what I've been told by people who are older than me, so maybe that's what they're recognizing and I'm internalizing this message. I think they're right, and I think this is a good thing because I think it's helping us overcome the silo that departments create or that countries can create.

And I think that I would encourage everyone to be committed to that, if you're not, or to continue doing it if you are. Because it's a bit challenging, but I think with advances in communication technologies, in the ease of travel, it's possible. It's more than possible. It's almost easy if you want to do it. And I think it's really neat and I've learned so much.

And I think my understanding of Korea and the world is so much better because I talked to someone from the Netherlands and someone from Hong Kong. I write with them, I collaborate with them, we share ideas, angst, et cetera. And I think that's making us better off, so I think that's something positive about new developments in our generation that's recognized by the older generation, so let's harness that.

MS. MOON: Wonderful, and a great note to end on our opening roundtable. We get so much bad news about the Koreas and it's nice to hear good news and hopeful news of better days to come. So thank you very much and we'll move on to the next panel at 12:45. You have about five minutes if you need to take a break. Thank you.

(Applause)

(Recess)

MS. BLOCK: Good morning everyone. I'm Eileen Block, part of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and I'll serve as the moderator and discussant for our second panel today. We will now explore two overarching themes of this conference on identity and power. We already heard a little bit earlier this morning and I hope we could dive a little deeper into these topics. So we're going to look specifically on

how nationalism, national identity and power in South Korea intersect and how they're interpreted at home and abroad. We will also look at how power in identity and its societal and economical value, we're also looking how that power inhibits or encourages change in identity itself.

So we have a very good star lineup of experts here today to help us go into these topics from different perspectives. And before our panelists join me on stage for a discussion, I'll invite each one to the podium to give their brief presentation for about 10 to 12 minutes and following that, we'll have our own discussion and open that up to the panel at around 11:30. So first and foremost, I would like to invite Dr. Jiun Bang to the podium and while you come up I'll do a brief introduction of what you're going to be showing us today. So Dr. Jiun Bang, she's a post-doctorate fellow at the University of Michigan, and she received her Ph.D. from USC. Her research interests include international relations, theory, security and Northeast Asia. Drawing from her doctorate project research, Jiun will examine the business of nationalism in Northeast Asia and how that is packaged, repackaged and sold as commercial interests. More specifically, she will approach the issue of territorial disputes in the region by using this framework. So, without further ado, I want to give the floor to Jiun.

MS. BANG: Okay. Thank you for coming. I'm going to go straight into my presentation. Today, I'll be talking about nationalism, but in keeping with this theme of being brave, I'm going give you a very different interpretation of nationalism and I'm going to talk about where political activity meets the marketplace and hence the numbers below this bar code are actually GPS coordinates of the contentious territory of Dokdo-Takeshima, between Japan and South Korea. And I think it encapsulates this idea of me talking about commercial activity with politics.

So how did I get into this in the first place? I was reading this very dominant popular discourse in nationalism about elite manipulation. And basically, it talks about how elites are able to tap into nationalist sentiments to sway the masses to their favor. And I thought there were a few weaknesses. And so, for one, what I call immaculate conception. So we are to believe that as soon as the words leave the mouth of the elites, they somehow travel and impregnate the hearts and minds of the masses without really even knowing what the specific conduits for the transmission really is.

And so second, it relates to the first point, the public is seen as very passive consumers of this nationalism and so there's a very clear division of labor between who is doing what. And so, third, relatedly, there's not much interaction between the government with the masses in making the nationalist narrative. And so, last, there's not much interaction between markets and politics at all.

Taking this into consideration, I'm basically arguing that all else being equal, greater commodification of nationalism will result in greater bilateral tensions. And I looked specifically at territorial sovereignty because it's a very non-controversial issue that gets to nationalism. What does this all mean though, really. Instead of treating nationalism as an emotion or affect, even maybe a movement, I'm treating it as if it were a commodity that can be produced, consumed and reproduced on the market. And so I can reinforce this link between why people really buy into nationalism.

I talked about why I care, so I want to give you a bit about why you should care, the contribution, right. So, first, I'm treating nationalism as a variable rather than a constant. And to talk a bit about what this means, if you, just as consumption waxes and wanes, so too does nationalism if you think of it as a consumption behavior, right. And so there's a tendency to treat nationalism as only going in one direction, which is up, but rarely do we think about the downside, so when it decreases. And taking it as a commodity this way allows me to think about it as a more dynamic variable that waxes and wanes.

Second, I can decouple nationalism from violence. So again, there's a tendency to couple nationalism and also tensions with violence, but I actually look at sub-war level diplomatic political disputes. And, third, and most importantly, it explores consumerism with citizenship. And so how does the marketplace afford a new space, and for one to express one's political identity, right. And it brings up a very, very interesting question about if I'm a producer of nationalism, is it a very liberating behavior as I become more empowered through profits that I make in the market or is it a very oppressive behavior as I become more tied to the state and the state cause. So am I an extension of the state.

So I'm going to talk a bit about my independent variable, which is the explanatory variable or the causal variable and it is commodification. And so the easiest way to think about this is along this matrix of you

have consumables, also called tangibles, or you have non-consumables, or intangibles. So under consumables, you have things like food, beverages and clothing, so think about a t-shirt with a big loud message on territorial sovereignty. And for non-consumables, there are experiences, so tourism, museums, even nationwide competitions that give prizes for the best impressive essay on territorial sovereignty protection, right.

So, the attribute of these foods and drinks, they're portable, they're also very multifunctional and they, in some ways streamlines the message in a very clear manner. And the attribute of these non-consumables is that they are very participatory, and so the consumers can really get into this process of developing the nationalist rhetoric.

And to give you a few examples of these consumables in particular, so things like a restaurant that serves Diaoyu, also known as Senkaku Islands, noodles and soups, or else you have Takashima manju on the left, you also have Dokdo bread on the right corner. And you have some Northern Territory snacks on the left in the middle there. There's some few examples to get the message across.

And so let me talk about the dependent variable or the outcome that I seek to explain, which is tensions or bilateral tensions. And so it's very important point here that I go over this because the tendency for us to think about tensions is only two ways. Those are type one dormant tensions and type four maximal. And by this I mean when we think about low tensions or high tensions, the volume and intensity always go in lockstep. And so when we think about high tensions, we think about war, oh East Asia, it's close to war because we have high tensions, and that's because we are linking volume with intensity.

And actually I create a typology where I disaggregate the two axes, so you could have more types of tensions that not necessarily go to war. So these blue types, quadrants are new tensions that you can see if you disaggregate volume from intensity. So things like type two homeostatic, so you could keep having low level tensions, but a lot of them without drifting into war. And my logic is by talking about commodification, we can really think about how it differs from militarization because it doesn't impact necessarily the intensity, just the volume.

And so, you might ask how am I measuring tensions, it's a very difficult task. And I decided to construct a database of bilateral summonses in Northeast Asia. And a summons is where the foreign ministry of one country calls in the ambassador of another country express displeasure or discontent over a certain issue or a dispute. And so I looked at all the summons that I could between or among the countries of Japan, South Korea, and China between 1998 to 2015, which gave me a database of 184 points. And as you can see, it does wax and wane which is very different to what the media will tell you about it's just being up all the way.

And I wanted to do a more in-depth case study, so I looked at, I overlaid the empirical existing territorial disputes in the region with my typology of tensions. And so I have Daemado Tsushima Island between Japan and South Korea in type one, and Dokdo Takeshima, the homeostatic version in type two. So my theory suggests that volume should be affected by commodification, so I decided to look at those two disputes. And just to, the advantage of doing this was not only are they the same two countries, but different disputes with varying levels of tensions.

To give you very brief evidence for the case study that I did, so the first one is Daemado Tsushima and as you're -- probably what your gut is telling you, it's a very low case of tensions, and there's also a very low case of commodification there. But, at one point, South Korean tourists overtook the entire population of Tsushima City in 2001, so there was a lot of tourism, and if you do careful process tracing, you see there was a very action reaction from when we see increased tourism and Japanese government becoming very worried and concerned about investments and injections of money by South Koreans.

Which is a very different case to Dokdo Takeshima, where we see a lot of commodification and quite a bit of tensions. And what is very interesting is this 2005 Dokdo Sustainable Use Act that the South Korean government passes. And this just creates a very whole of government let's infuse money into the island sort of approach. And not only that, there's a very big increase in tourism. As part of this DSUP, the government scraps the cap on how many people can visit the island daily. By 2009, which in effect has a 9,000 percent increase in tourists to the island, of which only less than one percent are foreigners, so it's mostly South Koreans going as tourism.

And this is another very interesting chart. So I thought quantification, everyone's so interested in quantification these days, how can I quantify something. And so I had a very hard time trying to think about how I can quantify this level of commercial activity or commodification and I decided to look at trademark applications. So how many businesses, including some national governments are applying for trademarks. And so in the name of the business would have something like Dokdo Bread or Takeshima manju. Right, so I looked at all the instances of trademarks from '98 to 2015 and so you also do see waxing and waning, and I overlaid this with tensions. And that was sort of my way of getting at not only gauging this level of commodification but also quantification and how that relates to tensions.

Just a bit on policy implications, what's the takeaway? First, there's an approach to think about tensions as just being there without having much human agency. But if you think about tensions and nationalism in a consumption manner, you can see how there is a lot of human agency behind tensions, and the fact that it, nationalism requires a lot of momentum and effort. And it's a very different approach to thinking about tensions that way. And also specifically going back to my typology of tensions, you prevent yourself from misdiagnosing war prospects, because maybe volume and intensity don't go hand in hand, maybe commodification has different impact.

Just to summarize, so I told you about tensions, how nationalism and commodification of nationalism affects tensions, and I want to give you this great quote from an interview that I did with the CEO of Dokdo Bread in 2015. He said, to be honest, there is still a negative societal perception that patriots and profits don't mix, but in the end, it's money that enables the patriots to protect their country. You can't avoid the issue of money. And this gets to this -- my idea about how the marketplace and political activity interact. Thank you very much for listening.

MS. BLOCK: Thank you, Jiun. Next, I would like to invite Steven Denney to take the podium. We already know a little bit about Steven Denney from the beginning panel and he's already gave us a bit of a teaser into his presentation of identity in South Korea. And just again, Steven, he's a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Toronto and a doctoral fellow at the Asian Institute at the Munk School of Global Affairs. I don't need to do another plug of Sino-NK.com.

(Laughter)

But today, Steven, he's going to go a little more in-depth and share his findings and observations from his long term project on measuring and understanding ethnic nationalism of Koreans, especially of resettled North Korean migrants in South Korea, and sharing those findings and implications for nationalism and national identity, so Steven, the floor is yours.

MR. DENNEY: Thank you. Good morning and greetings. To you, what does it mean to be truly South Korean? Since the early 1990s, a slow, but certain demographic transition has been underway in the Republic of Korea. An influx of migrants, international brides, and non-ethnic Koreans has been chipping away at the notion that South Korea is an ethnically homogenous nation. This process of change has precipitated a new discourse on South Korean nationhood and what it means to be South Korean. And it has led some to conclude that ethnic nationalism is on the decline. That ethnicity or race is no longer the defining component of Korean national identity.

So today, I'm going to challenge that conclusion by providing some -- a snippet of an ongoing project into the study of South Korean national identity by looking at resettled North Korean migrants. Here's some basic questions to just help orient your mind. I'm going to provide some answers over the course of my discussion today and I will read them with you. What can North Korean migrants tell us about identity change or non-change in contemporary South Korea? And what are the lessons for Korea and beyond?

As I mentioned, there are a number of contemporary scholars who have concluded based upon various research that ethnic nationalism in South Korea is on the decline or has been eroded or has gone away. And here you can see a brief snippet of some of the articles that have been published, including one from Katharine Moon. A lot of the research has been based upon public opinion data. When I was at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, this data came out in 2003. And these are answers to the question, "to be truly Korean, is it important to have the Korean bloodline?" And as you can see, there is a difference between younger people and older people. Younger people think it's less important. Older people think it's more important. This has led some to conclude that because of generational effects, or that differences in the conditions under which people come of age, that Korean ethnicity is no longer a defining feature or

a predominant feature of South Korean national identity.

I want to challenge this conclusion. And I think it's due to a silo problem. It's interesting silo has come up many times already, and I did not know that this word was going to be used so much. But let's talk about the silo. And what I mean by silo here is the idea here that for South Korean, you are born in Korea, you go to school in Korea, you graduate from Korea, you get married in Korea and you have a job there. People leave for the obligatory *yoohak* (study abroad). But, do they really settle down, do they really take on a new identity? Not really.

Most people know themselves and others from their own national context. Age, in other words, which is often used as an explanatory variable to predict or to explain an outcome such as what people think about national identity is perfectly correlated with exposure. So how do we know what the impact that growing up in South Korea today has on what people think about national identity? Can we talk to young South Koreans of college age, and ask them do you think ethnicity is important to be truly South Korean? They'll give you an answer, but what will they think in 15 years from now, and how do we know what the impact of growing up in South Korea today has on this answer?

The data that I showed you a moment ago here, it's a snippet in time, it's in 2013. Unfortunately, we don't have data going back to 1975 to compare how the answers have varied or not over time. So what South Korean people think today at the age 25 may be what South Korean people in 1975 at the age of 25 also thought. It's hard to say what exactly they might have answered, because we don't have the data. Hence, or contributing to this silo problem.

So how do we get around this? Well, there are ways. And I'm going to present one. Since the early 2000s, and picking up in the mid-2000s, the number of North Korean defectors, migrants, refugees, I'll allow you to choose your preferred word, have begun resettling in South Korea. Today, there are about 29,000 of them, ethnic Koreans who were born elsewhere, grew up elsewhere, North Korea, who have resettled in South Korea. They can help us overcome the silo problem. They are ethnically Korean, yet they did not grow up in South Korea. In other words, for this group of people, age is not perfectly

correlated with exposure. You can measure the impact that being in South Korea has on an ethnic Korean group. So this is where I begin.

I've just returned about two weeks ago from South Korea where I was for about six months, doing a collaborative project with a number of colleagues who happened to be a part of Sino-NK, of resettled North Korean migrants in South Korea. I've surveyed 350 people using a battery of questions of which I will report on some of the answers from one category, the national identity category. I also did about 120 interviews. This part is still ongoing, from the original 350. But I'm only going to talk a bit about the survey responses. We can talk about what I learned from my interview informally if you wish, or in the Q&A session.

I'm going to report on 250 because the last 100 actually just came in about a week ago and I have to input it. And for those of you who do data input, you know how long that takes. So I'm giving you a snippet or a part of the 350, so 250 and here's some basic descriptives. I will give you a few seconds to read through them. I will note that, and it stays consistent even after adding the additional 100. About 70 percent, roughly 70 percent of my sample is female, which is consistent with the number of females who are defectors in South Korea, which is 70 percent.

So how do you measure the salience of ethnicity, the importance of ethnicity or ethnic nationalism? I showed you one variable. It's a question that asks very specifically, is the bloodline important to being Korean. Well, there are other variables that are also considered important to the measure of this concept. And they are being born in Korea, or any national country, having a bloodline is mentioned, and living one's most life there. So what I've done is I've taken the scores, the responses for these three questions, I've coded and combined and created a new variable called the ethnic score. And it measures the salience of ethnicity to national identity based upon the responses given in my survey.

Here are comparative ethnic scores from my sample, the North Korean migrants, and for South Koreans, from the data I showed you previously. It's quite similar. You'll see that the average score for North Korean migrants is slightly higher. This would be expected. Ethnicity is from what we know empirically

and theoretically about how it's treated in North Korea, is a more salient component of the national discourse than it is in South Korea today. Also, the conditions of existence in North Korea are the type of conditions that would produce stronger sense of ethnic nationalism in the country, crisis, disconnectedness internationally, and so on.

But still, the trajectories for both populations is roughly the same. Even if you just looked at the South Korean data, you would see that there is a linear progression with regards to the salience of ethnicity. But as we said, there's a silo problem. So it's dangerous to conclude based upon data for only South Koreans that it is due to some effect, be it generational, be it a life cycle effect, that is that age is what explains how someone answers, or some other effect. But inserting the North Korean migrant data, a group for whom exposure is disaggregated from age. We can start to think about what's going on here for Koreans living in South Korea today.

So what I propose here, and this is only preliminary, but I've got some support for it, which I'm going to elaborate on in a moment. What explains the salience of ethnicity or how important ethnicity is to being South Korea today is age. As you age, it will become more important. And this is consistent with findings in political science and sociology, which suggests that as you get older, you tend to be more conservative.

What I think I'm seeing in my data is as you get older, you become more ethnically nationalist is a way to think about it. For those of you who do statistics, you'll recognize this right away. For those of you who do not, I will explain it very simply. It's an ordinary least square regression, using my data. And I want to comment on something what I've done with the age variable. Is I've transformed it to take into account life cycle -- I'm sorry, not life cycle effects but social learning. This idea that what you learn in younger years of life have more impact on you. So what happens to you at 12, 14, 16 will have a more lasting, enduring effect on you than what happens at 36. So I've transformed the data to take into account of this.

And what I've found simply is that the only statistically significant predictor of the ethnic score is age. The control variables which I used were quite interesting. I don't want to get into here now, but if you would like to talk more about them later, please ask. So here are some of my preliminary conclusions, and

I emphasize that they are only preliminary and I will read them. The older a North Korean migrant is, the more likely it is that she or he will see ethnicity as a salient component of Korean national identity. This conclusion likely holds true for South Koreans as well. Second, like other political attitudes, identity seems partially determined by age. Third, taking into account the effects of social learning, neither time spent in North Korea nor time spent in South Korea significantly affect the salience of ethnicity. In other words, what's doing the explaining here is age. In short, ethnic nationalism may not be on the decline.

Implications for further consideration. Given what I've presented you here with today, I want you to think about these two things, sort of bigger questions. First, is ethnic nationalism compatible with democratic or liberal democratic norms? I think not. And that might be problematic for a future South Korea. And a slightly more positive consideration, the second, what will be the role of ethnic nationalism in a post-unification scenario? I want to call upon just briefly, some of my experiences in doing my 100 plus interviews.

North Korean migrants are integrating relatively well, especially the older migrants. And the one thing that holds consistent across age groups is that they feel in part or in whole, a member of the South Korean society because of a shared ethnicity. Rogers Brubaker has admonished us to not always think of ethnic nationalism as an entirely bad thing because it isn't. In times of crisis, as we see on the peninsula regularly reproduced, it can be a mechanism for the production of social solidarity. And I think that might be happening. And I wonder to what extent that happened in post-unification Germany or in wartime Poland. So with these two large questions I will conclude. Thank you.

MS. BLOCK: Thank you, Steven. Now, I would like to invite our final presenter, Julie Yang to the podium. So Julie Yang, she's the manager of international public relations at the Ladies Professional Golf Association, where her primary interest is the economic and social opportunity that professional golf provides for women and girls. Most fittingly, Julie will take the themes of identity and power from the angle of women's golf diplomacy, which has helped to stir nationalism and is used as a form of soft power in South Korea. And the floor is yours, Julie.

MS. YANG: Hi everyone. If I could just get a show of hands of anyone that actually plays golf in the audience? Who thinks of golf as a diplomatic tool? All right, I have a tough crowd to persuade here I guess. So I --

MS. MOON: Be brave.

MS. YANG: Be brave and young. Thank you for that. And so, you know, I myself never really thought of golf or sports as being a very heavily diplomatic tool. I was studying at Georgetown on global politics and security, the traditional realms of diplomacy. But I don't know how many of you are aware that the LPGA is very big in Asia. The athletes are national icons there. And I think that golf showed me that the growing influence of Asia is also seen in the sports realm. And so I'll go through some facts and figures during the presentation, but I hope that by the end of today, you see golf as not just being an old man's sport, but something that provides young women with economic opportunities and it is something that really brings countries closer together.

And just a quick disclaimer that my lawyers insisted that I include, the views today are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the LPGA or any other organization, Georgetown or other, that I may be affiliated with.

Now, my thesis is that golf diplomacy has transitioned from a heavily male dominated stage that was primarily for state officials to currently a form of sports diplomacy that's largely non-governmental actors such as private citizens, and also corporate actors and professional women athletes. And so what do I mean by sports diplomacy. Sports diplomacy is when you enhance international exchange and understanding between countries through sports and also how countries can use sports and sporting events to generate and further establish their own soft power.

And I was looking through the existing literature on sports diplomacy, I've noticed that there wasn't too much out there, and I hope that this discussion and going further, that more literature about the potential and promise of sports diplomacy is further enhanced. I don't know how many of you are familiar with Dr. Victor Cha's book, *Beyond the Final Score*, and I think that really did push the envelope in terms of

generating more dialogue about how sports can serve as a diplomatic tool.

If I could just pull very quickly from his book to help sort of provide a basis for sports diplomacy. Dr. Victor Cha wrote that sport matters in world politics because it can create diplomatic breakthroughs or breakdowns in ways unanticipated by regular diplomacy. And just like how the white ping pong ball thawed relations between U.S. and China post Cold War, I see that the white golf ball is a way that countries in Asia, as well as in Europe and the United States can be drawn closer together.

So the evolution of professional women's golf in Korea. How many of you are familiar with this face? Se-ri Pak, she really was the first Korean player in the LPGA. In 1998, she won the U.S. Women's Open, and this year, she's actually retiring. When she first started in 1998, she was one of hundreds of players that was -- she was the only Korean player, and ten years later, you had 45 Korean players in the LPGA. Today, you have more than 50 players, many of which are in the top ten highest earning players in the LPGA. She was also the youngest to win the U.S. Women's Open which is one of the major championships on the tour. And there was this iconic image of her shooting a golf ball out of a water hazard. She took off her socks and entered the water, showing the sign of really commitment and dedication to the game.

And 1998 was a year when Korea was undergoing a very difficult financial crisis. And so Se-Ri Pak's win on a global stage really provided the country with a sort of a beacon of hope and it was a source of pride for the country when internationally, Korea was being known to not being in the best financial state. But to have this woman athlete bring home this trophy was really a source of pride for the country.

Fast forward to 2016, Korea again wins the gold medal in the golf in the Rio Olympics and this was the first time that gold had reentered the Olympics after more than 112 years. And so it was no big surprise I think to many, that Inbee Park, she brought home the gold, New Zealand brought home the silver and China brought home the bronze.

And again, golf would be entering the Olympics in 2020 in Tokyo after which it's going to be determined

whether or not golf will continue to be an Olympic sport. But what we've seen through the Olympics is golf being elevated to this international stage. A few weeks ago, the Chinese bronze winner had said that China divides its sports into Olympics and non-Olympics and as a result of the golf being reentered into the Olympics, she foresees it being treated somewhat differently within the country, perhaps more investment from the government into the sport and more interest from the general public.

Just a quick look back at golf diplomacy before the Olympics and before it was on the center stage in Korea. U.S. / Japan had conducted what was golf ball diplomacy. Here we have Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and former President Eisenhower playing golf. And there is a great excerpt from a journal, *Diplomacy & Statecraft* that was titled Golf Ball Diplomacy between former President Richard Nixon and the prime ministers of Japan during the late 1960s. And I'll give you time to just quickly read through it. But former President Nixon had used golf balls as a gesture to help further establish relations with Japan. And the former Prime Minister Kishi had said that his kind greeting symbolized the beginning of the end of tense U.S.-Japan relations, and golf ball diplomacy. And at the time, Japan was considered the golf capital of the world. And I think that many view that now as being Korea, given its prominence on the LPGA and its performance at the Olympics.

This is an interesting headline from the early 1980s in Malaysia whether golf diplomacy is on its way out. And we see here President Obama has used golf extensively for diplomacy. On the upper left, you have President Obama playing golf with the Prime Minister of Malaysia Najib, and so you know, the fact that the question of whether golf diplomacy is on its way out, I think that these images show that it's still pretty heavily conducted in the diplomatic field.

And what are the policy implications of this increase in professional women golfers on the global stage. The economic impact of how Korea's exporting its athletes, each country has their own golf league, but then the LPGA and then there's other regional golf leagues that Korea has been sending off its athletes to. In the LPGA alone, like I had said, there's more than 50 athletes that are waving the Korean flag. And what does that economic impact have? A lot of the tournaments have purses that are over a million dollars and so how that -- the contributions to the economy that these women athletes are bringing back

home is pretty impressive.

Private sector participation, the tournaments used to be sponsored heavily by U.S. companies or other Western companies, and now increasingly you see major Japanese companies, Korean companies, Taiwan, non-profit organizations sponsoring these tournaments. And how that provides a platform for many of these companies to raise their brand globally.

Female participation in the workforce and tourism, just in 2016 alone, we have 33 tournaments that are being conducted in over 16 countries. And that in and of itself is an economic driver, you know, when each tournament is coming home to these countries. And it provides an opportunity for fans and athletes to engage. The social impact, and we had spoken earlier about the issue of identity and ethnicity, and I think that sports and specifically women professional athletes provide a great opportunity for a woman to be empowered and to be a part of the economy and to elevate the image of not the submissive Asian woman, but a very strong image of being at the tee box and you know, whipping the driver and sending the ball hundreds of yards down. I think that question of what is identity, what is the Asian woman, what is the Korean woman's identity can also be further explored.

In terms of ethnicity, does sports create a new category of ethnicity? Many of the professional women golfers that we see were born in Korea, and yet are waving a different flag now. The number one golfer in the world, Lydia Ko was born in Korea, but she is New Zealand, and she waves a New Zealand flag and played for New Zealand at the Olympics. Has that category of ethnicity changed in some sports? It's something I think that's further to be considered. Haru Nomura is another athlete that's high profile. She has a Japanese and Korean parent, and how that changes her ethnicity and identity has been an interesting category as well.

And lastly, foreign policy, and I alluded to it earlier in terms of soft power, but how does golf international sports improve bilateral and international relations, if not create some tension in terms of competition between the two countries, how it can serve as a way to increase soft power, provide national prestige and national unity. We spoke briefly about how nationalism can be consumed and I think that many of the

fans in Korea and elsewhere, but going to these tournaments and watching the tournaments online is a way of consuming nationalism through sports.

And lastly, I'm curious to see how China further advances their sports development with the recent win in the bronze in the Olympics. This is a painting from ancient China that shows women back then playing golf. And the origin of golf is still debated. Sometimes the Chinese say that it was originated there. Scotland has a different point of view. But I think that this painting is fascinating to see how early on women were playing sports in something similar to golf. Thank you.

MS. BLOCK: Great, thank you, Julie. I would like for all of our panelists to take seats and then we can start the discussion. So first, I would just like to use my power as the moderator discussant to provide some of my own thoughts and questions for our panelists before moving on to Q&A with the audience. So just to briefly recap, our panel is about identity and power and just looking at how identity power is defined as commercial interest, how it's produced, reproduced. North Korean migrants settling in South Korea and how they look at their national personal identities, and in some ways not as much differences with South Koreans in terms of ethnic nationalism. And also looking at women and gender identity in South Korea as a soft power through this golf diplomacy which we just heard from Julie.

So first, I just wanted to say that I'm quite intrigued by Jiun's presentation, just applying this idea of nationalism as a commodity, as economics, as business. Who is profiting, who is not profiting from this type of thinking and how it's produced and reproduced for consumption by citizens. And I think we could apply this idea, not only thinking about territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan but also maybe somehow applied to our other presenters' topics, just sort of looking at the changing characteristics of consumers, the citizens of South Korea, an idea of this ethnic nationalism being continually repackaged. And also, even nationalism being culturally exported in the form of sports diplomacy and being a tool to use in other countries.

So there are a couple of questions I want to ask the entire panel, hopefully this makes sense. So one thing I want to start is just looking at inside South Korea and I want to ask you in terms of this commodified

nationalism, and how is this passed down to the younger generations. So I know that right now we have this focus of how strong and strengthened nationalism is in terms of perhaps profits and looking at sort of actual like consumer goods or experiences. And also looking at sort of Steven's surveys on the different generations and how they associate themselves with that identity, and also in terms of looking at women and girls in terms of promoting sort of this identity and nationalism and exporting that in the profit or the good of South Korea. So I would like to start with Jiun and we'll work our way to the right if that's fine with you.

MS. BANG: Great, thank you. So the question is how is commodification of nationalism passed down the younger generation. And that's a very, very interesting point, because I'm trying to think about or coin these sort of terms of -- so there's on the one hand, you have what I'm calling retail nationalism, it's that you need infrastructure, you need overhead, so something like Dokdo Ramen when I was talking to the CEO of Dokdo Ramen, which by the way, was very tasty, he needs, he was telling me how he was losing profit because it takes so much money to make the product. And so he really at this point is doing it for his own enjoyment and benefit. And so on the one hand you have something like retail nationalism which requires a lot of investment and money and I think if you're someone who is young and don't necessarily have the money, then maybe that isn't as accessible, but on the other hand, you have something that I'm tentatively calling artisanal nationalism, and that's more micro level - there's a great website that sells comfort women related products but they're not, nothing is very gaudy about them, they are very well made. They are actually very aesthetically appealing and I think that's what makes it more artisanal and that they only -- they just need a website and they do very micro level processing and manufacturing. And so if you're someone who is younger and you have that sort of technological platform, then artisanal nationalism could very well be a channel for you to get your ideas out there and use the marketplace for political activity. And I think that's sort of how I see the connection to the younger generation in commodification of nationalism, at least in my case.

MR. DENNEY: Just to confirm, I'm answering the same question, Eileen, right?

MS. BLOCK: Yes, yes.

MR. DENNEY: Okay. Jiun's work is really interesting and I want to sort of continue along the same thread of commodification and then I'll make a comment that's perhaps more related to my own work. How is a particular identity passed from one generation to the next? I think it's a quite common phenomenon and I think we are always in danger of or actually just doing this, assuming that because we have a new generation, 25 years have passed or conditions have changed, however you want to define a generation that people who constitute that generation will think differently, they'll have a different identity.

And I think we understate the power that parents have and the ease with which certain ideas are reproduced. In South Korea, for instance, one element that I would say integral to the contemporary national identity is a certain anti-Japanese sentiment. It was founded in the colonial period. Many of you know the story. This is continually reproduced and it's commodified and the commodification itself reproduces it. If you look at the way in which Ahn Jung-geun, who is the fellow in 1909 who shot and eventually killed Ito Hirobumi at a Harbin train station, he is a martyr, he is a national hero and he is reproduced regularly in textbooks and schools and in plays, commodification. And that reproduces a certain national identity that may not necessarily change with this new age, with this era of ease of travel and internationalism and all great -isms and ideas about who we are as a young generation. I think it's remarkable how similar we are to our parents and I don't think we should overlook that, because it's vitally important. Further to that -- so that's my comment sort of connecting it to Jiun's work which is very interesting.

I also think identity is, in addition to the reproduction of certain identities, and the passing of ideas to children, I think my work is suggesting that we should not overstate the influence of age and sort of natural life processes. I didn't go into my questions -- I didn't go into my work thinking that was what I was going to find. I was using age as the explanatory variable because that's what a lot of people are using, and it's a really interesting variable to see how things change as you get older. That's kind of what we're talking about today isn't it. And you see that as you get older, you become more conservative, why? Well, you get married, you get a job, you settle down. And when you do things like this, certain things tend to happen.

And in the literature I talked about, political science sociology and elsewhere, common sense, you become more conservative. And I think there's a relationship between that and what people think makes you whatever national identity. And I want to emphasize, I don't think it's just South Korea. I think it's here, in the U.S. and Canada. And the data kind of suggests it, if you look at it. As one gets older, as you look across age, what it means, like ethnicity, which is question that I asked my respondents. It's a question that's been reproduced in other surveys. I just took from an existing survey. It's been asked cross nationally for about a decade and a half, and you see similar trends. I think that should make us a little uncomfortable. But we can't deny it, can we, because life goes on and certain processes take place.

MS. YANG: I guess I'll start by defining nationalism in terms of sports. I see nationalism as being a sense that your country is superior, right, is the best. And often, the reason why Olympics is such a popular worldwide event with viewership extremely high is because I think that it fuels that sense of nationalism and there's so much pride behind an investment behind the gold medals because it shows undisputedly that that country is the best, right, is superior in that specific sport. And I see that the players in the LPGA and other professional golf leagues is that they're playing not just for themselves, but they're playing on behalf of the country. And so when you see a leader board that ranks all the countries for each tournament, it's not just their name, they have their country's flag right next to it.

And I think that many of the athletes also go in thinking that they're playing on behalf of their country, that they are sort of a national champion and as a result, they are national icons once they return home. I mean there's ceremonies at the airport and flowers and fans and press whenever these athletes return home to their country after a win. And so fueling that sense of nationalism and providing that national pride through golf and through sports I think has been fascinating for me, and the conference is called Young and Brave, but I would say that many of the young athletes that are playing professional golf right now are really the young and brave champions because they're -- the average age is like 18 or 20, every early 20s and they are going into different counties and playing on behalf of their country and themselves. And I think seeing that unfold is a very interesting new form of nationalism.

MS. BLOCK: Great. Thank you. Just leading off from that, I kind of want to shift the panel discussion to

the exporting of nationalism. So we've been looking within the views of South Korea and looking at national identity viewed by Koreans. And I'm curious about how this commodity of nationalism is exported to say the U.S. For instance, in my own experience in regards to seeing like Korean American groups in L.A. or in D.C. and New York, you do sometimes see the Dokdo label on newsletters for grocery stores, or you see a sticker maybe just posted onto the walls, like sort of graffiti art. So I'm kind of curious about what is Jiun, your take on this exporting nationalism as a commodity to the U.S. or to other countries and mostly, it's advocated by the groups here. So I wanted to start with you first on that.

MS. BANG: Great. So the question of exporting the commodity of nationalism, so in L.A., it's quite frequent that you see something like Dokdo Moving Company driving around the city and I believe there's Dokdo wine in California. And I've been wanting to meet with the CEO to see his take on how he got it started. But to me, so my own work here that I explained, was mainly on domestic consumption and that's why it's different from something like militarization, which is more action, reaction across borders, because I'm looking at how nationalism as an identity is consumed within borders, domestically, but with impacts across borders.

And so when I think about something like exports, I am hesitant to think that is an export because you rarely see for one, non-Koreans in the business. It's mainly of Korean ethnicity that are getting into this sort of commodification and so I'm not sure -- it's a different space, but it's the same people doing the work. And so for me, I'm very hesitant to say that this export then has any different effect as it does domestically within South Korea. But I don't think -- it's a very interesting question and I'm still on the fence about how I feel about the impact of exports but to me I don't think it really is an export because the effects are still the same, or the same people do the commodification.

MS. BLOCK: Great, thank you. I have one follow up question for Steven. You mentioned in the beginning of your PowerPoint -- you opened up sort of dramatically in regards to the changing ethnic nationalism in Korea. And you also mentioned not just North Korean resettled groups, but also maybe migrant workers from other countries, or maybe there's also like Chinese-Koreans, or others who are a diversification of this ethnic Korean identity. And I was curious whether you ever thought of from your

long term project, whether or not using that framework, this also applies to this group of ethnic Koreans, this minority, and just your views on that and also I'm curious about with time, let's say, you know, hopefully, you could continue your research for decades or for many years from now, and I'm just curious if you could still hold fast to that as you age, you tend to be more ethnically nationalist.

MR. DENNEY: Thank you. So two questions I took from that. What do I think or what is the potential for understanding the phenomenon that I'm interested in with other groups that have resettled in South Korea, such as Chinese Koreans, migrant laborers and so on? And the second is about reproduction of the surveys and of findings.

So the first question, I'm glad you brought it up, so I attempted -- you start very ambitiously in the dissertation project and you sort of narrow it down as time goes on because you're confronted with financial, emotional and psychological limitations. I wanted to include as a second group, Chinese-Koreans. Either those who were born and raised in Yanbian, the Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin province, or Chinese-Koreans in South Korea, or which there are hundreds of thousands. I still might include, maybe not for the dissertation, but at some point, the Chinese-Korean group, and it would indeed be interesting to survey them using the same questions, because it matters that in my study I was looking at North Koreans. Because it's taking advantage of what some might call a natural experiment. You have a divided peninsula, a divided people who then grow up and come of age under fundamentally different structural conditions, political, social and otherwise, and how does this affect a number of things.

Well, I'm looking at identity. So the fact that they moved themselves from North Korea to South Korea and resettled has opened up a really interesting avenue of inquiry that's been reproduced elsewhere, in Germany, and has been done in a similar fashion in North America, looking at people in Saskatchewan and North Dakota, who are otherwise similar but are in Canada and United States which are different places. So maybe I'll be writing something about the Chinese-Koreans who have settled. The other groups, I don't know what to do. Like so if we're looking at migrant laborers, who like, who are from, I don't know, Bangladesh, what do we ask them, what do we want to know about them? How apart do they feel of South Korea society? I can tell you, it's not very. They don't feel very integrated. But what about

like the children of international marriages? Data shows that South Koreans see them as basically Korean. They see them as more a part of South Korean society than they see Chinese-Koreans, for instance. So exploring those interesting outcomes is something I want to do.

The second part, just doing research going forward. I think that especially in the social sciences and science perhaps in general, there is a tendency to have a finding, to make a splash and then go do something else. But reproduction is sort of the essence of scientific inquiry, isn't it? To see whether or not what you're finding is actually true. You need it what like two, three, four times before it can be considered an actual finding. So if you're from a funding agency out there and you find my work interesting, talk to me on the side afterwards, because I am very interested in continuing to do it, really I am. With my collaborators, we are most interested in continuing this project after we've -- we're all doing our Ph.D.s, but after we do them we want to continue doing it to see whether what we're finding is an actual finding, or is like an aberration or is due to some other effect. So yeah, I'm very open to doing that, I want to.

MS. BLOCK: Okay, great, thank you, Steven. I think I've abused my power as a moderator. I've only left you 10 minutes to ask some questions to, okay, 15 minutes, great, thank you. So we're going to have a mic go around and I will select you and I ask that you please identify yourself so, sir in the front.

MR. MACRAE: Hi, Chris Macrae, World Class Brands. I'd like to sort of congratulate everyone in terms of putting the focus both on sports and national identities. Actually, 25 years ago, I've been researching fast moving consumer goods brands all through the '80s and we found there's a problem that a classical model was one product, one plan, one country. Basically, there were no platforms for going global, so basically sports and national identities have been borrowed by brands over the last 25 years. So my question is how do you use the sort of risks and opportunities of that to actually be brave for young people under 35's goals like sustainability or whatever your goals are, given that in a way, what you're looking at is sort of at the nexus between how these things have been manipulated in the last 25 years by big concerns and but where you maybe want to go as a generation, which is either borderless or has issues which are unique to your times.

MS. YANG: That was great, thank you for that really insightful question. I think you're right. A lot of corporations now, you know, traditional marketing for the younger generation has been shifting more towards sponsoring sporting events or trying to move towards sort of the online and what the younger generation is consuming and that's often not so much products, but it is sporting events and other activities and experiences. So absolutely. And your second part of the question, I'm sorry.

MR. MACRAE: Particularly interested in your organization because okay, many of the big sports organizations actually own their superstars to a large degree. And you appear to be saying, you know, that in a way your young star had more freedom to do choose what they stood for. Is that what you did say, or and if so, how could you use the advantage of ladies' professional golf in that direction.

MS. YANG: Sure. I think so many of the players have issues that they are personally passionate about, whether that's breast cancer awareness, heart health, and often some of the tournaments are also do charity pro-ams and associate themselves with a charity that often, if the players do like a hole-in-one or a birdie, then a certain amount will go to charities identified before the game. But I think that you see the younger generation and some of the athletes perhaps using their platform to promote issues that are of concern to them.

From the LPGA perspective, it's often woman empowerment, right. How do you provide a woman with a career track and I think what Se-Ri Pak had showed Korea in 1998 was that professional golf can be a viable career track that provides a global recognition for a woman to succeed? And I think that's what's really fascinating in Korea right now is that what's the category where you see Korean women really being at the forefront globally and I would have to say for my point of view right now, it's currently only golf where you see a very global recognition that they're sort of developing their own career and that I think is something that might speak to your question.

MS. BLOCK: Thank you. I want to take a couple of questions to Darcie in the back.

MS. JONES: Hi. I'm Darcie Draudt, I'm with Johns Hopkins University. As a student of citizenship, this is particular interesting to me as you kind of parsed the different contours of Korean ethnic or other aspects of Korean identity. So I have two related questions to Steven and to Julie. The first is to Steven. Looking at your data, driven from North Korean migrants living in South Korea, I wonder if you could kind of discuss the contours of how you distinguish North Korean national identity, ethnic identity and nationalism because it seems that there's a couple of steps that need to be made in order to make some claims about ethnic nationalism, especially if you're looking at a population that necessarily has a different relationship to the South Korean state than ethnic-Korean South Koreans, if I'm clear. That's probably a lot of jargon. And then to Julie, you mentioned how in the case of the migration of a lot of these athletes, they take on different citizenships, so for example, Lydia Ko now has New Zealand citizenship, but she was born in South Korea and still a lot Koreans identify her as part of the diaspora. So I wonder if you could kind of just explain a little bit about how these migrated athletes -- how different populations receive these athletes? How does New Zealand receive Lydia Ko and how South Korea see Lydia Ko, for example, thanks.

MS. BLOCK: Great. I would like to take another question. This gentleman right here.

SPEAKER: Hi. My name is Phil Wilcox. I'm a former graduate student at USC and former classmate of Dr. Jiun Bang, and a question for -- first of all, I want to say this is a very interesting seminar and it's very thought provoking as well. My question is for you, Dr. Jiun Bang, but other people can contribute as well. (inaudible) for Chinese nationalism, but it translates to South Korea as well. For example, in China's nationalism effort, especially after Tiananmen, there was the Patriotic Education Campaign, which focused a lot on anti-Japanese sentiment to teaching for children, but the Chinese government found that it's very difficult to control these national sentiments defined as a negative. And also, recently, in a recent panel at Brookings, it said because of a lot of tourism, which is something you mentioned Jiun, of China to Japan and the relatively positive feedback from the people, the tourists returning back to China that especially the young generation, that the tendency has sort of diminished like the people aren't as upset about Japan as they might have been before. But you focused more about tourism too in those contested territories, which is different in a sense, which doesn't really happen as much for the Diaoyu or Senkaku

Islands. People don't usually go to those islands as tourist events. So I was wondering, maybe there's only experience of South Korean traveling to Japan, if that might, especially the younger generation that might reduce the impact of like nationalism amongst those younger generation people or if it's just different, just go to the islands themselves. So it's a pretty different aspect of going to those specific countries rather than going to those contested territories. So thank you very much.

MS. BLOCK: So how about we work from to my right, and also take the opportunity if you want to add any closing remarks to your presentation or just sort of wrap it up for your own points. Thank you.

MS. YANG: Thanks Darcie for that question. I think, as I said earlier, you know, really defining the definition of identity has changed I think over and increasingly as we see in sports, what does an identity mean, even outside of sports. Dr. Moon was earlier mentioning how many of us have lived in different countries for extensive periods of time and speak different languages. Do we, even outside of sports, have a very singular identity, and I think that's a question that our generation has to really consider deeply.

In terms of sports I think that you see after a tournament an athlete will win and they'll often drape their country flag over them when they receive the trophy. And that symbol in and of itself is often a self identification, so recently in the Evian Championship, and In Gee Chun won and she's from Korea, so they draped her in a Korean flag and Lydia Ko would drape herself in a New Zealand flag which she did at the Olympics as well. And I think that really self selecting in a way what country you choose to identify with, which flag you choose to wave when you're playing on an international stage has become a way to define one's identity. But it's really something I think that might need further academic study is how identity is different in sports versus in other categories.

MR. DENNEY: Thanks again to Darcie for good questions. I want to -- Darcie stop me if I don't get it quite right, like if I did not quite understand your question, but you're saying is what we have here are two different groups of people who I'm asking the same question about a national identity of one of the countries to which one of the groups exclusively belongs to.

I'm making an assumption that both groups self identify as ethnic Koreans and I could in theory, include, given my interest and my design, any ethnic Koreans anywhere, because in part, what I'm looking at here is whether or not being elsewhere has any effect on your answer. Because the people move, the group that, the North Korean migrants in this case moved, so I can in theory measure the impact that being in different locations has on their responses. And I think it's worth pointing out too that I'm reproducing questions, the exact same questions that were asked to South Koreans for the resettled North Korean migrants. So I'm asking them what does it mean to be truly -- sometimes they translate it as Korean, which can be a bit misleading because it's *hankookin*, which means South Korean probably. So what does it mean to be truly South Korean and then you have seven, there's seven different endings to the beginning of that question and I was focusing on three of them.

So I want, so what I ended up looking at here was whether growing up in North Korea, being in China, and then being in South Korea has any effect on how they perceived the important qualities of South Korean national identity. And the answer is that it doesn't. Did that answer that question, Darcy, I feel like it didn't. Well, we should talk about it with everyone, but yeah, that's all I have to say about that.

MS. BANG: So Phil, thank you for being a great colleague and putting me on the spot. I think twofold. So the first question about you bringing up China, I think it gets to this term that social scientists are in love with, which is generalizability, how generalizable is my theory. And I can assure you I did look at China and its dispute with Diaoyutai Senkaku with Japan and it's fascinating because in a way, it tracks really well with what Buheung said and Dr. Moon said about money talking in China. Money really talks because it's not very capitalist in that way where you see a lot of commodification of nationalism surrounding Diaoyutai Senkaku. And I briefly looked at the number of trademarks under Diaoyutai in China and there's a lot of registered trademarks.

And this gets to the second point about state power and how is you mentioned the idea of states being able to, or not being able to control this sense of nationalism and the activity surrounding nationalism. And it's a great question because I think the state itself is trying to negotiate its power and especially when nationalism becomes embedded in this marketplace. And in a way, I think there is a very important role

for the state though still regardless of gatekeeping nationalism, and if I can, I just wanted to bring up one slide.

So, I myself was interested in how the state was negotiating its power with all this commercial activity, right. And so I decided to look at -- I'm hoping it will magically appear. So I looked at how the patent office actually gatekeeps which trademarks it decides to accept and which it decides to reject. And it's a very interesting case because if you look at South Korea, there's an accumulative total of 129 applications that have been accepted between '98, oh, here we go, between '98 to 2014, you have 129 applications, but then you actually have 230 rejections. So in a way you have more rejections than applications. And so the patent office itself is also very conscious about its role of gatekeeping, what gets filtered and what doesn't.

And so in this way, you also see the state negotiating its power that way and controlling. And so my final remark just goes back to Eileen's great comment about thinking about who is profiting and who is not. Something I wanted to show, which is interesting. So under the Dokdo Sustainable Use Project, DSUP, you see that the number of ministries that got money to get involved and helped to increase from two to 12 and the budget increased from \$5 million to \$650 million by 2013, and there's a great chart that I wanted to show that shows who is actually getting the most, the bulk of that money, which is not the foreign ministry, which we love to talk about in terms of these territorial disputes. It is, drumroll, it's actually the Ministry of Fisheries, and it's because they are building things that cost a lot of money. And so they get, they saw a budget increase of over 15,000 percent from 2004 to 2013. And 62 percent of that money goes to facilities construction and management. And that was an increase of 23,000 percent over the same period. And so thinking about who is profiting and who is not I think is a very great question.

MS. BLOCK: So that brings us to the close of our panel. I would like to thank our panelists here to share their expertise with us today. I do not want to keep us any longer from lunch, so we will break until 12:30 for our next panel, and let's go ahead congratulate our excellent panelists today.

(Applause)

MS. BLOCK: And lunch is served in the hallway to my left. Lunch is out here, but you're welcome to

bring your lunch back into the room. If you could please, if you want to talk to our panelists, please give them a chance to eat.

(Recess)

MS. MOON: Okay, we're going to resume our conference. If folks could please take a seat; if you're standing to stretch, or I don't know, to get a better view, great, but we do also have chairs. So we've had two really interesting panels this morning, and now, while you eat and digest -- don't fall asleep. Okay? We've got even more exciting things coming up.

Our next panel, we have three participants, speakers who are going to address, loosely, the topic of enmity and diplomacy. I tried to come up with titles that will capture your attention, especially post-lunch. So whenever you start out with enmity, you know, at least hopefully, people start paying attention. But of course, we want to end up -- or include and end on more positive notes of diplomacy.

So, our next panel, we will focus on issues of hostilities between the north and the south, but especially the North's cyber-attack program -- cyber war programs, strategies, and that's the enmity part. But we will also have Kayla, who will talk about espionage in the context of distrust and enmity that also leads to building bridges among cultures and countries in unintended ways. We would be looking at Germany and North Korea back in the '80s.

And then, we will end our panel with Mintaro, who will discuss the recent, last December, 2015 agreement between South Korea and Japan on the comfort women issue. And he will discuss that in the context of larger strategic issues in East Asia.

So, let me start by introducing our first speaker, Jenny Jun. She's a PhD candidate at Columbia University in political science, and the project team leader for a 2014 - 15 Center for Strategic and International Studies, which we know as CSIS, project on North Korea's cyber operations. She is also a co-author of the report called "North Korea's Cyber Operations Strategy and Responses." Her accomplishments, her background, it's all listed in the bio, so I will cut it short and ask Jenny to come up

to the podium. Thank you.

(Break in recording)

MS. JUN: Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for coming, and thank you, Dr. Moon, for organizing this wonderful conference, because I really also do believe that young scholars in particular, can make a meaningful contribution to our respective fields, you know, other than by having you know, a cheap hourly rate.

We can really challenge you know, existing ways of thinking by having grown up in a different environment, and that we're not yet beholden to serving existing assumptions. And that's how really, this project began, too. So when North Korea launched a cyber attack on Sony a couple of years ago, most people's first reaction was, and especially coming from the technical community, was that, wait -- but I thought they didn't even have electricity in North Korea (Laughter).

And so what then happened was that this assumption that North Korea was still sort of living under a rock, really, in my opinion -- you know, why didn't the research gap between you know, the technical community and area studies and it really hindered thinking a little bit more deeply about how North Korea would use emerging technologies to their strategy end.

So today, I'm going to try and bridge that gap a little bit and talk about not what just cyber weapons can do, but how a state can or cannot use cyber weapons to coerce an adversary. And we're going to look at two cases in which North Korea explicitly tried to use cyber attacks for coercion to see what works and what doesn't, and hopefully, this is going to help all of us from a defender's perspective on how to prepare informed strategy on such things.

(Break in recording)

MS. JUN: Before I begin, here is a quote that comes from one of the NIS testimonies at the South Korean National Assembly. And this quote is problematic for two reasons. First: Kim Jong-un seems to have a little bit of over confidence in what a cyber weapon can do. He's comparing at the level of nuclear

weapons and missiles.

And second, NIS, by not adding much analysis as to whether the statement is true or false, is sort of reinforcing our collective belief that cyber weapons is really this magic sword. And so as analysts, we need to you know, not take these quotes as verbatim, but sort of ask questions, and this is what we hope to explore in today's presentation.

And little overview of the contents, and quickly jumping to a quite overview of North Korea's cyber operations, just so we're all on the same page. So, North Korea's cyber efforts are a natural progression from their existing missions coming from electronic warfare, information warfare and to another extent, covert action and the irregular military operations. And naturally that really puts their cyber unit under the reconnaissance general bureau that has traditionally handled a lot of these things. And so this is where they're sort of thinking strategic thoughts on cyber activity comes from. And by now, you know, over the past couple of years, they've really expanded their operations, and they're now active in a wide range of malicious activity in cyberspace, including espionage, cyber crime -- and this is cut off at the bottom, but also, destructive cyber operations, which is mostly what we're going to focus about today.

And as a caveat, you know, studying North Korea is hard. Studying cyber is really hard, because of sort of the information gap. A lot of things are classified. You know, we don't have direct access to a lot of the information that we're dealing with, and so you know, verifiability and falsifiability is a big concern, but you know, we have to start somewhere, so you know, hopefully, you know, this is the beginning of a larger effort on this topic.

So quickly going over some elements of coercion to sort of get our thinking into the space, ability to coerce is often an important element of estimating state's power, and coercion is divided largely into compellence and deterrence. Compellence is basically, you know, getting someone to do something that they otherwise wouldn't want to do. Deterrence is getting someone not to do something that they otherwise would not want to do. And today's presentation will mostly focus on using cyber for compellence purposes.

And often, you know, states achieve this through making threats, especially when you don't have that much you know, carrots (sic) to offer. And two things that really go into making a threat credible and effective are a demonstration of capability, and two -- and the communication of the threat before the event actually happens. And what I mean by communication of the threat as -- you know, it has to be contingent, so in the form of if you do this, then I'm going to do this; and also, specific as to what you're going to do, if they do or don't do what you want them to do.

So then, how do we apply this in cyberspace and explore how coercion works in cyberspace. And you know, a little bit of a spoiler alert is that it's not actually as easy as you think. So we're going to look at sort of two large case studies that involve North Korea, where North Korea deliberately tried to threaten their opponent by making threats in relation to their cyber means.

So what most people focus on in the Sony case is the actual attack on November 24th, where the cyber attack happened on Sony headquarters. But what's really more interesting is how North Korea has structured its threats before and after November 24th in order to get theatres and Sony's to pull down the movie, "Interview."

And you know, North Korea has actually been protesting a lot, the movie, starting from around June, and they have threatened action -- countermeasures and retaliatory action against the U.S. government and Sony multiple times from the summer, but it really largely went ignored, mostly because the threat wasn't specific. And you know, largely, they couldn't really demonstrate capability that they are able to do such things; directly coerce an adversary that's across the Pacific.

So, after Sony happened, however, and as you all know, we made a really big fuss in the U.S. government and in the private sector in general. They made another threat around December 16th, where the Guardians of Peace, who are later sort of after attributed to be a North Korean APT group -- they warned a 9/11 style cyber attack on U.S. cinemas, if the movie is released.

And this time, the threat was actually effective. It scared a lot of the movie theatres, and mostly Sony, and

it sort of -- Sony ended up pulling down all of the movies, which later on, turned out to be threat was a bluff. But basically from the technical standpoint, the ability to hack Sony doesn't translate to the ability to hack into movie theatres. But you know, because of sort of the clear demonstration of capability, Sony actually backed down from this incident.

So moving on to the next case study, KHNP stands for Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power plant, and they're the agency that oversees all the hydro and nuclear power plants in South Korea. This is a little bit of a lesser known case, but it's a really good example of cyber coercion failing to work.

So around the same time in 2004, an unknown hacker group named Who Am I, who was also later attributed to be a North Korean APT group, started releasing a bunch of personal information, and basically, nuclear power plant blueprints online, and alleging that they have access to, you know, and the capability to compromise nuclear power plants in South Korea. And on December 23rd, they made a specific threat to say if you don't shut down three nuclear power plants by Christmas, we're going to launch a secondary strike.

The thing is, by articulating the strike beforehand, it really did something interesting. It alerted the Korean government and employees of KHNP, and basically, everyone went into an emergency lockdown. And they did 24/7 monitoring of every single network traffic. They scanned very system for viruses, and there was these big -- you know, there were Marines outside guarding the nuclear power plants. And they scanned everything, and they found out that there was actually no compromise as to what they were alluding to. So December 25th came and nothing happened, and so the crisis was subverted, and this hacker group never was able to sort of produce credibility in any other way.

So what this has for the implications is that at the micro level, if you just look at the operation itself, coercion is not as easy as you think, and mostly because an operation based on malware, they hinge on secrecy. So think of it as like covert action, and also, a successful exploitation of a particular system vulnerability, which doesn't really translate to other systems.

So the fact that you hacked into Sony doesn't mean that you can use the same tools to hack into a nuclear power plant, or you know, a government network. And so what makes these particularities of the weapons difficult is that it's really difficult to communicate a threat beforehand, because doing so alerts the other side, and it allows them to do a scan and clean up everything before the attack actually happens.

And also, secondly, it really hinders the demonstration of capability before the actual attack happens. So because coercion hinges on sort of the restraint on the part to hurt, you know, it's really hard to do that with malware-based type of operations. An exception might be something like D-DoS and Ransomware, but you know, we have yet to see such weapons being -- in application in the coercive sense.

And going a little bit into the other side of the debate, at the macro level with some work -- you know, cyber means might be useful, and this might be particularly attractive for North Korea to think about, who has a lot of limited means in other areas. So for example, first, cyber operations can achieve range.

For example, when you don't have a means to directly coerce someone who is across the Pacific, you know, maybe given the fact that they're developing ICBMs, it might be a little bit of a different story now, but other than ICBMs, it sort of gives them a direct means of coercion.

Second, cyber means can be used to boost credibility in another domain. So for example, if you're blocking information access, if you're blocking communications, it boosts your capability for other conventional operations or missiles or other conventional operational situations. So it can be used in that way.

Also, what's interesting is that for you to build a reputation for being a really strong cyber actor in the international community, what you might have to do is to build that reputation, the general belief that you are capable in the cyber domain through actually conducting repeated attacks and repeated -- you know, known compromises. So you know, what can be potentially problematic is for North Korea to sort of prove their cyber capability, they might need to actually conduct attacks like Sony to convey that they actually have these capabilities.

And the last thing is, technology is still evolving in a very fast manner in cyberspace, so with the intent to use cyber means in a coercive manner, people -- not just North Korea or private sector or other entities can invest into technologies that would allow them to use cyber means for coercive effects in ways that allow them to demonstrate capability, and in ways that allow them to create sort of an absentee communication of threat. So that's something to watch out for.

And so what this comes down to is a series of policy questions that I'm going to leave you with. So first of all, in a theoretical sense, how do you deal with this incentive to conduct actual attacks in order to demonstrate capability and build reputation? And second of all, which is sort of specific to North Korea is, how do you deter someone when they're not themselves, reliant on information systems for their daily activity, and therefore can't really create, like in the nuclear domain, cannot really create sort of a mutual hostage situation?

And third, you know, from a crisis management perspective, and this is where I guess diplomacy comes in, is under a certainty where you don't know whether this threat is credible or not, how do you devise a certain set of procedures and structures and information finding mechanisms, so that when you're Sony and you're attacked and they are threatening a secondary strike, how do you sort of manage that and get through that moment of uncertainty and avert a crisis? So with that, I'm going to leave you to the next presenter. Thanks. (Applause)

MS. MOON: I'd like to invite Kayla up to the table. Kayla comes from a great distance, all the way from the Woodrow Wilson Center (Laughter), but she has traveled many great distances in her young life in terms of where she's lived, and also, her intellectual linguistic travels. I think last night we realized that she probably covers about 2/3 of the languages among all of the participants here, from Korean, German, ancient Greek, Russian, Spanish –

MS. ORTA: And Chinese.

MS. MOON: -- and Chinese. (Laughter) She also has two BAs, one which includes linguistic -- how do you say that?

MS. ORTA: Langua-culturalism.

MS. MOON: -- langua-culturalism.

MS. ORTA: And cross-cultural.

(Simultaneous discussion)

MS. MOON: This is a generational difference.

MS. ORTA: Which is a (Inaudible).

MS. MOON: I don't even understand it. (Laughter) But anyway, very admirable, and she has some very fascinating research that she conducted at the Woodrow Wilson Center. She is an officer there, working in the history project, and -- the Cold War history project, and she's going to talk to us about German spies, espionage in North Korea and meeting up with West Germans and South Koreans, as well, through the eyes of this one particular agent.

MS. ORTA: Well good afternoon, everyone. So as Dr. Moon already mentioned, my topic today is going to cover something that is not generally spoken about when it comes to North-South Korean relations or Korean studies in general, and that is the topic of East Germany-North Korea relations; bilateral relations. And I'm going to talk about this through a particular lens, a historical perspective, as I look at archival research that was retrieved from the Stasi archives in East Germany.

My hope today is that by the end of this presentation, you not only have had a little bit of fun learning about East Germany espionage, but you also see and have in interest in the historical information we have and have access to on North Korea. So hopefully, this will spark your interest in archival research and historical perspectives.

And with that preface, let me tell you a story; a story about a spy. Our story begins in the 1980s in East Germany. Here's a photo of an East German city in the early 1980s that's approximately 1980 -- and if you can all see it, what I would want you to notice about this photo are the people on the street. So if you can see that there at the bottom, the people on the streets.

For us as a modern audience, this photo, for some of us more so than others, this photo looks a little bit

old. You can tell it's not from this present day. For some of us, it's not from recent history in our memories. And in some cases, for people if they're even young enough, this might look almost otherworldly, this kind of other perspective.

But for the people in this photo, this moment that's caught in the camera, by the camera, this is their here and now. This is their present. Like this photo, archival documents have a way of pulling us out of our own temporal mindset and perspectives and placing us into the everyday life perspectives of people who came before us in the past.

And in some sense, you could say this is almost like time traveling back to other perspectives that we did not experience ourselves, but we can now learn through the archival research. And this is what made me so interested in doing this research and these documents, because not only was it like reading a spy novel, but everything that happened actually did happen.

So now that I've set the stage and I've given you a little bit of context, I set the stage, now the question is of the character for the story. Who was the spy and why was he important or different for this time period? As you can see from the photo, on the side there, I have intentionally led you astray. The spy was not actually a man. She was a woman. And not only was she a woman, she was an East German woman living -- who was born in the 1930s, and these documents that I have specifically focus on the '80s, but she has experiences that go back before that.

So, I actually do know her full information. I know where she was born. I know her full name through my colleagues and people I have spoken with. She has passed away, unfortunately, a couple of years before I even started this research, which is a little bit of a bummer, because I would have loved to have had the opportunity to speak with her directly on her experiences.

But yeah, so she not only was an East German woman, but she was an East German woman who spoke Korean fluently; held a Ph.D. in Asian history, and was a professor at a major East German university that that focused -- and she was a professor on Korean history, specifically. Her interest in East Asia started

young. She did an undergraduate -- her undergraduate studies were in history and sinology, and she had the opportunity, a unique opportunity to travel to North Korea to study abroad for two years studying Korean language and Korean history.

Once she returned from North Korea, she continued to research. She did a little bit more work, and she actually went back, this time as a member of the East German embassy workers, and she was actually the cultural attaché for several years, additionally. So by the time she was in her mid-30s, she had lived in North Korea for almost approximately five years, and was fluent in the Korean language. And this, once again, is an East German woman living at the time of returning in the '60s at that point, which is just absolutely fascinating; just a fascinating, fascinating woman.

And so by the time of the documents that I have, I do know that documents do exist from her time in North Korea, specifically her time at the embassy. I don't have access currently to those, but through connections, I'm hoping to expand research and have access to those, as well. The documents I have today are from the '80s, so this is a very different doctoring of (Inaudible), so this is a Bergmann who is later in her life experiences. She's in her 50s, and she has been working as a professor for many years. And she even mocks her unique situation, almost, because not only is she older demographically and further along in her life experiences, but she has these wonderful skills and attributes, and she mocks her unique situation when she "applies to become a spy," and by referring to herself as a woman of over 50. And so that's a really interesting kind of tidbit there. And I'll discuss --
(Discussion off the record)

MS. ORTA: I have a tendency to talk very quickly (Laughter). And I will discuss a little bit more about why that applies in a minute, but first, I want to share you a story or two, in case this hasn't already whet your appetite, and got you thinking about this interesting topic; to tell you a little bit of a story.

So, accelerating a little bit into these documents. In 1984, Dr. Inga Barguttell had the opportunity to travel to South Korea for a conference or research. I'm not particularly sure, it's not as specific in the documents. During her trip -- and first off, this is very interesting, because already then, she was

positioned where she knew enough people in South Korea, and she was respected as a professor.

She had published a couple of books, hundreds of articles, and she was respected enough to be invited to conferences in South Korea. During her trip, she did have a minder. So, it's similar to what people talk about North Korea, traveling there. So when she was in South Korea, she had a minder, and she was you know, being taken from Point A to Point B and going here and there. And at one point, they get in the car, and they are driving down the road, and the car stops. And she looks out the window, and she sees written above the door, it says Institution for North Korean Studies. And so at this point, obviously, warning bells are going off in her head. Why have they brought her to the Institution for North Korea Studies? She had been in North Korea in the past, and there was a possibility that she also did spy work in North Korea, but now this was in the '80s, and this was like way past that. So the question was, what's going on with this?

She enters the building, and her minder stays in the hallway. They're not -- the minder is not allowed into the room. She enters the room, and for lack of a better term, there are 12 interrogators waiting for her in that room, and a three-hour conversation starts, where they start drilling her, asking her about her opinions on North Korea and her perspectives. And this was almost, I don't want to say a hazing period, but it was a period where they were trying to figure out, what did she know and what was her perspective? Was she pro-North Korea or was she pro-South Korea. And it was a very interesting situation.

And one of the parts that sticks out the most to tell you about her character and her interesting perspectives is that at one point, this conversation got very serious, and she describes that. It got very serious. And they asked her, very seriously, after the Korean War, did East Germany provide North Korea with funding to rebuild. This is a very serious question. Apparently, this boiled down to a lot of what they were talking about. And she replied simply and confidently, well, yes we did. And if you go to the South Korean University, in the library, you will find my book and you can read all about it. So, this is the kind of woman that Inga (Inaudible). And so, this is a fascinating character.

And with that, I'm going to go back a little bit and speak a little bit the documents. So here is an image of

two of the folders. So, I'll talk a little bit about Stasi documents and the Ministry for State Security in a minute. So if you're not as familiar with East German history, I'll get into that.

But first, I want you to notice that there's a folder labeled one and a folder labeled two. And the wonderful thing about this is, I actually had access to both of these folders. And the important thing is that folder one is her personnel folder. That's why I know all of her background information, because they keep a very solid record, and they asked that applicants -- in a lot of ways, once you're invited or coerced into joining to become a secret informer, you're asked to submit background paperwork information and to say why you're good. So, not everyone did it because they wanted to join. Maybe there was coercion involved. But they do have the background information. So because of that, I know all of her details. And then number two is her operations folder. And that's what's going to be really interesting for us to look at.

Really quickly, just a shameless plug and a shout-out. I had access to these documents through the Woodrow Wilson Center's digital archive, so I'm going to give them a shout-out for that. I also want to give a shout-out to Professor Bern-Schaeffer who actually was in Germany, gathered these documents and brought them back to us, so I did not have to travel myself. So in a lot of ways he did the hard work for me.

Okay. So for those of you not as familiar with East German history as you may be with North or South Korean history, the Stasi was a short name for the Ministry of State Security. It was founded in 1950. The Ministry for State Security, in German, the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, was a powerful omnipresent domestic and foreign surveillance apparatus.

It had full authority when it came to police force matters and intelligence. It had foreign intelligence agencies. It also had detention centers, local offices and its own armed forces. The Stasi referred to itself as the shield and sword of the party. So much of the North Korean party system, the MFS, which is also another acronym for Stasi, answered only to the head East German party, the SUD, the Socialist Unity Party for East Germany. It's a little bit interesting to look in the past see how this matches.

Okay, so moving on, I want to speak a little bit about the actual documents. So these are excerpts from the documents. So you can't look at these documents without having some very long German words. So at the top of this, it says (Laughter) (Foreign language). And this is a very Stasi-like term. It was created by the Stasi, and it means -- lichtfeld means field of vision, and malsalman means action or mission. And so through these documents, we were able to see what they were wanting to use Inga Barguttell for, and how to use her skills.

So not only -- and I'm not going to go into detail, but not only did she have marketable skills, because she had experience as a diplomatic historian, had experience with Asian history and culture, but also, she had contacts with the South Korean -- South Korean contacts in West Berlin. And these are some of the reasons, and we'll get into those a little bit.

So what's really interesting about these documents is that during the '80s, she would be in contact with an individual living in West Berlin who was associated in some way with the South Korean General Consulate, and through her access to academic and university opportunities, she was able to have research trips to the library; the university library in West Germany to meet with this individual and speak.

And there was a series of meetings that started roughly around January of 1984 all the way through February of 1988 with this individual and the individual that came after this individual. And these conversations were very friendly, in some ways, but at the same time, trading a lot of information was happening, and it was definitely in a lot of senses, a game of --

(Discussion off the record)

(Break in recording)

MS. ORTA: So we can see the titles, at least. Okay. So, Mistrusting Friends. So there was a lot of conversation and negotiation happening, but it was also at the same level, a game of espionage. Both Inga Barguttell, code name Bergmann, and her correspondent clearly knew that they were engaging with each other for the purpose of gaining information. Questions were asked. Topics were brought up with the

intent of seeing how the other person responded, and how they engaged. Just one second.

(Break in recording)

MS. ORTA: Also, incentives were provided and made, so there was kind of this negotiating back and forth in this concept, in a lot of what we refer to as spy, as is this power of knowledge. And Inga Barguttell played this wonderfully.

Not only does she play the game with the people she was interacting with, both North Koreans and South Koreans, giving them a little bit of information here, taking things back different ways, but she also played it with her superiors, because unlike the way the documents talk, or she says that she was inspired to join the Stasi, because she wanted to better East German (Inaudible), I think what she really was trying to do was have access to leaving East Germany and engaging with South Koreans and North Koreans to continue her research and her passion for East Asian studies. So, that's another interesting tidbit.

(Discussion off the record)

MS. ORTA: Okay, so briefly wrapping up, some of the things that I can't go into bigger detail are the specific incidents that occurred during the time of these documents. So all of these that are listed here, and I can't speak to them specifically right now, but you can ask me in Q&A, as well, are events that she witnessed as an East German engaging with both South Koreans and North Koreans on the topics. And so if there's two things I'd like for you to take away from this conversation, it is, one, that history is not dead. So contrary to popular belief, things that happen in the past do relate to a lot of the things that happen today. And the second thing is, is that the issue of North Korea -- North-South Korean relations is an inter-disciplinary issue; an issue that is not just based on the politics. It's not just based on the history. It's based on the social cultural interactions that do occur, and the linguistic exchanges that do happen. I'm a strong believer in inter-disciplinarianism, and I'm a strong believer that social culturalism can help change and interact and better the world.

So, if we can leap over the temporal distances, the time differences and break through the disciplinary boxes we put ourselves into that somehow make people think that certain information is inconsequential

to when it comes to North-South Korean relations, imagine the knowledge that can be gained from the past and the present to better the possibility of a future. All right, with that, I thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. MOON: Thank you very much, Kayla, and I hope you catch your breath (Laughter). Last, our speaker on this panel is Mintaro Oba, who most recently served in the State Department as the Korea Desk Officer. He was an indispensable part of the East Asia expertise in the State Department, and he is currently with the West Wing Writers. This just sounds so fascinating and fun. And he is also -- as I mentioned in my introduction that he represents, again, this non-silo existence and cross-fertilization and cross-ventilation. He's served in government. He's also been active in NGOs regarding North Korean human rights. He is a writer. He does pod -- makes his own video casts; does all sorts of interesting things, and most importantly, we're lucky to have him with us today to talk about Korea, Japan, the agreement last December on the comfort women issue, and the different actors and the drivers that led to it. Mintaro, would you like to take the podium, please? Thank you.

MR. OBA: Good afternoon. Thanks for having me. As you know, this is my favorite Korea think tank (Laughter), so happy to be here. (Applause) I'm also going to do a very un-Korean thing and not have a PowerPoint today, so I hope you bear with me.

A couple of disclaimers at the top. I left the State Department as a Korea desk officer about three weeks ago, so a lot of my experience at the State Department informs how I think about policy issues. But what I'm saying today is very personal opinions and assessments, and doesn't necessarily reflect the government's position on things. The second disclaimer is that I am currently a speech writer, but I didn't write a speech for myself. So, no judgment today (Laughter).

All right. So today, I'm talking about the so-called Comfort Women Agreement between Korea and Japan that was concluded in December of last year. It was a very courageous political act by Korean President Park and Japanese Prime Minister Abe.

At the government to government level, implementation has been fairly smooth. The foundation has been created. Issues of funding have been worked out. At the people to people level, the issue is a lot more complicated. We've seen protests. We've seen threats of lawsuits by at least 12 comfort women survivors, and we've seen threats to erect statues. So public opinion in Korea has been fairly skeptical of this comfort women agreement.

As you know, it's a top strategic priority for the United States that there are improved Korea-Japan relations. That's why we've been very focused on the implementation of the Comfort Women agreement, and that's why this administration has ramped up efforts on trilateral U.S.-Japan-Korea cooperation. The Secretary of State has continued with annual ministerial level trilateral meetings with his Korean and Japanese counterparts.

Deputy Secretary Tony Blinken has really taken charge of the trilateral issue. He spoke here at Brookings on his vision for the U.S.-Korea-Japan trilateral partnership, and he has instituted quarterly U.S.-Korea-Japan trilateral meetings to spur action in the trilateral partnership, and we've seen some results from that. We've seen increased cooperation on health security. Vice President Biden recently chaired a meeting with the U.S.-Korean and Japanese health ministers in support of the "cancer moonshot" initiative. The Ambassador at Large for women's issues at the State Department just hosted a trilateral women's empowerment forum. And in the secretary's recent meeting on margins of the UN General Assembly, with his Korean and Japanese counterparts, they agreed to strengthen trilateral cooperation on North Korea coming so soon after this last North Korean nuclear test.

So that's all very important. So overall, it's been a pretty mixed picture in terms of follow up to this Comfort Women agreement. And I think a lot of people are asking legitimate questions about whether this agreement is sustainable; whether this trilateral progress is sustainable. And to answer that question, I think you have to look at the overall trajectory of ROK-Japan relations over time.

There have been several good periods in the Korea-Japan relationship that I wanted to call your attention to today. The first is dating back to the formal normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. They

concluded the Normalization Treaty in June 1965, and it was a 14-year negotiation from October 1951 to June 1965.

The second period is several decades later, 1983 to 1984, when Yasuhiro Nakasone was the Japanese prime minister, and Chun Doo Hwan was the Korean president. And surprisingly, in November of 1983, almost as soon as Nakasone won election as the Japanese prime minister, he placed a call to Chun Doo Hwan, which was totally unprecedented for a Japanese leader at the time.

Later, he used the formulation that Japan deeply repents for its actions during World War II, and his first trip as prime minister was to Seoul, breaking a long string of precedent that Washington would be the first stop for a Japanese prime minister. And he extended \$4 billion of credits in grant aid to Korea, and in 1984, Chun also visited Tokyo.

And the third case of good ROK-Japan relations: In October, 1998, Keizo Obuchi was the Japanese prime minister. He expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apologies, which built on a statement by the former opposition prime minister, Murayama, but it was significant in that it was a formal government statement in a written form. And the Korean president at the time, Kim Dae-jung, expressed that he thought that would finally settle the issue, which sounds awfully familiar today. And they issued a very sweeping joint declaration about you know, the new Japan-Korea partnership heading into the 21st century.

So the puzzle with all of these cases is first, why did these good periods of Korea-Japan relations happen in the first place? And second, why were we not able to sustain those periods of good relations?

And there are a couple of big theories that I think people are very familiar with in ROK-Japan relations. First, most recently, Scott Snyder and Brad Glosserman published a book on the Japan-Korea identity clash, talking about how some of these almost irreconcilable ideational differences; this very fluid process of ideational negotiation in both Japan and Korea, really complicates the possibility of any long-term reconciliation.

And the second was some time ago, but it was Victor Cha's book, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*. And he sets up the theory that what explains variations in Japan-Korea relations is their relationship with their mutual ally, the United States. When they feared being abandoned or entrapped by the United States, they countered that by looking for closer relations with each other. And I agree with those theories, in part.

My argument about why these good periods in ROK-Japan relations happened is that they happened through strategic initiative, mostly on the Japanese part, especially by conservatives, and when the Japanese that good ROK-Japan relations would be in their interest; that, in combination with a bit of healthy pressure from the United States.

So looking back at the normalization treaty. That was a 14-year long negotiation. It was stalled for most of the time because of this heated anti-Japan sentiment in Korea. So why did it finally take shape? Well, if you look at the declassified documents from that time, you see that it mostly has to do -- well, in Korea with Park Chung-hee taking power, and in Japan, consensus forming among the most conservative factions of the ruling liberal democratic party that Japan needed to normalize relations with Korea, and that was important.

And it came from the strident anti-communism of those conservative LDP factions, and the realization that if Japan's strategy was going to be based on that premise, that they needed to normalize relations with Korea. And also, if you look at documents from that time, you'll see talking points from the United States very actively encouraging this normalization process along. And it's actually quite eerie how similar those talking points are to what the United States says to Korea and Japan today.

Second case: On the Nakasone era, here you have a very strategic, conservative Japanese prime minister, as well. He is the one who is most famous for calling Japan America's unsinkable aircraft carrier, and he had strong anti-communist credentials, as well. And so that sort of drove his reputation as a maverick, and it drove his unusual strategy of engaging the Republic of Korea.

(Break in recording)

MR. OBA: Now, why didn't those good periods last? I think it's because of the issues that Scott Snyder and Brad Glosserman identified with national identity. You know, I think Dr. Moon has cited someone who told her that anti-military, or militarism is in Japan's DNA. And these are things that you hear from Koreans a lot; these sweeping generalizations about Japan. And it's very clear that Koreans have to negotiate this role that Japan plays as the other in Korean society. And that is a very deep seated issue rooted in history, and it's not going to be swept away by any sort of government to government agreement.

But it is possible to slowly build government to government relations based on a convergence of interests. And I think that's why the Japanese have so often driven that, because they have a stronger strategic interest in countering China, and earlier, countering anti-communism. I've heard a lot of views expressed by Koreans that they don't really need Japan. Insofar as they need Japan for North Korea, the United States as an ally is going to string Japan along. And so that's sort of at the root of why it's very difficult to get action on ROK-Japan relations.

So in terms of policy recommendations, I'd say that to build on this Comfort Women agreement, we need to foster a very long-term reconciliation effort at the people to people level, not just at the government to government level. It needs to be a very sincere and frank and respectful discussion, and both Japan and Korea need to negotiate these history and identity issues at this level.

Japan needs to take initiative to follow up on the Comfort Women agreement and go above and beyond that to address issues with textbooks and history and demonstrate sincerity. But there is also an obligation on Korea's part to reciprocate in kind.

But for that long-term reconciliation effort at the people to people level to take place, you need good government to government relations. That creates the political space for that sort of negotiation of identity. That's why the United States has been undertaking these major trilateral efforts. Now, the key thing we need to do differently from other times when we've had good ROK-Japan relations is expand the constituencies for good ROK-Japan relations.

In the past, there's been a very limited constituency that really benefits from good ROK-Japan relations. And I think as you've seen from domestic policies, such as Obamacare or Social Security that were heatedly debated when they came out, they developed a constituency because they became indispensable to people.

So the whole point of trilateral cooperation today is to come up with cooperation using this brief period of warm ROK-Japan relations to do things that expand the constituencies and increase the groups and actors that benefit from ROK-Japan relations. That's what the Cancer Moonshot Cooperation has been about, and that's what the Women's Empowerment Cooperation has been about, and that's what the North Korea cooperation has been about.

And my final recommendation is to not neglect the informal level. A lot of Japanese diplomacy is done, you know, party to party with the LDP, and between these big business associations. And we need to engage those very closely to really develop a comprehensive, strong ROK-Japan relationship. Thank you.
(Applause)

MS. MOON: Thank you. I'd like to invite the speakers to come up for Q&A. And for the sake of time, I'm going to withhold questions of my own and open it up to the audience, and I will interject when necessary.
(Pause)

MS. MOON: So I'll take two or three questions at a time and give your speakers a chance to respond. But also, you're welcome to question one another, comment on one another's work, et cetera. Yes?

MR. MARSHALL: Michael Marshall, Global Peace Foundation. I'm tempted to ask Mr. Oba whether the Korean diplomats he dealt with as the State Department officer did a double take when they found someone of ethnic Japanese descent at the Korea desk of the State Department. But I'll ask another question (Laughter).

And that is, you talked about the anti-Japanese feeling in Korea rooted in history, but a phenomenon

that's puzzled me is that that seems to have continued into the younger generation. You would think that things rooted in history would grow weaker over time. That doesn't seem to have been the case. Do you have any insights onto why that should be so? I mean, I recognize this is an extremely complex problem.

MS. MOON: I'd like to take another question before we go to our panelists. Yes?

SPEAKER: Thanks. My name is (Inaudible portion), cyber security researcher. My ask is for -- my question is for Jenny. Do you see any malware attacks targeting North Korean defectors? And is it advanced or -- thanks.

MS. MOON: Interesting. Let's take one more. There's one more back there.

SPEAKER: Hello, my name is Jiwon (Inaudible). I'm from the Center for International Interests. My question is towards the Mr. Mintaro Oba. You've mentioned that it is important to have some reciprocal endeavors to have a better relationship within Korea and Japan. But I believe one very important factor that kind of impediments this process is that there is a lot of political burden for Korea leaders to be actually building a good relationship with Japan, because of the history. There are a lot of like critics saying things that those choices of ROK leaders having better relationships with Japan is actually rooted from their pro-Japanese history. Like for example, current President Park Geun-hye-- her father was -- is in a lot of debate whether she -- he was actually in pro-Japanese personal records or not.

So, I believe like those -- without solving those personal relationships that are related to pro-Japanese things, then I think it's still impossible to have a like -- for leaders to choose a better relationship with Japan. So, do you still think that it is actually necessary for us to start building that relationship at this stage, or whether if it's possible for Korean leaders to do that?

MS. MOON: Okay. I think Mintaro, you have a couple of questions there that are pretty heady. So I'll give you a little bit of time to prepare them. Maybe we could go to Jenny first.

MS. JUN: Thank you. So I don't know if it's appropriate for me to sort of disclose the names of the organizations that are being targeted, so maybe we can talk in private afterwards. But I would just like to say that there a lot of instances where not necessarily the defectors themselves, but where there are web

sites where they house a lot of information about North Korea; for example, newspapers that deal with North Korean issues, organizations of defector web sites. So malware analysts have actually found evidence that a lot of these web sites are part -- are sort of houses of watering hole attacks. So a lot of the visitors who come to these web sites will then get malware on their computers through watering holes. And that's how they get compromised. And it's just a good way for North Korea to select their target group based on what their interests are. So we can talk probably more about in private.

MS. MOON: Could you just define watering holes, for those less technologically able?

MS. JUN: Sure. So, it's when you compromise the web site and you embed a malicious link. So when they click on certain links that are embedded in the web site, it takes you to another phony web site which you know, automatically sort of downloads malware onto your computer. And so anyone who comes to the watering hole gets sort of infected. That's the whole idea.

MR. OBA: So, I think the first question was about anti-Japanese sentiment continuing into the younger generation. Counter to the expectation that it might grow weaker in time due to the distance from history. And I suppose I don't really agree with the premise that you know, that sense of identity grows weaker as you get distant from history.

We still reference, you know, the Boston Tea Party or the American Revolution in our country's narrative. And so, I think our distance from those things actually makes those more potent in our historical narrative, and it's a big part of our identity. And so I think the fact that anti-Japanese sentiment is continuing into the younger generation, and possibly even growing stronger, strongly supports the notion that putting Korea into opposition with Japan is not about the immediate history that happened right after World War II, but an essential part of Korean identity today.

And I think you also see that with Korean-Americans, many of whom, at least in my personal experience, are very anti-Japanese. And it's almost as if being virulently anti-Japanese or supporting the establishment of comfort women statues in the United States is sort of proving a sense of Korean identity

for Korean-Americans.

So, the second question was about the political burden that ROK leaders face in pursuing Korea-Japan relations. Yeah, I really do agree with that. I think Korean leaders face a very un-permissive domestic political environment. They face these very passionate views, and you know, Korean government officials, Korean diplomats are very, very sensitive to the view of their people, and they also have a very aggressive press.

So these are all constraints on the freedom of action of Korean leaders to take any sort of initiative in Korea-Japan relations. And I should have explained better in my presentation; you know, one of the main reasons I suggest that it is sort of on the Japanese side to take initiative is because of these domestic constraints that exist on the Korean side. I think Japanese political leaders have much more freedom to take initiative in Korea-Japan relations.

That being said, an improved relationship is in the U.S. strategic interest, and it's going to be very important to encourage the Koreans to reciprocate any Japanese initiative on that.

MS. MOON: Thank you. I want to add a couple of things here just to thicken the stew, in a way. So far, there is this assumption that Koreans, especially younger Koreans are not decreasing their anti-Japanese sentiment, and there are many, many, many, many surveys that you could choose that support one way or the other.

There are surveys that show that there is a generational component to anti-Japanism -- primarily older generations having anti-Japanese sentiments that are stronger and more consistent and long-lived than younger; that the younger generations are more cosmopolitan, and have not necessarily pan-Asian identity, but at least a pan-Asian sensibility of sorts, usually through pop-culture.

So we can cut this in many ways. One thing I want to make very clear is that even when South Koreans do engage in nationalist rhetoric and the purchasing of nationalistic propaganda and commodities, that does

not mean that they don't actually have positive, constructive relationships with individual Japanese.

Japanese and South Korean NGOs, for example, on the environment, on peace, on women's issues, on a variety of issues work very well together, and they have worked very well together, even in the periods of very, very heavy civil society tensions. So I think we have to be very careful. It's dangerous to paint Korean civil society as this monolithic group that is anti-Japanese and vice versa -- Japanese toward the South Koreans. It's just not the reality.

I think there are individuals in South Korea in the civil society that have learned to be very, very strategic and manipulative about the sentiments. Japanese -- anti-Japanese sentiment, about issues of pro-Japanese collaborators in the past. And so we have to also separate civil society leaders who have their own agendas and their ideologies and therefore, lead their groups in certain ways that end up increasing the volume of -- you know, the vocal volume, the audio volume of anti-Japanism.

But that does not necessarily mean there's a high intensity -- I'm borrowing Jiun Bang's language -- it doesn't mean there's a high intensity of real hostility or enmity. Okay? Rhetoric is rhetoric. Action is action. What leaders say, civil society leaders say versus what people do in their own private lives with friends in Japan visiting them or Skyping them or working on projects with them, are very different things.

I also want to address here the issue -- I think it's been interesting -- the issue of Korean-Americans and the anti -- the nationalist sentiment regarding comfort women issues that have come up. This is a very complicated issue. It's not just, in my view, a matter of Korean-Americans identifying as ethnic Koreans, and therefore, exhibiting ethno-nationalism.

It has a lot to do with using specific issues that will give them a political voice in the American political environment. How many issues do Korean-Americans actually have that can get attention in Washington, D.C.? Not many.

The comfort women issue actually is one of them, because of the House resolution that was passed in 2000 -- what was it, 2007, 2008? Right? Because already Congress had acknowledged this issue, Korean-Americans jumped on this issue, and therefore, started putting up street signs, comfort women statues, et cetera.

Of course, there were Korean-Americans who led the HR-121 resolution, the activist movement. But it wasn't just Korean-Americans. And those Korean-Americans, especially the younger generation who are active in the Comfort Women House Resolution activism, and I've interviewed them for my own research. The younger generation in particular, did not want to focus ethnic Korean nationalism against the Japanese. They wanted to emphasize women's human rights, and they worked with over a hundred to 150 different NGOs and civil society groups in the United States who had nothing to do with Korea or Korean Americans, based on human rights and peace and justice issues.

So even if you have an issue that turns into a House resolution, it does not mean that nationalist rhetoric and nationalist sentiment necessarily drove it, because -- but it does mean that certain people who capture the media can frame it that way, and we have to be very careful in that analysis.

I want to ask one question toward Kayla. Could you give us a sense, based on your research, of the implications from the research -- how could -- because one thing I find interesting about going back into the archives is that for those of us who are dying to know more accurate information about North Korea, archival research, going back into history and seeing the actual documents can serve as a guiding light. So, give us some sense of implications from your research that would help us understand North Korea and its interactions with other neighbors better, today. And then, we'll go back to the audience.

(Break in recording)

MS. ORTA: Okay, apologies, since with the slides debacle, I was unable to finish talking about this. And I appreciate you asking the question so I can bring up the topic again and speak on it.

So, some of the specific points. So, I had mentioned the 1988 South Korean Olympics. And this is a

particularly interesting point, because here is North and South Korea engaging in very much what we refer to as a legitimacy war. And so through the documents, when you look at Inga Barguttell and you look at Bergmann's interaction, she's speaking with people from South Korea, constantly asking about what is the North Korean perspective.

And you're also seeing them speaking about whether or not the -- East Germany will be in the Olympics; whether or not East Germany will side with their fellow friend, North Korea, or if they will side with their, you know, technically ideological foes and actually attend the '88 Olympics. And in the end, they do attend the '88 Olympics, and North Korea boycotts the entirety of the Olympics.

And so this is one area where you can directly see the relationships and the maneuvers and the negotiations that are going on. And one of the things that's fascinating to see that follows is that because of Bergmann's situation, not only does she talk to the South Korean side and get the perspective of the '88 Olympics, but she also is involved in the North Korean's legitimacy war side where North Korea, in some sense, internationally retaliates to the fact that they were not included in the way that they think they should have been, or at all, in the Olympic. And that was by hosting -- in 1988, they hosted a large scholar meeting in North Korea where they invited over a hundred different scholars, mostly from communist countries to come to North Korea, to visit North Korea, travel North Korea and experience North Korea.

They also held a 1989 World Youth Festival, and this was a World Youth Festival for youth and scholars. And this was an invitation to all communist countries to invite hundreds upon hundreds of students. I mean, there's documents -- not specifically these, but other ones that I've worked with, that list the cost of just shipping, you know, the material that they're going to be writing on.

So, you know, like shipping note pads or shipping pencils and everything. And it's orders of over up a thousand (sic) so for students to participate. So, this is really fascinating, see, because Inga Barguttell was involved. She was one of the scholars who went to North Korea for that conversation before the Olympics, and then, she was one of the people involved in the planning committee and putting together for the World Youth Festival.

And so this is something interesting, because you can see the debate going back and forth and how that
(Inaudible).

(Simultaneous discussion)

MS. MOON: So you're talking about the competition between the north and south for --

MS. ORTA: Yes, right.

MS. MOON: -- international recognition and legitimacy?

MS. ORTA: Yes, yes.

MS. MOON: Okay. And actually, the conference -- I call it South Korea you know, is crazy about
conference diplomacy right now. Every time you go out to South Korea and Seoul, especially, every hotel
is -- major hotel seems to be sponsoring at least two, if not more (Laughter) international conferences.

And in a way, North Korea has its own version --

MS. ORTA: Exactly.

MS. MOON: -- whether it's in Taekwondo or whether it's in -- with youth.

MS. ORTA: Mm-hmm.

MS. MOON: Or whether it's music festivals.

MS. ORTA: Right.

MS. MOON: And so we see this kind of competition continuing.

MS. ORTA: And it's --

MS. MOON: Let's go -- go ahead.

MS. ORTA: Oh sorry. I was just going to say it's also the idea of North Korea fighting back through North
Korean characteristics. So, what is it that they're comfortable with? And you said it perfectly, the
conference style of engagement.

MS. MOON: Thank you. So, we'll go back to the audience. The lady back there?

(Inaudible portion)

MS. MOON: Can you please wait for the microphone?

SPEAKER: I'm sorry. Good afternoon. I'm Lois. And I was at another conference. I'm a journalist, as well. And it was on Asia -- Asians. And they were talking about the Japanese and the Chinese, that there's enmity between the two; so much so that when they pass each other's cities, they'll bash a window or break a window or do something against the other one.

And now, you're saying that possibly the Koreans have enmity against the Japanese. What is it that you think causes this between these two Asian groups to be against one, namely the Japanese?

MS. MOON: It's a very simple answer. Colonial past. Japan colonized South Korea for about 36 years. Japan committed unspeakable massacres in some parts of China, and also, established a Japan dominated government in part of -- in a region of China. So, past warfare and past colonial or quasi-colonial experiences have left this kind of a bitter taste in China and South Korea.

Unlike the German case, there was no international pressure for Japan to apologize for -- and recognize and apologize for some of these atrocities. Could we --

(Break in recording)

MR. HILL: Gregory Hill from Radio Free Asia. My question is about a fact finding question, open to the floor, concerning the North Koreans espionage activity and their cyber warfare capabilities. Are there any concrete facts that they have a technology transfer from China? Are there any concrete evidence that the Beijing government did provide assistance to their so-called invisible ally; to their brothers to do something that -- as a watchdog, to do the dirty jobs that the Chinese government might not want to do?

MS. MOON: Okay, we got it. Thank you. Another question?

(No response heard)

MS. MOON: Okay, I think this one is yours.

MS. JUN: Thank you for your question. So, we actually -- I was part of another CSIS project over the past two years. And we actually looked -- tried to look heavily into your question, specifically as to whether

you know, there was any support from, you know, Beijing, the government, or any related agencies giving direct -- either transfer or sort of like personnel assistance to building North Korea's cyber warfare program or other cyber operations programs.

And you know, this might be just a limitation of our open source research and the limitations of what we can do and cannot do, but we actually weren't able to find any direct evidence that that was the case.

And when we traced sort of how North Korea's thinking on cyber developed (sic), a lot of it is actually continuous from other domains of operations. So, you see their first cyber units being sort of a quasi-electronic warfare unit, which you know, started adopting some of these cyber elements into their mission. And so that's how they sort of naturally evolved into this new issue area.

And we weren't able to sort of pinpoint to any testimonies or direct evidence that there was any assistance from Beijing involved in that.

MS. MOON: Okay, thank you. I have one question for Mintaro, and then we're going to have to wrap up. Mintaro, I find it really interesting that in our earlier panel on identities and power, Jiun Bang had talked about the literal fabrication -- the facilitation through fabrication of nationalistic goods -- commercial items, whether tangible or intangible, that actually reproduces national -- anti Japanese nationalist sentiment, and -- or you could say anti whichever country's sentiment in many of these countries in Asia.

And yet, in your talk, you emphasized the need for people to people level reconciliation. So I'm wondering, how can people to people level reconciliation between Japan and Korea proceed, while there is also this growth and proliferation of the commodification of anti-Japanese goods, sentiments -- we could say propaganda pop culture items in South Korea, and then similarly, vice versa, in Japan?

MR. OBA: I don't think those trends are mutually exclusive, and I think it's indicative of the strong anti-Japanese sentiment that you're seeing that sort of commodification.

But I don't think it excludes any sort of people to people effort to have frank discussions about textbooks among historians, or something like that. I think as you pointed out, civil society is not monolithic, and so, the key is for initiative to happen in the other direction from this commodification in Japan and Korea. So, I don't think the two are exclusive.

MS. MOON: Okay. Maybe people in the audience can have a start up and do some crowd fund raising -- what is it, crowd sourcing, fund raising, whatever you call it? I'm not of this generation (Laughter) -- to create a commodification of peace and reconciliation between Japan and Korea tee-shirts and tourist -- you know, opportunities.

You can have a counter commodification to improve Japan-Korea relations. So on that note, we will end this panel and we'll move on to our last and final panel focusing on North Korea. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

(Recess)

MS. STRATTON: Hi, everyone. Sorry that break couldn't be as long as we'd like, but if everyone can just take their seats, please. Great, thank you. So what a fantastic discussion to take us into the final panel of the second Young and Brave Conference here at Brookings. My name is Sharon Stratton. I am the U.S. program officer for the North Korea Strategy Center, and I'm very excited to be moderating our last discussion.

So, we've saved perhaps one of the trickiest panels for the end, and I'm really looking forward to a very lively Q&A, so please save up all of your questions. I will shortly invite to the podium three young experts who are going to present three very different perspectives on North Korea and divisions. In this panel we're seeking to challenge some of our existing assumptions around issues of divisions related to North Korea, and not necessarily the obvious ones.

So we'll be looking at divisions of agency over how we get to interpret North Korea. We'll be looking at divisions, emerging generational divisions within North Korea, particularly looking at the younger

generation whose loyalty to the state is far more diminished in contrast than the elders. We'll be looking at divisions in opinions on the logic of North Korea's pursuit of parallel development of nuclear weapons and the economy. And finally we'll be looking at divisions of Korean people and Korean families who are at risk of never seeing family members again after decades of separation.

So, it's my great pleasure to introduce our first panelist, Buheung Hyeon, to the podium. Buheung is completing his degree in political science at Columbia University and he's going to kick off the discussion by bringing to us -- or bringing to the conference a North Korean perspective on North Korean policy making, which shouldn't be as novel as it sounds. But, nevertheless, so, Buheung, I'd like you to take to the podium. Thank you.

MR. Hyeon: Okay. Good afternoon. Let me start with Korean greeting. (Foreign language.) This is how Koreans say, "did you have good lunch?" So, okay. I would like to focus on three questions on my semi-academic research. The reason I call it semi-academic is because these are good topics, but I haven't started digging in deep, so I'm still formatting the format of my research or thesis. But I'm going to release some of my thoughts on North Korea today by doing this presentation.

So, the economy and the political landscape of North Korea has dramatically changed over the past 20 years. Sorry. But on those, the reason why I say it's 20 years is because I counted from mid-1990s. Before then we can divide it, the period of North Korea, into two different parts. The first one is from, you know, after the Korean War to the middle of the 1990s, or after Korean War to the death of the founder, Kim Il-sung, in 1995 and then we can count the other part from 1995 to today. Because it's not only the death of Kim Il-sung is not only significant because he was the founder, but it also, it was kind of omen of starting a new age of North Korea.

So my three questions are: What has changed in the past 20 years? The second one will be: Why is there no sign of a people's uprising in North Korea? And the last one will be: What are the most effective way to help common North Koreans?

So my first question is: What has changed in the past 20 years? There are a lot of changes. We can count the change of economics. We can count the change of people's mentality or, you know, the diplomatic relationship. A lot of things. But my first point of this question is, the collapse of central distribution system. So I already mentioned it in early this morning, what it was. But let me go in deeper.

So the central distribution system is kind of a symbol of socialism or communism in North Korea. The government promised the people to provide food and freedom. And they kept up this system until middle 1990s, but because of lot of reasons, including diplomatic -- cutting off diplomatic ties because of the first nuclear issues and the economic hardships, the North Korean government couldn't sustain this system. So finally they gave up this system and the -- because of the stopping of this centralized distribution system, many North Koreans faced difficulty finding food. That's one of the reasons why a lot of North Koreans left the country just to find food in China and Russia and other countries.

Later on, at the beginning of this stage, North Korean government persecuted markets. Because of the shortage of food, people started to sell their goods in markets, so very early stage of market economy was formed during 1990s. In the early 2000, North Korean government realized that they cannot support their people with government effort. So they decided to distribute it. By adopting the July 1st economic improvement in 2001, North Korean government officially adopted the market system. After that, today, it has been over 15, 16 years now. There are over, I don't know how many, but thousands of small and big markets, all over in North Korea. And the markets are very actively run by individuals and the powerful organizations like military and the party and the cabinet.

But the reason I choose this point is because the collapse of a central distribution system is kind of -- it means that the country is no longer a socialistic country and I see, today I see, there is no chance to return or go back to this system again in the future.

The second one is the emergence of a middle class. Because of the collapse of the central distribution system, as we just, you know, as I just mentioned to you, marketization occurred in North Korea naturally. And because of the market activities, a lot of people engage in the market on trade with China. And a new

social class was emerged through this period, which is called the merchant class or *donju*. Donju means money holders, those who made a fortune during, you know, with trading with China. This class, the characteristic of this class, is they have money, but they don't have political power in the society, and that they are very aware of the fact that their fortune can be taken by the government any time if the government wants. So their insecurity and anxiety actually is a problem I see, and it could be the factor that they might use against the government in the future if the government tries to change or, you know, take their fortune or destroy it for the sake of their national security.

The third one will be: decline of a loyalty towards the government. I also just briefly talk about this point this morning. So, the generation gap between the older generation and new generation is pretty large. It's not like, you know, I don't know. I forgot my example, but it's pretty big. (Laughter) So, the young people especially, the market generation we call it, *jangmadang* generation in Korean, those who were born during the late '80s, and the early '90s, they don't have the memory of receiving, you know, gifts from the government. So because I discussed this in this morning's session, I will skip it. I will skip this section.

And the second question is, why there is no sign of a people's uprising in North Korea. I have been thinking with this -- thinking about this question for a long, long, long time until today. But I would like to share some, you know, thoughts that came across my mind. The first is the devastated economy. If you are so hungry, this is my personal experience, as well, if you are so hungry and there no food and -- you know, there's no food to eat, you cannot focus on anything. Your concentration is just focused on food, not anything else. And then if you are so hungry you cannot be the master of your social and economic and political life. North Koreans are in that situation.

Because of the poor condition, there -- all their concentration is focused on food and the market activities. Actually, we just talked about emergence of marketization in North Korea, but it's still, you know, the markets in North Korea is still has the form of early age economy. Compared to Myanmar, Philippines and Laos, those Southeastern Asian countries, North Korean government is very -- North Korean economy is very poor, poorly developed, still struggling to grow -- to find its way. And the second one is the absence of independence, social organizations. This is very big point because there is -- North Korea

is, I say, a government of -- it's a country of a government associations. From elementary school to nursing home you must be part of an organization in North Korean society. You cannot escape from the system, which means you cannot create your own independent non-government organizations.

The last one is the absence of a knowledge regarding democracy. In order to verify my claim, I checked all the North Korean textbooks from elementary to high school. I checked that their virtue of a communist and the history of a Korean and a lot of books, but I couldn't find any notion or message of democracy in their text books, which means the government doesn't teach it at all.

My last question is: What are the most ways to help a common North Koreans? I would say empower people through information. So information on North Korean affairs, information is very hot topic today. A lot of defector organizations keeps sending information into North Korea. At the early stage, maybe 10 or 15 years ago, we send -- defector organizations sent information with a video tape. And then later they moved it to CDs and DVDs. And today we send information through USB and the SD, micro-SD memory chips. And the defectors that I met this summer in South Korea, those who just escaped from North Korea maybe less than one year, they confessed that they watched a lot of, a lot of, a lot of dramas and movies. They even watch more movies and dramas than me. Because I have no time to watch it, but they just circulate tons it. Foreign media is circulating around the country.

Today I would insist, we need to upgrade the information. Upgrading information is important. You know? We need it to send documentaries about the Korean War and the development of South Korea and a lot of, you know, social and political messages. We needed some information. The reason why I'm saying this is because now, North Koreans are ready to understand it and the concept and the democracy.

Let me finish my presentation with last point, relax economic sanctions. It is important. I totally agree with, you know, the sanctions imposed on North Korea to punish by sanctions, but if the sanction is related to -- the economic sanction related to North Koreans' daily life, we should think about it again. Our enemy, the common enemy of a democratic world is Kim Jong-un, not the people. We try to cut off Kim Jong-un's arms and legs, but not the people. Kim Jong-un will never die by hunger, but the people.

So, you know, I insist that that you know, when we are formulating a policy toward North Korea, we always think about the humanitarian aid, whatever there is, you know, whatever -- in what kind of situation, the humanitarian aid shouldn't be stopped. Thank you.

MS. STRATTON: Thank you, Buheung. I'd like to invite our second speaker to the podium. Benjamin Silberstein is currently completing his Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania and, as mentioned in the first panel, as a native Swede, he's everybody's friend, which --

MR. SILBERSTEIN: I try.

MS. STRATTON: -- which I think is a really important thing to keep in the back of your mind in his presentation. Ben is about to do an analysis on North Korea's *byungjin* line policy. And he's going to challenge us to rethink our assumptions about whether it's inherently bound to fail or whether it might, indeed, be seen as successful.

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Okay, thank you very much. This is not transmitting over there right now, I think. Oh, there we go, perfect. Okay. So I would like to start by asking a quick question, and by a show of hands, how many people here have heard of the Tumen Economic Development Zone? Quite a lot of people. That's great.

I'd like to tell you briefly about my visit to the zone this summer. I was fortunate enough to get to go inside. Okay. I should probably explain what it is first. It's a complex of factories near a city called Tumen on the border between China and North Korea. So basically you have Chinese factories with North Korean workers who manufacture a whole range of products. And when I went to this factory, I told the people that I met that I was interested in maybe investing because that was a good way of getting people to chat. And I asked a few of these, a few of the Chinese heads of some of these companies, like, what are the obstacles you're facing? How are things going for you, just very generally? They said that, well, production is going very well and we're actually making quite a bit of money from this, but the one thing we wish is for more North Korean workers to come, but when we solicit our North Korean partners for

more people, they say that, well, it's hard to get people to come because the people with the right qualifications have far better opportunities inside North Korea than they do in your factory.

And this struck me as very interesting, especially at the time. This was in late June of this year. At that time, a lot of newspapers and a lot of news reports and analysts were talking about the newly, still fairly recently, adopted sanctions against North Korea that resulted from the fourth nuclear test. And the big thing here was, well, China finally seems to be on board. China is finally cutting North Korea off. All their high officials are claiming that this time it's different, so quite a lot of people were thinking that, well, now North Korea surely must be in a very squeezed and tight situation. And that's certainly not how it seemed to me.

And today I'm going to try to bridge these very divergent images of, on the other hand, a North Korea that is deeply stagnant and where things are continuously getting worse and with sort of a different take on looking at how are things actually progressing inside North Korea, and this whole concept of *byungjin*. I am using it as sort of a framework to answer a very broad question of how is North Korea really doing, because it's kind of pointless to ask unless you can contrast it to something. So *byungjin* in very few words means this dual track development of the economy and nuclear weapons. So the idea basically is that you don't have to choose one or the other, you can do both. And this policy was first -- it first came up in the early 1960s in North Korea. It was revived by Kim Jong-un in 2013 and it was highlighted again during the Seventh Party congress in North Korea earlier this year. So the basic idea of my presentation is that, well, if you want to evaluate how things are looking inside North Korea or for North Korea in general, you have to first look at what the North Korean government strategy is. And I think that *byungjin* offers a fairly useful framework for doing that.

So, and my basic argument is that North Korea is absolutely not a wealthy country. It's very important to remember that I, and I think all of us who have been on stage today, we come from a generation of people who are interested in Korea, that very much started reading about it when there was still a famine going on in the country, so what I am about to talk about today really needs to be contrasted against a very, very dire background. But I would say, briefly, that although North Korea is not a wealthy country, it's also not

stagnant, and I think that the basic strategy that the regime has pursued for at least the past three years of developing the economy and nuclear weapons in tandem, actually has a pretty smart core. The basic thought is, if you can put more of your resources into developing a nuclear deterrent, after that you can kind of relax. You don't need to continuously update your army or you don't need to keep pushing for the conventional forces to upgrade their equipment. And you can spend resources elsewhere.

So I'm not going to go in that much into detail on nuclear weapons, because for anyone who's read newspapers in the past few weeks, it should be fairly clear that North Korea is very well on track to having a functioning nuclear bomb. So things are going well on that front. (Laughter) And I am going to, instead, focus on the economic side of *byungjin* and so first of all, when Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011-2012, a lot of people were hoping for a Deng Xiaoping moment that Kim Jong-un would get up on a stage in Pyongyang and say, well, okay, we're abandoning the old line of hardcore central planned economy. It doesn't matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice, and so on. That hasn't happened. But, when you read North Korean sources, when you read economics journals from North Korea, for example, when you read North Korean media, there has actually been quite an interesting change of rhetoric. And I'm usually very skeptical about these things, but the more I've read North Korean materials on economic policy, the more convinced I've grown that, well, something is happening. It's still unclear what in concrete terms, but for -- just a very quick example, in the -- how many people have read *Chosun Sinbo*. Yes, a few. That's wonderful. It's a newspaper based in Japan which is very loyal to the North Korean regime.

They interviewed a North Korean official in 2013 about the so-called Our Style Economic Management Method, which was implemented in 2012. This North Korean official stated that -- and this is a semi-quote, under this new system, individual enterprises take responsibility for production methods, and workers and farmers, interestingly enough, receive distribution of gains in accordance with the amount that they work. And I read one South Korean scholar who is a very major authority on this area say that these reforms grant almost complete autonomy to companies in production outside of state planning, and production outside of state indicators.

So one hotly debated component of these economic reforms was in agriculture. There is not a lot of evidence on this, but at least there have surfaced a few instances of, sort of, rumors of agricultural reforms in North Korea where work teams on collective farms get to keep a far greater share of their own production than they used to, and they can then sell it onto the market. Another component of this is supposedly shrinking the size of work teams on collective farms so that with smaller work teams, people have an increased incentive to work harder. When I traveled to the North Korean border this summer, one person I was traveling with pointed out to me, across the border that, well, when I was there at the same place a few years ago, there were a whole lot more people on the field at the same time. I'm not sure that I'm entirely convinced by just this type of observation where you're seeing around just five people working the same plot at once, but it's worth thinking about.

So, also under Kim Jong-un, there's been a general sense of, in a way more formal and harder control of the markets in the sense that the North Korean government has, for several years, increased things such as taxation on markets and formalized the market system that Buheung just talked about.

So, yeah, so how has this worked in general? It's very hard to summarize that within the 12-minute span that we have, but I'd like to introduce a couple pieces of data just to give a general sense. Here is data that I've borrowed from the *Daily NK*, a South Korean online publication that publishes news from inside North Korea. I'm going to step over here for a second, or try to use this. It's not working, but if you look at sort of the latter years of this data, you can see that there's a steady increase in prices for both foreign currency and for rice until around 2012 where the market is still pretty volatile, but less so than in the past. The continuous inflation seems to have stopped. And I want to especially hone in on the past two and a half years. And the reason I do this is that the food and agricultural organization of the United Nations claimed, a few weeks ago, that -- or a couple of months by now, I guess, that the agricultural production in North Korea, this year, was lower than it had been for the past four years.

Reasonably, if that was true, if access to food in North Korea was lower than it had been for several years, prices should be going up. But they just don't seem to be shooting up as much as one would have expected. So what I'm trying to show here is a general sense of market stability compared to the past.

There could be several reasons for this. One is just more the regime letting market mechanisms function in a freer way that, in other words, if supply seems to be going down from certain farms or even in the country as a whole, then people are able to import more from China. That's one possibility. Or another possibility is that, well, maybe these changes that we have very few hard facts about, but that may have happened are actually having an impact.

The last, I'm going to sort of rush through this, the last piece of information I'd like to bring to you all is about trade between North Korea and China. Again, when I went to the Sino-Korean border this summer, the expectations that I carried with me was that I was going to be able to see stark changes having happened as a result of worsening relations between China and North Korea. There is also a think tank in DC called CSIS that published a study where they used satellite pictures, trying to show train cars in North Korea and China standing still, not moving across the border the same way they had the year before that.

So, when I went to Dandong in China, which borders Sinuiju in North Korea, it's the absolute majority of trade between China and North Korea goes through this city, I decided to count trucks, to look at, well, how many trucks are actually crossing the border, and what does that tell us? On a normal day, according to most people I've spoken to, and according to a lot of news reports, around 200 trucks go across the border each day. I got up at 6:00 a.m., went to the bridge and started counting. And around 8:00 a.m. in the morning I saw one postal truck. And I figured, well, that doesn't really matter. You're going to keep sending mail to each other no matter what the international political situation is like. But for the remainder of the hours that I spent at the border, I counted around 90 trucks crossing the bridge and another 40 or so going the other way, into North Korea. And overall, when I left the bridge area and I went to look around the city, I saw lines and lines and lines of Chinese trucks lining up to go into the customs area to cross the border -- to cross the bridge into North Korea. And I am going to show you just a few pictures of what this looked like.

So overall, I saw way more than 200 trucks. I think it's important to not overplay this very anecdotal piece of evidence. The picture I am trying to drive home here is not that sanctions have not had any impact whatsoever, because we don't know that for sure. I am trying to show that the idea of North Korea

as completely cut off from China in terms of trade and from the international economic system is just not entirely correct. Here are some other trucks crossing the border. This is the scene around Dandong, central Dandong, the customs area is right to the left over there. And these lines of trucks cover, literally, the entire streets around this area.

I talked to a bunch of people who -- one North Korean truck driver from Haeju among others, who I -- he asked if I was really from Sweden. I showed him my ID card just to make sure that I promise you, I'm not from the U.S. And not a single person that I asked -- and I asked very general questions so, sort of, how are things going? I wouldn't run up and be like, oh, do you think that your country's -- that the sanctions against your country are working? That's not something that you want to -- it's not an everyday kind of chat to have. (Laughter) But I would ask questions, like, well, so have things changed much in the recent -- in the past few months? Is traffic, like, does it seem to be a little calmer than usual? Not a single person that I asked these questions to, no one said, well, yeah, a big thing happened in April or March. Like, that was not the impression that people seemed to have who work in this field around the border.

So with this last picture, I'm going to conclude. And since we are in Washington, D.C., I would like to mention just one or two potential policy implications. I think the biggest one and the most important one for me is, if people think that North Korea will automatically collapse and go away in just by sort of imploding under its own weight, I think that's very much -- that a very naïve hope. And I think that when people ask, how long can North Korea go on like this? I think the answer is, maybe for longer than some would expect. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. STRATTON: Thank you, Benjamin. So I'd like to introduce the final speaker of the panel and of the conference, Dan Aum. Dan is, let me get this right, assistant director.

MR. AUM: There's nobody actually under me, so it doesn't really matter.

MS. STRATTON: Okay. I currently am, right now. So Dan is going to be looking at the division of Korean people and families. This is an issue that's recently attracted attention in the U.S. in recent years, as

Korean-Americans seek to be reunited with family members who remain in the north. So, over to you, Dan.

MR. AUM: Thanks so much, Sharon. And I want to start off by thanking Dr. Moon and Paul for taking a chance on us. Let me start with the caveat that, you know, not only are these my personal views, they don't reflect the National Bureau of Asian Research, I can't even guarantee that they're young or brave.

So when one of my colleagues saw that I was doing this, and she's actually in the audience, she said, why do you have to be brave to do this? When I heard the question, I was relieved that she didn't challenge the young part. And so, sure, I can carry the young part, but when I think about brave I think about folks like my good friend and colleague, Buheung. So it probably didn't come out in the introduction, and what you might not know is, in order to be here today, he had to start from North Korea, trek through China, stop in Burma, then Laos, and then back to Burma, and then finally took a plane to South Korea. From there he went to the Republic of Texas, as was mentioned earlier. And he left with some of his family. That said, some of his family still remains in North Korea today, and I want to talk a little bit about that.

So at the end of this presentation I want to make three points. So one is that in addition to the official inter-Korean state family reunions, there's a whole swath of opportunity to help support unofficial reunions. That's point one. Point two is that under international law, there is an implied right to family reunifications for refugees. And then third is, I'm going to offer a couple of menu of options for how people can take action on this matter.

So let me share a statistic that I found surprising. So 19, since 1995, there have been a total of 19 official state-to-state inter-Korean family reunions. These are organized by both North Korea and South Korea, of course. And in total, of from the 19 reunions, there have been a total of less than 20,000 individuals who have actually met. So what that means is, of the 130,000 plus who have registered in South Korea to be reunited, a fraction of them have actually met, and this isn't even counting the 100,000 plus Korean-Americans who are part of the larger diaspora who haven't been reconnected with their family. So there's a very small sliver of folks who have actually been able to connect after being broken by the Korean War.

But these Korean reunions, as many of you know, are inconstant. They're subject to the sensitivities of the inter-Korean political dynamic. And at the end of the day, they have to receive the approval of one, dear Kim Jong-un. Because these are inconstant, thousands of others have actually sought alternate routes in order to reunite with their family. So I'm going to talk a little bit about those.

So there are two main ones. So one is a privately arranged reunion, usually carried through a broker and where they meet at an intermediary country, and usually China. So a broker finds somebody in North Korea. They contact them. They reach the other members of the family, and they arrange for them to meet somewhere near the border in China.

The second route is through escapes from North Korea. Now, we typically, when we think of Korean War reunions, we typically think of the Korean War generation, the elderly folks who were a family during the Korean War and then were split thereafter or sometime during. But what we forget sometimes is there's this large swath of North Korean refugees who are on a daily basis being divided by the current policies that are in place. And so what I wanted to do is expand the aperture for us to realize that family reunions are not just for the 60, 70, 80 plus folks, but they're for folks like Buheung and other North Korean families that are being divided now.

So why do I mention these? Oh, quick, let me -- I'll give you a little recap of what the unofficial family reunions look like. So for the privately arranged ones, so the brokers meet. Usually they take a couple of days to meet, but they have to go back, so they're temporary. In terms of total reunions, there have been less than 2000, around 1700. But these are only the ones that have been reported by the Ministry of Unification that tallies these results. The reason why they tally these is that the South Korean government supports, financially, these efforts so that if you're able to confirm a family member in North Korea, and then you're actually able to meet them, then the South Korean government will defray those costs for the family members.

Despite the support, there's been a diminishment in the total number of meetings. So it peaked in 2008 when there were about 314, but by the time it was 2013 there were a total of 34. There are a number of

reasons for this, which I won't go into all the details, but in part it's the increased securitization of the Sino-North Korean border, in part the increased military presence on both sides of the aisle. Also, generally, because there's more autonomy within North Korea, people are finding that they can maintain their sustenance there. But there are other reasons.

So, the second one is defections. Now, you know, the quick of it is that North Korean refugees flee North Korea for a number of reasons and they, like Buheung, usually end up in a third country where they can eventually find an embassy or, through privately arranged channels, you know, a plane, that they can arrive in a safe haven country. The problem is that for many North Koreans who do escape, they still have the fear of their family left behind. In North Korea there is a policy of guilt by association, where if one member of the family commits a political crime, they're up to three generations of the family members can be sent to political prisons for that one individual person. And so while for individuals, refugees can escape, they are still left with the memory that their family is not reunited.

So, defections, too, have decreased significantly in recent years, and we've just started to see a little bit of an uptick this year. Just to give you a couple numbers, in 2014 there were a total of around 1400, but between 2008 and 2013, the average was 24 to 2900, again, for similar reasons of border security and the increase both the financial and human costs to these defections. You know, when we do these, you never want to forget that there are actual human implications to these and there's a market for this, and brokers are engaged in this high-risk, high-reward type of market. There are certainly reports of both brokers and refugees who escape get caught and sent back to North Korea where it's been regularly documented that they face harassment, torture, and sometimes even death.

So why do I mention these? So there are a couple of advantage to these compared to the formal inter-Korean unions. One of them is that they're private and you have more autonomy. For the inter-Korean reunions, you have both North Korean minders and other people surveilling what's going on. If you meet privately in China you have, you know, a whole room to yourself and you can do, say, think whatever you like. The other one is, I mentioned before, it doesn't require the permission of the North Korean government, and this is also self-selective. What I mean by that is, even for those who have signed up to

be part of the lottery system to be reunified, not everybody can meet. As I mentioned before there was 130,000 that signed up, and more than half of those people have deceased. And so given the total of 20,000 people, there's a lot of people who don't make it through that lottery system. But even when they do, and when these inter-Korean family reunions are arranged, only a couple hundred, a handful, of people actually get to meet. And certainly on the North Korean side it's pretty well-known that it's given as a political favor to those that the regime favors.

And so in this sense, all you need, and it's a recurring theme here, all you need is money in China. Money talks in China. And so these are family reunions that can happen today if you have the money. So these are the two alternate routes, aside from the official inter-Korean family reunions.

So I have a legal background. I'm sort of an IR adoptee, but there is a saying in legal lore that if you have the facts on your side, you pound the facts. If you have the law on your side, you pound the law. If you have neither on your side, you pound the table. (Laughter) Fortunately for us we have a little bit of law here. So under international law, there is no general recognition for the protection of a family reunification. But, that said, it's a fundamental tenant under international law that the state must protect family unity.

So I'll take you through a couple of specific provisions. So, for instance, Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that the family is the fundamental and natural group unit of society such so that the state must protect that unity. And this language is repeated across other international instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, you know, the ICCPR and so forth. So you combine that with the existing refugee convention where there's a clear prohibition on forcibly repatriating, forcibly sending back, individuals back to countries where the definition of refugee being, if you have a well-founded fear of persecution owing to race, you know, race, religion, nationality, membership of a social political class. So there are these set of conditions, and if you fit that condition, the state is prohibited from sending you back to that country where you might face those conditions. And then the third piece of law is the convention on the rights of the child. Now, the convention on the rights of the child is the only specific text that refers to family reunification. And in this instance, they say

that family reunification requires states to deal with these applications for reunification in a positive, humane, and expeditious manner. Okay. That's a lot of law out there.

So what does that all mean, right? What happens when we put it into the pressure cooker? What comes out? So, the jurisdiction that takes -- that has looked at family reunification cases the most often is the European Court on Human Rights. And while what the decision by that court isn't authoritative, or doesn't have authority over China or the other third party countries that are forcibly repatriating, but it does in Russia, the European court is seen as a persuasive authority when reasoning on similar arguments. And so what do they say?

So, briefly, they balance the individual rights with the state's right to protect and secure its own borders. Naturally, right? So the balancing test that they come up with is threefold. One is whether or not the divided member can enjoy their family unity elsewhere. That's number one. Two, whether it's impossible or extremely difficult for them to continue that family relationship they had before they were split. And then three, whether the member was separated involuntarily.

So for the sake of time, I'll cut to the chase. A North Korean refugee hits all three of those prongs. They left and they can't be reunited without a fear of being persecuted. There's a high bar for them to do that. And then, finally, the situation in North Korea is such that, any return or continuation there would be involuntary.

So, what to do with this law? We have great law. How do we execute it is probably the most interesting part. And so there are many options, and much of it is collated from the great work that researchers have already done broadly on the question of refugee repatriation, including Roberta Cohen who used to be at Brookings. And she's done a lot of work here. And so it's essentially two -- there's a two-part system. One is initiation and engagement, and then two is dropping the hammer. So the first would be initiating with the countries involved that serve as the intermediary countries where refugees come through. So, right, that would be China, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, et cetera, et cetera. And then, with the stakeholder countries where there are separated families, South Korea, the UK, the U.S. You gather them together

and have somebody who is an objective and distinguished jurist, for instance, someone at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and have them start a dialogue on how to facilitate these exchanges.

One argument to make towards the Chinese government officials would be to say, look, these brokerages, these defections, happen because you have security officials willing to take bribes. So as part of your anti-corruption campaign, let's monetize this. U.S., Korea, UK, we'll pay China to help facilitate to get the refugees out and through to a safe haven country where they're accepted.

So I'll, again, for a time, let me skip to the hammer. So there are a couple of options. Talking, talking, and figuring out a way, as China says, to collaborate on human rights issues and not just criticize. Should these countries fail to implement these terms, there -- I'm thinking of three broad options and I'll just hit high points.

So, one would be to raise the issue of forcible repatriation before UN human rights committees, and start naming specific countries by name. So prior to the UN Commission of Inquiry that created this great report on North Korean human rights, usually the report would criticize the action of countries that repatriate, but wouldn't name China by name. Upping the pressure here would be one way to do that.

The second thing would be to bring this question before the International Court of Justice. And so there's a process where the UN General Assembly can send a legal question about international law to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. Now it's non-binding. It's an advisory opinion, but this decision could be later used in the application of whether or not China and all the other third party countries are involved in this forcible repatriation.

And I'll end with the last point, which is, I mentioned the UN COI. So it wasn't until Justice Kirby, for the first time on UN letterhead, wrote a letter to President Xi Jinping forewarning that your officials could be responsible for the crime of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity for the forcible repatriation. So this isn't refugee convention stuff. This isn't regular international human right stuff, this is international criminal law, which means individuals possibly could be prosecuted in an international court.

So I end this by just noting that I read a recent report that there were 30 North Korean refugees who were caught and repatriated from China to North Korea during the summer. And there was a recent report about their conditions from being beaten up by prison guards to, if they collapse, what the prison guards make them beat each other up. And so my hope and my point in presenting these options is that if these infrastructures are in place and if these processes are in place, then maybe one day we'd have them come here and speak and tell their story rather than having them languish in a jail. Thank you.

(Applause)

MS. STRATTON: Thank you, Dan. In the interest of time I'd like to invite all of the panelists to come straight up to the table and take their seats. We'll go straight into a Q&A. Before you ask your question, please state your name and your affiliation, and make your question a question. We've been sitting here listening to presentations all day, so please try and make your question very short and clear for our panelists to answer. So I'm going to take a couple at a time, and if you could -- if there's someone specifically that you'd like to address your question to, please make that known, as well. Yes? Can we take this question?

MR. MARSHALL: Michael Marshall, Global Peace Foundation. A question for Mr. Silberstein. In the Soviet Union, prior to its collapse, it was often said that it was a system of totalitarianism tempered by corruption. In North Korea, with the rise of the donju class and the acceptance of marketization to a certain degree, I think we're beginning to see the rise of corruption as state officials get payoffs for entrepreneurs to launch their businesses. I mean, these are the things that I've read and you read. What evidence have you seen of this, either yourself directly or with colleagues of yours who have traveled in the North?

MS. STRATTON: Sorry. So, is there someone else with another question so we can take a batch? Or, if not, I can just get Ben to hop straight in. Okay. Ben, do you want to just go straight in?

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Sure. So your question is if there's any tangible evidence that that's sort of the totalitarian character of North Korea is breaking down because of corruption and similar phenomena?

MR. MARSHALL: (Inaudible 0:54:51.)

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Yeah.

MR. MARSHALL: (Inaudible 0:54:52.)

MR. SILBERSTEIN: Oh, I think, first of all, I think that Buheung would be a far better person to answer this than me, but I think corruption from everything that I've read and everyone I've talked to about this topic, it's been pretty unanimously clear that corruption is a very important part of how the North Korean economy functions, and I think there's an interesting argument here as to, is that, maybe, a good thing, given the fact that rules, at least in the past, have been very prohibitively harsh? So I think it's an ongoing scholarly debate whether corruption can actually further economic growth and things like that. But I think the answer is yes.

MS. STRATTON: Thank you, Ben. I'm going to put a question to Buheung, if you don't mind. Buheung, you spoke about the importance of providing information to North Koreans as a means to empowering North Koreans and, in a sense, I think prompting a sort of awakening. I read an article, recently, in the *Asia Times*, written by Dr. Katy Oh who spoke about, one of the key causes of political stability in North Korea being the concept of inertia. People just live their lives sort of one ordinary day after the other, and particularly at the risk of punishment, there's no real sort of impetus for them to cause any change. So this concept of inertia as being one of the key factors for political stability in North Korea. Do you think that there's a sort of inertia that we're stuck in as the international policy making community with regards to North Korea in terms of the possibilities that we see available in North Korea?

MR. HYEON: So, what was your first question? Sorry, I missed it.

MS. STRATTON: So, my question is, people ask why hasn't the regime collapsed? Why haven't we seen an uprising? And it was proposed in an article in the *Asia Times* that the concept of inertia is a really powerful factor. People are just living one ordinary day after the other.

MR. HYEON: Right, right. Right.

MS. STRATTON: Do you think that as an international policymaking community we're also stuck in our

own sort of inertia? We're kind of –

MR. HYEON: Mm-hmm. Okay. I see. The reason why they live just day-by-day is because they have no chance to interact with other communities. I think, you know, a lot of North Koreans, they never left the country. Like, they never have chance to visit other countries, maybe except those who have families or business, or if you are lucky enough to be a government officer who can -- who have a chance to visit, you know, other countries. And in terms of the information thing, I would say that information -- people really watch, you know, people really are interested in outside of the world and they just don't have the chance to access it and thankfully, today we hear a lot of, you know, testimonies and then evidence from -- we collected from other defectors.

I was in Seoul for the summer to meet those new defectors who just, you know, escaped. And their testimonies are amazing. I see clear evidence that the society -- like the willingness of people obtaining more knowledge and gaining more -- satisfied their interest about the outside world. And the international community, I think, we can, you know, now we are helping those activities and that we need to focus on it more. And I just remember that that -- a friend of mine who escaped North Korea, not with me, but he graduated high school with me. He once told me, we needed to bomb North Korea with information. That's the only way that we can crack down the regime.

MS. STRATTON: Thank you, Buheung. Yes, we'll take this question from the front. Thanks.

KAYLA: Hi. Thank you for your presentation. My name is Kayla. I'm from Georgetown, a student at the Georgetown University, and my question is to Mr. Hyeon. So you talked about providing and continuing to provide food and commodity aid to North Korea as a means to help the common people, but is there a way to ensure that those goods are directly delivered to the people? And, if not, if there's no way to find out, then how can we counter the argument that, you know, the aids are going to support the regime?

MR. HYEON: Okay. That question is not new, because we have talked about that issue for decades. The first reason, I think if we, in Korean, I would say, in Korean, we (foreign language), which means, if you

buttoned your first button in the wrong place, which means, when you are providing humanitarian aid to North Korea in the middle of the '90s, we didn't ask. We didn't actually demand at all -- we didn't send the people to monitor, you know, those process. We just said, oh, they are hungry. We should provide food. So South Korea and the United States and a lot of nations, they helped North Korea. But we didn't actually monitor it. After, you know, doing this aid for years, we later realized, those humanitarian aids actually went to, you know, distributed it to wrong groups, like military or the party members. And especially the powerful politicians in North Korea, they actually made a lot of profit by selling those humanitarian aids in the market. So it's not only me but a lot of people in -- we insist that when we provide a humanitarian aid into North Korea, we have to ask. We have to put a condition on this before we send our money or food. Ask the North Korean government, are you going to -- okay, you ask us for money or food, especially food, we -- this is our condition. We want to see the scene of distributing this food. And the, as we know, North Korea just had a big flood past month in the Hamgyong province, where a majority of defectors have their family, North Korean government asked the South Korea, I don't think they directly asked the South Korea, but international world to aid it, to help, you know, those -- to recover those situations. And I think it's good chance to test or, you know, to test those methods, because they first asked us to help. Thank you.

MS. STRATTON: Thank you. Yes, we'll take this question in the middle.

DAISY: Hi, I'm Daisy. I'm a medical student at Georgetown University. I actually have two questions, if that's okay, for Mr. Hyeon and for everyone else. My first question is, you mention that there are these defectors that have defected relatively early or if they did earlier in their childhood and have had the chance to grow up elsewhere, in China or in South Korea. And I'm actually aware of, there's this organization called Korean American Sharing Movement, and they invite North Korean defectors who are currently college students, or grad students in South Korea, and invite them here to multiple organizations to learn about different channels of democracy and stuff. And from what I understand, it's a pretty new organization, but I understand that there have been efforts to educate these North Korean defectors. I just wonder, and from what I have -- so I interned there before entering med school, and from what I have understood from just talking to these defectors that they have different things that they want

to do personally, but it didn't really make me think that there were active movements who, like, really stayed together to have a goal towards, like, a concerted goal towards how they can make a change back in North Korea. So I just wonder, you know, what are some realistic ways that they could start thinking about, you know, staying together and keeping that in mind as they develop personally, themselves, at the same time as coping with their trauma of going from there to here. So that's my first question. And my second question is, in your presentation, Buheung, you mentioned that one of the reasons people, you know, live day-to-day and don't really have this incentive to, you know, make an uprising is because they are too hungry. They are just too tired to do anything else other than, you know, staying alive, I also understand that there are North Koreans that are more on the upper end of the SES and they -- maybe they have a different reason for not --

MS. STRATTON: Sorry. I'm so sorry to cut you off. Can you just make that question really succinct?

DAISY: Yeah, so how could you incentivize these non-starving North Koreans to contribute to, perhaps, making an uprising? Thanks.

MR. HYEON: Yes, that's a good question, but because of the time constraint, can I answer your question after this session, or, you know, if you have same question, you can come to me with her, as well. Thank you.

MS. STRATTON: Do we have time for any more questions, or should I -- yes? Okay. Dr. Moon, please.

DR. MOON: We'll make this the last question since I don't have the last word. My colleague, Paul Park, will have the last word, closing the conference. My question is for Ben. I'm curious what your thoughts would be, because you are giving us some food for thought about, what if North Korea were to "succeed" and we can debate forever what that means, in its own, so-called, its own, you know, economic progress, its reconstruction? They never want to use the word reform, but they like the word economic development or, you know, reconstruction. In many ways, when I read critiques of *byungjin* or any kind of economic reform efforts in North Korea in the past, you know, 10 years or so, I think, at least in the

U.S., we seem to have a really short attention span in terms of the timeline of how to measure success, progress, in which sectors, over what time periods. So what you said today made me think, well, should we have a longer timeline in which to see what happens with *byungjin* or/and other economic efforts? So can you give us a sense of, right now you've looked at about three years of *byungjin*. What do you foresee in the next five, possibly 10, possibly 15, given that many of us believe North Korea will continue to exist and muddle through?

MR. SILBERSTEIN: I think that's a really interesting question, and I think that one thing that people sometimes forget when we discuss North Korea is that the world is sadly, but truly, filled with a lot of poor countries, that where we wouldn't be asking -- I have never been to a policy seminar and heard the question, how long can Cambodia survive and muddle through been asked. It's just not something that we talk about in that way. I think that what we've seen in the North Korean case is that, really, I tried to bring up some examples of reforms that truly nobody really knows exactly how deep they've gone, but I think that what we've seen overall is that when -- as long as the government, sort of, stays away from the market, things tend to improve overall. And I think that's one of the most important factors of Kim Jong-un's tenure is that Kim Jong-un has not attacked the market unlike Kim Jong-il did, and I think that's a very conscious move.

So, looking at it 15 years down the road, I tend to think that when people speculate about the future, let's say 7 out of 10 times people tend to be wrong. To be generous. But I think the long-term perspectives, sort of end game with *byungjin* is to -- I mean, there are a lot of nuclear weapon states in the world where nobody really questions whether or not they should -- they have a right to nuclear weapons anymore. I think on the weapons side, that's what the North Korean regime is hoping for. On the economic side, I would be very surprised that, well, let's put it this way, I would not be surprised if the current trends continue and if they sort of mix between top down economic development and bottom up economic development continues. And I think one certain thing is, I think the markets are definitely in North Korea to stay, not at least for the reasons that Buheung went into in his presentation.

MS. STRATTON: Thank you. And I think with that we'll have to wrap up our final panel, so please join

me to thank our three panelists with a round of applause.

DR. MOON: Okay, and we've come to the end of the day. Thank you, those of you who have been with us since the morning, and for those who have come in and out in your busy day. There is a person I'd like to recognize, who's traveled very far to be with us, also to be with her daughter. I believe she's here, Sharon Stratton's mother from Australia. Would you stand up? We welcome you with open hearts. It's so nice. I'm sure you are so proud of your daughter. And it's nice to have your support for everyone else in the room. So, welcome.

So, I'd like to introduce Paul Park, my colleague, who is a senior research assistant at Brookings in our center. He is the one largely responsible for organizing this conference and working very closely with me and with lots of other people to make today happen, last night's dinner happen, and most of all to forge a sense of community among the scholars today, the scholars, presenters, students of Korea in the best sense. And also to continue this link to last year's alumnae, alumni -- I teach at a women's college, so I always have to say alumnae, as well as alumni, or alums, who also stay engaged with us. We had Twitter's from Korea, from someone who joined us who originally came from Vietnam who's working in Korea now. We have several of you in our audience. Would you stand up? Darcie, I saw Matt. Kent Boydston was here. We have had, Darcie's one of maybe four people who went in and out today, so we're really grateful. So Paul, thank you for making this happen. Thank you for keeping us together. And without further ado, I would like to offer you, Paul Park so that he can give us some closing remarks. And he is definitely young, definitely brave, and also definitely funny.

MR. PARK: There's no pressure, right? Thank you all for coming today. And thank you, Dr. Moon, for giving me the opportunity to deliver the event's closing remarks. Often DC folks tend to focus on certain things regarding the Koreas, but I think today's conference showed that there's a lot more to cover than what we're normally exposed to.

As the first roundtable discussed, peninsular issues are becoming more and more international and consideration of diverse foreign perspectives will only make for a sounder policy analysis. We listened--

more, actually more accurately, we literally dissected nationalism today. We looked into how nationalism is being commodified and affecting bilateral tensions, and even how ethnic nationalism is not really dwindling in light of demographic change. And at the same time, Korean nationalism is being stirred with the rising self-power it has achieved by being at the forefront of women's golf and thus changing or more or less shaping a new identity for women in Korean society. We then heard about South Korea's diplomatic efforts with Japan and how that -- this must go beyond government to government efforts for true reconciliation.

We were also treated to a technical analysis of the limits of North Korea's coercive capabilities. And, lastly, we listened to something that we rarely get to. We listened to an analysis of historical archives, an espionage story, and really trying to see what we could find through those archives in our knowledge of North Korea today.

And we just heard from our last panel some narratives surrounding the realities of North Korea, and these narratives are contrary to mainstream opinion and views. I mean, we literally heard about how *byungjin* is somewhat working, contrary to what a lot of people say. I'm sorry. And I think what I took most from Buheung's presentation about change occurring in North Korea was, I really want to point out the emphasis on the upgraded information and how you are seeing the fact that -- seeing the need for a new type of information that's -- should be injected to North Korea and to North Korea's citizens, because they are now ready for some democracy, and, in part, because of the exposure to foreign media, like you mentioned.

And lastly, we heard from Dan Aum about the alternative approaches to Korean family reunions in the face of political situations and the international legal aspect of it for pursuing such reunions.

I think it's important to also note that these are just some of the new approaches and an analysis the next generation of Korean experts are introducing, and I hope such opportunities like today will continue for a more diversified and nuanced approach toward both Koreas.

In the interest of time I will keep my remarks short, but I'd like to thank you all for coming, and especially to those who stayed until the end and didn't leave after lunch, and we hope to have this conference next year. I hope to see you all next year, and let's give another round of applause to all of the panelists. Thank you.

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