In the post–cold war era, some of the greatest threats to global stability come not from powerful hegemonic powers battling each other but from smaller, much less intrinsically powerful polities refusing to abide by the common principles of reciprocity and civility that guide world order. Many of these weak, outlaw nations attack their own people; they are seriously repressive, showing no respect for human rights and disdaining basic freedoms and democratic values. These heavy repressors breach official international conventions and covenants (such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and offend against unofficial global human rights norms. A handful of these internally abusive nation-states also behave in a provocative, pugnacious manner regionally; they are aggressive to their neighbors and serial offenders against world order. It is the actions and postures of these two kinds of nation-states—the gross repressors and the hostile, aggressive repressors—not rivalries among the big powers, that are currently the causes of conflict and the main perils to the peace of the world.

This book attempts, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, to specify attributes common to those of the world’s nation-states that behave odiously and in a truly troubling manner—those that operate beyond the international normative pale. From a human rights perspective—and presuming its value in an orderly world—those states are the worst of the worst. They
breach a variety of “civilized” norms. They undermine regional and global stability.

This book seeks a common understanding of what constitutes gross repression by nation-states. It defines the kinds of actions that constitute repression and proposes a method of measuring repressiveness (human rights violations by nation-states). It further advances the possibility of creating a scale capable of distinguishing among the repressors according to the quality of their predatory rapaciousness. By thus formulating the basis of an index of nation-state repressiveness, with a rank ordering of miscreants and malefactors among countries, we create a valuable diagnostic tool capable of guiding the United Nations and big powers as they seek to mitigate manifest injustice and curb tyranny in the developing world. Such an index would also identify and target gross offenders of the “responsibility to protect” norm, which the UN is pledged to enforce. In this book, each of the regimes discussed is repressive toward its own citizens. North Korea, Turkmenistan, Burma, Zimbabwe, and Equatorial Guinea are much more repressive than the others, and are designated here as gross repressors. The remaining countries—Belarus, Uzbekistan, Syria, Togo, and Tunisia—are deemed somewhat less nasty to their own citizens but are still highly repressive internally.

This book also seeks to characterize and measure aggressiveness among repressors, and to single out as a category for separate study those nation-states that rank high on both the repressive and aggressive axes of a carefully delineated representation of nation-state behavior. Although many scholars and policymakers tend loosely to label both the most heavily repressive states and the aggressive repressors as rogue states, this book seeks to reserve that pejorative designation primarily for the handful of national repressors that are also aggressive. Analytically, the term “rogue state” should be reserved for the North Koreas and Irans of the world—those nation-states that both immiserate their own citizens and also act belligerently and in a destabilizing manner toward the rest of the world. Of the cases discussed in this book, only North Korea, Belarus, and Syria are true rogues because they marry high levels of internal repression with aggressive behavior to their neighbors and beyond. North Korea spreads weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Belarus exports arms and drugs (as does North Korea), and Syria sponsors terrorism.

The Nature of Repression

All repressive states, by definition, greatly abuse their own citizens. They prey on them. They deny all or virtually all fundamental human rights and civil lib-
erties; eschew or make mockery of democracy; use the mailed fist to compel obedience and achieve compliance with the demands (even whims) of their rulers or ruling juntas; obliterate the rule of law and instead follow the law of the jungle; assassinate opponents and take political prisoners; favor collective punishment of families, groups, and lineages; often are capricious in their policies and actions; totally command their economies; inhibit individual prosperity; are seriously corrupt; operate patrimonially, with fawning clients; build a personality cult while otherwise minimizing ideology; and often manage over many years to create a culture of dependency and conformity. In some cases, these repressive regimes even starve their followers, withholding food rations from most citizens while their rulers live luxuriously.

The essence of such state-enforced terror is its unpredictable arbitrariness, the absence of explanation, the lack of any means whereby wrongs can, even theoretically, be redressed, and the inculcation of a widespread feeling of mental impotence and lethargy. Dictators and authoritarian regimes intimidate their citizens by whimsical, quixotic, bizarrely idiosyncratic behaviors (as each of the cases in this book exemplifies) and by seductive forms of co-optation—all well mixed together with mindless brutalities. Malevolent rulers are clever enough to manipulate their subjects and simultaneously to keep them supinely in thrall. The sinister François (Papa Doc) Duvalier, dictator of Haiti in the 1950s and 1960s, provides an instructive example of how such regimes suppress individuality and enforce obedience. “Haiti,” a contemporary report concluded, “is the paralytic fear of a capricious dictatorial regime of unusual malevolence; none but the most secure Haitians are immune from the stabbing anxiety which afflicts all [of their] days and nights. . . . The dominant feature of the dictatorship is its arbitrariness: the blue-serge-suited Al Capone-like figures who live in the white rococo presidential palace have never thought twice about drawing a revolver from their shoulder holsters and mutilating someone suspected of antagonism, disobedience, or mere idiosyncratic behavior.” Nothing of any moment “happens without [Duvalier’s] specific approval.”

Using the criteria set out above and additional indicators, it is possible to rank nation-states according to their levels of depravity—according to the extent to which each preys mercilessly on its own people. Rather than differentiating impressionistically between repressive and not so repressive states, and in order to distinguish more precisely the worst of the worst from the merely unpleasant, one can assign objective numerical scores to each aspect of a state’s repressiveness. One state holds more political prisoners annually and across time than another. A second assassimates opponents, and the number
and frequency of those mysterious deaths can be counted. The denial of basic freedoms can be documented and assessed, and given a score based on an objective set of measurements. The absence of any rule of law would be compared to other polities with diminished legal provisions. A state’s command of its economy would be noted and evaluated. Food scarcities would be documented. Degrees of corruption would be approximated using existing measurement techniques.

Overall, it is possible both theoretically and practically to measure the repressiveness of individual states, using many more, and more refined, indicators and subindicators than those employed in the construction of the otherwise worthy index proposed by Caprioli and Trumbore in chapter 2. Such a new, comprehensive system, ranking repressors and human rights violators more clearly and more objectively (that is, not by the employment of opinions and survey data) than existing methods (including the tripartite “free,” “partly free,” and “unfree” parsings of Freedom House), would separate— even grade—those states that qualify as grossly repressive or very highly repressive from those that fall below such thresholds. Of the cases in this book, for example, North Korea obviously represses its people with a greater fervor and ferocity than does Tunisia. But Tunisia is still sufficiently repressive, by our criteria, to qualify as highly repressive, and the proposed ranking system would display that behavioral pattern quantitatively.

The availability of such a carefully researched and classified catalogue of repressive regimes would enable international and national policymakers to focus appropriately on such extreme offenders of established or emerging behavioral norms. Instead of responding to ad hoc claims or impressionistic reports, defenders of world order and the UN conventions on human rights and against genocide—as well as the new responsibility to protect norm—would then be equipped to craft effective responses, knowing that accusations of regime misbehavior were concretely based on methods of collecting and arraying data that themselves possessed the virtues of transparency and comparison.

Fortunately, the proposition that human rights and other violations can be measured follows and is derived from the proposal that governance is itself measurable, using proxy indicators and subindicators, and that repressive states are fundamentally nation-states that deliver the least good governance to their peoples. This measurement paradigm, explored at length elsewhere, assumes that nation-states exist to deliver political goods such as security, rule of law, political freedom, economic opportunity, education, health, and a functional infrastructure. Repressive states provide little of those goods, except
for security (the reverse twist of denial and oppression), so they can be scored according to already developed criteria. In addition, to assess a repressive state’s true character more finely, additional indicators of repression can be used as measurement tools and appropriate numbers developed. Table 1-1 lists the different repressive practices that are capable of being quantified.

That explained, it is important heuristically to understand the value and possibility of measuring repressiveness—of arraying human rights violators according to sets of objective criteria—even though in practice it can sometimes prove exceedingly difficult to measure the actual performance of the worst of the worst in a strictly quantitative manner. A fundamental problem is the paucity of good data. Those nation-states that deserve scrutiny and qualify for it on anecdotal or impressionistic grounds have the most to hide. They rarely provide or publish accurate statistics. Numbers of assassinations and prisoners as well as violations of human rights must be gathered clandestinely or estimated from credible rumors. Repressive regimes themselves will not offer up infractions for outside inspection or admit to wrongdoing. The necessary data must be gathered from fugitive sources, making quantification questionable and precision impossible. Nevertheless, it is critical—as the chapters that follow explain—to provide the basis of a framework for measuring repressiveness within and among states. Without it, throwing up pejorative designations like “very highly repressive” or “rogue” has little analytical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1-1. Indicators of Repression: A Checklista</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House arrestees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuses of prisoners</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secret incarcerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassinations or attempted murders of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappearances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity imposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretrial detention duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence against women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced abortions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child labor incidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking of women and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking of small arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking of narcotics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The higher the value per capita of population per year, the more repressive the regime.
meaning or utilitarian value. Too easily, a nation-state is now said in quasi-diplomatic parlance to exhibit roguish behavior merely whenever a big power such as the United States becomes displeased.

**Aggressiveness and Repression**

Among the worst states in the world are a number that behave excessively badly toward their own people; they oppress and repress them systematically, and over long periods. But not all of those miserable human rights performers endanger other nation-states, even their neighbors. Only a few nation-states at any one time are both significantly repressive on one scale and, on the other scale, decidedly aggressive in their neighborhood or exporters of danger beyond their borders. It is the intersection of the two scales that describes “aggressive repressors.” In order to qualify, a nation-state must demonstrate disdain for the rights and liberties of its own citizens and disdain for world order norms by behaving aggressively beyond its borders.

Many more nation-states are repressive than are aggressive. That is, not all repressive states, despite a predilection to aggression and danger, flout the procedures of world order. (Caprioli and Trumbore suggest otherwise.) To do so as outlaws, as disturbers of the global system in the sense that former secretary of state Madeleine Albright described, they have to possess or be working to develop WMD, sponsor or give support to terrorists, or traffic in fissile material, WMD components, long-range or short-range delivery systems, small arms, or narcotics. (WMD includes chemical and biological warfare as well as nuclear warfare capability.) Additionally, even if they do not engage in these activities, such countries still may be considered aggressive if, within their neighborhood or region, they foment trouble or destabilize their own areas. Libya certainly was dangerous in that last sense, as well as in some of the aforementioned ways. Liberia and Burkina Faso also sought to undermine their neighbors in West Africa, succeeding for a time. Belarus and North Korea are state suppliers of small arms. They also traffic in narcotics, and North Korea has gained infamy and foreign exchange by counterfeiting currency. But some of the more odiously internally repressive states, like Equatorial Guinea or Zimbabwe, have not been accused of trafficking violations or of deliberately attempting to destabilize their regions.

Measuring most forms of aggression or dangerousness is obviously both easy—the International Atomic Energy Agency tries to monitor WMD violations, as do the big powers; the U.S. State Department names sponsors of ter-
ror; and suppliers of arms and drugs are generally listed—and elusive, since most of the alleged activity is illicit and covert. (Measuring nuclear capability is easier than discovering chemical and biological warfare capability, as the inspections of prewar Iraq amply demonstrate.) Even so, more precision is necessary to separate the unquestionably aggressive states from those whose infractions of international codes of behavior are serious but less threatening or destabilizing to the global system. Greater objectivity is desperately needed if high levels of aggressiveness, together with gross repressiveness, are going to qualify a nation-state for rogue status. Thus a method of quantifying levels of aggression or dangerousness is here proposed. It scores countries depending on the level of their trafficking of small arms, narcotics, and fissile material; backing, funding, and export of terror; possession of or attempted possession of WMD; and number and extent of cross-border attacks within a recent five-year period. (See figure 1-1 and table 1-2.)

Using those numbers permits answers to questions such as, is Iran more or less dangerous to international order than North Korea—or Pakistan? Responses to such questions hitherto have been based on impressionistic or ad hoc criteria. One of the purposes of this book is to offer more specific methods of answering such questions and to provide transparent ways of deciding which among the grossly repressive states are the real rogues and deserving of greater policy attention.

**Qualifying as a Rogue State**

Those nation-states in today’s world that are both highly repressive internally and highly aggressive externally can be classified as rogues. (See table 1-2.) Depending on their externally oriented activities, even straightforward repressive states may qualify for rogue status and thus for strong policy attention.

Regardless of whether the rogue label makes sense analytically, the term remains in public discourse. As a shorthand expression of particular opprobrium, it became popular in the 1990s. After the “evil empire” was dispatched and America’s global power ascendance was assured, world order was still disturbed by jumped-up nation-states that breached international norms of behavior, outrageously and always egregiously. From Washington’s perspective, those were the nation-states that played by no known rules of world order, pursuing at best idiosyncratic designs. They disregarded Washington’s predominant military might and followed autarkic rather than collegial, consensual, or respectful policy trajectories. First in the Clinton administration
and then in the George W. Bush administration, Washington began calling these outlaw, anomic, unsavory, and troublesome places “rogues.”

A rogue is an outlier, an elephant pushed out of the herd. Horses that misbehave or shirk are rogues. Worse, animals are rogues when they are vicious and destructive. For humans, rogue once referred to criminals, tramps, or scoundrels. It still carries those definitions but also connotes a dishonest or worthless person. Rogues are caddish, disreputable, and unsavory, with questionable antecedents and impure intentions. Etymologically derived from rogare (Latin, to ask and to beg), the word slipped into roger in mid-sixteenth century English (a begging vagabond pretending to be a poor scholar from Oxford or Cambridge). That usage possibly led to the use of rogue to describe a class of vagrants and unprincipled persons. Whatever the precise etymological origin of the word, it was always employed pejoratively. Likewise, by the late twentieth century, there could be little uncertainty about the meaning of Washington's labels. Rogues simply did not belong to the family of nations. Their bizarre, unprincipled, cantankerous methods of operating in the global arena set them outside its bounds.

In 1996, President Clinton called Iran and Iraq rogue states. He spoke in 1997 and 1998 of the vulnerability of the United States to the “reckless acts of
rogue states” and to “an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers, and international criminals.” They were the “twenty-first century predators.” As Hoyt shows so well, the Clinton administration’s thirty-six leading policy articulators condemned rogue or pariah states more than 150 times throughout the 1990s.9

Anthony Lake, former president Clinton’s national security adviser, identified nation-states “on the wrong side of history” because they failed to respect basic international values such as democracy, the market economy, collective security, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. “Our policy,” wrote Lake, “must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family but also assault its basic values.” Lake named Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya as “backlash” states. “Their behavior is often aggressive and defiant.” They suppressed human rights and had embarked on costly military programs to produce weapons of mass destruction. They had exhibited siege mentalities.10

Then secretary of state Albright said that dealing with “rogue states” was one of the “great challenges of our time” because rogues’ “sole purpose” was destroying “the system.” The very essence of “rogue states,” said Albright, involved being outside the international system and “throwing, literally, hand grenades inside in order to destroy it.”11 Albright much later decided for tactical reasons to refer to this class of adversary—supporters of terrorism, developers of missiles, and disrupters of international order—as “states of concern.” Those states, whether of concern or as rogues, desired to disrupt the international system.12 Rogue states, in other words, were the primary policy worry of the post–cold war era; rogues collectively and individually replaced the Soviet Union as the repositories of evil.

Table 1-2. Characteristics of Countries in the Samplea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Repressiveness and aggressiveness</th>
<th>True rogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Highly repressive and aggressive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Grossly repressive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Grossly repressive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Grossly repressive and aggressive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Highly repressive and aggressive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Highly repressive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Highly repressive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Grossly repressive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Highly repressive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Grossly repressive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Based on a scale that depends on the level of their trafficking of small arms, narcotics, and fissile material; backing, funding, and export of terror; possession of or attempted possession of WMD; and number and extent of cross-border attacks within a recent five-year period.
The second Bush administration’s National Missile Defense system and reports emanating from the Pentagon were predicated on countering rogue states. Even before the destruction of the World Trade Center’s twin towers on September 11, 2001, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell declared that the United States required a missile defense shield for protection against rogue states. “We believe,” he said, “that it was Washington’s responsibility to protect against rogue states.” President Bush conflated rogue behavior with evil behavior. In today’s dangerous world, he worried about the world’s least responsible states—nation-states for whom “terror and blackmail” were a way of life. The “axis of evil” was composed of roguish states.

Commentators and scholars, both present and past, employed the appellation “rogue” to describe those polities that opposed the dominant powers in the international system (especially the United States), showed aggressiveness, operated in a manner that troubled world order, were human rights violators, or otherwise flouted international law. Possessors of WMD and sponsors of terrorism obviously were rogues because they refrained from obeying international standards. Rogues were “crazy” states.

Henriksen’s rogue states are those that exhibit contempt for international norms, as per Albright’s model. Klare’s definition echoes Lake: his rogues are those “hostile (or seemingly hostile) Third World state[s] . . . with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities . . . bent on sabotaging the prevailing world order.” They oppose the spread of democracy and harbor aggressive intentions toward less powerful neighbors. The actions of such states are unpredictable and hence roguish.

Calling a nation a rogue state admittedly inhibits dispute and conflict resolution. Yet policymakers are going to continue to decry annoying or difficult states as rogues. It is a form of Washingtonian shorthand and will not easily be replaced. At a series of meetings that preceded the writing of this book, participants initially decided that the word “rogue” should be banished because it lacked precise and uncontested analytical content. Later, after lengthy discussion, the participants concluded reluctantly that the word would continue to be used by politicians, regardless of what analysts preferred. Therefore, it was important to attempt to give the essence of rogueness in international relations meaningful content. In their chapter, Caprioli and Trumbore also argue that providing a specific designation for “states that systematically violate international norms [and] are . . . dangerous to international society is valuable[,] . . . [calling on] us to think seriously about the . . . factors that lead states toward . . . dangerous international behavior.”
Rather than simply drop the word *rogue* from the analytical vocabulary, it is more productive to define precisely how and when a nation-state becomes classified as a rogue. Before the end of the cold war, the term *rogue* was used much more narrowly by a limited coterie of scholars to describe a nasty nation-state that refused to treat its inhabitants decently—that is, in accord with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In one of their several pathbreaking articles, Caprioli and Trumbore argue that for the term *rogue* to possess analytical utility, its usage should be restricted to “domestic characteristics of state repression and domestic inequality.” They wanted the designation to be used only for those states that “systematically allow domestic discrimination and inequality on the basis of ethnicity and gender, and perpetrate systematic repression against their own citizens.” However, Caprioli and Trumbore went on to contend that such discriminators and repressors would always exhibit aggression and violence internationally.

This volume offers a fuller, measurable, and more comprehensive definition. Rogues, to repeat, are only those few nation-states that exhibit grossly repressive and unquestionably aggressive tendencies. The existing policy and academic usages are too imprecise, too ad hoc, and too rhetorical by design to give the quality of being a rogue state sufficient meaning and analytical utility. Despite the attractiveness of the Caprioli and Trumbore index, and their detailed argument that repressiveness predisposes a nation-state to behave in a “roguish” manner, I prefer to classify nation-states according to the degrees of their repressiveness internally and aggression externally. Such a system of ranking is capable of distinguishing the world’s worst states from those that abuse their own citizens or behave badly but—compared to the truly atrocious examples—merely constitute international embarrassments. It is possible, in other words, to compare and parse distinctions in practice between, say, North Korea and Cambodia, or Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

At the core of this search for the common characteristics of the world’s most unsavory and dangerous nation-states is the quest to develop satisfactory ways of measuring and assessing the nature and extent of a nation-state’s repression. In their chapter for this book, Caprioli and Trumbore suggest that rogue states can be identified by measuring a specific, limited set of human rights violations. Persistent violators among states pose both conventional and unconventional threats to international security. They are the states that refuse to protect against human rights attacks within their own borders. They discriminate on grounds of ethnicity, religion, language, and gender. Moreover, the same attitude that favors abuses of human rights can
express itself in a state’s international as well as its other domestic behavior. Nation-states that prey upon their own people are illegitimate both internally and externally.

Caprioli and Trumbore construct a rogue state index to classify “human rights rogues.” The index represents political and economic discrimination on the basis of gender and ethnicity, and violent attacks on political opponents. This method codes for public policies that have affected or are affecting a group’s political status, exclusion, or other restriction vis-à-vis other groups within the same society. The authors are consequently able to affix scores to the performance of a country, based on state discrimination against out-groups. They can do the same for discrimination against and relative economic and social opportunities afforded to women. Their repression measure includes the prevalence of political imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and so on. They provide a table listing average index scores by country for 1980–2001; Sweden is the least repressive state; Iran, the most repressive.

Additionally, Caprioli and Trumbore show that highly repressive rogues (by their definition) are more aggressive externally and more apt to sponsor terrorism. They also have been more likely to pursue or possess WMD.

Caprioli and Trumbore, effectively in the vanguard of scientific studies of the rogue phenomenon among states, have been inventive and innovative, not least in their chapter for this book. But, as helpful as their carefully calibrated methodological proposal may be, it narrows the range of potential measures of repression, and it also relies on data gathered by others for different purposes. A fuller repertoire of possible indicators and subindicators of repression would provide more points of comparison and more complex ways to distinguish venal from somewhat less venal nation-states. The goal is to be able to aggregate any nation-state’s human rights and analogous failings, using quantifiable measurements that are not derived primarily from compilations by others of subjectively obtained data.

Repressive nation-states endanger their own citizens and consequently are serious threats to national, regional, and international order. State-sponsored repression, often directed at ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other minorities or majorities, leads to civil wars and carnage. Sometimes war and carnage infect a broader region, as in West Africa. Even if repression within a state remains confined, the suffering of target populations constitutes a grave threat to world order. Repressive states thus are “dangerous” globally on that account alone. But they attain full status as “rogues” if, additionally, they are aggressive—if they seek confrontationally to destabilize world order.
The Cases

The sample of country cases in this book was chosen to provide a range of nation-state examples of repression and aggression, or both. Even before the chapters were written and this book prepared, these countries were suspect as serious human rights violators and, in some cases, as notorious WMD proliferators. Obviously, these were normative presumptions, but those preconceptions had yet to be tested. Moreover, the gradations among the nation-states accused of repressive tendencies could only have been guessed at, a priori. How the cases would be arrayed and sorted was not known. Only much later did it become clear, as it is now, that there is a set of grossly repressive polities and another set of highly (but not grossly) repressive states. Furthermore, the true rogue states are both grossly repressive and highly aggressive; they lie at the intersection between the repressive and aggressive axes.21

Of the arguably most repressive nation-states among our selected cases—North Korea, Burma, Turkmenistan, Zimbabwe, and Equatorial Guinea—only the first is truly dangerous and therefore an outstanding rogue. If Iran may be considered (and measured) as less repressive than the members of the first group, it still has aggressive tendencies as a wannabe WMD proliferator and serial sponsor of terrorism. Its designation as a rogue thus ultimately depends on its double ranking along the two axes.

Many of the worst of the worst country examples are gathered in this volume, but not all. Most of our sample is drawn from the ranks of developing nations. Many repressors are small in terms of population numbers, but a few exhibit average demographic densities. Not all are low-income countries. Some are wealthy from oil or gas extraction, on an average per capita basis, and a few are growing rapidly, again because of petroleum. But among the wealthy, unequal distribution is the norm, with remarkably skewed Gini coefficients. Tables 1-3 and 1-4 array salient demographic, human development, educational, and economic characteristics of the country cases in this book, and several others, for easy comparison.

Adding to and expanding upon these tables, Yi Feng and Saumik Paul have examined available quantitative data from standard sources for our sample (and for Cuba, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan) of highly repressive states, assessing both the quality of the data and their meaning.22 Their findings enable us to sort our countries according to their degrees of political freedom, political stability, rule of law, control of corruption, and amount of accountability. Feng and Paul supplement the array of economic statistics
shown in tables 1-3 and 1-4, using GNI rather than per capita GDP and for slightly different years. They show foreign direct investment amounts as well as foreign assistance per capita. Feng and Paul enhance the social numbers in the tables, adding an important gender dimension. (Caprioli and Trumbore’s index also emphasizes gender.) They import official figures for the degree of religious freedom in the sample countries. Finally, the authors construct and analyze composite indexes. Their findings indicate a strong correlation
Repressive, Aggressive, and Rogue Nation-States

between their political and economic indexes, but only moderate correlation between the political index and the social index.

If a citizen had to live in one of these repressive societies, they show how to choose among them depending on whether political, economic, or social standards were the main criterion. Unfortunately, however, even the analysis of fundamental data by Feng and Paul cannot fully provide more than a rough approximation of repressiveness in the world’s worst states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Telecommunications density (per 1,000 population)</th>
<th>Military expenditure percentage (of 2003 GDP)</th>
<th>Development aid received (millions of U.S.$)</th>
<th>Corruption rank (158 = most corrupt)</th>
<th>Economic freedom rank (155 = most repressed)</th>
<th>Freedom House ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone lines</td>
<td>Internet users</td>
<td>Total armed forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>311</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>1.3g</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>107</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>378,000</td>
<td>3.4i</td>
<td>125.8</td>
<td>155</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>33.9j</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Not ranked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>297,000</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>160.3</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>Not ranked</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


h. Russia pays for some of it.

i. 1990 value; has presumably increased as forces have nearly doubled.

j. Unless otherwise noted, data on North Korea are from CIA, World Factbook (2005), www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html.

k. Presumed little to none.


m. Food aid provided to North Korea since 1995 valued at approximately $1.5 billion. UN World Food Programme, “World Hunger—Korea (DPR)” (2005), www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?region=5&section=9&sub_section=5&country=408.
All failed states are by definition repressive, but not all repressive states have failed. Indeed, several of the most repressive states in this book’s sample are hollow states—failed but for the excessive security that prevents the state in question from being characterized as “failed.”23 No collapsed state—the analytical designation beyond “failed”—can be repressive because the apparatus of repression is by definition lacking. But repressive states are often “weak”—the analytical position between “strong” and “failed”—possibly harboring the ingredients of failure once their vaunted security apparatuses are challenged. None is a “strong” state, for none delivers political goods in quality and quantity as defined in earlier studies. A few, wealthy and secure, nevertheless deliver little in terms of rule of law, political freedom, and economic opportunity to most citizens. Those latter examples also supply little in terms of educational or health services. Repressive regimes,

### Table 1-4. The Worst of the Worst: Comparative Profiles, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Human Development Index rank, 2006 (177 = least developed)</th>
<th>GNI per capita, 2006 (in U.S.$)</th>
<th>Population, 2004 (millions)</th>
<th>Literacy rate, 2004 (percent)</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth, 2004 (years)</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate, 2004 (per 1,000 live births)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>99.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24.0</td>
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<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Source:** Except where noted, all data are from UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2006 (November 2006), hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/.


c. See table 1-3, note d.

focused as they are on bolstering and protecting heavy-handed rule and the extraction of riches from a subservient population, usually pay little attention, almost by definition, to delivering political goods beyond the political good of security.

This volume includes a careful dissection of Belarus, Burma (Myanmar), Equatorial Guinea, North Korea, Syria, Togo, Turkmenistan, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. We would have liked to have included chapters on Cuba, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan to round out more fully the A list of repressive and threatening nation-states. The absence of such chapters testifies more to contributor failures than to selection bias, however, and also includes an element of accident. Additionally, this book excludes—largely on account of space—the discussion of a bevy of smaller despotisms and near-despotisms, such as Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Eritrea, and monarchical Swaziland.

<table>
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<td>Internet users</td>
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<td>n.a.</td>
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<tr>
<td>154</td>
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<td>200,000</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
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<td>85</td>
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e. Heritage Foundation, “2007 Index of Economic Freedom,” www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm. Note that in some cases, states are tied in their rankings in this index.


g. Unless otherwise noted, data on North Korea are from CIA, The World Factbook (2005), www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html.

h. 980,000 total.
China deserves to be assessed as a sometime repressor and potentially aggressive rogue, but no study of China is included; it is a big power and thus cannot be defined as a rogue. Likewise, Russia represses some of its many peoples and may be considered aggressive. Some readers may regard the United States and Russia as rogues for ideological reasons, but neither fits the criterion of acting against world order as set out here. All three big powers, in fact, define world order by virtue of possessing a veto in the UN Security Council.

In any event, our collection of potential rogues is intended to be suggestive, not inclusive. All the cases discussed are abusers of human rights and abridgers of civil liberties. How much is too much? How high on the scale of repression does a nation-state have to reach to merit international attention and condemnation? Using our scale, it is possible analytically to compare, say, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and contrast Togo and Tunisia to Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe, and thus to formulate proportionate and consistent policies.

The Gross Repressors

North Korea and Niyazov’s Turkmenistan (until the end of 2006) are the nation-states among our cases that exceed the others in their respective slavish devotion to semidivine, all-powerful, rulership. In both cases, post-Soviet rulers acted idiosyncratically, without even a minor genuflection to the welfare of the ordinary inhabitants of their Potemkin-like countries. Styling himself Turkmenbashi (chief of all Turkmen), Saparmurad Niyazov in Turkmenistan exceeded the tyrannical outbursts of his neighbors by removing physicians and other health care professionals, banning higher education, and providing ideologies of his own devising. Kim Jong-il, in North Korea, presided over a decade-long confiscation of his people’s food supplies, starving about 1 million of his citizens as an afterthought. Neither all-powerful despot pretended to be participatory. Neither pretended to respect human rights or grant the usual civil liberties. Each respected no laws other than those of his own devising. Although Turkmenistan should be comparatively prosperous thanks to abundant supplies of natural gas (it is the tenth largest producer in the world), petroleum wells, and a small population of 5 million, Turkmenbashi confiscated the wealth of his country no less than Kim Jong-il in his much poorer domain. Global Witness, a judicious investigative British nongovernmental organization (NGO), accused Niyazov of siphoning off most of his country’s estimated $2 billion a year in gas revenues and concealing them in offshore...
accounts. About half of the population of Turkmenistan still lives below the regional and national poverty level, and per capita GDP is estimated at $640. In 2006, virtually all pensions were cancelled, and sickness and maternity benefits were abrogated. All business activity depended upon government approval and patronage. Moreover, the public health system was in shambles, infant mortality rates were high, and life expectancy levels were low (for ex-Soviet satrapies). By 2006, most hospitals outside the capital had been shut down. The remaining clinics offered only rudimentary care, “condemning thousands to death from common, treatable illnesses such as tuberculosis.” Niyazov also banned the import of pharmaceutical supplies from Russia, leading to severe shortages of common medicines and drugs. Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, his self-appointed successor, promised—in the first weeks after his “election” as president in February 2007—to redress some of the unfortunate excesses of Turkmenbashi’s reign while, simultaneously, ruling with a similarly heavy, autocratic hand.

Both North Korea and Turkmenistan are and were tyrannies for tyranny’s sake. At least, few outsiders could discern any rationales and little rational behavior on the part of the two despots and their arrays of acolytes. Kim Jong-il and his associates are much more paranoid than Turkmenbashi was, perhaps with reason, but neither Asian leader ever evinced concern for fellow countrymen. Those poor, downtrodden Koreans and Turkmen existed, from the rulers’ points of view, strictly to be preyed upon and terrorized. Sovereigns in most of the hereditary monarchies of yore were obliged, at various levels, to deliver political goods to their followers, else their followers would leave the kingdom or otherwise defect; however, North Korea and Turkmenistan have bolted shut their borders and have refused so far to deliver political goods that are not relevant to the regime’s control or the regime’s economy. It is obvious that there is no freedom of movement or expression in either country. As Marcus Noland writes in his chapter, North Korea is “hermetically sealed.” Even the Russian media have been eliminated in Turkmenistan, but that may now change. Freedom of religion is curtailed if not abolished in North Korea. Freedom from want has obviously been honored in the breach in North Korea and, to some extent, in Turkmenistan.

The regimes in both North Korea and Turkmenistan, as well as in so many of the other remarkable cases in this book, have long ago compelled conformity among their peoples. The deification of North Korea’s dynastic leadership has been accomplished through intense political socialization, emphasizing ideological and “personal devotion of religious intensity.” Freely
voicing impure or antiregime thoughts in public is impossible; speaking one's mind within the confines of one's home, to family members or trusted friends, is unwise. "Any sign of political deviance, from listening to radio broadcasts to singing South Korean songs to sitting on a newspaper containing the photograph of Kim Il-sung is subject to punishment," reports Noland.

The regime in Turkmenistan has been unable since 1991 to acculturate its people to the same extent, but Turkmenbashi certainly tried. As president for life, he produced his own two-volume "little green book"—the Ruhnama—of spiritual teachings and revisionist history, erected expensive monuments to himself throughout the country, constructed gold-domed palaces and huge mosques, changed the names of months to remind citizens of him and his mother, and named towns, mountains, libraries, and schools in his honor. Turkmenbashi even altered the Turkmen word for bread, giving that staple his mother's name. He tightened the vise on independent talk, closed most libraries outside the capital, and restricted educational opportunities by ending public secondary schooling beyond the ninth grade. Moreover, Russian-language instruction was cut back severely, and a rigid affirmative action policy meant the dismissal of thousands of non-Turkmen (defined as being descended from three generations of Turkmen) teachers. Niyazov refused to recognize foreign university degrees obtained after 2005, and his home-grown higher education system was in shambles at his death. In 2006, the rector of a regional teachers' college in Turkmenabad burned 500,000 Russian-language volumes since there was no need to house books printed in a foreign language.

In Turkmenistan, criticism or dissent was defined (as it is in so many of our cases) as treason. Such offenses were and may still be punishable by long prison terms, confinement to psychiatric hospitals (as the Soviets were wont to do), and internal banishment to arid salt flats along the Caspian Sea. Private conversations were monitored by informers, telephones and e-mails were tapped, and Internet access was severely limited.

The imposition of collective punishment on families and groups (up to three generations in a family for one person's offense in North Korea, with similar instances being reported in Turkmenistan), the arbitrary and random (and thus terroristic) practice of coercion, and a blanket imposition of an atmosphere of fear across all levels of society are but three ways in which these quintessentially despotic regimes control and repress those who have the misfortune to reside there. Their prisons are full of inmates, their indigenous dissidents are deeply underground or in exile, and torture is widespread. Forced abortions and infanticide are said to occur in North Korea. The external critics of both regimes are at risk, even well outside national borders.
Assassinations occur. Accountability does not exist. Everything that is not specifically permitted (as in Duvalier’s Haiti) is forbidden. Effectively, there is no independent press or judiciary, and virtually no civil society.

The U.S. State Department’s 2006 summary of Turkmenistan’s human rights record under Niyazov concluded that “the government continued to commit serious abuses . . . [and] severely restricted political and civil liberties.” Torture, prolonged detention without trial, abuse of religious minorities, collective punishment, denial of fair trials, arbitrary interference with privacy, a blacklist preventing travel, and violence against women were among the charges. But there was less evidence in 2006 of child labor during the cotton harvest.

For North Korea, the same report said that the regime “continued to commit numerous serious abuses,” subjecting its citizens to rigid controls. It said that there were reports of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and arbitrary detention. Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. Torture was common. Pregnant female prisoners were compelled to undergo abortions. Babies born in prison were killed at birth. There were widespread reports of trafficking in women and girls among refugees and workers crossing the border into China.

As the authors of the respective chapters on those two cases rightly suggest, precise measurement of the depths of each nation’s depravity is impossible and conceivably pointless. There are no reliable data. Nevertheless, North Korea is the world’s most militarized society, with a massive share of the country’s population under arms and a preponderance of GDP devoted to the military. Noland believes that North Korea’s network of camps for political prisoners holds 200,000 or more inmates, but that is a crude estimate. Enforcement squads would be able to testify about assassinations perpetrated or incarcerations arranged. Spies and thought police would be able to offer comments on conformity and successful self-censorship. A tour of the prisons and reeducation centers would provide specific human instances of deprivation and state attack, and there are fugitive memoirs of occasional prison camp survivors. Even a postconflict truth commission would find it difficult to specify every example of repression, however, and to add them up. At the same time, mere impressionistic summations will not do.

Turkmenistan in 1997 decreed that all economic statistics were state secrets. So are all other numbers. Turkmenbashi doled out what figures he pleased. In his chapter, Gregory Gleason says that this sole ruler practiced the “big lie,” exaggerating national progress and pillorying those who would say otherwise. Naturally, officially there are no political prisoners and no violations of the
Data to demonstrate the depth of tyranny in Burma (Myanmar) are no more abundant than they are for North Korea and Turkmenistan. There are few reliable statistics, not even for Burma’s population. GDP numbers are wild estimates, with $225 per capita in 2004 being employed by outsiders for want of anything better. The amount of corruption in Burma is not exactly known either, although Transparency International ranks Burma second to last on its index. Precise numbers of political prisoners are not available. Nevertheless, since 1962 the military rulers of the once wealthy and food-sufficient country have compelled conformity through brutal means; eviscerated its agricultural, economic, medical, and educational infrastructures; prevented freely elected members of parliament from taking their seats and forming a democratic government (in 1990); and removed political freedoms and eliminated human rights with no less efficiency and just as much deadening impact as in North Korea and Turkmenistan. The rulers of Burma absolutely shun debate of any kind and assert that democracy is a foreign notion to be combated at all costs.

General Ne Win ruled Burma, almost single-handedly, in an idiosyncratic, xenophobic, kleptocratic manner from 1968 to 1988. Thereafter, military juntas that first called themselves the State Law and Order Restoration Council and then the State Peace and Development Committee exercised power in Burma through a decisionmaking apparatus that was at least nominally collective. Since a purge in 2004, however, General Than Shwe, the senior officer in the collective, has emerged as its leading figure, with dominant authority. All of the members of the junta are required to sleep every night at military headquarters, obviously to prevent dissent and defection. In 2005, Than Shwe moved much of the ruling apparatus out of Rangoon (Yangon) to an obscure new national government center and mountain redoubt 200 miles north. Overtures to Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Prize–winning opposition leader who remains under house arrest, largely ceased in 2005.

A very large army, as in North Korea, maintains a tight grip on the country. It enforces Than Shwe’s orders and, along with the police, operates an elaborately detailed spying system, exercises autarkic economic influence, creates social norms, imposes conformity, prevents mobility, and, to Burmese, presents a mailed fist, never a velvet glove. No more than five people are allowed to gather in public without official permission. For decades, the army has imposed compulsory labor requirements on rural inhabitants, taken political prisoners, destroyed unfriendly villages, employed torture and “elimination,”
raped widely, and prevented all free expression and nearly all Internet usage. The State Department said that Burma’s human rights record worsened during 2006: students were detained, ethnic minority villagers were attacked, and there were notable extrajudicial killings, disappearances, rapes, and torture. Villagers were compelled to relocate. Children were recruited forcibly for labor brigades; women and children were trafficked. The army has practiced forced removal, arbitrarily dumping large numbers of urban dwellers in rural areas, sometimes into “model villages.” Telephones and electronic equipment must be “authorized” by the regime. In her chapter, Priscilla Clapp reports that the Burmese army has laid waste to large areas, along the Thai border for example, leaving tens of thousands homeless. But it has not needed to massacre opponents, Buddhist monks, and protesting civilians on the scale employed to suppress the 1988 uprising.

Robert Gabriel Mugabe has issued no “little green book” of sayings to be memorized. Nor is he referred to as “Dear Leader,” as in North Korea—but then neither was Pol Pot of Cambodia nor Ne Win of Burma, both of whom Mugabe tends despotically to resemble. His unprovoked, seemingly mindless destruction of periurban shanty towns and informal business premises near Harare in 2005 left at least 700,000 and up to 1.2 million Zimbabweans without shelter, livelihood, or the accumulated furnishings of homes and businesses. At the same time, throughout 2005 and 2006 and well into 2007, millions of Zimbabweans went hungry, some starving, because Mugabe and his henchmen used access to dwindling food supplies as a direct political weapon. Ruthlessly, Mugabe has systematically been punishing urban dwellers and other supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Zimbabwe’s opposition, for their impudence in contesting elections (and winning many seats) against himself and his dominant party in 2000, 2002, and 2005. In March 2007, Mugabe also unleashed a brutal assault on the leaders and key operatives of the MDC, killing a few and maiming at least 200 others.

The 2000, 2002, and 2005 elections were rigged and the results falsified. Mugabe has nevertheless waved away criticism and rebuffed diplomatic intervention from African neighbors, Britain, the European Union, South Africa, and the United States. Meanwhile, he has tightened economic and political screws within the country, kept tight media bans and deported all foreign journalists, subverted the once independent supreme court and high court, used police and informal militia to inhibit opposition political rallies and all citizen protest, employed the tools of assassination and political imprisonment where necessary, and attempted to sell sections of Zimbabwe for personal profit to concessionaires from China, Libya, Malaysia, and South Africa.
Mugabe’s regime routinely brutalizes both its opponents and persons or groups critical of the policies and procedures of the government—as the events of March 2007 clearly demonstrated. There is no coerced labor, on the Burmese model, and until 2005, there were no compulsory removals of populations. But arbitrary arrests, detentions without trial, sexual assaults, torture, political killings, and generalized mayhem are all tools used by the Mugabe machine—to repress and terrorize Zimbabweans.

Seventeen of the then fifty-three MDC members of parliament were arrested during 2003, some more than once, and held for varying lengths of time. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Paradza was arrested in his court chambers for “hostile rulings” against the government. One of those hostile rulings was an order releasing MDC mayor Elias Mudzuri from police custody; Mugabe had demanded Mudzuri’s arrest and removal from office on trumped-up charges. The leader of the opposition party was tried for treason, on fake charges and with falsified testimony. In 2005 and 2006, there was a wave of arrests for hoarding food, withholding foreign exchange, manipulating the currency, and being disrespectful economically and politically to Mugabe and his regime. In 2007, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, after suffering a concussion at the hands of Mugabe’s enforcers, was arrested along with dozens of his key supporters.

Mugabe has successfully eradicated civil society, just as he has destroyed the free press, neutered the independent judiciary, muted foreign criticism, emasculated the opposition, curtailed local protest by the meting out of exemplary punishments, and deflected external African criticism via a vigorous nationalistic propaganda campaign. Equally, the Mugabe regime has denied the existence of widespread hunger and starvation. He has effectively channeled internationally supplied food assistance to cities and rural areas dominated by his political party, hoarding available rations for his own favorites in order to influence political results in 2005. As Roman Catholic archbishop Pius Ncube has oft complained, Mugabe uses maize rations to “reward supporters and punish dissidents.” In 2007, Ncube urged fellow Zimbabweans to use civil disobedience to resist the regime.

Although there are no gulags, a combination of Central Intelligence Organization, military, and police operations successfully intimidates Zimbabwe’s people. Their actions make MDC members and supporters miserable, successfully spread terror throughout the nation-state, force innocent and apolitical citizens to run for the lives, and destroy the educational and health services. Demoralizing and disheartening, too, widespread corruption under
Mugabe has sapped the country of its entrepreneurial vitality and poured sand on the wheels of national progress.

Equatorial Guinea, never a paragon of political and social advancement, is Africa’s other odious tyranny. A tiny (population 500,000), oil-rich, former Spanish colony on the western edge of Gabon, it rivals Mugabe for oppressive excesses. Never a democracy and never well run (unlike Zimbabwe in earlier times), and always without the sparkling human resource capacities of Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea has equally abused human rights and indigenous aspirations without the steep fall from attainment and grace that Zimbabweans have endured since 1998. In its 2007 report, the Department of State listed a concatenation of state-sponsored abuse: torture; beatings; abuse of prisoners; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest; harassment of foreigners; judicial corruption; severe restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and assembly; violence against women; trafficking in persons; and forced child labor. John Heilbrunn argues that Equatorial Guinea’s long entrenched practices of violence against opponents, nepotism, collusion, and wholesale corruption deny its rulers, the Mongomo-Nguema clan, any possibility of liberalization. They “cannot permit meaningful reforms since decades of human rights abuses . . . have intensified demands for revenge and retribution.”

President Theodore Obiang Nguema came to power through violence—killing his uncle—and has perpetuated his dominance only through the persecution of opponents and potential future adversaries, and by denying the entire populace of his country any freedoms whatsoever. Indeed, Nguema has even refused them an opportunity to participate in Equatorial Guinea’s remarkable recent economic returns from petroleum discoveries. Like most dictators, he keeps those proceeds for himself and his family.

Nguema is a Weberian “sultan,” exercising power without restraint and unencumbered by any rules or any commitment to an ideological or any other set of values. Unrestrained greed and unrestrained power, together with meaningful paranoia, necessarily drive his regime. Discoveries of offshore petroleum obviously played into and strengthened existing acquisitive tendencies. Like Mugabe, Nguema and his family have confiscated desirable land and ousted groups with preexisting tenure in order to lease territory to foreign enterprises and to monopolize resources of timber on the mainland. Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea are criminal states; so are nearly all of the examples discussed in this chapter and elaborated upon throughout the book.
Equatorial Guinea has never known more than a rudimentary rule of law. Nor has it known anything that would resemble fair play. Routine violence, reports Heilbrunn, “shapes everyday life.” Amnesty International lists beatings, disappearances, and arbitrary incarcerations. Detention, harassment, intimidation, and loss of property occur without the possibility of redress or adjudication. Macías Nguema, Obiang Nguema’s equally destructive predecessor, reputedly killed 50,000 of his own people (a tenth of the total national population) between 1969 and 1979. In Zimbabwe, Mugabe massacred a mere 30,000 between 1982 and 1984.

Nor does today’s President Nguema redeem himself by spending oil wealth for the welfare of his subjects. In 2002, barely more than 1 percent of government expenditure was devoted to health, with slightly more being allocated to education. Much of the rest of the budget is spent on security. Paying soldiers and police well is a requirement for despotic regimes. Without the enforcers, an absolute state risks losing control and encouraging coups from among the ranks of the disgruntled legions bearing arms.

The High Repressors

Alexander Lukashenko, Europe’s lone tyrant and president of Belarus, resembles Mugabe much more than Nguema in his postures and actions. As Margarita Balmaceda suggests in her chapter on Belarus, the Lukashenko regime poses a serious threat both to its own citizens and to Europe’s still fragile security system. Moreover, even if Lukashenko has fewer political prisoners than other repressive regimes and has not starved his people in the North Korean, Cambodian, and Zimbabwean manner, his regime has institutionalized a strategy of repression with such force that contemporary Belarus closely resembles many aspects of the atrocious nation-state exemplars of despotism already discussed.

Balmaceda characterizes Belarus as moderately high on a scale of repression. That is, Belarus no longer routinely imprisons or assassinates hosts of opponents. Instead, thugs (possibly police in mufti) working for the state systematically beat up opposition figures and sympathizers—even presidential candidates in 2006—thus successfully sowing fear. These same political nonconformers are subjected to serial arrest, release, and rearrest—and prison conditions are harsh. In addition, the state harasses anyone with views antithetical to Lukashenko, often hounding them out of private jobs. Since 2004, officers of the state have been permitted to enter any home for any reason. The state severely limits freedom of expression, restricts access to
independent thinking and education, and dramatically restricts the activities of international and local NGOs (as Burma and Zimbabwe also do). Self-censorship is ubiquitous. Judicial decisions are controlled by Lukashenko. Elections are rigged. The state limits permits for most kinds of economic activity and, through its control of commercial real estate, inhibits any kind of independent initiative. Formal local political institutions exist, but Lukashenko manipulates them, and his subordinates, as if they were marionettes. As in most of the “worst of the worst” cases discussed in this book, the requests and criticisms of international organizations and the world’s big powers are largely ignored, thanks in this case to slavish backing (at least until the natural gas controversy of early 2007) from Russia. The regime’s harsh actions together create an atmosphere of repression that permeates “all aspects of life” in Belarus. Balmaceda concludes that in Belarus, “repression is a way of life.”

For each of our examples of repression, we must ask how the national despot—in this modern, globalized age—manages to stay in power. Obviously, each of the all-powerful leaders and presidents for life, even the leader of the Burmese junta, survives by being ruthless, by creating an effective apparatus of intimidation, and by socializing his people to accept a massive degree of implicit coercion and conformity. That is more the North Korean, Turkmen, and Burmese model, where informing and spying have been developed to a fine art. However, Zimbabweans are too sophisticated to become willing conformists. Instead, in Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea, as well as in the more effectively conformist countries, naked force is employed to cow a potentially restive population and impose subservience.

Like Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Lukashenko in Belarus has advanced the arts of soft and hard repression by terrorizing his own deputies and cabinet ministers, moving all government employees to short-term contracts, and blackmailing senior and junior officials. As in all authoritarian states, patronage is also essential in Belarus, for Lukashenko, like Mugabe, has made all major political and economic actors dependent on his own patrimonial largesse. There are no nonexecutive sources of autonomous economic power; gainful employment opportunities are in state hands, giving the regime and Lukashenko immense leverage on what remains a tightly regulated post-Soviet economy. Furthermore, Lukashenko has successfully managed the flow of information to Belarus’s formidable nonurban population; they know little about the progressive economic reforms and rapid growth in neighboring former Soviet countries. Lukashenko also regularly empties state coffers for the purposes of regime maintenance.
Lukashenko, like Niyazov and Kim Jong-il, believes in ideological indoctrination. Belarus has its handbook of authorized ideas and aphorisms. At private and public workplaces, and in the schools, the workers and students of Belarus are exposed to such instruction. A youth brigade, to which all students must belong, helps to enforce the instruction, and, since 2004, students at all universities in Belarus have had to pass an ideological foundations course based on the handbook. Moreover, each school and workplace has—in the Soviet manner—an ideological controller.

Most of the country cases of repression examined in this book are comparatively impoverished, in some cases (Burma, North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Zimbabwe) as a direct result of human agency. Belarus, almost despite the initiatives and methods of Lukashenko, is comparatively well off, ranking relatively high (sixty-seventh) in the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report listings for 2006 thanks to high levels of literacy and low levels of infant mortality. The per capita GDP for 2006 was $1,868, putting Belarus at a disadvantaged place in Europe but at a higher position relative to the benighted polities in our sample. Only Tunisia and Equatorial Guinea, because of recent oil production, rank higher.

The citizens of Belarus, despite their ruler’s attempt to impose a blanket of conformity, appear to have a degree of personal space greater than that enjoyed by comparable citizens of North Korea and Turkmenistan. They can exercise somewhat more freedom of movement and thought, if never to excess. Syrians, amid the reign of Bashar al-Asad (from 2000), the son of the founding despot, were gaining such personal space before 2006, amid the verbal battering that their country and their rulers received from the UN, the United States and France, and their fellow members of the Arab League. As David Lesch notes in his chapter, under Hafiz al-Asad—the current president’s father and the architect of Syria’s special form of harsh authoritarian rule—a Faustian bargain was struck between the regime and the country’s people: in return for stability and security, and doses of economic progress, freedom was banished. Under Asad the son, there was at first some mild relaxation of restrictions. But in 2006, especially after the battles of the latest war in Lebanon and Syria’s earlier compelled withdrawal from Lebanon subsequent to its complicity in the murder of a key Lebanese leader, the regime’s harsh internal control of dissent and political opportunity was largely restored.

Asad the father came to power in 1970 and forcibly eliminated and filled prisons with opponents, eradicated free expression, massacred 20,000 supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982, and constructed a
tough apparatus of repression comparable to those in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Belarus. In early 2006, with Syria in transition, there were fewer political prisoners, somewhat more space than before for nongovernmental organizations and civil society, and limited new openings for the media.

By early 2007, however, Syria, coming in from the cold, remained a repressive state. The security forces, under the ruler’s brother-in-law, were still powerful. A discussion of Asef al-Shawkat’s pervasive national influence as head of military intelligence, and his methods, was suggested by a Syrian television newscaster who subsequently fled the country: “The fascination of such people is that we all know that in one moment they could give you everything that you wish for, or they could kick you into an iron box.” He continued, “They have fists of steel and ropes of silk.”

The UN Human Rights Committee and Human Rights Watch in 2005 reminded the international community that Asad’s Syria continued to be governed under emergency legislation promulgated in 1963. The regime greatly limits rights to freedom of opinion and expression, curbs the right of peaceful assembly, and ignores the right to freedom of association (and trade unions). It routinely practices torture, provisions of the national constitution to the contrary. Seven political prisoners allegedly died of torture in 2004; despite more recent releases of hundreds of fellow political prisoners, thousands more still languished in Syrian prisons in 2005, and there were new arrests. Others simply “disappeared” during the 1990s and into this century.

Amnesty International in 2005 reported the continued harassment of human rights defenders. They are put under constant surveillance, banned from traveling, tortured, imprisoned after rigged trials in special military courts, and smeared in the official media as “traitors.” In Human Rights Watch’s words, “Syria has a long record of arbitrary arrests, systematic torture, prolonged detention of suspects, and grossly unfair trials.” Preventive arrests are common.

Widespread internal spying is the norm, with public or private expressions of discontent still discouraged and forcibly curtailed. Opposition websites have routinely been shut down. The regime’s channeling of economic privilege and opportunity to relatives of the ruler, and its wholesale nepotism and corruption, remains with little change. Likewise, families close to the Asads still receive favored access to educational and employment opportunities. Syria continued through 2007 to be a bifurcated state, with the Alawi minority and cronies of the Asad family still in ascendance and other Syrians—Sunni, Turkmen, Christian, and Kurdish (2 million, or 10 percent of the national population)—treated as inferiors.
According to the U.S. State Department’s 2006 country report on terrorism, Syria’s aggressiveness is exemplified by its political and material support for Hezbollah, the radical Shiite terror group in Lebanon, and for several Palestinian terrorist organizations. Damascus shelters the leaders of these organizations. As Imad Moustapha, Syria’s ambassador to Washington, said in 2006, “I... now occupy the unique position of being the only ambassador of a rogue state in the United States.” He continued, “That’s a joke. We are not a rogue state, but no other ‘quote-unquote’ rogue state has an ambassador here.”

Uzbekistan is a toughly run, heavily repressive, ex-Soviet state being scrutinized in 2007 by the arbiters of world order as thoroughly as Syria (and North Korea), but for different reasons. Uzbekistan had been an ally of the United States in the war against the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan, despite the antidemocratic actions and human rights abuses of its regime, until Islam Karimov, its longtime president, perpetrated one brutal massacre too many in 2005. That year the Andijan atrocities brought the regime’s excesses sharply before international viewers, truncated relations with the United States and the EU, and intensified scrutiny of Uzbekistan’s highly repressive tendencies.

Karimov extended his presidential term to 2007 by means of a controlled referendum in 2002. But, like so much in hypercentralized Uzbekistan, that show of participatory rule fooled no one. Karimov is the supreme ruler of his country in this era, as he was as a regional super apparatchik in Soviet times. Yet he is more modern and more sophisticated than Niyazov or Kim Jong-il, and has not instituted a cult of personality. Nor has he transformed Uzbekistan into an autarky, as Ne Win did in Burma and Niyazov did in Turkmenistan. Even so, the International Crisis Group maintained that Uzbekistan was “well down the path of self-destruction followed by such countries as Burma, Zimbabwe, and North Korea.” Karimov is no more and no less than a straightforward authoritarian determined to maintain a firm grip on power and on the corrupt distribution of wealth within his cotton-growing country.

There are no significant countervailing institutions. The legislature is a rubber stamp, and cabinet members exist to do the president’s bidding. However, Karimov and the regime owe their survival in good times and bad to the backing of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Committee on Security, complementary if competitive focuses of intrigue and strife. Additionally, Karimov, unlike the much more totalitarian despots in this book’s sample, draws support from and to some extent depends upon the acquiescence of local-level
elites much more than contemporary tyrants in Turkmenistan or Zimbabwe. In that sense, he is even more precariously perched as a ruler than Asad in Syria. His citizens are also much more connected to the globalized world than those in North Korea and Turkmenistan, adding to his vulnerability.

No human rights or civil liberties are respected. Free expression is banished, and sources of information are tightly controlled. Islamists, especially those who belong to Hizb ut-Tahrir, have been hounded and imprisoned. Thousands of religious extremists have been arrested and their movements banned. In her chapter, Martha Olcott estimates that Uzbekistan holds several thousand political prisoners.48 The security forces routinely compel confessions, employ instruments of torture, and curb redress to even a rudimentary rule of law. Journalists are also beaten for “defaming the nation,” and evidence is planted on suspects. The judicial system, as in all of the cases in this volume, is a sham. Ordinary Uzbeks remain wary of arousing security suspicions, but there is less private self-censorship than in several other of our country cases.

Togo is an African version of Uzbekistan. For twenty-seven years under Etienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma, Togo was the home of Africa’s most enduring dictatorship. He and his associates, from the country’s north, persecuted southerners. Then the despot died of a heart attack in 2005. His security forces rallied around Eyadéma’s son, killed hundreds and attacked many more of his potential opponents, and made sure that Faure Gnassingbé, the son, won an election with about 60 percent of the votes cast. The son’s regime took up in terms of repression where the father left off, and (like Bashar al-Asad) kept family members and other cronies in positions of authority and influence.

Gnassingbé’s government employs terror to prevent competition and dissent, and to compel obedience. There is routine intimidation, despite Togo being packed between two democratic African states, Ghana and Benin. The ruling regime also colludes, as Eyadéma did, with Togo’s commercial sector. It binds them and others to the state by restricting opportunities for corrupt gain to a favored few, most often relatives. As in nearly all of our other cases, the ruler hardly can thrive without being patrimonial. He must provide opportunities for enrichment to a flock of retainers while keeping most of his citizens in poverty. (Togo’s per capita GDP in 2005 was about $415.)49 Eyadéma’s nationalization of the country’s most important resource—its phosphate mines—helped to reward a small group well. In such an atmosphere, the security forces have to receive special privileges and, to succeed, the president must play client against client, occasionally throwing some to the wolves.
Gnassingbé’s father, according to international human rights NGOs, was a merciless despot. His security forces in 1998 supposedly captured opponents, bound them, and tossed them out of airplanes, in the manner of Argentina’s armed forces; bodies were found on beaches along the Gulf of Guinea. Togolese were kept poor, illiterate, and insufficiently educated. Togo’s people also suffer from other human development deficiencies, as the annual UN Development Programme Report and Index show so well. Infant mortality is high (62.2 per 1,000), life expectancy is low (54.3 years), and more than half of the population lacks consistent access to clean water.

Despite having a new, younger ruler, Togo, like Syria, suffers from decades of authoritarian leadership. Human rights and civil liberties are absent. Censorship is standard. Spying is fundamental. The security forces control individuals just as they do, say, in Burma—but with less determination and ferocity. The death of Eyadéma and the election of Faure Gnassingbé have made little difference to the ways in which the peoples of Togo are unable to pursue life, liberty, and happiness. As Heilbrunn shows in his chapter, hardly anything has changed since the death of Eyadéma.

Although participants in the conferences that preceded the development of this volume initially expressed surprise at the inclusion of Tunisia, our last example, a close inspection reveals that this country is no longer (if it ever was) a progressive North African nation-state. Under Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s founding president, the impress of authoritarian rule was somehow softened by the ruler’s legitimacy and by the absence of overt avarice. Tunisia became an oasis of peace in a turbulent region consumed by strife. Its comparatively high levels of development also testified to Bourguiba’s deft leadership. Moreover, compared to their neighbors and the peoples of much of the rest of the Middle East and Africa, Tunisians complained less about the oppression of their government. Yet another difference between then and now in Tunisia is that times, and external expectations, have changed.

Tunisian perceptions of the effective governance of their rulers and, objectively, the manner in which their government performed (and delivered political goods) altered for the worse when President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali pushed the aging Bourguiba out of office in 1987. A critical period of “cleansing” followed in 1991–1992, when the Ben Ali regime eliminated Islamists. Subsequently, Ben Ali and his family have arrogated and aggregated perquisites of dominance, extirpated rivals, and put a tight lid on potential dissent and dissenters. A recent U.S. Department of State report said that official Tunisia remained “intolerant of public criticism and used physical abuse, criminal investigations, the [military] court system, arbitrary arrests, residential restric-
tions, and travel controls ... to discourage criticism. The Government restricted freedom of assembly and association. All media are “asphyxiated,” and self-censorship is common. The Internet is closely monitored. The Tunisian security forces, like those in Uzbekistan and elsewhere, use physical abuse and beatings against those considered threats. Ben Ali also employs a paramilitary group of thugs to intimidate his antagonists. Furthermore, the Ben Ali regime utilizes torture in many forms and treats political prisoners harshly. Some Islamists and other opponents of Ben Ali have died in prison or shortly after being released. The Department of State's report for 2006 stressed how intolerant of criticism the Ben Ali government continued to be, how corrupt it was, and how it continued to commit heinous human rights abuses.

Like all of the other examples in this book, and several outside its pages, Tunisia—despite its reputation and wealth—is a police state. According to Clement Henry, there are 150,000 police in a country of 10 million, a proportionally higher number than in Britain, France, or Germany. Yet, although Ben Ali’s men routinely torture opponents, Henry suggests that Tunisia is less repressive than many, if not all, of the case studies contained in this book. Compared to other places, political prisoners are fewer, and the denial of liberties and rights is more limited. Ben Ali, across some dimensions, may also have begun his reign using less draconian methods of rule than had Bourguiba. But Ben Ali’s presidency in the 1990s soon consumed the other ministries, dominated the ruling party, morphed into a cult of personality without much of a guiding personality, ramped up his family’s intervention in and accumulation of sources of significant state wealth, and ran roughshod over the judicial and legal institutions of the state. Ben Ali’s Tunisia is a corrupt as well as a repressive state, now obligated institutionally to serve the ruling family and the Ben Ali regime and not, as in earlier times, some kind of postcolonial national destiny.

In the new Tunisia, as in the old, elections and their results are manipulated. Indeed, the fact that many of the countries represented in this book hold elections constitutes no claim against their nondemocratic repressiveness. In all of the cases, elections are cosmetic. In a few less hypocritical examples, elections are no longer held because the supreme ruler has been designated “for life,” or because the regimes do not believe that the democratic practice of elections suits their needs. Ben Ali’s regime is in the first camp, where elections are conducted to appease international public opinion and in order to provide a justification, domestically, for continued repression.

Likewise, even Tunisia, arguably the least venally repressive of our sample of nation-states, permits no public free expression. Thus accountability is
limited, and civil society has no significant voice. Self-censorship exists in Tunisia, also, but in contrast to other cases, its practice may be less consistent. And the French connection, especially Tunisia’s proximity geographically and intellectually to France, serves (along with a thriving and outspoken diaspora) to limit the oppressive character of Tunisia’s official censorship. Unlike the successful spying and surveillance operations of Syria or Turkmenistan, Ben Ali cannot so easily control what Tunisians say in private to each other. Nor, as in Bourguiba’s Tunisia, can the long, sinister arm of the regime reach into Europe to assassinate and intimidate opponents.

By 2006–2007, Tunisia was also a target of Salafist terrorists linked to al Qaeda. From their bases in neighboring Algeria, militants attempted to place bombs in Tunis and thus to disrupt Tunisia’s thriving tourist industry. Better governance as well as tighter surveillance were the presumed antidotes to the effective spread of terror.

**Methods of Repression and Policy Responses**

The recipe for effective state repression is clear. Construct a large, powerful, and omnipotent security force apparatus. Use it to terrorize your own people, employing a variety of techniques to impose conformity and isolate potential dissidents. Spy on everyone; tap telephones and interfere with the Internet. Employ a network of informers; pay well for information from concierges, barkeepers, street sweepers, and so on. Encourage eavesdropping. Eliminate free expression in the press or in other media. Control clerics. Construct a lavish cult of personality around the ruler. Create a bogus philosophy to undergird and provide justification and apologetics for the foundations of the repressive regime. Distribute compendiums of “glorious thoughts.” Manipulate all of the levers of economic opportunity so that the prosperity of individuals and families depends on the ruler and his or her close associates. Wrap the ruler and a vast array of associates in a web of corruption, the better to distort priorities and control all lucrative avenues of wealth and patrimony. Close the national borders. Prevent travel. Crack down on protests and protesters. Beat people almost at random. Arrest ordinary people as well as suspects arbitrarily; interrogate them mercilessly. Torture them. Incarcerate dastardly miscreants, or persons with independent ideas, after show trials in fake courts. Assassinate some, and subject others to mysterious accidents. Meddle in the national diaspora, even to the extent of attacking opponents overseas. At home, impose collective punishment for the acts of a few, or even of a single person, on whole families or clans. In special cases, in order to
demonstrate the power of the ruling regime, use food deprivation as a weapon, or send soldiers to wipe out whole villages and cities, massacre civilians, or perpetrate genocide. Most of all, rulers and ruling regimes must never flinch. Even when international bodies or international NGOs bleat, deny all accusations, avoid exploratory visits by international rapporteurs, and complain mightily about infringements of national sovereignty.

Each of these steps down the nefarious road of gross repressiveness can be documented and measured, either directly or by using proxies. Even a rough ranking permits good and appropriate policy to be made toward countries sharing the same kinds of repressive pursuits rather than doing so episodically and ad hoc. It also encourages intelligent policymaking well before (not after) willful nation-states impose insuperable restraints on their own peoples or lash out aggressively at neighbors and the international order. By having a publicly available method of identifying repressive states clearly and measuring the magnitude of their repressiveness, Washington and other capitals will be unable to ignore the harmful quality of nation-states with whom they might need or wish to share strategic or economic interests. They will have to confront the realities of repression and will find it uncomfortable to embrace nations that fundamentally prey on their own people.

Likewise, because it is only among the highly repressive states that the real rogues—the aggressive and dangerous rogues—will be found, policy actions can and should be crafted to encourage those outlaw states to adhere more strictly to global basic values. Incentives can be provided by the big powers and international order to elicit behavioral reforms. If not, the international system and the United Nations will have a transparent foundation on which to base a campaign of sanctions, possibly leading to forceful initiatives under chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The proliferation of nuclear arms, chemical or biological capabilities, and light weapons is dangerous and destabilizing, as is regime support of trans-border terrorism. Of equal concern as a threat to stability and normative behavior is internal repression. In order to achieve a more peaceful, prosperous world, it behooves the UN and big powers to act consistently against the repressors. Only by their so doing will widespread deprivations of human rights and the immiseration of whole peoples over long periods of time be reduced. State-sponsored oppression is just as dangerous in terms of lives lost and opportunities forfeited as state-sponsored terrorism. Explicitly measuring and labeling highly repressive states, and showing how they attack their own citizens, is the first step toward reform and the improved well-being of millions of the poorest and most abused peoples of the world.
Notes


2. Mary Caprioli and Peter Trumbore prefer a much broader definition of “rogue.” Their data show that all gross repressors are rogues because such human rights violators inevitably breach world order norms. See chapter 2 in this volume.

3. Syria may also possess WMD in the form of biological and chemical weapons. See David Lesch, chapter 11 in this volume.


7. See their analysis in chapter 2.


17. See chapter 2.


20. See chapter 2.

21. Ambassador Richard Jones, now the envoy of the United States to Israel, suggested this formulation at a meeting of the Kennedy School’s Rogue States Project in October, 2004.

22. See chapter 3 in this volume for Feng and Paul’s methodology and analysis.

23. For an elaboration of these concepts and distinctions, see Rotberg, *When States Fail*, 20–30.

24. Most observers believe that Turkmenistan has been losing, not gaining, population, but Niyazov insisted that his nation-state must grow, so in 2006 the Turkmenistan National Institute of Statistics reported a growth rate of nearly 3 percent and a total population of nearly 7 million. No census, however, has been taken since the early 1990s. See “The Overview of the Social and Economic Development of Turkmenistan in January–March 2006” (April 17, 2006), www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/ekonom/ek_stat/170406_eng.htm.

25. See *Economist* (May 27, 2006).

26. Ibid.

27. For this and other quotes on North Korea, see Marcus Noland, chapter 4 in this volume.

28. For a full exploration of Turkmenistan under the Niyazov regime, see Gregory Gleason, chapter 5 in this volume.


31. See Priscilla Clapp, chapter 6 in this volume.

32. Burma (Myanmar) ranks 160 of 163 on the 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index. (The state shares its place with Guinea and Iraq, making its rank fall second from the


34. For a full description of Zimbabwe under Mugabe, see Robert Rotberg, chapter 7 in this volume.

35. Paradza was eventually found guilty in late 2005, fleeing to Britain in early 2006 to avoid a possible ten-year sentence by the High Court. See UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Country of Origin Information Report: Zimbabwe (Geneva, April 2006).

36. The party referred to is the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF).


39. See John Heilbrunn, chapter 9, in this volume, for a discussion of Equatorial Guinea and further references.

40. See chapter 8 in this volume.


42. See chapter 11 in this volume.


48. See chapter 10 in this volume.

Repressive, Aggressive, and Rogue Nation-States


51. See chapter 9.


54. For Clement Henry’s discussion of repression in Tunisia, see chapter 12 in this volume.