Since emerging as independent states in 1947, Pakistan and India have been engaged in one of the world’s most complex and sharply contested rivalries. It is as long-lived as the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab dispute. Though the two states are similar in many ways, not least in their cultural closeness, they began with a basic clash of national identities, soon followed by border and territorial disputes. Each then went on to support separatist elements in the other country. Now, after four wars and numerous crises, they are nuclear rivals, and a deep and near-permanent diplomatic hostility shapes their relations with the rest of the world. The conflict continues to evoke international attention, although only rarely action. In comparative terms, it has the dubious distinction of being one of the few conflicts that are truly intractable, meaning conflicts that last more than twenty years despite multiple attempts to end them. As one student of the subject notes, 95 percent of the world’s conflicts are resolvable, only 5 percent are not, the India-Pakistan dispute being the longest-lasting in the latter group.¹

Relations between India and Pakistan, today the world’s second and sixth most populous states, are far from static, however. They improve and deteriorate within a certain range—generating new aspects and complications, giving rise to cautious optimism, but also feeding uncertainty. The emergence of nuclear capability in both states after 1998 raised the stakes but also reduced the chances of a new conflict. Although going nuclear did not prevent a small war in 1999 and nearly a major one in 2001–02, it did show that these weapons affect the propensity for (and conduct of) war between nuclear-armed rivals. All the same, intelligence errors or a strategic misjudgment—of a kind common to all states, big and small, wise and stupid—could (and probably will) lead to another crisis.
History’s Trajectory

In the wide view of scholars and policymakers, the rivalry between India and Pakistan is deeply rooted in the years 1858, when Great Britain assumed direct control over a large part of the subcontinent, taking over from the British East India Company, and 1947, when it partitioned India and decamped. During these years many princely states continued with ultimate authority resting in the British Crown and Parliament. Over half of territorial India (approximately two-thirds of the population) was ruled by British administrators, magistrates, and military forces—collectively known as the Raj—as well as a large army raised in India but officered by the British. The overall security of the subcontinent was enforced by the unchallenged sea power of the Royal Navy. The Indian military (later divided between the two successor states) tied the region together, its multiethnic, multireligious, and mult caste regiments reflecting the region’s diversity as well as British expansion from the south and the east to the west and northwest.

Under the Raj’s system of direct and indirect governance, South Asia became a strategically coherent region. It served as an important commercial and military gateway to East and Southeast Asia; then as a source of capital, technology, manpower, and investment for Britain’s African and Middle East possessions; and later as an imperial police force in two world wars.

Even before 1947, conflict arose as a result of the intertwining of two competitions. The first competition was between the nascent visions of India and Pakistan, epitomized respectively by the Congress Party and the Muslim League. Both wanted independence from Britain; the Muslim League also wanted independence from a perceived Hindu dominance. The second was the multisided rivalry between and among the princely states, the British Raj, and the leaders of these two competing nationalist movements. The visions of the Muslim League and Congress also differed in the disposition of the princely states; the rivalry was further complicated by their different military, strategic, and economic visions.

The Indian National Congress, formed as a lobbying group in 1885, was initially sympathetic to British rule (one of its founders was an Englishman). Until the group’s Lahore session in 1929, it regarded itself as a loyal opposition movement, seeking not independence but reform. By 1930 the Congress was transformed into a mass movement seeking independence—albeit one still led by elites—and included such notable Muslims as Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Maulana Azad. Still other Muslims called for a renaissance, leading to the foundation of the Muslim League in Dhaka in 1906. The close analogy with the Middle East has often been noted; there the concept of Israel as a homeland for
the Jewish people and that of Palestine as an Arab-dominated but multiethnic state was intensified and enlarged by their incompatible territorial claims.

In response to pressure, the British introduced the elective principle in the governance of India under the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 and acceded to demands for separate electorates for Muslims, a step that was strongly criticized both by Hindu-oriented parties and by secular groups such as the Indian National Congress. By 1940 the Muslim League, now with Jinnah at its head, was openly advocating a separate Muslim-dominated and -oriented state, to be called Pakistan.

Despite the rivalry between the ideas of India and Pakistan, supporters on both sides agreed on one major point: all wanted to rid India of the British, although the two differed in the proposed timing of the break. Note, too, that many prominent Muslims were members of the Indian National Congress, though the League ultimately claimed to speak on behalf of all of Indian Muslims. When partition finally took place, it drove the greater population into disastrous turmoil: hundreds of thousands lost their lives and millions became refugees. About 7.2 million Indian Muslims migrated to Pakistan, forming about one-fourth of the population of West Pakistan. On the other side, about 5.5 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India.

The two states subsequently acquired extraregional, mutually exclusive allies, became ideological rivals, and were shaped by quite different organizing principles. All of this happened despite a common history and geography, very similar cultural roots and economic systems, and a strategic environment that had been shared for centuries.

Partition was made even more complicated by the existence of a third vision of South Asia, that of the hundreds of princely and autonomous states, although only a half dozen really counted. Though nominally independent, even the major ones—Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagadh—were bound to New Delhi by treaty and by their inferior military capability.* The British saw to it that no princely state acquired modern military hardware in any significant amount and that the princely armies were deployed and manned in such a way as to ensure that they would never serve as the basis for a breakaway movement. This control strategy was applied during World War II when many of the princely armies were brought into the regular Indian army. The British exerted similar control through their treaties with the princes and attendant political advisers residing in the state capitals. These ensured that the rulers did not stray in the direction of independence.

*In this book I usually refer to the state simply as Kashmir, or J&K. It is now divided into Indian-controlled and Pakistan-controlled administrative units in the respective countries.
and that affairs of state remained within boundaries tolerated by the British. The quid pro quo was that when a ruler got into trouble, he (or rarely she) could usually count on British military and political support. By and large the system worked at very little cost to the British, as exemplified by Hyderabad, a princely state larger than France with a predominantly Hindu population and a Muslim ruler, known as the nizam. The British provided advice and security to the (Muslim) nizam, who presided over a cluster of smaller Hindu rulers, who in turn governed a largely Hindu population, albeit one with a sizable Muslim minority in one of India’s most stable regions—now the state of Andhra Pradesh. Some of these princes, including the nizam at one point, had thoughts of independence, but the costs of challenging the British were steep, and the rewards for loyalty, both fiscal and symbolic, were substantial, as was the assurance of British support against any usurpers.

When partition did come, the Indian princes were strongly advised by the British to choose either India or Pakistan. The visions of a future India and Pakistan rubbed against the ambitions of some of the princes, with the result that the rush to force them to join one or the other ignited several significant conflicts.

Although technically the decision to accede was in the hands of the ruler, not the ruled, India used force to incorporate Hyderabad and Junagadh (another largely Hindu state with a Muslim ruler). But it also proposed a plebiscite in the cases of Junagadh and Jammu and Kashmir, the latter a largely Muslim state with a Hindu ruler. The offer to Kashmir, subsequently regretted by Indian diplomats, came at a moment when the Indian and Pakistani armies were inconclusively battling for control of the state, and the stalemate has continued ever since.

The decision to coerce Hyderabad (in the middle of India) and Junagadh (on the western India-Pakistan border), both Muslim-ruled states with Hindu majorities, into joining India generated anger and unease about Indian intentions. Meanwhile, the handling of Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state with a Hindu ruler, sparked a conflict that would become the focus of competition between India and Pakistan for the next sixty years. This dispute reinforced Pakistan’s notion that the army was the most critical institution for the survival and advancement of the nation, which was to have a detrimental effect on Pakistan’s political order.

In the short view, it seemed natural that the British Empire should be succeeded by only a few states. The Raj itself rose from the ashes of the Mughal Empire, which in turn was the heir to several regional empires. In the long view, stretching over two millennia, states of the subcontinent emerged in a pattern of imperial advance and retreat, of a single dominant power and
then diverse and often competing centers of power. No iron law decrees that South Asia should be dominated by one state, or even two states. Indeed, other regions—China, Europe—have had their integrative moments as well, followed by long spells of competition and rivalry among the fragments.4

The periods of imperial retreat were not necessarily marked by stagnation; modern historiography points to important cultural, economic, and even military developments during the many hundreds of years when South Asia was politically less united. Of equal significance here, these years saw the rise of durable regional and subregional political, economic, and cultural alignments. Some of these endured for centuries, especially in South India and along India’s western coast, while Afghanistan was under North India’s thumb. As a result, even when South Asia was ruled from North India or Delhi, regional powers were usually in a bargaining position with the more powerful rulers.5

Bloodbath and Independence

On July 18, 1947, Britain’s Parliament passed the India Independence Act and less than a month later, on August 14 and 15, respectively, declared India and Pakistan independent sovereign states. The dates were staggered to allow the last viceroy of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, to travel from India to Pakistan for the transfer of power. He was then appointed governor-general of India, but in Pakistan the title was assumed by Jinnah to spite Mountbatten, who in his view was too pro-Indian and too much under the influence of Jawaharlal Nehru, the leading Indian politician of his generation.

The vast catastrophe called Partition was prefigured in the ghastly Calcutta riots of 1946. I deal with its impact on the memories of citizens of both states later in the book; suffice to say that it shaped the views of millions of Indians and Pakistanis, especially those who were forced to migrate from one state or another, or who were the victims (or perpetrators) of atrocities. Many of their memories, often in wildly distorted versions of the truth, have been passed on to second and third generations.

Important stories of members of both communities who helped or rescued members of a different faith are mostly undocumented. The great authors and cultural figures who recognized and opposed Partition go unmentioned. Even official history projects in both countries pay little attention to these stories and are devoted mainly to building national solidarity around negatives: distrust or hatred of another religious or ethnic community.

This is true of both countries, but not in equal measure. Taking the moral high ground, India has always seen itself as the regional power that does not need Pakistan and as the prime inheritor of the Raj’s legacy of subcontinental
dominance. Pakistan, as the smaller and militarily weaker of the two states, has assumed a more defensive and also a more assertive posture, strikingly reminiscent of Israel’s stance. In keeping with these attitudes, India rejects outside support, whereas Pakistan cultivates it. In the case of Kashmir, Indians work hard to ignore what steps might change the status quo, whereas Pakistan is eager to seize upon them. India, which once sought UN intervention in Kashmir, now abhors it, and Indian diplomats scramble mightily to prevent it from being raised in any forum in the world, even as their government has been unable to accommodate or suppress Kashmiri separatists and pro-Pakistani factions. On the other side, generations of Pakistanis have been taught to believe that fundamentally India has not come to terms with Pakistan’s existence. This overall narrative was reinforced and legitimized by the educational curricula in both countries, perpetuating the divide in successive generations, and the role of partition in feeding this narrative is well documented.

As for the more material consequences, the second partition (which gave East Bengal independence) was also important. In 1947 India and Pakistan constituted 94 percent of the South Asian land mass (not including Afghanistan) and 96 percent of its population. After the creation of Bangladesh out of the former East Pakistan in 1971 these figures changed: Pakistan was reduced by half in population and size. Today, with the loss of East Pakistan, Pakistan accounts for 12 percent of the total population of South Asia, 18 percent of the land mass, and 8.5 percent of the total economy. Its military spending remains very high, about 22 percent of government expenditure. India spends much more on defense, about US$44.4 billion next to Pakistan’s $5.6 billion, although as a proportion of GNP defense spending is about 2.7–2.8 percent for both. Nevertheless, Pakistan is falling behind India in terms of overall defense spending and conventional weaponry, which has propelled its nuclear acquisition program; it probably has more nuclear weapons than India, although exact figures are difficult to come by.

From the outset, both states benefited from institutions established by the British: a strong bureaucracy, a functioning judiciary, and a professional military. Contrary to its current status, however, Pakistan’s army did not start out as the strongest institution in the state. Very few Pakistanis filled the ranks above colonel, and for a number of years key positions were held by British officers, who even served as the army’s first two chiefs. At the same time, Pakistan had a uniting figure in a native son, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Meanwhile, India had not only Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi but also a much stronger second and third tier of leaders.

Created in two parts or wings, with the more populous but militarily weaker East separated from the West by 1,000 miles of Indian territory,
Pakistan held a critically important strategic position. Yet the chaos of partition left it with a proportionately weaker state capacity than India’s, as well as limited financial resources. Many Pakistanis also claimed that India had not fulfilled its part of the bargain when it came to sharing military assets, which quickly bred suspicion throughout official Pakistan, but especially the army—where it became one of the institution’s treasured grievances. Thus right off the bat Pakistan viewed India as a hostile neighbor and considered itself vulnerable to India’s malevolence, which meant that the Pakistan army’s primary role from the beginning would be to counter India’s enmity. Actually, the lesson drawn by both sides in the aftermath of partition and the ensuing wars and crises was that some military capability directed against the other was a prime necessity. Each saw the other as its most serious security threat, second only to the consolidation and absorption of the princely states.

**Four Crises**

India-Pakistan relations were greatly affected by four post-partition crises, three of them involving the princely states of Kashmir (see chapters 5 and 6), Hyderabad, and Junagadh. A fourth crisis revolved around the 1950 communal riots in East Bengal, which led the two rivals to sign the Nehru-Liaquat Pact protecting minority rights.7

In the case of Junagadh, trouble erupted when on August 15, 1947, its Muslim ruler acceded to Pakistan, which welcomed the move. Junagadh’s largely Hindu public responded with massive protests, however, which prompted Indian forces to occupy the state on November 9, 1947, whereupon the ruler reversed himself and acceded to India (on the border, the weak Pakistani forces were unable to intervene in the state). On February 20, 1948, India held a referendum on the accession, and the state’s population voted in favor of it.

As for Kashmir, its maharaja toyed with the idea of independence but changed his mind when the state came under attack from Pakistani raiders and was granted armed assistance from India. He then acceded to India, handing over powers of defense, communication, and foreign affairs. Both India and Pakistan agreed that the accession would be confirmed by a referendum once hostilities had ceased.

By May 1948 the Indian army had regained control over much, but not all, of Kashmir, and the regular Pakistan army was called upon to mount an offense. The war ended on January 1, 1949, when a cease-fire was arranged by the United Nations, which recommended that both India and Pakistan abide by their commitment to hold a referendum in the state. The two sides
agreed to establish a cease-fire line where the fighting had stopped, which became a de facto border monitored by a UN peacekeeping force, but the referendum was never held.

Initially Hyderabad’s ruler also believed that he could sustain an independent existence. Although the state was physically distant from Pakistan, he was assured its political and moral support. After months of negotiations with Indian officials, Nehru decided to use force to annex the state. Though a liberal internationalist, he was prompted by his tough home minister, Sardar Vallabhai Patel, who was less enamored of international mediation and peacemaking after the experience in Kashmir and who argued that India could not accept a hostile (and very large) independent state at its very core. In a police action termed Operation Polo, the Indian army swept through Hyderabad state, easily defeating the armed militias, known as Razakars.

The fourth crisis, centered in Pakistan’s East Bengal, arose following the widespread massacre of its Hindu residents after partition, which sent thousands of Hindus fleeing to India. Reminded of the 1946 Calcutta bloodbath, Indians responded with a welling up of anti-Muslim feelings. A perplexed Nehru adopted a strategy of moving Indian armed forces closer to East Pakistan. Given the weakness of Pakistani forces in East Bengal, there was no realistic way Pakistan could stop them. After several crisis-filled months, Nehru and the Pakistani prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, agreed each country should protect its minorities and called for separate investigations of the communal situation on each side of their borders.

Throughout this crisis Great Britain was actively engaged on the diplomatic scene. Two of India’s three service chiefs and all of Pakistan’s were British—they provided London with up-to-the minute accounts of each government’s policies, which were sometimes communicated to the other side. The United States regarded the conflict as tertiary, however, despite Prime Minister Liaquat’s strong pitch to the Truman administration for military assistance.

Meanwhile, domestic public opinion on both sides became inflamed, nearly swamping the leadership with its rhetoric of crisis and war. Nehru and Liaquat agreed to a stopgap in the hope that a forthcoming UN mission might bring a resolution to the Kashmir conflict. Nevertheless, the overall pattern was by then set: Pakistan concluded that its military weakness allowed India to push it around; India felt that the Pakistanis had not given up on the two-nation theory that had broken India up to begin with.

These various conflicts, individually and collectively, drove home several “lessons” to Indian and Pakistani politicians, bureaucrats, and generals that have become embedded in their national narratives:
—The duplicity of the other side.
—The mixed role of international intervention—both sides sought it but only to pin the blame on the other.
—Indian eagerness to use force and coercion when it was in a dominant position, justified by alleged violations against Hindus in Pakistan.
—Pakistani willingness to play the Muslim card, especially the inflammatory idea of Hindus and Muslims constituting two separate nations.
—The tight link between domestic politics and foreign policy to the point where they were considered inseparable.

On both sides conservatives and fundamentalists egged on the leadership. Soon relations between India and Pakistan took on the qualities of a “communal riot with armor,” a term I first heard from General “Monty” Palit, one of the ablest of the wartime entries into the Indian army.

More Wars and Crises

Pakistan’s military vulnerability and the death by 1951 of its two dominant political figures, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, helped solidify army influence. Unlike India, with a strong Congress Party governing most of the country, Pakistan saw the Muslim League quickly deteriorate and the army (aligned with the bureaucracy) emerge as its most powerful institution. It then gained military hardware in the mid-1950s when it joined two U.S.-led treaty organizations—the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization, CENTO) and the Manila Pact (later the South East Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO). However, these failed to provide Pakistan the security guarantee it sought against India.

Instead, Great Britain and the United States maintained cordial ties with India until the mid-1960s, particularly from about 1959 onward when it actually moved close to the Western powers as a consequence of their shared fears of communist China. Indeed, India bought significant weapons from America and even received some grant assistance for its military.

These foreign links may have facilitated the single most important peaceful agreement between India and Pakistan, the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. The brainchild of the World Bank, the treaty contains a mechanism for arbitration and has worked—almost flawlessly—for fifty years, even though it has been a less-than-optimal solution to the problem of dividing the Indus waters between the two states. In the absence of any further agreements of this magnitude and because of a huge increase in demand, the 1960 treaty does not match up with contemporary demands.

When war broke out in 1965, this time it was triggered by the miscalculations of President Ayub Khan and his youthful foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had become wary of India’s growing military power, now
fortified by American, British, and Soviet military hardware. The two tried to instigate a Kashmiri revolt and put pressure on India to negotiate on Kashmir, but the war ended in a stalemate. The United States suspended military aid to both countries and stood aside while the Soviet Union brokered a peace agreement in Tashkent. This reinforced the strategic status quo but was to have a deep effect on Pakistan’s unity. Ayub had declared during the war that East Pakistan could not be effectively defended (it was nearly encircled by India), which contributed to East Bengal’s estrangement.

In 1971 East Bengali nationalism, fermenting for years, erupted into rebellion. Aided by a huge covert operation, in which Bengali-speaking Indian officers “resigned” their commissions to advise Bengali separatist forces, culminating in a direct Indian military intervention, the East broke away, forming the new state of Bangladesh. What remained of Pakistan came to be dominated by Punjabis, who made up almost 58 percent of the “new” Pakistani population, compared with 30 percent in undivided Pakistan. Coincidentally, they were also the largest ethnic/linguistic group in the army, thus bringing Pakistan’s center of political power into alignment with its center of military power. More worrisome from a strategic perspective, the army and the political leadership, humiliated by India’s victory, were bent on revenge, something blissfully ignored by victorious India.

For its part, New Delhi assumed that Pakistan was no longer a serious rival. When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made peace with Bhutto, she failed to resolve still-remaining differences over Kashmir and a host of minor disputes, although in 1983, just before she was assassinated, she did establish a joint commission with Pakistan supposedly outside the political and military arenas. Its four subcommissions were to explore a host of items: trade, health, sports, science, consular issues, travel, and tourism. She also agreed to a declaration on the South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) organization, the predecessor to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), but Pakistan vetoed an Indian proposal for a ministerial-level council.

This movement toward cooperation subsided when Pakistani governments began meddling in Indian affairs, notably in Kashmir. Indians came to view Pakistan as the most significant destabilizing force in the region and as part of an encircling alliance of hostile powers, which included its sponsors in Beijing and Washington. For at least a decade the Indians suspected that America, China, and Pakistan were fearful of a resurgent India. In fact, India’s rise was being hampered by its own dysfunctional economy, its incapacity to come to grips with a still-recalcitrant Pakistan, and its continuing military dependence on the Soviet Union. The latter proved especially embarrassing when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 without
even informing India. This was the beginning of a long Indian search for an alternative friend among the world’s great powers.

Between 1987 and 2002 India and Pakistan faced another four crises, made a few aborted moves toward normalization, and saw the derailment of the Joint Commission. No crisis evolved into a major war, and even the Kargil War of 1999 remained limited. At the same time, none of the steps to mitigate their rivalry were noticeably effective, including the Composite Dialogue introduced to address issues of terrorism. Moreover, the acquisition of nuclear weapons in both countries by the early 1980s added a new dimension to the rivalry. Yet both sides had also learned valuable lessons about the limits of conflict in attempting to achieve national objectives. The result was a period of relative stability and maturity in bilateral engagement, although not necessarily irreversible progress.

This cursory overview of the India-Pakistan relationship sets the stage for two central themes of this book. First, both India and Pakistan are modeled upon the modern nation-state, a model that is in some cases being imposed on peoples who share a weak national identity and marginal allegiance to the central state, as compared with their regional and linguistic affiliations. Second, the very legitimacy or “idea” of India and Pakistan as constituted at present is challenged by some, but not all, in the other country, a challenge that has deep roots in prewar relations between contesting images of the subcontinent’s future.

These factors led the two states to become enduring enemies, each considering itself vulnerable to the other. Their shared and contested origins as modern states have also sparked the fear on both sides that their populations are not entirely loyal and that there are outsiders who do not mean them well. This thinking in turn makes it tempting to entertain the idea of turning unhappy populations against their neighbor’s center. The view in Pakistani security circles is that even if Kashmir cannot be wrested from India, Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiris will force India to divert resources to containing Kashmiri discontent. Conversely, Indians are in favor of tacit or sometimes explicit support for dissident Pakistani minority groups, as epitomized in the massive support provided to the Bangladeshi separatist movement in 1970–71. In sum, fears echo back and forth between the two countries, reinforcing paranoia in both.

**Expectations**

That paranoia received an early spark from British expectations regarding the wisdom and consequences of creating a larger India and a smaller
Pakistan. Another contributing factor was Britain’s timing of the split, which was not guided by a realistic assessment of the difficulties of simultaneously dividing British India and incorporating the princely states into one of the two successor states.

**British Concerns**

Britain’s Labor government was primarily concerned with the possible loss of British lives and with Britain’s feeble global position. If the Indians and Pakistanis really wanted independence, the British argued, they might as well get it sooner than they expected. This was the attitude of Lord Mountbatten, who had been made viceroy in part because of his closeness to Jawaharlal Nehru and other Indian leaders. Mountbatten’s charm and British haste carried the day, with catastrophic results. Mountbatten’s temperament and that of his political superiors could be gauged by the countdown calendar he commissioned and distributed to his staff: when August 15 came, the Raj would be gone.

The consequences of partition are the subject of hundreds of books, but they are nowhere better summarized than in “Partition,” a poem by W. H. Auden describing the plight of Sir Cyril Radcliff, a British administrator having no familiarity with the Indian subcontinent who chaired the committees set up to define the boundaries of the new India and Pakistan. His lack of experience in South Asia, which was even less than Mountbatten’s, and its bitter flavor are evident in the following excerpt:

Having never set eyes on the land he was called to partition
Between two peoples fanatically at odds,
With their different diets and incompatible gods.

He got down to work, to the task of settling the fate
Of millions. The maps at his disposal were out of date
And the Census Returns almost certainly incorrect,

But in seven weeks it was done, the frontiers decided,
A continent for better or worse divided.13

Those who knew the region’s security problems were less optimistic. A few British generals thought that Pakistan could serve as India’s bulwark, guarding the North-West Frontier Province as the British had for a century. Indeed, Pakistan Army Headquarters moved into the old Northern Command of the (British) Indian army. However, most British senior officers were skeptical. One of the Raj’s greatest generals and its last commander
in chief, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, was dubious about some of his subordinates’ enthusiasm for Pakistan, which in his view would at best be a second-rate power, unable to cope with any serious threat: “From the purely military and strategical aspect, . . . it must be concluded that the provision of adequate insurance in the shape of reasonably good defensive arrangements for Pakistan would be a most difficult and expensive business, and that no guarantee of success could be given.”

Those who like Auchinleck opposed partition pleaded in vain for a more measured withdrawal. In the especially relevant view of most British Indian army generals, Auchinleck being the most experienced, the division of India into two states was not really necessary, and all were enraged over the way it was rushed. Thirty years after the event, he caustically referred to this period as the most difficult in his entire professional career. This view was echoed by one of the most capable British civil servants of the period, Sir Philip Mason, author of several classic studies of India, its bureaucracy, and army.

Among outside observers, the United States was sympathetic to the Indian nationalist movement but gave little thought to the prospect of Pakistan. Washington—especially President Franklin D. Roosevelt—saw British India as an unsustainable manifestation of colonialism, although he tempered his views to avoid alienating America’s British ally during World War II (India was the site of several major bases for American forces that operated in Burma, resupplied the Chinese Nationalists, and gained access to Southeast Asia). After partition, America believed the United Nations should be the mechanism used to resolve the Kashmir issue but avoided taking sides, and eventually the Truman administration resigned itself to the situation on the ground.

Stalin’s Soviet Union at first saw India as ripe for revolution, although its support for communists in India soured Nehru and other Indian leaders. Later, the Soviet Union supported India’s position on Kashmir and provided massive military aid for this campaign. Soviet policy, like that of the United States, was driven by the need to gather allies in South Asia for the larger cold war struggle.

**Indian and Pakistani Views**

The impending partition of British India met with differences of opinion throughout the subcontinent, with strong pro-Pakistani sentiments in some regions, opposition in others. The demand for an independent Pakistan (which did not really acquire much political weight until the late 1930s) was strongest in areas of greatest Hindu-Muslim tension, notably the northern Indian plains, parts of the Bombay Presidency, and Bengal. In these regions the “two-nation theory” was a rallying cry for Muslims, a notable proponent
being the poet-philosopher Allama Iqbal. In this view, Hindus and Muslims were two separate “nations,” each deserving its own state.

Aligarh Muslim University, founded in 1875 by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the first major Muslim reformist-educationalist in British India, was a center of pro-Pakistan thought, and a large number of Pakistani politicians and soldiers studied there. These included Iqbal, whose writings inspired the Pakistan movement in the 1930s; Pakistan’s first two prime ministers; its second and third governor-generals; and even, briefly, Ayub Khan, who later seized power in a military coup. Some Indians regarded Aligarh with suspicion (and still do) and moved to establish another “nationalist,” that is, explicitly pro-Indian, Muslim university, Jamia Milia, in New Delhi.

Ironically, the Pakistan movement was weakest in several provinces that became part of the new state of Pakistan, notably the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, and Sindh. This meant that the most enthusiastic supporters of Pakistan, many of them migrants to the new state, found themselves living in a population that was less than dedicated to the idea of a new, Islamic state. But its supporters were not of one mind in their vision. Iqbal, for example, saw Pakistan as a step on the road to a greater Muslim South Asian community. The far more secular Jinnah, whose brilliance and acumen actually brought about Pakistan’s independence, wanted a homeland for Muslims, but not necessarily a nation made up entirely of Muslims. He, and many of the important Muslim landed gentry, considered themselves binational; they would live in “Pakistan” but retain homes in what was to become India, and they envisioned normal relations between the two successor states. Indeed, one of Jinnah’s proposals was that Pakistan would become a province within a larger Indian entity, not a separate state.

Some proponents of independence favored a very loose political order with a high degree of regional autonomy and with some ties to India, as reflected in the actual Pakistani constitution, which envisions the country as a federation. By contrast, India’s central government—the Union—has the power to create or alter individual states. The possibility of a “Pakistan” existing within India was always considered an option, but in the end the terms and conditions of such an arrangement were beyond agreement. The critical point insisted upon by Jinnah and the Muslim League was a separate army—something that the British had not planned for.

Many did not subscribe to Jinnah’s latter-day moderate vision of Pakistan, however, especially Islamists such as Maulana Maudoodi and other leaders of the militant Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) movement. A few regional leaders saw the British departure as an opportunity to gain or keep provincial autonomy and never subscribed to the idea of a strong central government
in Pakistan; others wanted a more orthodox and Islamic Pakistan—Iqbal’s model. After years of wrangling, Pakistan acquired a constitution that was in theory federal but in fact had strong centralizing tendencies, although it lacked the kind of political and cultural movement that would create the social basis for a centralized state. In particular, it had a weak civil service and increasingly powerful military, while the landlords and the “feudals” wanted to be left alone, secure in their regional position. Pakistan has since been ruled by an alliance between this conservative establishment and the army.

Because Muslims were not well represented in British India’s civil and military bureaucracies—they had not turned to education as fervently as had Hindus—and their overall number was far lower, most supported partition. It would, they argued, provide jobs and promotions faster than an undivided India. This was especially the view of Muslim army officers, most of whom held a lower rank than their Hindu counterparts.

For India’s large Sikh community, which lived primarily in the Punjab, the prospect of partition was alarming—and rightly so. It was devastated by partition, suffering more than any other community forced to migrate in vast numbers to India. The dream of an independent Sikh state mirroring Muslim Pakistan lingered and later burst out (with Pakistani help) in the form of a Khalistan movement in the 1980s. This was eventually contained by the Indian government.

Indian Hindus had mixed views of the wisdom of creating a separate Muslim state in South Asia. A few, such as B. R. Ambedkar, a prominent leader of the lowest Hindu castes (known variously as untouchables, scheduled castes, and now Dalits), welcomed an independent Pakistan on the grounds that Muslim soldiers and officers would then be concentrated in the new state rather than in India, where they would be a political threat to the government. His logic was forceful: get the most powerful element of the army (Punjabi Muslims) out of India, where they would cause political mischief; without them the Indian army would be easier to control. It was also prescient: the army became a major force in Pakistan, rising to dominance in large part because Punjab was both the political and military center of the country. By contrast, India’s Punjab—split again by the creation of Haryana in 1966—was neither a military nor a political center of power.

Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru did not see eye to eye on the creation of Pakistan, Gandhi calling it a disaster (he was willing to make Jinnah the prime minister of an undivided India to avoid partition). He was later reviled by Hindu extremists for urging India to be more responsible in the division of assets between the two countries—this “softness” toward Pakistan may have been the motive behind his assassination in 1948. Nehru,
who did become the new India’s first prime minister, agreed to partition but assumed that Pakistan, divided by a thousand miles of India, was not a permanent fixture. As the eminent social psychologist Ashis Nandy has written, Nehru expected Pakistan to collapse within months, thinking that a theocratic state could not survive in the contemporary world. Like Israel, it was a historical aberration, argued Nehru and other Indians, a throwback to the religious states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Nehru had little reason to offer concessions to Pakistan, especially over Kashmir, which was for him an emotional as well as strategic issue. This was the general view held in the dominant Indian National Congress, with Sardar Patel being the most pessimistic about Pakistan’s chances and the need for India to cooperate with the new state.

Hindu conservatives harbored more visceral anti-Pakistani attitudes, which partition only intensified. Veer Savarkar, then the leader of the militant Hindu revivalist group Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), had opposed partition on the grounds that India was a cultural and religious entity with a Muslim minority that did not merit the privilege of becoming a separate state. Although he agreed with the “two-nation” theory, he did not believe that Muslims deserved any such reward, especially since RSS hagiography indicated they had conquered an innocent and vulnerable India by military oppression and forced conversions. A later faction of Indian political conservatives supported normalization with Pakistan, arguing that a religious state was not anathema, and that a Muslim Pakistan could exist alongside a Hindu India. However, the large numbers of Hindu refugees, especially from Sindh and Punjab, strengthened the anti-Pakistani sentiments of the militant RSS and later its associated political parties, the Jana Sangh Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

These diverse views about the creation of Pakistan and partition can be summed up as follows:

—The two entities could live as separate if not quite equal states, as pragmatic rivals that might be able to cooperate (the view of Jinnah and of Gandhi).

—Pakistan could be the forerunner of a larger Islamist awakening, one that would eventually affect India’s Muslim population (Iqbal’s view and, to some extent, that of today’s Jamaat-i-Islami).

—Pakistan could not be sustained as a modern state; its Islamic identity was an anomaly, and it would eventually be absorbed into India or broken up (Nehru’s view and that of many Congress Party members).

—An independent Pakistan would represent a civilizational challenge to India and thus be an unacceptable entity (the RSS view).
—Pakistan’s ethnic balances (the dominance of the Punjab) would present a political problem to democratic India, and separate but unequal status was desirable (Ambedkar’s view).

The differences between India and Pakistan at partition were important, although sometimes ignored amid the rhetoric of a shared culture, geography, climate, and geostrategic location, or the manufactured myth of eternal Hindu-Muslim conflict. For one thing, the division of British India’s two major provinces, Punjab and Bengal, produced very different successor provinces (in Pakistan) or states (in India). First, East Pakistan retained a large Hindu population, whereas West Punjab purged its Hindu minorities. Second, Pakistan’s Punjab was the heartland of the increasingly powerful army, but very few soldiers came from the predominantly Bengali East Pakistan. Third, East Pakistan was largely rural, having been cut off from the great metropolitan area of Calcutta, once India’s most industrialized city. As a result, there was a vast economic gap between East and West Pakistan, notably the prosperous Punjab.

The formal identities of the two new countries differed markedly as well, with Pakistan considered an Islamic republic and India a secular state. Of course, from the very beginning there were and still are many secular elements in the state of Pakistan, while religious identity is an important factor in India’s politics and society; Pakistan has struggled longer and with greater difficulty to translate these overarching “ideas” into a workable reality, in the form of practical educational and political principles. Although both began life as poor states, with pockets of wealth and rudimentary industrial capabilities, they followed very different development philosophies. Nehru and the Congress Party set India on the road to modernization by engaging in modest land reform and increasing the power of the state in promoting industrial development. Fatally, Pakistan neglected land reform, largely because the leadership of the Muslim League was drawn from the landed aristocracy. On balance, however, West Pakistan became far more prosperous than most parts of India.

**Mind the Gap**

The surprise of India-Pakistan relations is how little they have changed over six decades, with the notable exception of the separation of East Pakistan (which some still feel portends the eventual breakup of the rest of the state). Relations between states are often summarized as “up” or “down,” “better” or “worse,” or, invoking a climatic metaphor, “cooler” or “warmer.” Such terms are often wheeled in to describe complex trends, but they are unable
to capture the full range of relations between states. To illustrate, how should relations between democracies be summarized when some may have strained political or strategic relations at the governmental level, for example, yet have lively cultural links or ideological ties? The complexities are even greater in the case of India and Pakistan, where numerous factors are in play, from the physical, sociocultural, and economic attributes of the overall region to the attitudes, some of which generate violence while others produce attempts at formal and informal cooperation.

Perhaps there is no better example of “distant neighbors” than these two states. To invoke Winston Churchill’s comment about America and Britain, one might say India and Pakistan are divided by several common languages. Officials on both sides speak the same words but frequently mean different things. Even more important, there is no single axis around which the relationship can pivot. Instead, suspicion and hostility fill the space. The pathologies of India-Pakistan relations are well captured in the authoritative study of Pakistan’s negotiating strategies with New Delhi carried out by the experienced American diplomats in South Asia, Ambassadors Howard and Teresita Schaffer.

If intraregional trade in “goods, capital, and ideas” is taken to mean regional integration, as defined by the World Bank, South Asia is one of the least integrated areas of the world. In 2004 it was the only developing region (as also defined by the World Bank) in which intraregional trade accounted for less than 5 percent of its world trade. In this definition, the flow of ideas is crudely measured by the cross-border movement of people, the number of telephone calls, or the purchase of technology and royalty payments. In South Asia, for example, only 7 percent of international telephone calls are regional, compared with 71 percent in East Asia.

As countries attempt to ensure their competitiveness in an increasingly globalized economy, they form regional trading blocs as a preferred strategy. By some estimates, more than 100 regional trading arrangements are in effect today. Although South Asia has progressed significantly in integrating with the global economy, its regional integration has been negligible.

The first attempt at a regional grouping in the region was the Colombo Plan, developed after the 1950 Commonwealth Conference of Foreign Ministers and designed to improve regional living standards. A number of countries, including two dozen non-Commonwealth states, are members. The plan facilitates modest bilateral assistance for regional states and is devoted by and large to social and economic development.

The first truly regional organization grew out of the signing of the 2004 South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement, which led to the creation
of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in the same year. Despite these moves, South Asia’s most important export markets remain in North America and the European Union. In fact, Nepal is the only South Asian country with a substantial intraregional trade presence: just under 55 percent of its exports and imports by value are traded intraregionally, almost all with India. (See chapter 2 for further discussion of regional economic development and chapter 5 for the prospects of enhanced trade.)

One of the reasons for South Asia’s weak integration is its relatively protectionist stance, as evidenced by the ratios of its exports and imports to GDP, which are lower than the world average, as well as its import tariffs, which are the highest of any developing region in the world. South Asia is also weak in facilitating trade. Compared with East Asia, it registers the worst performance in every major category of trade facilitation, from ports to customs to regulations to services.

On the other hand, informal or illegal trade is high and is widely assumed to represent an unlocked potential for trade—a signal that the countries’ economies are complementary. According to some estimates, the value of goods smuggled from India to Pakistan ranges from $200 million to $10 billion. Implicitly, a high volume of illegal trade due to a lack of regional integration can be remedied by state measures designed to remove artificial barriers to trade.

The positive scenario for South Asia is that when regional integration and cooperation increase, connectivity will improve, restrictions on trade will be reduced, landlocked countries will be given full access to markets, energy shortages will be eased, and growth and investment will rise. It is widely assumed that this bottom-up approach would help improve the environment for regional politics, increase welfare, and promote peace and stability. In the real world, however, this scenario’s arrival date is always in the future.

The Violence Factor

South Asia—led by India and Pakistan—is also one of the most violent (or least peaceful) regions of the world, whether because of the states’ internal disorder or turbulent relations between them. According to the Global Peace Index (GPI), an authoritative comparison of violence within and between states, South Asia (including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) is the third most violent region in the world. The GPI, which is developed by a web-based think tank called Vision of Humanity, applies to a UN-defined list of nineteen regions. South Asia ranks behind only Middle Africa and Northern Africa (GPI 2.387) on the violence scale. At the other end of the spectrum, Northern Europe ranks as the most peaceful
The index is based on domestic violence and the prevalence of violence between states. Within South Asia, Afghanistan is the least peaceful, followed by Pakistan and then India. The most peaceful state in the region is Bhutan (GPI 1.481). Former British India—today’s India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—has a GPI of 2.484, which is higher than that of even Northern Africa. Although one may disagree with how the index is defined, it points to clear trends for each state (and for pairs of states). Given their several wars and multiple crises, India and Pakistan ranked with the most dangerous pairs in the world, and the nuclearization of their conflict makes the stakes attending their rivalry even higher.

Polls and Public Attitudes

Not surprisingly, most polls show that Pakistanis and Indians are suspicious of each other and diverge in their approach to governance and politics. But polling often provides a limited measure of public opinion, as suggested by some differences in polling results regarding the attitudes of these two publics. A 2011 Pew poll, for example, indicated the Pakistani public’s historic hostility toward India, whereas other polling has shown a large pro-India swing. India used to be identified as Pakistan’s greatest threat, greater than al Qaeda or the Taliban, but recent polls indicate greater support for normalization: in a 2012 poll 62 percent of Pakistanis thought it important to improve relations with India.29 And roughly two-thirds supported more bilateral trade and further talks to try to reduce tensions between the two nations. On the other hand, Pew’s 2012 polling shows that 72 percent of Pakistanis see India in an unfavorable light, with more than half (55 percent) feeling very unfavorable toward their neighbor. Furthermore, 57 percent of Pakistanis see India as a very serious threat.30

According to other polls, Pakistanis are keenly aware that they are lagging behind India in terms of economic growth, while 44 percent consider India’s increasing importance in world affairs a “critical threat.”31 These sentiments might suggest a heightened sensitivity to their military vulnerability, or possibly even a recognition of Pakistan’s own mismanaged priorities, although when it comes to India’s treatment of Muslim minorities—a traditionally sensitive issue for Pakistanis—opinions on Kashmir would suggest otherwise. In a 2008 World Public Opinion poll designed to measure public attitudes toward Kashmir, Pakistanis questioned the Indian government’s ability to treat its Muslim populations responsibly. More than half of all Pakistanis polled recently viewed India as negligent in this regard.32 Indeed, this theme has been a mainstay of the Pakistani press since 1947, rising to the fore again in late 2012 when the liberal English-language Pakistan press
frequently cited the reelection of Gujarat’s BJP minister Narendra Modi as evidence of the communalism of Indian politics. As the polls also show, most Pakistanis disagree that their own government is supporting Islamist militancy in Kashmir or in India in general, or is to blame for terror in Pakistan. If anything, conservative Pakistanis freely accuse India of fomenting communal and sectarian violence in its neighbor.

Indian polls are a mirror image of those conducted in Pakistan, although they reflect somewhat reduced anger. When asked in 2011 to identify the biggest threat to India, 45 percent responded Pakistan, 19 percent Lashkar-e-Taiba (the terrorist Islamist organization), 16 percent the Naxalites (militant communist groups), and 7 percent China. Indians widely believe the Pakistani government bears responsibility for terrorist attacks (not without a basis in fact): according to some polls, 47 percent believe that Pakistan has provided support to militant groups that attack civilians in Indian Kashmir, while 53 percent think it supports groups that attack Indians in general. When polled about Kashmir, 45 percent of Indians believe Kashmiris want to stay within India, while only 10 percent think they desire independence. As I discuss later in the book, Kashmiris themselves are far more in favor of autonomy or independence.

On a more positive note, the 2011 survey also found that 70 percent of Pakistanis and 74 percent of Indians consider improved relations important and support greater diplomatic and economic ties across the border on the assumption that this would promote economic development for both nations. This and the expressed support for increased bilateral trade (among 69 percent of Pakistanis and 67 percent of Indians) may mean that individual economic priorities outweigh the impact of political hostilities and may be a major test of any normalization process that attempts to work from the bottom up. Although 2012 polls of nine countries show India has the lowest attitudes toward Pakistan, an overwhelming majority of respondents (77 percent) think it is important to resolve the Kashmir dispute, and 58 percent favor further talks to reduce India-Pakistan tensions.

When it comes to Pakistani views on the use of violence, the majority polled denounced violence perpetrated against the Indian population: 64 percent said attacks against government institutions, such as parliament, were never justified, and only 12 percent felt they were sometimes justified. When asked about specific targets, 68 percent condemned “attacks conducted against Indian . . . subways, stock exchanges, and tourist sites,” whereas only 12 percent said these attacks were sometimes justified. More interesting, almost a year after the assassination of Osama bin Laden, a Pew Global Attitudes poll found a marked changed in attitudes: 55 percent of Pakistani
Muslims now held an unfavorable view of al Qaeda and only 13 percent a favorable view, whereas just a year earlier 21 percent had expressed “confidence in bin Laden.”

Equally notable, while both perceive each other as threats, the desire for greater defense spending is low. In both populations only 31 percent wished to see greater allocations for defense spending as opposed to the two other options of maintaining or reducing arms levels. Furthermore, a Gallup survey in 2001 asking about hypothetically sending aid to India in the wake of the 2001 Gujerat earthquake found an encouraging 80 percent in favor of such aid.

Although recent surveys neglect to ask Pakistanis directly about the comparative threat of the United States and India, a joint initiative by the World Opinion Poll and the United States Institute for Peace in 2008 found 78 percent considered the American military presence in Afghanistan a critical threat, whereas 54 percent named India a critical threat. This anticipated the 2012 Pakistani shift in policy toward India, as tensions with the United States mounted. In fact, India is a distant concern in some parts of the country, such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). When asked to rank threats to their personal safety—choosing between the United States, India, the Taliban in Pakistan, al Qaeda, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, the Afghan Taliban, and Israel—America was mentioned most often, in 38 percent of the responses, and India in only 12 percent.

As already mentioned and revealed in a particularly penetrating opinion study, Indians and Pakistanis differ significantly in their attitudes toward governance. The reasons for this are many: historical antecedents in the two states, changing attitudes of successive governments, and the rise of different political and social movements that placed different stress on democracy as opposed to authoritarian (“firm”) government. All South Asian states bear elements of their Raj legacy, but the differences between India and Pakistan in this regard become clearer when public opinion is depicted in the form of a “funnel” or inverted pyramid that subtracts (from the overall support of democracy) elements that would prefer another kind of state (figure 1-1).

To illustrate, 95 percent of Indians and 83 percent of Pakistanis support the idea of democracy with elected officials. However, if one subtracts those who are either indifferent or who would “prefer dictatorship sometimes,” the pro-democracy faction shrinks to 73 percent for India and 45 percent for Pakistan. If those who prefer army rule are excluded, the bar drops to 59 percent for India and 19 percent for Pakistan. Similarly, excluding those who would prefer being ruled by “a king” brings the bar to 55 percent for India and 13 percent for Pakistan. If those who want a strong leader without
any democratic restraint are further excluded, the bar of support for democracy drops to 40 percent for India and 10 percent for Pakistan. Finally, when approval of the role of experts rather than politicians is excluded, Indian support for democracy falls to 19 percent and Pakistani support to only 7 percent. Drawing on these data, scholar Philip Oldenburg concludes that only 20 percent of Indians and 7 percent of Pakistanis support government by elected leaders without qualification. In other words, “the idea that the country should be governed by the army was endorsed by six out of every ten responses in Pakistan . . . [which is] one of the highest levels of support for army rule recorded in any part of the world.”45

What most baffles outsiders (as well as Pakistanis) about both public opinion and policies in Pakistan is that they reflect a country aspiring to be a liberal democracy despite being part military autocracy. It seems that a neighbor’s hostility has shaped Pakistan’s domestic structure more than that of India, enabling the military to rule Pakistan for more than half of its life, while India has opted for a federalized, liberal democracy committed to secularism (most of the time). These differences are important not only as a springboard of attitudes on both sides but also as a barrier for some Indians who would like to normalize with a Pakistan that was in many
respects close to it in ideology and purpose, although one cannot ignore the cultural and political differences of the two sides, themes that I return to in subsequent chapters.

Indeed, it is hard to find much congruence in Pakistani and Indian attitudes toward normalization. As Krishna Kumar puts it, their relations are divided by an iron curtain that “discourages any serious desire to know how the other thinks. And it keeps the two countries from building a common pool of knowledge about themselves and the world.”46 This mutual blind spot renders both populations vulnerable to being easily influenced by the limited and unchallenged narrative in the public consciousness about the other. With both publics greatly influenced by the media, biased educational curricula, and decades of observing hostile relations between the regimes, they hardly feel pressed to confront that narrative.

Writing on national cinema in India, culture and media expert Sumita Chakravarti explains that it may “be more a term of convenience, one that orients foreign audiences rather than reflects the social realities of the nation-group so designated.”47 This thought makes clear that discussions, programs, movies, and news reporting in both Pakistan and India should not be taken as a mirror of societal attitudes. On the other hand, the level of media attention does demonstrate which issues cause the most public consternation. When India or Pakistan show a miniseries on partition, for example, “millions in both countries are glued to their television sets and for weeks local newspapers are filled with letters and articles.48

Of course, a few commentators in Pakistan have appeared ready to criticize the media’s obsession with mass-producing images of atrocities committed against Muslims in Kashmir, for instance.49 The underlying intention of repeating these stories endlessly, they argue, is to highlight India’s unreasonableness and lack of genuine interest in the well-being of Kashmiri citizens, as was the case in 1999 during the limited war between Indian and Pakistani forces in the Kargil region. The truth, however, is that the Pakistani media withdrew their support for the campaign once Pakistan was condemned by the international community, and that very few saw it as morally illegitimate in the first place.

Up until the late 1980s Pakistan’s media were under tight state control, so their only option was to promulgate state narratives of India or revert to the legacy of pre-partition politics, spreading culpability to the British and their role in uprooting the Muslims of the subcontinent from their position of power.50 With new and independent news channels arriving on the scene recently and foreign media sources more available, the public in both states is gaining greater access to information. Modern communications systems,
including personal networking, now available cheaply and widely, have helped expand avenues of information as well. Nonetheless, preexisting stereotypes remain difficult to dispel, particularly when groups with anti-Indian political agendas have equally free reign to address the public. No good deed goes unpunished, however: in giving extremists as well as moderate voices electronic loudspeakers, the widespread democratizing of the media in both states has had the downside of making governments less able to govern.

In India the situation is complicated by the presence of a large Muslim minority, about 14 percent of the population. If the media portrayal of Muslims is taken to provide a good measure of how Pakistan is viewed, it may not be altogether evident that India seems to be dealing more constructively with its minorities than Pakistan, which is still focused on stereotypes. This is partly because Muslims constitute an important market in the Indian economy and a growing force in Indian politics—offending almost one-fifth of consumers or voters is not a shrewd market strategy. The electronic media industry, in particular, has a considerable educated Muslim presence in urban areas. Even so, Pakistan remains a negative presence—a causal factor in the identity crisis that Indian Muslims must deal with equally as much as with India’s imperfect identity as a secular and inclusive state. In times of political tension, Indians are apt to distrust the Muslim community, on the assumption that if it undermined India’s unity once, history may repeat itself. In the treatment of terrorists, for instance, even if the mention of Pakistan is taboo, the association is automatic, largely because a vocal segment of the public believes that Pakistan is a threat. Discussions on the radio and letters to newspaper editors tirelessly reinforce the popular theory that Pakistan wants to dismember India.

While Pakistanis are aware of India’s economic progress, Indians are aware of its absence in Pakistan to the point of harboring “a coarse almost sordid image of day-to-day reality in Pakistan.” Even educated, liberal-minded Indians think the military’s grip on the country is a reflection of a population prone to violence and narrow-mindedness. Kargil again serves to demonstrate public opinion. The Indian media were highly critical of the government’s apparent “softness” in dealing with Pakistan’s military incursions across the Line of Control. But likewise, many Pakistanis, even those who are highly educated, exaggerate and distort the discrimination against Muslims that sometimes occurs in India.

Cooperation

With a few exceptions, the absence of deep and meaningful formal cooperation between New Delhi and Islamabad is a good measure of the region’s
weak integration (as already mentioned, the lowest in the world). No one expects them to cooperate, so it is surprising when they do.

Yet both sides agreed early on to avoid “any propaganda” regarding the amalgamation of Pakistan and India, including the establishment of any organization for this purpose. In 1950 Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan signed an agreement further extending this commitment, specifying that it should apply to “terrorists” and support for secessionism. These agreements have never been operative, nor have subsequent agreements by the information ministers on both sides to refrain from hostile propaganda.

Forty years later they are still criticizing each other’s positions on terrorism, propaganda, and support for separatists. When still another round of foreign secretary talks began in July 1990, the Indian preconditions for normalization were to be Pakistani statements dissociating the country from subversive activities in Kashmir, extraditing fugitives, and ceasing funding for separatists’ activities in Kashmir. Pakistan, of course, replied that discussions on Kashmir were its own precondition.

However, several notable attempts have been made to “reset” the dialogue, most of them occurring after 2003 when the two sides agreed to a cease-fire on the Kashmir Line of Control, which still holds today. A “composite dialogue” process was established, following a statement by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee that all subjects, including Kashmir, could be discussed. It focused on several problem areas, including water, trade, travel, Siachen, Sir Creek, terrorism, and Kashmir. India suspended the dialogue after the terrorist attack on Mumbai on November 26, 2008, demanding that Pakistan take action against those responsible. Upon subsequent limited actions by Pakistan, India announced on April 2010 that it would not insist that Pakistan had fully to satisfy Indian demands on terrorism as a precondition for talks (earlier, Pakistan had countered by questioning Indian responsibility for horrific attacks on the Samjhauta Express, the India-Pakistan train service). The two prime ministers agreed to revive the dialogue without precondition but also without the title “composite.” The decision was implemented slowly, with foreign secretary meetings in March 2011, meetings of the home ministers, and then a visit of the Pakistani prime minister to India to watch the Cricket World Series Cup semifinal between India and Pakistan.

It is hard to find opportunities for each state’s political and bureaucratic equals to talk to each other, and when they do the results have usually been nonproductive, so deep are the differences in their perspectives. Just as disturbing, these official talks have always been vulnerable to outside forces, notably attacks by extremists based in India and Pakistan. The Mumbai
attacks were clearly designed to disrupt the dialogue; the same was probably true of the Samjhauta Express attack by Hindu fanatics.\textsuperscript{58} It seems extremists on both sides are united in their desire to prevent normal dialogue between their respective countries.

There may be exceptions. Studies have shown that both sports and popular films have an integrating effect at the national level, at least within India.\textsuperscript{59} Whether they have this impact between sovereign states is unknown. Both India and Pakistan are full and active members of the International Cricket Council (which manages the Cricket World Cup) and the Asian Cricket Council (which manages the Asia Cup). They play each other regularly in third countries, and when extremists do not threaten, their home-and-home matches are huge events. A few Pakistanis play in the Indian Premiere League, based in individual Indian cities, and there are Indian and Pakistani teammates in third countries. There are no interstate tours of club, college, or university teams, the life-blood of national cricket, and on several occasions cricket matches have been canceled because of the fear of terror attacks, both in India and Pakistan.

The most politically explicit sports partnership has been in men’s tennis doubles, with an Indian and a Pakistani teamed up in 2010–11 boasting of their binational credentials, and offering to play a tennis match at Wagah on the India-Pakistan border. Their slogan was “Stop war, start tennis.”\textsuperscript{60} Balancing this—in terms of political impact—Sania Mirza, a talented Muslim Indian women’s tennis player, has been roundly criticized for having married a Pakistani citizen and was under police protection in India for wearing normal women’s tennis garb.

The singular exception to the overall lack of cooperation is the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, historically reviled by Indian diplomats as a foreign (U.S.) imposition on India. It has operated uninterruptedly for more than fifty years, with some success, but is currently threatened by pressure on both states for increased water shares. There has been no serious discussion of bringing other countries into a region-wide water arrangement, and India has found its water relations with Bangladesh to be very strained. China remains aloof from the region in terms of water power, even though the source of most important Indian and Pakistani rivers (the Indus and the Brahmaputra in particular) lies in China.

Both India and Pakistan made an attempt at regional cooperation as founding members of SAARC, but the organization barely got off the ground. At its inception the Indians suspected that it was a Pakistani plot to undercut Indian dominance, and the Pakistanis thought it was an Indian
plot to exercise hegemony—in reality it was a goodwill effort by Sri Lanka and Nepal. No less futile is the South Asian Free Trade Area, which still remains an agreement on paper only.

In keeping with their Raj origins, the militaries of both states are also members of various UN missions, and sometimes both are in the same peacekeeping force, although to my knowledge one has never served under the direct command of officers from the other. Recent UN operations include East Timor and Sudan.61

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) thrive in both states, partly because of international support but also because the burgeoning social media and the Internet are keeping them abreast of events within and outside the region. Yet there are few cross-border ties between these groups, the most important being the organization of journalists (South Asia Free Media Association), which meets regularly in South Asian states.62 Because visas are an issue, hardly any students from one state study in the other. Although a 2012 agreement between India and Pakistan included some measures for liberalizing their visa regimes, they applied only to the elderly and businesspersons and not to students. As for tourist traffic, it consists mainly of Sikh pilgrims going to holy shrines in Pakistan and a few Muslims going to shrines in India.

Various crises have precipitated some cooperation. For example, the Simla Agreement (1972) ending the 1971 war laid down principles that theoretically govern relations today, although these are routinely bent by both states. In addition, the Lahore Declaration of 1999, issued following a historic visit to Pakistan by Prime Minister Vajpayee, a BJP leader, led to a bus service between Delhi and Lahore. However, the declaration is remembered more for the fact that the Pakistan army was planning a cross-border attack at Kargil while Vajpayee was in Pakistan.

After India and Pakistan became nuclear weapons states in 1998, they quickly and dutifully signed a group of agreements to notify each other of their respective civilian nuclear facilities and to provide lists of citizens kept in prison. They also agreed to a hotline between their armies, and also one between their political leaders.

As discussed in later chapters, talks are also under way about expanding trade and giving each state preferential treatment. The two national academies of science are reportedly engaging in some cooperation, and minor steps are being taken to deal with common agricultural problems, usually at the encouragement of some NGO or international organization that operates in both states. In early 2012 the Indian National Science Academy and the Pakistani Academy of Science signed a memo of understanding for
possible joint projects, agreeing “to identify specialized institutions so that scientists in both the countries could collaborate in different fields including research projects; organisation of joint workshops, seminars and conferences and exchange of scientists, professors and students for higher education programmes.”

Although the business communities might be expected to show the most cooperation, they have been reluctant to go beyond the limits set by the army in Pakistan and the Home and External Affairs Ministries in India. Until quite recently, Indian governments have done little to assist economic normalization, while Indian firms on the whole have not found Pakistan to be a welcome place to do business. However, this represents the greatest area of potential growth and cooperation (see chapter 6), and the two business communities have already had a hand in the 2012 agreement to start discussions on reducing excess tariffs.

**Rivalry outside the Region**

For several generations, diplomats of India and Pakistan have regarded their overseas assignments and other postings to international organizations, including most UN bodies, as an opportunity to gain merit by denigrating the other. This has become a joke in the diplomatic community, which long ago tired of the incessant one-upmanship by each country. Furthermore, each state has blocked the other’s membership in certain groups. Pakistan prevented India from joining the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), an association of over fifty-seven Muslim states that routinely criticizes Indian policy in Kashmir, while India has carefully excluded Pakistan from groups that it sponsors, such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).

In response to a decision by the International Court of Arbitration, both countries agreed to abide by the UN peacekeeping mandate in Kashmir, but with reservations. India, for example, severely limited the UN presence in its territory after the 1971 war. Worse, neither state has been able to find (or seemed interested in) common ground where they might work together. Their strategic freedom of action is mightily constrained by their respective set of international friends, who provide diplomatic support to each on such well-worn issues as Kashmir or human rights violations.

The absence of cooperation is especially noticeable in the matter of Afghanistan, where both countries compete despite important and parallel security interests. When created, Pakistan was a neighbor of Afghanistan, but distracted by the greater Indian threat, Pakistani operations never went much beyond intelligence service and deliberately keeping the frontier
regions backward: Pakistan did not have the depth and resources to do much more, so left these areas to their own devices. By contrast, India consolidated its position in its northeast, battling a series of tribal rebellions over the years with a mixture of force, bribery, and the Indian model of democratic governance. Similarly, China expanded into Tibet and its far west regions.

Elsewhere in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, a region once dominated by the Raj, India and Pakistan share the same choke points, the same overseas ethnic interests (especially in the Persian Gulf region), and the same concerns about piracy and smuggling, yet find it difficult if not impossible to cooperate directly. On the other hand, they do engage in some limited cooperation when warranted by a common interest in regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or international bodies. Diplomats and strategists on both sides might attribute this general lack of cooperation to the rivalry in Kashmir, but in areas where they have a natural shared interest it goes beyond this. Countries that would like to encourage India-Pakistan normalization in UN forums for antipiracy, peacekeeping, and other operations have long since given up on enabling the two states to work together. Their bilateral relations also seem to be as impermeable as ever. Their hostility infiltrates almost all regional issues, from security to cross-border trade or cooperation. If held at all, regional summits mainly serve as an occasion for informal consultations between Indian and Pakistani diplomats—smaller countries like Bangladesh or Sri Lanka know full well that the proposals for a South Asian free trade zone or even economic union will remain on paper until the two agree. The centrality of the India-Pakistan dispute, playing itself out in regular wars, crises, and a near-total absence of cooperation defines South Asia. As a result, SAARC was comatose on arrival; it rules out bilateral issues, at India’s insistence, and serves only to give the leadership of the two states a place to meet offline from time to time, and to provide smaller South Asian states—notably Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal—the illusion of a regional organization that means something.

There is a paradox here: the two states are economically more prosperous and politically weaker than ever before. All governments in the modern world are challenged by their greater access to ideas from elsewhere, as well as the new means of communication within their states. Twitter, Facebook, the web, and other social media have made governance difficult. It is hard to build states, economies, and national identities in the face of an expansion of “people’s power.” These media have given large numbers of people the ability to interact with each other and with the outside world that was reserved for the upper classes in the nineteenth century and the middle classes in the twentieth century. Today’s Indians and Pakistanis are better able to connect,
to express their grievances, and to organize against the state. What is astonishing is that this functional fragmentation has not led to cross-border alliances or contacts between the two states, as it has in other regions. Though weak as states, they are nevertheless strong enough to prevent these ties from growing.

Since India and Pakistan never went through a “Pan Arab” moment or succumbed to the idea of collaboration, they have developed only feeble linkages between peace groups and the business communities, and no companies openly do business in both states. University students find it almost impossible to attend classes in each other’s country, although a few elite colleges have established tentative linkages and some Pakistanis attend the new graduate-student-only South Asian University established by SAARC and located in New Delhi. The India-Pakistan divide is most apparent in the trade and investment sectors. While China’s two-way trade with India ($74 billion in 2011) and Pakistan ($11 billion in 2011) is growing at high rates, total official trade between the two South Asian rivals remains minimal and stagnant ($3 billion in 2011). The same applies to investments, with China investing an average $2 billion in the Pakistani economy annually and $500 million in India, while India and Pakistan make hardly any significant mutual investments. India did not even permit Pakistani investments until 2012. Yet the fringes of popular and mass culture abroad, in third countries, are now home to a community that has developed through joint contacts and business deals between entertainers and businessmen. An important but undocumented cultural exchange takes place in these areas. Back home, India and Pakistan remain comfortable in their “enemy-ness,” although they are diverging in this sense in some important geostrategic ways. The dominant perceived threat in India is no longer Pakistan but China, while the great threat for Pakistan now is not India but domestic terror groups and abroad the United States.

**The Wrong Metaphor**

Because they are based on the calculations of humans, all nations rely upon simplifying metaphors to define themselves, their history, and guidelines for the future. Since 1940 the grand political metaphor for Americans has been Pearl Harbor, which stands for a sneak attack, a breakdown of intelligence, and a civilizational war. Many subsequent crises have been interpreted in the light of the original metaphor, especially the New York and Washington attacks of 9/11, which were as complex in civilizational and moral overtones as Pearl Harbor. A common metaphor in the India-Pakistan context is the communal or religious riot between Hindus and Muslims. The metaphor of
the religious riot refers to the original partition of India and for many outsiders has become the implicit (if no longer accurate) explanation of Indian-Pakistani rivalry. “India and Pakistan would be at peace were it not for their dispute over Kashmir, desired by Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India,” goes the refrain.

Besides being historically inaccurate, the metaphor is conceptually wrong. Most riots in India and Pakistan—religious and otherwise—are part of a complex bargaining relationship between two or more political communities. The riot itself is one stage in a long and complex game, and the purpose of the game is not only to gain the upper hand over the other side but also to influence the bystander—in the case of religious riots, the local police and military authorities. India-Pakistan relations have to be seen in this framework. Unless one side or the other collapses entirely, the game will continue, and nuclear weapons do not change this basic fact, although they do present an alternative and mutually undesirable end to the game. The nature of the game becomes clearer when one examines the major disputes between the two sides (chapter 2) and then sees how this powerful but historically flawed metaphor has been reified in the politics of both India (chapter 3) and Pakistan (chapter 4).