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Introduction

The global order is shifting in an appreciable but awkward fashion. The global governance fabric set up in the post-1945 era, the crux of the U.S.-dominated liberal international order, is now seriously frayed. The Bretton Woods and UN institutions face fundamental crises of efficiency. The G-x process modifications added in recent decades, most notably the G-7/8, are seen as illegitimate because of their limited membership.

Questions of leadership have also arisen. The center of gravity of the global power structure is arguably no longer in the United States, a transition that reflects the erosion of U.S. leadership capabilities. The George W. Bush administration abdicated both the normative and practical responsibilities of liberal internationalism, and its unilateral overstretch in Iraq and poor economic policies seem to have drained U.S. resources. Added to these rash policies, the issues of renditions and Guantanamo Bay detainees have undermined the United States’ normative credentials.

Still, an analysis of the shifting global order that focuses only on fading U.S. hegemony and leadership is insufficient. The world is also changing at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a result of the emergence of new powers—especially China, India, and Brazil. The challenges these states pose to global governance differ from previous challenges to U.S. leadership. These countries neither accede to a Western-centric order nor view themselves as beneficiaries of the liberal international system. Distance from the liberal world order does not necessarily mean, however, a fundamental rejection of the tenets of the established system. Thus the rise of these states from among the global South does not preclude the emergence of new institutions that can serve the interests of both the traditional powers and the rising powers.
These different components related to “the crunching and grinding of geopolitical plates” stand at the center of this volume. What jumps out in an evaluation of the global system is the distinctive context of the shift in global power. Unlike many previous transformations the contemporary shift in the global order has not emerged in the aftermath of armed struggle. The classic model for reconstruction is the creation of the system of global governance that followed World War II. The current reconfiguration, though, is not the result of a dramatic rupture, nor even analogous to the end of the cold war; rather, in the post–cold war era a new order has emerged but without a comprehensive form of settlement.

The financial tsunami of 2008–09 does suggest the image of a sharp break with the status quo, but even this “made in the U.S.” economic crisis should not lead one to exaggerate the extent of the transition of power. Although it faces severe fiscal and military constraints, the United States retains a privileged standing in global politics, maintained through a combination of material and normative attributes.

The Contemporary G-x Process

What, then, has altered in the global system? The primary change appears to be that no longer can the United States simply impose its will on others. Many of the initiatives put in train by President Barack Obama require the United States to exert a new style of diplomatic skill that places the onus on negotiation and compromise. Rather than imposing discipline in an arbitrary fashion, the United States needs to demonstrate that it too can be a rules keeper as well as a rules maker. To compensate for the relative decline of both its capabilities and its legitimacy, and to displace some of the responsibilities of leadership, the United States must act in a more inclusive fashion. Indeed it was the United States that convened the most dramatic illustration of a “rising institution,” the transition of the G-20 from a forum for finance ministers and central bank governors to an expanded Leaders’ Summit.

Although the G-20 points to the capacity of the international system to adjust and to accommodate both rising states and rising institutions, it also raises a number of open-ended questions about contemporary global governance.

The first of these questions relates to the specific format of rising institutions. A hallmark of the liberal international order has been its universalist appeal; even amid its most severe crisis, in the move toward the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, assumptions of legitimacy rested squarely on UN authorization. The G-x bodies, however, are quite distinct—the G-20 and before it the G-7/8 and the many associated bodies make no such claim of universalism but instead are quite self-consciously created as clubs of the few. At the same time the G-x process also uses transgovernmental networks: G-7/8 finance ministers, G-20 finance ministers, and a variety of other groupings, such as trade ministers and foreign ministers. The legitimacy attached to these groups is functional in nature, with weight (or influence) and efficiency as the core rationales; for example, the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate consists of seventeen countries responsible for the large majority of greenhouse gas emissions. Whether traditional powers or a combination of traditional powers and global South countries, however, only “major” countries with a big stake in the system are accorded representation in any of these G-x bodies. And even in this mix there is frequently an implicit hierarchy of powers.

A second question about contemporary global governance deals with the ingredients that bind the mix of rising states and rising institutions. One thing that is different about the G-20 is that, unlike earlier plurilateral forums such as the G-7, it lacks like-mindedness. While the G-7 could and would often disagree on policies and decisions, the steering group ethos reflected a sense that this exclusive club could guide international public policy not just on the basis of rich countries’ preferences but by making a collective appeal through shared democratic values and similar ways of looking at the global system. If not a club of the likeminded, then, what is the G-20? Could it be an updated “central committee” reminiscent of a nineteenth-century concert of European powers?5 The G-20 differs from historical concerts, however, in that its priority is global governance, not the division of territorial spoils. Global public goods were to be derived from the effective performance of the G-20 as a crisis committee in the face of the near-death experience of the global financial system. And indeed the effects of the rescue efforts put in place by the new G-20 architecture extended well beyond the club to the wider international arena. If the G-20 eschewed fairness it generated systematic benefits.

A third question concerns the issue of scope in contemporary global governance. Any targeting of rising states must focus on the big three of China, India, and Brazil. Does this concentration of attention minimize the roles of other states? The same question arises concerning the nature of rising institutions.

The G-20 receives a good deal of scrutiny in this volume, and the G-x process certainly represents the dynamic evolution of institutions and rising states in global governance. The G-x process is far more dynamic and purposive than the more traditional—and in most cases far more formal and treaty-based—UN and Bretton Woods institutions, although changes are occurring in these more traditional institutions as well. Informal institutions increasingly are the means of addressing complex global problems in a more diverse way. Compared to other bilateral or institutionalized groupings, “multilateral institutions are weaker and fragmented but they also matter in shaping and directing the flow of politics and economics.” While these rising institutions lack the binding mechanisms of formalized, traditional forums, they are increasingly setting the agenda for further discussion.

One source of awkwardness in the contemporary international order arises from the disconnect between the forums of rising states and the rising states themselves. Novel forms of networks represent key ingredients for the rising institutions. What is evident is that the G-x process is not just about leaders’ clubs but is also built on trangovernmental networks. Thus the G-7 Leaders’ Summit is built on its precursor, the G-7 finance ministers’ forum. These networks may reinforce the older traditional powers as opposed to rising states from the global South. Conversely, rising states may seek alternative forms of institutions in competition with established structures—such as the BRICs and the G-5. From this perspective the G-20 might be a significant exception to the rule, with its signaling of a “coming in” of these rising powers and their integration in a revamped and rather exclusive club.

It is not always obvious where rising states are acting in tandem with rising institutions. Much of the process of change is occurring on an incremental basis in highly technical forums and thus proceeds “below the radar.” The accumulated effect nonetheless is a dramatic one that holds promise for a fundamental transformation of the main arena of international politics. Albeit replete with built-in constraints about durability, the array of opportunities for rising states to drive the formation of rising institutions and for rising institutions to necessitate new recipes for relations with rising states merits a comprehensive assessment.

Beyond a Single Rising State

Of the cluster of rising states, the only one whose rise is seen by some as analogous to past systemic challengers is China. Although this interpretation is

strongly contested, some have labeled China a new “Prussian” threat: disruptive, potentially revisionist, and a challenge to the status quo. Nonetheless it is the differences with the past, not the similarities that stand out as China rises. One key difference is the economic interdependence of the contemporary global system, seen in the image of “Chimerica”—the intertwined dependence of China and the United States on each other. Another difference with the past is the nature of accepted forms of diplomacy. Historically a disruptive emerging power like Germany combined coercion and bilateral arrangements, but China increasingly embraces an extended form of multilateral diplomacy. If the Chinese are still suspicious about surveillance and the accompanying intrusion into its sovereignty, they are at least beginning to appreciate that the promotion of a stable international order requires some degree of coordination of domestic policies.

Importantly, however, the current shift in the global order differs from past changes in that China is rising in tandem with other countries of the global South. This plurality of actors among the rising states has led to a vigorous debate about whether the twenty-first century will belong to China or India as economic (and nuclear) superpowers; in other bodies of literature China and India are linked as the “Asian drivers” of the global economy.

One aspect of the shift in the global order is the novel manner in which states—especially rising states—are interacting with market forces and the wider dynamics of globalization, reinforced by the opening of different forms of networks across the global system. Rising states and rising institutions are often seen as independent variables, but in fact rising states and institutions are much intertwined: rising states are often at the forefront of the emerging institutions—the domestic and international concerns must be juxtaposed to highlight the differing nature of these rising actors.

The volume is broadly separated into three distinct sections. The first, “Great Powers and International Structure,” explores leadership and emerging forms of governance. These chapters address the evolving nature of international structures and state engagement. With the move of rising powers to the forefront of international affairs, new mechanisms are needed for collaboration in global governance. How the traditional powers, such as the United States, respond

7. See the recent debate between Niall Ferguson and James Fallows on the China-Prussia analogy in “Niall Ferguson and James Fallows on ‘Chimerica,’” FORA.tv (fora.tv/2009/07/01/Niall_Ferguson_and_James_Fallows_on_Chimerica); James Fallows, “More Chimerica, Ferguson, Fallows, Kaiser Wilhelm, etc.,” *The Atlantic,* July 5, 2009; and Niall Ferguson, “‘Chimerica’ Is Headed for a Divorce,” *Newsweek,* August 15, 2009.


will have a large impact on the outcome of contemporary engagement. In that regard transgovernmental networks represent a benign environment where traditional and rising power officials can interact collaboratively in meeting the challenges of global governance.

The second section, “Rising States,” shifts attention to the emerging powers. The domestic concerns of these increasingly important international actors ultimately will influence how they engage with rising institutions and traditional powers alike. The chapters in this section provide an appreciation of how the global system is evolving by explaining the ways in which rising states are becoming increasingly implicated with and integrated into the contemporary international system and their reasons for doing so.

The final section, “Rising Institutions,” examines the emergence on the international scene of various institutions and the changes they are bringing about in global governance. In stark contrast to the traditional UN and Bretton Woods institutions, these new forums typically are informal clubs and networks, but even the traditional institutions are adapting to tackle new global governance issues, most particularly counterterrorism. Whether traditional or emerging from the G-x process, however, these new governance organizations raise concerns about their effectiveness.

Rising Institutions and Rising States:
In Competition or in Tandem?

With rising states come big questions about modifications to global governance. In the past rising states muscled their way into elevated status, or tried to. In some cases, the challenge was defeated in war; in other cases, most notably that of the USSR, some degree of accommodation was achieved diplomatically via the United Nations through the granting of veto power, if not via institutions covering military or economic spheres.

A key test of the twenty-first-century order will be how the rising states relate to the organizational machinery of global governance. The problem is highlighted by efforts to preserve the privileges of the old elite. This status quo orientation stands out on UN reform, where the five permanent members of the Security Council cling together to ward off demands for expanded membership. The same resistance shapes the response to efforts to reform Bretton Woods financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, where China has less voting power than the Benelux states.

The challenge of meshing rising states and rising institutions is made more difficult by the existence of other factors. The first of these concerns the legacy of North-South relations. Each of the big rising states has its own national interests...
that it seeks to defend and promote, but each also sees itself in some form or another as a defender and promoter of the collective concerns of the global South and as a bridge between the top tier, to which it has now moved, and the bottom rungs.\(^\text{10}\) Such “developmentalism” represents a serious limitation to collaborative global governance.\(^\text{11}\) One explicit form of this ideology is the creation of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) dialogue forum, which stresses “the need to make the structures of global governance more democratic, representative and legitimate by increasing the participation of developing countries in the decision-making bodies of multilateral institutions.”\(^\text{12}\) The post-1945 order revolved around specific pivotal points—above all, formal international institutions such as the UN, the Bretton Woods system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and later the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although these structures allowed the global South a degree of access, these clubs—the economic ones in particular—remained hierarchical. As the traditional rules of the game have become increasingly contested over time, however, participation has expanded but the capacity to generate collective decisions has badly eroded.

Institutionally the established formal structures—such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the G-8—have been joined by a number of exclusive clubs and informal forums in which countries from either the North or the South are dominant. “Coalitions of the willing” exemplify the former,\(^\text{13}\) while the latter notably includes the G-77, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, as well as groupings such as IBSA, the G-5, and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China). This dynamic could make the relationship between rising states and aspects of the institutional structure far messier, with their amplified voices making it extremely difficult to come to consensus on economic issues—the immobilized Doha Development Round of trade negotiations is a clear case in point. Yet rising institutions provide some positive signs of new conduits between the established powers and the rising states. The G-20 finance ministers’ meetings are an example of this trend. The Asian financial crisis gave birth in 1999 to this institution with a mix of North and South and creditor and debtor countries. In turn the 2008 global financial crisis saw this forum upgraded to the leaders level.

\(^{10}\) See Cooper and Antkiewicz (2008).
\(^{11}\) Hurrell (2007).
\(^{13}\) See Cooper (2008).
There is a temptation to see China simply as authoritarian—as a more sophisticated version of a resurgent and seemingly belligerent Russia.\(^{14}\) Equally, however, China can be viewed as the archetypal globalization success story. From the perspective of the global economy China is not so much a “spoiler” of the global order as a stabilizer, and the solution to managing the “products of success” is seen as enhanced cooperation.\(^{15}\) Indeed it has been pointed out that China “has made a huge bet on integration into the world economy.”\(^{16}\) Misreading this situation through calls for a unilateral, or wholly Atlanticist, version of the global order will alienate, and possibly provoke, the rising states.\(^{17}\)

There are, furthermore, arenas of cooperation beyond the economic where the traditional powers might be beneficiaries. In the case of the war on terrorism, coordinated action, information sharing, and common international forums of current and rising powers will be mutually helpful.\(^{18}\) What began as a partnership of convenience ultimately could become a strategic commitment as all powers develop shared goals of security and prosperity.

Yet the obstacles to meshing current institutions and rising powers should not be underestimated. There is distrust on both sides. Rising states remain wary about approaches that attempt to lock (or “socialize”) them into obligations where their interests and values are subordinated to those of the traditional powers. In the North there is anxiety about losing control of a system that has proved beneficial to their economic and diplomatic interests. If the rising powers gain more prominent seats at the international table, do others lose privileges?

Any new condominium of old and new powers will meet diplomatic resistance from those excluded. Amply illustrating this inevitability is the June 2009 Summit of the “192” UN countries amply, where North and South “battled to a standoff.”\(^{19}\) The populist left in Latin America is another source of discontent. But similar sentiment extends to the “uninvited” among more traditional but smaller powers such as the Nordic countries, left out of the G-20 notwithstanding a stellar record of good international citizenship, and Switzerland and Liechtenstein, which face mounting assaults on their status as secretive “offshore” finance centers.

\(^{14}\) See Freedom House (2009).


\(^{17}\) Kagan (2008).

\(^{18}\) Shen (2004).

Expanding Global Governance Interaction among the Platforms

The challenges associated with integrating the rising states into the established international architecture are both conceptual and practical. The varied nature of the rising states and the wide array of institutional formats in place or in train determine that there will not be one all-encompassing way for this process to take place; nonetheless, the chapters in this volume examine various approaches to a reconfigured global governance architecture, one that is both open and responsive.

The volume begins with an introductory section analyzing the choices and changes that face the established world powers and the current architecture of global governance. John Ikenberry focuses on the current state and role of the traditional powers—most notably the United States—and on whether the liberal internationalist order can be remade. In doing so, he helps to frame how the United States and the current architecture need to adapt to challenges to their leadership on the part of the rising powers. Ikenberry charts the history of the liberal internationalist order before discussing how the current configuration of established and rising powers must adapt to meet changing times. As he notes, “The U.S. hegemonic organization of liberal order no longer appears to offer a solid foundation for the maintenance of an open, rules-based system—an impasse to which the very success of the old order is partly responsible for bringing us.” Ikenberry argues that, for a new liberal internationalist order to emerge, the United States must play an active role in ensuring the participation of the rising powers in international institutions—at the expense, of course, of a reduction of its own level of influence. It remains to be seen how the United States will respond to this challenge. Ikenberry concludes that the new liberal international order will need to become less hegemonic and “flatter,” with a hierarchy that includes a greater number of voices in the top tier.

Anne-Marie Slaughter and Thomas Hale present a compelling case for the importance of less rigid and formal mechanisms for global governance and crisis resolution. They argue that informal transgovernmental networks would afford rising powers a greater voice and more influence on the world stage, and provide the flexibility necessary to organize groups of different countries around common problems. Slaughter and Hale also suggest the possibility of sidestepping potentially divisive issues or organizational arrangements. They caution, however, that these networks are not suited to all instances or conditions and, in fact, might discourage participation by emerging powers that feel alienated from such processes. Still, transgovernmental networks create mutually beneficial relationships, as the actors involved are able to learn from the experience and perspectives of others, thus building their own capacity and
knowledge. And while such networks might not solve all problems, they allow for long-term convergence and the sharing of conventions on a variety of issues.

Andrew F. Cooper, in examining changes in global architecture and the challenge of rising states and actors, argues that it is important to address how these actors interact with one another and with international institutions. Rising states are establishing both formal and informal clubs, the development logic and influence of which need to be understood. In analyzing some of these groups Cooper looks through various lenses. In this sense “labels matter,” as different rising state groupings allow for distinct ways of approaching global governance. IBSA, for example, is a dialogue forum based on three countries—India, Brazil, and South Africa—that share a common identity in that they are all “champions” of the global South, with normative power derived from their respective histories and common situations. In contrast the much-touted BRIC grouping, coined by the investment bank Goldman Sachs, focuses mainly on economic weight and potential. As Cooper argues, however, this focus fails to take into account other attributes—including military, diplomatic, and soft power—necessary to become Great Powers on the world scene. An extension of the BRICs that does take these factors into account and fills in some of the gaps is BRIC-SAM—the BRICs group plus South Africa, the ASEAN countries and Mexico.

The Core States in Question

Moving away from the overarching concerns and implications of the rising states as a group, the volume turns to the character and role of individual rising states. Despite their involvement in various clubs, the rising states remain focused on national sovereignty and the promotion of their domestic interests. Understanding these priorities offers insight into how these states are becoming key players in international affairs.

Gregory Chin provides a fresh perspective on China, whose rising status has been widely acknowledged. By focusing on a tangible set of actions and international policies Chin explores what kind of global leader China might become and how it will affect the established world order, both strategically and financially. Chin also looks at whether China will accept or challenge the established norms and powers, and argues that China has found a middle path between a status quo and revisionist power. China is operating as part of—and appears to be creating change within—the global governance system, while developing hedging options and reaching out to other countries and regions to develop its own international clout.

Amrita Narlikar takes up the task of examining India, the other rising Asian power often compared with China, and assesses whether it is cooperative or
antagonistic in the face of the current and evolving global governance system. By focusing on India’s involvement in WTO discussions and the bilateral nuclear nonproliferation deal with the United States, Narlikar demonstrates the multiple personalities of India’s foreign policy. In the former example, India’s domestic concerns and historic positioning toward such international institutions have led to a combative position, with the country showing little interest in compromises that would both benefit India’s rise and preserve the strength and integrity of the WTO. On the nuclear file, though, India’s pragmatic negotiation with the United States demonstrates a willingness to make concessions on issues where doing so enhances its interests.

Andrew Hurrell focuses on Brazil, which has now established itself as an influential global power, and on the problems Brazil must navigate to maintain its elevated position. For Hurrell, Brazil’s two largest challenges come in the forms of ideas and institutions. Brazil now has an important stake in how international institutions are transformed, but it must look beyond the immediate challenges of the recent global financial crisis and attendant calls for institutional reforms, and it must make an active contribution to the dialogue necessary to make viable, long-term reforms possible.

The rising states of China, India, and Brazil capture much of the attention, but Andrew Moravcsik reminds us of the continuing importance of the relatively quiet “other superpower,” the European Union. The EU accounts for a significant portion of the world’s economy, is the world’s “second” military power (when combined), and its members have a great deal of influence in the world’s international institutions. The EU’s success in bridging national governments has been extraordinary. It is, as Moravcsik writes, “the most ambitious and successful international organization of all time, pioneering institutional practices far in advance of anything viewed elsewhere.” While idiosyncratic on a comparative basis and fraught with internal constraints, the model of European integration proves a constructive example of how to move ahead with innovations to the global governance system.

Expanding the Range of Global Governance Institutions

*Rising States, Rising Institutions* concludes by examining various international groupings that are emerging and threatening to alter or even to displace established institutions. Central in this examination is the evolving G-x process.

Alan S. Alexandroff and John Kirton begin this section by focusing on the role that the newly emergent G-20 Leaders’ Summit played in dealing with the global financial crisis. Coming dramatically into prominence, the G-20 has reoriented club summity away from the G-8 and the “likeminded” membership of
developed Western countries to an integration of traditional, rising, and developing countries. Revealing that a crisis can trigger opportunities for substantive institutional change, Alexandroff and Kirton herald this new expanded forum. By comparing and contrasting the Washington (November 2008), London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 2009) Summits, the authors focus on how the G-20 process is serving as an important bridging exercise and as a way to enmesh the rising powers within the current global governance system. Alexandroff and Kirton cautioned, though, that these Summits were held with the global financial crisis as a guiding context; it will be interesting to see if the G-20 remains focused on financial issues, where many of its members have common interests, or expands into an ongoing dialogue on a more comprehensive agenda.

John Kirton then amplifies the discussion of the G-x process by focusing on the transgovernmental network of finance ministers that originated in the late 1990s. Kirton argues that the G-20 finance ministers’ meeting is at the forefront of global governance networks of ministerial forums and summits that allow for horizontal relationships and influence. It has worked well, although questions remain about the effectiveness of this forum and of the whole G-x process. Still, talk of expanding the sphere of influence of rising states should be accompanied by discussion of the importance of normative considerations for entry into the group. The diversity of the G-20 refers not just to considerations of geography or economic size but also to governance styles, with traditional Western democracies intermingled with newer democracies in the global South, as well as Russia (a “managed democracy”) and China (a single-party state).

In his chapter Daniel Drezner focuses on the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as an influential force in international relations. The growth of SWFs from rising states can be viewed as a test of how these countries are interacting with existing institutions. Drezner also touches on the geopolitical and economic concerns associated with SWFs. Financially, Drezner argues, SWFs do not pose a serious threat to global financial governance, as the established powers remain integral actors in this arena. But if these funds continue to grow and begin to outpace the wealth of the OECD countries, they would become a significant challenge for the global financial system, particularly if rising states gradually shift their resources away from the established powers and institutions. That the BRICs have expressed a willingness to begin diversifying their investments highlights that such a scenario is not exaggerated.

Flynt Leverett uses energy security as a meeting point for rising institutions and to express how sovereign states work in international institutions. After a brief look at the history of international energy regulation, Leverett ties this into how energy affects global governance itself, noting that supply and demand (and price) issues can have a dramatic impact on the lives of people around the
world, and that national governments as well as international institutions must be attuned to the geopolitical ramifications of energy. Finally, he looks at the effectiveness and the possibilities of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and, in keeping with the theme of this volume, discusses the challenges and opportunities that rising states present for international energy cooperation.

Steven E. Miller finishes this section with a look at global security in the post-9/11 era. He focuses not only on how the United States responded to the terrorist attacks and other threats to its security, but also on how the international community and institutions of global governance reacted. These simultaneous responses proved to be very different. Washington moved toward a unilateral approach that sought to use whatever means were necessary to assert its national interests and security. In the global governance institutions, however, there was an increased emphasis on multilateralism and cooperative approaches to dealing with transnational threats. By reviewing these two responses in tandem, Miller highlights the complex nature of international reality. In an increasingly interconnected world, the ripple effects of attacks such as those on 9/11 can spread far and wide. The responses of institutions such as the UN, NATO, and the EU have been promising: law, cooperation, and diplomacy are privileged as much of the world looks to global governance for security. With a new administration in Washington—apparently one more committed to multilateralism—there is hope that the collaborative precedent set following 9/11 will have a positive, lasting, and consequential legacy for global governance institutions.

**Teasing Out the Implications**

The international governance architecture is in the midst of substantial change. Rising states are engaging with the established powers. Countries that have remained on the margins of the global governance system for so long are now asking for a place at the table. These demands are accompanied by significant implications for global governance. Will rising states—notably China, India, and Brazil—play a productive role in the processes of greater integration or strike a more combative pose? Equally, how will countries that have previously enjoyed a privileged position—in the case of the United States, hegemonic power—respond to influential new actors?

One view points to the desire among traditional powers and rising states to be embedded in institutions across the board, covering strategic as well as economic and social arenas. Another perspective, however, posits that, as the tightened patterns of global economic integration—that is to say, globalization—become more fully recognized, so will the dynamics of leadership diversity and a kind of “unlikemindedness.” Although each of the contributions to this volume has a
different emphasis, they uniformly focus the discussion on how the global governance system might adapt to these changing pressure points. Together they offer needed conceptual and practical insights into how the dynamic of an emergent cluster of rising states can be meshed with an adaptive set of rising institutions. Only by bringing both elements to the fore can there be a keener understanding of whether and how the world of the twenty-first century can be governed more legitimately and effectively.

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