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## CHANGING POLICIES IN NATIONAL PARKS

It's time for us to change America.

—BARACK OBAMA

If you want to make enemies, try to change something.

—WOODROW WILSON

The overarching theme of U.S. politics today is change. As suggested by the opening quote, which comes from Barack Obama's speech accepting the Democratic Party's nomination for president, Obama built his campaign on that theme. Not to be outdone, his opponent, John McCain, countered Obama's slogan, "Change you can believe in," with "Change you can trust."<sup>1</sup> But as the famous quote from former President Wilson warns—and as President Obama is now fully aware—significant change does not come easily. How, then, does it occur?

Natural resource management is one area in which policymakers have sought to make significant changes. In the closing decades of the twentieth century, many Americans realized that traditional natural resource policies had resulted in substantial and often negative impacts on the environment. Whether intentionally or not, those policies had diminished or destroyed or at least altered many of the most precious public lands and rivers on the North American continent. Some Americans began to think about taking the next step in their evolving relationship with nature, an evolution that historically has witnessed stages

of fear, ignorance, abuse, use, and finally preservation. But preservation was not enough. Conditions had been changed, so simply saving public sites as they now were might preserve what many viewed as the mistakes of the past. The next step involved restoration—or if that was not possible, then at least repair of those mistakes. Thus, a decade into the twenty-first century, decisionmakers have promised to change policies to restore natural conditions at literally hundreds of public sites across the United States.

This book discusses efforts to change traditional policies at four sites that are important to millions of people, not just U.S. citizens. The names of the places alone—Yellowstone, Yosemite, the Everglades, and the Grand Canyon—inspire images of deep forests, majestic peaks, extraordinary wildlife, and vistas that can overwhelm anyone’s senses. To a considerable extent, those images are still accurate, but public policies have caused significant deterioration of natural conditions at these magnificent places. Although the mandate for the National Park Service, the public agency responsible for national parks, calls on park officials to leave them “unimpaired” for future generations, the parks already have been impaired. In recent years, therefore, policymakers have attempted to reverse traditional policies by reintroducing eliminated species, reducing automobile traffic, replenishing fresh water supplies, and restoring natural water flows. Are the goals of those efforts being realized? I will argue that those seeking to alter the status quo can achieve the substantial change necessary to repair the damage from entrenched, traditional practices only when they create effective coalitions for change.

### *The Challenge of Changing Past Policies*

Before addressing how such repairs might be made, I emphasize that democratic political systems, certainly including the U.S. government, generally are not conducive to effecting dramatic change. Indeed, the framers designed the U.S. government to include separation of powers and multiple checks and balances in order to make radical change difficult. An obvious example is the procedure required to amend the Constitution, a procedure that has proven to be an insurmountable obstacle

for causes ranging from equal rights for women to prohibition of flag burning. Even beyond the institutional obstacles to change, policies themselves, once implemented, take on a life of their own that is not easy to alter. Procedures become routine, and interests of all kinds become entrenched. One of the most powerful concepts in the policy literature is that of the “iron triangle” made up of interest groups, public agencies, and members of Congress. Such coalitions have come to dominate specific policy issues, working together to benefit from the status quo.<sup>2</sup> Not surprisingly then, the first principle taught in many courses on public policy is that change typically occurs only incrementally or inconsistently.<sup>3</sup> Even prominent scholars who have questioned that principle acknowledge that incrementalism “has dominated thinking about policy change since the 1950s.”<sup>4</sup>

However difficult substantial change may be, policymakers do occasionally pronounce some event as signaling an entirely new policy approach. In fact, some public policies have changed so dramatically over time that they are considered reversals of past goals. Whereas for decades state and local governments pursued policies designed to prevent the participation of black Americans in the political process, for example, federal mandates in 1964 and 1965 not only declared such policies illegitimate but implemented others, such as the designation of minority congressional districts, to reverse those policies. Policies on other issues, from pesticide regulation to discouragement of smoking to decommissioning of nuclear power plants, have displayed dramatic changes over time.<sup>5</sup> The frequency of such changes, notably in policy areas involving environmental issues, seems to have increased in recent decades, perhaps due to improvements in science, greater understanding, better communication, the immediacy of events, or even the willingness to question any traditional behavior. However, efforts to achieve significant changes may be even more daunting in coming years if the country faces continued partisan gridlock and calls for increased fiscal austerity measures.

Restoring natural environments requires substantial changes in policy goals and human behavior. Many scientists argue that restoring an ecosystem to its condition prior to human disturbance is virtually impossible if for no other reason than the fact that environments are


always changing,<sup>6</sup> and many restoration proponents realize that achieving an exact replica of an earlier ecosystem may not be possible. A more operational definition, then, is “returning an ecosystem to a close approximation of its condition prior to disturbance.”<sup>7</sup> The Society for Ecological Restoration identifies restoration as “reestablishing an ecologically healthy relationship between nature and culture.”<sup>8</sup>

To assess the efforts to repair the damage to natural conditions from past policies, this analysis focuses on projects at four of the most revered national parks: Yellowstone, Yosemite, the Everglades, and the Grand Canyon. The World Heritage Committee lists all four as World Heritage sites, along with such remarkable places as the Great Barrier Reef and the Galapagos Islands. The outcomes of repair efforts at these parks are important for at least two reasons. First, as anyone who has ever visited them knows, the reverence accorded to these places is well deserved. Thus, what happens to them is of interest to the millions of people who value public lands and waters. Second, the outcome of restoration efforts here will say much about restoration efforts elsewhere. To put it more bluntly, if repair efforts here are doomed to failure, then what can be expected of restoration projects at other, less revered sites?

### *The Tarnished Crown Jewels*

However destructive the policies that followed, the basic decision to set aside some of the nation’s most precious lands and waters in a national park system showed remarkable foresight. One can argue whether statutory protection of lands in the mid-nineteenth century resulted from the efforts of prescient conservationists or tourist-seeking entrepreneurs.<sup>9</sup> The fact is that federal policymakers, beginning with the original assignment of Yosemite to the state of California in 1864 and the designation of Yellowstone as a national park in 1872, initiated a process that resulted in protection of a truly remarkable set of public spaces. Today, the national park system contains nearly 400 of the most scenic, historic, and valued sites in the country. While these sites still entice and inspire millions of visitors each year, as shown in figure 1-1, there’s trouble in paradise.

Figure 1-1. *National Parks Visitation, 1900–2007*



#### BACKGROUND

As the park system grew, in 1916 Congress established the National Park Service (NPS) within the Department of the Interior to manage the system’s various units, and in so doing it created a lasting source of tension in park operations. Congress mandated the NPS to facilitate “enjoyment” of the parks even while keeping them in “unimpaired” condition for generations to come. The NPS has since struggled to find a balance between those potentially competing missions, a balance that may never have existed in the first place. To a significant extent, this struggle created a legacy for the NPS that affects its implementation of any program, including the most high-profile.

The mandate to provide both use and preservation has created an agency with something of a split personality. Most within the NPS are determined to emphasize preservation, often joking of being “paid in sunsets.” One study found agency employees bonded by a “deep faith in the idea of a national park system.”<sup>10</sup> A survey of NPS personnel in the 1980s found 84 percent seeing preservation as “the major purpose”

of the agency while only 9 percent emphasized use.<sup>11</sup> However, political authorities have often pushed the NPS to promote use, especially in terms of service to tourists and commercial interests serving tourists. Over time, the purpose of the NPS came to be that of “managing people more than managing parks.”<sup>12</sup> One historian wrote that “a professional agency has been transformed into a political agency, leading to an emphasis on recreation, complete with urban malls [and] supermarkets.”<sup>13</sup> Another wrote that “management emphasized little more than preserving park scenery.”<sup>14</sup>

On many other occasions, political authorities have used the parks for “park barrel” purposes by establishing frivolous programs and even questionable new units.<sup>15</sup> Thus, by the 1990s, political scientists were more likely to characterize the NPS as a “responsive” than a “proactive” agency.<sup>16</sup> Agency personnel did not deny the charge. A major self-assessment on the agency’s seventy-fifth anniversary, for example, explicitly recognized the NPS as “thwarted by inadequately trained managers and politicized decision making” and lacking the information and capability needed to “defend its mission and resources in Washington.”<sup>17</sup> As a result, agency personnel are generally sympathetic to the goals of restoration and preservation but somewhat risk-averse in implementing the changes to achieve them.

NPS personnel also face significant challenges in their daily management of the parks. The parks face both internal threats (such as traffic and congestion) and external threats (such as pollution and encroaching development). The most obvious internal threat involves excessive visitor use. The line showing total visitation to national parks in figure 1-1 reflects the success of the NPS in attracting increasing numbers of visitors throughout the twentieth century. Visits are shown in thousands. In order to put the figure on the same scale as the individual park graphs, the line for total visits actually reflects total visits divided by 100, but the overall trends are telling. The problems arise not from the number of people coming into the parks as much as from how they get there and how they use them once inside. (The leveling off in the last two decades, discussed in later chapters, is a concern for the agency.)

As for external threats, the parks proved disturbingly vulnerable. The previously mentioned self-assessment described “a mismatch

between the demand that the park units be protected and the tools available when the threats to park resources and values are increasingly coming from outside unit boundaries.”<sup>18</sup> Those threats include air and water pollution from outside sources as well as encroachment by growth and development outside park boundaries. Management reactions to those threats often were ineffective and contributed to the problems in the national parks. At some places, including those discussed in this book, the consequences have been substantial.

The result of the agency’s dual mandate, political demands, and the daunting threats to the parks often were policies that did not ensure preservation of the natural environment and frequently caused substantial damage instead.

#### A NEW ERA?

The environmental awakening of the late twentieth century led to potentially significant changes in the management of the national parks. In short, as one analyst stated, people increasingly recognized that “human attempts to dominate nature could well have a dark underside.”<sup>19</sup> One aspect of those changes involved renewed attention to the goal of protecting the natural conditions within the units. For example, the first strategic objective listed by the seventy-fifth anniversary report was that “the primary responsibility of the NPS must be protection of park resources from internal and external impairment.”<sup>20</sup> A second aspect of those changes was more aggressive. Policymakers issued new orders for management not just to protect or even preserve parks but to work to restore natural conditions within parks that had suffered from past practices.

At Yellowstone, traditional wildlife policies had had a severe impact on the ecosystem because they removed predators, but in the 1990s, NPS and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) reintroduced wolves to the park, attempting to restore a balance that had been absent since the 1930s. Yosemite’s managers historically allowed and in fact encouraged the use of automobiles to visit and explore the park, but in recent years policymakers have called for the reduction and eventual elimination of automobile traffic in the heart of the ecosystem, the Yosemite

Valley. This plan, first launched in 1980, was reiterated in somewhat different form in 2000.

Historical policies at the Everglades diverted the water so essential for these wetlands to rapidly growing cities and farms to the point that the ecosystem was nearly destroyed. In 2000, however, policymakers launched the most expensive restoration plan ever attempted, with the stated goal of repairing the damage from past water allocation and use practices. Past policies at the Grand Canyon, in particular the construction and use of a large hydroelectric dam in 1963 at Glen Canyon, substantially altered the ecosystem of the Colorado River. Beginning in the early 1990s, policymakers promised to try to restore some of that ecosystem, while some environmental groups argued for removal of the Glen Canyon Dam.

#### WHY THESE CASES?

The cases in this book were chosen for several reasons. First, as mentioned, they involve some of the most precious areas in the world. By virtually any standard, the four parks are the cream of the crop, the diamonds among the crown jewels that make up the U.S. national park system. Furthermore, all four are World Heritage sites, renowned not just in the United States but throughout the world. Efforts to restore them therefore are important to literally millions of people. Second, because these are such revered lands, the repair projects are high-profile, and that fact has implications for other restoration efforts. The failure of these efforts could result in severe criticism and negative consequences for funding of similar projects. Explaining failures, or even limited successes, as is done in this book, can mitigate blanket condemnations of efforts to restore natural conditions in times of fiscal scarcity. A third reason is that these cases are quite similar in many ways and therefore comparable. All take place in highly valued natural areas where every action is publicized and of importance at least to certain parts of society. All enjoy considerable support among the environmental community. Restoration projects at all four parks require significant departures from past practices; thus, at least some conflict is inevitable at all four. All four involve implementation of efforts to change policies during the last fifteen years. A fourth reason is that these cases represent a range



of challenges involving public lands, from species protection to visitor use to external encroachment to river corridor management. Two represent largely internal issues and two largely external threats. Finally, the cases differ in ways that are important to more general arguments regarding changes to traditional public policies.

### *A Framework for Assessing Repair Efforts*

A large literature addresses broad questions of democratic responsiveness and policy change, illustrating useful concepts for anticipating and assessing the efforts to repair the damage to parks from past policies. Those concepts include the importance of coalitions for change and the conditions that they create and use to gain support for change.

#### COALITIONS FOR CHANGE

Virtually every effort to change the status quo involves conflict between those who benefit from the status quo and those who are trying to alter it. The reintroduction of wolves to Yellowstone, for instance, has produced conflicts with those who prefer their absence. As two pioneering social scientists stated, “many decision problems take the form of a choice between retaining the status quo and accepting an alternative to it, which is advantageous in some respects and disadvantageous in others.”<sup>21</sup> Change does not come automatically, but as the result of the actions of those who seek it. How do they proceed?

Whatever the goal—to bring back wolves to Yellowstone, reduce auto traffic in Yosemite, restore water flows in the Everglades, or remove the Glen Canyon Dam—advocates have to apply pressure on political leaders. A long line of literature on pressure politics in the United States has evolved, providing a useful tool for assessing the actions of advocates for change. The idea that pressure groups formed around common interests in order to affect public policies has been prevalent at least since James Madison’s fear of factions in *Federalist 10*. Well into the twentieth century, many political scientists argued that to understand policies, you needed to understand the interest groups trying to affect those policies;<sup>22</sup> some even argued that that was all you needed to understand.<sup>23</sup> Those arguments have evolved over time. One widely adopted

perspective in the policy literature on political pressure posits a crucial role for advocacy coalitions. The advocacy coalition framework describes policy as a product of stable system parameters such as constitutional rules, changes in the external environment such as economic crises, and competition between coalitions of actors. This framework has proven a compelling tool in the analysis of dozens of different instances of policy change.<sup>24</sup>

Advocacy coalitions contain not just interest groups but also journalists, researchers, and agency officials who “seek to influence public policy” in a particular domain.<sup>25</sup> Analysis based on this conceptualization is a significant improvement over past analyses that examined only the impact of interest groups. Indeed, what some saw as the diminished influence of individual groups may well have been the result of a misguided effort to assess the influence of just one isolated component of a larger collection of institutional actors all pursuing a similar goal. It also extends the work of scholars who questioned the utility of “iron triangles,” with their focus on only three components: interest group leaders, sympathetic agency officials, and complicit legislators.<sup>26</sup>

The idea that advocacy coalitions contain journalists, academics, and agency officials is helpful in defining and analyzing pressure for change, but it is still admittedly somewhat “undeveloped.”<sup>27</sup> Advocacy coalition scholars suggest that the different components of a coalition “engage in a nontrivial degree of coordination.”<sup>28</sup> I argue that the degree of coordination is less important than the fact that the different parts of even an informal coalition are working toward the same goals. How, in particular, do those different parts help make the overall effort more effective? At each of the parks in question, interest groups, journalists, academics, and agency officials have all played important roles in repair efforts, albeit to varying degrees of effect. I argue that the inclusion of these actors, regardless of how much they explicitly coordinate, helps explain how pro-change forces create and use certain conditions to effectively engage the larger public.

#### CONDITIONS FOR CHANGE

If a coalition wants to make a dramatic change, such as reintroducing an eliminated species or removing a dam, what can it do to succeed?

One of the principal lessons from the literature on policy change is that altering the status quo requires the involvement of the larger public. E. E. Schattschneider described any conflict situation as involving both participants and observers and argued, “The first proposition is that the outcome of every conflict is determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in it.”<sup>29</sup> The audience consists of the many people who have not previously been involved in the conflict but whose collective action can, if mobilized, foster fundamental changes to the status quo. They can provide the pressure, resources, and financial support essential to formulating and implementing significant policy changes. How can coalitions create and expand the sphere of conflict to make audience involvement in repair efforts more likely? I propose several approaches: they can define the issue; present economic arguments; present scientific evidence; and elicit agency commitment.

*Issue Definition.* First, the audience is more likely to become involved if the image of the alternative to the status quo is more positive than that of the status quo. For instance, the people who seek to eliminate cars from Yosemite Valley face arguments from those who defend the public’s right to easy access to the park. Change advocates therefore have to portray their goal as something other than an attempt to “lock people out” of the park—perhaps as an attempt to preserve the natural beauty of the place, which is what drew the public in the first place.

Much of the argument for the importance of issue definition comes from recent work that attempts to explain periods of dramatic change in policies but allows for what scholars term “punctuated equilibrium”: policies typically are stable, with only marginal adjustments, except for periods during which something happens to produce dramatic change.<sup>30</sup> The “something” that happens is substantial change in the image of an issue. The policy image involves “the supporting set of ideas structuring how policymakers think about and discuss the policy.”<sup>31</sup> For instance, nuclear policy was in relative equilibrium until the image of nuclear power shifted from one that focused on energy generation to one that focused on public safety and environmental damage. Once the image of an issue has been shaken, change to the status quo is much more possible.<sup>32</sup> Scholars have shown the importance to policy changes from image alteration in places ranging from Canada to China.<sup>33</sup>

How can pro-change coalitions define issues to engage the larger public? One way is to frame issues in terms that are sympathetic to proposed changes or antipathetic to the status quo. Framing highlights some element of reality regarding an issue to the point of affecting perceptions of that issue.<sup>34</sup> For example, policies affecting a river that have traditionally been framed in terms of increasing economic utility may be described in terms of decreasing environmental health. Advocates of eliminating inheritance taxes use the term “death taxes” rather than “estate taxes.” At Yosemite, those seeking to reduce cars in the valley could frame the status quo in terms of traffic jams and smog. Another way to shape issue definition is to use new information that can “shock, disrupt, and destabilize” a previously stable policy.<sup>35</sup> For instance, many people thought differently about the use of ethanol for fuel once information came out suggesting a link to increasing food prices. Another way to redefine an issue is to take advantage of unplanned external events that disrupt existing images. Focusing on events such as international crises or natural disasters may completely alter the image of an issue.<sup>36</sup> A recent example involves Hurricane Katrina, which forced policymakers to rethink the use of levees to structure waterways.

Advocacy coalitions contain journalists and other media actors. If such actors are at least somewhat sympathetic to a coalition’s goals, they can be quite effective in using all these techniques to shape an image in ways that help engage and elicit the support of the larger public audience. As Baumgartner and Jones conclude, “issue definition, then, is the driving force in both stability and instability, primarily because issue definition has the potential for mobilizing the previously disinterested.”<sup>37</sup> The degree to which proponents have been able to shape images favorable to repair efforts varies in the four cases examined here.

*Economic Arguments.* A second condition affecting the ability of change proponents to engage the larger public involves the economics of the proposed policy change. Advocates for a change are more likely to be effective if they can cite economic arguments showing that the benefits of their alternative policy exceed the costs of attaining it or the costs of maintaining the status quo. A paramount challenge for those seeking to remove the Glen Canyon Dam to restore natural flows in the Grand Canyon, for example, is to make the economic case that dam removal

will not be excessively costly in terms of lost power or lost capacity to store water.

A variety of scholarly research supports the importance of economic arguments to policy change. The most obvious argument involves the use of benefit-cost analysis, which has had at least some impact on policy changes on issues ranging from dam construction to pollution control to economic regulation.<sup>38</sup> Other research involves case studies, particularly the literature on efforts to overcome collective action problems. Work in this field shows that a policy change to affect some collective goods problem is more likely to occur if advocates show that current patterns of resource use are costly or ineffective.<sup>39</sup> Another line of research comparing the behavior of the fifty states has often shown a statistically significant role for perceptions of economic conditions as well as actual economic conditions on state innovations and programs.<sup>40</sup>

Whether independently or in cooperation with pro-change advocates, the academics and researchers involved in advocacy coalitions also may make compelling arguments for policy change. If they do so, a pro-change coalition is more capable of eliciting support from members of the larger public who may otherwise be reluctant to back proposed changes with financial resources. A classic example of advocates using academics to make economic arguments to powerful effect occurred in the case of the Grand Canyon, although this instance involved a dam controversy prior to the current one involving Glen Canyon Dam. In the early 1960s, David Brower and others opposing dams in the Grand Canyon area recruited economists and engineers to argue that not only would the proposed dams be costly but that cheaper alternatives were available.<sup>41</sup> The impact of economic arguments in mobilizing public support can be especially important during times of economic stress, such as today, when many citizens are reluctant to consider new ideas that may entail new costs. Economic arguments also are crucial in cases involving environmental restoration when opponents of change argue that such projects are frivolous. The economic arguments in the four cases studied in this volume have not been uniformly compelling.

*Scientific Evidence.* A third condition affecting the likelihood of audience involvement in change efforts concerns the scientific evidence for

the alternatives to the status quo. Evidence that a change to the status quo can be beneficial to society can be useful in enlisting public support for the change. For example, those seeking to reintroduce wolves to Yellowstone had to present biological arguments that the impacts on other species in the larger ecosystem would be positive.

The impact of scientific evidence on policy change proposals is not always clear, and the role of science in recent political debates on many issues has been controversial. Different sides often present their own versions and interpretations of scientific evidence. Nevertheless, a positive impact of scientific evidence has been apparent in numerous environmental policies, particularly with efforts to achieve collaborative changes to the status quo.<sup>42</sup> Again, consensus does not always exist on the science presented to support or reject a change. It is fair to say, however, that if those seeking change are unable to offer substantial scientific evidence to support their proposal, the lack of support only enhances the status quo. One classic example concerns climate change policies in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. While the science on climate change has become increasingly confident and nearly unanimous in recent years, the lack of scientific consensus in earlier decades slowed U.S. action or at least provided a justification for inaction in spite of calls for new policies. Indeed, studies have shown that efforts to change policies that are not supported by “hard science” are not likely to succeed.<sup>43</sup> The four cases studied here vary in terms of the confidence inspired by available scientific evidence.

*Agency Commitment.* A fourth condition that makes audience involvement in and support for policy change more likely is if those who would manage the proposed changes—and especially those who would implement the changes—are committed and cooperative. If the larger public senses a lack of commitment from key agencies, it will be reluctant to become involved or to support change efforts. At the Everglades, for example, restoration efforts involve officials in not just an agency perceived as sympathetic to such goals (the NPS) but also the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, an agency whose history involves more construction than restoration.

The literature suggests that agencies play a key role in policy formulation and implementation, although all public agencies are subject to

potentially significant pressure and constraints from external institutional actors, such as Congress and the courts.<sup>44</sup> Empirical studies show that while agencies vary in terms of autonomy and responsiveness to other institutional actors, they do have some discretionary authority;<sup>45</sup> a theoretical framework of policy change therefore must take into account the motivations of those within key agencies. All agencies have some sense of identity or organizational culture or, as one scholar of bureaucracy described it, “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.”<sup>46</sup> Inevitably, that sense of identity is linked to the agency’s mission and the conditions surrounding its creation.<sup>47</sup> If the key agency involved in implementing a policy has an organizational culture that is antipathetic to change, then agency officials can use their discretionary authority to make significant changes to that policy less likely.

Having the commitment of the agency with primary jurisdiction over a policy is not enough, however. Managing proposed policy changes may well require the action of multiple agencies. That possibility increases when policies involve multiple jurisdictions, such as states, and multiple tasks, as do many restoration efforts involving large ecosystems. The importance of scale has been noted in policy efforts ranging from international treaties to collective action efforts involving common resources.<sup>48</sup> Having a mandate to perform multiple tasks—for instance, to create jobs and implement fiscal austerity measures simultaneously—inevitably complicates any policy.<sup>49</sup> In cases involving multiple jurisdictions and multiple tasks, as with the Everglades, multiple agencies often are involved in both formulating and implementing policy changes. If multiple agencies that have different organizational cultures are involved, then the potential for tension, if not conflict, is high. The policy literature, including classic implementation studies and recent work on multiple principals, describes the potentially problematic impact of the involvement of more than one agency in putting policies into place.<sup>50</sup> Communication and cooperation between the agencies are essential to overcoming such problems.

Therefore, another condition affecting the likelihood of public support for policy change involves the actions of agency officials. Agency officials who are committed to the goals of advocacy coalitions can

make efforts to change policy more effective by coordinating the supervision of multiple tasks and reducing interagency conflict to make such changes more manageable. The attainment of policy goals is “unlikely unless officials in the implementing agencies are strongly committed to the achievement of these objectives.”<sup>51</sup> Interagency commitment and cooperation vary in these cases.

#### SUMMARY

To summarize, those seeking significant change to the status quo at the four parks analyzed here are more likely to attract needed support from the larger public if certain conditions are met. Positive issue definition, compelling economic arguments, convincing scientific evidence, and agency commitment are required if proposed changes are to occur. The working hypothesis for the following empirical examinations therefore is the following: When the coalitions seeking change at these parks effectively create and utilize those conditions, then they are more likely to achieve substantial change, in this context repair of damage from past behavior. The less effective pro-change forces are at creating effective coalitions and favorable conditions for engaging the larger public, the more likely efforts to repair damage will remain incremental and inconsistent.

This working hypothesis is logical and straightforward. It may not seem counterintuitive, but I will revisit the argument in the final chapter to present a more nuanced view based on the empirical assessment of the cases. As is, the general theoretical framework described above does facilitate the use of important policy change concepts in an accessible way; it also enables the explanation of outcomes. As other scholars have observed, much policy analysis focuses on process when what is needed is to understand outcomes: “We also need more analyses of distributions of outcomes though this has not been a favored mode of analysis in political science or public policy.”<sup>52</sup>

#### *Organization of the Volume*

The next four chapters provide considerable background for each case, consistent with the need, stressed by the predominating theories of



policy change, to analyze policies over decades of time.<sup>53</sup> However, I focus mainly on the most recent major decisions regarding repair efforts and the implementation of those decisions. That serves two purposes. Substantively, the major recent decisions determine what is happening in the parks today. Analysis of those policies allows us to be current and to anticipate future action (or inaction). Methodologically, the focus on recent decisions makes the cases more comparable in terms of their individual time frame. I argue that the outcomes in these cases can be explained by the actions of pro-change coalitions and the conditions that they create and use to achieve public involvement. Each case study therefore describes the behavior of those seeking changes and those conditions.

The case studies use whatever information is available. I have followed and in some cases participated in these repair efforts for years. I have studied and been involved with the parks for decades. Therefore, I use some personal anecdotes as well as historical reviews, archival records, and interviews with a wide range of people involved in each case. The participants in these interviews, at least the ones willing to be identified, are listed in the appendix. My personal anecdotes are not meant to be self-indulgent but rather to convey some sense of the character of these places. Indeed, understanding them is truly possible only by experiencing them on the ground (or water, as the case may be). I also attempt to be as analytical as possible, but nearly anyone who has spent much time in places such as those examined here develops certain views and feelings, and my own preferences become apparent.

The final chapter summarizes, synthesizes, and generalizes beyond the case studies. I argue that the lessons from these cases can be applied to other attempts at restoration and efforts to change policies. Obviously, these repair projects are not the only ones occurring in the national parks, nor are they even the only ones happening in these specific parks. These projects are, however, crucial to the future of these places, and they offer lessons to others who are attempting to rethink past public policies.