The U.S. Census provides researchers, policymakers, planners, business leaders, journalists, and other interested parties with a valuable once-in-a-decade snapshot of the social, demographic, and economic makeup of America. This was not the original purpose of the census; the framers of the U.S. Constitution designed the population count to regulate democratic representation through population size and distribution. However, the census’s value for understanding and tracking change among the American populace has become of paramount interest. The nearly $200 billion in federal funds that are distributed annually to states based on the decennial census attest to its importance.1

Americans have long been fascinated with numbers—especially when they reveal who we are as a nation. Francis Walker, director of the 1870 and 1880 censuses, capitalized on an American “passion for statistics” to greatly expand the census beyond its original purpose.2 Under his leadership, the census invented such concepts as the center of population statistic in 1870 that tracked America’s westward movement back to 1790. This measure helped the public to visualize national settlement, which the census found shifting westward an average of about seventy feet a day. Walker also added dozens of new questions to the census. The so-called jumbo census of 1880 was so stuffed with questions that it took the better part of a decade to analyze. Problems with data tabulation in the 1880 census led to the

invention of a keypunch counter in 1890, whose commercial application led to the formation of IBM.

The 2000 census remains a treasure trove of information. It confirms that our nation is undergoing a period of dynamic, volatile change; and cities and suburbs are the places where these trends play out most vividly. The residents of our metropolitan areas are growing older, while the proportion of young workers is starting to shrink. Cities and suburbs are more diverse, as a surge of new immigrants into the country locates first in our metro areas and increasingly in the suburbs. Singles and older Americans living alone have now surpassed married couples with children as the prevailing household type in suburbs. And despite the rebirth of many U.S. cities, the census confirms that suburban growth still dominates.

The evidence from Census 2000 explodes many long-held stereotypes about cities and suburbs. Government, businesses, and nonprofits must now change their policies and practices to reflect the new metropolitan reality. This series, sponsored by the Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy and the Fannie Mae Foundation, brings together analyses of Census 2000 data to depict the latest picture of urban and suburban America. The series outlines what this new reality means for the vast array of policies, politics, and programs shaping these places. This first volume is based on the first release of “short-form” data from the census on population, race and ethnicity, and household types in this country. Future volumes will reveal deeper spatial trends provided by “long-form” data and Public Use Micro Sample data, as they are released by the Census Bureau.

PEOPLING THE UNITED STATES FROM THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO TODAY

During the nineteenth century, Americans created a vast, coast-to-coast network of cities so that by 1900 the core of every major U.S. region, except for Las Vegas, was established. During the twentieth century, and especially in the years following World War II, growth spread from these urban cores, giving us today’s vast metropolis. During the past two centuries, settlement swept into every corner of the nation, the census-defined “frontier” opened and closed (in 1890), waves of immigrants came from all parts of the globe (and keep coming), and the United States shifted from being majority rural to majority urban (1920) and is now half suburban (2000). Thus we have shifted from settling the original frontier of Daniel Boone’s Kentucky to the crabgrass frontier at the metropolitan fringe.
CENSUS 2000: DATA RELEASE AND NEW PROCEDURES ON RACE

Census 2000 is the first decennial U.S. census to be released via the Internet. This creates opportunities for a wide range of users to have firsthand access to the data. The data are being released over a two-year period, with basic demographic information released first, followed by more detailed data.

What Do Researchers Mean by Short- and Long-Form Data?
In March 2001, the Census Bureau released the first data from Census 2000, the Redistricting Data Summary File, which provided population counts for race and Hispanic categories. Other files with data from the census short form followed. These data, referred to as 100 percent items because they derive from questions asked of all U.S. households and residents, include household relationship, sex, race, age, and Hispanic or Latino origin, and housing data related to tenure and occupancy status. All of the chapters in this volume contain analyses derived from short-form data.

The long-form questionnaire asked all of the same questions as the short form, as well as detailed questions relating to the social, economic, and housing characteristics of each individual and household. Information derived from the long form is referred to as sample data, because approximately one in six households receives the long-form questionnaire.

Data files are tabulated from the long form for a range of geographic entities, including states, metropolitan areas, census tracts, and block groups. The Census Bureau began releasing sample data files from Census 2000 in July 2002. Future editions in this series will include analyses of long-form data.

How Did the Census Bureau Collect Race Data This Time?
One of the most important changes in Census 2000 was the way data were collected on race and Hispanic origin. The federal government considers race and Hispanic origin distinct concepts and therefore captures information on them in two separate questions. These two questions appeared on the census short form and were thus asked of every individual residing in the United States. Respondents were first asked to identify whether they were of “Spanish, Hispanic or Latino” origin. That question was then followed by another question that asked people to identify whether they were white, black, Asian, American Indian, Native Hawaiian, or “some other race.” For the first time, respondents could check off more than one race to describe themselves. While race in the 1990 census was limited to six response categories, the ability to choose one or more race categories in 2000 raised the number of potential responses to 63. Adding the Hispanic or Latino dimension raises the possible identity combinations to 126. Because of these changes, racial and ethnic data from Census 2000 are not directly comparable to those from 1990.
Birth and death rates have also shifted dramatically during the past two centuries. In 1800 the United States had a demographic profile not unlike some current third world nations with high birth and death rates. Because of improvements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (especially in sanitation), death rates began to fall dramatically as life expectancy climbed. The nation’s natural increase in population surged as birth rates remained high. The slow fall-off in birth rates was partly because of recent immigrants who maintained a higher fertility pattern reflecting their country of origin. By the 1930s, however, more restrictive immigration laws and the Great Depression began to significantly bring down birth rates. Increasingly assimilated immigrants and their children began to have lower fertility rates in line with native-born Americans. And as the nation shifted from rural to urban and mandatory elementary education laws became common, the demand for children as farm laborers diminished, and family size dropped.

By World War II, the nation was on the path of much slower growth than the previous century and a half, but a postwar baby boom and renewed immigration reversed this trend. The generation born during the 1920s and 1930s, for reasons often debated by social scientists, defied the downward trend in birth rates and instead parented the baby boom. This boom began in 1946 and gathered speed during the 1950s. By the late 1950s, births exceeded 4 million a year and the fertility rate climbed to more than 3.7 births a woman in child-bearing years (the rate is now below 2.1). The baby boom ended by the mid-1960s, and fertility rates began a steady fall, yet during these same years, the United States reformed immigration laws and set in place the next wave of renewed population growth.

While population growth dipped in the 1970s, it gained momentum in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s. By 2000, America’s population had reached a high of more than 281 million. The nation grew by nearly 33 million during the 1990s, or a number equivalent to the total population at the start of the Civil War. This was the largest U.S. numerical increase ever seen. The decade’s 13.2 percent increase was the fastest growth since the 1960s.

Metropolitan areas were clearly at the vanguard of the nation’s latest growth trends. By 2000, more than eight out of every ten persons in the United States resided in metropolitan areas, up from less than two-thirds in 1960. Nearly one-third of all Americans lived in large metro areas of 5 million persons or more.

METROPOLITAN AMERICA IN 2000

The dawn of a new century presents an opportune moment to take stock of the health and function of America’s metropolitan areas. This is particularly true given the immense pace and scope of change under way in the United States. Cities and their suburbs do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they reflect the “fashions and feasibilities” of American society. Yet discussions about cities and metropolitan areas often rely more on rhetoric than reality. There are knowledgeable urban observers who use the emergence of “living downtowns” as evidence of a broader back-to-the-city movement in the United States. But the renewed activities in a refurbished downtown may not capture the larger trends occurring in the remainder of the city or the metropolitan area as a whole.

The chapters in this volume turn to the first round of Census 2000 data on population, race and ethnicity, and household composition to begin to sort out the debate about the health of cities and suburbs. This volume attempts to answer these simple questions:
— Are cities coming back?
— Are all suburbs growing?
— Are cities and suburbs becoming more alike?
What emerges is a story of immense change and heterogeneity. Some of the distinctions relate to which region a city or suburb is located in, the South or the Northeast, the West or the Midwest. These regional variations are further distinguished by differences in economic function (for example, hi-tech economies rather than older manufacturing places) and in historic racial and ethnic composition (for example, immigration centers rather than primarily white-black metro areas).

Are Cities Coming Back?

Several factors define the health of a central city, but population growth is often used as a common barometer of city vitality. Population change is one of the first measures provided by the decennial census that gives urban observers, experts, and leaders a sense of the state of America’s cities.

Without a doubt, central cities performed better in the 1990s than they did in the 1980s when it came to population growth. In chapter 1, Edward L. Glaeser and Jesse M. Shapiro show us that U.S. cities of 100,000 persons or more grew at twice the rate in the 1990s than they did in the 1980s. But despite this good news, there were some large variations in city population growth.

growth—from as high as 85 percent growth in Las Vegas to as low as a 15 percent decline in Hartford. Western cities grew the fastest, at an average pace of 19.5 percent, while the cities in the Northeast, on average, lost population. The authors offer several explanations for the different patterns of city growth. Cities were more likely to grow if they had high percentages of educated residents and thus strong human capital, if they had a service sector—rather than a manufacturing—economy, and if they began the decade with a large immigrant population base. Ironically, the most important factor affecting the population growth of cities may be the one factor that leaders simply cannot control: the weather. Glaeser and Shapiro state it plainly, “these regional patterns can be understood as the result of the tyranny of the weather. Warm, dry places grew. Cold, wet places declined.”

Alan Berube’s analysis in chapter 2 reinforces Glaeser and Shapiro’s cautionary note that not all cities did well in the 1990s, especially if one compares their population growth rates to those of their suburbs. On the whole, the top 100 cities gained population in the 1990s; however, 28 of these cities lost residents or did not grow at all. As Glaeser and Shapiro reveal, most of these cities were located in the Northeast or Midwest. Furthermore, only five central cities experienced a true comeback in that they had converted their 1980s population loss into a net gain in the 1990s. These “renaissance cities” were Denver, Memphis, Atlanta, Chicago, and Yonkers. Berube finds that no matter how strongly or weakly cities grew in population in the 1990s, their suburbs fared better. Although the top 100 cities grew by 9 percent as a whole, their suburbs grew twice as fast—by 18 percent. Suburban growth outpaced city growth in four out of every five cities.

It is evident that despite the strength of the 1990s economy, Rust Belt cities in the Midwest and Northeast still struggled to attract new residents and hold on to existing ones. But, no matter whether they gained residents or lost them, Patrick A. Simmons and Robert E. Lang find that the 1990s were still the best decade for older, industrial cities since the 1940s. In chapter 3, they examine population growth trends for thirty-six older, industrial cities during the past five decades—from the 1950s to today—and then rank the decades by how well the cities fared during that period. The authors find that, as a group, the older cities performed best during the 1990s when they together added approximately 580,000 people. The worst decade was the 1970s, when suburban expansion took off and twenty-nine cities suffered their worst postwar population declines. Many of these cities have not yet regained the population levels of their heyday; however, several, including Chicago and New York, have grown again since the 1970s.

The 1990s were clearly a positive decade for many cities. As Rebecca R. Sohmer and Robert E. Lang confirm in chapter 4, the 1990s were also a good
decade for the nation’s downtowns. Out of a selection of twenty-four cities, the authors find that eighteen actually saw their downtown populations grow in the past decade. For half of the cities, like Seattle and Denver, the explosive growth in downtown residents mirrored the overall population growth in the city. The real high performers were six cities in the Midwest and Northeast that were able to increase their downtown populations despite their citywide loss in residents—Cleveland, Norfolk, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Milwaukee. Although it is unclear whether this trend is due to changing demographics at the heart of central cities, or residential choices that people are making, the proximity of downtowns to work and transit offer hope of a continued steady growth into the next decade.

These chapters show that most cities and downtowns grew in the 1990s, but Alan Berube and Benjamin Forman argue that these trends mask a larger unevenness of population growth inside our central cities. In chapter 5, the authors note that while about two-thirds of downtown census tracts in the 100 largest cities added population, this growth was dwarfed by the larger population loss in surrounding neighborhoods or by the expansive population growth at the cities’ edge. In fact, more than 60 percent of the overall population growth in these largest cities occurred in the outer ring of neighborhoods bordering the suburbs, while only 11 percent took place in inner-core neighborhoods. As such, most cities actually decentralized within their own borders in the 1990s. These trends were accentuated in the South and West, where growth at the periphery overwhelmed growth in the core, and in the Midwest, where outer-ring neighborhoods grew despite residential declines surrounding downtowns. These patterns serve as a reminder that not all neighborhoods shared in the benefits of city population growth in the 1990s.

Are All Suburbs Growing?

The American suburb continued to show its strength—and dominance—by the year 2000. As mentioned earlier, suburban growth outpaced city growth irrespective of whether a city’s population was falling like Baltimore’s, staying stable like Kansas City’s, or rising rapidly like Denver’s. Even Sun Belt cities like Phoenix, Dallas, and Houston grew more slowly than their suburbs. But as with cities, there are growth variations among suburbs. Chapters 6 and 7 show us a contrasting picture of the new, rapidly growing suburbs in the Southwest and the declining ones in the colder regions of the country.

In chapter 6, Lang and Simmons describe a new suburban phenomenon dubbed the “boomburb,” which may indicate the direction of many subur-
ban cities in the Sun Belt. These cities are products of newer master-planned community-oriented growth in metropolitan areas largely in the Southwest. While all of these cities had more than 100,000 people living in them in 2000, they are most notable for their explosive growth during the past few decades. Suburban cities such as Irving, Arlington, and Plano near Dallas-Fort Worth, Chandler near Phoenix, and Henderson outside Las Vegas grew by more than forty times their size, from just a few thousand people in the 1950s, to populations of several hundred thousand by 2000. Such rapid growth raises many questions about the pressures of service delivery, the quality of new construction, and the capacity of transportation and road systems in these places.

Meanwhile, some of the suburbs of the Midwest and Northeast struggled with the same population declines that pervaded their central cities, and some of the loss was fairly rapid. In the 2,600 suburbs analyzed by William H. Lucy and David L. Phillips in chapter 7, there were 700 that lost population at an average rate of 6.1 percent of residents per suburb. Sometimes population decline occurred in the inner-ring suburbs, but often declining suburbs were scattered across metropolitan areas. While most of America’s shrinking suburbs were in the older regions of the country, suburbs in the South and West were not immune to population loss. For instance, while Pittsburgh had the largest number of declining suburbs (108), Denver’s suburbs had the highest average population loss (at 35.7 percent).

Are Cities and Suburbs Becoming More Alike?

Beyond the continued growth and dispersal of the American population, the 1990s ushered in a period of greater diversity. First, the U.S. population became even more racially and ethnically diverse, with four out of every five new additions to the population being a person of color. Notably, Hispanics passed African Americans as the nation’s largest racial/ethnic group, while the Asian American population strengthened its presence by more than 50 percent. Second, the nation also became more diverse in household formation. The traditional nuclear family is a shrinking phenomenon as changes in social norms regarding marriage, divorce, cohabitation, and childbearing are becoming more acceptable, and as the baby boomer generation enters its empty-nester years. Together, these larger demographic trends are redefining cities and suburbs.

One of the most dramatic changes in cities in the 1990s is that the majority of central cities became majority “minority” for the first time in American history. Berube’s analysis in chapter 8 describes the transforma-
tion of the nation’s 100 largest cities into truly multiracial, multicultural centers. First, the share of non-Hispanic whites in these cities decreased from 52 percent in 1990 to 44 percent by 2000. Cities like Anaheim, Philadelphia, and Albuquerque now have more persons of color than non-Hispanic whites. While the white population shrank in the 100 largest cities by more than 2 million, their Hispanic population ballooned by 3.8 million. Nearly every city (97 out of 100) experienced a growth in Hispanics—at a typical rate of 64.5 percent. If not for the growth in Hispanic population, 19 out of 74 growing cities would have lost population in the 1990s. Just as widespread as the growth in Hispanics was the increase in Asians; 95 out of 100 cities added Asian residents, though at a slower pace. Meanwhile, the share of African Americans in the largest cities shrank slightly, from 24.7 percent in 1990 to 24.1 percent in 2000. The cities that lost black residents were mostly found in California and in cities in the Rust Belt region. The combination of deep declines of white residents, modest changes in the black population, and explosive growth in Hispanics and Asians explains the tipping of America’s cities into primarily communities of color.

As central cities solidify their place as the nation’s centers of racial and ethnic diversity, the nation’s suburbs are also becoming more heterogeneous. Nationwide, 95 percent of the foreign-born population in 2000 lived in metropolitan areas, with slightly more than half residing outside of central cities. In chapter 9, William H. Frey tracks the dramatic shift of the minority population into suburban areas across the country. Overall, the share of racial and ethnic minorities living in the suburbs increased substantially in the 1990s, moving from less than one-fifth to more than one-quarter of all suburbanites. This trend is most evident in metro areas that already had a strong immigrant base. The suburbs in these melting pot metro areas had sizable portions of their population that were Hispanic, Asian, and African American. In contrast, Hispanics were the largest community of color in the suburbs of largely white metro areas in the South and West, while African Americans were the largest suburban minority population in other metro areas. Frey also finds that, just as in cities, the growth of racial and ethnic groups fueled the bulk of the population growth in suburbs in the 1990s.

The rapid rise of Hispanics in the United States not only transformed cities and suburbs but also affected many new parts of the country, particularly many smaller metro areas that had experienced little immigrant settlement in the past. In chapter 10, Roberto Suro and Audrey Singer describe how the explosive growth of the Latino population has created many new
Latino destination areas in the United States while cementing the dominance of traditional immigration gateways as immigration centers. The authors find that places like Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN, Portland, OR, and Raleigh-Durham, NC, which had relatively few Latinos two decades ago, saw their Latino populations triple in size between 1980 and 2000. Meanwhile, long-established Latino metros such as New York, Los Angeles, and Miami experienced the largest absolute gains in Latinos and remain home to more than half of the nation’s Hispanics. The chapter also echoes Frey’s conclusions about the rise of multicultural suburbia: more than half of all Latinos in the United States now live in the suburbs; they increased their presence in the suburbs by 71 percent in the decade.

As the wave of new Hispanics, Asians, and the foreign-born sweeps over U.S. cities and suburbs, it is important to consider how these changes are affecting the pattern of opportunities in our country. Two chapters, one by Glaeser and Jacob L. Vigdor and the other by John R. Logan, provide different—but not opposing—views about what the latest census data tell us about the state of racial segregation in America.

In chapter 11, Glaeser and Vigdor present the promising news from the 1990s; the level of black to nonblack segregation in the country reached its lowest point since 1920. Although African American segregation remains very high in general, it continued a three-decade decline in the 1990s. In fact, segregation levels in the 300 metro areas studied dropped in all but nineteen places. The authors find that the decline in segregation occurred primarily because of the black integration of white neighborhoods and not the non-black movement into African American areas, which on the whole have remained isolated. The authors also find that most of the promising trends occurred in rapidly growing metro areas, and metro areas in the West and South. However, segregation remained severe in highly populous metro areas, particularly those located in the Midwest and Northeast.

John Logan similarly acknowledges in chapter 12 that black-white segregation in the country has been dropping. But he also urges us to not lose sight of its severity and to look beyond the black-white color line as this country’s diversity accelerates, especially in the suburbs. First, Logan asserts that while black-white segregation dropped in both the 1980s and 1990s, the progress remains glacial, considering how high segregation remains. Meanwhile, in the past two decades, segregation levels of Hispanics and Asians from whites have remained largely unchanged, despite the swift rise of these two groups in the country. In general, whites still live in primarily all-white neighborhoods, while blacks, Hispanics, and Asians live in more integrated places, often with other communities of color. This chapter also
details that as suburbs have grown more diverse, minority segregation there has increased. As they increasingly take on urban characteristics, the suburbs may also be replicating the cities’ pattern of neighborhood segregation and thus the growing inequality of life chances among communities of color that live in them.

Finally, chapter 13 completes the early picture of the dynamic change taking place in our cities and suburbs. Frey and Berube examine the shifting household composition in metropolitan America and find that certain cities are looking more stereotypically suburban while some suburbs are attracting households that have traditionally been associated with cities. For instance, the authors document that the rapidly growing cities in the Sun Belt saw significant increases in married couples with children, while their Rust Belt counterparts continued their loss of such families. Nearly all suburbs, however, saw faster growth in all types of households compared with their cities. Most noteworthy is that by 2000, the largest household type in the suburbs was nonfamilies (29 percent)—young singles and elderly persons living alone—followed by married couples with children (27 percent).

The findings presented in this volume are unequivocal. Cities and suburbs are undergoing a dynamic metamorphosis. Cities are growing, bolstered by a strong economy and the growth of new immigrants, but their suburbs are growing faster. As suburban expansion continues, the demographic differences between cities and suburbs are narrowing. Many immigrants today are bypassing cities and heading straight for the suburbs, joining other persons of color who are increasingly locating there. And as these and other changes unfold, it appears that the metro areas in the South and West are moving in opposite trajectories to their neighbors in the Midwest and Northeast. In the end, there are clear regional differences in the country, and even stark differences among individual metro areas. Government, business, and nonprofit leaders must know the demographic context of the communities in which they work. These demographic shifts are signaling changes in demand for housing and services such as schools and childcare, healthcare, and eldercare, as well as changing consumer preferences for private sector goods. They also signal the shifting nature of politics in our cities and suburbs, redefining the coalitions for change and the voting behaviors that may play out at the state and national levels.

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Bruce Katz and Robert E. Lang

