



THE
IDEA
OF

PAKISTAN

STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONTENTS

	Preface	vii
	Introduction	1
ONE	The Idea of Pakistan	15
TWO	The State of Pakistan	39
THREE	The Army's Pakistan	97
FOUR	Political Pakistan	131
FIVE	Islamic Pakistan	161
SIX	Regionalism and Separatism	201
SEVEN	Demographic, Educational, and Economic Prospects	231
EIGHT	Pakistan's Futures	267
NINE	American Options	301
	Notes	329
	Index	369

MAPS

Pakistan in 2004	xii
The Subcontinent on the Eve of Islam, and Early Arab Inroads, 700–975	14
The Ghurid and Mamluk Dynasties, 1170–1290 and the Delhi Sultanate under the Khaljis and Tughluqs, 1290–1390	17
The Mughal Empire, 1556–1707	19
Choudhary Ramat Ali's 1940 Plan for Pakistan	27
Pakistan in 1947	40
Pakistan in 1972	76
Languages of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Northwest India	209
Pakistan in Its Larger Regional Setting	300

INTRODUCTION

In recent years Pakistan has become a strategically important state, both criticized as a rogue power and praised as being on the front line in the ill-named war on terrorism. The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States identifies Pakistan, along with Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, as a high-priority state.

This is not a new development. In the 1950s and 1960s Pakistan was a member of two American-sponsored alliances, but then drifted away from Washington. In the 1980s Pakistan was a vital partner in evicting the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, even though its covert nuclear program drew much criticism. In 1996 it was one of three states (the others being Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, UAE) to recognize the Taliban regime, which was by then playing host to the terrorist organization al Qaeda. After September 11, 2001, Pakistan was again characterized by American officials as a vital ally, even though it was caught, and admitted to, covertly spreading nuclear technology to a number of states; further, its enthusiasm in tracking down al Qaeda and Taliban leaders was suspect.¹

Unfortunately, the United States has only a few true Pakistan experts and knows remarkably little about this country. Much of what has been written is palpably wrong, or at best superficial.² Over the years, it has become difficult to conduct research in Pakistan's deteriorating security environment, and support for such work has dried up. It is little wonder,

then, that views cover a wide spectrum, with “rogue state” at one extreme—some would call it a potential nuclear Yugoslavia or even the most dangerous place in the world.³ The flamboyant French intellectual Bernard-Henri Levy called Pakistan “the most delinquent of nations.”⁴ According to a senior Indian diplomat, it “represents everything . . . in the forefront of U.S. concerns: religious fundamentalism, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in possession of a failing state, a military dictatorship masquerading behind a pale democratic façade.” To Jaswant Singh, former Indian minister of external affairs, Pakistan is “Taliban East.”⁵ Others, however, notably senior officials of the George W. Bush administration, have praised Pakistan as a misunderstood, but still effective, friend deserving of American support.⁶

To probe beyond the headlines, this book offers a double biography. One biography is that of the idea of Pakistan, the notion that India’s Muslims needed a homeland for their protection and to fulfill their cultural and civilizational destiny. The second biography is that of the state of Pakistan, the largely military-dominated entity that now possesses nuclear weapons, has a hostile relationship with most of its neighbors, and is characterized by weak and uneven economic growth, political chaos, and sectarian violence.

I also try to peek into Pakistan’s future, to ask whether failure is a strong possibility. If so, would Pakistan dissolve slowly or collapse in a sudden cataclysm? Or would it become an outlaw and threat to the entire world, acting as a base for international terrorism and perhaps sharing its nuclear weapons technology with other states and terrorist groups? Can Pakistan become a normal state at peace with its neighbors and itself?

In the ensuing discussion, I return to questions I addressed at length back in 1985.⁷ At that time, I warned that Pakistan could again become its own worst enemy, that highly dangerous futures might be in store, including a repetition of the 1971 catastrophe when Pakistan became the first post–World War II state to break up.⁸ Here, I again ask which policies—economic, political, strategic—pursued *now* might avert the worst outcomes and help steer the country in a direction compatible with its own identity and interests, as well as the key interests of the United States and Pakistan’s important neighbors. A stable, prosperous, progressive Pakistan could trigger a new spurt of South Asian development, in partnership with India and Afghanistan.

Several factors bode well in this regard. Pakistan's economy was once viewed as a success story, and its governments, though often military in nature, have been relatively moderate and have maintained many political freedoms. For most of its history, Pakistan has oscillated between unstable democracy and benign authoritarianism. It has never had a popular revolution, its levels of political violence (except for the Bangladesh interregnum) have been high but not pathological, and it has always had a cohesive and well-educated political elite. This did not translate into a full-fledged democracy, but then Pakistan did not undergo the excesses of neighbors such as China or Iran, nor, despite its Islamic identity, did it veer toward religious authoritarianism. Pakistan does well in many areas and arguably can still emerge as a successful state and cohesive nation.

Hence it is necessary to take a nuanced view of "failure"—a term widely and imprecisely used to describe Pakistan. The term derives from a sparse literature on recent cases in which states were unable to deliver the most fundamental necessities to their citizens.⁹ Most of these entities—Somalia, parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and Afghanistan—were hardly states to begin with and could not withstand the external and internal stresses that stripped away their capacity to provide food, shelter, and security to their citizens. However, surely the term also applies when states are unable to defend against foreign aggression, or, more spectacularly, when they commit genocide against their own citizens? Is it not a failure of the state when its leaders embark upon a ruinous quixotic policy? In short, failure is not a straightforward concept, since even the most advanced and competent states "fail" from time to time, either in relation to their own citizens or as political entities operating in a complex global environment. At least five kinds of failure can be identified:

—*The failure to live up to past expectations, one's own and those of others.* Nations seldom fulfill their high ideals and early promise. Pakistan, created as a haven for Indian Muslims, was to be a stable and prosperous Islamic state. The discrepancy between its early aspirations and contemporary reality is one of the country's more notable features.

—*Failure of vision.* Pakistan's founders expected the *idea* of Pakistan to shape the *state* of Pakistan; instead, a military bureaucracy governs the state and imposes its own vision of a Pakistani nation.

—*Economic failure.* With the loss of the very poor East Wing in 1971, Pakistan expected to gain middle-income status. But the economy did not fire up, and its per capita income today is below that of India.

—*Failure of leadership.* Pakistan has a distinct political and governing class: the “Establishment,” a moderate oligarchy that has presided over many political, economic, and strategic disasters, and whose most promising leaders, notably Benazir Bhutto, have by and large disappointed their ardent supporters, creating further disillusionment with the political process.

—*Catastrophic failure.* Failing states, at one time absorbed by imperial powers or neighbors or placed under international trusteeship, today pose a highly visible and serious problem for the world, complicated by refugees and migrants, televised holocausts, and the internationalization of ethnic conflict. An additional concern in Pakistan’s case is the possible spread of nuclear weapons, missiles, and Islamic radicalism: a catastrophically failed Pakistan would become a matter of grave concern to many states.

Like their neighbors, Pakistanis themselves are concerned about the country’s future.¹⁰ The internal debate intensified after the military again assumed power in 1999. Although some resigned themselves to another spell of military rule, hoping that this time the generals would “fix” the system once and for all, others grew cynical. The coup, they argued, simply represented another failure, adding to the four or five earlier ones.

Yet there is evidence that success and the high expectations of its founding fathers and friends abroad may not altogether elude Pakistan. State *resurrection* is not out of reach, as has been amply demonstrated in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and perhaps most dramatically in Russia—which had failed as the Soviet Union but was able to reinvent itself and take its place as a normal state with reasonable prospects for the future.

In laying out the evidence for this possibility in Pakistan’s case, I begin with a historical overview, followed by a more detailed examination of the evolution of both the idea and the state of Pakistan (chapters 1–2), and then a survey of Pakistan’s major political and social institutions, notably its military, political, Islamist, and regional elites (chapters 3–6). I also ask how they themselves diagnose Pakistan’s assets and liabilities. What are their organizational or ideological imperatives? How do they establish the legitimacy of their own perspectives on Pakistan, and who are their key foreign allies? What policies would they introduce if they were to come to power? Next comes a discussion of some critical demographic,

economic, and educational constraints in Pakistan (chapter 7) and the resulting range of its plausible “futures”(chapter 8). The book closes with some policy options for the United States (chapter 9).

Any study of Pakistan must be careful to see it as it is—not as an evil or blessed twin of India, to which it is often compared—but as a state with its own identity, logic, and future. My approach is to examine the way in which the idea of Pakistan intersects with the hard realities of the state and to determine what this bodes for the future. Pakistan is both interesting and alarming. It could emerge as the pariah of Asia. This is not a welcome prospect, but there are worse: a collapsing Pakistan, spewing out nuclear weapons and Islamic extremists, or even a Pakistan transformed into a truly radical and militant state.

Pakistan: A Short History

Until the arrival of Muslim traders, missionaries, and armies in the late seventh and early eighth centuries, the population of South Asia was primarily Hindu and Buddhist. By A.D. 1100 a number of Indo-Muslim states had been established, and by the sixteenth century the Mughal Empire dominated northern India. The British formally disbanded the empire in 1858, at which time about one-quarter of India’s population were Muslims. They were concentrated in East Bengal, the Northwest Frontier, Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan, with large Muslim minorities in present-day Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.¹¹

India’s Muslims slowly adapted to British rule yet maintained their identity, establishing the Aligarh Muslim University (1875) and the Muslim League (1906). The latter, dominated by wealthy landowners and Muslim professionals, was largely secular in orientation, though a basic concern was the fate of Muslims in a mainly Hindu political order. There was no suggestion of a separate Muslim state until 1930, when the Punjabi poet-politician Mohammed Iqbal raised the idea. Three years later a group of Indian students at Cambridge proposed naming it Pakistan. As the prospects for British withdrawal from South Asia increased, the Muslim League, led by the lawyer-politician Mohammed Ali Jinnah (born December 1876, died September 1948), declared its support for the idea of Pakistan at its 1940 Lahore session; one year later the most powerful of the religious—or Islamist—groups, the Jama’at-i-Islami, was founded.

Following negotiations between the British, the secular but largely Hindu Indian National Congress, and the Muslim League in 1946, the state of Pakistan was born on August 14, 1947, and India gained independence on August 15. Pakistan was carved out of five provinces of British India plus some princely states. Under the new boundaries, the provinces of Bengal and Punjab were partitioned, and millions of people had to move. The eastern part of Bengal, which was overwhelmingly Muslim (but with a 15 percent Hindu minority), became East Pakistan, or the East Wing. It was slightly more populous than West Pakistan (together their population was about a quarter of India's). Western Punjab, including the important princely state of Bahawalpur, became the Pakistani province of Punjab. The eastern area, and a number of ethnically Punjabi princely states, became the Indian state of Punjab. West Pakistan also included Baluchistan, the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), and Sindh.

However, India and Pakistan could not agree on the disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and in October 1948 went to war over it, with former comrades now pitted against each other even though Pakistan's higher military command was still entirely British. A cease-fire brokered by the United Nations in January 1949 left about three-fourths of the state, including the prized Valley, in Indian hands. Since then Kashmir has figured in most India-Pakistan crises, including the 1965 war and the miniwar in Kargil in 1999. Obtaining justice for Muslim Kashmiris living in the Indian-administered parts of the state has been a central goal of Pakistan's foreign and security policy for five decades. Pakistan has tried diplomatic, military, and low-level military pressure on India to hold a plebiscite (as recommended in several UN resolutions) or to negotiate a change in the status quo, all to no avail. A fresh approach, featuring diplomacy rather than coercion, began in January 2004 after a summit meeting between Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, and India's prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee. In a statement issued before the summit, Vajpayee indicated that he wanted to make a third "and last" effort to normalize relations with Pakistan. After some secret diplomacy between the two countries, President Musharraf stated that the UN resolutions on Kashmir might be set aside in the event of progress on a Kashmir settlement. Subsequently, both states began to ease travel and other restrictions, and an Indian cricket team toured Pakistan, to great popular acclaim in both countries. By July 2004 the India-Pakistan dialogue on

nuclear confidence-building measures had resumed, but with little expectation of a breakthrough, or of rapid movement toward a dialogue on more contentious issues, such as Kashmir.

At independence, Jinnah was appointed Pakistan's governor-general, and his close associate, Liaquat Ali Khan, became prime minister, but neither man had deep roots in the new state. Jinnah was from Bombay and Liaquat had spent much of his career in North India. Then both suffered untimely deaths that threw the country into political chaos. Jinnah succumbed to tuberculosis on September 11, 1948, and Liaquat was assassinated at a political rally in Rawalpindi on October 17, 1951. Toward 1954 the Muslim League, whose supporters were in large part migrants from India, went into decline, losing power in both wings. Control fell to a coalition of émigré politicians, bureaucrats, and, eventually, the army. Also in 1954 the four provinces of West Pakistan were combined into a single administrative entity under a "One-Unit" scheme, to balance the more populous East Wing.

It was not until March 23, 1956, that the Constituent Assembly approved the first constitution, which renamed the state the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. A former soldier, Iskander Mirza, became president under the new constitution, which he abrogated two and a half years later, on October 7, 1958. Mirza was himself displaced in a 1958 coup by General Ayub Khan, beginning Pakistan's long experiment with military rule.

Pakistan has had four spells of direct or indirect military rule and several failed coup attempts. The successful coups were by Generals Ayub Khan (1958), Yahya Khan (1969), Zia ul-Haq (1977), and Pervez Musharraf (1999). Each was justified on the grounds of national security, with the army claiming to be Pakistan's ultimate protector, and each of the generals derided the incompetence or corruption of the politicians. Despite these claims and the variety of military governments, none left Pakistan better equipped to face its multiple domestic and foreign challenges. Of the failed coups, usually by low-level officers (the successful ones were led by the army chiefs), the first was the Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951, and the most recent an attempt by an Islamic-minded general and several junior officers in 1995; in 2004 several officers of lower rank were implicated in an assassination attempt on President Musharraf.

After winning 80 percent of the votes in a "yes or no" referendum, Ayub became president on February 17, 1960. He strengthened the

One-Unit scheme by appointing a powerful governor of West Pakistan and introduced a system of “basic democracies” that provided the framework for National Assembly elections in April 1962. Assisted by a tolerant attitude toward private enterprise and considerable foreign aid, Pakistan experienced rapid economic growth during Ayub’s tenure. He also concluded a division of the Indus waters with India in 1960, which secured a reliable flow of water.

Pakistan’s growing foreign ties had been marked by a mutual defense agreement with the United States and entry into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, as well as membership in the Baghdad Pact (later Central Treaty Organization, CENTO) in 1955. However, these counted for little during the full-scale war with India over Kashmir between September 6 and 22, 1965. American interest in the region then faded, and it fell to the Soviet Union to mediate the postwar negotiations between Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. By then Pakistan had developed a close strategic tie with China; this eventually yielded significant military assistance, including missile and nuclear technology and large quantities of technically mediocre aircraft and armor.

The 1965 war contributed to domestic unrest, as did Ayub’s ill health and treatment of the East Wing (which, he remarked, was militarily expendable). On March 26, 1969, the army commander, General Yahya Khan, removed Ayub, imposed martial law, dissolved the national and provincial assemblies, and did away with the One-Unit scheme. When East Pakistan’s Awami League Party won an absolute majority in the new national assembly two years later, Yahya denied its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the prime ministership and instead allowed a military crackdown in East Pakistan. In response, Sheikh Mujibur declared Bangladesh an independent state, and an independent government was formed. Because India had militarily supported the Bangladesh movement, war again broke out between India and Pakistan on December 3, 1971.

Two weeks later, the Pakistan army was defeated in the east (there were few battles in the west), and more than 90,000 Pakistani troops surrendered. East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh, and Pakistan lost over half of its population. China, which had developed a strategic and military tie with Pakistan to maintain a balance with the Soviet Union and India, declined to intervene on Pakistan’s behalf, while the United States did little more than make political and

military gestures, which included the dispatch of a carrier, the *Enterprise*, to the Bay of Bengal.

The loss of East Pakistan not only meant a loss of people but it changed the nature of the state. East Bengal, though Pakistan's poorest region, was home to a more moderate Islam. This region had also contributed an important and diverse Bengali element to Pakistani society and culture. The balance of political power changed too. Punjab became Pakistan's dominant province, being both more populous than Sindh, Baluchistan, or the NWFP and economically far more prosperous, as well as contributing the overwhelming number of officers and soldiers to the ruling military.

Following the loss, Yahya was forced to resign by his fellow officers. They turned to West Pakistan's most charismatic politician, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to assume power in what remained of Pakistan. Bhutto first became chief martial law administrator, then president, and finally, in a new constitutional order, prime minister. The constitution, approved by parliament on April 10, 1973, though subsequently modified, still provides the overall framework for Pakistani governance.

One of Bhutto's first acts was to sign a peace treaty with Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi at Simla in July 1972, and the following year to secure the return of Pakistani prisoners of war captured by India in East Pakistan. At the same time, he ruthlessly suppressed a separatist movement in Baluchistan that was modeled after the East Pakistan breakaway. Bhutto also pursued a policy of "Islamic socialism" attempting to appease both his Islamist critics and his leftist supporters, but his autocratic style of governance (and the army's wariness) led to mass protests over delegitimized parliamentary elections and a coup on July 4, 1977. Subsequently, in a dubious trial, the Lahore High Court convicted Bhutto of conspiracy to commit murder, and he was hanged in Rawalpindi on April 4, 1979.

While in office, Bhutto had begun a Pakistani nuclear weapons program. After he was deposed in 1977 by General Zia ul-Haq, it fell under the army's direct control. Nuclear weapons were seen as a way of countering India's larger army, matching India's suspected nuclear program, and providing an umbrella under which Pakistan might launch low-level probes in the disputed Kashmir region.

General Zia ul-Haq was the first (and so far the only) Pakistani leader truly committed to a program of Islamization. The United States became

Zia's staunchest supporter since Pakistan was the channel for military aid to the Afghan mujahiddin, then engaging the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.¹² The Zia years saw the acceleration of the nuclear program, growing Islamization in the armed forces and Pakistani society at large, and a decline in spending on health, education, and social services. Under American pressure, Zia did allow nonparty elections in February 1985 and lifted martial law in the last week of that year; but he dismissed his own prime minister (Mohammad Khan Junejo) in May 1988 when the latter showed some sign of independence on foreign policy issues. After Zia died in a still-unexplained plane crash on August 17, 1988, both the press and Pakistan's political parties showed an impressive regenerative capacity, and Pakistan embarked on a ten-year experiment with democracy.

This experiment featured two prominent politicians, Benazir Bhutto (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's intelligent, Western-educated daughter) and Nawaz Sharif, a member of a Punjabi business family that Zia had brought into politics. Benazir had assumed the leadership of the left-centrist Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the country's only true national party, and Nawaz headed the reborn Pakistan Muslim League, a somewhat more conservative group. Benazir and Nawaz each served as prime minister for two terms—Benazir from December 1988 to August 1990 and October 1993 to November 1996, and Nawaz from November 1990 to July 1993 and February 1997 to October 1999.

For the most part, freedom was protected, other parties were allowed to function normally, and it appeared that Pakistan had evolved into a two-party democracy. However, the army, conservative members of Pakistan's powerful Establishment, the intelligence services, and the former bureaucrat Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who had succeeded Zia as president, could not resist the temptation to interfere behind the scenes. Neither Benazir nor Nawaz served a full term—both were dismissed by the president (often with the connivance of the army), and the election process was manipulated by the internal wing of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) and other intelligence services. Benazir and Nawaz provided the excuse for their own dismissals as both engaged in or tolerated a degree of corruption. Furthermore, Nawaz showed signs of deep insecurity by interfering with the operations of Pakistan's judiciary and indulging in other abuses of power. The army also suspected the two of being "soft" on India and the Kashmir problem. Under their governments,

Pakistan's Varied Islam

Islam is divided into two major sects, Sunni and Shi'ia. Pakistan mirrors the global percentage of each: of the total number of Muslims, about 85 percent are Sunni and 12 percent are Shi'ia. Shiism is anchored in Iran, an almost totally Shi'ia state. The sects differ over the legitimate successor to the Prophet and are organized along different lines. By analogy, Sunnis resemble Protestants in that they believe they have a direct spiritual linkage to God; Shi'ia tend to be more formally organized, like the Catholic Church, and the clergy (many of whom trace their theological roots back to Iran and Iraq) are hierarchically structured. Sunni and Shi'ia have separate mosques in Pakistan, although in some cases—notably in the army—they pray together in a syncretic Islamic service.

Pakistan is also home to a number of other Islamic sects, including the Ismailis, the followers of the Aga Khan. The Ismailis reside in some of the urban areas, primarily Karachi, and in the far northern mountainous region; they have contributed to Pakistan's medical and charitable institutions, mostly through the renowned Aga Khan Foundation. There is no theological opposition to them, as there was to another sect, the Ahmediyyas, founded in the Punjabi town of Qadian in 1889. Its followers were declared non-Muslims by Pakistan's parliament in 1974, a move supported by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. They were subsequently threatened with death if they passed themselves off as Muslims, prayed in a mosque, or uttered the basic declaration of faith, the *Kalima*. While these four are the main formal sects, most Pakistanis in rural areas remain vague about their Islam, and their religion is strongly intermixed with folk practices, Sufi beliefs, and even Hinduism and Buddhism.

sectarian violence also increased, especially in Karachi and Lahore, with Sunni and Shi'ia murder squads targeting doctors and other elites.

During the democratic interregnum, as in previous decades, the army remained the true power in Pakistan, coming to the forefront again in October 1999 when Nawaz's army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, dismissed the civilian government and assumed power as "chief executive." Musharraf accused Nawaz of attempted murder after the former's aircraft was diverted on a return flight from abroad. The murder charge was dropped, but Nawaz and his immediate family were exiled to Saudi Arabia; Benazir also resides outside Pakistan, while her husband remains imprisoned back home, awaiting trial for corruption.

After a farcical national referendum in May 2001, Musharraf declared himself president on June 20, 2001. Pakistan's intelligence services were active in the subsequent October 2002 election, preventing both the PML and the PPP from effectively organizing themselves. This enabled a coalition of Islamic parties to come to power in the Northwest Frontier Province and share power in Baluchistan. A kind of parliamentary government exists in Pakistan today, with Musharraf as president, choosing and dismissing prime ministers as he sees fit—first selecting a pliable Baluch politician, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, and then forcing him to resign eighteen months later, in June 2004, to be replaced by the minister of finance, Shaukat Aziz, a former Citibank official. It remains to be seen whether Aziz's technocratic credentials are sufficient for him to tackle Pakistan's sectarian and ethnic conflicts and still retain the confidence of the army.

Since 1999 Musharraf has, with Shaukat Aziz's expert guidance, succeeded to some extent in repairing the economic damage from ten years of free-spending governments. There has been some progress in the form of modest growth and an increase in available foreign exchange, but Pakistan remains an unattractive place for investment. Despite the rise of sectarian violence and the better performance of the Islamic and religious parties, there is no "green wave" washing over Pakistan; most of its citizens remain devout Muslims but are not attracted to Islamic extremism. Yet, given the increase in poverty, the still faltering economy, the lack of a real political process, and Pakistan's continuing conflicts with its neighbors—notably Afghanistan and India—few Pakistanis are optimistic about the future. Musharraf's version of military rule was far more tolerant than that of Zia, but as with previous military regimes, the army appears unable to govern Pakistan itself but will not allow anyone else the opportunity to do so either.

Furthermore, Pakistan's repeated conflicts with India continue to alarm the international community. Since 1987 there have been three major near-war crises (in 1987, 1990, and 2002) and one miniwar (in the Kargil region of Kashmir in 1999). All but the first involved two nuclear weapons states. These crises alternate with periods of détente and seeming cordiality, hence the complexity of India-Pakistan relations and the dual role played by the army in Pakistan—with one face turned inward and enforcing its version of political order and stability, the other turned

toward India (and to a lesser degree, Afghanistan) and the threats lying there. Even the army is aware of India's growing strategic and economic power and Pakistan's relative decline, which may have prompted the decision to soften Pakistan's position on Kashmir in late 2003. This, plus cooperation with the United States in rounding up al Qaeda and Taliban remnants, led to a series of assassination attempts against President Musharraf, who in the waning days of 2003 pledged to give up his army post by the end of 2004, seek parliamentary legitimacy as president, and serve at least one full term in that office, through 2007. As I discuss more fully in chapter 8, Musharraf's declared course suggests one plausible future for Pakistan, but there are other, less benign ones.