Introduction

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Fundamental to the American Dream is somewhere to call home—a safe and welcoming “anchor place” where families are raised and memories are formed. Furthermore, housing must be viewed in the context of the community in which it is located. Improvements in housing need to be linked to improvements in schools, community safety, transportation and job access.


“Community” . . . means homogeneity of race, class and, especially, home values.

—Mike Davis, City of Quartz

This is a book about closing the gap between the nation that we are becoming and the nation that we have, thus far, known how to be. By any measure, the United States is fast becoming the most racially and ethnically diverse society in history. During the 1990s, four of five new additions to the population—and two of three to the labor force—were people of color, and most big cities in America became “majority minority” for the first time in history. One-third of all population growth in the 1990s resulted from immigration—80 per-
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percent of it from Asia, Africa, Latin America, or the Caribbean.¹ And these trends are projected to continue in the decades ahead.

Nowhere are the opportunities and challenges posed by increased social diversity more significant than in metropolitan areas—the cities and suburbs where eight in ten Americans now live. As a nation, we have a long history of ambivalence toward diversity in our midst, and as Mike Davis underscores bluntly above, this ambivalence is not limited to foreign-born immigrants.

Together, these facts pose a distinctly metropolitan dilemma, and that dilemma is the focus of this book: How should America’s cities and suburbs respond to dramatically increased racial and ethnic diversity given a history of inequality and the persistence of segregated communities? More specifically, how can we ensure opportunity and security for all given persistent patterns of segregation by race and class—patterns complicated by the unsustainable growth machine that we have come to know as “sprawl”? Compared with their counterparts in European and other wealthy regions, America’s metropolitan areas are both very sprawling and very segregated by race and class, a dual pattern that creates what scholars have termed an uneven “geography of opportunity.”² Understanding and changing that geography is crucial if America is to improve outcomes in education, employment, safety, health, and other vital areas over the next generation. I begin with a look at why this imperative is so invisible in the nation’s public life.

The Missing Diversity Issue

Not all issues tied to social diversity receive equal billing in America. Affirmative action in education and the job market are understandably visible and controversial, given persistent racial inequality, a retrenchment in spending on social problems over the past three decades, and the nation’s ambivalence about civil rights and race-based policy.³ In the case of education, attention follows controversy and specific, high-stakes policy decisions. The high-profile Supreme Court decisions upholding certain minority preferences in university admissions brought renewed public inquiry and debate, as did the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the landmark case that nullified official segregation by race in the nation’s public schools. Whatever one’s politics, attention is sorely needed—both to what diversity means in America, given our past and present, and to how the nation should respond to increased diversity and persistent racial inequality in ways that are consistent with its core values. Access to

² Briggs (2003); Galster and Killen (1995); Ihlanfeldt (1999); Pastor (2001); Squires (2002).
jobs and educational opportunity is undeniably crucial, although specific policies to ensure fair and equitable access are often tricky to implement.4

Compare those high-profile challenges to a much less visible—and arguably more intractable—challenge, one inextricably linked to education and economic opportunity: the challenge to ensure that people of all backgrounds enjoy access to housing in communities that serve as steppingstones to opportunity, political influence, and broader social horizons rather than as isolated and isolating traps with second-class support systems.5 This more invisible challenge defines the still-missing agenda for social equity in America, and it is not limited to an agenda for the inner-city “ghetto” neighborhoods that still absorb the media. A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that racial segregation is not merely correlated with unequal social and economic outcomes but also specifically contributes to worsening inequality in metropolitan areas, which drive the nation’s and the world’s economy.6 Moreover, the evidence debunks a central myth in American public and private life—that members of racial and ethnic minority groups who gain higher skills and incomes eliminate any barriers to housing choice, escaping the narrow geography of opportunity that confronted so many of their parents. As Sheryll Cashin argues provocatively in her recent book *The Failures of Integration*, the challenge to make communities of opportunity widely accessible is no less urgent because some members of racial minority groups express “integration fatigue” or seek what Camille Charles describes, in chapter 3, as a racial comfort zone.7

As I outline below, two recent trends in American public life make it urgent to rethink these issues. First, the geography of race and class represents a crucial litmus test for the new “regionalism”—the political movement to address the linked fortunes of cities and suburbs with regional, or jurisdiction-spanning, solutions. Driven in part by growing concerns about the high social and economic costs of sprawl—the dominant pattern of U.S. metropolitan development—regionalism has gained considerable momentum since the early 1990s. Regionalism has variously emphasized economic competitiveness, environmental sustainability, social equity, and other issues, sometimes under the banner of “smart growth,” or growth management, to curb sprawl.

The second major trend is the disappearance of housing policy as a public issue over the past two decades—that is, besides discussion of interest rates, taxation, and other economic policies that affect the housing costs and assets of mostly middle- and upper-income households. Housing is all but invisible as a

social policy issue, and this is particularly problematic in light of the nation’s growing diversity and sharp economic inequality.

More Pluribus: Now What?

A flurry of reports and headlines, many of them based on 2000 census data, highlight important, ongoing changes in who we are as a nation and how we live. The reality of unprecedented racial and ethnic change, driven by immigration, is lost on few people in America. But too often the “So what?” and “Now what?” of that change receive only fleeting or sensationalized attention. The difficult tasks now are to understand what is driving the social and economic changes we will face as a far more diverse society, to examine the implications of those changes for economic opportunity and growth, to consider needed responses (public policy and private action) in light of the hard-won lessons of the past, and to build constituencies that will give those responses a chance.

To address those tasks, this project began with a dialogue among the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, which focuses on bringing academic research to bear on public policy and practice on behalf of racial justice, and two collaborating institutions known for public policy research: the Brookings Institution’s Metropolitan Policy Program (focused on the changing fortunes of cities and suburbs) and Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies (focused on housing markets). At the outset, we were struck by the dearth of well-developed research in several areas:

—The forces driving economic and racial segregation in housing patterns in increasingly diverse metropolitan areas.

—The role of growth management, a magnet for activism and reform, given the concerns about unhealthy sprawl, in shaping racial equity and housing opportunity.

—And the politics and effectiveness of efforts to reduce geographic barriers to racial justice and more equitable opportunity.

There is a large literature on the role of race in housing, to be sure, but rarely is the issue considered in the context of metropolitan politics and reform proposals. It is the multiple dimensions of this challenge—how to create access to communities of opportunity by expanding housing choices—that define the focus of this volume.

The volume addresses four main questions:

—What forces limit choice in housing and community location, defining an uneven geography of opportunity by race and class?

—Why is that uneven geography important? That is, what are its consequences for the social and economic prospects of people in America’s cities and suburbs?
—What special barriers to housing opportunity confront low-income families, including the minority poor?
—What are the lessons, for politics and policy, of efforts made to expand housing choices and thereby change the geography of opportunity?

As noted above, the risks posed by the uneven geography of opportunity, not to mention the challenges associated with changing it, are all but invisible on the public agenda as well as in the nation’s intellectual life. When social equity issues in housing receive attention at all, it is the affordability crisis, not the geography of exclusion, that attracts attention. In her best-selling *Nickel and Dimed*, for example, journalist Barbara Ehrenreich vividly captures the near impossibility of juggling dead-end jobs and high-cost, often unfit housing. The 2000 census indicates that some 28 million American families pay exorbitant costs for housing, according to federal standards of affordability. The cost gap widened sharply during the 1990s, as housing markets tightened in many cities and the stock of affordable housing continued its long-run disappearing act. Federal subsidies for low- and moderate-income families fell so sharply and abruptly following the second session of Congress in 1996 that journalist Jason DeParle labeled it “the year that housing died.” America’s faith that the private market, unaided by government, would meet all housing needs had evidently reached a new (and costly) pinnacle. As DeParle observed: “Housing problems are far more central to the lives of the poor than a number of issues—immunizations, school lunches—that have made recent headlines. The cost of shelter breaks the budgets of low-income Americans, crowds them into violent ghettos, far from good jobs and schools—or both.”

High costs are understandably more visible, but location, as DeParle hints and every realtor knows, helps define the real value of one’s housing. What is more, race and location together make housing rather unique among public policy issues in America. Whereas most issues primarily engender debate about who (the policy target group), what (the design of public subsidy programs or regulation), and how much (public generosity relative to private obligation), housing is also, unavoidably, about where. To underscore this point, the important spatial dimensions of health and school access issues—primary care availability in low-income neighborhoods, school choice, and so forth—largely reflect segregated housing patterns.

Housing policymaking and the delivery of housing are fraught with territorial debates and the politics of place, since the attractiveness of places has, over the nation’s history, been closely identified in the public mind with the race and

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class traits of the people who live in those places. The American dilemma related to increased racial and ethnic diversity therefore confronts a sobering legacy, and that dilemma has assumed a distinctively metropolitan character.

As John Goering notes in chapter 6 of this volume, in the late 1960s the U.S. government declared the racial and economic segregation of America’s cities and suburbs an urgent national problem. On that challenge, it was thought, rested many of the country’s hopes for closing gaps in education, jobs, health, safety, and other aspects of opportunity and well-being, as well as the gaps in understanding and trust that polarize our politics along class and race lines. As Ed Goetz and others note in chapter 11, by the early 1970s a number of states and localities pursued inclusionary and “fair share” housing policies, and some created options for overriding exclusionary land use decisions at the local level—”anti-snob zoning,” for example.

But after thirty years of modest experimenting with wider housing choice, it appears that the nation primarily lacks the will, not the way, to reduce persistent segregation by race and class. Outside of a handful of progressive, self-consciously integrated neighborhoods and small cities, racial segregation has, as a public concern, receded into memory, the stuff of civil rights lore and the integrationist aims of a bygone era. Those aims are familiar to many advocates and academics and certainly to a small and struggling “fair housing” field, but while opinion polls show greater tolerance of racial diversity in neighborhoods, the explicit aim of reducing segregation by race is not widely supported beyond that base of specialists. For most Americans, in fact, the racial desegregation agenda is old news, because the problem, they believe, has long been solved: Fighting discrimination in the private housing market is thought to be government’s only obligation, and as we will see, the public wrongly assumes that such discrimination is rare. Moreover, as I highlight in the next chapter, there have been significant declines in key measures of racial segregation. So perhaps, claim observers, the problem is resolving itself.

As for segregation by income level or social class, the prevailing public view is

10. For a concise overview of this history, and a review and update of fair share housing allocation, regional housing assessments, inclusionary zoning, and other policy and planning tools, see Meck, Retzlaff, and Schwab (2003).
11. In this chapter, I use race as shorthand to indicate identities defined, officially, by race and ethnicity. For example, black and white refer to members of those racial groups who do not identify as having Hispanic ethnic origins. Hispanic, meanwhile, is an ethnic group identifier inclusive of any race with which the members of that group identify. These distinctions are not canonical or universally accepted, as observers have noted for decades, and the creation of an official multiracial identification option in the 2000 census only adds to the complexity of distinguishing people in America on the basis of race. On trends in identity and self-identification over time, see Perlmann and Waters (2002); Bean and Stevens (2003); Alba and Nee (2003). On the history and politics of racial categories in the United States, including census practice, see Nobles (2000).
even more straightforward and less encumbered by a sense of public obligation: Surely people should be able to live wherever they can afford to live, among whomever they want? Segregation produces largely homogeneous communities, and certain kinds of homogeneity, as Mike Davis implies in the quotation above, are thought to provide a kind of insurance on property wealth, as well as the next generation’s school and career prospects.

The shift away from inclusionary aims in the nation’s mood and politics has been widely documented and discussed, as have the huge disparities produced by a generation of economic and social change in America. Since the 1960s, on the whole, the picture has become starker: Cities lost jobs (and even in the 1990s gained fewer than the suburbs), poverty became significantly more concentrated geographically, and middle-class votes and political power likewise left the cities and older suburbs, where minorities remain disproportionately concentrated. With the exception of a few measures, racial disparities in education, health, earnings, and wealth either persisted or widened in the 1980s and 1990s. In general, whites fared best, Asian Americans bifurcated into successful and unsuccessful subgroups, and median outcomes for blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans were poorest.

What is more, the stakes associated with geographic disparities by race rose considerably. Whether measured by median family income, poverty rate, unemployment, or other indicators, the gap between cities and suburbs widened dramatically in the post–World War II period, and the gaps among suburbs—particularly between affluent bedroom suburbs and mixed-income, more racially diverse suburban communities—have recently widened as well. School failure is, if anything, more closely tied to segregation by race and class than it was thirty years ago, because millions of families with the best housing choices have exited diverse central cities for more homogeneous suburban school districts. The mismatch between where many groups of job seekers live and where jobs are growing is greater than it was then, in part because of the increasingly decentralized pattern that economists call job sprawl. And newer threats—the crack cocaine epidemic, AIDS risk tied to intravenous drug use by addicts concentrated in high-poverty areas, and the long-run stressors, or “weathering,” associated with living in high-risk, high-crime environments—reinforce the links among place of residence, physical and mental health, and life prospects. These links appear to be much sharper in the United States than in other wealthy nations, a fact that reflects this nation’s sprawling local growth patterns, its history of race relations,

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15. Ellen (1999); Ihlafeldt (1999); Orfield (2002).
the laissez-faire character of its local job markets, and the form and functions of its social safety net. Other inequities include environmental injustices, such as the disproportionate concentration of hazardous facilities, and their awful spillover effects, in low-income and minority communities. 17

Although poverty became somewhat less concentrated in urban ghettos and racial minorities less city bound in the 1990s, it is not as though access to opportunity is now ensured for the nation’s increasingly diverse population. Since tools for regulating land development at the local level were developed in the United States a century ago, diversity of race and class has been contained, ensuring that disadvantage is concentrated in particular places. 18 In the 1990s, as the population became more diverse, it was not the fact of containment that changed significantly but the shape of the “container,” which morphed to include many at-risk suburbs, not just central cities. Because of the way communities develop physically in America—the way they sprawl and also tend to exclude lower-status people—the missing agenda for social equity turns out to hinge in part on a fledgling movement to create the safe, economically competitive, physically healthy, and environmentally sustainable development—“smarter” community growth—that would benefit people of all backgrounds. 19

A key question is whether growth can be made more socially equitable as well. The movement for more sustainable patterns of community growth gained considerable momentum in the 1990s, but its success will depend to a great extent on the ability of leaders inside and outside government to recognize windows of opportunity, offer novel frames that change the face of divisive issues, and forge innovative coalitions. 20 Those political factors, in turn, will reflect how we think and talk about race, privilege, and opportunity in America.

Segregation Debates Old and New

Whereas advocacy and scholarship often emphasize the goal of stable racial integration at the neighborhood level, 21 the real priority is creating access for all, regardless of race and class, to communities of opportunity—whether neighborhoods or entire municipalities—with good schools, public services, and economic prospects. There are several reasons to redefine the challenge in this way. First, while it would be naïve to ignore the strong association, for a century now, between racial segregation (specifically) and economic inequality, in an increasingly diverse nation, racial integration per se is far too rough a proxy for real

17. See Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998); Ellen, Mijanovich, and Dillman (2001); Briggs (2003); Pastor (2001).
access to opportunity. For more and more families in America, “making it” to the suburbs and a somewhat integrated neighborhood no longer ensures access to the schools, workplaces, valuable social networks, and other institutions that shape opportunity so powerfully.

Second, wider class segregation within racial groups over the past thirty years—what Robert Reich famously calls “the secession of the successful”—also makes racial integration a less and less reliable proxy for expanded opportunity.22

Third, neighborhood-level integration is often not a realistic hope, at least not in the short term, with rapid immigration and consumers’ housing preferences pushing hard in the direction of ethnic enclaves. Add to that the reality that not all segregation is bad: Immigrant ethnic enclaves, for example, help millions of families find their footing and get ahead in America, while enclaves of native-born minorities can likewise be viable if public and private investment remain strong.

Fourth, as Camille Charles explores in chapter 3, support for racial integration per se is waning among minorities even as the attitudes reported by whites reflect greater tolerance.23 But the desire for better schools, safer streets, and more economically viable communities remains strong and universal.

Fifth and finally, the scale of demographic change that the nation faces and the stakes involved in local decisions about how communities accommodate growth together suggest an opportunity to make social equity a part of the conversation about managing growth. Equity includes access to affordable housing regardless of race or ethnic background. While it is not clear that neighborhood racial integration is the most promising banner behind which to promote this goal, communities that exclude low- and moderate-income housing through various limits on development do tend to be less racially diverse, contributing to a segregated society.24 These places have removed—or long neglected to build—entry points for a wide range of families.

Admittedly, the direct link between greater social equity—including racial equity—and more sustainable patterns of local development is easier to make in seminar than in the real world of politics and policymaking. Some advocates contend that denser, more transit-oriented patterns of metropolitan development, together with increased investment in cities and older suburbs, will attract whites to older areas and improve minorities’ access to suburban jobs. But the growing interest in curbing sprawl has not thus far had a significant impact on the mechanisms that fragment metropolitan areas politically or segregate them

23. See also Bobo (2001).
24. The strongest link between local land use controls and racial diversity appears to work through rental housing: Over time, restricting rental development is strongly associated with having a smaller black and Hispanic population. See Pendall (2000); Pendall and others, chapter 10, this volume.
along race and class lines. Efforts to manage unplanned growth could actually make segregation worse, not better, as Rolf Pendall and his coauthors explain in chapter 10. And some aspects of decentralized or sprawling development appear to benefit people of color by enhancing access to low-cost housing—for example, entry-level homes where suburban land is cheap.25 Also, sprawling, fast-growing “elastic” cities, most of them in the Sun Belt, do not reflect the entrenched patterns of segregation that mark former industrial cities in the Rust Belt. For the most part, places that had lower levels of segregation at the beginning of the 1990s saw the largest reductions in segregation over the decade.26

Careful observers and practitioners of “metropolitics” differ considerably over how to forge the coalitions needed to create the changes an equitable development agenda might require. Should cities and older suburbs organize at the state government level around their shared fiscal interests? Should advocates lead with race or consciously avoid traditional civil rights strategies and other race-based approaches? Should leaders build support for the common-fortunes principle known as regionalism, a powerful but rather abstract idea? Or should specific, linked problems be chosen—such as shortages of affordable housing, transportation inequities, and limited access to jobs—that a “big tent” of political interests might care about? This book will not resolve those important questions, but we hope to illuminate them in significant ways.

Plan and Perspective of the Book

At the core of this book is a concern for helping communities handle increased racial and ethnic diversity in ways that deliver on the promise of equal opportunity. Our focus is on the geography of housing choice—where people live in urban and suburban America, who their neighbors are, and how those patterns affect their opportunities in education, the job market, health, and other important domains. The authors have no single view on these challenges, emphasizing distinct tasks within the larger project of accommodating unprecedented diversity. What is more, they do not hold to any party line on how public policy should handle race, the legacy of the past, or the issue of defining and ensuring access to opportunity. Some contributors argue for universal policies to ensure that affordable housing can be found across a wider geography, overcoming long-standing barriers of race and class, while others stress the need for more targeted, group-specific strategies. But the contributors share a set of values and broad political perspectives that should be stated at the outset—that effective public policy must address the failures of the market to deliver meaningful choice regardless of race, that the nation bears a special responsibility for those

who have faced historical disadvantages, and that tackling the uneven geography of opportunity is crucial to the future of the American experiment as a whole and, in particular, to the promise of equal opportunity.

The next chapter provides a critical look at what drives metropolitan growth patterns in America, at the changing geography of race and opportunity associated with those growth patterns, and at the social and economic consequences of that geography. I focus primarily on changes in racial segregation: The number of exclusively white communities has declined significantly in recent decades, for example, yet many integrating communities are in “at-risk” suburbs, with the crime, school failure, and other problems more typical of central cities. I then consider the best available evidence on the consequences of segregated housing patterns for access to good schools and job opportunities, noting the growing body of evidence on health impacts as well.

The chapters in part 1, “Housing Choice, Racial Attitudes, and Discrimination,” consider the major forces that shape housing choice in America, including racial attitudes and avoidance patterns, discrimination in the housing market, and the shifting behavior of financial institutions. In chapter 3, Camille Charles shows how changing racial attitudes and neighborhood preferences help determine the make-up of the communities in which people of various backgrounds live. She offers compelling evidence that race per se, not merely race-related class prejudices, powerfully shape consumer views on which neighbors and neighborhoods are desirable. Moreover, there is a troubling hierarchy—a racial totem pole of preferred neighbors—that puts whites on top and blacks on the bottom of the preferences of both whites and minorities, including fast-growing immigrant groups. In chapter 4, Margery Austin Turner and Stephen L. Ross show how persistent patterns of racial discrimination—unequal terms of sale or rent, “steering” by real estate agents, and other tactics—shape the housing search for people of various racial backgrounds. The authors suggest ways that civil rights enforcement and education efforts should respond as discrimination becomes more subtle and thus more difficult to detect and punish. In chapter 5, William Apgar and Allegra Calder examine massive shifts in America’s capital markets, including the rise of subprime and “predatory” mortgage lending, which heavily targets minority communities and threatens hard-won gains in minority homeownership and wealth creation. The authors outline what should be done to promote more equitable access to capital and to protect family assets, regardless of race.

Part 2, “Housing Opportunity for Low-Income Families”: Programs meant to help low- and moderate-income families, many of them racial minorities, have too often exacerbated geographic barriers to opportunity, for example, by concentrating poor families in dangerous buildings and distressed neighborhoods. In chapter 6, John Goering, reviewing the history and scholarly evaluation of the federal Moving to Opportunity experiment, explores the promise of reforming
such programs. He focuses in particular on what can be learned from efforts to deconcentrate poverty by helping families to leave ghetto neighborhoods. In chapter 7, James Rosenbaum, Stefanie DeLuca, and Tammy Tuck examine the social consequences of the most famous of these housing mobility programs—Chicago’s court-ordered Gautreaux program, which helped thousands of very low-income, mostly black families leave high-poverty public housing for private apartments in the city and suburbs of Chicago. Focusing on Gautreaux’s suburban movers and how they adapted to mostly white, middle-income communities, Rosenbaum and his coauthors suggest that movers’ norms and capabilities can change dramatically in the context of a safer and more supportive community, notwithstanding the race and class differences between the in-movers and their suburban neighbors.

Susan Popkin and Mary Cunningham provide crucial evidence in chapter 8 on one of the most important shifts in U.S. housing policy in the past generation—the move to demolish much-maligned public housing projects. Focusing on Chicago, where all of the city’s high-rise projects are being removed under an unprecedented transformation plan, Popkin and Cunningham warn of families that face homelessness, continued segregation by race and income, and other challenges when they leave the projects without adequate support. Addressing the intersection of law and program implementation, in chapter 9, veteran civil rights attorney Philip Tegeler examines the long-standing neglect of desegregation incentives in federal housing and community development programs and presents promising ideas for reform.

Part 3, “Metropolitan Development and Policy Coalitions”: If the uneven geography of opportunity poses an essentially metropolitan dilemma in a changing nation, what key policy decisions and political forces will define the solutions? Since state and local land use policy, in particular, has so often been an instrument of exclusion, in chapter 10, Rolf Pendall, Arthur Nelson, Casey Dawkins, and Gerrit Knaap critically examine prospects for joining the goals of smarter growth, affordable housing, and racial equity. In chapter 11, Edward Goetz, Karen Chapple, and Barbara Lukermann discuss the rise and fall of an innovative commitment to creating a “fair share” of affordable housing throughout one major metropolitan area, the Twin Cities region. Because the region is often touted as a pacesetter in the movement for regional problem solving and because it became significantly more diverse, in terms of both race and income, in the 1980s and 1990s, the authors’ findings are sobering: Fair share housing persists mainly in name, and the unraveling of this important public policy reflects the loss of both the financial and the political capital that metropolitan areas will need as they absorb much of the nation’s increased diversity. Finally, in chapter 12, Mara Sidney analyzes the dual—and too often schizophrenic—agenda for expanding housing opportunity, showing how local advocates for fair housing (regardless of race) and affordable housing (for people with low or
moderate income) either seize or miss opportunities to forge effective coalitions. She focuses on how state and local contexts affect the impact of federal policies on the issue framing public education, civil rights enforcement, and other strategies that housing advocates employ.

Part 4, “Conclusions”: In chapter 13, Angela Glover Blackwell and Judith Bell, drawing on their experience at the leading edge of the movement for “equitable development,” examine specific cases of applying that paradigm to state and local policymaking. Blackwell and Bell also outline a vision of leadership development that embraces and capitalizes on the nation’s growing racial and ethnic diversity. In chapter 14, I conclude the book with an assessment of the politics of race and opportunity that define the housing issue and an outline of the range of public policies and private choices that will be needed to change the geography of opportunity. I emphasize the importance of distinguishing policies that expand one’s housing choices from those that protect one’s ability to exercise the choices available or that specifically encourage one to make better, more informed choices. I also highlight the folly of continuing more limited, piecemeal efforts, including a narrow approach to enforcing civil rights.

Rethinking Priorities

I argue above that the segregation of neighborhoods and entire jurisdictions by race and class is largely invisible, both on the public agenda and in the nation’s intellectual life. To focus on the latter for a moment, in recent years some of the nation’s most respected thinkers have urged a focus on the single issue (or two) that provides the greatest leverage to address increased economic inequality in the United States. Educational achievement is one such favorite.27 Clearly, educational success is so important to earnings and wealth—and those so important to every other indicator of well-being—that the educational achievement gap dividing racial groups and income levels is a linchpin of inequality, one worthy of a much greater investment of energy and resources by our society. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with setting policy priorities, particularly when fiscal times are tough and citizens’ faith in government and engagement in public affairs are at record lows. But the lack of attention to persistently high segregation is dangerous in at least two respects. First, it ignores the huge contribution that segregated living makes to inequality in education, employment, health, and other areas. Second, it presumes that gains in economic success will be mirrored in more integrated living patterns over time—a link for which the evidence is mixed at best. Addressing both points, the next chapter considers how our communities acquired their current shape and just how quickly and dramatically they are changing in demographic and spatial terms.

References


The longer America takes to achieve full racial inclusion and participation, the more complex the task becomes. What was once the province of civil rights activists seeking removal of explicit racial barriers to housing, education, and jobs has become a twenty-first-century conundrum for metropolitan planning and development: how to create economically viable, livable, sustainable regions. Among other things, the strategy that accomplishes this will have to rebuild and reclaim the vibrancy of the urban core and address the geographic dimensions of racial exclusion.

Our organization, PolicyLink, has been in the forefront of an emerging movement called equitable development—anchored by the fair distribution of affordable and racially inclusionary housing. In this chapter, we provide an overview that movement, outline its core strategies, and connect efforts in the field—many of them still unfolding—to the timely studies found in this volume. We conclude with a focus on developing the leadership that this all-important work will require.

Why Equitable Development

Even as people of color gained rights, sprawling, poorly planned development patterns drew resources out of the urban core communities where African Americans and recent immigrants were increasingly being concentrated. Now,
regions, fueled by the decentralization of urban growth, have emerged as the dominant economic and demographic units, rather than cities. Economic clusters extend beyond, or completely outside of, long-established city business centers. Transit systems cut across neighborhoods and towns with an emphasis on linking suburban workers to jobs. And new census analyses show that, over the last decade, many older suburbs experienced a growth in minority residents and in poverty and a loss of white and higher-income residents, suggesting new challenges for these communities and a continuation of the sprawling pattern.

As this volume reminds us, the emerging regional economies have ushered in new barriers to opportunity, particularly for low-income people of color. Inner-city public schools have deteriorated as suburban migration draws tax revenue and political clout away from the urban core. The lack of affordable housing in surrounding neighborhoods with higher-performing schools further isolates low-income city residents from quality public education. Finding housing near new job opportunities has been difficult for people of color, since job growth has frequently been focused in outlying communities with little, if any, rental housing and with restrictive land use policies requiring large lot sizes and other exclusionary zoning practices, along with a host of other not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY)-oriented policies and practices. The Millennial Housing Commission’s report notes that “restrictive zoning practices” and the “adoption of local regulations that discourage housing development” are key elements to the spatial mismatch between job growth and job seekers’ places of residence.1

In the regional economy, housing is the linchpin to quality of life: access to high-quality schools, jobs, services, and recreation. Increasing the supply of affordable housing is essential to improving housing opportunity, but achieving racial equity will require more. To reach equity goals, affordable units must be spread across the region. Planning for these units must accomplish the following:
—Anticipate the dislocation that accompanies gentrification as well as the white and middle-class flight that often follows the entry of low-income people of color, particularly African Americans;
—Coordinate with regional transportation services;
—Focus on workforce development and circumvent a jobs-housing mismatch; and
—Incorporate asset- and wealth-building strategies.

In short, planning must address all of the race-filled challenges of metropolitan development.

Advocates for racial economic and social equity have begun to understand this new regional paradigm and to grapple with the opportunities and challenges that it presents. New relationships and partnerships are being sought and built, and coalitions are emerging to develop strategies to achieve equity in the

local and regional context. In November 2002, PolicyLink collaborated with the Funders’ Network for Smart Growth and Livable Communities to host a meeting on promoting regional equity. The original plans were to attract 250 participants; the overwhelming response, however, forced us to close registration at 650. As a result of generous contributions for scholarships, particularly by the Ford Foundation, and attention to racial and geographic diversity, over half the participants were people of color and thirty-five states were represented. An array of policy issues was explored during in-depth strategic discussions, which highlighted and dissected specific experiences and specific places. The need for affordable housing as a key part of local, regional, state, and federal agendas was clear, as was the need for comprehensive approaches.

The newly emerging equitable development paradigm aims to ensure that low-income people and communities of color benefit from local and regional economic activity by requiring that housing development and distribution are seen as the centerpiece of geographic and racial fairness. Further, it collectively targets transportation, asset and workforce development, and public and private investment policies and practices.

Equitable development is also relevant in a variety of community contexts, ranging from weak urban markets with neighborhoods suffering from years of severe disinvestment to economically vibrant regions surrounding vital urban centers with “hot” housing markets that fuel gentrification in once-neglected neighborhoods. This agenda has currency whether the goal is reducing concentrated poverty, avoiding displacement of existing residents in revitalizing communities, or promoting mixed-income, mixed-race neighborhoods across the region. This comprehensive approach is guided by the following goals:

—To integrate people-focused and place-focused strategies. Community and regional development and revitalization policies and practices must integrate people-focused strategies—efforts that support low-income community residents and families—with place-focused strategies—those that stabilize and improve housing, commercial establishments, and environments.

—To reduce local and regional disparities. One’s home address should not be the determinant of one’s life chances. The services, amenities, and opportunities that are essential for healthy, livable communities should be accessible to all neighborhoods. Though some trade-offs will exist in the near term, win-win solutions must be crafted that simultaneously improve conditions in low-income communities of color and build healthy metropolitan regions. Metropolitan areas that pay attention to both regional growth and central city poverty are more likely to thrive.

—To promote double bottom-line investments. Public and private investments in low-income communities are key to revitalization, but to reduce poverty and promote advancement these investments must produce a double bottom line: financial returns for investors and also economic and social benefits
for residents (for example, jobs, needed services, entrepreneurial opportunities, and access to desirable, affordable housing, including ownership options).

—To ensure a meaningful community voice, participation, and leadership. Broad, well-supported participation of community residents and organizations in planning and development helps ensure that the results benefit the community, respond to the needs of low-income people and people of color, and reflect the principles articulated above. To accomplish this, community residents and organizations must have access to the tools, knowledge, and resources that can guarantee meaningful participation in development. This last principle goes beyond metropolitan policy analysis and planning ideas to the new civics of regional leadership.

Equitable Development in Practice

In the new regional paradigm, development, to be fair and racially inclusive, must place the highest priority on promoting sound, comprehensive housing policies and strategies that provide desirable, safe, affordable housing for all residents all over the region. The principles of equitable development raise the challenge to simultaneously address the needs of the people in the community while improving the quality of the housing stock and commercial and service environment. This means city and county officials, nonprofit and for-profit developers, and local leaders paying attention, from the beginning of a neighborhood improvement process, to finding ways to keep housing affordable over time. It also means that commercial and residential development outside of poor urban neighborhoods should seek ways to create affordable housing. Further, transportation and other regional public investments should enhance the value of housing throughout the region by making jobs and recreational activities broadly accessible.

There must also be a focus on making sure that revitalization efforts create jobs and opportunities for those in need and promote wealth building. Unfortunately, attention in this latter arena, if disconnected from housing affordability, may lead to displacement. Below, in the discussion of the Market Creek Plaza experience, we look at efforts to expand housing choices and regional opportunity across lines of race and income, addressing gentrification and displacement in revitalizing areas, equitable development in weaker markets, and links to transportation and other metropolitan growth issues.

Market Creek Plaza, located on a former abandoned factory site in the diverse yet underserved Diamond Neighborhoods of San Diego, embodies many of the principles of equitable development. Conceived through a partnership between the Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation (JCNI) and local residents, Market Creek is a thriving twenty-acre, mixed-use commercial and cultural center anchored by a Food 4 Less supermarket. In 1997 JCNI—an
operating foundation established by the Jacobs Family Foundation with the mission of strengthening neighborhoods—decided to locate and focus its work in the Diamond Neighborhoods, whose 88,000 residents are 43 percent Hispanic, 30 percent African American, 12 percent Asian, 11 percent white, 3 percent non-Hispanic mixed race, and 1 percent Hawaiian–Pacific Islander. Nearly a quarter of the area’s residents earn less than $15,000 annually, and an estimated 30 percent do not have access to a car, making travel to retail facilities or job opportunities in other neighborhoods difficult. Accordingly, the project initially focused not on affordable housing (which at that time was amply available in the historically disinvested community) but on attracting economic activity and retail and cultural amenities to the Diamond Neighborhoods. The resident planning and ownership philosophy guiding Market Creek Plaza’s design and construction exemplifies equitable development in practice.

With the support and collaboration of JCNI, Diamond residents organized into teams and crafted development plans, which included a large, well-stocked supermarket, local grocery and construction jobs (as well as small business opportunities), and a plaza design reflecting the cultural diversity of the neighborhood. The construction team, a diverse coalition of trade and youth organizations, engaged in comprehensive recruiting, training, and business development efforts to achieve a hiring rate of 69 percent women-owned or people-of-color-owned contractors for the Market Creek Plaza construction (compared to a rate of 2 percent for the city of San Diego at large). Another team negotiated an agreement with Food 4 Less to hire and train Diamond residents at its other San Diego locations, thereby building the skills necessary for them to successfully transition to employment at the Market Creek site; when that store opened in January 2001, 91 percent of employees hired to fill the 110 union positions were local residents. This partnership produced benefits for both the community and the supermarket; according to Food 4 Less, the Market Creek Plaza store is one of the two best performers of any of its San Diego locations.

These two aspects of the project—resident engagement and economic viability—demonstrate how equitable development can not only revitalize neighborhoods but also ensure that local residents of color benefit. With Market Creek Plaza as a catalyst for neighborhood reinvestment and visibility, the Diamond Neighborhoods are now vulnerable to rising housing values, which threaten the ability of community residents to stay and reap the very benefits of development they worked to create. Since only one-third of homes in the immediate neighborhood of Market Creek Plaza are owner occupied, rising housing costs may eventually force longtime renters out. Anticipating this threat, JCNI is

2. Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation (undated).
3. To learn more about the process and accomplishments of Market Creek Plaza, including the innovative design and the local businesses that are finding space in the plaza, see McCulloch and Robinson (2002; 2005).
exploring housing stabilization strategies—such as limited equity co-ops and community land trusts—with a particular focus on resident ownership. As the Market Creek Plaza story continues to unfold, the fair distribution of affordable housing, including maintaining the stock of such housing as a neglected area improves, must remain the cornerstone of equitable development in the Diamond Neighborhoods and beyond.

**Equitable Development and Housing**

The realization that, to be equitable, access to affordable housing must always be paramount in the development process led PolicyLink to launch, in 2001, the Equitable Development Toolkit: Beyond Gentrification. The tool kit points advocates to strategies, policies, and practices being used around the country to enable low-income residents to remain in their neighborhoods and reap the benefits of revitalizing communities. It provides access to information about promising approaches organized under the headings of affordable housing, controlling development, financing strategies, and income and asset creation. However, the majority of the organizations, networks, and coalitions with which PolicyLink interacts—spanning community development, civil rights, transportation, housing, and environmental groups—have identified the expansion and fair distribution of affordable housing as the key target of their work.4

The fact that such a diverse array of groups has landed on the equity (fair) and geographic (distribution) challenges of affordable housing reveals a strategic opportunity to bring new constituencies into housing policy and into the quest for full racial inclusion. It also opens the door to the need for regional equity as an overarching goal. For reasons outlined above—and indeed, throughout this volume—we would argue that a focus on race and housing in the context of regional development and growth is the only way to achieve regional equity.

Regional development patterns play a significant role in housing gentrification and displacement. Yet as contributors to this volume show, without political will and a strategic agenda, little progress will be made toward achieving regional equity through housing advocacy. Many jurisdictions shun responsibility for producing affordable housing, and external enforcement mechanisms are the exception. To make matters worse, public commitment to housing affordability problems in the United States has significantly diminished—as Xavier de Souza Briggs argues (chapters 1 and 14, this volume), housing affordability is the most invisible social policy issue in America—placing greater dependence, but no pressure, on the private sector to address the challenge.

4. Responding to this need, sixteen of the twenty-four tools in the tool kit are focused on housing strategies and their catalyst role in equitable development.
Building a coherent housing strategy that responds to geographic concerns and promotes racial equity requires bundling a number of tactics, policies, and practices together. The tool kit identifies and explains some of these: expiring-use features of laws and regulations, just-cause evictions, code enforcement, infill incentives, developer exactions, rent controls, inclusionary zoning, limited equity housing co-ops, community land trusts, housing trusts funds, transit-oriented development, and real estate transfer taxes, to name a few.

Isolated from the local and regional development process and disconnected from a goal of racial equity, though, these strategies produce piecemeal results. But as part of a conscious equitable development agenda working in partnership with a multi-issue coalition and in concert with a broad spectrum of government agencies—housing, economic development, transportation, parks and recreation, zoning—these strategies begin to build a meaningful response to the years of uncontrolled, sprawling inequity. These substantive strategies get nowhere without political will and financial and other resource commitments.

In response to the toolkit and our work in equitable development, PolicyLink began to hear from advocates living and working in communities with weak markets who felt that the equitable development framing had application in their communities. Although gentrification was not a factor in their cities, these advocates were particularly attracted to principles that guide the development process in the areas of concentrated poverty where residents had little voice and little hope of seeing benefits from development beyond a space in public housing (which also seemed to be vanishing). These inquiries led us to scrutinize the tools to determine how they interact in these weak market environments. What we found, of course, is that different tools are appropriate at different times and that using some tools together can produce the best result. Most important, it is clear that if the development process is successful, sooner or later the issue of dislocation—whether full-blown gentrification or not—will surface. Setting up the development process with that reality in mind, taking advantage of land and property that may be quite affordable at the beginning of the process, and integrating benefits for existing residents will lead to equitable results.

The following sections focus on the possibilities for addressing affordable housing that are available to communities in different stages of development. The cities of Washington and Boston have attracted significant economic development and have experienced significant revitalization in many of their neighborhoods, yet there are steps that can be taken to ensure that low-income communities of color benefit from that development. Baltimore, by contrast, is a “weak market” city, still seeking revitalization, but it may well have greater opportunities to incorporate a range of affordable housing tools into its development plans. In California, a variety of organizations worked together to mount a multi-issue campaign to address infrastructure investment throughout the state. Affordable housing is the core issue in each of these places; an examination of
efforts currently taking place in them demonstrate the possibilities of equitable development strategies.

Race, Space, and Equitable Development in Washington

In the past several years, Washington has experienced a dramatic economic turnaround, heating up a dampened housing market and igniting displacement in some newly desirable low-income neighborhoods. Further, the housing construction market has reignited. These changes have led organizers and advocates to look to inclusionary zoning as a strategy to address the city’s critical affordable housing needs. In this city, embracing inclusionary zoning comes as a next step after the establishment of a housing trust fund.

A healthy regional economy and successful local policies, including strategic public investments, have transformed some Washington neighborhoods from economically depressed areas with concentrations of low- and moderate-income residents—many of whom are African American—to neighborhoods highly sought after by higher-income renters and buyers—many of whom are white. The resulting interplay of race and geography make Washington a laboratory for understanding how equitable development tools and strategies can lead to housing equity.

The neighborhoods in the District and their development course over the last decade mirror what has happened in many regions across the United States. Growth, prosperity, and opportunity are located on one side of the Anacostia River, while population loss, community distress, and poverty are concentrated on the other. The Anacostia River is both a geographical boundary and a metaphor for the great divide between the affluent and the economically depressed residents of Washington.

The new vitality in some low-income neighborhoods has sparked significant displacement dynamics, with low-income residents being pushed out by escalating rents and condominium conversions just as their neighborhoods have begun to have the very conveniences and amenities that they fought for. Much of this displacement occurs along racial lines, revealing inequity issues that can be effectively addressed by equitable development strategies. Indeed, the combination of housing that is affordable to a wide range of income categories as well as situated across the region in a manner that affords accessibility to jobs, schools, and shops is a critical measurement of equitable development.

The time is right for applying equitable development tools in Washington. The city is experiencing an unprecedented surge in private investment: its Office of Planning, which tracks major housing projects, estimates that since 2000 approximately 30,000 units have been planned or completed or are under construction. If all these units are finished, the potential impact of an inclusionary zoning policy is substantial. A mandatory strategy for affordable housing is in
order. But developing an appropriate proposal and strategy for successful adoption—with agreed targets for the policy’s impact—is challenging. Differing views on the political realities of the District and its elected officials shape how advocates define the parameters of a potential inclusionary zoning policy. Moreover, meeting the range of needs of low-income residents will take strong and innovative skills in organizing and maintaining coalitions as well as developing policy.

Typically, affordable housing construction occurs in neighborhoods that already have a high concentration of affordable units and does not facilitate a pathway to greater opportunity. Mandatory inclusionary zoning can provide a counterweight to this pattern by designating where affordable units must be located and who must benefit; organizers and advocates in Washington decided to focus on achieving such a policy. The campaign, however, is vulnerable to the pitfalls common to grassroots struggles that seek a broad coalition including low-income residents, organized labor, researchers, policy advocates, and business and civic leaders. Finding points of agreement among the differing perspectives of those involved in the development of campaign strategies is critical.

Organizing groups tend to represent low- and very low-income residents. Leaders of these groups have experienced similar campaigns and are wary of efforts that may dilute campaign goals. Housing policy groups lack a strong grassroots constituency, which is a challenge for national and regional organizations. Moreover, policy groups, while desiring meaningful change, frequently are concerned with broader constituencies (from the working poor to low- and very low-income renters) and multiple political and economic dynamics (for example, will this negatively impact developers’ bottom line, thereby decreasing political viability?). Politically savvy leaders of these groups may deem it best to focus on bigger picture issues, seemingly at the expense of the needs of individuals represented by the organizers.

As the Washington campaign for inclusionary zoning got under way, the challenge was to reconcile these points of view, to develop a consistent strategy, and to seek agreement on targets and tactics for reaching campaign goals. One “hot spot” for these differing perspectives involves targets for affordable units mandated by the proposed inclusionary zoning policy. To meet the needs of organizers’ primarily low-income African American constituencies, the target needed to be as low as possible. The Washington area’s median income is $82,800. Targeting 80 percent of area median income—or $66,000—for inclusionary units would not have ensured that low-income residents were guaranteed benefits. But as Karen Brown shows in her study of the thirty-year experience with inclusionary zoning in the District’s growing suburban communities, inclusionary public policy is largely a market strategy. How much added flexibility an inclusionary zoning policy can actually grant a private developer while
still allowing him to view development as attractive (profitable) is an important question. Reducing the area medium-income percentage to make units more available to residents with lower incomes might drive away developers who fear that lower prices would cut too deep into their profits.

Organizers and their constituents in communities of color shared a lack of faith in whether implementation of the plan would ensure actual, tangible benefits: Would they actually end up renting or owning one of the newly built, affordable units? The success of inclusionary zoning policies and communities’ enthusiasm about implementation seem tied both to the provisions of the ordinance and to the designated management of the units and use of the revenues created by the policy. Some jurisdictions with a strong, well-respected, well-connected (to communities of color and policymakers) nonprofit housing sector have given these organizations ongoing responsibility for the management of new affordable units, thus helping to ensure that implementation of inclusionary zoning helps to advance racial justice goals. In other jurisdictions, public agencies help ensure that low-income communities of color benefit by virtue of their connection to—and relative trust by—residents. In the District, where the housing authority has lacked a positive public will, the key was the engagement of the nonprofit sector, its connection and credibility with communities of color, and its capacity to ensure successful implementation.

While a long-standing distrust between organizing and policy advocacy groups could have made the discussions and strategic decisionmaking more difficult, the strong commitment of both groups to addressing housing needs has brought all voices to the table. The continued dynamic of the alliance among the organizations plays out against a backdrop of the need for housing and the determination to create it. Advocates recognize the possibilities that an inclusionary zoning policy can offer to a community desperately in need of the benefits that accompany affordable housing. In Boston, such a tool has been in place for over thirty years, but current political realities make it necessary to vigilantly struggle to maintain and strengthen it.

**Boston: Safeguarding Tools for Housing Equity**

Advocates from the greater Boston area came together in November 2002 to explore regional challenges and the possibilities of working together on the intersection of housing, transportation, and equitable development. This initial convening was far more representative of the city of Boston than of the overall region. In fact, many of the participants in the first convening were skeptical of the notion of engaging in a regional effort. These were seasoned organizations and leaders, and they were not sure that they were ready to embrace the whole region as the focus for any of their efforts.
Communities in the Boston region are highly segregated by race and income; the increasingly multicultural and multiracial nature of the region has not translated into integrated neighborhoods. The 2000 census shows that one-fifth of the census tracts in the region have at least 15 percent of their population living in poverty, and almost one-third of these tracts have a poverty rate of 30 percent or more. These high-poverty neighborhoods are concentrated in Boston, though aging suburbs also contain large pockets of vulnerable families, including newer immigrant groups. The concentration of low-income populations reflects significant racial disparities. The population in the tracts with more than 30 percent poverty was 52 percent people of color, including 17 percent black, 27 percent Hispanic, and 9 percent Asian.

The discussions of the challenges in affordable housing, transportation, environmental justice, and workforce development crystallized the regional realities for the Boston leaders. Community organizations tend to focus their work on achieving equity in specific areas, such as housing, transportation, land use, and economic development. But recognizing that the achievement of regional equity will require focusing on the intersection of many issues and developing an integrated strategy for addressing them, by April 2003 a core group of committed regional players had emerged, calling itself Action for Regional Equity (Action!). The group represents seventeen organizations with strong advocacy bases in the ethnic, social equity, and community development fields. These include organizations focused on organizing, policy analysis and advocacy, affordable housing, and economic development. Outreach efforts netted strong organizations representing suburban communities as partners with the Boston-based groups. A menu of policy opportunities emerged for Action! to consider. One of those policies—Chapter 40B—represents many of the promises and challenges to achieving regional equity and was the catalyst for determining future action.

As Spencer Cowan finds in a study of antisnob zoning in several states, Massachusetts’ Chapter 40B was an early attempt to undermine exclusionary housing practices and is potentially one of the state’s most effective policy tools for ensuring that affordable housing is spread fairly across all communities. Enacted in 1969, 40B is meant to encourage the production of affordable housing in all communities throughout the commonwealth. The law addresses the shortage of affordable housing statewide by reducing unnecessary barriers created by local approval processes, local zoning, and other restrictions. Towns in Massachusetts have considerable freedom to make siting and other decisions, which mitigates against reversing intense segregation through regional action. The program is controversial, like antisnob zoning in other states, because it gives developers the right to override local zoning laws through a state appeals
process if the jurisdiction does not provide 10 percent of its housing stock as affordable. A developer could go to the state, for example, and be approved to build a hundred-unit apartment complex if 20 percent of the proposed units were affordable to low-income residents. Controversy aside, 40B has a positive intended effect, expanding the geography of affordable housing.

Action! endorses a community-based policy agenda for achieving equitable development goals across the region. It embraces the need for comprehensive action, including environmental justice and social equity concerns, and recognizes the connections among public transit, affordable housing, workforce development, and open-space issues, seeing these aspects as closely linked and requiring integrated regional change. Finally, the group wants to ensure that the needs of low-income residents are addressed and that equitable development objectives are met through balanced land use decisions across jurisdictions. While research shows that the best outcomes for low-income families are realized in mixed-income communities, the region's development trends continue to concentrate poverty and racially segregate communities. Low-income people of color who are concentrated in high-poverty neighborhoods are prey to economic disinvestment and political neglect, exposed to crime, and isolated from good jobs, quality education, health services, and even essential amenities such as supermarkets. Strengthening 40B could lead to the creation of mixed-income communities that could help alleviate these problems.

At the same time, the political landscape shifted. A new Republican governor was elected in Massachusetts and took office in January 2003. He established a state Office of Commonwealth Development and appointed a longtime smart growth advocate from the New England region as chief of the new office. The state cabinet-level position was charged with coordinating the fragmented policies and programs of multiple agencies, including Environmental Affairs, Transportation, and the Department of Housing and Community Development, and the state's fiercely independent cities and towns. This new smart growth “czar” was potentially leading a dramatic shift in government receptivity to cross-issue and cross-jurisdictional action.

Meanwhile, opposition to 40B resulted in multiple attempts to weaken the legislation. In 2002 the legislature passed a compromise measure; it was supported by affordable housing advocates but was ultimately vetoed by the governor. In 2003 more than seventy bills were introduced to amend 40B, causing the governor to form a diverse task force, including some members of Action!, to develop a legislative compromise. Public discussion of 40B gave Action! a tangible organizing focus with the potential for real policy impact. As originally drafted, Chapter 40B contained no language specific to race, though in its thirty-four-year history, as Cowan shows, 40B has proven to be a vital tool for racial inclusion by creating a more varied and affordable mix of housing types—entry points for diverse families—in local communities. Like the not-in-my-
backyard furor elsewhere in America, current debates about 40B are studded with codes for racial exclusion, such as “community character” and “declining [school] test scores,” making clear that some opponents intend to dismantle or weaken the legislation.

Action! targeted hearings on 40B for some of their efforts. Leaders came to testify and brought their members to fill hearing rooms. Equity voices were heavily represented, framing the issues and setting the stage for the challenges that any effective measure ought to address. As part of these efforts, groups sought to raise the specter of racial exclusion, always present but seldom acknowledged in the Boston region and many other parts of our nation. These advocates want the issues examined through a racial lens, among others, to highlight the segregated and racially polarized nature of the region and to broaden support for their efforts among advocates of racial equity. This includes developing a media strategy that targets ethnic and mainstream media as part of the comprehensive agenda to build support for maintaining and strengthening 40B.

These efforts are ongoing and are indicative of the multifaceted approach and time commitment required to add or strengthen equity objectives in major housing and land use policies and practices that have developed over time. Action! exemplifies the challenges of coalition building and the opportunities inherent in framing issues with equitable development in mind to ensure that race is not left out of the equation. The new regional effort represents a stretch for most of the involved leaders and organizations. The groups that make up the coalition are very sophisticated and known for taking strong positions. The fifteen-month process to hammer out a regional strategy and to convince their constituents of its efficacy should not be overlooked. As Peter Dreier reminds us in a paper on successful housing advocacy in Los Angeles, communities that take on affordable housing campaigns should be prepared for the strenuous efforts that may be needed to successfully incorporate the points of view of all groups necessary to achieve campaign goals.7 This means acknowledging the need for organizations to maintain commitments to their missions, which are typically focused at the neighborhood and city level, while pursuing a regional agenda for affordable housing. In most instances, such organizations will have a local and single-issue focus; working at the regional level often means entering brand new territory.

Working through the issues and conflicts that coalition building requires can develop the capacity of the coalition and its leaders, thus enabling them to successfully advance equitable development throughout the region. The seeds are there for Action! to develop into a deep and cohesive coalition. Moreover, the multi-issue nature of Action! suggests new opportunities, as well as different challenges, to develop more cross-issue coalitions with the strength, flexibility,

and trust to carry out multiple campaigns. In Boston, the Barr Foundation has brought new resources to Action! and its members, providing hope that the group will be able to embrace its new equitable development approach with support for enhanced organizational efforts.

**Equitable Development in Weak Market Cities**

The discussions about Washington and Boston reveal how useful a framework of equitable development is in forming housing strategies that stabilize and secure low-income and working families in communities seeing an influx of new investment. According to the 2000 census, approximately one-quarter of all large cities (those with populations of more than 100,000) continue to face significant population decline and the attendant disinvestment that follows. These Rust Belt cities are primarily located in the Northeast and Midwest and just a few decades ago were thriving industrial and manufacturing centers that drove economic growth in their regions as well as the national economy. In recent years organizations such as the Community Development Partnership Network have worked to bring greater national attention to the challenges that these “weak market” cities face, such as declining home values and equity, diminishing tax bases that lead to fewer public amenities, large-scale vacant and abandoned property, brownfields, racial concentration of poverty, loss of social networks, and lower median incomes.

Rebuilding neighborhoods in weak market cities so that they become or remain vibrant communities is a fundamental equitable development challenge. All communities in a region should be “places of choice,” with the services and supports that individuals and families need to be economically and socially stable. Many weak market cities lack the most basic amenities (for example, banks, grocery stores, neighborhood parks, cultural centers) that families need to lead healthy, productive lives. Transforming distressed communities requires understanding the competitive advantage of these places relative to the region, then tailoring strategies to attract reinvestment, while connecting existing low-income residents to the benefits of future revitalization.

Housing investments can be a key vehicle for promoting equitable development in weak market cities. However, the tools and strategies employed may be quite different than in their “hotter market” counterparts. An exploration of Baltimore, Maryland, reveals the differences. Baltimore is a weak market city in a region that is doing well. As of the 2000 census the median household income

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10. PolicyLink and the Community Development Partnership Network are collaborating on a research report (to be released in mid 2005) that will articulate the policy and action agenda for promoting regional equity in weak market cities.
in the city of Baltimore is 60 percent of the region ($30,078 versus $49,938) and has declined approximately 9 percent since 1990. In 2000 the average home price in Baltimore was 53 percent of the regional average ($69,900 versus $132,400) and declined by 5 percent from 1990. The disparity across the region is quite great, with suburban communities such as Anne Arundel County ($156,500) and Howard County ($198,600) having median housing values well above the regional average.\textsuperscript{11} The region is characterized by high levels of racial segregation and concentrated poverty, with low-income people and communities of color disproportionately living in the central city.

A key equitable development goal for Baltimore is to stimulate the real estate market in the central city in a manner that brings new investment but that also secures and stabilizes existing residents so they enjoy the benefits of revitalization, such as appreciating home values and improved neighborhood services. One important housing strategy that tries to strike this balance is the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative in Baltimore, which recognizes the critical role that healthy, attractive neighborhoods play in making the city and region thrive. The initiative focuses on “in the middle” neighborhoods, which usually do not have compelling enough problems to attract headlines yet also fail to attract investment dollars because of troubled properties. The Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative draws on neighborhood strength, harnessing assets and utilizing market forces to reinvigorate neighborhoods in the middle. Housing investments that build home equity and appreciation are coupled with civic engagement activities that strengthen the social fabric of the neighborhood. In the Belair-Edison neighborhood, for instance, median sales prices for homes on target blocks increased over 9 percent from 2002 to 2003; it is long-term, existing residents who are benefiting from this revitalization. Foundations such as the Goldseker Foundation and the Baltimore Community Foundation have made strategic investments in the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative, recognizing the importance of this approach to building thriving neighborhoods that are connected to the broader region.

At the same time, Baltimore needs housing strategies that will create more affordable housing options in more advantageous communities in the region so that lower-income residents are better connected to a web of vital services and supports. One promising effort that is under way is being led by the Citizens Planning and Housing Association and the Baltimore Regional Initiative Developing Genuine Equality, which are partnering on an inclusionary zoning campaign for the Baltimore region. In the near term they are focusing on getting mandatory inclusionary zoning in Anne Arundel and Howard Counties—and then trying for adoption of a statewide ordinance.

\textsuperscript{11} For the regional numbers we use statistics for the Baltimore primary metropolitan statistical area.
As the Baltimore experience shows, weak market cities must reinvigorate the real estate market in the central city, while promoting affordable housing opportunities across the region. It is, indeed, a hard balance to strike. Promoting affordable housing in suburban communities will require reforming exclusionary land use practices that preclude the development of more affordable housing types. And producing affordable housing in the central city needs to be done in a manner that does not further concentrate poverty in these communities. When affordable housing is constructed in the central city, it must be connected to broader efforts aimed at neighborhood revitalization.

Using Multi-Issue Coalitions to Expand Affordable Housing Resources

In California, support for a new multi-issue, equity-focused coalition sparked efforts at the state level to develop strategies and resources to engage an array of organizations and constituencies. The James Irvine Foundation provided multi-year support for the Sustainable Communities Working Group. This group included organizations that had never worked together and some that had only recently come to the issues of land use and equity. The working group included American Farmland Trust, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Surface Transportation Policy Project, California Works Foundation (a labor-based research organization), and more recently PolicyLink. Together, these organizations focused on developing an agenda to link the interests of environmental, housing, civil rights, and transportation advocates.

In 2003 the working group supported new incentives for multisector development. Typically, localities fund and support development for specific infrastructure investments, such as a new freeway or expanded sewer lines. While a multisector approach to such development seems prudent, the reality is that funding comes either in project- or sector-specific amounts. This approach has presented particular challenges in California, where the state’s constitution requires a two-thirds supermajority for passage of bonds and local special taxes.

California’s exponential growth, coupled with inefficient land use patterns, poses critical challenges to the state’s quality of life. Its population has grown 200 percent over the past fifty years, totaling nearly 34 million residents, and is expected to grow by another 12 million by 2020. Housing prices and rents in many regions are exorbitantly high because of inadequate affordable housing production. Poorly planned residential and commercial developments have resulted in increased traffic, exposing 80 percent of the population to unhealthy levels of air pollution. The state suffers from a severe lack of infrastructure improvements due to the lack of much-needed public investments. Areas that have sought to raise revenues to make needed improvements have met with very mixed success. Between 1986 and 2002, 1,438 tax measures that would fund a
broad range of community needs were proposed; of these, slightly less than half (46 percent) passed. Analysts note that if the voter approval threshold had been 55 percent—still a healthy majority—rather than two-thirds, the passage rate would have been 57 percent, with over 25 percent more measures approved and billions of additional dollars available for vital local community investments.

The working group sought a constitutional amendment to reduce the voter threshold—from two-thirds to 55 percent—for localities seeking bonds and special taxes linking affordable housing, transportation, parks and open space, and general infrastructure investments. The campaign allowed the group to make the linkage between the issues and local, regional, and statewide needs. It also allowed them to point to the need for multiple strategies and to argue that the proposed measure would push localities to take a more integrated, and effective, approach to infrastructure investment. The campaign also laid the foundation for arguing that isolated transportation investments would not solve regional congestion challenges, that solutions require multisector strategies.

Lowering the threshold holds the promise for greater success. In 2000 voters approved Proposition 39, a ballot initiative that decreased the threshold for education bonds, and the passage rate for proposed measures dramatically improved. Proposition 39 lowered the voter approval threshold from two-thirds to 55 percent for local school bonds for repair, construction, or replacement of aging and overcrowded school facilities. Communities that had been previously unable to pass bonds were able to do so because of Proposition 39. Since its passage, 147 school districts have successfully passed bond measures. Of these, 82—or over half—had never passed any school bond measure. The successful use of Proposition 39 offers strong evidence that a majority of California residents are frequently willing to support public investments when they have the power to do so.

While both houses of the California legislature are primarily Democratic, they do not have two-thirds majorities in either house. An impressive coalition emerged to support the proposed measures. The initial coalition of transportation, housing, environmental, and civil rights organizations expanded to include strong voices from the business community. Unfortunately, despite strong and increasing support across issues, geography, and constituency, Republican legislators threatened to run primary challengers against any member who showed support for measures connected to tax increases, even for measures such as these, which would place the ultimate decision with voters.

Republicans clamped down because they did not want to facilitate any measures that could be tied to increased state revenues, and they demanded unity behind their strategy. No cracks appeared in the Republican’s strategy. Because this is California, one group seriously considered moving the measures in some form on to the ballot through a signature-gathering process. (There are multiple ways to qualify an initiative for the ballot—through the legislature or with a large number of voters’ signatures to a petition.) But with the legislative and
political stalemate, the effort stalled. Groups are reviewing their options and planning for the continuation of this multisector approach to regional issues.

Lessons from the Field

The Washington, Boston, and California coalitions described above include strong representation from affordable housing advocates and rely on them for their technical knowledge and political and legislative lobbying skills. The California coalition also includes groups with strong litigation skills, a strength typical of fair housing advocates. However, none of these coalitions has made reaching out to fair housing advocates a major objective. This is because fair housing and affordable housing suffer a common limitation: a lack of strong, organized constituencies. In the cities cited above, and in others where PolicyLink has worked, the challenge has been balancing the needs of constituency-based groups with those that have a policy or industry focus. The comprehensive nature of equitable development speaks to the need for diversity of constituency, skill, and race, but the ability to mobilize expanded efforts is most hampered by capacity issues at the organization, coalition, and leadership levels.

Beyond the coalition issues lie questions about racism and racial preferences, as discussed in the study by Camille Charles (chapter 3, this volume). Will efforts like those in Boston, for example, help to change how people think about race and neighborhoods? To the extent that these efforts spur new relationships, the data suggest that they should. And to the extent that these efforts visibly take on polarized views and political dynamics, they should help to spark important public debates. But as Charles herself notes in an overview of long-run trends in racial attitudes, whether indicators of racism decrease or simply shift is a question that can only be answered over time. None of the efforts described in this chapter, or anywhere else in this book, suggests that the rate of change can be dramatically accelerated.

Instead, this and other chapters offer new road maps—and key caveats on older ones—for reaching the goals of greater equity and full inclusion and participation in our society. Though the processes of coalition building and advocacy may be occasionally fraught with tension and discord, seeing them through to resolution is critical to change. Success requires that the voices of leaders of color, and neighbors of all colors, are heard and that they have the resources to be meaningful and regular participants in policy campaigns and debates. We turn our attention last to the leadership question.

Leadership for Policy Change

Successful campaigns that benefit low-income communities and people of color need organized constituencies, coalitions, and alliances to carry them out.
Organizing requires leadership to gather forces, facilitate discussion, guide strategy development, and be an active presence in policy formation. Before efforts like those described above in San Diego, Washington, and Boston took off, leaders saw the need and took steps to address it.

In campaigns across the country, leaders of color are making a critical difference in the evolution of policy development and implementation by forming alliances and bridging divides that often exist between organizing groups and policy organizations. Even with the backing of strong organizations and engaged constituencies, many, however, continue to find it difficult to access policy venues, those critical places where decisions are made that have direct impact on the daily lives of people of color in low-income communities. These barriers led PolicyLink to interview over a hundred leaders and to survey the literature on leadership and leadership development. The study reveals a great deal about the special roles that leaders of color can and must play and about the best available options for overcoming the barriers they face.

Leaders of color can make the decisive difference in ensuring that affordable housing initiatives are built on principles of equitable development. More often than not, these are leaders who possess the following: a set of values focused on justice, equity, and inclusion; a passionate commitment to improving the quality of life of everyone in the community; a willingness to bridge boundaries of race, ethnicity, class, and gender; and a deep understanding of the importance of an organized constituency and how to build it. Leaders who come from and are rooted in communities of color understand the issues confronting their communities and can bring a new perspective to discussions about housing, health, employment, education, and the environment. The policies that result from such inclusion are likely to be beneficial to the communities they are designed to serve.

Yet there are only a few people of color in public, private, or nonprofit sector positions where policy is made or influenced. More than 80 percent of congressional leaders, 94 percent of state governors, and 96 percent of university presidents in the United States are white men. In the entire history of the United States Congress, there have been only eighteen senators of color—and only three African American senators since Reconstruction. Only one African American and one Asian American—L. Douglas Wilder of Virginia and Gary Locke of Washington, respectively—have been elected to gubernatorial positions (although several African Americans have run unsuccessfully for governor in recent years, and Indian American Bobby Jindal narrowly lost the 2003 race for Louisiana governor before his landslide election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 2004). Throughout the 1990s, white men constituted 97 percent
of Fortune 500 chief executive officers (CEOs). In philanthropy, 94 percent of all CEOs and 90 percent of all chief financial officers (CFOs) are white. And while media play a critical role in influencing policy, newspaper newsrooms are 88 percent white.

The exclusion of people of color from policy discussions and decisions has repercussions beyond communities of color. It deprives the nation of the wisdom and experience these communities could bring to bear in solving some of the country’s most seemingly intractable problems.

Leadership development programs can be an effective way to ameliorate this situation. However, to be successful, such programs must go beyond training to provide access to policy arenas as well as to support networks that help remove the isolation faced by many leaders of color. The PolicyLink study finds that the best leadership programs include mentors for program participants and focus not only on the leader but also on building the capacity of the leader’s organization and constituency, which are necessary to successfully engage policymaking. This triple focus—on leader, organization, and constituency—offers the best means of supporting the policymaking involvement of communities of color.

The inequities so apparent today have been long in the making and will not be quickly made right. Still, strategies for addressing those inequities are available and can speed the day when regions truly are the economically viable, livable communities they should be, providing the basics for quality of life: a place to live, a place to learn, and a place to earn. By addressing the need for and location of affordable housing, equitable development strategies provide the foundation for education and jobs. The more intentional organizers and advocates are in applying equitable development principles and in building the public will required to spread those principles from regions to the states and the nation, the more likely it is that policies on fair and affordable housing—as well as health, education, transportation, and other issues—will be inclusive of the racial and ethnic diversity that increasingly defines our nation and puts its ideals to the test.

References


14. CEO data from Fortune 500.


Whatever the prevailing mood has been at the national level, America’s local communities have a long history of ambivalence toward new arrivals and minority groups, whether immigrant or native born. As early as 1750, for example, Benjamin Franklin suggested that German immigrants arriving in numbers in Philadelphia “will never adopt our language or customs,” and, perhaps surprisingly from our current vantage point, he added, “any more than they can acquire our complexion.”

Much of this ambivalence has been expressed through housing exclusion, from government-sanctioned segregation in the era of Jim Crow and ongoing discrimination by realtors, banks, and other private parties to the everyday acts of racial avoidance—perfectly legal, but costly—that thwart the creation of a more integrated society. In this book, we outline why unequal housing choices and the uneven metropolitan development patterns associated with segregated growth continue—and also what those patterns imply as economic inequality persists and America rapidly becomes more racially and ethnically diverse than ever before. Rapid immigration makes some segregation by race or ethnic group inevitable in the years to come, because newcomers tend to arrive in particular places faster than they can diffuse through the housing market. But more worrisome is the growth of class segregation within racial groups over the past generation, as well as the fact that many immigrants and native-born minorities are “making it” to suburbs that no longer offer secure ladders to education or job opportunity.
The prospect of a dual society, officially welcoming but socially gated, looms. More than any other factor, high levels of segregation by race and class, by neighborhood and municipality, determine the quality of schools and other public services, rates of street crime and associated levels of fear and insecurity, geographic access to jobs, exposure to environmental hazards, and prospects for building assets through property investment. We are well beyond the folk wisdom about “bad neighborhoods” or the stereotypes about people who live in them. Beyond the carefully researched consequences for education and economic opportunity on which I focus in chapter 2, compelling new evidence from criminology and public health indicates specific ways that segregation by race and income contributes to many of the nation’s most persistent health disparities and the propensity—of young males, in particular—to perpetrate violence. These links between place and well-being are deeply disturbing in a society that declares equality of opportunity a core value, and so are the broad trends: In at least some of these dimensions, such as educational opportunity and geographic access to jobs, the social costs of segregation appear to have increased sharply since 1970. Low- and moderate-income families, particularly if they are racial minorities, are not only more likely to live in high-risk, low-resource places but also are more likely to bounce among such neighborhoods, moving frequently due to rent increases, divorce, the death of a wage earner, or other life shocks. Long-run exposure to poor neighborhoods is especially high for African Americans, and race is a much stronger predictor of this pattern than income, household type, or other factors.

Tied to the forces that produce and reproduce this segregation, the extent of sprawl—relatively low-density, car-reliant, unplanned growth on the undeveloped fringe of metropolitan areas—has begun to frustrate even middle- and upper-income families, who can afford to live at a safe distance from many of the problems of cities and older, at-risk suburbs. The nation’s current strategy for handling race and class differences at the local level is, paradoxically, what we might call containment-plus-sprawl. It is a strategy that disperses and subsidizes new development while concentrating social and economic advantage. This system permits, and in fiscal and other terms actually encourages, some communities to function as exclusive and exclusionary clubs. Consistent with these patterns, white Americans, who have the widest housing choices, report increasing tolerance of racial and ethnic diversity in principle but little enthusiasm for policies aimed at reducing racial inequality. Meanwhile, segregated jurisdictions obscure the possibilities of forging a common-interest politics, without which basic reforms to the dominant investment and development model are all but impossible.

What are the prospects for changing these patterns, given such lukewarm support for efforts to attack inequality, and what kinds of change should we emphasize? In this final chapter, I analyze the politics, principles, and policy choices needed to create a more equitable geography of opportunity in America, beginning with a look at the central dilemmas that change will confront.

Core Dilemmas

We should think about prospects for change in the context of four dilemmas. First, traditional civil rights strategies, including strategies for enforcing antidiscrimination “fair housing” laws, are necessary but woefully insufficient to expand housing choice. Civil rights strategies must evolve significantly to address that fact. Second is the thorny dilemma of competing public objectives, which are common in race-conscious policy debates and rarely resolvable by invoking rights alone. Third, our public life should anticipate the important—but often unspoken and uncomfortable—tension between the integrationist agenda and what we might call the agenda for group empowerment. Put differently, this is the tension between integrating all groups and empowering particular groups, often defined by race and by historical disadvantage. Group empowerment often hinges on hopes that concentration has powerful advantages, that “separate”—if it leads to better targeting—can lead to “equal.” Fourth is the dilemma of local, exclusionary politics and the need to build broader-based support for inclusionary policy: The central political challenge is to create coalitions and other mechanisms of change powerful enough to overcome exclusion by local communities.

The Power and Limits of Civil Rights

Traditional civil rights strategies for protecting housing choice, while important, offer surprisingly little leverage on the problem of changing the geography of opportunity. Why? For one thing, the forces that produce class segregation in our communities are, for the most part, perfectly legal, since they encourage discrimination by income (ability to pay), which is what competitive markets do by design. As many urban observers emphasize, any meaningful solutions to class segregation must address where people can afford to live, a matter shaped in important ways by government policy, not just by compliance with antidiscrimination protections that regulate transactions in the private market. Where the racial dimension of segregation is concerned, even if most acts of racial discrimination in housing markets—the acts that are illegal—were detected, and even if the violators were effectively prosecuted, fair housing enforcement alone would have a limited impact on the racial makeup of America’s communities, for reasons I detail below. Vigorously enforced fair housing laws are important in a society that declares a commitment to equal opportunity regardless of one’s
background but not because those laws contribute significantly to desegregating the society.

This fact reflects a wider challenge associated with how we act on complex social problems. All too often, we rely on policy fixes that seem to connect to the problems we care about or that some trusted advocate has earlier endorsed. But smart, legitimate strategies should come before the policies they help to justify. Good strategies embody particular ideas about cause and effect—what business strategists and designers of social programs call “logic models,” which explain why the state of the world will change in a particular direction if some action is taken. Specific sets of causes and effects, outlined in sequences or chains of necessary conditions, expose assumptions and contingencies that decisionmakers, interest groups, and implementers alike should understand. These strategies help us avoid costly, unintended consequences as well as policies that come to be more symbolic than effective for meeting a specific aim.

Consider again the example of enforcing laws against housing discrimination. Here is a logic model (a chain of conditions) outlining what an impact on levels of segregation would in fact require:

—Condition 1. A wide range of potential victims (housing consumers) are aware of their rights under law. Survey data indicate that most Americans know that housing discrimination is illegal, and also think it is wrong, but feel that it is not much of a problem any more. The threshold condition—knowing that we all have the right to receive equal treatment in the marketplace—clearly depends on ongoing public education, because foreign-born immigrants and low-income people are generally less familiar with civil rights protections and also because violators of housing rights rely on this ignorance.

—Condition 2. In a given act violating fair housing laws, the victims are aware that they have been victimized (for example, by real estate professionals, financial institutions, others). Using federal testing and enforcement data, George Galster estimates that only about 1 percent of the two million acts of housing discrimination each year even generated complaints during the 1980s, and the evidence is that housing discrimination has become more subtle since then. For example, realtors commonly “editorialize” about neighborhoods to provide more information to white homebuyers and to encourage them to choose areas with fewer poor or nonwhite households. What is more, the language realtors use with testing agents suggests that they know that this form of steering is illegal but do not fear being caught.

—Condition 3. The victims are willing and able to report their perceived victimization to public authorities. In fact, the data above indicate that many perceived acts go unreported—and for a wide array of reasons that are challenging

4. Galster (1990); see also Turner and Ross, chapter 4, this volume.
to address. Other obligations seem more pressing, one fears retribution, or one doubts that anything good will come from filing a complaint.

—Condition 4. Adequate resources are in place for processing, investigating, and adjudicating legitimate claims (the operational element of enforcement). Yet these resources have been inadequate from the start, that is, since 1968, when federal fair housing protections were hastily enacted after the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr.⁶ All the key functions are chronically understaffed: sorting claims effectively, investigating appropriate claims vigorously, and then acting on the evidence.

—Condition 5. For those claims that produce a finding of guilt, penalties are adequate to deter or limit future violations of the law. We have no direct evidence on these effects in the fair housing arena, but evidence on regulatory effects in other fields suggest little reason for optimism that current enforcement efforts have a significant effect on the incidence of housing discrimination.⁷ Two factors drive the effectiveness of any enforcement effort: success at detecting and reliably prosecuting bad behavior; and penalties sufficient to change the bad behavior. Fair housing enforcement scores low on both, and in general, equal opportunity enforcement—in labor and other domains, on race, disability, and other bases for discrimination—struggles with both.

—Condition 6. Reductions of discriminatory behavior will have a significant effect on housing choices, thus enabling more inclusive and integrated communities to emerge. Yet acts of discrimination in the marketplace, especially since they often go undetected, have a limited effect on the kinds of neighborhoods that people of various backgrounds prefer. Simply put, reducing bad behavior in the market will not clearly change what people desire, only their ability to realize those desires.

Conditions 1 through 3 show why fair access to housing will always be a difficult civil right to enforce, and conditions 4 and 5 indicate that the prospects for significantly limiting future bad behavior (reducing the target) are likely very modest, at least through law enforcement. Broader changes in societal attitudes and practices could certainly help there. But the final condition is the clincher: Segregated communities result not just from frustrated attempts by minority homeseekers to find more integrated settings but also from preferences of whites and minorities alike that undermine a more residentially integrated society. Even small differences in these preferences (by race of homeseeker) can lead to very segregated outcomes in a marketplace offering a limited supply of available housing units and given the preexisting condition of segregation.⁸ What this means is that segregation stems not only from illegal acts of discrimination but also from perfectly legal, if segregative, choices—“self-steering” by whites and

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⁷ Cooter and Ulen (2004).
⁸ Ellen (2000); Schelling (1971).
minorities—as well as a limited, geographically concentrated supply of affordable housing choices.

This is not a blame-the-victim argument about fault, and the preferences of people of color that Camille Charles examines in detail (chapter 3, in this volume)—looking for a racial comfort zone, wariness about being the pioneer in possibly unwelcoming territory—appear to capture the legacy of past injustice, of social exclusion, and even of the physical risk faced by early pioneers of color in formerly all-white communities. Moreover, people of all backgrounds seem to value the benefits of living among a critical mass of “people like me”—however that may be defined. Wanting that is not illegal, nor is avoiding particular neighborhoods because of that desire. But as a practical matter, we should disabuse ourselves of the notion that mere enforcement of antidiscrimination law is a powerful tool for reducing segregation by race and class in America.

As Margery Austin Turner and Stephen Ross explain in chapter 4, fighting contemporary patterns of housing discrimination is nevertheless key to ensuring that people can make full and informed housing choices, and the fight will need to adapt to changing patterns of behavior—over-the-phone discrimination in which landlords and rental agents respond to accents and ethnically identifiable names, more education of immigrants about their housing rights, and education and testing to combat unequal assistance by realtors with mortgage finance. Regulation strategy expert Malcolm Sparrow offers a compelling argument for picking important problems on such a list and problem solving creatively around them, rather than continuing a broad and diffuse, procedure-focused compliance effort that seems destined to continue failing.9 Finally, beyond the specific domain of consumer rights in the housing market, other rights-based strategies—addressing transportation equity and a host of issues relevant to metropolitan development patterns—may turn out to be significant in the years ahead.

**Competing Objectives**

Some barriers to opportunity in America—discrimination in the housing market on the basis of race, for example—are simply wrong. The law says so. We should ensure that rights are well understood and improve the mechanisms for detecting violations, and violators should be held accountable. But many of the choices that confront America’s communities, including those that tap into sharply conflicting interests related to real estate or turf, are far more discretionary and distributional in character. These choices do not juxtapose minority and majority rights in a straightforward standoff. Rather, the most important choices that will define the future of our communities involve difficult trade-offs among a host of issues relevant to metropolitan development patterns—may turn out to be significant in the years ahead.

more affordable for a wide variety of households, especially for working families, while specifically promoting equitable access regardless of race (since neither objective ensures the other); preserving the quality of life of built-up communities while accommodating new population growth across a range of incomes (perhaps through smarter growth); and ensuring an appropriate degree of local decisionmaking—in a country that cherishes localism—while addressing urgent, higher-level goals that will shape the fortunes of entire metropolitan regions, states, and the nation (achieving what we might term home-rule-plus).

These housing-related dilemmas, and the imperfect resolutions that most policies and programs represent, are analogous to the difficult education dilemmas that have stirred so much public debate of late—for example, public university admissions plans that seek to both reward merit and reduce inequality by race and income, promoting diversity in the educational experiences of all students.10 Mara Sidney, in her chapter analyzing the politics of fair housing and affordable housing in two very different metropolitan areas (chapter 12), shows why competing objectives require careful political strategies, not just clever policy measures. One reason that laundry lists of reform spur too little action is that too often advocates sidestep the thorny issue of trade-offs or demonize the opposition. In saying this, I am not arguing that all views on race, space, and opportunity are equally valid—rather that competing objectives call for creativity in reframing problems to be less zero-sum (win/lose) where possible, finding ways to mitigate costs and compensate those who disproportionately bear them, adding issues to the mix to make more valuable trades possible among the parties in conflict, and organizing new constituencies for important ideas, not just cutting deals with the parties and interests already in play.11 In the final part of this chapter, I illustrate how such stakeholder and issue analyses can lead to innovative problem solving.

Integrating All Groups versus Empowering Some Groups

Since the uneven geography of opportunity is, as Camille Charles puts it, color coded, we face the puzzle of defining an agenda for public action that balances the important aims of integration—not forced but available for those who choose it—with those of group empowerment. Even if it enjoyed more public attention and wider support, the traditional integrationist agenda, whether focused on integration by race or class or both, is clearly no cure-all. No agenda for public policy and public action can address itself strictly to the integration of privileged communities—what economist Anthony Downs analyzed as “opening up the suburbs” some thirty years ago—at the expense of those who continue to

live in, or who move into, disadvantaged areas. Improving life and expanding opportunity for members of disadvantaged groups who do not move is also critical. Downs acknowledged that, and so have other careful observers, often to promote community development (place upgrading) but more recently to advance race-targeted programs, such as charter schools designed to focus on the learning needs of minority students.

Fierce arguments over these contrasting aims go back to the upheaval of the 1960s—to the politics of the War on Poverty, the civil rights movement, and the claims of ethnic nationalism. Not only have race-conscious public policies lost considerable support in recent decades, so too have efforts to promote racial integration specifically—and not just the controversial federal efforts focused on low-income housing that John Goering recounts in chapter 6. One oppositional school of thought, more popular with white Americans but enjoying minority support as well, argues that “affirmative,” race-conscious policies, including some that promote residential integration by race, undermine the very equal opportunity standards that advocates of racial equity claim to promote—that affirmative amounts to discriminatory. In the 1990s the argument that affirmative policies discriminate against whites scored significant victories in the courts and legislatures, for example, as well as in the court of public opinion.

A second oppositional school, more often minority led, argues that integration has either been oversold (in its benefits) or comes at too great an opportunity cost for individuals, minority groups, and the society at large (in terms of other goods or objectives traded off). Should a minority renter or homebuyer family move into a neighborhood composed mainly of another racial or ethnic group, risking harassment and managing the costs of adjustment, for the sake of a complex bundle of benefits that living in a particular community might confer over time? The evidence is that people differ in their calculus of these costs and benefits and thus in their willingness to make such choices. Should precious public resources emphasize the creation of mixed-income housing and other investments to attract middle-income, racially diverse housing consumers to urban neighborhoods, when housing affordable to low-income households is at crisis scarcity levels in many communities? Should we address the increasing segregation of schools across lines of city and suburb (between-district segregation) if that focus somehow diverts attention from the strengthening of urban schools for the children they currently enroll?

As Camille Charles underlines in her chapter, there is some evidence that “integration fatigue” has grown among minorities, even as white attitudes show greater racial tolerance and, at the same time, less support for the notion that minorities deserve special help to overcome ongoing disadvantages. Racial integration efforts confront opposition from strange political bedfellows, then,
including some minorities and liberal whites, who think integration too costly and less urgent than other needs, and conservatives—of all racial and ethnic backgrounds—who think the available means of promoting greater integration are unfair.

Meanwhile, in the group empowerment domain, the cause of community development—and the impressively developed industry of mostly nonprofit organizations that work to advance it—has thus far been given a paper cup, as the saying goes, to bail out an ocean. Most of the conditions that make inner-city America such a consistent nexus of social problems, for example, are orchestrated by social and economic forces operating at a metropolitan or larger scale. These are forces that small community developers targeting particular neighborhoods, and likewise faith institutions and secular social welfare groups that do important work with disadvantaged individuals and families, are simply not equipped to change.\(^\text{13}\) All too often, community development simply “holds up the bottom”—that is, prevents conditions from worsening significantly in the most vulnerable places—or unintentionally spurs gentrification that may displace low-income and minority residents. Efforts to reform the most segregated urban schools likewise achieve mostly modest victories in a context offering long odds.

It is not enough to declare that both integration and group empowerment are important—that is, expanding housing choices across metropolitan areas for people of all backgrounds and ensuring that every neighborhood and every school, no matter how modest, can be a stepping-stone to opportunity. The larger task is leveraging the changes in metropolitan America to promote both aims—at once, at a meaningful scale. As Angela Glover Blackwell and Judith Bell explain in their chapter on innovations in practice and policymaking, attending to the inclusiveness and the long-term viability of a range of communities and their residents is the core wisdom of an agenda for equitable development (see chapter 13). Such dual attention is also at the heart of what David Rusk calls the “inside game/outside game” that can make both cities and suburbs work.\(^\text{14}\) Any meaningful dual agenda will address the interests of the central cities that we typically associate with our deepest social ills and societal contradictions, as well as the less usual suspects—the older “at risk” suburbs struggling with city-like problems and limited resources to respond; the rapidly growing bedroom suburbs that are burdened by excessive, unplanned, growth; and the other types of communities that define metropolitan America.\(^\text{15}\) Addressing this range of problems is crucial, since cities are not the only, and in some areas not the primary, gateways for new arrivals; suburban communities are increasingly

important gateways for minority families, including many first- and second-
generation immigrants. But moving from an agenda in principle to the civics of
change requires a closer look at just how fast the local politics of social equity
has changed in America in recent decades.

Addressing the Local Politics of Exclusion

Not only are exclusionary suburban communities fiercely protective of their
autonomy on land use and fiscal matters, but thanks to steady suburbanization,
cities have been losing ground for forty years in political representation at the
state and federal levels. Chicago’s share of Illinois’ population dropped from 35
percent to 23 percent between 1960 and 2000, for example, and Detroit’s from
21 percent to just under 10 percent of Michigan’s.16 In the same period, subur-
banites and their interests came to the fore in Congress and by 1992 had come
to represent the majority electorate nationally and the dominant focus of presi-
dential campaigns.17

By far the most talked about political idea for addressing these realities is
Myron Orfield’s “winning coalition” strategy.18 Drawing on his own leadership
experience in the Minnesota state legislature, Orfield suggests that central cities
and at-risk suburbs represent a natural coalition that can, if well organized, out-
vote the more affluent suburban interests that defend fiscal inequities and race
and class exclusion. Orfield points to revenue sharing and other policy reforms
as evidence of Minnesota’s success at addressing enormous inequalities in the
resources available to local communities. The key arena, says Orfield, is state
legislatures, where the authority over local taxation, land use, transportation and
infrastructure investments, and more are concentrated in America’s system of
federalism.

As political scientist Hal Wolman and his colleagues observe, though, very
little careful analysis has been done of coalition formation in statehouses. In
their four-state study of city and suburban governments’ political strategies and
state-level policy agendas, these researchers find that the potential for Orfield-
esque coalitions is clear in varied state contexts but that it is mostly that—
potential.19 Cities and older suburbs, far from cooperating around fiscal equity
interests, largely compete over infrastructure and other investments, defending
their immediate interests in every-town-for-itself lobbying. Regionalism does
not rank high for any jurisdiction, leaving a political vacuum. “Instead of con-
ceiving a single regional fiscal interest,” conclude the researchers, “coalitions
should be built around different issue areas that have a regional dimension, such

as transportation, public education, and fair share housing.” These analysts acknowledge the role of leadership in mining the potential for new coalitions, and they underscore the fact that, because of their statewide constituency, governors, Republicans and Democrats alike, often have the strong “natural” interest in genuinely regional issues, such as economic competitiveness. Recent efforts by the Brookings Institution to provide research support for regional efforts to bring back distressed communities in Pennsylvania, Maine, and other states corroborate these initial conclusions by political observers: Common-stakes coalitions must be actively forged, often against the grain of short-term political horizons, well-established and narrow conceptions of what it takes to revive local economies (chasing after sports stadiums, for example), the perennial instinct to “build it new,” and more. But once forged, coalitions can leverage important changes in state policy, reversing the common bias for new suburban or ex-urban growth and against older, built-up communities.

In Place Matters, a broader analysis of the political prospects for crossing the city-suburban divide, political scientists Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom emphasize, like Orfield, the ways in which demographic trends and voting patterns do not fit the stereotype through which political leaders play on the fears of a white, conservative suburban majority. First, suburbs, as we have seen, are increasingly diverse in both race and class terms. Suburbs thus offer greater potential for novel issue framing—changing the way people think about important issues rather than talking about different issues entirely—to tap emergent interests, new coalitions among groups, and policy innovations than the ingrained image of the city-suburban divide suggests. Second, increased racial and ethnic diversity is creating new and varied patterns of conflict and cooperation among immigrant groups, native-born blacks, and whites—patterns that will be become more important as immigrants naturalize, register to vote, and mobilize around particular candidates and issues. In addition, redistricting could shift the balance of the congressional electorate in profound ways in the years to come. Finally, particular political figures—Bill Clinton, for example—show that elected officials can be quite successful by campaigning on common-purpose themes that appeal to a wide array of voters in city and suburbs alike.

Beyond electoral politics, note the researchers, important nongovernmental groups—business, labor, and civic organizations—are making use of the burgeoning supply of sophisticated regional analyses and commentary from opinion leaders in media and academia. These nongovernmental actors are crucial for overcoming the tendency of elected officials, in both cities and suburbs, to protect turf rather than engage in longer-run coalition building and serious

change. Policy Link’s work (chapter 13) is a standout example, and Mara Sidney’s chapter examines political options available to nonprofit advocates in distinct political contexts, in particular to use issue framing and forge wider coalitions rather than hew to a narrower compliance orientation. One lesson of her careful case studies may be that we do need dedicated compliance agents (who support enforcement) but that some of these agents cannot effectively double as policy advocates (who build a broader political base and push for basic reform).

Edward Goetz, Karen Chapple, and Barbara Lukermann, in their chapter on how fair share politics and policy unraveled in the Twin Cities region, suggest a few key principles for the metropolitics of fair share housing strategies: First, policy tools that merely permit something controversial (affordable housing, say) will not deliver on it if local support has eroded or remains disorganized and if a shift in budget politics destroys needed development subsidies; and second, specific powers held by regional, state, or other supralocal levels of government indeed represent crucial levers for change. When regional authorities chose not to monitor and enforce fair share housing requirements, local communities in the Twin Cities region were free to ignore affordable housing, leaving fair share principles “on the books” but doing little to deliver on those principles. The Twin Cities experience does not suggest that fair share strategies are doomed to failure, only that their success hinges on political and fiscal support that endures beyond initial efforts by reformers to get progressive policy measures on the books.

Finally, as the infamous and long-litigated saga of exclusionary zoning in Mount Laurel, New Jersey, underscores, the courts remain an important arena for securing key public commitments when electoral and legislative politics fail to address them. But as with fair share housing in the Twin Cities, what the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled as policy, and what families in search of wider housing opportunity actually realized in the way of benefits, were quite different. In its landmark 1975 ruling (Mount Laurel I) and a series of linked rulings in the decades that followed, the court found that exclusionary zoning violated the general welfare provision of the state constitution by failing to address regional housing needs. The court indicated that local governments throughout the state had an affirmative obligation to include low- and moderate-income housing in their development plans. Data on the production of low- and moderate-income housing in their development plans.


23. For an overview of the rulings and a comparison to Pennsylvania’s distinct approach to exclusionary zoning over the same period, see Mitchell (2004). Assessments of the impact of inclusionary zoning (that is, over and above what would have happened in its absence) are rare. Using an innovative data set combining an aerial survey with the housing census for the 1970—90 period in the eight-county Philadelphia metropolitan area, which includes counties in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Mitchell finds that Pennsylvania’s approach, which did not link the builder’s remedy to inclusion of low- and moderate-income housing, has had a larger impact on the diversity of housing types produced over the long run. Mitchell suggests that New Jersey’s Mount Laurel
moderate-income housing since *Mount Laurel I* suggest that about 26,000 affordable units have been produced around the state, most of them as a result of the policy, but that little racial integration—a secondary objective of the inclusionary ruling—has occurred. What is more, thanks to *Mount Laurel II*, the primary mechanism for overcoming exclusionary land use is a “builder’s remedy,” by which real estate developers can gain approvals in towns that fail to come up with an inclusionary plan. Once authorized by the court or a state administrative agency, developers must produce one housing unit affordable to low- and moderate-income families for every four new market-rate units.

By favoring new development, the Mount Laurel incentives are now clashing with a major push by state and local leaders to curb sprawl—both to preserve farmland and to protect wildlife habitat. As a land use attorney working for the New Jersey association of local governments told the *New York Times*, “It’s not that people are opposed to affordable housing. They’re just opposed to the sprawl that comes along with it.” Whether or not the first claim is valid, the second underscores the folly of ignoring competing objectives: Efforts to respond to economic and social diversity will struggle in new ways if diversity only comes with growth and growth itself is increasingly unpopular. Developing more varied policy tools to promote inclusionary growth, a theme discussed by Rolf Pendall, Arthur Nelson, Casey Dawkins, and Gerrit Knaap in their chapter on growth management and by Blackwell and Bell in their chapter on equitable development, will be crucial in the years ahead. So will efforts to build political support for the tools that offer results.

**Summary**

Strategies for expanding the geography of opportunity will, like it or not, reflect some resolution, however imperfect, of these four dilemmas—the necessary evolution of civil rights enforcement (recognizing the limits of antidiscrimination strategies for changing the geography of opportunity), a range of competing objectives that are not resolvable merely by invoking rights, the uneasy coexistence of integrationist and group empowerment aims, and local political framework remained vulnerable to local opposition, which the Pennsylvania policy avoided by mandating a variety of housing types, including apartments and townhouses, without stipulating income levels of occupants. Cowan (2001), in a statistical analysis of inclusionary zoning in four states, finds credible evidence of positive impacts, most of all in communities with some preexisting racial and ethnic diversity. Supported by careful policy analysis, a multi-stakeholder task force in one of those states—Massachusetts—has developed new proposals to address the concerns of municipalities that oppose a diversity of housing types, including state funding formulas that would respond to increased enrollments in local public schools and thereby mitigate the exclusionary effects of fiscal zoning. See Carman, Bluestone, and White (2003).

opposition—all in the context of shifting demographic sands in cities and suburbs. Before I outline a policy agenda that reflects these considerations, however, I consider next the odd character of housing as a public issue.

The Invisible, Contentious Public Issue

Given that housing is everywhere and is so basic a human need, it is curiously invisible as a public issue in America. Housing represents the single largest expense for most families, one-fifth of the nation’s economy, far and away the primary source of wealth for most families who own their homes and, in the form of attaining homeownership, a key to asset building for the millions of renter families who have little or no wealth.25 Housing was also a primary source of ballast in the recent economic downturn, as owners “cashed out” significant housing wealth—almost $100 billion in 2002 alone—to buy goods and services.26 Over the past half-century, since the landmark Housing Act of 1949 declared “a decent home and a suitable living environment for all Americans” to be a national policy goal, America saw enormous change in its housing stock. The quality of our housing has increased dramatically—fifty to a hundred years ago, shacks and unhealthy tenement buildings constituted the most visible housing problem—and so, too, have the costs, as building codes became more stringent and as demand for bigger and better housing increased along with family incomes.

To be fair, certain things about housing require little ongoing public attention or policy response. Well-established tax and land use policies that reward homeowners and support the building, real estate, and financial services industries enjoy broad and deep political support. The federal income tax deduction for home mortgage interest and for local property tax payments represents a transfer of over $100 billion a year to homeowners, who are primarily middle and upper income; that is about five times the total spent on all housing programs for low- and moderate-income people.27 Most Americans, whether they are owners or renters who wish to become owners, support pro-ownership tax policies, though, and the low mortgage rates that signal a healthy supply of credit and consumption in the economy as a whole.

It is particular housing problems, then, that are largely invisible to the body politic. They are not at all invisible, however, to the 28 million American households who live in unaffordable housing.28 For a variety of reasons, housing costs

28. “Affordable” housing is, by the federal government’s definition, housing that does not cost its occupants more than 30 percent of household income. If Bill Gates’s home meets this criterion, regardless of the dollar amount he spends, his home is “affordable” by this definition. “Subsidized”
and wages on the bottom of the economic ladder have diverged significantly over the past thirty years, particularly in high-demand regions of the country. This widening gap has created an affordability crisis in many metropolitan housing markets and is most acute for working families at low- and moderate-income levels and for the nonworking poor. On average, a parent working full time must earn almost $15 an hour, about three times the federal minimum wage, in order to afford a “modest” two-bedroom home or apartment, by federal standards. This minimum “housing wage” is much higher in many of the nation’s most vibrant metropolitan economies. The evidence from leading economists is that land use regulation contributes mightily to the cost problem, particularly in the tightest housing markets, exacting a steep “zoning tax.”

Although careful investigations consistently find the scarcity of decent, affordable rental housing to be the biggest cost burden facing families on welfare or in the nation’s large low-wage job market, attention to high housing costs, such as it is, is often not focused on the needs of these struggling low-income families. Public attention to the gap between wages and housing costs often coincides with middle-class housing “crises”—when, for example, at the height of the dot.com boom in Austin, Boston, San Francisco, Seattle, and other hot local markets college-educated, middle-class professionals were lined up around the block to secure decent apartments at the same time that many urban neighborhoods began to gentrify under the new demand, displacing low- and moderate-income families and rendering some homeless.

29. This divergence holds even when housing size and other factors that vary over time are held constant. Quigley and Raphael (2004) find that a marked increase in the amount of housing consumed by the average American household, together with inflation and higher incomes, cannot explain the widening gap between wages and housing costs for low-income workers and their families. Unlike other government programs that provide health or income supplements to families based on means testing, housing programs do not make use of the single, nationally defined (federal) poverty threshold (see note above). Moreover, distinctions between housing cost burden in general and the scale of housing needs for families of modest incomes in particular have created labels that confuse public discussions about housing need and the rightful aims of housing policy.

Whatever the focus, America's first urgent housing problem is affordability, most of all for those with low and moderate incomes. Second is the problem of where housing affordable to those households is located. As I note in chapter 2, racial segregation patterns partly reflect the concentration of low- and moderate-income housing in particular neighborhoods of cities and older suburbs, a problem that careful observers have underscored since Charles Abrams wrote *Forbidden Neighbors*, a study of prejudice in housing, in 1955. Beyond the problem of cost, then, is an urgent need to expand the geography of affordable housing. This was a core element of many policy recommendations to enhance the viability of cities and also to improve race relations in the 1960s and 1970s. But in general, this aim, distinct from the aim of expanding the supply of affordable housing anywhere, has been a focus for a relatively small number of state and local governments plus a small, politically vulnerable constituency of housing advocates relegated to “playing defense” on the affordability problem. Focusing low-income housing assistance—for example, via public housing and the Section 8 rental subsidy program—on the poorest of the poor, a basic federal targeting decision that reflects a worthy commitment to the most vulnerable, has, sadly, only increased local opposition to dispersing low- and moderate-income housing.33

In *From the Puritans to the Projects*, an incisive history of “public housing and public neighbors,” urban historian Lawrence Vale details the deep roots of our ambivalence toward the placement of the poor in our midst—and the mixed motives of policy efforts, since the New Deal, to house the economically marginal.34 Beyond the cultural or attitudinal elements of this contention, there is the question of immediate economic and political calculus: When it comes to the forces that squeeze the housing supply or restrict it to certain geographic areas, the monetary interests of owners and renters are frequently in conflict. Most owners and other property investors become wealthier when land and housing prices increase, while renters benefit from lower prices. So those with an investment interest in housing do not naturally rally around the needs of those who merely consume housing.35

In this context, housing advocacy’s important and largely defensive battle over affordability risks a number of hazards. One is trading away social inclusion as a public value: “Help them secure housing but not here in my community.” A second hazard is increasing the concentration of affordable housing in inner-city areas or older at-risk suburbs, far away from quality schools, job growth, safer

35. Students of local politics refer to this as a distinction between those who hold use values (only) and those who have exchange values in property. Logan and Molotch (1987) offer the classic analysis of this political economy of place, and Goetz and Sidney (1994) vividly demonstrate the conflicts between these two in a Minneapolis case they aptly title “Revenge of the Property Owners.”
streets, and other keys to opportunity and upward mobility. That is, even if we manage to supply more affordable housing, if it is only across a sharply restricted geography our public policies will worsen the very geography of inequality that we need to overcome.

An earlier generation of housing assistance policies showed the folly of building low-cost housing wherever we could: Racially segregated ghettos grew up quickly around some of the largest high-rise public housing projects, especially when rules on eligibility and rent made it unattractive for working families to live in them.36 Now, for better or worse, the winds of policy reform are blowing. Whereas “housing opportunity” had long been used as a mere synonym for housing assistance output (units added to the low-cost housing supply, tenant-based vouchers, and so on), in the 1990s a larger, richer concept of a housing opportunity bundle—including geographic access to key supports (better schools, areas of job growth, safer streets, perhaps richer social networks, and more)—became a staple of housing policy debates, at least at the federal level.37 Beleaguered housing assistance programs swung back, belatedly perhaps, to the core axiom of all real estate practice: Location matters. As Sue Popkin and Mary Cunningham warn in chapter 8, the sea change in federal policy, felt most dramatically in the transformation of stigmatized public housing projects, brings new risks, such as reinforcing existing patterns of racial and economic segregation and leaving many vulnerable families at risk of losing shelter altogether.

Finally, if the availability and location of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families garner little attention in today’s political debates, a third housing policy aim, that of fighting discrimination by race, religious creed, disability, or other “protected classes,” has been still more invisible and politically vulnerable. This is in spite of the fact that fair housing is, by nature, a universal policy that protects Americans of all backgrounds. Recall that most Americans think housing discrimination is wrong and know it is illegal but also believe that it is no longer much of a problem.

Housing Policy Redux

At least since the 1960s, government has faced dilemmas on all three fronts—housing cost, geographic concentration, and fair access. Most state governments spend little to help meet housing needs and largely defer land use decisions to

36. See Massey and Denton (1993). Under current provisions, federal rent vouchers—subsidies that follow families rather than physical developments—have largely failed, for more than two decades now, to deliver access to a wide range of quality neighborhoods, though they do much better than public housing (a fixed, place-based form of housing assistance). See Newman and Schnare (1997); Devine and others (2003). Several chapters in this volume assess the implications of expanding the geography of housing assistance (Rosenbaum, DeLuca, and Tuck, chapter 7; Goering, chapter 6).
local governments. Local governments, in turn, behave according to their demographics, fiscal base, and organized constituencies: Central cities tend to have the best developed housing programs but weakest fiscal capacity, plus they can do little—at least, directly—to encourage suburbs to accept their fair share of low- and moderate-income housing. Older suburbs fear becoming low-rise ghettos if a concentration of social need should “tip” their communities. And affluent bedroom suburbs and suburban job centers tend to recognize no self-interest in accepting low- or moderate-income households from their less affluent neighboring communities. As Pendall and his colleagues explain in chapter 10, since local land use policy has long been linked to race and class exclusion, the new generation of efforts to rethink the management of local development will have to pursue inclusionary growth quite intentionally if inclusion is a goal.

As for federal action, the easiest way for the federal government to offer support is through financial subsidies—grants, loan guarantees, and tax credits—to nonprofits, businesses, and state and local governments. But political and fiscal pressure has steadily reduced these federal subsidies, both in real terms and as a share of domestic spending, over the last twenty-five years. As Goetz, Chapple, and Lukermann show in chapter 11, the significant reduction in federal aid to local government housing programs was central to the unraveling of metropolitan fair share programs in the Twin Cities, a region often hailed for its progressive, interjurisdictional (metropolitan) approaches to urban problems. Along with a reduced fiscal commitment overall, the federal government stopped the expansion of public housing thirty years ago and has steadily increased the participation of businesses and nonprofit organizations in developing and managing low- and moderate-income housing. Meanwhile, enforcing antidiscrimination protections is a federal obligation, but since bad behavior is so difficult to detect, effective fair housing enforcement depends on a host of local actions engaging government agencies, realtors, consumers, fair housing advocates and testing agents, and often prodiversity civic groups. Here, too, federal funding has been modest—under $50 million in the 2004 fiscal year—and its effects limited.

In a prospective look at housing policy in the 1990s, Langley Keyes and Denise DiPasquale illustrate how major federal policy statements tend to reflect the prevailing political winds as well as these longer-run features of the housing policy landscape. In 1968, for example, the report by President Johnson’s

40. Blank and Ellwood (2002); Bratt (2003).
41. Goetz (1993). Only about one-quarter of all eligible households actually receive federal rental assistance (Dolbear 2002), a figure that did not increase even over the course of the nation’s record-breaking economic expansion in the 1990s. At $15 billion to $20 billion in expenditure a year, this is the nation’s largest single program to help low- and moderate-income families meet their housing costs.
42. Galster (1990); Turner and Ross, chapter 4; and Sidney, chapter 12, this volume.
Committee on Urban Housing assumed strong federal leadership and significant funding to expand and disperse affordable housing. Largely made up of distinguished private sector leaders, the committee believed that America’s key housing problems were fixable and that public-private partnerships, while desirable, should not preclude federal activism where required.

In 1982 President Reagan’s Commission on Housing struck a very different tone and articulated very different assumptions and policy priorities. It concluded that 1960s-era programs had largely compounded, not ameliorated, problems of urban deterioration and the isolation of low-income and minority families from economic opportunity. “The nation cannot afford yet another system of entitlements expanding endlessly out of effective control,” said the report.\footnote{Report of the President’s Commission on Housing (1983, p. xxii).} Dispersal and racial desegregation aims were nowhere on the agenda, but getting rid of costly regulations would, the commission assured, unleash “the genius of the market economy.”

In 1988 the National Housing Task Force, which was formed by Congress and not the president, sounded a vital, if largely unheeded, warning: Most Americans had achieved the vision of the 1949 act, but “for millions of our families, we have not only fallen short, we are losing ground.”\footnote{Report of the National Housing Task Force (1988, p. 1).} The task force noted that the nation’s low-rent stock was eroding, making it crucial to both preserve existing affordable supply and to creatively expand that supply through partnerships with private and nonprofit actors.

The latest national policy group, the Bipartisan Millennial Housing Commission appointed by Congress, focuses its 2002 report on America’s steadily growing affordability crisis, which generally reflects the trends highlighted by the task force some fourteen years earlier: a loss of affordable housing supply (low-rent units most of all) and growing demand from households that earn too little. The commission outlines a vision for the nation’s housing that emphasizes wider access to opportunity: “To produce and preserve more sustainable, affordable housing \textit{in healthy communities} to help American families progress up the ladder of economic opportunity.”\footnote{Bipartisan Millennial Housing Commission (2002, p. 4), emphasis added.} The report’s case for larger and wiser housing investments mentions the importance of neighborhood quality and geographic access to opportunity, and its outline of barriers to more affordable supply cites exclusionary zoning and costly fees imposed by local governments—the focus of the 1991 Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, which had been appointed by HUD secretary Jack Kemp, and of a recent update on “barrier removal” published by HUD.\footnote{Advisory Commission (1991); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2005). For a detailed critique of the Millennial Housing Commission’s work by a long-time advocate of inclusionary and affordable housing, see Chester Hartman, “Millennial Misfire,” \textit{Shelterforce Online} (www.nhi.org/online [July 2002]).}
But other than this indirect acknowledgment of how avidly most American communities exclude affordable housing, the Bipartisan Millennial Housing Commission sidesteps the question of segregation by race and class, and its policy recommendations do not include actions by the federal government to encourage states and localities to be more inclusionary as the nation’s population grows and becomes more diverse. The commission echoes the importance of community quality as a key societal aim but—sadly—offers only tepid support for the fiscal or other changes that realizing this aim might require. It is unfortunate, given the demographic and spatial patterns so clearly reshaping the local landscape throughout America, that this bipartisan national policy statement offers so little recognition of segregation and virtually no support for a public response. More specifically, the commission fails to acknowledge the real risk: that we will succeed in expanding the supply of affordable housing but only in the well-contained geography that already hosts most such housing. Again, the risk is deepening the very inequalities of place that we need to undo as the nation becomes more diverse and the sharp inequality in incomes persists. Finally, it is unfortunate that the commission’s report, such as it is, managed to attract so little attention, whether from policymakers, the media, or the general public. HUD, once the nation’s ambitious agency for urban problem solving, did not even issue a statement acknowledging the release of this “millennial” report.

Conclusion

The public conversation in America has often ignored, and well-intended policy debates tend to muddle, a crucial distinction. Framed as a question of strategy, the distinction is this: Should we emphasize reducing segregation by race and class (through what I term “cure” strategies), or should we emphasize reducing its terrible social costs without trying to reduce the extent of segregation itself to any significant degree (via “mitigation” strategies)? Put differently, should we invest in changing where people are willing and able to live, or should we try to transform the mechanisms that link a person’s place of residence to their opportunity set? These strategies respond to distinct definitions of the problem to be solved (see table 14-1).

For ethical and practical reasons, it is hard to imagine choosing one strategy, always and everywhere, instead of the other, and where mitigation strategies are concerned, in spite of the less satisfying label, proposals to offer car vouchers to low-income households (to address job sprawl) and to upgrade struggling neighborhoods and schools hint at urgent, and in some cases very immediate and practical, responses to inequality. These examples also hint at how widely policy proposals in this category range in terms of their do-ability, cost, potential leverage on the outcomes we care about (educational success, job attainment, health and well-being, and so on), and evident political support. Regardless, mitigation
Table 14-1. Transforming the Geography of Opportunity: Which Strategies for Which Problems?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Leading to Segregation</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary land use policies and limited supply of affordable housing</td>
<td>Cures for problems leading to segregation (strategies for reducing rates of segregation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create more choices through fair share housing policies, inclusionary zoning, review of local land use decisions for focal projects supported by higher governments, fiscal reforms to address “zoning for dollars,” funding to expand supply and to subsidize demand by low- and moderate-income households, regional mobility programs for these households, and supportive housing for at-risk families.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination by sellers, lenders, brokers, and public housing agencies</td>
<td>Protect choices through fair housing testing, enforcement, and education (of sellers, consumers, real estate brokers, lenders).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregative residential choices of consumers (including “neighborhood avoidance”) in cities and suburbs</td>
<td>Promote more informed choice and new choices through affirmative marketing (to all racial groups); through community development (area-based upgrading), including mixed-income and mixed-tenure housing development, to attract diverse in-movers; and through housing subsidies and counseling and choice incentives for low-income households.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems Stemming from Segregation</td>
<td>Mitigation of problems stemming from segregation (strategies for reducing costs of segregation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational inequality across schools or school districts</td>
<td>Desegregate schools through voluntary choice and magnet programs, fiscal transfers to reduce funding inequalities or strengthen low-performing schools, and vouchers to encourage wider choice and competition, with racial equity safeguards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers to job access</td>
<td>Create transportation alternatives, such as car vouchers, reverse commute transit programs, regional workforce development alliances or networks (intermediation, matching of workers and jobs), equal employment opportunity (antidiscrimination) enforcement and education, and workforce development and “job readiness” programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatially concentrated crime, lower quality housing and services, lack of amenities</td>
<td>Upgrade neighborhoods through reform of public services such as policing, health care, and human services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood stigmas that discourage investment and hiring</td>
<td>Upgrade neighborhoods, use positive marketing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
strategies could ensure that thousands of neighborhoods in central cities and at-risk suburbs act as stepping-stones, not isolating and damaging traps. Broadly, these strategies seek to improve places as contexts (valuable for what living in these places offers) and as locations (valuable for what one can access from these places). If we value competitive markets, local decisionmaking, and other features of society that generate some degree of economic inequality, then we should work to eliminate or substantially weaken the invidious link between where you can afford to live and what your life prospects, or those of your children, are.

Fair enough, but a society that venerates freedom of choice—with quasi-religious zeal, as the word *venerate* would imply—should also want to expand choices in ways that respond to the nation we are becoming, in demographic, economic, and other terms. Along with the other contributors to this volume, whose recommendations I examine below, I argue that expanding housing choice is a linchpin for any agenda to ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequality in a more and more diverse society. For this reason, and because the nature and quality of housing choices are also at the heart of the sustainable growth debate—the debate over sprawl and disinvestment in older places—I focus on cure strategies here.

In broad terms, expanding housing choices means three things: creating more valuable choices for a wider array of people, protecting those choices from discrimination and other barriers to choice, and enabling the choosers to make the best possible choices for themselves and their families. The narrowest reading of housing rights, for example, imagines a threshold protection of choice: access to the housing options one can afford, given the current rules of the development game. But as legal scholars and social critics Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres observe, the real questions for a changing society are: Who has a voice in setting those rules or changing them over time? And how can we set the rules in ways that deliver on the core of the American experiment—opportunity for all?48

These questions underline the importance of creating more choices—of transforming what it means to have choices, not just protecting the limited choices that so many of us have.

Several chapters in this book suggest that tried-and-true policies to create more choices by expanding the geography, not just the supply, of affordable housing deserve more support. First, we need to significantly expand funding, and also lower regulatory barriers and development costs, for affordable housing overall. Federal, state, and local proposals to create or expand housing trust funds are especially promising, as are a new generation of efforts to understand which land regulations and building codes impose excessive costs relative to

their benefits.\textsuperscript{49} The flexibility of a trust fund—which typically originates with a guaranteed public revenue source but blends these with varied private dollars as well—is good politics, not just savvy finance, as the case of the highly successful Los Angeles housing campaign shows.\textsuperscript{50} But new fund proposals at the state and federal levels should specifically consider financial incentives for localities or metropolitan regions that commit to lowering costly regulatory barriers and to dispersing housing for low- and moderate-income families.

Second, we should expand and diversify mixed-income housing policies and programs in particular. As Pendall and colleagues (chapter 10) and Blackwell and Bell (chapter 13) explain, mixed-income housing may represent our best hope for proactively integrating entire municipalities as well as neighborhoods. This is true both in exclusionary communities, which tend to offer high-performing schools and other special access to opportunity, and in revitalizing central cities, where many low-income families are being displaced by gentrification. But no one model works everywhere. For example, inclusionary zoning policies rely on significant new housing development to expand the supply and the geography of affordable housing, so inclusionary zoning best suits growing areas anticipating significant new housing development. Plus, most of these programs are race neutral, so promoting diversity, if that is a local aim, will hinge on social marketing or other supports to encourage racially and ethnically diverse occupancy.

Third, policymakers and advocates will need to negotiate a wiser second generation of fair share housing policies—learning from the 1970s and 1980s wave of reforms—as part of metropolitan planning, growth management, and investment. As Pendall and colleagues warn, local governments could decide to use the tools on the smart growth menu that protect open space and offer fewer public subsidies for private development but not the tools that would promote mixed-income housing and typically lead to greater racial diversity.\textsuperscript{51} And as Goetz, Chapple, and Lukermann show in the rise and fall of fair share in the Twin Cities area, passive policy without political support and needed development incentives, including subsidies, will do little. Policies that merely “permit” inclusionary housing may not produce it.

Fourth, we need to dramatically scale up well-implemented, metropolitan-wide housing mobility programs for low- and moderate-income families. As Goering emphasizes in his chapter, the early lessons of the ongoing federal


\textsuperscript{50} Dreier (2001).

\textsuperscript{51} Two major projects of the American Planning Association have produced useful guides; see Meck (2002), a study and public education effort that addresses growth management; and Meck, Retzlaff, and Schwab (2003), a study that offers a concise history of regional housing efforts as well as a host of strategies and state and local case studies.
Moving to Opportunity experiment are that low-income families do need special mobility encouragement and assistance but also that they can make successful, and potentially life-changing, moves to low-poverty areas. There are also signs that not all families adjust well, that there may be important challenges for particular members of mover families (such as boys, who seem to adapt differently from girls to new neighborhoods), and that housing assistance alone does not compensate for a lack of transportation to get around in more car-reliant areas (including suburbs) or for other barriers to social and economic success.

Offering a new look at the Gautreaux mobility program in metropolitan Chicago, James Rosenbaum, Stefanie DeLuca, and Tammy Tuck (chapter 7) emphasize that new capabilities and preferences, while they may take years to develop for low-income minority families that move into new environments, can operate in powerful ways to help such families take advantage of a wider geography of opportunity, including access to advantaged school districts. But if we are serious about using housing policy to connect more families to economic opportunity, why not link housing vouchers to car vouchers (or other transportation assistance) and, at the same time, emphasize job and school connections for low-income movers?

Fifth, the large-scale transformation of public housing that began in the 1990s is probably the most important shift in America’s low-income housing policy in a half century. But it will only be a positive shift if we find viable alternatives for many of the most vulnerable families who leave public housing. As Popkin and Cunningham show (chapter 8), without careful safeguards and programs to suit a range of family types—such as service-enriched “supportive housing”—the relocation of former public housing residents can reinforce existing patterns of racial segregation and leave many of the most vulnerable families at risk of losing shelter altogether.

Sixth, “doing less harm” ought to be a key tenet of the federal role in a new era of metropolitan opportunity and change. As Philip Tegeler indicates in chapter 9, we need to address the lingering, segregative effects of well-established federal housing and community development programs—including programs that now spur private and nonprofit developers, rather than public agencies, to produce almost all of the nation’s affordable housing. A number of large-scale, very important programs skirt the federal “site and neighborhood standards” that are meant to further integration and access to communities of opportunity. Funding more community development on a metropolitan basis may address some of these trade-offs. But so would key changes to existing laws and regulations, which Tegeler outlines.

Seventh, and finally among the options for creating more choice, promoting fiscal equity would remove perverse local incentives to exclude affordable housing—and even family housing generally, in some instances. Local officials in some of the nation’s fastest growing suburban towns use zoning to discourage
family-scale housing development, such as condominium units with more than two bedrooms. Fearing that school and other service costs will exceed their property tax capacity, these officials in effect favor what the Boston Globe has labeled “child-proof” housing.  

As I note in chapter 1, thanks in part to a high reliance on local property tax revenues to cover service costs, local governments in America have a perverse incentive to exclude (zone out) housing for low- and moderate-income working families in particular. State-level and metropolitan agreements could change this. Transfers from the federal level could help stimulate reforms, for example as part of broader metropolitan demonstration efforts to manage growth and strengthen connections to work for a wide range of families.

If creating new housing choices is the threshold strategy, however, protecting choice is equally important. As for discrimination in the search for housing, Turner and Ross, in chapter 4, outline stepped-up public education efforts (so an increasingly diverse consumer base knows its rights) along with updated testing and enforcement to detect and prosecute more violators, both for in-person and over-the-phone transactions. Meanwhile, William Apgar and Allegra Calder (chapter 5) emphasize the need to significantly improve the literacy of borrowers about credit schemes and financial risk, particularly in low-income and minority communities, and to strengthen laws against the most predatory lending, which has increased dramatically in just the past decade, proliferating new financial products but also stripping away hard-won assets from those who can least afford such losses. If one in six adult Americans is functionally illiterate, is it any wonder that so many millions are financially illiterate and thus prey to the worst abuses of deregulated capital markets? And finally, civil rights and community development advocacy are at last beginning to tackle the geography of opportunity beyond fair housing—through links to transportation equity and environmental justice, for example. Progress on these fronts would not only be advantageous and appropriate in and of itself but would also enhance the value of expanded housing choice.

In some instances, opportunities to create and protect housing choice are inextricably linked—one reason why making regional access to affordable housing should be a key agenda in more fair housing work. Mara Sidney shows in chapter 12 why reliance on narrowly defined federal fair housing policies may


53. Compared to local counterparts in Europe and other affluent regions, local governments in the United States are extraordinarily reliant on local revenues. European rates of intergovernmental aid range from a low of 40 percent in France to 60 percent in Great Britain and 80 percent in Italy, excluding costs for education, firefighters, and police, which are often paid for entirely by national governments (Savitch 2002). By comparison, U.S. cities obtain only about 30–35 percent of their revenues from higher government (state and federal) sources. See also Nivola (1999) on the fiscal dimensions of land use decisions and development patterns in Europe and the United States.

lead local fair housing advocates to marginalize themselves and miss out on key opportunities to build broader coalitions. On the other hand, supporting an expanded geography of affordable housing, in part by expanding the constituency for wider access, sometimes means choosing not to insist on racial set-asides or other guarantees of diversity. But as Sidney warns, “Continuing to avoid public discussion of race in order to win political support for housing measures does little to advance our political system’s ability to address real racial injustices.” Local context should determine the tactics that blend political confrontation and cooperation: going it alone versus acting in coalition, and “naming race” prominently versus addressing it more indirectly. A new generation of social marketing efforts could tap the interests of employers, schools and other public agencies, unions, and faith institutions in more proactively addressing racial and ethnic diversity in changing communities, especially in fast-growing ones. Rather than duck race (as an issue) in order to build broader coalitions, the practical politics of this will dictate the time and the place to make group-specific, including race-specific, claims. Clearly, not all efforts to promote racial justice and greater equity can be race-first or even race-based in their policy prescriptions. But just as clearly, they must be race-conscious in order to be credible as well as effective.

Finally, wider and better protected choices, while worthy in and of themselves, will not make the society less segregated if consumers make mostly segregative choices about where to live. In careful studies that encompass reported racial attitudes and preferences on one hand and actual housing choices (across several decades of census taking) on the other, researchers reaffirm the wisdom of an earlier generation of efforts, still going strong in a small number of neighborhoods and towns, to use affirmative, prodiversity marketing as well as community development (upgrading) strategies to attract a diversity of new residents. Considering the tensions between integration and empowerment, the questions ahead are not only about “receiving” communities’ willingness to be diversity friendly but about “sending” areas’ willingness to make their residents aware of their exit options. One example is renter and homeowner counseling that highlights neighborhood and school quality in communities that are racially different from, and typically less poor than, the sender areas that families leave behind—the basis for the well-known Gautreaux housing experiment in Chicago that chapter 7 profiles in a new light.

Because the constituency for change remains narrow and fragmented, advocates for change, both inside and outside of government, will need to bring employers, unions, faith communities, and other stakeholders into this arena. It will take broad support and a host of tailored political messages—some about economic competitiveness and fiscal sanity, others about social justice.

55. See Charles (chapter 3, this volume); Ellen (2000); Nyden, Maly, and Lukehart (1997).
and the practice of moral community—to make progress on these old divides (see table 14-2).

For employers, promoting housing that is affordable to working families is a smart competitive strategy, as the companies that built up mill and mining towns (and subsidized worker housing) recognized in the nineteenth century. But the housing issue needs the political capital of business at least as much as enlightened financial investment. As the track record and commitment of the San Francisco Bay area’s Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group shows, respected employers can make a big difference when advocating for well-designed affordable housing at local planning and zoning hearings, which do so much to determine the geography of housing opportunity in America. “Employer-assisted” housing programs, in which employers directly subsidize employees’ mortgages or other housing costs but do not necessarily advocate for more affordable housing development in a wider array of communities, merely scratch the surface of engagement by business.

For faith institutions, housing and community development challenges offer special opportunities to practice religious community, in part because all of the major faiths define social inclusion as a core value, and because, as Habitat for Humanity has shown so well around the globe, housing can build communities—literally and figuratively. What is more, not every faith or faith-based institution need become a developer of housing or a direct service provider. There are many useful leadership roles to be played on housing and the economic opportunity issues to which housing is linked, including regionwide advocacy and financial investment.

For unions, housing affordability—more specifically, decent housing in communities of opportunity—is a bread-and-butter issue for the membership base, arguably as vital as, though much less understood than, good schools and good jobs. Resurgent unions, mostly in the service sectors that represent the lion’s share of economic growth now, are likely to be very important players in urban politics in the decade ahead. Unions of hotel and restaurant workers, janitors, and other occupations have already shown their muscle in state and local races in California, Nevada, and New York, and of course unions of teachers, police officers, correctional officers, and firefighters have long shaped state and local budget battles and electoral outcomes. It remains to be seen whether unions and their potential allies will develop savvy policy agendas and winning coalitions that leverage the role of housing as a linchpin of economic opportunity in America.

Given what I describe as housing’s curious invisibility as a social policy issue, it is a shame that so much political analysis of the nation’s changing cities and regions emphasizes formal theoretical modeling rather than developing lessons for practical politics. Even in the face of sharp conflicts or public apathy, change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Priorities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Employers</td>
<td>Recruiting and developing a more racially and ethnically diverse workforce; recruiting and retaining employees in high-cost markets; projecting a socially responsible public image; maintaining positive relations with city hall and other levels of government</td>
<td>Clear business purpose; public image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>Recruiting and developing a more racially and ethnically diverse workforce; delivering “bread-and-butter” benefits to members (strong wages and benefits, good schools, affordable housing and healthcare); choosing socially responsible investments for union pension funds, such as affordable housing and community economic development</td>
<td>Increased membership; tangible benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public school officials and advocates</td>
<td>Improving outcomes for disadvantaged students; reducing achievement gaps by race and income; heading off costly litigation; addressing increased racial diversity in enrollments (many suburban communities)</td>
<td>Achievement gaps; cost savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan transportation agencies</td>
<td>Creating access to jobs through flexible (multimodal) mobility strategies; reducing costs of new infrastructure; creating positive spillovers and more sustainable development, such as through transit-oriented housing and shopping hubs</td>
<td>Demonstrable public benefit; cost reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith institutions</td>
<td>Practicing religious community through collective action and ministry activities; developing faith-based nonprofits (where appropriate); promoting morality in public and private life, by message and example; choosing socially responsible investments, such as affordable housing and community economic development</td>
<td>For faith-based nonprofit service providers, operational capacity and social impact; for others, increase in membership, community morals, consistency with core ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-rate housing developers</td>
<td>Tapping new markets; innovating to reduce costs, apply new technology, and serve a more diverse customer base; streamlining the development process</td>
<td>Meet market needs; reduce development costs and delays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordable housing developers</td>
<td>Creating more product to house more families; creating positive spillover effects through housing and economic development projects; building resilient communities of choice, beyond “bricks and mortar” output</td>
<td>Funds to expand scale; operating capacity to manage complex projects, for example in transit-oriented development or other new areas; reduced development costs and delays</td>
</tr>
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</table>
agents and other civic entrepreneurs often have more room for maneuver than they believe, as the evolving fields of negotiation, mediation, and consensus building illustrate. Efforts to map the interests of the range of stakeholders identified above should not only consider what key stakeholders actually value—as opposed to what an advocate may think they should value—but which issues or interests are most important to a given stakeholder. Where stakeholders value the same things equally, shared interests can lead to strong, natural coalitions. Where their priorities are very different, trades can often be negotiated, because one party can get more of what it wants at little cost to the other party. Many coalition builders assume, wrongly, that only shared interests should be emphasized, forgoing opportunities to inventory differences that may be crucial to negotiated agreement. Powerful coalitions can be forged among unusual suspects with seemingly disparate priorities.

Broad political support will be especially crucial if advocates for wider housing choice manage to seize the opportunities created by the contentious politics of sprawl. While consensus building has its place, broad support need not aim for consensus measures. As Myron Orfield argues, the latter can lead to lowest-common-denominator, offend-no-one solutions that are not solutions at all. And while an unfocused, everything-but-the-kitchen-sink approach should be avoided, housing advocates can work to recognize and make use of unexpected political opportunities. As Blackwell and Bell show in chapter 13, the growing public awareness of links among fair and affordable housing, access to jobs, school quality, and other regional opportunity priorities make for rich but challenging constituency organizing and political communication. Likewise, efforts by activist scholars, including those affiliated with the Brookings Institution’s Metropolitan Policy Program, are supporting big-tent coalitions that emphasize common stakes and broad reinvestment agendas. Environmentalists, businesspeople and economic development professionals, racial justice advocates, faith communities, unions, and others have a huge, shared stake in revitalizing older communities and redeploying the billions of local, state, and federal dollars that currently—and quite effectively—underwrite sprawl. These efforts are much more promising, over the long run, than a community development agenda that limits itself to neighborhood improvement, one small place at a time.

Where the prospects for racial equity are concerned, we cannot ignore or hope to sidestep the tensions between an integrationist agenda and the agenda of community (group-specific) empowerment. While we emphasize the case for integration in this book, the real aim is expanding choices and improving access to opportunity wherever people live and whomever they choose to live among. The evidence of our nation’s history is that we will never ensure equal opportunity in

a state of high segregation. But integration and community empowerment strategies can both be part of more equitable development in our communities.

America’s metropolitan dilemma is this: The promise and strains associated with rapid social change in our country—led by increased racial and ethnic diversity but reflecting growing economic inequality, an aging population, and other shifts as well—will register in the ways our communities choose to develop. There was nothing natural or inevitable about the current shape of things—the uneven geography of opportunity, the sprawl in housing and jobs, the sharp segregation by race and class. Nor are the alternatives to these patterns predetermined. But communities do have choices, and we should get on with the work of understanding and pursuing them.

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