CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The bulletin is this: Edge Cities mean that density is back.

—JOEL GARREAU (1991)

That much-quoted line from Joel Garreau's compelling and influential book *Edge City* often is cited with a sigh of relief by those who hope that suburbia is finally growing up and starting to behave itself. Many people in the smart growth movement—which seeks among other goals to build higher-density, mixed-use suburbs—are especially invested in the idea that maturing edge cities represent a hopeful future. Given this author's sympathies with the smart growth movement,[1] he is not especially happy to deliver the latest bulletin: the long-standing presence of "edgeless cities" means that sprawl is back—or, more accurately, that it never went away.

Edgeless cities, a form of sprawling office development that does not have the density or cohesiveness of edge cities, account for two-thirds of the office space found outside downtowns. Among the nation's largest office markets, edgeless cities have nearly twice the space of edge cities. And they are everywhere—no major metropolitan area is without them. Edgeless cities are not mixed-use, pedestrian-friendly areas, nor are they easily accessed by public transit. They are not even easy to locate, because they are scattered in a way that is almost impossible to chart. Edgeless cities spread almost imperceptibly throughout metropolitan areas, filling out central cities, occupying much of the space between more concentrated suburban business districts, and ringing the metropolitan area's

1. See Danielsen and Lang (1998); Danielsen, Lang, and Fulton (1999); Lang (2000a).

built-up periphery. It is telling that the 1999 movie *Office Space*, which was filmed in an edgeless landscape outside Dallas, makes no direct mention of the environment, although the director turns his satiric attention to just about everything else in suburbia, including traffic jams, formula restaurants, and cheaply constructed condos.

In contrast, edge cities are easy to find. Their buildings rise over the horizontal suburban landscape like the Emerald City over Oz. Garreau got in his car and drove to these places. He stood at their center, surveyed the scene, and declared the new city found. On the way to the new city, he passed through miles of uncharted suburbia. At the exit ramps along the nation's beltways, unnoted, were the other new cities. But Garreau is a reporter, not a social scientist. It is his job to report the notable—not the mundane.

A good example of an edgeless city is central New Jersey, especially the area around Princeton. The town of Princeton is a traditional center that features an old main street, Nassau Street, running alongside the university. But outside the city, things are not so tidy. Princeton as a business center is less a center than a region, more accurately called greater Princeton. Much of the region's office development spills north from the city for miles along route 1 toward New Brunswick, while some reaches south to Trenton. More offices lie along routes 27 and 206. Development also spreads east toward the New Jersey Turnpike, and office parks line many county and other minor roads. And Princeton's edgeless city is not isolated. Office development in neighboring Monmouth, Middlesex, Somerset, and Hunterdon counties fits the same pattern. There are a few older cities and some newer suburban office concentrations, but the vast majority of office space in central New Jersey (or greater Princeton) is edgeless. In total, central New Jersey edgeless cities stretch over a thousand square miles of metropolitan area.

Measuring edgeless cities has been a conceptual challenge requiring several trials involving various errors. The form of edgeless cities can be described in various ways—as illimitable, indefinite, undiscovered, imperceptible, elusive. The term "edgeless city" captures the fact that most suburban office areas lack a physical edge. Edgeless cities thus are cities in *function*, in that they contain office employment, but not in *form*, because they are scattered, unlike traditional and even some suburban office development. In contrast to some larger edge cities that combine large-scale office with major retail development, most edgeless cities contain isolated office buildings or small clusters of buildings of varying densities over vast swaths of metropolitan space.

Many social critics disparage edge cities as sprawling, alienating, corporate versions of real cities.[2] But if those critics do not like edge cities, they are absolutely going to hate edgeless cities, which are not even cohesive enough to pretend to be cities. Critics focus on edge cities in part because they can at least identify them. By contrast, edgeless cities are stealthy—they come in under the radar. The new urbanists snidely describe "edge cities" as "a term which implies urbanism but is in fact only the statistical *agglomeration* of housing, subdivisions, shopping centers, and business parks."[3] For new urbanists, "an Edge City is equivalent but not equal to a city." Consider that edgeless cities fit the new urbanist description of edge cities—minus "agglomeration"—and you get an idea of how low such critics' regard for edgeless cities must be.

Garreau's book sparked considerable controversy. It had its fans and its detractors, yet all but a few took Garreau at his word: that for bad or good, edge cities represented the suburban future.[4] Garreau had it right—or at least partly right. Edge cities represent one suburban future, but only one. This book reports on the other new metropolis to have emerged in the past few decades. It covers an alternative suburban future, the post-polycentric version.[5]

The study on which this book is based explores America's metropolitan form by examining the growth and spatial structure of nondowntown office space. Using rental office space data from 1979 to 1999, it shows how the nation's largest metropolitan areas arrived at their current commercial geography.[6] It looks at the evolving spatial structure of rental office space in thirteen of the nation's largest markets, which together contain more than 2.6 billion square feet of office space and 26,000 buildings. The markets are found throughout the United States: six are in the Northeast and Midwest, and seven are in the South and the West. The metropolitan areas studied are Atlanta, Boston,

2. For example, see Soja (1997).

3. CNU (1999), emphasis added.

4. Fans included Delany (1993) and Kenneth Jackson, "The View from the Periphery," *New York Times*, September 22, 1991, sec. 7, pp. 1, 11; detractors included Beauregard (1995), Clarke (1992), and Sharpe and Wallach (1992). For a skeptic, see Abbott (1991).

5. Descriptions of post-polycentric urban form have an extensive literature. For example, see Lessinger (1962), Lewis (1983, 1995), Lynch (1961), Pressman (1985), and Webber (1967).

6. Even though the data end with the last quarter of 1999, new construction fell off dramatically after that, leaving many markets unchanged during the next two years (ULI 2002).

Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.[7]

The study's major finding is that most metropolitan rental office space exists in either high-density downtowns or low-density edgeless cities. The medium-density office environments of edge cities and secondary downtowns, which account for eighty-one places in the study, constitute just one-quarter of metropolitan space. In addition, edgeless cities have more total space than the downtown in eleven of the thirteen metropolitan areas studied. Only New York City and Chicago, the two largest downtowns in the United States, surpass their region's edgeless cities in rental office space.

This book's main thesis is *not* that edgeless cities are especially new; the data show that they have been around for decades. It is that as both advocates and critics focused on edge cities, edgeless cities were overlooked. In the rush to find a new form of cohesiveness in the suburbs, most observers missed the chaos. That chaos is revealed by simply looking at the geography of office data. Most non-downtown office space falls outside large clusters, often appearing in smaller clusters, corridors, and scattered locations. Most important, exploring what drives the chaos may improve our comprehension of the new metropolis, which, despite being several decades old, is new to our understanding.

The study reported in this book is not intended to be an exhaustive multivariate statistical analysis, although the findings are partly data derived. The book is not an exercise in GIS (geographic information systems) technology, even though some preliminary office data maps are presented. Rather, the data, illustrations, maps, and photos shown help reframe current thinking on the metropolis. The typologies developed here are not definitive; follow-up research will refine them.[8] And although the study was national in scope, only thirteen metropolitan areas are included. Future work will greatly expand that number, adding many more modest-sized regions.

The book is less about offering new models than it is about challenging old ones. The term "edgeless city" may not stick. The label was picked in part to take the *edge* off the edge city concept and in the process open a new debate on metropolitan growth trends. The main

7. For purposes of this study, Washington, D.C., is treated as part of the Northeast/Midwest.

8. As a follow-up to this book, the author expects to work with the Metropolitan Area Research Corporation (now ameregis) on a series of projects that refine the categories through more sophisticated mapping and statistical analysis.

contribution is thus conceptual. Just as Myron Orfield's 1997 book *Metropolitics* distinguished two kinds of suburbs—those with high and low fiscal capacity—this study distinguishes two types of suburban office development: bounded and edgeless. And, like Orfield's work, this book has numerous implications beyond the data. One is that in many ways edgeless cities raise an even bigger challenge than edge cities for those who seek to build a less sprawling suburbia.

The Marked and the Unmarked

The subject of this book falls in a category that some cognitive sociologists refer to as "the unmarked." Whereas "marked" subjects have some exceptional quality that attracts study, the unmarked often go undocumented.[9] In some behavioral studies, for example, gay individuals such as those who live in the Castro neighborhood of San Francisco and participate in gay rights parades are the marked, and their behavior and lifestyle sometimes is taken as representative of that of all gays. Yet there are studies that show that a large portion of the gay community attempts to fit into the straight world.[10] By virtue of their more conventional lifestyle, these people, the unmarked, do not generate much media or research interest, but any comprehensive characterization of the gay world would have to include them.

Edgeless cities are the unmarked phenomena of the new metropolis. They are mundane, they are ubiquitous, and most people intuitively know what they are. But no national empirical study has characterized them. However, edgeless cities need to be understood; the public policy stakes surrounding smart growth alone warrant their study. And when they are described in a way that a general audience can understand, they can attract attention. A preliminary form of the research in this book published in late 2000 generated national and local media interest.[11]

9. Brekhus (1998).

10. Brekhus (1998).

11. Stories covering the research (Lang 2000c) appeared immediately in *USA Today,* the *Washington Post,* and the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*. Follow-up stories included a report from the Associated Press (Hansen 2001) and the journal *Planning*. See Haya El Nasser, "Edgeless Cities Confound Efforts to Control Growth," *USA Today,* October 31, 2000, p. 4A; Jackie Spinner, "Scattered Offices Said to Fuel Traffic Woes; Report Seeks Growth in, near District," *Washington Post,* November 1, 2000, p. E1; Tony Wilbert, "Atlanta Trails only Detroit in Suburban Sprawl," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution,* November 1, 2000, p. 3E; Jeff Hansen, "State's Population Shifts Rework Cityscapes," *Birmingham News,* May 13, 2001; Knack (2000).

The media seem to love "man bites dog" stories.[12] The idea that a place such as Tysons Corner, Virginia (a large edge city outside Washington, D.C., that is heavily featured in Garreau's book) has more office space than the state capital, Richmond, is by now passé. But the fact that Washington's edgeless cities (which comprise more than a thousand scattered, low-slung buildings) cumulatively are bigger than DC's downtown is news. The public can grasp that a big, new, suburban city like Tysons Corner has surpassed an older traditional one like Richmond. It is more striking—and therefore newsworthy—to consider that, taken together, all the faceless, no-name office parks stretching to the edge of the region include more office space than is found downtown. Edgeless cities' moment in the spotlight may indeed have arrived. This book now marks the unmarked, revealing some surprising results.

Why Follow Office Space?

Following office space trends is a good way to understand metropolitan change because office space is where a large percentage of job growth occurs. In some metropolitan areas, nearly half of all newly hired employees go to work in office buildings,[13] which were the last major element of central cities to suburbanize, following residences and retail stores.[14] The rapid growth of suburban office development was so significant a trend that it sparked a series of books and articles in the late 1980s and early 1990s that sought to explain how it reshaped the American metropolis; some observers understood the meaning of this trend as early as the 1970s.[15]

The location of office space is critical in a number of public policy areas. For example, the distribution of new office space affects the extent to which a jobs/housing mismatch exists in a region.[16] It also can

12. The author worked on many such stories as a consultant to *USA Today* in 2001 during the release of the 2000 short-form census data.

13. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1998).

14. Leinberger (1996); Muller (1980).

15. Baldassare (1986); Bruegmann and Davis (1992); Cervero (1986, 1989); Erickson (1985); Fishman (1987, 1990); Fulton (1986); Garreau (1991); Hartshorn and Muller (1986, 1989); Leinberger and Lockwood (1986); Pivo (1990); Romanos, Chifos, and Fenner (1989); Breckenfeld (1972); Linda Greenhouse, "The Outer City: Growth Turning into a Menace," *New York Times,* June 3, 1971; John Herbers, "The Outer City; Uneasiness over the Future," *New York Times,* June 2, 1971; Douglas E. Kneeland, "The Outer City; There Is No Firm Stereotype," *New York Times,* May 31, 1971; Vance (1977).

16. Cervero (1986).

influence economic opportunity, if, for example, there is a mismatch between the locations of jobs and concentrations of minority households.[17] Office location also has an impact on urban sprawl. If much new office space is constructed at the regional edge, it extends commuter sheds for many miles into undeveloped rural areas, thereby feeding sprawl.[18] Finally, the geography of office location figures prominently in transportation analysis. If most new space is built in areas with no access to public transit, reliance on automobiles will continue to grow.

The growing importance of suburban office space in American life has even led to a new coinage: the "office park dad,"[19] who "is a suburban, non-union, stock-owning political moderate, age 25–50."[20] Office park dads, estimated to be about 15 percent of the voting age population, form a political swing group, like the minivan-driving, suburban "soccer moms" of the 1990s. The term "office park dads" works as political shorthand because these "dads" are so common—the fact that they are not "downtown dads" reflects how significant and ubiquitous a work setting suburban office space has become. And, like edgeless cities (where so many of them work), office park dads are now "marked," at least by political analysts.

While office space data are an important indicator of metropolitan change, they cannot convey the whole picture. The office space documented in the study is leased, multi-tenanted buildings; other major employment sites such as government offices, warehouses, flex space (offices combined with light-manufacturing facilities), hospitals, and universities (for more details on the data, see appendix A) are excluded. This study therefore reports only a portion of the white-collar employment, albeit a significant share, in thirteen of the nation's largest metropolitan areas. While retail space was not specifically tracked, the presence or absence of large regional malls amid office development was noted.

Also missing from the study were small office buildings such as those occupied by local professionals (for example, dentists and tax preparers). Providers of such services have long been dispersed because they fill

17. Kain (1991).

18. Ding and Bingham (2000).

19. Jill Lawrence, "Democrats Trying to Woo Suburban Dads," *USA Today,* May 21, 2002, p. A3; David Von Drehle, "For Democrats, Key Voters May Be Married to Soccer Moms: Pollster Says Party Should Target 'Office Park Dads.'" *Washington Post,* May 22, 2002, p. A8.

20. Lawrence, "Democrats Trying to Woo Suburban Dads."

local needs and therefore quickly followed people to the suburbs. Instead, this study zeros in on the type of office buildings that used to be almost exclusively found in large commercial centers, housing businesses such as advertising and finance. Had all local businesses been included in this analysis, the regions would have seemed radically decentralized, and the recent shift of higher-order economic activity from the center to the edge might have been lost in background noise.

This study measures only one type of sprawl—office sprawl. While office development is an important dimension of sprawl, it is not the only measure. Multiple sprawl measures are used in this book to offer a context for office sprawl.

Is the New Metropolitan Form Really New?

At the start of the twentieth century, almost all of America's office space could be found in its downtowns. But even in the early decades of the century, "uptowns" began to form a few miles from the original downtown, offering newer, less congested, and often more upscale business environments. Examples include the Wilshire district of Los Angeles and midtown Manhattan. Uptowns were driven by two main forces—a decentralizing population (especially wealthy people) and transportation improvements. Streetcars—and soon automobiles—loosened downtown's hold on commerce during the 1910s. The waves of decentralized office development that followed in edge cities and edgeless cities made the once distinct uptowns seem more like downtown—some of the original uptowns are now so old and so relatively close to downtown that now they are treated essentially as extensions of downtown.

Satellite cities, another form of decentralized growth, also flourished in the early twentieth century. In a 1915 publication entitled *Satellite Cities: A Case Study of Industrial Suburbs,* economist Graham Taylor described an emerging pattern of metropolitan development in which heavy industry was rapidly shifting to the suburbs in search of more space and lower costs. And more than seventy-five years ago sociologist Ernest Burgess noted that business growth, which he characterized as being "centralized-decentralized" in structure, already was evident at Chicago's edge.[21]

Early twentieth-century satellite and centralized suburbs mimicked big cities, although at a slightly lower density and on a smaller scale.

21. Burgess (1925).

Satellites included all of the features that defined a city: a main street shopping area, high-density residential neighborhoods, and, by the late nineteenth century, factory districts.[22] In the 1920s, it was even typical for larger satellite cities in the New York region, such as Newark, N.J., to have a signature Art Deco office tower, representing an already decentralizing service economy.[23]

So is the new metropolitan form really new?[24] Given the history of decentralization in America, that is a legitimate question. This study finds that most contemporary suburban business districts do not resemble traditional downtowns, uptowns, or satellite cities. Except for a few large, dense edge cities, suburban commercial districts lack, for example, a dense business core. They therefore can be seen as distinct from traditional cities—not so much in their function as in their low-density, loose spatial configuration.

Suburbia's economy reached an unprecedented diversity by the 1980s, as specialized service enterprises of every kind were established outside central business districts.[25] The multifunctional early twenty-first century "suburbs" can no longer be described by the familiar moniker "bedroom communities." They now contain all the elements of a city, including a rapidly growing number of poor households.[26] Yet even as they become more urban, suburbs maintain a distinct pattern. A new metropolitan form therefore has emerged in the past several decades: low density, automobile dependent, and dispersed. Not quite the traditional city, suburb, or exurb, but with elements of all three, it is the still-emergent America of the mall, the beltway, the subdivision, the multiplex movie theater, the drive-through fast-food outlet, the low-rise office cube, and the shopping strip.

This book shows that, as seen through the filter of rental office space development, there are many different metropolitan forms. One of the more interesting findings is that while the office building is among the most generic building types in modern America, their distribution across metropolitan areas varies tremendously and reflects regional quirks.[27]

22. Bourchert (1996).

23. Hughes, Miller, and Lang (1992).

24. "New" in this context means having emerged over the past several decades, not in, say, the 1990s.

25. Bateman (1985); Daniels (1985); Leinberger and Lockwood (1986).

26. Orfield (1997, 2002).

27. The low-rise suburban office building is now so common that it is financed through the secondary market and sold to investors as a standard real estate commodity (Leinberger 2001).

These buildings often must be fitted into existing metropolitan development patterns, which can result in some unique spatial forms.

There are, of course, some patterns to office development that reflect the region of the country. There is a distinct Texas city building style. Styles in New York and Chicago are similar, as they are Los Angeles and San Francisco. Yet the country supports many more variants of built form than would appear to be the case from a casual windshield survey of metropolitan America.[28] This study reveals how the ordinary often is quite extraordinary; the diversity that is the modern metropolis comes through in the analysis.

Not only do edgeless cities appear in all thirteen metropolitan areas, they are scattered throughout these regions. Some edgeless cities lie within the outskirts of cities, while others sweep around and between suburban edge cities, while still others ring the region at its exurban edge. The image that may best describe edgeless cities is that of low-grade commercial filler—they occupy vast areas as they fill in the various nooks and crannies of the metropolis. Their spatial form therefore varies by region, based in part on where in the metropolitan landscape they lie and how much of it they occupy.

Edge Cities, Edgeless Cities, and the New Metropolitan Form

One problem with the edge city model is that it conflates all non-downtown office space with office space that is located specifically in an edge city.[29] In fact, as this study shows, edge cities (or office clusters with more than 5 million square feet of office space, with or without major retail space) currently account for only one-third of all non-downtown office space, while edgeless cities make up the remaining two-thirds. If one were to apply the strict criteria for edge cities (that they contain 5 million square feet of office space combined, plus 600,000 square feet of retail space) the proportion would be much smaller, perhaps a little as one-fifth. The suburban office economy as it appears in the edge city model implies a polycentric regional format featuring a central business district (CBD) hub and edge city spokes, much like the older satellite city model. But often that is not the case. A closer look at the urban

28. Pressman (1985).

29. Garreau (1991, p. 5) assumes that "two-thirds of all American office facilities are in Edge Cities"—therefore, all U.S. office space outside a downtown can be found in an edge city.

form of specific edge cities (for example, Princeton, N.J.) reveals that many of them spread over tens and sometimes hundreds of square miles. Some are better categorized as edgeless.

The edge city model also assumes that the location of office space is determined by the proximity of shopping malls. Others have empirically demonstrated that that is not the case.[30] The lack of locational affinity between major retail stores and office space demonstrates how far the metropolitan form has evolved beyond current concepts. The relationship between the department store and the office building in the old downtown seems natural—a taken-for-granted reality. It is reasonable to suppose that they would pair up again in the suburbs, this time in the form of the mall and the office park. While the use of automobiles works to reduce built densities and massive parking lots encircle new suburban downtowns, the old, basic order of the city remains.[31]

However, when commerce decamped from regional cores, the connection between major retail and office space may have been lost. Because people now can drive from one location to another, commutes to offices and trips to stores need not wind up in the same place, as was often the case in a rail-based metropolis. Shopping malls and office parks are free to find independent locations that best match their respective market areas and commuter sheds. Most often, those locations are separate, which is why large edge cities (where offices cluster around shopping malls) are the exception rather than the rule. The new metropolitan form shows up less often in the Tysons Corners of the nation than in the greater Princetons. As this study finds, that is where most of the office space built outside downtowns is found.

As noted above, large metropolitan areas have long been polycentric. But today's polycentrism is different. Whereas factory towns, secondary cities, and even edge cities share a spatial logic with big cities, albeit on a smaller scale, edgeless cities represent a departure. Edge cities are perhaps the last stop on the road away from traditional urban forms. One day edge cities may be seen as a transitional urban form—an attempt to build auto-based, low-density downtowns before developers realized that for the most part, cars made such places unnecessary.

Perhaps most important, edgeless cities are not edge cities waiting to happen. Instead they represent a concurrent, competing, and more decentralized form of office development. In fact, the office data

30. Pivo (1990).
31. Leinberger and Lockwood (1986).

presented in this book indicate that edge cities and edgeless cities grew up more or less together. But edge cities did experience a burst of growth in the mid- to late 1980s, at the time that Garreau was observing them. Edge city growth has since slowed, while edgeless cities seem to have grown at a steadier pace.

Ironically, some big edge cities face the same land cost and congestion pressures as old downtowns, for now they too are central places. It therefore appears that even many edge cities are starting to lose their edge.[32] Edgeless cities may be the ultimate result of a metropolitan process that has been tearing apart concentrated commercial development for the better part of a century.[33] One alternative title considered for this book was *The Rise and Fall (or Stall) of Edge Cities*. In many ways, the study is as much about the fate of edge cities as it is a depiction of edgeless cities.

Book Organization and Topics

This book first addresses ways to categorize office location environments; this includes a discussion of the literature on the topic. A presentation and analysis of office data follow. Next, the fates of edge cities and edgeless cities are considered. How office development fits within the regional context is then explored, and new methods to measure metropolitan sprawl and urban density are presented. Finally, some of the public policy and business investment implications of edgeless cities are considered.

Chapter 2 reviews some of the literature describing the new metropolitan form. The review covers efforts to analyze the emerging suburban metropolis, focusing on office location patterns and the role they play in shaping metropolitan development. Next, which urban functions are likely to remain downtown despite the predominance of non-CBD office development are considered. The chapter ends with a synthesis and reformulation of theory that frame the data analyses that follow.

The first part of chapter 3 reviews efforts to label the new metropolis, presenting several summary tables to show the difficulty of capturing in a single term this still emerging phenomenon. Definitions form the core of this study. The edgeless city is a newly identified category of office space, so maps, photos, and illustrations are provided to demonstrate its

32. Fulton (1996).
33. Mills (1988).

uniqueness relative to traditional office categories. The office categories described here are used throughout the rest of the book in data analysis.

Chapter 4 examines the distribution of office space in downtowns, edge cities, and edgeless cities in the thirteen metropolitan areas covered in the study. The profiles contain the names and office space inventories for all of the downtowns and edge cities in these areas, including some analysis of historic growth trends within regions and across metropolitan areas. The chapter ends with regional comparisons, in which metropolitan spatial types are developed based on the data.

Chapter 5 covers ways to map and measure the new metropolitan form. It begins with a descriptive typology of edgeless cities and includes maps showing the distribution of office space in four metropolitan areas—Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, and San Francisco—selected to show a range of urban spatial forms.

Chapter 6 examines the types, locations, and evolution of edge cities. Two classes of edge cities derived from a descriptive interpretation of the office space data are established, and an analysis of very large edge cities is given. Next, a life cycle model showing how edge cities form and mature is presented. The discussion finally turns to why edgeless cities appear to be have been flourishing for at least the last several decades.

In chapter 7, edgeless cities are placed in a regional context. Office sprawl is just one dimension of metropolitan form. Three other schemes that look at housing, urbanized area, and built density also are considered and compared. The chapter organizes recent research on sprawl into a comprehensive analysis that places rental office development in a regional context in the thirteen metropolitan areas covered in the study.

The emergence of edgeless cities challenges policymakers and practitioners who favor more compact regions to rethink some of their planning strategies. New urbanist architects and developers, smart growth advocates, transportation and land use planners, environmentalists, politicians interested in regional social equity, and many others are directing much of their attention to curbing the type of urban sprawl that edgeless cities exemplify. Chapter 8 considers the relationship of edgeless cities and several regional growth issues. It also explores the market and investment conditions that edgeless cities present.