Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, is hallowed ground in America. In July 1863 it was the scene of a major battle in America’s Civil War. The decisive moment in that epic battle came on its third day when the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia launched a massive assault on the center of the Union Army of the Potomac. This assault, known as Pickett’s Charge, failed catastrophically: half the attacking force were wounded or killed, and the rebel army never again invaded the North.

On December 17, 1956, President Dwight David Eisenhower, who owned a farm in Gettysburg, took his houseguest, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, to visit the spot from which Pickett’s Charge was launched. Then as now a large monument topped with an equestrian statue of Confederate commander Robert E. Lee marks the spot. The two men spent the better part of an hour looking at the site of Pickett’s Charge as the president explained the significance of the Civil War to American history, culture, and politics.

Then they returned to Eisenhower’s farm just a mile away. In fact, Eisenhower had bought the farm in 1950 because it was close to the battlefield. The original farmhouse had served as a temporary
hospital for wounded Confederate soldiers during the battle. Ike, as he was called, had first visited Gettysburg in 1915 as a West Point military academy cadet. From his living room he could see the ridge where Lee’s statue stood in the distance.

Nehru was spending the night at the farm so the two leaders could spend time together in a relaxed private venue. It was a challenging visit; the two men were world-famous leaders, but worlds apart in their thinking. Eisenhower had led the D-Day invasion of Europe in 1944 that defeated Nazi Germany and believed he was engaged in another life-and-death struggle with the communist world in the 1950s. Nehru had been jailed for thirteen years in British prisons in India for fighting for independence from Great Britain. He had led the “Quit India” movement during World War II, seeking to sabotage the British war effort and colonial government, which ultimately helped to bring independence for his country. In the 1950s Nehru was the leader of the nonaligned movement that sought to unite the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa in a neutral bloc during the cold war. At that time the Indian press portrayed America as a hot-tempered imperialist power; the U.S. press portrayed India as soft on communism and weak willed.

Yet as the leaders of the two largest democracies in the world, both Ike and Nehru knew they needed to work together despite their differences, and the trip to Gettysburg was intended to allow time for a quiet and candid exchange of views free from the glare of the press. The president prepared carefully for the event; he had the White House and State Department ascertain Nehru’s food and drink preferences, for example. It turned out that the leader of the world’s largest Hindu country liked filet mignon and enjoyed an occasional Scotch as long as it was all in private. Nehru’s daughter, Indira, accompanied him to the farm and reportedly shared his food preferences.

By his own admission, Eisenhower was fascinated with India, although in 1956 he had not yet visited the country. He was also fascinated by Nehru, whom he regarded like most Americans at
the time as “a somewhat inexplicable and occasionally exasperating personality” because he often seemed to condemn American and British actions more vigorously than he condemned Soviet behavior. In the fall of 1956, for example, Nehru had strongly condemned the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt while more mildly criticizing the Soviet invasion of Hungary.

Just before his visit to the United States, Nehru had met with two key visitors in New Delhi in November. First he met with Tibet’s new young monarch, the Dalai Lama, who had left his palace in Lhasa to visit India and was considering whether to seek political asylum to escape China’s invasion of his homeland. He asked Nehru to raise the issue of China’s takeover of Tibet in his subsequent visit with Eisenhower. Nehru’s second visitor was the prime minister of China, Zhou Enlai, who urged Nehru to tell the Dalai Lama to return to his palace and pressed India not to interfere in what he called China’s internal affairs. The Dalai Lama did return to Tibet in March 1957.

The two leaders spent fourteen hours talking in Gettysburg, and Eisenhower wrote down fourteen pages of notes on the talks when he got back to the White House. In private he found Nehru much more critical of Soviet behavior in Hungary than he had been in public. Nehru was “horrified” at the Soviet invasion and predicted that it “spelled the eventual death knell of international communism, because ‘nationalism is stronger than communism.’” But Nehru, Eisenhower concluded, would always be tougher on European and American actions, which reminded him of British imperialism, than on Russian and Chinese activities, which were often undertaken in support of anti-imperialist nationalist movements in the developing world.

China was a major topic of their discussions. Nehru pressed Eisenhower to support giving Communist China the seat in the United Nations Security Council that Nationalist China had been given in 1945 at the end of World War II, making it one of the five permanent members of the Council with the right to veto any
resolution it did not approve. It was “only logical that any government controlling six hundred million people will sooner or later have to be brought into the council of nations,” Nehru argued. The prime minister dismissed any possibility that China would attack India, given the “fortunate location of the Himalayan mountain chain” on their 1,800 miles of common border. India could not afford the cost of building a defense along this long border: Taking part in an arms race would jeopardize its hopes of development. Better, Nehru concluded, that India stay neutral in the cold war and seek to build friendly ties with China. Eisenhower, with China’s role in the Korean War still fresh in his memory, refused to budge on China and the UN seat. There is no record in the Eisenhower notes of Nehru’s raising the Dalai Lama’s request for help against China’s occupation of Tibet.

Nehru was critical of U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, but he was confident that the two South Asian states could ultimately resolve their differences, including the dispute over Kashmir. He was more critical of Portugal, which still was holding onto its small colony in India at Goa. Because Portugal was a NATO member and an American ally, Nehru pressed Ike to get Lisbon to let go of its vestiges of empire.

The two did not come to agreement on all issues or even on most, but Eisenhower concluded that he “liked Prime Minister Nehru; Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was not easy to understand: few people are, but his was a personality of unusual contradictions.” The two leaders left the farm with a much better appreciation of each other’s point of view and were more inclined to understand each other’s position than before. Nehru’s preeminent biographer, Stanley Wolpert, later wrote that the “two days of top secret talks helped defuse the world conflagration in late 1956 and turned the tide of Indian-U.S. relations.” That may be a bit of an exaggeration. The two democracies remained estranged for decades to come, but the summit did at least clear the air between the two leaders.
IKE AND INDIA, 1950–60

KOREA

Ike owed his presidency to the Korean War. After twenty years of Democrats in the White House, the war hero Eisenhower was elected on the promise that he would go to Korea to end an unpopular war that Americans were desperate to conclude. The war was the backdrop for U.S. policy and intelligence in Asia in the second half of the twentieth century and is an important place to start in understanding the CIA’s role in India and Tibet that shaped Kennedy’s forgotten crisis in 1962.

The American intelligence community’s experience with the People’s Republic of China and North Korea began with a disaster, a catastrophic intelligence failure in 1950 that cost the lives of thousands of Americans. Worse, it was a self-imposed disaster—the result of terrible intelligence management, not the poor collection or analysis of information. To add insult to injury the government of India had warned the United States that disaster loomed, but was ignored.

Mao Zedong formally announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949. After decades of civil war and struggle against Japan, Mao restored the unity of China and made himself the unquestioned dictator of the world’s most populous nation. It was an amazing triumph both for Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, which had been forced only fifteen years before to abandon most of Chinese territory to its domestic and foreign enemies and to retreat in the famous Long March across 6,000 miles in 370 days to the remote northern province of Yenan in 1934.

A year after the creation of the PRC, Mao made two historic decisions. On October 7, 1950, he sent Chinese troops across the border into Tibet, the remote Himalayan kingdom between China and India that had achieved something close to de facto independence during China’s long decline in the nineteenth century. At first
the invasion was limited to border areas, but gradually China exerted more and more control over Tibet, as described later.

At the same time Mao made another historic decision: China would enter the Korean War and fight the United States and its United Nations allies for control of the Korean peninsula. The war in Korea had begun on June 25, 1950, when communist North Korea invaded the South. Two days later the UN Security Council agreed to send troops to defend the South; Russia, which at that time was boycotting the Security Council, thus failed to veto the troop deployment. More than twenty nations ultimately contributed troops to the UN fighting force. Mao had not been party to North Korea’s plans and was only told of the invasion after the fact. Russia, however, was North Korea’s closest partner at the start of the war, and Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s communist dictator, did obtain Russian permission to attack. Joseph Stalin, not Mao, was thus the decider.

Within days of crossing the border, the North Koreans routed the southern army and captured the South’s capital at Seoul. President Harry Truman decided to send American troops to prevent the complete defeat of the Republic of Korea, ordering his commander in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, to send U.S. troops then stationed in Japan to defend the South. In September MacArthur, a hero of World War II, stopped the North Korean advance and then launched an amphibious attack behind enemy lines at Inchon, which recaptured Seoul and led to the rout of the North Korean army. MacArthur’s troops fought with the UN force.

The United States was uncertain about how to proceed after recapturing Seoul. MacArthur wanted to pursue the defeated North Koreans back across the 38th parallel, the prewar border, and march all the way to the Yalu River, Korea’s historic border with China. The South Korean government was even more eager to move northward and reunite the country. However, many in Washington and other Western capitals, including London, were more cautious and worried that moving into the North would provoke the
Chinese. MacArthur, in control of the troops on the scene, prevailed, taking them on the march to the Yalu.

Mao decided in early October to send his army south across the Yalu River and fight MacArthur’s forces. On October 8, 1950, Mao told Kim Il Sung that Chinese troops were on their way and that he had ordered them to cross the Yalu to “repel the invasion launched by the American imperialists and their running dogs.”

The Chinese Communist Forces (or CCF as they were referred to in the war) were commanded by one of Mao’s comrades from the Long March, Peng Dehuai, and they secretly moved into North Korea in mid-October. By late November Peng had 400,000 CCF troops in more than thirty divisions in North Korea.

The American army in Korea and Japan, the Eighth Army, was poorly prepared for the war. The occupation troops in Japan who were rushed to the Korean front were not combat ready; many of the officers were too old for frontline battlefield conditions. Training was “slipshod and routine.”

The relatively easy victory over North Korea at Inchon had reinforced a sense of complacency among the commanders and GIs that the war was all but over. MacArthur promised that the troops would be home by Christmas 1950.

**Faulty Intelligence**

MacArthur had always understood that if you “control intelligence, you control decision making.” He had built an intelligence community in his area of command that listened attentively to what he wanted and gave him intelligence that reinforced his already held views. MacArthur wanted total control of the war and its execution, not second-guessing by his subordinates or outside interference by Washington, especially by the White House and the Pentagon. If his Tokyo command headquarters were solely responsible for collecting and assessing intelligence on the enemy, then MacArthur alone could decide how big the enemy threat was and thus what to do about it.
MacArthur’s authority put America’s relatively new civilian intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, in an awkward position. It was not permitted to have a representative in Tokyo or participate in preparing intelligence estimates for the Eighth Army. During World War II, MacArthur had done the same thing, excluding the CIA’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), from his South West Pacific command. MacArthur, who never spent a single night in Korea during the war, preferring to sleep in his headquarters in Japan, wanted no outside intelligence challenger. As one historian of the war wrote later, “Only after the great and catastrophic failure on the whereabouts and intentions of China’s armies would the CIA finally be allowed into the region.”

MacArthur’s intelligence chief, or G2, was General Charles Willoughby, who had been with his commander since serving in the Philippines in 1939, before World War II. A self-styled admirer of the general, Willoughby later wrote a sycophantic biography of MacArthur that was more than a thousand pages long. He was born in Germany as Karl Weidenbach and styled himself a Prussian, a most unusual role model for an American officer in the wake of two wars against Germany, but one he relished, even occasionally wearing a monocle. He was also an admirer of Spain’s fascist military dictator Francisco Franco. One prominent CIA officer in the early 1950s, Frank Wisner, said Willoughby was “all ideology and almost never any facts.”

In June 1950 Willoughby assured MacArthur that North Korea would not invade the South, despite alarms raised by then-CIA director Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter. In the fall of that year Willoughby’s office refused to believe or confirm reports that thousands of CCF troops were in North Korea. Even when Chinese prisoners were captured, Willoughby dismissed them as a few experts or advisers, not as a group of soldiers. The G2 in Tokyo recognized that some Chinese divisions had entered the North, but argued that they were not full-strength combat units. Willoughby “doctored the intelligence in order to permit MacArthur’s forces
IKE AND INDIA, 1950–60

to go where they wanted to go militarily, to the banks of the Yalu,”
with no contrary or dissenting voices heard in Tokyo or Washing-
ton.17 The Tokyo estimate of the number of CCF forces in Korea
was less than one-tenth the reality.

On October 15, 1950, MacArthur had met with President Tru-
man on Wake Island in the mid-Pacific. The general told the presi-
dent that the war would be over by Thanksgiving and most troops
would be home by Christmas. When Truman asked, “What will
be the attitude of Commie China?” MacArthur said it would not
intervene. Even if China tried, it could not get more than 50,000
troops across the Yalu River, MacArthur promised, citing his G2’s
intelligence estimate. In fact, by October 19, 260,000 CCF soldiers
had already crossed into Korea.18

Even the first encounters with Chinese forces on the battlefield
did not shake the faulty intelligence estimate. In late October the
Eighth Army fought a bitter and costly battle with CCF forces at
Unsan in the North. The Americans were routed, but then the Chi-
nese pulled back. They wanted to entice the Eighth Army north-
ward to trap it far from its supply lines and to isolate it near the
Chinese frontier. Willoughby dismissed the Unsan battle as un-
important and continued to claim that the Chinese would not in-
tervene in force. So did MacArthur. The Chinese decision to trap
an American unit in Unsan, then stop and regroup, would be un-
erringly similar to the Chinese invasion of India twelve years later
in which they used the same tactic—attack, halt, and then attack
again—to defeat the Indian army.

MacArthur made one of his lightning-quick trips to Korea from
Tokyo on November 24, 1950, telling the U.S. ambassador in Seoul
there were only 25,000 Chinese troops in Korea. Then he had his
return flight to Tokyo fly along the Yalu River, making possible a
personal reconnaissance intended to impress the media. His report
to Washington dismissed the danger of Chinese intervention. Three
days later Peng’s armies struck the American forces as they were
driving to the Yalu River.19
The result was a disaster. The Eighth Army was routed again and its South Korean allies destroyed. Thousands of allied troops died and were wounded. As the British military historian Max Hastings described later, the total disintegration “resembled the collapse of the French in 1940 to the Nazis and the British at Singapore in 1942 to the Japanese.” By December 31, 1950, the Americans had been driven 120 miles south back to the 38th parallel and were still retreating. Seoul would fall to Peng’s armies in early 1951. It was by far the worst military debacle the U.S. armed forces suffered in the entire twentieth century. A new American commander, General Matthew Ridgway, took over from MacArthur in Korea. One of his first acts was to bring the CIA into theater to provide an alternative intelligence viewpoint from that given by Willoughby’s Tokyo headquarters.

India’s Role in the Korean Conflict

As mentioned earlier, India had tried to warn America that Chinese forces would enter the Korean War and was proven correct. From the start of the war India tried to broker a truce. As early as July 1950 Nehru’s government had suggested to the allies that China might press North Korea to accept a cease-fire in Korea along the 38th parallel, thereby restoring the status quo ante, if the Americans allowed Communist China to take control of China’s seat in the UN Security Council still controlled by the Nationalist Chinese government now exiled on the island of Taiwan. Washington did not take the proposal seriously.

India refused to send combat troops to join the UN forces in Korea. Although it did send a medical unit, the 60th Parachute Field Ambulance Regiment, to help the allies, it tried to remain neutral in the conflict. Moreover, India was one of a small number of non-communist governments that had formally recognized the PRC and had an ambassador in Beijing. India’s ambassador was an experienced diplomat named K. M. Panikkar, who had also written
several books on the struggle against Western imperialism in Asia. The ambassador knew his account very well; he had been India’s first and only ambassador to the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek after Indian independence in 1947 and then was appointed India’s first ambassador to the communist government in 1949. He also had Tibet experience, having traveled there in 1949 on Nehru’s behalf to sound out the Tibetans on whether they would resist a Chinese takeover. Panikkar enjoyed very good contacts in China. He had regular access to the top leadership of the People’s Republic, including Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. His memoirs make clear he admired his hosts for ending the chaos that had enveloped their country during the preceding century. Meanwhile U.S. leaders considered Panikkar and Nehru to be “soft” on communism and too neutral in the global struggle with Stalin and Mao.

In September 1950 Panikkar’s military contacts in Beijing began to warn him that the PRC would not sit still and allow the UN forces including the Eighth Army to march to the Yalu. Chinese military officials told him that Mao was prepared to risk nuclear war to stop those forces from advancing. The Indian embassy in Beijing reported that trainloads of CCF troops were moving to the border region, and the Indian government passed these reports on to Washington and London.

On October 2, 1950, Panikkar was summoned at midnight to meet the Chinese prime minister, Zhou Enlai, Mao’s closest confidant. After being driven through the deserted streets of Beijing, Panikkar was received by the prime minister, who also served as foreign minister, at thirty minutes past midnight. As Panikkar described the meeting, despite the late hour and the seriousness of the issue—the “peace of the world”—Zhou was as “courteous and charming as ever and did not give the least impression of worry or nervousness or indeed of being in any particular hurry.” It was only after tea was served that Zhou got to the point. He told Panikkar that if American troops crossed the 38th parallel China would
intervene. At 1:30 a.m. Panikkar cabled the warning to Nehru, who had it sent to the UN allies.

The British were particularly alarmed by the Indian message. The United Kingdom and its Commonwealth allies had the second-largest contingent of troops—two brigades—in the UN force in Korea. The British were also worried that provoking China in Korea could lead to a Chinese attack on their colony in Hong Kong. The stakes were high for London.

The British Joint Chiefs of Staff were led by the commander of the British forces in India and Burma during World War II, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, who knew a great deal about China. Slim had been worried since July that moving north of the 38th parallel would provoke Chinese intervention. When Panikkar’s message arrived in London it considerably reinforced the joint chiefs’ anxieties. The British intelligence community, led by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which prepared synthesized estimates for the prime minister, was more cautious and thought that Chinese intervention was still unlikely but possible. It dismissed Zhou’s warning as not being specific enough. As the JIC noted in late 1951, the British intelligence community in 1950 did not yet understand that Mao was the only real decisionmaker in Beijing and that he was making his decisions based not on Western thinking about global politics but on his own view of China’s interests. The JIC’s watered-down warning did not reassure the British joint chiefs, who kept sounding the alarm in London.

In Tokyo MacArthur and Willoughby completely dismissed the Indian warning as merely communist propaganda delivered by an untrustworthy source. The CIA analysts in Washington were more inclined to accept Panikkar’s warning as genuine, but being heavily influenced by the view from Eighth Army headquarters they also thought the Chinese would not intervene in force. The CIA did prepare a National Intelligence Estimate, the collective opinion of the entire intelligence community in Washington, on November 6, 1950, titled “Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea”; however,
IKE AND INDIA, 1950–60

it assessed that there were only 30,000 Chinese troops south of the Yalu. An update on November 24 put the number at 70,000 in just four divisions, an estimate still wildly off the mark.29

In any case, the CIA, assuming that the communist world was a monolith in which Stalin dictated all the moves, believed that the decision to intervene in Korea would be made in Moscow by the Soviet leader. What the agency did not know was that Stalin was encouraging the Chinese to fight, while promising only very limited Soviet aid and assistance—not troops—for the war.30 Stalin did not even promise to provide any air cover. Mao was angered that Stalin would not send Russians to fight, but decided to strike anyway. The dispute over Korea added fuel to Mao’s distrust of Stalin and exacerbated the emerging Sino-Soviet rivalry for control of the communist movement worldwide, but that was still a secret to outsiders.

In Washington the secretary of state, Dean Acheson, was one of the smartest men in the Truman administration on most matters, but he too was convinced the Chinese would not intervene. It would be “sheer madness” for Mao to take on America, Acheson said, and the Indian warning was the “mere vaporings of a panicky Panikkar.”31

Frustrated, Panikkar wrote in his diary later in 1950 that “America has knowingly elected for war, with Britain following. The Chinese armies now concentrated on the Yalu will intervene decisively in the fight. Probably some of the Americans want that. They probably feel that this is an opportunity to have a show down with China. In any case MacArthur’s dream has come true. I only hope it does not turn into a nightmare.”32

Future of the U.S.-China Relationship

The catastrophe on the Yalu would have a lasting impact on American thinking about China. Coming after the communists’ victory in the Chinese civil war, the Korean debacle fueled a domestic political
debate over “who lost China” that pitted the handful of China experts in Washington against a powerful lobby that argued the China hands were either soft on communism or, worse, were communist agents serving foreign interests. Led by Senator Joe McCarthy and Congressman Richard Nixon, the right wing of the Republican Party fought any effort to rethink American policy toward China, to give the PRC the UN Security Council seat, or even to talk with China for the next two decades. Ironically it would be Nixon who finally implemented all of these changes in 1971.

The Korean War was crucial to framing American impressions that China was a crazy communist state that was even more dangerous than the Soviet Union and much more inscrutable. The Chinese communists were perceived as reckless and ready for nuclear war. Talking to them was considered a waste of time and possibly immoral. Mao came to be seen as an irrational but cunning leader.

The intelligence disaster would also frame how Americans later viewed the Chinese invasion of India in 1962. Americans had vivid memories of how China had surprised them in 1950, defeating an American war hero and almost driving UN forces out of Korea. When China attacked India in 1962, JFK and other Americans assumed the worst: China would be unstoppable.

The war also galvanized the CIA to look for ways to strike back at China, both to weaken the communists’ hold on power and to divert the country’s attention internally to domestic unrest. The CIA wanted to demonstrate to the new U.S. president, Ike, that it could do better than the Tokyo intelligence operation had done in 1950, not only by analyzing Chinese behavior and intentions more accurately but also by actually running covert operations inside the PRC to weaken it.

The Korean War came to an end in 1953, with the Indians playing an important role in arranging the cease-fire between the PRC and the UN. India helped with the repatriation of captured prisoners to each side, a very delicate issue because thousands of North Korean and Chinese prisoners wanted to be free to stay in the South
IKE AND INDIA, 1950–60

and not go home. The Indians supervised a careful process that ensured they were able to defect, but without too much humiliation for the communist regimes.

TIBET

Ambassador Panikkar was also at the center of the other crisis Mao created in October 1950 when he decided to invade Tibet. At that time Tibet was an almost medieval impoverished theocracy run by Buddhist monks. It was a remote, landlocked country that had little access to the outside world. Almost 500,000 square miles in size, the equivalent of Western Europe, Tibet is bounded by tall mountains on three sides. Only to the east on the border with China does the terrain permit relatively easy access. To the south the Himalayas make transportation very difficult, and two other mountain chains block easy passage from the west and north.33

Tibet was formally a protectorate of China since 1720. However, since the two Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars in the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese control over this far western province had become increasingly weakened; after the 1911 Chinese revolution, Tibet’s political connections with China became even more attenuated. Beset by internal civil wars and external aggression from Japan, the weak Nationalist government held little sway in Lhasa, Tibet’s capital. Meanwhile Britain’s interest in Tibet increased. The British Empire in India preferred a weak Tibet as a useful buffer on the Raj’s northern border and treated Tibet as an all but independent country while acknowledging ultimate Chinese sovereignty. In 1914 the British signed a treaty with Tibet at Simla in India that gave the British the India-Tibet border lines that London wanted. The Chinese were invited to sign the treaty as well, but refused.34

No Chinese government would accept that Tibet was an independent country, and certainly not one that had just won a civil war and was determined to reunite all of historic China under its
authority. Nor did India claim to have any sovereignty over Tibet. It was the British in 1914 who drew the boundary between Tibet and India to the Raj’s advantage. In the west of India this boundary was known as the Johnson Line, which divided Kashmir from China; in the east the border was known as the McMahon Line dividing eastern India, Assam, from China—both lines being named after the British diplomats who drew them. When the communists won the Chinese civil war in 1949, they accepted neither the semi-independence of Tibet nor the boundary lines drawn by British imperialism between Tibet and India.

In early October 1950, just as he was dealing with Zhou’s warning that China would invade Korea, Panikkar received reports that 20,000 Chinese forces had crossed into Tibet and seized control of a strip of land along the frontier dividing Tibet from China. On October 25, China announced that it had begun “the process of ‘Liberating Tibet’ and the fat was in the fire,” in the ambassador’s words. Nehru instructed Panikkar to issue a strong démarche to the Chinese government protesting China’s use of force. Zhou replied with an equally strong message claiming that China only wanted to restore its control of Tibet and would seek to do so, if possible, by peaceful means. India made clear in its subsequent diplomatic messages that it recognized China’s sovereignty over Tibet and did not intend to intervene in internal Chinese affairs, but was only protesting its use of military force.

Nehru faced pressure at home and abroad to do more. The Indian press was full of stories about Chinese atrocities in Tibet and the potential for China to use Tibet to threaten India. His own intelligence chief, B. N. Mullik, head of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) from 1950 until after Nehru died, warned Nehru that China’s move into Tibet was “sinister” and would threaten India’s interests. Mullik also thought Panikkar was too soft on China. In the United Nations, which had already deployed forces to fight the Chinese in Korea, there was pressure to label the PRC as an aggressor and to condemn the invasion. Nehru worked quietly both to calm down
IKE AND INDIA, 1950–60

his agitated domestic constituency and to keep the Tibet issue out of the UN.

Chinese forces did not occupy all of Tibet in 1950; rather China’s strategy was to seize the border area and then negotiate full control over the kingdom with the weak theocratic government in Lhasa, which was powerless to resist the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The “stiffness” in Chinese-Indian relations caused by the invasion, as Panikkar described it, proved to be short-lived. Nehru had neither the capability nor the intention of fighting for control of Tibet, and Mao was not eager to overplay his very strong hand. Instead, Mao was content to gradually absorb Tibet and welcomed Nehru’s behind-the-scenes help in the UN. After all China had enough on its agenda with a full-scale war with the United States and the UN underway in Korea.

In Tibet the Chinese incursion understandably created panic. The post of Dalai Lama, Tibet’s divinely chosen head of state, was hastily filled with the accession of a fifteen-year-old young man on November 17, 1950. He had been named heir at the age of four, but was still studying for the role when the invasion occurred. The new Dalai Lama fled the capital and moved to a Buddhist monastery close to the Indian border. The U.S. ambassador in New Delhi, Loy Henderson, secretly urged the young man to leave Tibet and seek asylum outside the country, thereby keeping alive a Tibetan government in exile. The American consulate in Calcutta, the closest U.S. diplomatic post to Tibet, opened a communications channel to the Tibetan leadership remaining in Tibet. The Dalai Lama’s older brother (aged twenty-nine), Thubten Norbu, traveled to the United States as a guest of a San Francisco-based group, the Committee for a Free Asia, which was financed by the CIA.

Washington was very eager to get the Tibetans to engage in armed resistance against China, thereby opening another front against Mao. The assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs was Dean Rusk, a hawk on China. Rusk and Henderson, however, were constrained by the United States’ continued support for
Nationalist China whose leaders, like Mao, claimed that Tibet was a part of China. They were also constrained by Nehru’s reluctance to support military operations in Tibet where China had every military advantage.39

Even before the Chinese invaded, the Tibetans, in light of their isolation and weakness, had initiated talks with China. The Tibetan leaders reluctantly signed a seventeen-point agreement in Beijing that acknowledged China’s authority in Tibet, but preserved the institution of the Dalai Lama. In September 1951 the Tibetan government formally accepted the Chinese takeover of Tibet. The PLA entered Lhasa, and the young Dalai Lama returned to the capital to preside over a puppet regime. Nehru endorsed the deal; Rusk and Henderson were outflanked.

Earlier that year, on January 26, the Indian Embassy in Beijing had celebrated the first anniversary of the creation of the Indian Republic. To the surprise of everyone, Mao himself attended the dinner event at the Peking Hotel along with his wife, an unprecedented symbol of friendship both for India and its ambassador. In his toast Mao praised the “thousands of years of friendship between the people of India and China.”40 Mao’s gesture indicated that the Tibet crisis of 1950 had ended.

Zhou and Panikkar were able to resolve many of the outstanding bilateral Sino-Indian issues concerning Tibet. The Indian diplomatic mission in Lhasa, inherited from the British, was turned into a consulate under the authority of the embassy in Beijing. In turn China opened a consulate in Bombay to keep symmetry in the relationship. China accepted that India had legitimate trade relations with Tibet, and New Delhi fully acknowledged Chinese political sovereignty in Tibet.41 Only the issue of the border between India and Chinese Tibet was unresolved. It remains so today.

In 1954 India and China formalized their areas of agreement in a treaty concerning Tibet. It began with a statement of five principles of coexistence, or Panch Sheela as they are called in Hindi: Indo-Chinese relations based on mutual respect for each other’s territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, and peaceful coexistence. The Panch Sheela principles seemed to place India and China on a long-term path of peaceful relations.

However, Nehru’s intelligence chief, B. N. Mullik, felt that the treaty was a bad bargain, ceding Indian interests in Tibet in return for vague promises of good behavior and goodwill. He wrote that a “weak and friendly Tibet” was being replaced by a “strong and bellicose China” on India’s northern border. But Mullik agreed with Nehru that India did not have the military capability to aid the Tibetans or stop Chinese advances in Tibet, because the military balance was so lopsided in Mao’s favor.

For Nehru, in contrast, the treaty was a significant accomplishment. China and India had never quarreled in their long history as Asia’s great civilizations, and Nehru was convinced that they would become great nations again. Both had been the victims of imperialism, especially British imperialism. With the end of the age of imperialism, China and India could lead the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa as an alternative to the two superpowers, then engaged in the cold war.

After signing the treaty, Nehru visited China for the first time as prime minister in October 1954. The visit highlighted the two countries’ friendly relationship and shared anti-imperialist ideology. Nehru felt comfortable enough to raise the border issue, noting China’s issuance of maps that showed large parts of India along both the Johnson and McMahon Lines as belonging to China. Zhou told Nehru that these were old maps from the Nationalist period and that the PRC had yet to print new ones. Nehru found this answer unsatisfactory, but it did not change his desire to emphasize the positive in Indo-Chinese relations.

Tibet stayed on the back burner of world diplomacy in the 1950s as China gradually tightened its grip on the region, following a stage-by-stage plan for incorporating Tibet into the PRC. First, it built a network of modern roads and airports to link the remote
area more and more closely to China’s infrastructure, thereby facilitating its military control. One such road was built on territory that India claimed as part of Kashmir, in the region called Aksai Chin. More Chinese troops arrived in Lhasa to control the capital, preparing the way for the second stage: replacing indirect rule by the Dalai Lama with direct military rule. In the third stage—the “Sinoization of Tibet” as one author described it—significant numbers of ethnic Han Chinese began to settle in the region, threatening to make the ethnic Tibetans a minority in their own country. Yet the unique Tibetan sociopolitical system based on the rule of the Buddhist priestly caste and the Dalai Lama was kept superficially intact until the Dalai Lama made his trip to New Delhi in late 1956.45

Zhou Enlai visited New Delhi three times during the several months that the Dalai Lama was in India, urging Nehru to send him home and promising respect for Tibetan rights. Both Nehru and the Dalai Lama decided to take Zhou’s promises seriously. But after the return of the “god king” in March 1957, the situation in Tibet deteriorated. China’s determination to reduce the kingdom to a province of the communist dictatorship became increasingly obvious, and Tibetan resistance grew more serious. An insurrection began in parts of the province, and the PLA deployed more and more soldiers to crush it. Clearly China was no longer abiding by the terms of the 1954 treaty with India.

In 1965 the CIA did a top-secret postmortem of the Sino-Indian War that was later declassified. In assessing the early years of the dispute between Nehru and Mao over Tibet, the CIA concluded correctly that China “played on Nehru’s Asian, anti-imperialist mental attitude; his proclivity to temporize, and his sincere desire for an amicable Sino-Indian relationship.” China’s “strategy was to avoid making explicit, in conversations and communications with Nehru, any Chinese border claims, while avoiding any retraction of those claims which would require changing Chinese maps.”
The CIA postmortem concluded it “was a masterpiece of guile executed by Chou en Lai.”

PAKISTAN

The Eisenhower administration took office in January 1953. At the top of its foreign policy team were two brothers: The older one, John Foster Dulles, became secretary of state, and the younger brother, Allen Dulles, became the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Their grandfather had lived in India as a Presbyterian missionary for five years in the 1850s and later wrote a book titled Life in India that extolled the British imperial regime as a model of beneficent white people bringing civilization to non-Christian brown peoples. John Foster Dulles inherited many of his grandfather’s strict moral views. By the 1950s these views had hardened into a black-and-white vision of the world, in which America was fighting a holy crusade against godless communism and neutrality was immoral. India under Nehru, with its ties to “Red” China and its refusal to join America’s anticommunist bloc of alliances, was on the wrong side of the elder Dulles’s view of good and evil.

The younger Dulles was just as committed to the prosecution of the cold war as his brother, but his manner was a bit less judgmental. Many in Washington saw him as a true professional intelligence officer, not a partisan. Kennedy’s aide Arthur Schlesinger, for example, wrote later about Allen Dulles that he was “urbane, courtly and honorable, almost wholly devoid of the intellectual rigidity and personal self righteousness of his brother” and his “coolness and proficiency” were admirable.

Allen was a boy wonder. At the age of eight he published his first article, a critique of British imperialism in the Boer War. After graduating with honors from Princeton he received a grant to teach in India at Ewing Christian College. In 1914 as World War I began,
he traveled via Paris to India. On the long steamship voyage Allen read Rudyard Kipling’s famous novel *Kim* about the great game in South Asia, the espionage war between the Russians and the British at the turn of the twentieth century, and he became entranced with spycraft. He never parted with his copy of *Kim*; it was on his bedside table when he passed away. In India Dulles met Jawaharlal Nehru, who had just completed his education in Cambridge. A year later, in 1915, Dulles returned to the United States and joined the Foreign Service; his first posting was in Vienna, capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was losing the Great War.48

During World War II Allen Dulles served with the OSS, America’s first civilian spy organization; he ran its office in Bern, Switzerland, a key neutral country in the heart of Europe. Allen relished the job and was good at it. He was involved in the July 1944 secret plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler, which was immortalized in the movie *Valkyrie*, and helped orchestrate the surrender of German forces in Italy in 1945. He joined the CIA, OSS’s successor, in January 1951 as deputy director for plans, heading its covert action side. At that time the American intelligence community was still reeling from the fiasco in Korea. In August 1951 Dulles was promoted to deputy director of the CIA, and in January 1953 Eisenhower made him director of central intelligence (DCI).

At the same time Eisenhower appointed Allen’s older brother as secretary of state. On assuming that office John Foster Dulles embarked on a global campaign to build an alliance network of countries that would surround the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC); the goal was to extend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance that protected Europe from the USSR into a worldwide bloc fighting on America’s side in the cold war.

Nehru wanted no part of a bipolar world war against communism, but India’s neighbor Pakistan saw opportunity in the Dulles scheme. One-fourth the size of its neighbor and acutely worried about Indian ambitions, Pakistan was eager to find a foreign pro-
IKE AND INDIA, 1950–60

In turn America was eager to protect Pakistan. Pakistan joined not just one alliance with America but two—becoming a founding member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Southeast Asia. By the mid-1950s, Pakistanis could claim to be America’s most allied ally. Large amounts of military and economic aid followed. Pakistan’s motives, of course, were to find allies and resources to confront India, not the USSR and PRC. The first Pakistani commander of the Pakistani Army, field marshal (and later president) Mohammad Ayub Khan, wrote later that “the crux of the problem for Pakistan was Indian hostility,” and that is why Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO.49

While John Foster Dulles built alliances in public, Allen was building secret alliances between the CIA and friendly intelligence services. In Pakistan that meant the ISI—the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate—which had been created by an Australian officer seconded to the Pakistani army in early 1948. Major General Walter Joseph Cawthorne was born in Melbourne and served in World War I with the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) at Gallipoli against the Turks and in Flanders against the Germans. After the war he joined the British Indian Army and served in the North West Frontier Province, policing the Pashtun tribes along the Afghanistan border. During World War II he was the first head of intelligence for British forces in the Middle East (1939–41) and then director of intelligence for the India Command and deputy director of intelligence for the South East Asia Command.

After the partition of India, Cawthorne chose to serve in the new Pakistani army, which was initially commanded by a British officer, General Douglas Gracey. Cawthorne was given the job of creating a professional military intelligence service for the Pakistani military. In 1951 he was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the new Pakistani army before returning to Australia to be director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau in the Australian Ministry of Defense.
In 1954 he became the first Australian High Commissioner (ambassador) in Karachi. He also served as Australia’s ambassador to Canada in the late 1950s. Cawthorne died in 1970.

The ISI created by Cawthorne was focused on military intelligence and had no role in domestic spying. It was modeled on the British secret intelligence service, MI6, from which it received training and assistance. From its inception it was responsible for serving as a liaison with foreign intelligence services, and so the ISI was the CIA’s natural partner.

As mentioned, Pakistan’s first Pakistani military commander in chief was Ayub Khan, who took over from Gracey in January 1951. Khan was a graduate of the British military academy Sandhurst and in World War II fought in Burma with the British Fourteenth Army against the Japanese. After Pakistan achieved independence he was commander of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan before becoming chief of the army. He met often with Allen Dulles during his visits to the United States in the 1950s. In 1958 Ayub Khan became Pakistan’s first military dictator in a bloodless coup.

During the cold war, Dulles advocated for covert action as a low-profile and inexpensive alternative to military action to advance American interests around the world. His first big success came in Iran in 1953, when Operation Ajax, a joint mission with the British, overthrew a nationalist government in Tehran led by Mohammad Mossadegh. In his place the Shah of Iran was restored to full authority as the dictator of Persia. In one stroke, Allen Dulles had moved Iran from being a wobbly neutral in the cold war to one of America’s closest allies in the Muslim world and a firm bulwark of containment of the USSR on its southern border. No American lives had been lost, and the American role was plausibly deniable. Ike was very pleased; the president “marveled that the operation had been carried out with the loss of just a few hundred lives, none of them American. Allen had shown that he could crush foreign leaders secretly, cheaply, and almost bloodlessly.”50
IKE AND INDIA, 1950–60

In Central America the CIA succeeded in overthrowing a leftist government in Guatemala. Other missions were less successful. Efforts to stir up anticommunist resistance in Poland, Albania, and inside the USSR itself failed. In Indochina a long and costly battle with communism began in the early 1950s to try to salvage the French colonial empire there; it evolved into the Vietnam War. Yet the Iran operation outshone the failures.

By the mid-1950s the CIA had become a global organization, having grown sixfold since its founding in 1947. Dulles commanded 15,000 employees in fifty countries with a budget in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Working with his brother the secretary of state and an enthusiastic president, Allen Dulles was a player at the most senior decisionmaking table of American national security.51

In 1957 Dulles turned to Pakistan for help with launching a CIA operation in Tibet. This required cooperation between two divisions of his covert Directorate of Plans: the Far East (FE) Division and the Near East (NE) Division. FE had responsibility for China operations, and NE for Pakistan and India operations. FE was enthusiastic about operations in China, whereas NE was more reluctant to involve its clients in adventures inside that country. This bureaucratic division of labor would have its consequences over time, but at the start the two cooperated.

The Tibet resistance leaders identified a small group of six Tibetans to be sent for CIA training in insurgency tactics and clandestine operations. The Dalai Lama’s older brother, who was then living in the United States and was already in contact with the CIA, helped select the six trainees. With Pakistani assistance they were exfiltrated out of Tibet into East Pakistan in mid-1957. The ISI arranged for them to stay briefly at an abandoned World War II air base named Kurmitula about ten miles north of Dacca, then the capital of East Pakistan. Built by the Royal Air Force in the war, the base was relatively primitive with a landing strip 1,000 meters long.52
A CIA plane flew the first batch of recruits from Kurmitula to a CIA training facility on the island of Saipan that had been used previously for training fighters from other countries. By October 1957 the first team of Tibetans was ready to go home and use their newly developed skills to help the rebellion. The plan was to use an unmarked CIA-owned B-17 bomber to fly them to Kurmitula and, after refueling, to fly over Indian territory into Tibet where the recruits would parachute to the ground and join the insurgents. Polish anticommunist émigrés piloted the plane so that no American would be in risk of capture if anything went wrong. The mission was a success, and a second flight from East Pakistan followed in November 1957. By the end of the year, the CIA was in close contact with the Tibetan resistance and supporting their fight to free their country. Dulles was ecstatic.  

The operation became more regular in 1958 when the ferrying of resistance fighters was accompanied by periodic paradrops of arms, communications radios, and other equipment flown out of Pakistan; 18,000 pounds were dropped by the end of the year. More Tibetans fled their country and contacted the CIA for training. Some were trained at the CIA’s Virginia facility known as the Farm, but most were sent to an abandoned prisoner of war camp in Colorado—Camp Hale—that had been used to hold Germans captured from the famous Afrika Korps in World War II. Colorado had a topography and climate somewhat similar to the Himalayas, which enhanced the training regime.

The Chinese were aware of some elements of the CIA activity: They had captured Tibetans who were knowledgeable about the operation, and some of the equipment dropped in Tibet had fallen into the PLA’s hands. In July 1958 China officially protested to India, its southern neighbor, that “subversive and disruptive activities against China’s Tibet region were being carried out by the United States with fugitive reactionaries from Tibet.” This protest suggests that the Chinese assumed some degree of Indian complicity in
the CIA operation. The Chinese apparently were not aware of the
Pakistani role because they did not lodge a protest in Karachi.54

As the rebellion expanded, the Dalai Lama regretted his 1957
decision to return to Lhasa and live under Chinese occupation. Concluding that Zhou Enlai had lied to him and Nehru about
China’s peaceful intentions in Tibet, the Dalai Lama decided it was
time to flee the country and set up an opposition in exile to rally
international support against the Chinese. By this point three di-
visions of the PLA were occupying Lhasa, and clashes had broken
out between the Dalai Lama’s supporters and the Chinese army.55
The royal palace even came under fire from the PLA, and some
4,000 Tibetans were killed in the attack on the city. By 1958 up to
200,000 PLA troops were deployed across Tibet, occupying the
country and suppressing the insurgency.56

On March 17, 1959, the Dalai Lama secretly left his palace in
Lhasa and fled with his entourage and guards to India. According
to Harry Rositzke, the Dalai Lama “was accompanied on his flight
by a CIA trained radio operator who was able to keep Washington
posted on his often hazardous progress.”57 On March 27, Allen
Dulles told the president that his operatives were escorting the Dalai
Lama to freedom and political asylum in India. It was another
coup for the DCI.

The director was also an enthusiastic proponent of new tech-
nology in the fight against communism. Dulles backed a project
to develop a reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2, which could fly at the
edge of space for hundreds of miles while taking photographs of
the earth below. When the imagery was recovered at the end of the
mission, CIA photo interpreters could look inside the USSR and
PRC and see what the communist regimes were secretly building
at their factories, airfields, nuclear facilities, and other hidden lo-
cations. For the first time in human history an intelligence service
could look down from the sky and see inside its enemies’ most top-
secret facilities.
The U-2 project was led by one of Dulles’s protégés, Richard Bissell who, like the director, was widely admired in Washington. Schlesinger wrote years later that he was “a man of character and remarkable intellectual gifts” whose U-2 project was the “greatest intelligence coup since the war.”

With the development of the U-2, which went from concept to implementation in less than eighteen months, Dulles had given Eisenhower another intelligence victory. Its first operational missions took place over East Germany and Czechoslovakia in June 1956, but the top-priority targets for the U-2 were the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Pakistan’s location made it a critical partner for flight operations over both countries. Dulles persuaded Ayub Khan to allow the aircraft to deploy and operate from an air base near Lahore in Pakistan; from there the planes would fly across Europe to the USSR. Operation Soft Touch began on August 5, 1957, with the first flight over the USSR. On August 21, 1957 another first occurred: A U-2 mission flew from Lahore over Tibet to peer into the forbidden province of Red China.

The president personally approved every U-2 mission in advance, given the high stakes in operating piloted aircraft so deep behind the iron curtain and over China. Bissell would brief him in the White House on each plane’s flight route, targets for intelligence collection, and the anticipated risk from communist air defenses. Bissell by all accounts was a terrific briefer who always had done his homework.

CIA-ISI cooperation increased after Ayub Khan’s “revolution,” as he called his 1958 coup. In West Pakistan a more permanent facility was set up at a base near Peshawar for U-2 operations, and flights began from there in 1959. On May 13, when a U-2 landed in East Pakistan after flying across the PRC from the Philippines, it was the first time a Pakistani Air Force base outside Dacca was used for top-secret surveillance of China; another mission soon followed. In addition, not just Americans but also Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots flew U-2 missions. The first RAF pilot, Wing Com-
mander Robbie Robinson, flew a U-2 mission from Peshawar over the USSR on December 6, 1959. Other missions followed.62

Ayub Khan also agreed to permit the establishment of an intelligence collection facility near Peshawar in 1959. To seal the arrangements, on March 5, 1959, the United States and Pakistan signed a bilateral security agreement supplementing the CENTO and SEATO security treaties. Ayub demanded a price for his cooperation: He wanted state-of-the-art American jet fighters, allegedly to prevent overfl ights of his intelligence bases.63 After some delay American military aid expanded to include delivery of the F-104 jet fighter, then the top-of-the-line American fighter plane. Pakistan had become America’s crucial intelligence partner in South Asia with facilities in both wings of the country, East and West Pakistan, providing critical support to Allen Dulles’s CIA. In his autobiography Khan cryptically thanks the younger Dulles for all his help he provided to Pakistan.64

EISENHOWER GOES TO SOUTH ASIA

In December 1959 President Eisenhower became the first American president in ofﬁ ce to travel to South Asia. Only one American president had even traveled to South Asia before: After the end of his second term in ofﬁ ce Ulysses S. Grant and his wife had made an historic round-the-world trip beginning in England in May 1877. After a grand tour of Europe and the Holy Land, the Grants visited Aden and Bombay. They were hosted by the governor general in Bombay and then went by train to the Taj Mahal and the holy city of Benares on the Ganges. After leaving Calcutta, Grant went to Burma, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Tokyo. The world travelers returned to San Francisco in December 1879. No American president before or since has traveled so long and so far abroad.65

Ike’s three-week tour to Italy, Tunisia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iran, Greece, France, Spain, and Morocco set its
own record: No American president in office had ever visited so many countries in a single trip. Due to poor health, the president’s wife Mamie did not accompany her husband. It was also the maiden voyage for Air Force One, the president’s Boeing 707 that would become a symbol of American technology and power for decades after.66

The president arrived in Karachi on December 7, 1959 (the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941), where he was met by a crowd of 750,000 cheering Pakistanis. Eisenhower and Ayub Khan reviewed their cooperation on intelligence issues, which formed by now the heart of the bilateral relationship. Khan pressed the president to push India to negotiate a solution to the Kashmir dispute, an unresolved issue from the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The Hindu maharajah of Kashmir had chosen to join India then, despite the fact that the majority of his subjects were Muslims who probably wanted to be part of Pakistan. India and Pakistan fought a war to control the province and ended up splitting it between them when a cease-fire was arranged in 1948. Nehru, whose family roots were in Kashmir, had consistently refused to negotiate a peace agreement on any basis other than the status quo, leaving Pakistan with an irredentist demand for control of the Indian-held part of the province. Eisenhower made no promises to Khan, knowing that Nehru would not budge.

Ike also took in some tourist sites in Karachi, including watching a cricket match between Pakistan and Australia. Ayub Khan hated Karachi, the capital chosen by Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Jinnah in 1947, because he thought it ugly and too rowdy. He disliked its crowded streets and feared his political opponents could easily mobilize a mob there.67 Ayub Khan therefore decided to build a new capital city to be named Islamabad close to the general headquarters of the Pakistani army in Rawalpindi and his birthplace near Abbottabad in the Punjab. But in 1959 Islamabad was a dream, not a reality, so the government seat was still in Karachi.68
After three days in Pakistan, Air Force One took the president for a brief visit to Afghanistan. He toured Kabul and had discussions with Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud who told the president that Pakistan, not the Soviet Union, was the greatest threat to his country. Later that day Air Force One flew to New Delhi.

Eisenhower later wrote that the whole trip across three continents was planned so he could fulfill his desire to visit India, a desire that had been sparked by his conversations with Nehru in Gettysburg three years before. The crowds in New Delhi were even larger than those in Karachi: Millions came out to cheer the American president. Ike spent four days in India, including a trip to visit the Taj Mahal in Agra.

As at Gettysburg, China was at the center of the president’s dialogue with Nehru. China was still printing maps showing its claim to territory that India believed was its own. Yet much had changed since 1956. The Indian Intelligence Bureau had discovered that the Chinese had built a major highway across the Aksai Chin region, territory that India claimed was part of Kashmir and thus under Indian sovereignty. The area was uninhabited, but was critical to facilitate transportation and communication for the Chinese occupation of Tibet. The road linked Tibet to the other Chinese central Asian province of Sinkiang or Xinjiang.69

When the Indian press reported the construction of the strategic road, there was an outcry. Nehru demanded that China withdraw from the disputed territory. Zhou Enlai refused, suggesting in a letter instead that China take Aksai Chin in return for giving up its claim to Indian territory at the other end of the Chinese-Indian border in the North East Frontier. Nehru would not accept the exchange, and by 1959 Chinese relations with India had deteriorated. The 1965 CIA postmortem concluded that the Tibet uprising had gravely compromised Nehru’s ability to keep Indian relations with China friendly. The crisis between the two countries
was now in the open, with the Indian press pushing Nehru not to give Mao any concessions.\textsuperscript{70}  

In November 1959 Zhou had invited Nehru to a summit meeting in Beijing to defuse tensions over the border issue. In advance of the meeting, the Chinese had again suggested a de facto trade: China would give up its claims to northeast India, accepting the McMahon Line, and in turn India would accept Chinese control of Aksai Chin. The Indian press summarized the deal as China would take what it had already stolen and promise not to steal more. Nehru did not accept the invitation and refused to negotiate further.\textsuperscript{71}  

The Dalai Lama’s presence in India was another major point of friction between India and China. Nehru had granted the monarch political asylum in March 1959 when he fled the PLA. The Dalai Lama was given a home in Dharamsala, a hill station town built by the British, where he received visitors, including from the media, and decried the Chinese occupation of his homeland. Nehru sought to navigate a difficult balance—providing humanitarian help to the Tibetan leader without alienating China—by allowing him to set up an informal government in exile in India. However, China saw the Dalai Lama as a mortal enemy trying to subvert its control of Tibet.  

Nehru undoubtedly had some knowledge of the CIA’s connections with the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama, but he was probably unaware of the Pakistani role in the covert operation in Tibet.\textsuperscript{72}  
The Dalai Lama asked the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi to arrange a meeting with Eisenhower while he was in India, but Nehru refused to allow it. He told U.S. ambassador Ellsworth Bunker that an American-Tibetan summit meeting would antagonize China too much and that he still hoped to find an accommodation with Mao.\textsuperscript{73}  

In contrast with Nehru, IB director B. N. Mullik saw China as India’s main threat, along with Pakistan. Starting from scratch with no intelligence capability in 1948, India had greatly increased its intelligence infrastructure along the northern border in response to the Chinese occupation of Tibet. The first IB post on the north-
ern border was set up in 1950; by 1952 thirty IB posts were collecting information along the disputed frontier, and by 1960 the number of posts had more than doubled to sixty-nine. By 1962 the IB had seventy-seven such posts along the border manned by almost 1,600 personnel. Many were in remote areas difficult to reach by land and so required support from the Indian Air Force. These patrols often clashed with PLA forces. This improved intelligence collection provided Nehru an increasingly bleak picture of Chinese intentions and capabilities. It also gave him a good picture of what the Dalai Lama was doing in his home in exile in India.

In their final dinner with just the two of them, Ike and Nehru discussed China, with Eisenhower mostly listening to Nehru’s description of the border and Tibet issues. Nehru explained his constraints and the limits of his support for the Tibetans. The earlier American outrage about Indian neutrality was now gone (John Foster Dulles had also passed away) and was replaced by a “cordial sympathy, verging at times on a suitor’s ardor” for India. Nehru urged Eisenhower to use American influence with Pakistan to get Ayub Khan to agree to a “no war” pledge with India, in which the two countries would pledge publicly to resolve all their differences peacefully and to commit to nonbelligerency. Ike promised to use his influence and to have his ambassador raise the idea with the field marshal, but Ayub Khan refused to make that pledge.

Yet the president’s trip was a great personal success for Eisenhower. He was greeted as a hero both in Pakistan and India. “I like Ike,” his campaign motto, seemed to be true in South Asia as much as it was true back home.

Meanwhile, as the backdrop to Ike’s visit, the CIA’s covert war in Tibet was intensifying. After the Dalai Lama’s defection to India, Allen Dulles had asked for presidential authorization to step up aid to the insurgents, and on April 1, 1959, Ike gave the go-ahead. More Tibetan recruits were flown from Kurmitola for training and then dropped by parachute back into Tibet. To help facilitate the missions and collect intelligence on Chinese forces, Ike also
authorized U-2 flights over Tibet to provide aerial imagery of the battlefield.\textsuperscript{78} As mentioned earlier, two U-2 missions flew across China from the Philippines to the Kurmitola airstrip in mid-May 1959, in flights covering more than 4,000 miles. Three more U-2 missions crossed Tibet in September 1959.\textsuperscript{79}

\textbf{THE U-2 CRISIS}

Then disaster struck Dulles’s prized project. Pakistan’s crucial role in American spy missions was exposed to the entire world on May 1, 1960, when the Soviets shot down Operation Grand Slam, a U-2 aircraft flying from the Peshawar base over Soviet Union airspace to an airfield in northern Norway, in the town of Bodo. The plane’s pilot, Francis Gary Powers, survived the missile strike that destroyed the aircraft, parachuted safely, and was taken prisoner by the Soviets.\textsuperscript{80}

Eisenhower had agonized over the decision to approve Grand Slam, the most ambitious U-2 mission yet flown and the first to ever completely cross the USSR. He knew the Soviet air defenses were improving and also how catastrophic a shootdown of a CIA U-2 plane could be for U.S.-Soviet relations. However, Ike planned to attend a four-power summit in Paris beginning on May 16, 1960, that he hoped would mark a period of détente between the West and the USSR and result in a cooling of the temperature of the cold war and perhaps modest cooperation between the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control and the status of Berlin. In advance of the summit, Eisenhower needed intelligence on the USSR’s deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), then in its inception. Only the U-2 could accurately report how many ICBMs the USSR was deploying.\textsuperscript{81}

Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell pressed Ike to approve Grand Slam. They also told the president that the odds of a pilot surviving a missile strike on a U-2 were “one in a million.” And even if
the pilot did survive the crash, he had a poison pin available to commit suicide. Although the CIA did not order the pilots to use the pin if shot down, the agency clearly presented it as an option. So Eisenhower reluctantly gave the go-ahead to Grand Slam.

When the Soviets initially announced they had shot down an American plane deep inside Russia, they did not say they had captured the pilot. In response, the United States sought to minimize the affair and claimed that a weather plane had gone off course accidentally. Then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev announced triumphantly that the U.S. government was lying, that the pilot had been captured along with his poison pin. Powers also had seven gold women’s rings with him for use in buying help from those who found him if he did survive a crash. Khrushchev mocked the rings, suggesting “perhaps he was supposed to have flown still higher, to Mars and seduced Martian ladies.” Eisenhower was at his Gettysburg farm when Khrushchev delivered his news to the world press. Ike refused to apologize for the overflights, although he ordered Dulles to stop U-2 missions over Russia because they were too dangerous.

The Paris summit, held just days after, was a disaster. Khrushchev demanded an apology for the U-2 mission and then stormed out of the first session of the talks, leaving to return to Moscow by way of East Berlin. Any hope of détente in the final year of the Eisenhower presidency was gone. U-2 planes would still fly over China and many other countries, but their days of collecting intelligence over Russia were over.

Eisenhower did not fire Dulles or Bissell, nor did he curb the CIA’s covert operations around the world. The president had known the risks of each U-2 flight and had approved the decision to fly Grand Slam. He still welcomed the intelligence the CIA provided. The Tibet project continued with Pakistan’s help. Despite the embarrassment of the discovery that he was hosting a U-2 airbase, Ayub Khan and the ISI continued to work closely with the Americans.
JFK’S FORGOTTEN CRISIS

However, Dulles and Bissell increasingly focused on two new operations. In the Congo, a recently independent Belgian colony, the CIA was involved in an operation to prevent a leftist politician named Patrice Lumumba from taking power. Lumumba was suspected of being pro-Soviet and was to die shortly at the hands of his Congolese enemies and Belgian mercenaries.84

Much closer to home, Fidel Castro had taken power in Cuba. Like Lumumba he was suspected of leaning toward Moscow and being pro-communist. Dulles, Bissell, and Eisenhower set in motion a plot to overthrow Castro. That plan would be the first major challenge to Ike’s successor, John F. Kennedy.