India’s Experience with a Pegged Exchange Rate

According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the exchange rate of the Indian rupee is “market determined,” in the sense that it is set in a currency market and is not administratively determined. However, the RBI actively trades in the foreign exchange market with the stated goal of “containing volatility” and influencing the market price. Recent research on the Bank’s interventions has demonstrated that the rupee is effectively pegged to the U.S. dollar. That link to the dollar, combined with the easing of restrictions on India’s current account and capital account during the 1990s, suggests a potential conflict with Bank efforts to conduct an autonomous monetary policy directed toward stabilizing the domestic economy.

A key insight of open economy macroeconomics, newly prominent in recent decades, is the idea of the “impossible trinity.” The theory is that no country can simultaneously have an open capital account, a fixed exchange rate, and a monetary policy targeted on the domestic economy. Specifically, once the capital account is open and the exchange rate is fixed, monetary policy is driven solely by the need to uphold the fixed exchange rate.

To review the logic of the impossible trinity, suppose a central bank begins to tighten monetary policy in the presence of an open capital account and a fixed exchange rate. Tight monetary policy raises interest rates, which attract capital inflows. The central bank must therefore buy foreign currency to prevent a currency appreciation. Financing the purchases requires an increase in the monetary base, reversing the earlier effort to tighten monetary policy. As an alternative, the bank might seek to finance the purchase of foreign currency by offsetting sales of other domestic assets, such as its holding of government debt (a process known as sterilization);

1. This paper grew out of conversations with Ajay Shah. The views in this paper are my own. I would like to thank Rajnish Mehra, Indira Rajaraman, Shankar Acharya, Arvind Virmani, Suman Bery, and Barry Bosworth for many improvements to the paper. I am grateful to CMIE and Golak Nath of NSE for help on data.

but those actions will exacerbate the rise in interest rates, attracting further inflows.

Few countries today adhere to the extreme position of having a fixed exchange rate. But many countries that try to "manage" a "market determined exchange rate" face similar conflicts. And the more the central bank focuses on currency policy, the more it loses monetary policy autonomy.

In the years after World War II, many countries chose to have autonomy in both currency policy and monetary policy and did so successfully by closing the capital account. With a closed capital account, even if economic agents have speculative views about future fluctuations of the currency, they cannot express these views by taking positions in the foreign exchange market. With a more open capital account, however, when economic agents have speculative views about the future, they are able to move capital across borders and vary their net currency positions. For example, an importer who expects a rupee appreciation may choose to delay payments in order to convert into U.S. dollars at a more attractive exchange rate. The steady increase in openness on the capital account in recent decades is forcing many countries now to grapple with the trade-off between having a currency policy and having monetary policy.

Until the past decade, India had a system of strong capital controls. In the spirit of the impossible trinity, these controls made it possible for India’s central bank to operate a fixed exchange rate regime and have monetary policy autonomy. During the 1990s, however, restrictions on the current account and the capital account were substantially, though not completely, eased. (A later section of this paper describes capital mobility in India in more detail.)

As the conceptual framework of the impossible trinity implies, India’s liberalization of the current account and the capital account should have steadily tied monetary policy to the need to maintain the currency regime.3 Although currency flexibility in India appears to have been unchanged in the past twenty-five years, the monetary policy consequences of upholding this currency policy are likely to have changed substantially.

It is important to emphasize that India has neither a completely open capital account nor a completely fixed exchange rate. The current policy framework comprises partial controls on capital, a pegged (but not fixed) exchange rate with extremely low volatility, and an effort at monetary policy autonomy. The policy framework in India today is hence an interesting gray area, one not well illuminated by theory.

This paper seeks to shed some light on the extent to which India’s choice of a pegged currency regime has attenuated monetary policy. It addresses four questions. First, where does India stand in terms of opening the capital account? Second, what has the RBI’s stance of sterilization been? Third, is it possible to isolate episodes of large-scale currency trading by the central bank? And finally, what were the monetary consequences of currency trading?

The following sections provide a brief summary of recent research on India’s currency regime, an overview of the implications of capital controls for the operation of the currency forward market, and an examination of the extent to which the RBI has sought to sterilize the domestic monetary implications of its exchange market interventions. These discussions provide the context for the analysis of two episodes of large-scale RBI intervention in currency markets, one in 1993–94 and the other after June 2001. In both episodes the RBI accumulated foreign currency reserves in an effort to resist an exchange rate appreciation. The analysis highlights the growing conflict for India between implementing a pegged exchange rate and operating an autonomous monetary policy.

Recent Research on India’s Currency Regime

Several recent research papers have focused on the question of how to characterize a country’s de facto currency regime, as opposed to the regime that the central bank claims is in operation. G. A. Calvo and C. M. Reinhart propose a metric of currency flexibility that combines volatility of the exchange rate, volatility of foreign exchange reserves, and interest rate volatility.4 Within this context, they find that the Indian exchange rate exhibits extremely low flexibility and that the degree of flexibility did not change during 1979–99.

Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff propose a data-driven algorithm for identifying the de facto currency regime.5 First, they examine the monthly absolute percentage change in the exchange rate. If the change is equal to zero for four consecutive months or more, they classify that episode (however long it lasts) as a de facto peg if no dual or multiple exchange rates are in place. This approach allows them to identify relatively short-lived de facto pegs as well as longer-lasting pegs. Second, they compute the probability that the monthly exchange rate change remains within a 1 percent band over a

5. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
rolling five-year period. If the probability is 80 percent or higher, they clas-
sify the regime as a de facto peg or crawling peg over the entire five-year
period. If the exchange rate has no drift, they classify it as a fixed parity; if
it has a positive drift, they label it a crawling peg. If it goes through periods
of both appreciation and depreciation, it is a moving peg. Based on these
methods, Reinhart and Rogoff classify the current currency regime in India
as a “peg to the US dollar” (in various forms) since August 1979.

In a working paper last year I examined in more detail the question of
how to characterize India’s currency regime. In summary, I found that
India’s enormous reserves buildup after mid-2002 cannot be explained
as a quest for reserves as insurance. In addition, extending Calvo and
Reinhart’s metric of currency flexibility beyond 1999 shows no change
over 1979–2003. A variety of tests betray symptoms of pegging the rupee
to the U.S. dollar. The volatility of the rupee-dollar exchange rate, for
example, is extremely low while that of the exchange rate of rupee and the
euro or the yen is high. Tests based on a methodology devised by J. Frankel
and S.-J. Wei show that the dollar is overwhelmingly the dominant cur-
currency in explaining fluctuations of the Indian currency.

India’s Openness on the Capital Account

It is widely believed that India opened up to capital inflows beginning in
1991. But as table 1 shows, total inflows dropped from 11.6 percent of GDP
in 1991–92 to 9.7 percent of GDP in 2002–03. Nonofficial flows stagnated
at roughly 9 percent. How can this picture be reconciled with India’s sub-
stantial capital account liberalization during the 1990s?

Understanding the Elements of Openness

One explanation for this seeming contradiction lies in the way capital flows
are measured. They can be measured in terms of gross inflows, or net in-
flows, or gross flows (inflows plus outflows), just as trade openness can be
measured in terms of the trade balance, or exports, or exports plus imports.
In the case of trade, or the current account, the most meaningful measure,
which is universally used, is exports plus imports as percentage of GDP.
Similarly, I will use capital account inflows plus outflows as percentage of
GDP to measure the extent of capital account openness.

The second explanation involves thinking carefully about the nature of capital controls in India today. It proves useful to think in terms of a hierarchy of openness of the different channels through which capital now flows both inward and outward. The following discussion touches briefly on the channels in this hierarchy, running from the most open to the most controlled.

**CURRENT ACCOUNT.** Since India’s current account was sharply liberalized during the 1990s, trade in both goods and services has grown enormously. As table 2 shows, trade, as a share of GDP, grew from 21.3 percent to 36.8 percent from 1991–92 to 2002–03.

The current account is one of the most open channels for cross-border capital movements because government inspectors are unable to measure accurately the value of goods and services, such as shipments of diamonds or email attachments containing software. The current account is also a well-known channel for evading capital controls. During the 1990s, for example, trade mis invoicing on the current account was a significant route for capital flows. Hence the growth of the current account should be interpreted as an effective easing of capital controls. Since 1991, RBI regulations on the current account have not been used to implement currency policy.

**INVESTMENT FLOWS.** Investment flows involve some capital controls. India has steadily eased restrictions on foreign direct investment, foreign institutional investors engaging in portfolio investment, and outward flows by Indian firms seeking to build international operations, so that investment flows are a relatively open channel for cross-border capital flows. Nevertheless, government regulations for foreign direct investment involve restrictions in certain industries—such as that foreign investors cannot own more than 24 percent of an insurance company. And rules for foreign institutional investors have caps for the ownership of any one stock and ceilings for the total ownership by all such investors in a

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Nonofficial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991–92</td>
<td>11.59</td>
<td>8.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–96</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>6.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002–03</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>9.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Foreign investors are essentially prohibited from buying government bonds. At the same time, these channels constitute effective capital account convertibility for these classes of investors, who are free to move capital in and out of India and who are permitted access to the currency forward market. As with the current account, tactical changes in these rules have not been used by the government or RBI as an instrument of implementing currency policy.

**OTHER CAPITAL FLOWS.** Balance-of-payments statistics show an entry for “other capital flows,” which consist of delayed export receipts, advance payments against imports, and loans to nonresidents by residents. These offer a channel for capital flows that are not restricted by official controls.

**LOANS.** Although Indian firms can borrow from overseas, the borrowing involves significant restrictions, and the Ministry of Finance and RBI have attempted to use changes in these capital controls as a way to implement currency policy.

**BANKING FLOWS.** Capital flows through the banking system are influenced by a very detailed set of regulatory restrictions operated by RBI. As both the central bank and the banking regulator, RBI uses banking regulation to implement capital controls. For example, RBI sets the interest rate at which banks borrow from foreigners (labeled “nonresident Indians”). Hence it is useful to think of all capital flows through the banking system as being highly controlled.

**OFFICIAL FLOWS.** These flows are, by definition, not available to private economic agents and are excluded from consideration.

As table 3 shows, the least-controlled capital flow channel, investment flows, increased from less than 1 percent of GDP to 3.9 percent of GDP.
over a decade. The most-controlled channel, banking flows, dropped from 10 percent of GDP to 5.5 percent of GDP. Overall, private capital flows saw no trend increase.

With the current and capital account combined, India’s total private external transactions rose from roughly 35 percent of GDP to more than 50 percent of GDP from 1991–92 to 2002–03. Over this decade, both the foreign exchange market and private participation in it increased considerably.

Restrictions on the Currency Forward Market

One element of the capital controls now in place is barriers to arbitrage on the currency forward market. In a conventional forward market, arbitrage defines the forward rate. Even if strong speculative views and positions on the market exist, in a normal forward market no interesting interpretation can be attached to the level of the forward premium because the premium is determined purely by covered interest parity. When violations of market efficiency arise, near-infinite capital comes into play in arbitrage. Through this process, arbitrageurs restore the forward price to its fair value.

In India, RBI rules sharply restrict the ability of banks to engage in covered interest parity arbitrage, thus breaking the link between the spot market price and the price of the derivative.9 In addition, although the RBI trades extensively to manipulate the spot market, the observed forward price tends to be a market-determined rate.

Interestingly, the RBI rules that inhibit covered interest parity arbitrage combine with the relatively undistorted forward market to generate a

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9. Currency derivatives can either trade OTC or on exchange. At present, currency derivatives are only traded OTC; there is no exchange. Hence, my treatment is limited to currency forwards and does not use data from a currency futures market.
remarkable information source. When arbitrage does not determine prices, information from the forward market conveys expectations about the future. If economic agents expect the rupee to depreciate, they grow more interested in selling rupees forward. Exporters stay unhedged, and importers are likely to hedge. Conversely, if economic agents expect the rupee to appreciate, they grow more interested in buying rupees forward.

The arithmetic of forward pricing, as noted, is based on covered interest parity, which involves comparing two routes for riskless dollar investment. An investor could convert $1 into $(1 + r_d)^T$ through $r_w$, which is obtained from the U.S. zero coupon yield curve for $T$ years. Or the investor could convert into rupee at the spot price ($S$), invest in the Government of India (GOI) zero coupon yield of comparable maturity, and obtain a locked-in cash flow of $S(1 + r_i)^T/F$ by converting back into dollars at the exchange rate $F$ at date $T$. Under no-arbitrage, these two investment strategies have to yield an identical return, through which the fair value for $F$ can be computed. Once we know the fair value, we can measure the error when compared with the observed market price.

If RBI rules did not restrict arbitrage, the forward premium would not be informative. Under the existing policy framework, however, it is a uniquely useful market-based measure of future expectations, one that is not available in most countries where regulators do not inhibit arbitrage.

Internationally, empirical research related to currency expectations uses data based on surveys. Market participants, central bankers, multinational companies, and economics departments of banks are interviewed on a weekly or monthly frequency. Survey data such as the Currency Forecasters’ Digest, now known as the Financial Times Currency Forecast, form the basis of empirical research on currency expectations.

Although no such data are available for India, the daily data from the forward market on the deviation of the forward-market rate from covered interest parity are a unique high-frequency source of information about currency expectations. As shown in figure 1, in the rupee-dollar forward market, deviations from the covered parity conditions have tended to persist over many years. In an open market, arbitrage would have wiped out such deviations almost instantly.

Apart from conveying expectations of the market, the error between the observed forward premium and its fair value also shows the arbitrage opportunity available to those who are allowed to participate in the forward market.

Extent of Sterilization

A central bank has several options in responding to variations in the volume of net capital inflows. One is simply to allow the market for foreign exchange to clear through changes in its price. But if the central bank is committed to a specific exchange rate, it can finance its purchases of foreign exchange either by expanding the monetary base or by selling other domestic assets, normally government debt. Concern that large expansions of the monetary base could worsen inflation pressures often leads to efforts to “sterilize,” or offset, the monetary implications through the sale of other assets in the bank’s portfolio. The extent of sterilization by the central bank can differ, depending on both the need to sterilize and the ability to do so. It is also possible to distinguish between “narrow” sterilization, involving the sale of other domestic assets, and “broad” sterilization, involving levers like changes in reserve requirements.

In what follows I estimate an offset coefficient that measures the extent to which the addition to net foreign exchange assets (NFA) is sterilized by the central bank. The central bank offsets the change in NFA by changes in net domestic assets (NDA), where NDA is a policy variable. My work
is based on a monetary model, which includes a simple money demand function and a money supply function. The reduced form expression assumes that NDA is responsive to demand conditions in the economy, determined by output growth. Changes in NDA take into account the changes in the monetary base due to changes in NFA or to changes in reserve requirements. When the central bank fully offsets changes in NFA, in the limit, the offset coefficient is \(-1\). Partial sterilization generates values of the coefficient between 0 and \(-1\).

The model is estimated for the period April 1993 to December 2003 using monthly data. Net domestic assets of the RBI are adjusted to reflect net non-monetary liabilities. For comparability, the index of industrial production (IIP) is re-expressed in nominal terms using the wholesale price index. This yields a time-series of the nominal IIP (IIPn), which is used as a proxy for nominal output. The cash reserve ratio (CRR) is used to measure bank reserve requirements.

The series NDA, NFA, and IIPn are non-stationary. Unit root tests indicate that they are I(1). Further, both the Johansen cointegration tests and standard tests for stationarity suggest that the series are cointegrated. Consequently, the model for estimating the offset coefficient is set up as an error-correction model. The first stage is specified in levels, and the second stage in first differences with the lagged residual term as an additional variable and with monthly dummies:

\[
\begin{align*}
NDA &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{NFA} + \alpha_2 \text{IIPn} + \alpha_3 \text{CRR} + \varepsilon, \\
\Delta \text{NDA} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \varepsilon_{t-1} + \beta_2 \Delta \text{NFA} + \beta_3 \Delta \text{IIPn} + \gamma,
\end{align*}
\]

The empirical results are

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{NDA} &= -0.822 \text{ NFA} + 841.6 \text{ IIPn} + 360.4 \text{ CRR}, \\
& (30.7) (17.7) (0.4) R^2 = 0.93
\end{align*}
\]

and with error correction,

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta \text{NDA} &= -0.271 \varepsilon_{t-1} - 0.602 \Delta \text{NFA} + 375.2 \Delta \text{IIPn} \\
& (4.5) (5.4) (5.8) R^2 = 0.38
\end{align*}
\]

The results suggest that RBI directly sterilized its currency intervention by a reduction in net domestic assets. However, though the extent of sterilization

12. Schadler and others (1993) estimate an offset coefficient that measures the degree to which capital inflows offset the changes in net domestic assets in a fixed exchange rate regime. My model is similar to the one used by them, but is motivated by a different question.
was large, it was not complete. The offset coefficient is estimated to be $-0.8$ in levels and 0.6 in the error-correction estimate.

The relationship with output growth was found to be positive and highly significant. In other words, growth in net domestic assets was higher when output growth was faster. The coefficient of CRR was found to be insignificant and is excluded in the error-correction estimate.

**Analyzing Major Episodes of RBI Currency Trading**

To understand the consequences of the impossible trinity, as well as issues in the implementation of the rupee-dollar peg, it is interesting to focus on the periods when the RBI has engaged heavily in currency trading. Figure 2 shows the time-series of India’s foreign currency reserves from January 1993 to November 2003. Based on the rate of reserve accumulation, two episodes merit attention. Episode I runs from June 1993 to November 1994 (eighteen months). Episode II runs from August 2001 onward. Both episodes happen to involve a sharp increase in reserves. There is no comparable episode of a sharp drop in reserves.

Reserves increased because the central bank was purchasing dollars to prevent an appreciation of the rupee. Figure 3 shows the time-series of daily volatility of the rupee-dollar exchange rate during the period in question.
In both Episodes I and II, the standard deviation of daily returns attains low values like 0.1 percent.

I propose to understand both these episodes using the following framework. First, how did the episode commence? Second, what were the fluctuations of the currency in the episode? How tightly did RBI peg the currency? Third, what was the currency forward market thinking? Fourth, how large was RBI’s currency trading, compared with reserve money? Fifth, how did RBI offset the monetary implications of currency trading? Sixth, what was the trajectory of money supply and interest rates in the episode?

**Episode I**

In 1993–94 India began liberalizing portfolio inflows. From near-zero levels, portfolio inflows rose sharply to $307 million in the second quarter of 1993–94, to $935 million in the third quarter, to $2283 million in the fourth quarter. The shift marked the beginning of a capital surge into the country.
Table 4 shows the evolution of balance of payments around Episode I. The current account was unchanged from 1992–93 to 1993–94. Net capital inflows, however, rose sharply from $2.9 billion to $9.6 billion. My dating of Episode I, from June 1993 to November 1994, is squarely in this period of high capital inflows.

Faced with a capital surge, RBI chose to prevent the rupee from appreciating. The rupee-dollar rate was kept largely fixed, as shown in figure 4. Between July 1993 and December 1993, the dollar was fixed at Rs. 31.42. In January 1994, it moved to Rs. 31.37.

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Table 4. Balance of Payments in Episode I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Current account balance</th>
<th>Net capital inflows</th>
<th>Change in net foreign assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991–92</td>
<td>−9.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td>−1.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>−1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–94</td>
<td>−1.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–95</td>
<td>−3.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–96</td>
<td>−5.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>−0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996–97</td>
<td>−4.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>4.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


FIGURE 4. Expectations of Rupee Appreciation, Episode I

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Reserve Bank of India and Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.

Episode I: Vertical lines are placed at “06/01/93” and “11/01/94.”
As noted earlier, covered interest parity violations on the currency forward market are a source of information about the speculative views of private market participants. In a longer time-series beginning from 1993, the errors are typically negative, reflecting expectations of rupee depreciation.  

As figure 4 shows, the speculative views of the market swung into positive terrain at the start of Episode I. That is, private market participants appear to have believed that the rupee was a “market determined exchange rate,” so the capital surge would lead to a rupee appreciation.

With the benefit of hindsight, we know that these expectations were incorrect. Nevertheless, this information about expectations shaped contemporaneous investment decisions of economic agents and thus the capital flows.

Figure 5 shows the time-series of RBI purchases of foreign currency during Episode I. Because the exchange rate was fixed, the data on currency intervention serve as a proxy for the capital inflow into the economy, for which monthly data are not available.

The similarity between the fluctuations of RBI purchases of foreign currency and the mispricings on the currency forward market is striking. This is consistent with my argument that such mispricings reflect the then prevalent currency views of private market participants, which would have shaped their decisions on short-term capital flows.

When a central bank engages in currency trading, the trading affects reserve money. If the capital account is highly open, the scale of currency trading required to distort the price on the currency market is larger. In the case of Episode I, the purchases of foreign assets by RBI led to a rise in net foreign assets from 20 percent of reserve money to 45 percent of reserve money.

As noted, the central bank has several options in sterilizing this impact. One would be the sale of government bonds that are part of reserve money. Data for open market operations in this period have not been released, but at the time of Episode I the bond market was highly illiquid, which may have placed constraints on the RBI’s use of open market operations in sterilization. Another option would have been the weaker lever of not replacing maturing government bonds.

Figure 6 shows the growth of net foreign assets and net domestic assets in Episode I. Net foreign assets rose sharply, reflecting currency trading.

13. The “typical” configuration in India has been one where domestic inflation is higher than worldwide inflation, and the rupee has steadily depreciated.
FIGURE 5. RBI Net Purchases of Foreign Currency, Episode I

Note: 1 crore is 10 million.

FIGURE 6. Central Bank Assets and Reserve Money, Episode I

Note: 1 crore is 10 million.
Sterilization is “partial,” in that NDA fell, but the drop in NDA was not as large as the rise in NFA.

By my dating, Episode I started in June 1993. One year into the episode, the growth of reserve money, $M_0$, had touched 30 percent. Beginning on June 11, 1994, RBI embarked on monetary tightening by using reserve requirements (see table 5). These policy decisions marked a reversal of RBI’s earlier policy of phasing out the cash reserve ratio (CRR), which was seen as a component of financial repression and a tax on banking. The use of reserve requirements as a tool for currency policy has been observed to affect interest rates in many developing countries.\(^\text{14}\)

Figure 7 summarizes the monetary consequences of the pegged exchange rate regime in Episode I. Reserve money grew at rates as high as 30 percent annualized. The RBI muted the impact of reserve money growth on $M_1$ growth through the use of reserve requirements. Interest rates during the period of the capital surge declined slightly, as may be expected if sterilization is incomplete. The decline can be attributed to the higher growth of money supply. Toward the end of the period, when reserve requirements were raised and as output growth in the economy picked up, short-term interest rates rose (figure 8).

To summarize, Episode I began as a surge in capital inflows. Although the exchange rate was fixed, the market expected the rupee to appreciate against the dollar. The months when the market expected rupee appreciation saw a sharp inflow of dollars. To prevent the appreciation, the RBI actively purchased dollars, pushing net foreign assets as a share of reserve money up from 20 percent to 45 percent. Because the bond market was relatively illiquid, the opportunity for doing open market operations was limited. Although net domestic assets growth slowed, the shift did not offset the sharp growth

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**TABLE 5. RBI Use of Reserve Requirements for Sterilization in Episode I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 1994</td>
<td>Cash reserve ratio raised from 14% to 14.5%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9, 1994</td>
<td>CRR raised to 14.75%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 6, 1994</td>
<td>CRR raised to 15%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 29, 1994</td>
<td>CRR for foreign currency nonresident accounts raised from 0% to 7.5%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 21, 1995</td>
<td>CRR for nonresident accounts raised from 0% to 7.5%;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CRR for FCNR accounts raised to 15%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17, 1995</td>
<td>Conditions for overdraft facility to stock brokers to draw money from banks made more stringent.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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\(^{14}\) Reinhart and Reinhart (1999).
FIGURE 7. Growth of Reserve Money and M₃, Episode I

Note: M₃ includes currency, demand deposits, and saving accounts.

FIGURE 8. The 91-Day Treasury Bill Rate and the Cash Reserve Ratio, Episode I

Episode I: Vertical lines are placed at “06/01/93” and “11/01/94.”
in NFA, and reserve money grew at rates as high as 30 percent. Short-term interest rates fell for roughly a year, reflecting only partial sterilization. After that, reserve requirements were tightened, and interest rates rose. At the same time, M3 growth accelerated.

In Episode I, the near-fixed exchange rate during a period of large dollar inflows necessitated massive RBI currency trading, which led to rapid growth of reserve money and to a temporary reversal of the phase-out of CRR. Although RBI raised reserve requirements, M3 growth accelerated significantly. The monetary tightening, which began in month twelve of this eighteen-month episode, led to a period of rising interest rates. Episode I was, hence, India’s first experience with the loss of monetary policy autonomy.

The experience was particularly striking given that during Episode I, openness on the capital account was limited and the external sector was small relative to the Indian economy. Nevertheless, the logic of the impossible trinity was powerful enough that the pursuit of currency pegging led to an economically significant attenuation of monetary policy.

### Table 6. Balance of Payments in Episode II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Current account balance</th>
<th>Net capital inflows</th>
<th>Change in net foreign assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999–2000</td>
<td>−4.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–01</td>
<td>−2.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>6.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001–02</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>12.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002–03</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>17.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003–04</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>37.38</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Episode II

Unlike Episode I, Episode II did not begin with a capital surge. In 2000–01 and 2001–02, India’s capital account (table 6) was remarkably stable. From 1999–2000 to 2001–02, net capital inflows into India were roughly $10 billion a year. Instead, Episode II began with a dramatic shift in the current account—from a deficit of $4.7 billion (1999–2000) to a surplus of $1.4 billion (2001–02)—that affected the currency market.

Figure 9 underlines this difference between Episode I and Episode II. Early in Episode II, the current account turned from a deficit into a surplus; later, large capital inflows began.
Currency Spot and Forward Markets

In Episode II, the central bank at first prevented the rupee from appreciating. In June 2002, however, with foreign exchange reserves exceeding $55 billion, the rupee was allowed to appreciate.

Figure 10 shows that currency expectations had started turning around even before the rupee began appreciating. After June, when the rupee was allowed to start appreciating, private forecasts of the rupee changed sharply. After July, the observed forward premium was lower than the fair value, reflecting expectations of a currency appreciation.

Currency Expectations and Capital Flows

Foreign exchange reserves with the RBI started growing sharply in 2001–02, that is, before the increase in capital inflows in the following year. The implementation of the pegged exchange rate, coupled with the strengthening current account, led to a sharp increase in currency trading by RBI (figure 11).

15. There was a sharp decline in the forward premium during Episode II, from March 2003 onward. This partly merely reflected a change in the fair value (that is, changes in the 90-day rate in India and in the United States). However, there was also a widening of the gap between the two series, which is shown in figure 10, which shows the mispricing on the forward market.

Note: 1 crore is 10 million.
Full Period: Vertical lines are placed at “06/01/93” and “11/01/94” and “08/01/01.”

![Figure 9. Current Account Surplus and Capital Inflows in Episode II](image-url)
Strictly, the observed forward premium should be slightly higher than that computed from covered interest parity, owing to the country credit risk premium required for India exposure. However, the failure probability of a GOI bond on a 90-day horizon is likely to have been negligible through this period. Hence, this is unlikely to be an important issue in my analysis.

As noted earlier, apart from conveying expectations of the market, the error between the observed forward premium and its fair value also shows the arbitrage opportunity available to foreign investors. In December 2003, the error between the observed forward premium and its fair value exceeded 350 basis points. A foreigner who bought GOI bonds and had a locked-in repatriation into U.S. dollars at a future date using the forward market was thus earning a return of over 350 basis points. Not surprisingly, the period after July 2002 witnessed a sharp inflow of dollars, both on the current and capital account (figure 9). The capital surge thus began in 2002–03.

Tools for Sterilization

In terms of sterilization, Episode II also differed from Episode I. This time, the institutional infrastructure for conducting open market operations was in place. By 2000–01, the turnover ratio in the bond market had risen to 100 percent, making the market sufficiently liquid for the

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16. Strictly, the observed forward premium should be slightly higher than that computed from covered interest parity, owing to the country credit risk premium required for India exposure. However, the failure probability of a GOI bond on a 90-day horizon is likely to have been negligible through this period. Hence, this is unlikely to be an important issue in my analysis.
government to be able to conduct substantial open market operations (figure 12). 17

Figure 13 shows that the increase in net foreign exchange assets was sterilized by open market operations. In a striking and inverse relationship, the months with high purchases of U.S. dollars were months with substantial sale of GOI bonds.

Table 7 shows that the stock of government bonds with the RBI was reduced to barely Rs. 274 billion, or about $6 billion, by March 2004. That same month, a new category of bonds, Market Stabilization Bonds, was designed to be used solely as an instrument of sterilization. The cash reserve ratio stood at 4.5 percent in March 2004. The existing legal framework prevents the CRR from being cut below 3 percent.

Money Growth

Because of sterilization, reserve money did not grow despite the increase in net foreign assets. Instead, the share of net foreign assets in reserve money increased sharply from 65 percent in 2001 to 78 percent in 2002 to more than 100 percent in January 2004. Figure 14 shows the sharp decline in the

17. While data are not available for the first episode, there is a consensus that the bond market was even more illiquid in the preceding years.
**Figure 12.** Turnover Ratio of Government Bonds, January 1993–February 2004

**Figure 13.** Currency Trading and Open Market Operations, 1993–2003


Full Period: Vertical lines are placed at “06/01/93” and “11/01/94” and “08/01/01.”
share of RBI credit to the government in reserve money. As a consequence, growth of reserve money remained under control.

Because sterilization was possible through the simplest route, open market operations, it was not necessary for the RBI to reduce money supply through changes in reserve requirements, as in the first episode. On the contrary, CRR was steadily reduced.

As a consequence, the money multiplier increased in value during this period. Despite that, as a result of the large scale of sterilization and the low

### TABLE 7. Sources of Reserve Money, March 19, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Billions of rupees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net RBI credit to government</td>
<td>274.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBI credit to banks</td>
<td>39.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign exchange assets of RBI</td>
<td>4974.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government’s currency liabilities to the public</td>
<td>72.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net nonmonetary liabilities of RBI</td>
<td>1277.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve money</td>
<td>4082.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### FIGURE 14. Net Foreign Assets, Net Domestic Assets, and Reserve Money of the Reserve Bank of India, Episode II


Episode II: The vertical line is placed at “08/01/01.”
growth of reserve money, the growth of money supply remained under control (figure 15).

Stance of Monetary Policy

The unprecedented drop in interest rates that India experienced in Episode II reflects a combination of developments. The first was the partial sterilization of capital inflows, which open economy macroeconomics expects to lower domestic interest rates. The second was the steady pace of CRR reductions. And the third was slow output growth during this period, which led to slow growth in demand for capital.

Summary

To summarize, Episode II began as a surge in the current account. Capital account openness in this episode was greater than it was in the first episode. After June 2002, the rupee began to appreciate, the forward market forecasted further appreciation, and a capital surge began. Net foreign assets as a share of reserve money went up from an already high 70 percent to 120 percent. The RBI actively used the bond market for open market operations. The program for phasing out the cash reserve ratio stayed on course;

FIGURE 15. Growth of Reserve Money and the Money Supply, Episode II

Note: M3 is the sum of currency, demand deposits, and savings accounts.
Episode II: The vertical line is placed at “08/01/01.”
the money multiplier kept rising. \( M_3 \) and \( M_0 \) growth did not accelerate. The CRR was steadily cut. Interest rates declined sharply through a combination of partial sterilization of capital inflows and a steady pace of CRR reduction.

In contrast with Episode I, when the rupee was kept largely fixed, Episode II saw a slow appreciation of the rupee. The daily volatility of the rupee-dollar exchange rate remained very low, at around 0.1 percent, and the rupee-dollar rate was not a random walk. Once the rupee started appreciating, currency expectations turned around, followed by a sharp inflow of capital, which may have been motivated by either covered interest parity arbitrage or currency speculation.

**Comparing the Two Episodes**

Did the stance of direct sterilization change in Episode I or Episode II? To address this question, I introduce slope dummies \( d_1 \) and \( d_2 \) for the two episodes. The model may now be expressed as follows:
Three $\alpha$ coefficients are of interest: $\alpha_1$, the "normal" level of sterilization; $\alpha_2$, which tests for a change in stance in Episode I; and $\alpha_3$, which tests for a change in stance in Episode II.

The estimated equation when slope dummies for the each of the episodes are introduced is

$$NDA = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1NFA + \alpha_2d_1 * NFA + \alpha_3d_2 * NFA + \alpha_4IIPn + \alpha_5CRR + \epsilon.$$  

(5)

The coefficient of NFA is estimated to be $-0.67$, suggesting that, in general, the RBI sterilizes roughly two-thirds of its trading in the foreign exchange market. This result is broadly consistent with previous RBI study results on sterilization by Sitikantha Pattanaik and Satyananda Sahoo that RBI undertook large-scale but not full sterilization.\(^{18}\)

The coefficient for the dummy for Episode II is negative and significant, showing a change in the stance of the RBI. The coefficient for Episode I is not found to be significant.

Table 8 summarizes the differences between the two episodes. In some senses, the outcomes in Episode II were more benign than those in Episode I. Given access to a more liquid bond market, the RBI was able to sterilize to keep the monetary base under control. It could continue to cut the cash reserve ratio steadily and prevent interest rates from rising. In Episode I, the central bank’s inability to use open market operations led to a sharp rise in the monetary base that was followed by a rise in the CRR and interest rates. So far Episode II has been spared these developments.

Both episodes featured a tightly pegged exchange rate and partial sterilization of capital inflows. Hence, the surge in capital inflows was expansionary and helped to generate a drop in interest rates.

All through Episode I, a current account deficit offset capital inflows. In contrast, in Episode II, the current account has turned positive.

The most important difference is that Episode I ended in 1.25 years, while Episode II had been under way 2.5 years as of the time of writing.

\(^{18}\) Pattanaik and Sahoo (2001).
How Episode II unfolds further is one of the most interesting questions in Indian macroeconomics today.

**Conclusion**

The reforms of the 1990s in India saw a significant opening of the current and capital accounts and created new challenges for the implementation of the pegged exchange rate regime.

Faced with a surge of capital inflows soon after the rupee had been made "market determined," the RBI followed a policy of a fixed exchange rate, which implied large-scale trading in the currency market. That trading led to an acceleration in reserve accumulation that was partly sterilized and that partly spilled over into an expansionary monetary policy. Despite the small capital account, pegging to the U.S. dollar led to an attenuation of monetary policy autonomy.

The second major episode of currency trading took place in 2000–01 with a surplus on the current account. Faced with pressure on the rupee to appreciate, the RBI traded extensively on the currency market. This time, the rupee-dollar exchange rate was not fixed. From June 2002 onward, RBI permitted some appreciation.

This appreciation might have been motivated by the RBI’s desire to reduce the extent of trading required to implement the peg. However, as soon as the rupee started appreciating, currency expectations changed: instead of depreciating, the rupee was expected to appreciate. The full impact of a more open capital account, with a smaller set of capital controls, led to a surge of inflows on both the current and capital account. The following

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Episode I</th>
<th>Episode II (thus far)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiation</td>
<td>Capital account</td>
<td>Current account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange rate</td>
<td>Mostly fixed</td>
<td>Slight appreciation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward market</td>
<td>Expected appreciation</td>
<td>Expected appreciation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net foreign assets as share of reserve money</td>
<td>21% → 45%</td>
<td>70% → 120%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash reserve ratio phase-out</td>
<td>Reversed</td>
<td>Unaffected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond market</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Much improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of open market operations</td>
<td>Data not disclosed</td>
<td>Strongly visible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_0$ and $M_3$ growth</td>
<td>Accelerated</td>
<td>Unaffected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
twenty months have been spent trying to curb the inflows, maintain the currency peg, and cling to monetary policy autonomy.

In conclusion, Episodes I and II both highlight the extent to which implementing a pegged exchange rate comes at the cost of autonomy in monetary policy. As India continues on the path of eliminating currency controls, it appears that implementing the pegged regime will increasingly crowd out monetary policy autonomy.
Rajnish Mehra: Ila Patnaik presents an excellent case study of a country in the process of moving from a regime of strict capital controls to one with a relatively open capital account. The degree of capital account control in India is very different today from what it was in the early 1990s. As a measure of openness, the differential (premium) between the “unofficial” and official rupee-dollar rate has dramatically declined over the past fifteen years. It is now less than 0.5 percent.

The paper begins by citing convincing evidence that the rupee is pegged to the U.S. dollar. Taking Robert Mundell’s 1961 insight into the “impossible trinity” as a starting point, Patnaik goes on to argue that the consequences of a pegged exchange rate are likely to be very different with and without capital controls. Specifically, a fixed exchange rate coupled with free capital movements implies a loss of monetary policy independence. Monetary policy in such a setting is entirely determined by the exchange rate system. As India continues on the path of eliminating currency controls, it appears that implementing the pegged regime will increasingly reduce its monetary policy autonomy.

Patnaik identifies two empirically significant periods during the years from 1990 to 2003, when there was a sharp increase in reserves: June 1993–November 1994 (Episode I) and August 2001–present (Episode II). The metric used is the observed increase in the gross reserves measured in dollars.

I will present a somewhat different perspective. Rather than focusing on the level of foreign reserves, I examine the data using the relative shares of foreign reserves to GNP. Here, figure 17, which displays the gross level of foreign currency assets, is the counterpart of figure 2 in the Patnaik paper, except that I have used data expressed in rupees, whereas her figure 2 is expressed in dollars. To the extent that the rupee-dollar rate has fluctuated, the figures are not affine transformations of each other. A potentially more useful way of looking at these data is captured by figure 18, which graphs

I especially thank John Donaldson and Barry Bosworth for their insightful comments. I am grateful to the participants of the India Policy Forum conference for a stimulating discussion. Finally, I thank D. K. Pant and K. A. Siddiqui for their meticulous research assistance.
**FIGURE 17.** Gross Level of Foreign Currency Assets

**FIGURE 18.** Foreign Currency Assets as Share of GDP, 1980–2003
foreign currency reserves as a share of GDP. It is clear that the post-1990 period is very different from the pre-1990 period. After 1990, two periods of rapid change in reserves stand out: 1990–95 (+5.75 percent of GDP) and 1996–present (+8.93 percent of GDP).

While these time periods do not correspond precisely to those identified in the paper, the exact periods are unimportant for the observations made there. Patnaik is agnostic about the costs and benefits of a fixed exchange rate regime and hence does not make a policy recommendation. In my discussion below I will address this and other related issues.

Clearly, a part of the post–1990 reserve accumulation is a rational response to the foreign exchange crisis in 1990–91. Demand for reserves held by Central Banks is similar to the demand for inventories and, like optimal inventory accumulation, depends on: demand uncertainty (+), reorder costs (+), stock-out costs (+), and the opportunity cost of funds (−).

Various heuristics have been proposed for optimal reserve accumulation. “Import cover,” defined as twelve times the ratio of reserves to merchandise imports is one such heuristic. It is an ad hoc proxy for “demand uncertainty.” The RBI achieved this target in mid-2002.

The RBI attained this level of reserves by engaging in a classic sterilization policy—buying foreign currency and bonds and offsetting these purchases by issuing domestic bonds, while leaving M0 remarkably stable at about 15 percent of GNP, as shown in figures 19 and 20. (Figure 19 is the counterpart of figures 6 and 14 in Patnaik’s paper, with the modification that I have expressed all quantities as a share of GDP.)

What are the costs of such a policy? This clearly depends on what is used as a benchmark for the “optimal level” of reserves. Using “import cover” as a measure of reserve adequacy, anything more than about 10 percent of GDP would classify as an unnecessary “cost.”

Getting an estimate of this cost requires an estimate of the real interest rate differential between U.S. and Indian assets held by the RBI. As of mid-2002, about 95 percent of foreign assets held by the RBI were in the form of liquid assets. Since theoretically the equity premium is negligible, an estimate for the equilibrium risk free rate along a balanced growth path is

\[ r = \rho + \gamma E(\frac{dc}{dt}), \]

1. These series appear to co-integrated.
2. “Stock out” costs are harder to measure but these became very real in the case of India in 1990–91. An adequate import cover will ensure that these costs are never incurred.
where \( r \) is the risk free rate, \( \rho \) is a measure of the time preference, \( \gamma \) is a measure of risk aversion, and \( E(dc/dt) \) is the expected growth rate of consumption.

For India, a reasonable calibration results in a figure of about 6 percent. For the United States, this figure is about 4 percent. Thus an estimate of the cost of the current policy of holding reserves more than 10 percent of GNP, because of the differential yield on domestic and foreign assets, is between 0.1 percent and 0.2 percent of GNP annually. An additional cost arises because of the increase in the domestic cost of capital and the consequent effect on corporate investments and valuations. Although these numbers are not excessively large at the moment, the cost of such interventions can, and will, mount in the future. In addition, potentially more serious costs may arise because of the distortion of price signals, as discussed below.

**Implications for Equity Markets**

Without appreciation of the rupee, Indian stocks will appear progressively cheap by international standards. Furthermore, the inevitable speculation about future appreciation may result in an influx (and subsequent withdrawal) of portfolio investments by foreign institutional investors. This process may already be under way and could impose a major cost, as it could destabilize financial markets. A glimpse of such a scenario was seen in the sharp decline in the stock market on the day of the Congress-led gov-
ernment takeover in May 2004. Figure 20 shows that Indian equity valuations are again comparable to their level during the “tech bubble,” in sharp contrast to those in other developed capital markets, which are well below their pre-crash levels.

**Issues of Interest Rate Differential Parity and Forward Contracts**

Selective restrictions on different players can lead to undesirable outcomes and skewed incentives. For example, a situation such as that depicted in Patnaik’s figures 4 and 10 cannot arise unless investors have some restrictions on them. For the price of forward contracts to be different from that implied by the interest rate differential parity, there have to be restrictions such that no player has the ability both to buy and sell local currency and at the same time to buy and sell foreign currency in unlimited amounts. Domestic players may have their ability to borrow foreign currency restricted, while foreign players have their ability to sell local currency restricted.

To illustrate, if the rupee spot price was 50 per dollar, the one-year forward price implied by the interest rate differential 55 per dollar, and
forward price 53 per dollar, foreign investors, in the absence of any restriction, would avail themselves of a “free lunch”: borrow dollars, buy rupees spot, and sell rupees one year forward.

The difference between the forward price and that implied by interest rate parity would be a function of two factors. The first is market expectations of future movements of spot. The second is the relative strength of the restrictions that tend to strengthen the currency forwards relative to spot (for example, foreign borrowing restrictions on domestic players) compared to the restrictions tending to weaken it (for example, restriction on foreign players’ forward buying of domestic currency).

It is difficult to disentangle these two effects. However, I believe that the forward prices clearly contain some information, not necessarily about the future spot movements but about market players’ expectations for such movements, and that these could be exploited by coalitions not subjected to restrictions. For example, in China (domestic) coalitions of individual agents subject to different partial restrictions are able, as a unit, to circumvent most restrictions. Clearly this does nothing to enhance investor confidence.

**Concluding Comments**

There is a vast literature on the merits of different exchange rate regimes with which the reader is undoubtedly familiar. I believe that the operating characteristics of flexible exchange rate regimes have been shown to be superior to those of fixed rate regimes, particularly in the long run. Economic history reinforces these conclusions. Countries that had abandoned the gold standard typically recovered quicker after the Great Depression. A disproportionate number of recent financial crises have involved countries with fixed rate regimes. (Stanley Fischer’s 2001 Lionel Robbins Lecture at the London School of Economics elaborated well on these issues). Under floating rate regimes, price signals are less distorted, resulting in better investment and allocation decisions. In China, with big capital inflows and no currency float, the influx of capital has apparently driven the cost of capital for the “well connected” to zero. This may result in a misallocation of capital and provides no market discipline for industry to gradually become more competitive. I stress these aspects especially because in

3. These observations arise from my conversations with Chinese doctoral students in the United States.
developing countries there has been a tendency to emphasize the development of the domestic industry.

Recent actions of the RBI suggest that it wishes to avoid the financial excesses that many observers believe may shortly plague the Chinese economy.

**Indira Rajaraman:** Ila Patnaik contrasts two episodes of foreign exchange surge in India. Episode I covered a fifteen-month period during 1993–94. Episode II began in August 2001 and finally came to an end in May 2004. Patnaik contrasts the first, moved by a capital inflow surge, with the second, which she characterizes as having been initiated by a current account surge. She sees the attempt to hold the currency value stable in the face of the surge, using sterilization, as having seriously eroded monetary policy autonomy.

The evidence in favor of Patnaik’s thesis that Episode II was precipitated by a current account surge is presented in table 6. Although it is true that the current account balance went from negative in 2000–01 to positive in 2001–02, at a time of stable net capital inflows, there were convulsions within the capital account in these two years that are not shown in the table. I present in table 9 the latest figures for the current and capital accounts over the years 2000–01, 2001–02, and 2002–03 (which differ from the unrevised figures in table 6 of the paper). It is clear that while investment inflows, both direct (FDI) and portfolio (FII), remained largely stable between 2000–01 and 2001–02, net loans from abroad declined very sharply indeed, with a sharp corresponding increase in banking capital. This increase in turn consists of two components, bank deposits in special schemes for nonresident Indians (NRI deposits) and other inflows through commercial banking channels. While NRI deposits remained stable over all three years, other commercial banking inflows increased sharply, from negative $1.5 billion in 2000–01 to positive $2.8 billion in 2001–02 and further to $5.4 billion in 2002–03. The increase in banking inflows by $4.3 billion in 2001–02 relative to the previous year was as large as the turnaround in the current account. In the face of this evidence, it is difficult to characterize Episode II as having originated in the current account. The commercial banking channel is subject to very detailed regulatory restrictions, as the author states quite clearly in discussing table 3. That table gives a misleading picture of the magnitude of these flows by comparing 2002–03 to 1991–92, leading the author to conclude that the most controlled component of capital inflows, through the banking channel, has shrunk over the years as a percent of GDP.
It is clear that banking inflows increased precipitously in 2001–02 relative to the previous year, and that in turn could only have been because they were officially sanctioned and permitted. Thus monetary policy, defined broadly to include the whole panoply of regulatory and administered instruments of control, could actually and quite justifiably be characterized as a major precipitating factor of Episode II.

This raises the larger issue of how independent the Reserve Bank of India is and has been in respect of the range of monetary policy instruments nominally within its control. As long as the central bank is subject to informal channels of direction from the executive arm of the government of the day, the autonomy of monetary policy is eroded at its very core. This is the central issue of concern. The RBI was clearly powerless to contain the surge at source through instruments that were well within its nominal control. Its inability to exercise those instruments remains the most serious erosion of autonomy, rather than the erosion of autonomy consequent upon an attempt to maintain currency stability in the face of a surge.

Finally, the composition of the current account surge shows that it was the result not so much of a merchandise turnaround as a surge in exports of services. Invisibles are a well-known channel for returning flight capital. It is entirely possible that the surge in exports of services could have occurred, in part if not entirely, in response to a fear of currency appreciation consequent upon the greater permissiveness toward banking capital inflows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Billions of dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current and capital accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–01      2001–02      2002–03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−3.59        0.78         4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.02        10.57        12.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI          3.27          4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FII          2.59          1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans        4.25          −1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−0.91        −0.36         2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.81         5.59          8.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRI deposits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.32         2.75          2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other        −1.51         2.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−3.59        0.78          4.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchandise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−14.37       −12.70        −12.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invisibles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.78        13.49         17.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.48         4.58          6.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that banking inflows increased precipitously in 2001–02 relative to the previous year, and that in turn could only have been because they were officially sanctioned and permitted. Thus monetary policy, defined broadly to include the whole panoply of regulatory and administered instruments of control, could actually and quite justifiably be characterized as a major precipitating factor of Episode II.

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Finally, the composition of the current account surge shows that it was the result not so much of a merchandise turnaround as a surge in exports of services. Invisibles are a well-known channel for returning flight capital. It is entirely possible that the surge in exports of services could have occurred, in part if not entirely, in response to a fear of currency appreciation consequent upon the greater permissiveness toward banking capital inflows.
General Discussion

Several discussants pointed to the need to better understand the factors behind the change in the net flows of banking capital. Could the reserve bank control those flows? Some also doubted that banking capital should be viewed as more controllable than other types of capital flows. Sanjeev Sandal stressed the importance of distinguishing between permanent and transitory inflows. Allowing the exchange rate to appreciate would be more desirable if an inflow was believed to be permanent.

Rajnish Mehra pointed to the importance of determining why portfolio capital was flowing into India. Was the Indian equity market undervalued? If the exchange rate is fixed, foreign capital will continue to flow in until there is a perception that the costs to the central bank of maintaining the rate are excessive. At that point, there will be a large and sudden outflow. Vijay Joshi suggested a tax on capital inflows as an alternative to a more flexible exchange rate.

Kenneth Kletzer argued that policymakers should focus on the desired combination of fiscal and monetary policies, not the exchange rate. In the face of a partial liberalization of the capital account, monetary policy must chose between the interest rate or the exchange rate. Kletzer believed that India’s continued focus on a fixed exchange rate would come at the cost of considerable interest rate volatility.

Ila Patnaik questioned the emphasis on capital inflows, since she believed that the pressure on the exchange rate resulted from a surplus in the current account. The capital inflows began only after a shift in exchange rate expectations that made it attractive to bet on rupee appreciation. She chose not to discuss in her paper what the exchange rate regime should be but whether it was still possible both to pursue an autonomous domestic monetary policy and to control the exchange rate.
References


