Arms Control Policy and the National Security Council

March 23, 2000

Ivo H. Daalder and I.M. Destler, Moderators

Karla J. Nieting, Rapporteur

Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland

The Brookings Institution
Washington, DC
The National Security Council Project

Co-Directors: Ivo H. Daalder and I.M. Destler

Research Assistants: Karla Nieting
Shakira Edwards
Khushali Parikh Shah

Funding for this program has been generously provided by the John M. Olin Foundation.

The Oral History Roundtables

The Nixon Administration National Security Council (December 8, 1998)

International Economic Policymaking and the National Security Council (February 11, 1999)

The Bush Administration National Security Council (April 29, 1999)

The Role of the National Security Advisers (October 25, 1999)

Arms Control and the National Security Council (March 23, 2000)

China Policy and the National Security Council (November 4, 1999), forthcoming

The Clinton Administration National Security Council (September 27, 2000), forthcoming

© The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2001
CONTENTS

Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................iii

Participants ........................................................................................................................................... v

Transcript of the Roundtable .................................................................................................................1

Appendix A: Agenda .............................................................................................................................63

About the Co-Directors .........................................................................................................................65
INTRODUCTION

During the cold war, arms control policy was a focal point in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The progress of negotiations was closely tracked by observers both within and outside of successive administrations, and the outcome of such negotiations frequently proved to be a harbinger of the entire superpower relationship. Thus the process for making policy was crucial.

Since arms control, almost uniquely among national security issues, involves both the expertise and equities of all the key national security agencies – including the Departments of State and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Staff, and the Intelligence Community – the National Security Council has long played a central role in coordinating policy making and implementation. This process has often worked well – defining the central issues, and helping to forge interagency consensus on policy directions. But it has also broken down on occasion – either because the issue proved to be too difficult or contentious or because some players decided to ignore the interagency process altogether.

To shed light on this variation, the National Security Council Project convened a roundtable panel on March 23, 2000, to explore the ways NSC’s in different administrations worked to coordinate U.S. policy on arms control. Participants in this roundtable represented a broad range of experiences across administrations, from Eisenhower to Clinton. Participants were asked to respond to a set of questions (Appendix A) to draw upon their understanding of how the decisionmaking processes on arms control worked in relation to the National Security Council.

This is the sixth in a series of roundtables held by the NSC Project, which is co-sponsored by the Center for International and Security Studies at the Maryland School of Public Affairs and the Foreign Policy Studies program of the Brookings Institution. Transcripts of four previous roundtables – on the Nixon NSC, on the role of the NSC in international economic policymaking, on the Bush NSC, and on the role of the national security adviser – have already been published and are available on the Brookings website at [http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nsc.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nsc.htm). Two additional transcripts – on the NSC and U.S. policy toward China and on the Clinton administration NSC – will be published in the near future. These seminars have been conducted for their own independent value. They also provided useful insight for “A New NSC for a New Administration,” a policy brief published by the Brookings Institution in November 2000 (also available on the Brookings website at [http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nsc.htm](http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nsc.htm)) and a book to be published in 2001.

We are grateful to the participants for coming and talking with candor and insight. We are also particularly grateful to Karla Nieting for her help in organizing the roundtable, editing
the transcript, and working with the participants in bringing this edited version of the proceedings to publication. Responsibility for any remaining errors rests with us.

Ivo Daalder
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
Research Director (1991-99), CISSM

I. M. Destler
Professor, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland
Director (1992-99), CISSM
**Participants**


BARRY E. CARTER, staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1969-70; staff member, National Security Council, 1970-72; senior counsel, Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, 1975; acting under secretary and then deputy under secretary for export administration, Department of Commerce, and U.S. vice chair to the secretary of defense for bilateral defense conversion committees with Russia and other new independent states, 1993-96; professor of law, Georgetown University Law Center, 1979-93 and 1996-present.


H. ALLEN HOLMES, principal deputy assistant secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State, 1979-82; ambassador to Portugal, 1982-85; assistant secretary for politico-military affairs, Department of State, 1985-89; ambassador-at-large for burdensharing, Department of State, 1989-93; assistant secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict, Department of Defense, 1993-99; adjunct professor, Georgetown University, 2000-present.

JOHN D. HOLUM, professional staff member, Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, 1965-79; policy planning staff, Department of State, 1979-81; attorney, O’Melveny & Myers, 1981-93; director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1993-97; senior adviser to the president and secretary of state for arms control and international security, Department of State, 1997-2000; under secretary for arms control and international security, Department of State, 2000; Atlas Air, 2000-present.
ADMIRAL JONATHAN T. HOWE, military assistant to the deputy secretary, Department of Defense, 1982-83; director of politico-military affairs, Department of State, 1983-84; deputy chairman of the military committee, NATO, 1986-87; assistant to the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1987-89; deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, National Security Council, 1991-93.

CARL KAYSEN, deputy special assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1961-63; director, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, 1966-76; professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977-90; professor emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991-present.


DESTLER: Welcome to this oral history roundtable on arms control policy and the National Security Council. As most of you know, Ivo and I are working on a research project on the National Security Council, which is both an organizational history and also an effort to make recommendations for 2001 and beyond.

A major part of our project is to host a series of oral history roundtables in which we bring people together who have been involved either in the same administration or in a particular issue across administrations. This is the sixth in our series of roundtables, and they are on the record for publication and distribution. Each of you will have a chance to edit your remarks for style and succinctness.

There are patterns that seem to emerge and persist in U.S. policymaking across administrations. On arms control, one that has been evident in several administrations is the NSC being the basic focal point and the central locus of the policy process, and somebody else, often the secretary of state, being the negotiator – either the actual or the formal negotiator. It varies.

One question we want to address is whether that pattern or division of labor is a reasonable characterization of work on arms control across administrations. And, second, is that a good process? Is it effective? Is it efficient? Or is it a recipe for conflict?

We thought that we would start by talking about the first administrations that dealt with arms control and which are well represented here – the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. But before we do that, why don’t we very quickly go around the table and have people introduce themselves and very briefly state their connection to the NSC process and the arms control issue.

ODEEN: I’m Phil Odeen. I’m executive vice president for TRW, based here in Washington. I was in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] during the 1960s and early 1970s, but didn’t really get involved then in arms control issues. I was on the NSC staff from 1971 to 1973 as the head of program analysis, which was the analytic focus there. Hal Sonnenfeldt, Bill Hyland and I were there to work with Henry on arms control issues. I was there through the SALT I and the beginning of SALT II and a series of other agreements. Then during the late 1970s I was

---


2 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union began with a preliminary session from November 17 to December 22, 1969, with full negotiations beginning on April 16, 1970, and ending on May 26, 1972. SALT I, as the first set of negotiations became known, focused predominantly on defensive arms limitations though they also discussed limits on offensive arms. The talks led to the signature of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to Strategic Offensive Arms.
brought in during one of the reviews and did a fairly major review of the NSC-State-DoD relationship for the Carter administration. So I did have a view from rather different times.

AARON: I’m David Aaron, currently undersecretary for international trade at the Commerce Department, but I was, for many years, in ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] and on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Prior to that, I worked in the Bureau of European Affairs at the State Department on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and subsequently I worked for Phil on the NSC and later became deputy national security advisor in the Carter administration.

GARTHOFF: Ray Garthoff. I was involved in working on arms control matters in the Eisenhower administration in the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] in the second Eisenhower administration. Then I was in the State Department in the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations and serving abroad in the Carter administration.

Particularly in working in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, I provided State Department staffing support to the secretary and to our interface with the new ACDA. And then I was involved in the SALT negotiations, continuing into the Nixon administration until 1973.

HOLUM: John Holum. It’s appropriate that Ray Garthoff and I are sitting next to each other because he worked for the new ACDA, and I was there at its demise.

I worked on arms control issues on the Hill in the 1960s, working for Senator McGovern when he worked on the Foreign Relations Committee. I was on the policy planning staff of the State Department in the Carter administration and then I came back into government in 1993 to revitalize the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In 1997 I helped negotiate its merger into the Department of State and am now the designated undersecretary for arms control and international security, still awaiting confirmation and meanwhile a senior adviser to the president and secretary of state for arms control and international security.

KAYSEN: I’m Carl Kaysen. I was deputy national security adviser in the Kennedy administration, and I did work particularly on arms control issues such as military procurement and military budget issues.

HARRIS: I’m Elisa Harris. I am currently on the National Security Council staff and have been

---

*Arms. The ABM Treaty effectively placed limits on the development of ballistic missile defense whereas the Interim Agreement reached only modest agreement on a cap for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) but no agreement on the testing, production, or deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The latter weapons were left over for later negotiations.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) resumed with a month of meetings in November-December 1972 and culminated with the signature of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms on June 18, 1979, in Vienna. The Treaty’s primary provisions included a limit of 2,400 for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and a limit of 1,320 for launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles. The SALT II agreement was never ratified, although both the Soviet and U.S. governments agreed to abide by its limitations.

3 Senator George A. McGovern (D-S.D.) served in the U.S. Senate from 1963 to 1981.*
since January of 1993. I’ve spent the last seven-plus years working on chemical and biological nonproliferation and arms control, as well as missile nonproliferation.

On the arms control side, I was very much involved in ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and am currently spending a considerable part of my time working on the negotiations on the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol – the compliance protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention.4

Before joining the NSC, I was a guest scholar here at Brookings, and in one of my other former lives, I worked on arms control for the House International Relations Committee.

HALPERIN: I’m Morton Halperin. I was a consultant to the OSD in the Kennedy administration, doing some work on arms control, including the test ban and was in various positions in OSD, and beginning in 1967 I was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. I was then on the National Security Council staff for nine months in 1969. And for the last 15 months, I’ve been the director of policy planning at the State Department.

KOCH: I’m Susan Koch, and the short version is I’m an arms control bureaucrat. I’m currently deputy assistant secretary of defense for threat reduction policy, which is our new phrase for arms control, and started working arms control issues at Defense in the late 1980s, towards the end of the Reagan administration. In the Bush administration, I was at ACDA as assistant director for strategic and nuclear affairs and then on the NSC staff in the defense policy and arms control directorate. Since February of 1993 I have been in my current position back in DoD.

McNAMARA: Ted McNamara. I started in the arms control area with ACDA in the early 1970s and worked there on SALT, CSCE, and MBFR.5 MBFR and Basket III of the CSCE were

---

4 The Biological Weapons Convention was signed on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975, after the U.S. ratified the treaty on January 22, 1975. Parties to the BWC agreed not to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire biological agents or toxins “that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” and the “weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” Furthermore, parties agreed to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes any biological agents or toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery within nine months after the convention’s entry into force.

The BWC, however, did not contain means for verification of compliance. As a result, this issue has come up at each of the review conferences, which take place every five years. Measures taken to improve the ability to verify include the adoption of confidence building measures and the creation of an a d hoc committee of scientists and experts to review possibilities. At the next review conference scheduled for 2001, the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol is to be considered as a means for establishing a BWC verification regime.

5 The Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Helsinki on July 3, 1973, and ended on August 1, 1975. The conference drew together thirty-five states from Europe, including the United States and Canada. The comprehensive approach taken by the CSCE led to agreement on ten core principles, particularly the inviolability of borders and non-interference in internal affairs, and three “baskets” of recommendations. Basket I dealt with security issues; Basket II with economic issues; and Basket III with human rights.

As a prerequisite for its participation in a CSCE, the United States insisted on Soviet agreement on initiating talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). The MBFR negotiations between the United States, Soviet Union, NATO, and WTO states began on October 30, 1973. The talks consisted of a series of proposals and counterproposals on reductions in the levels of conventional forces. Talks continued off-and-on until
among things I worked on the most. But after being a basket case there for a while, I went off to Moscow as a political military officer, where again I worked as the deputy political counselor chiefly on arms control matters, nonproliferation, and U.S.-Soviet bilateral issues at the embassy.

I came back to PM, the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, from Moscow and worked as special assistant to Les Gelb for the final wrap-up of SALT II.\(^6\) I also worked on INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] and NATO arms control issues. I then went off for over a decade and did other political-military affairs not directly concerned with arms control. I was Jon Howe’s deputy for a while during that period and did regional arms control and arms sales.

I came back in the Clinton administration and was assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs doing arms control, although by then it was secondary to nonproliferation. I worked on such things as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Nonproliferation Treaty extension, etc.

So off and on over most of my career I’ve been in and out of arms control and almost always in some fashion in political-military affairs.

HOLMES: I’m Allen Holmes.

McNAMARA: Oh, I forgot. I was also Allen’s deputy.

HOLMES: Well, I was going to say, you left out the fact that you worked for me. Maybe it’s because I knocked him out on the squash court one time.

I was assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the State Department in Reagan II, basically 1985 to 1989. George Shultz hired me to come and sort of run herd on the ground crew that was then the NSC arms control group.\(^7\) Roz Ridgway had the easy task of taming the Soviets.\(^8\)

So that was my principal activity in PM and working in the NSC system. I chaired most of the groups for Shultz. That’s the way he wanted it, and that’s part of the discussion we’ll have on different styles, and policy organizations.

HOWE: I’m Jon Howe. I also kept an eye on Hal Sonnenfeldt while serving on the Kissinger NSC staff in the Nixon administration. I worked for Vice President Rockefeller in the Ford administration. But my principal tie in arms control was as director of PM in the early Reagan administration – 1982 to 1984 – in which we did all kinds of arms control.

When I came back to town toward the end of the Reagan administration, I was assistant 

\(^{6}\) Leslie H. Gelb served as the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs from 1977 to 1979.

\(^{7}\) George P. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989.

\(^{8}\) Rozanne L. Ridgway was the assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs from 1985 to 1989.
to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. And this was at the time when Secretary Shultz was going to Moscow at a pace that seemed like every other week. I was the chairman’s representative in those kinds of negotiations since arms control was always central to discussions with the Soviet Union.

KEENY: Spurgeon Keeny. I started my involvement in arms control in 1958 when I worked as a technical assistant to the president’s science advisor, Jim Killian, and largely at the initiative of the president’s Science Advisory Committee, which was then a rather significant body. 9

President Eisenhower and Khrushchev had initiated the comprehensive test ban process, and the first thing that happened was a conference of experts in the summer of 1958.10 It was essentially run out of the science advisor’s office, and I became the staff director for the U.S. delegation to the conference of experts, which had eight countries involved. The mission was to determine whether conceptually you could have a verification system – not to agree on a particular system. And that led to the initiation of negotiations on the comprehensive test ban in the fall of 1958, and I was one of the delegates. I was staff director on the various technical working groups that emerged during the course of that negotiation.

I was the technical assistant science advisor under Killian and Kistiakowsky at the end of Eisenhower administration and under Wiesner in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.11 And somewhere along the line, about 1962, I was also put on the NSC staff by Bundy and Carl Kaysen.12 So, I was on both NSC staff and the science advisor staff, and that was through the rest of the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations and at the very beginning of the Nixon administration.

I think Kissinger had fired everybody else except Hal Saunders, who they were afraid to fire because he knew too much about the Middle East situation.13 And I guess I knew too many people at Harvard so Kissinger decided the simpler solution was to just keep me on.

---

9 James R. Killian, Jr. became President Eisenhower’s first science advisor at the end of 1957 and chaired the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) until departing from government in 1959.

10 Nikita Khrushchev was leader of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964. In August 1957, President Eisenhower announced that the United States would suspend weapons testing for up to two years if, among other conditions, the Soviet Union agreed to cease producing fissionable materials and allowed compliance verification. In response, the Soviet Union announced on March 31, 1958, that it would stop its nuclear testing if the West would do likewise. The response to these initiatives was the convocation of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests on July 1, 1958, in Geneva to identify what would be necessary to verify a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. Scientists from the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland participated. On August 21, 1958, the conference released a report indicating that a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) with a network of 160 monitoring stations could identify nuclear tests in the atmosphere and underwater down to one kiloton and could detect underground nuclear tests down to one kiloton but underground tests below five kilotons could not necessarily be distinguished from earthquakes without on-site inspections.

11 George B. Kistiakowsky succeeded Killian as the president’s science advisor, serving in that position from 1959 to 1961. Jerome B. Wiesner followed as President Kennedy’s science advisor.

12 McGeorge Bundy was national security adviser from 1961 to 1966.

13 Harold H. Saunders was a member of the NSC staff in the Johnson and Nixon administrations.
But it was awfully crowded there because Halperin and Sonnenfeldt and Larry Lynn were all trying to take over my position.\textsuperscript{14} It was really pretty dreadful. So I was relieved when Gerard Smith asked me to be assistant director at ACDA, as assistant director for science and technology.\textsuperscript{15} I did the back-stopping for ACDA on the SALT I/ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty negotiations and had extensive dealings with the NSC staff and Kissinger in that capacity.

Then Nixon finally decided that they would reward the successful negotiators on the ABM and SALT I treaties and principal staff people by firing them all. So I found myself taking a very early retirement and working with the Mitre Corporation for three or four years. Then I came back and was the deputy director of ACDA during the Carter period and was involved in all the arms control issues then afoot, and was extensively involved in dealing with the NSC staff at that time.

Since then I've been variously senior scholar in residence at the National Academy of Sciences, and for the last 15 years the president and executive director of the Arms Control Association.

DAALDER: Well, as you can see, we have a broad, deep historical background here.

KEENY: Can I add one more thing?

DAALDER: Sure.

KEENY: I do hope you go back a little before 1969, because there's some very interesting differences that come to light if you look a little further back in history.

DAALDER: I think what we'll do is what we've done at most of these roundtables in dealing with issues is to try to march as quickly as possible chronologically through the system.

DESTLER: Our speed is not always rapid.

DAALDER: I'd like to start with the end of the Eisenhower and beginning of the Kennedy administrations, but I know that Mort has to leave for a meeting shortly, although he will come back later and we can come back to many of these issues. Because he has both Kennedy and Johnson backgrounds, I wonder, Mort, if you would start and provide some perspective on how you think the system worked at that time and what the particular strengths and weaknesses were. You may want to address, as part of that consideration, how that changed under Henry and Nixon.

\textsuperscript{14} Laurence Lynn, Jr. served as a member, and later director, of the NSC program analysis staff from 1969 to 1971. He held the lead in preparing for SALT and was responsible for the creation of the Verification Panel.

\textsuperscript{15} Gerard C. Smith was the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969 to 1973. For more information on SALT I and his role in the negotiations, see Gerard Smith, \textit{Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks} (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980).
HALPERIN: That’s a big subject.

DAALDER: And I know you have to leave.

HALPERIN: The Johnson administration had no real system, as far as I could tell. Basically the system was: Memos had to go to the president from the principals before anything would happen, and any memo that was sent to Dean Rusk got put in his drawer.¹⁶ So it was very hard to get anybody’s attention on anything.

The serious arms control process in the Johnson administration was the beginning of the strategic arms process. As nearly as I could tell, it rose out of a decision and negotiation between Johnson and McNamara, which I’ve actually written about.¹⁷ The agreement basically was that there would be an announcement of the deployment of the ABM in return for which there would be a serious attempt to negotiate with the Russians. And an ad hoc team was put together that worked behind the scenes. I think the three members of that team are actually here tonight and they can speak on it as well.¹⁸

Basically we were told to come up with a serious proposal. The first thing we did was to go to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. In fact, Harold Brown went to the chairman and said, “A formal arms control unit can’t do this.”¹⁹ It was in the very different business of inventing proposals that looked good but which nobody took seriously. The chairman was persuaded to appoint a special assistant for this project – Royal Allison.²⁰ And so basically the NSC, State, and OSD with Allison representing the chairman of the joint chiefs worked on an informal process to put together a proposal.

There was, I think, one senior-level interagency meeting in the whole process. The committee of principals met once. Walt Rostow came and said the president wants an agreement.²¹ Richard Helms came in and said the CIA will participate in monitoring, which was one of the seminal events in this whole process.²²

The Agency’s position had been that it was not in the business of monitoring arms

¹⁶ Dean Rusk was secretary of state from 1961 to 1969.
¹⁸ The three members were Garthoff, Keeny, and Halperin.
¹⁹ Harold Brown was director of the Livermore Laboratory before he became director of defense research and engineering under Robert McNamara from 1961 to 1965, secretary of the Air Force from 1965 to 1969, and secretary of defense from 1977 to 1981.
²⁰ Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison became the assistant to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff for strategic arms negotiations in July 1968.
²¹ Walt W. Rostow was national security adviser from 1966 to 1969. During the Kennedy administration he served as deputy to McGeorge Bundy until late 1961 and thereafter as director of the Policy Planning Council at the State Department.
²² Richard M. Helms served as director of central intelligence from 1966 to 1973.
control agreements because it was not prepared to allow the use of anything that it learned. Therefore, you couldn’t count on it to monitor an agreement, since you couldn’t tell anybody the Russians had violated it because you would reveal the source. They were absolutely serious. The assumption was that agreements have to be verified by formal agreed procedures and that was all. Maybe you could use intelligence to help you figure out what to do within those procedures. And the procedure in which we were trying to operate was that we would not ask for any kind of verification where we would operate on the basis of national means. That required the Agency to make the decision that it did make, which is that it would be prepared to do it with the understanding that it might require the Agency to allow a statement to be made that the agreement had been violated based on intelligence.

The rest of it was done by a very informal process between the two agencies. There was a series of meetings that I think Phil Farley chaired, where we basically worked informally.23

DESTLER: The two agencies were?

HALPERIN: Well, it was the NSC. It was always the NSC, State, and OSD.

KEENY: ACDA?

HALPERIN: Well, ACDA was in and out and it was not involved in the serious meetings. And then at the end, we followed the formal processes. That is, the secretary of state sent a letter to the secretary of defense saying, “We would like to make this proposal to the Russians. What does the Defense Department think about it?” The secretary of defense said, “Send it to the chairman and ask for the views of the joint chiefs of staff.” The joint chiefs, to everybody’s astonishment, came back and said not only that they could live with this, but this agreement, if properly implemented, would advance our security. That was yet another sort of major intellectual change – the notion that an arms control agreement actually could advance security. Up until then, the chiefs’ view had been, if it didn’t do harm, that was the best you could do. McNamara sent the memo to the president endorsing the State Department proposal, and we were in the process of working out the negotiating instructions when the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia and it came to an end.24

KEENY: There was a very close correlation there because we were going to make the announcement on a Monday, and people knew the Soviets probably were going to invade but you couldn’t be sure. You knew they were all on the border and prepared to invade. I had lunch, I think on Friday, with Yuly Vorontsov, who was then counselor.25 I said, “I can assure you that, although I have no instructions, I’m sure that if Czechoslovakia is invaded we won’t make the announcement on Monday.”

---

23 Philip J. Farley was the deputy assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs from 1967 to 1969 and later the deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969 to 1973.

24 The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia took place on August 20, 1968.

He said, “Well, the Soviet Union will do what it has to do for its security.” And anyway they went in on Sunday, so there was no announcement that the meetings were going to begin in the middle of September.

GARTHOFF: In Leningrad.

HALPERIN: In Leningrad, right. In fact, Dobrynin came in with the two things at the same time. He came in with a final agreed communiqué, that we’re ready, announce it. Then he said, “Well, by the way, my government has told me that by the invitation of the government of Czechoslovakia, Soviet and allied forces have invaded.”26 Apparently he said it with a straight face as if we would go ahead and make the announcement.

KEENY: It’s always dangerous to differ on points of history. But as I understand it, what happened was Dobrynin got instructions to deliver a message at some specific time to Johnson that the invasion was going to take place. It would be starting in an hour or whatever, and he was very upset about how he was going to handle it. And so he went in and he put it first to Johnson. He knew it was a very serious matter. What did Johnson do next? I’m told he thought a moment and said, “Let’s have a drink.”

DAALDER: Mort, given how the informal system in fact produced quite good outcomes, did that inform how you and others thought about perpetuating the system under Kissinger, how to formulate policy under the new administration, or how to set up the system at that time? That was a much more formal system designed to maintain White House control in one way or another.

HALPERIN: The impetus for the formal system, which I know you talked about at another roundtable, did not come out of this issue. It came out of many others, including biological weapons. But I don’t know what your definition of arms control is.

DAALDER: It certainly includes that.

HALPERIN: I have my version of this history, which I think some of you have heard, and I’ll be interested in the other versions in the group. Rusk wrote a letter to McNamara in early 1968, or something like that, saying, “We think it would be a good idea to ban biological weapons. What is the Defense Department’s view?” And McNamara got that letter and promptly sent a memo to the joint chiefs of staff saying, “The State Department would like to ban or limit biological weapons. What do you think about this?” And the chiefs did what they always do. They sent it down. It was an army program so it went to the army, and then it went to the people who do biological weapons. To nobody’s surprise they produced a memorandum that said: “We cannot accept any limits on biological weapons.”

Then it went to the army chief of staff who said, “There may be a reason to overrule this, but certainly I don’t have any reason to fight with my own staff.” So the army chief went into the joint chiefs and repeated the same thing. The chiefs looked around, and, as far as I can tell,

26 Anatoly Dobrynin was the Soviet ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986.
they all said, “This is an army program. We don’t fight with each other’s program.” And so they promptly sent a memo to the secretary of defense saying, “No.”

We then went to McNamara and he basically said, “I’ve got a war on. I’ve got to pick my fights with the chiefs. Johnson doesn’t like to overrule the chiefs anyway, and I’ve got to pick when I ask him to overrule the chiefs. This is not my fight. It’s Dean Rusk’s fight.” And he wrote back and said, “You asked me my view; you asked for the views of the joint chiefs and here they are.” People went to the secretary of state and he said in effect, I’m not going to Lyndon Johnson and ask him to overrule the Pentagon.

The thing got put in a desk drawer. When we repeated it in 1969, the memo said, “The president wants to know what the various alternatives and options are for limiting biological weapons.” We said what those memos always said at the beginning of the administration: He doesn’t want recommendations, just an analysis of the pros and cons of a variety of options, including eliminating that and other options.

We then got an interagency options paper which listed the pros and cons. There was an NSC meeting almost every week, and the chairman, who sat across the table every week from the president, made it clear very quickly to his colleagues that he could not go in every week and do what you can easily do when you sign a piece of paper that says, “Western civilization depends on it.” Basically he came in and said, “There will be some degradation, but if you think this is important we can live with it.” And the decision was made that we would eliminate the weapons.

So in the arms control field, it was that issue that propelled a different kind of system, not the strategic stuff. My own view is that on the very biggest issues it doesn’t matter what the form of the system is, the principals are going to find a way that works to get done what the president wants done, and that the formal system is much more important for issues that fall below that level. I think the difference between strategic arms and biological weapons is a good example.

GARTHOFF: Well, I have some additional comments on the early part of SALT, but I’d rather wait and go back chronologically because I think that we will gain from going through it that way and seeing how the system was working. And it did deteriorate some in the Johnson administration from what the Kennedy period had, and the Kennedy administration in turn was different from the Eisenhower administration.

DAALDER: In fact, if you want to start off there and then perhaps Spurgeon and Carl can follow on with their experience on the late Eisenhower period and explain how it then worked into the Kennedy administration. We’ll stick with the Kennedy administration for a bit and then move on from there.

GARTHOFF: Okay. The Eisenhower administration, of course, had a much more structured

---

system. The National Security Council meetings were the high point and the Planning Board of the NSC would be tasked with working out plans. Also, if a national intelligence estimate was called for, it would be factored in so that it would be available at that same NSC meeting, and so on.

At the time, a lot of us who were involved thought that the whole system was over-structured, and it tended to get rather boring and cut and dried. And that criticism has some validity. But I must say that, in retrospect, I came later to appreciate the fact that at least it did serve to bring together the various considerations and the various players whose considerations needed to be taken into account.

As Spurgeon has mentioned, one of the important beginnings of arms control was in the testing area. Another area that I’ll just mention briefly was the surprise attack conference, also in 1958. I was not at the conference but I was involved in preparing papers for it and in back-up, and I thought it worked rather smoothly in terms of different agencies being involved, participating, and providing material for it.

For the moment that’s all I would add on the Eisenhower administration.

AARON: Could I ask a question on that, Ray?

GARTHOFF: Yes.

AARON: The other thing about the NSC system that was a little different from that period was the Operations Coordinating Board, which was supposed to follow-up and ensure that policies were implemented. It was something nobody ever paid attention to in making decisions. But did that have an impact? I mean, I’ve never really talked to people that were there at the time.

GARTHOFF: Well, in theory it was supposed to be the follow-through on the execution of decisions once they were made, in contrast with the Planning Board, which did the preparatory work before a decision was made by the Council. Maybe Spurgeon has an additional or a different view on that, but from what I saw, it was not as well worked out in terms of follow-through as it should have been in theory. In addition, the OCB tended to get much more interested, and involved on some issues – psychological warfare and things of that sort – and did not really, from what I could tell, follow-through on a lot of the routine things that it was

---

28 The NSC Planning Board was created in the Eisenhower administration as an interagency committee at the assistant secretary level that was chaired by the national security adviser. It met on Tuesday and Friday afternoons and its primary function was to review proposals and papers brought to it by various departments, revise the drafts, and make recommendations to the president. It was disbanded by the Kennedy administration because of a belief that the NSC had become overly bureaucratized.

29 The Conference of Experts on Surprise Attack was convened in the fall of 1958 in Geneva. It examined whether inspection against surprise attacks was possible and workable. Due to disagreements between the United States and Soviet Union over limiting the discussion only to inspection measures, the conference was suspended indefinitely on January 21, 1959.

30 The Operations Coordinating Board was established in 1953 by President Eisenhower and abolished in 1961 by President Kennedy. Its function was to coordinate to the implementation of the president’s decisions.
supposed to.

KEENY: A couple of comments. One is that the Operations group never did anything that I could see. Certainly in focusing on arms control they had zero involvement in follow-up because there was never a treaty, although there was a lot of activity. I always thought that the explanation was that either it was just a nonfunctional group or they were in fact concerning themselves with covert political operations, which was a very popular subject at that time and presumably they had a significant role there. But it certainly didn’t seem to me it had that role in the things I was familiar with.

GARTHOFF: I think that’s right. It was two things. It was supposed to be follow-through. But it was also successor to the PSB, the Psychological Strategy Board, which was involved in what were broadly covert activities and propaganda in fighting the cold war.\(^{31}\)

And that’s what the OCB really was involved with. I agree with Spurgeon that, at least from what I could see, it didn’t really play any role as far as these early beginnings in arms control, even though nominally it should have.

DESTLER: Who were the actual negotiators? Were they from the State Department?

KEENY: Can I talk about that?

DESTLER: Yeah.

KEENY: There were two important things. One was the comprehensive test ban and the other was the surprise attack group. I’ll take the comprehensive test ban first. This was something that Killian, the President’s Science Advisors Board, and the president were very interested in.

I think the president had come to conclude that nuclear weapons had no useful role and was quite anxious to do something about it. And I think, even though they had this complicated, rather formal system, it was completely bypassed. (Andy Goodpaster would be the best witness on precisely what happened procedurally.\(^{32}\) But the president really turned it over to the science advisors, and the elaborate formal arrangement had almost no impact on what happened and what we did.

The State Department at that time had only literally a handful of people in this area. I believe Phil Farley was in charge of the office at that time. Ron Spiers was there and a couple of other people.\(^{33}\) But you can count on the fingers of one hand the number of people in the whole State Department activity on this, and they had other responsibilities to boot. So they were

---

31 The Psychological Strategy Board was created in April 1951 by President Truman under the auspices of the NSC to coordinate its strategy on psychological warfare. It was later dismantled by the Eisenhower administration.

32 General Andrew Goodpaster was staff secretary from 1954 to 1961 and as such responsible for the president’s day-to-day engagement in national security issues.

33 Ronald I. Spiers was the officer-in-charge of disarmament affairs in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1957 to 1961.
largely observers in this whole process, and it was all organized out of our office. But this could only have been done with the president’s support and direction. We couldn’t possibly have operated that way without it.

DAALDER: Were other agencies cut out of things, like the Atomic Energy Commission?34

KEENY: No, there were meetings of members and the principals and whatnot. But while that was going on, we were organizing a conference of experts and we had really involved all the top scientists in the United States who were interested. And we worked closely with the Air Force, which had the responsibility for intelligence collection in this area. There were also people from the State Department. It was largely run on a day-to-day basis in preparing for this conference that Eisenhower said he wanted. There were, I think, some meetings of the committee of principals related to it.

But when we finally went to the conference, the charter was to see what could be done. We weren’t to prove that it could be done or it couldn’t be done. It was just to work with the Soviets and the British and the French. I guess they had to balance the thing so they had some people from Poland, Romania, and Hungary. The Canadians were also there. And we really had to do almost all the work. Some British and the Soviets did a certain amount. They sent top-level people. And we wrote our own instructions. We’d call back and they’d say, “How’s it going today?” And I’d talk to Killian or Kistiakowsky, who was then working for Killian on it. They’d write instructions and they’d send them out.

HARRIS: The science advisor’s office wrote the instructions?

KEENY: Right. But it wasn’t quite the same. This was not a negotiation for a treaty in quite the normal sense so the instructions were not quite that significant, other than to get on with the business.

The delegation had three delegates who were not government officials in any way. The head of the delegation was Jim Fisk. I guess he was head of Bell Labs at the time. And the other two were E. O. Lawrence, a very distinguished, conservative physicist, and Robert Bacher, another distinguished physicist, who had been one of the four deputies at Los Alamos in the atomic bomb project.35

KAYSEN: He was one of the original members.

---

34 Created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Atomic Energy Commission took control of the research and development of atomic energy for military and later civilian uses. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1975 abolished the AEC and created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration. The Department of Energy succeeded the latter agency in 1977.

35 Ernest O. Lawrence was a physicist at the University of California, Berkeley from 1928 to 1958. On the Manhattan Project he was in charge of the team developing the electromagnetic process to separate uranium. Robert Bacher, a physics professor at the California Institute of Technology, headed the experimental division at Los Alamos.
KEENY: He was a key man in the Manhattan Project, and a distinguished physicist. And we had enough people to staff all of the problems with people like Hans Bethe and Wolfgang Panofsky. And Harold Brown and Frank Press and many other distinguished scientists. It was a unique delegation. It ran itself.

When it came around to starting the negotiations in October, Eisenhower declared a testing moratorium, which the Soviets followed up on. The process began to formalize more. The State Department and the committee of principals became the operating groups, and they met from time to time. But I don’t think the formal, elaborate NSC structure under Gordon Gray and other people was ever really used. They were very unhappy about it, and one of the reasons this was handled this way was Eisenhower knew that the JCS was against this whole thing. The Defense Department was against it, and the State Department didn’t know what they thought.

DESTLER: So Eisenhower was bypassing his own system?

KEENY: Eisenhower bypassed his system.

DAALDER: Because the system wasn’t producing what he wanted.

KEENY: This is where someone like Goodpaster would be one of the few people who would have any insight. Eisenhower realized that there was no way you could possibly do anything using the existing system, so he took another path. We had a very strong delegation despite my presence on it. And the chief delegate was Wadsworth, who was a political appointee.

KAYSEN: Jim Wadsworth.

KEENY: Yes, and he had been connected with the State Department although I forget what his connections were. But the State Department then began to take the leading role, and you had all the obvious agencies involved. There was no ACDA at the time, but State, Defense, and CIA were there. They met with the principals when major points of departure came up as to what you did next. And the negotiations ran until they collapsed with the shoot down of the U-2 over

36 The Manhattan Project was the code name for the U.S. government research project (1942-45) that created the atomic bomb.

37 Hans A. Bethe, a renowned German-born physicist, headed the theoretical physics division of the Manhattan Project. Wolfgang K. H. “Pief” Panofsky was a professor of physics at Stanford University and director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center.

38 Frank Press was professor of geophysics and director of the seismology laboratory at the California Institute of Technology from 1955-1965, and professor of geophysics and chairman of the earth and planetary sciences department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1965 to 1977. He later served as the president’s science advisor from 1977 to 1981 and president of the National Academy of Sciences from 1981 to 1993.


40 James J. Wadsworth served as the representative of the United States to the United Nations from 1960 to 1961. Prior to assuming the top position, he was the deputy head of the U.S. mission to the United Nations for seven years.
DAALDER: Since we’re still in 1960, Carl, can you move us into the Kennedy administration for a bit and then we’ll accelerate from there.

KAYSEN: I think the first thing to say is that the Kennedy administration didn’t begin with an interest in arms control. The first moves in this sphere were to make big military build-ups, the biggest one made till we started MIRVing the force and worrying about civil defense. It was not exactly an arms control measure.

Because of Congress’ reaction, we never did anything about civil defense. I think arms control started rising in the agenda when the Russians resumed testing. Its first manifestation was a tremendously long discussion about whether we should resume testing that lasted from the end of the summer of 1961 right through to spring 1962. Retrospectively, I think Kennedy had decided from the very first that he had no choice, that he had to resume testing as a kind of international political matter. It was not domestic pressure so much as “they did this to us, we’ve got to do it to them.”

Since it’s not very gemütlich, I will not describe what Kennedy first said when Jerry Wiesner and I picked up a radio broadcast from the CIA that indicated the Russians were going to test. There was an announcement about how aircraft shouldn’t do this and so on. And we walked across the street and told Kennedy and his response was “kicked in the _ _ _ again.”

Despite his reaction, there was a really very intense discussion about testing and its significance. It involved DoD, CIA, Wiesner and Spurgeon, and Bundy and me. I was the one who did most of the work. But if I think of it, I probably wrote only ten memos as to why we didn’t want to resume testing. And Seaborg and Haworth were in this, too. I think that discussion led to a renewed interest in the test ban subject.

The other negotiation that went on was on disarmament. I was trying to think if it was Arthur Dean or not, who spent endless time talking to Kuznetsov about the principles of general complete disarmament. They produced a more or less content-free document setting forth the principles of general and complete disarmament.

The test ban negotiation went off and on, starting in 1962. Let me give you a sense of the players before I go rapidly back through the chronology. The State Department was hardly in it at all. The secretary and George Ball had no interest in this. Their perspective was dominated by their anxieties about what signing the test ban treaty would do to NATO’s solidarity, what it

---

41 A U-2 reconnaissance airplane was shot down over the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk on May 1, 1960.

42 Glenn T. Seaborg worked on the Manhattan Project and later served as the chair of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1961 to 1971. Leland J. Haworth was a commissioner on the AEC during the Kennedy administration.

43 Arthur H. Dean served as the chief U.S. negotiator at the test ban negotiations in Geneva during the Kennedy administration. Vasily V. Kuznetsov was the Soviet deputy foreign minister from 1955 to 1977.

44 George W. Ball was undersecretary of state from 1961 to 1966.
would do to the Germans, and if Rusk would preside over meetings of the committee of principals.

I think the committee of principals had little importance, and, as I said, the State Department at the top simply had no interest. ACDA was created, and I remind you that its head was a Republican and rather characteristic of Kennedy’s style. If there was a move that looked leftist, he’d appoint a Republican. The director was Bill Foster, and the deputy director was Butch Fisher. Butch had a serious interest. I can remember an exchange between Foster and McNamara, which I think gives a flavor of the business and Foster’s general attitude. Foster made some comment about what we would do if there was cheating on tests, and McNamara said, “Bill, you let me worry about the military aspects of this treaty, and you put your attention on how we get it. That’s your job.”

Foster really didn’t seem to me to have a strong passion for getting a treaty for reasons probably Spurgeon can say more about than I can. Going back to the conference of experts and so on, a lot of the discussion during this period focused on how many inspections there would be. And again, looking back, it was sort of a silly question because nobody had discussed what an inspection would consist of, how you would do it, and whether you could in fact carry out a meaningful inspection of the presumed underground tests in any way that could be negotiated. There never was such a discussion in the Kennedy administration. But there was tremendous discussion about how many inspections were necessary or sufficient.

Who were the big participants? McNamara, who was very much interested in getting a treaty. Harold Brown, who succeeded Herb York very early in the Kennedy administration, kept McNamara on top of this issue and instructed him on the technical in and outs. Jerry Wiesner, who was extremely active; and Spurgeon and I, so to speak, worked for Jerry and Mac Bundy respectively. I carried the load for Mac, since Jerry carried his own load and Spurgeon and I carried the message. I think the president was very much interested in the treaty and pushed it. And it was really the major arms control item in the Kennedy administration.

The joint chiefs were opposed. McCone was opposed, and McCone was a fairly active player. McCone’s opposition went underground. He sent somebody to work for the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee to gather testimony opposing the test ban treaty. There was some internal comment on this, but I would say again it was a case of the president having appointed a Republican and having decided he had to live with him. But Abe Chayes, who was the State Department counsel, and I were interested in this.

---

45 William C. Foster was the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1961 to 1968. Adrian “Butch” Fisher was deputy director of ACDA during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

46 Herbert F. York was the first director of the Livermore Radiation Laboratory. In March 1958 he left for Washington where he served first as the chief scientist of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. In December 1958 he became the first director of defense research and engineering, a position he held until 1961. He also served as a member of the President’s Science Advisory Committee in the Eisenhower and Johnson administrations.

47 John A. McCone chaired the Atomic Energy Commission from 1958 to 1960 and directed the Central Intelligence Agency from 1961 to 1965.

48 Abram Chayes was the State Department legal adviser from 1961 to 1964.
SEVERAL VOICES: He was the legal officer.

KAYSEN: That’s right, he was the legal officer. He was interested in this, but his channel was to the NSC staff, not to the management of the Defense Department. We’d talk about it, and he actually alerted me to this hearing that was being held on the Hill. So I got McNamara interested, and that resulted in McNamara’s getting some testimony into the hearing so that there would not be a one-sided record of the Preparedness Subcommittee and the Armed Services Committee of the Senate saying we can’t have a test ban.

Another interesting thing was the role of Seaborg, who was the chairman, and Haworth, who was the second of the three members of the Commission. Seaborg tended to delegate the arms control issues to Haworth. He was a distinguished scientist, not a Nobel laureate but a very eminent physicist who had been the director of Brookhaven and had been in the nuclear business, and he was strong on arms control.

Seaborg was the man who felt the pressure from the Joint Committee because it was strongly against arms control and the nuclear test ban. And the Joint Committee was the transmission belt for the lab interest.

I think that’s about as much of the story as I can relate.

DESTLER: Very quickly on the negotiation. How was Harriman chosen and what difference did that make?49

KAYSEN: I think it made an enormous difference. It happened in one of those weekend operations. I happened to be at the White House and Bundy was on vacation. It was in June; McNamara was at one commencement and Max Taylor was at another; the president was in Florida.50

I talked to Ted Sorensen when I got the cable from Khrushchev and I called Godfrey McHugh, who was the military aide from the Air Force, to get this cable to the president.51 I talked to Sorensen and then I talked to the president. I said to the president that it was Ted’s judgment that if he asked Rusk that Rusk would ask Paul [Nitze] to be the negotiator.52 And it was my judgment that was a bad idea. And the president said, “Let’s ask McCloy.”53 And

49 W. Averell Harriman held numerous positions in U.S. government, including assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern and Pacific affairs from 1961 to 1963, undersecretary of state for political affairs from 1963 to 1965, and ambassador-at-large until his retirement in 1969.

50 General Maxwell D. Taylor served as adviser to the president for military and intelligence affairs from 1961 to 1962 and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff from 1962 to 1964.

51 Theodore Sorensen served as special counsel and speechwriter for President Kennedy. Col. Godfrey McHugh was an Air Force aide to President Kennedy.

52 In the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Paul H. Nitze was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1961 to 1963 and secretary of the navy from 1963 to 1967.

53 John J. McCloy served in a variety of government positions and during the Kennedy administration was a chief arms control negotiator.
McCloy was asked and he didn’t want to do it. He was saving himself for the Middle East, it was later said. But I never heard this from McCloy, so it’s speculative. So I said to Ted, “Why don’t we get Harriman. If we get Harriman, we’ll get a treaty.” And Ted called the president and suggested Harriman. And so Harriman was appointed.

The delegation was made up of John McNaughton for the Defense Department; Butch Fisher for ACDA; and myself for the NSC. There was also Frank Long for ACDA on the technical side and Frank Press, who was a geophysicist and was on PSAC. Frank Press had done a lot of work in 1962 which showed that the Air Force calibration of Soviet earthquakes was wrong. An Air Force organization called AFTAC [Air Force Technical Applications Center] was charged with monitoring Soviet underground tests, and it ran the seismic system. And Frank had shown that what we thought was the calibration of small and confusing earthquakes in the Soviet Union had been misdone. It’s a hard thing to do right. So Frank was sent on the delegation in case we wanted to discuss seismic detection. And I’ll finish by saying Frank discovered the first day he was in Moscow that there wasn’t a geophysicist to be found in Moscow, which told us before Khrushchev could tell us that there was going to be no comprehensive test ban treaty.

The negotiations after that were really easy. The sticking points were East and West Germany and discussion of the non-aggression pact. I made a call to Bundy and actually got the president, and there was an agreed way to deal with the two Germanies problem. Harriman managed to sort of push Gromyko along a day at a time on how we’re going to discuss the non-aggression pact after we finished the discussion of this treaty. So that got pushed off and we had a treaty. Khrushchev clearly wanted a treaty and so we got one.

GARTHOFF: I would mention, first, Carl, that at the very beginning of the Kennedy administration there was the setting up of a whole slew of special committees. McCloy had one, Bill Foster had one, and so did a number of others that looked at all aspects of arms control and disarmament. It was the first time there had been any sort of comprehensive analysis.

It didn’t lead to very much, at least not directly, but it did involve bringing in a lot of people from Cambridge and so forth. For some people who came into the government, it was the first time looking at these things. And the main concrete result was that it contributed directly to the decision to establish ACDA.

That occurred in the spring/summer of 1961. I remember that very well because I was borrowed from the CIA to be a member of the conventional forces team on this. Then I went back and I wrote the CIA comments. By that time I had transferred over to the State Department.

---

54 John McNaughton was deputy assistant secretary of defense for international affairs during the Kennedy administration and later assistant secretary of defense.

55 Franklin A. Long was the assistant director for science and technology at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Kennedy administration.

56 Andrei Gromyko was the foreign minister of the Soviet Union from 1957 to 1985.

57 The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of September 26, 1961 (P.L. 87-297).
and wrote the State Department’s comments on it. So it was a little bit incestuous there. But the discussion of principles at the disarmament conference in September 1961 included McCloy and Kuznetsov.

The other thing that happened was that the 18-nation Disarmament Committee was set up.\(^{58}\) And you had the beginning of what became the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva beginning in March 1962. For several weeks it met at the foreign minister level, and then it got into regular continuing talks of general disarmament and a whole slew of other things. That led to all of the business of having routine regular negotiators in the field there and a routine system of decision-making on all sorts of things, most of which ended up not amounting to very much.

There was a system for this in the Committee of Principals and the Deputies Committee, with back-up for those continuing negotiations. As Carl has said, when it came to something really important, like the Harriman mission going for the Limited Test Ban Treaty, it got taken out of regular channels.\(^{59}\) This was sort of a special thing, and the NSC certainly was in the central role. That’s because, among other things, the key issues, apart from the actual negotiations with the Russians, really had to do with negotiations with the JCS over what would end up being a system of so-called safeguards that they would be given to offset the fact that testing would end. And it also had to do with Congress, of course.

So those were handled pretty much in the White House. And my recollection is that the Russians had told us before Harriman went over that they were ready to do something on a limited test ban. Nonetheless, it was exactly the instruction that Harriman took and carried out, but one was first to make a strong pitch on the comprehensive ban, and if that didn’t work to fall back to the limited ban, which then succeeded.

There were other things, although you hit certainly the main ones, Carl. There was this question of the ban on weapons in space in the fall of 1963, which we originally ran out of our special committee [the NSAM 156 Committee] that dealt with protecting reconnaissance satellites and so on. But it also went into the Committee of Principals machinery and there was a recommendation that went over saying, without dissent, that we thought that a declaratory ban on weapons in space was not a good idea. And Carl called me up and said, “Ray, has this really been thought through?” And I said, “No, it hasn’t.” So it came back with the recommendation

\(^{58}\) The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), formed in 1961, grew out of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, which was set up in 1959 to discuss outside general and complete disarmament outside of the General Assembly. The eighteen-nation group included the eastern bloc states of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union; the western bloc of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and a non-aligned group of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and Egypt. The non-aligned group eventually came to dispute the limited number of members of the ENDC and pushed through an expansion of in the General Assembly in 1969 at which time the name of the forum was changed to Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Further expansion took place later. Among its early accomplishments was work done on the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Seabed Treaty.

\(^{59}\) The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, or Limited Test Ban Treaty, was formally signed by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States on August 5, 1963. The United States ratified it on October 7, 1963, and it entered into force three days later. The treaty prohibited nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space, or under water but not underground.
of “not accepted” and a suggestion that we look at it again. Well, we did look at it again. I had already drafted the new thing, and we went back in very short order with our recommendation that it should be supported, but not through a treaty, through a coordinated U.S./Soviet effort in the UN General Assembly and parallel unilateral U.S. and Soviet statements on the record.

DESTLER: Ray, could you take us forward a few years to the Nixon administration? You participated in that process, too, which was a very different process. Others should also comment on that, because although Mort talked about the biological weapons comparison, he didn’t really address the very different sort of process.

GARTHOFF: Okay, but I do want to very briefly say two things about the Johnson administration. One of those is on the SALT negotiations in the earliest period, which was before Mort’s time, at the end of 1966 and the spring of 1967. It started out with the NSC aware of it, and then really just State and Defense. John McNaughton and I handled all the early drafting on that. We prepared positions, but of course it didn’t get anywhere in 1967. Negotiations did not ever begin. Then there was a year’s hiatus before events in 1968 and what Mort was talking about in getting the initial position for the SALT talks.

The other thing I wanted to mention in the Johnson administration, just so we don’t entirely miss it because it’s also an important example, was the Gilpatric Committee on Nonproliferation at the end of 1964 and beginning of 1965. That didn’t lead to any early and drastic change, but it was an important re-look at it with a blue-ribbon outside group. It involved some interesting staff preparation from all the agencies, and that was coordinated through a little committee which was headed by Spurgeon Keeny from NSC staff, myself from State, and people from Defense and ACDA. We each were responsible for getting our agencies’ inputs to the thing, and that involved a re-look at that subject.

In the Nixon administration, right from the beginning there was certainly a shift to a central NSC staffing role. There was a whole series of NSSM [National Security Study Memorandum] studies and so forth that were prepared under the auspices and the aegis of the interagency committees centered on the NSC, although they were often prepared in ACDA and other departments and all of them were fed into that process.

Gerard Smith took a very active role, initially as the head of ACDA, and later in the dual role also as head of the delegation when it was established. And a negotiating team was set up on a very different basis than any before. It was a collegial team. Gerry Smith was, without any question, the head of the delegation, but at the same time there were presidentially named representatives of the JCS, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Arms Control Agency. One person who did not personally represent any agency, but who was included in his own right, was Harold Brown.

That meant there was a certain difference in the way that the negotiating team would function. Although the State Department, ACDA, and CIA support groups worked pretty much

---

60 In November 1964, President Johnson appointed the Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation headed by Roswell L. Gilpatric, who was deputy secretary of defense during the Kennedy administration. The task force was asked to review the problem of nuclear proliferation and report back to the president by January 1965.
as part of a central delegation – and Dave Aaron will remember this very well – both Defense and JCS had their own self-contained elements in support of their principals and their own back-channel communications. So when it came to putting forth formal communications to and from the delegation, they all went through the Executive Office. There was myself and Sid Graybeal from ACDA and Dave [Aaron].

This system with the people that were involved worked reasonably well. I’m not sure that it was a good model. Of course, there was the whole system of meetings leading up to the occasional NSC meetings, but that was very soon superseded by the Verification Panel established for the purpose of resolving differing views on the question of verification. And it was very quickly used by Henry [Kissinger] to supersede the interagency undersecretaries committee. It had the same membership. The difference was that instead of being chaired by the undersecretary of state, it was chaired by the national security adviser. That became the key.

Then there was also, for more routine backing up of the delegation, a back-stopping committee chaired by Phil Farley, the deputy director of ACDA and also a member of the delegation, although only on rare occasions there. And that worked pretty well. We sometimes called it the “back-stabbing” committee, but that’s not really the way we thought about it.

DAALDER: Ray, was the NSC represented on the delegation?

GARTHOFF: No. The NSC was not represented on the delegation, and that’s interesting.

DAALDER: They had their own delegation, their own negotiations?

GARTHOFF: No. Certainly beginning in 1971, there was the first back-channel direct negotiation with Henry and then also later in the spring of 1972. There was in addition to the formal communications, which were all from the delegation to the secretary of state (and that meant the whole community in Washington), there also was a back channel between Henry and Gerry. Henry’s intent and understanding was that this was strictly between the two of them. In fact, Gerry shared this with the other senior members of the delegation.

DAALDER: But not with the secretary of state?

GARTHOFF: No, not with the secretary of state.

DAALDER: So there was a back channel between Henry and the delegation?

GARTHOFF: It was a back channel between Henry and Gerry, not between Henry and the delegation. There was also an oral back channel between Gerry and the senior members of the delegation. That helped but it was awkward and had some disadvantages as well.

---

61 Sidney N. Graybeal was a member of the SALT negotiating team.

62 The back-channel negotiations were secret contacts between Kissinger and Dobrynin. See Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War President (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, 1995); and Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).
The most unsuccessful aspect of this whole procedure came at the very end when the president and his party went to Moscow before the negotiations had been completed. And the decision was to leave the delegation in Helsinki to negotiate the last issues of substance while only the president, Henry, and some NSC staff people were negotiating in Moscow. And this was not a very satisfactory system. It was saved from some serious problems only because of the existence of the back channel between Henry and Gerry, between Moscow and Helsinki. For example, we saw something that they had already tentatively agreed to which involved the modification and allowable changes in silo size, which inadvertently would have prevented our MIRVing. For better or worse, we called that to the attention of Henry.

DAALDER: Major mistake.

GARTHOFF: I guess our dedication to honesty in the process got ahead of our preference for policy results.

KEENY: I’d like to add a little bit on this and a few earlier things, too, but which are relevant to your interests as I understand them. At the very beginning of the Nixon administration, they were going to spend a year or whatever studying this problem before going back. Initially ACDA had responsibility for the interagency process, and I inherited this when I arrived there. And it did not go well because you can imagine how much success we had when Kissinger was screaming for studies and my putting a deadline on the JCS was not entirely effective. The State Department wasn’t doing anything so that was no problem. But gradually this Verification Panel was set up because Kissinger really didn’t understand anything about a lot of this and he wanted to try to educate himself and I guess the others. They had big arguments about whether the Russians had initial MIRVs.

So there was a lot to be done. But very early on the NSC staff decided that the NSC would chair a particular study that was going forward. This upset my boss, Gerry Smith, very much because he felt it was critical that ACDA maintain its interagency leadership role. State was not a player. They had no interest in what happened bureaucratically or substantively. I thought the NSC taking over was a good development. I guess I’d been involved with NSC a lot, but I thought there was no chance for this thing to get anywhere until President Nixon and people around him adopted it to be a program that they wanted to succeed. It wasn’t going to be forced on them from the bottom up through some bureaucratic process. So I had many an argument with Gerard Smith, who felt that we weren’t fighting for our rights sufficiently hard and because Kissinger and he really hated each other.

I felt that it was going the right way, and Phil Farley agreed with me (I was the assistant director; he was the deputy). We couldn’t make any progress, so the NSC took it over and the Verification Panel must have had dozens of meetings going over the details of the verification problem. And by the time that was finished and the negotiations started, the whole process was being run by Phil Odeen and --

ODEEN: Wayne Smith.63

63 K. Wayne Smith was director of program analysis on the National Security Council from 1971 to 1972.
KEENY: Right, Wayne Smith. They variously were in charge of the interagency committee. In addition to that, there were innumerable NSC meetings. I must have sat in a dozen or more meetings. Nixon used it as his way to maneuver the process and I think to bring the other departments along because the chiefs and the Department of Defense people were really not very enthusiastic about any of this. That was a very long complicated process to educate and bring them along.

By the time we were really into negotiations, the NSC was really doing it. And we – Phil Farley and myself – were running the back-stopping. But those were the day-to-day details of the operation. All the policy questions went to the working group, the verification panel, and ultimately to the NSC.

And that was really quite different. Under Kennedy and Johnson, there were very few NSC meetings.

DESTLER: Let’s stay with Nixon.

KEENY: We should come back later to the Gilpatric panel.

DESTLER: After we get through our history, then we’ll try to go back.

ODEEN: I got into the loop in the fall of 1971. I had been in the Pentagon as the principal deputy assistant secretary for systems analysis. I had no involvement with arms control. My boss was Gardiner Tucker.64 He was the assistant secretary and the OSD person that handled all the arms control stuff. Gardiner was involved full time in that and I basically ran the rest of the organization. So I was totally new to it when I arrived on that scene in November of 1971.

I think by that time the ABM Treaty was largely resolved. I think most of the deals were done. Barry [Carter], you were there at the time. Barry was the full-time person working for me. And I had two deputies – one that handled arms control and strategic issues and one that did everything else. Jack Merritt had the job initially, and then David [Aaron] came six months or a year later to take that job.65

By that time, the Verification Panel was clearly the group that ran the whole process. Henry chaired it. The day-to-day work was done by the Verification Panel Working Group, which I chaired. That was the group that did all the analyses. We did a lot of detailed studies of all kinds that went way beyond verification issues. Anything having to do with negotiations was done by the Verification Panel Working Group.

It was unlike a lot of the working groups that we had – and we had a lot of them. I think I chaired three or four different ones. They were mainly to keep the bureaucracy busy so they wouldn’t get in our way. This one was a good one. It was where the issues were worked

---

64 Gardiner L. Tucker served as the assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis from 1970 to 1973.

65 Lt. Col. Jack Merritt was a member of the NSC staff from 1971 to 1972.
seriously. We had active involvement from OSD, the joint chiefs, State, and the CIA.

It included Carl Duckett and Bruce Clark of the CIA and several DoD people.\textsuperscript{66} It was a very substantive effort. We did serious analysis and presented alternatives and options to the Verification Panel, which met, I think as Spurgeon said, regularly. Spurgeon was with the working group and I think Ron Spiers was the person from State.

KEENY: I think it was Frank Perez.\textsuperscript{67}

ODEEN: Well, maybe. We came up with the options, developed the papers, staffed the Verification Panel meetings, wrote the results, drafted the memos from the president, and so on. That really became the focus of the whole effort.

I’d sort of forgotten about the backstopping committee. I hadn’t thought of it for thirty years. As I recall, and, Ray, this may be unfair, they got the message back from the delegation saying, “What do we do about this?” And they staffed an answer. These were kind of routine things that didn’t matter that much.

GARTHOFF: I think that’s right. Probably the difference was that the Verification Panel Working Group, like the Planning Board in the Eisenhower period, was preparing things for a decision, and, a back-stopping committee helped in the execution.

DAALDER: At some point you had two negotiations going on – a formal and an informal one. And you had one staff presumably staffing both negotiations, or Henry staffing both, and being part of the Verification Working Group.

DESTLER: Henry was in charge of policy for the formal negotiation as well as --

ODEEN: As well as conducting his own negotiations.

DAALDER: How do you separate those two?

ODEEN: They were totally disassociated. We were working on the same issues but --

DAALDER: But presumably you weren’t working issues. You were working with Henry in the formal working group.

ODEEN: We certainly didn’t talk about those things. It was kept quite close. There was very little knowledge of the kind of work really going on. Even in cases like the Moscow negotiations that Ray talked about where Henry was in Moscow at the very last minute making a number of decisions. Bill Hyland and Hal Sonnenfeldt were there, and I was in Washington. They would call back with questions and issues and we would go out and staff them. I remember needing answers in two or three or four hours on important questions. I remember trying to find Dick

\textsuperscript{66} Carl Duckett and Bruce Clark were CIA officials.

\textsuperscript{67} Frank Perez was a staff member of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department.
Helms one day at lunch and he had totally disappeared from the face of the earth. There were all kinds of speculations where Helms was. We couldn’t find him for a couple hours.

CARTER: Apparently shopping at Woodward and Lothrop, it was discovered.⁶⁸

DESTLER: Just to press on the backstopping issue – both the formal and the back channel negotiations. To what extent were you privy to the substance of the back-channel negotiations? Were you having to backstop them in ways that could cause conflict with the people on your committee that you were working with?

ODEEN: We were pretty much always in conflict.

GARTHOFF: Nobody in Washington was privy to or involved in backstopping or even aware of the back-channel messages, except in the NSC.

DESTLER: How did they handle their staff? Did they lose their credibility with the agencies?

GARTHOFF: Both in the backstopping committee and the Verification Panel Working Group, there was no awareness of the other activities.

ODEEN: Right. But the issues were the same issues, the analysis was the same analysis. We had done all this work so we had this common body of knowledge and conclusions.

DAALDER: To take a different example. When we held our roundtable on the Nixon administration, Win Lord said that when they went to a presidential meeting in Beijing for the first time, there were three briefing books.⁶⁹ There was the briefing book that was for the president and for Henry, which had all the materials. Then there was the briefing book for the people who were also on the plane, which had some materials taken out. And there was the briefing book for everybody else, which had none of the materials in it. And they had to try to figure out which paper had to go in which briefing book and to make absolutely sure that the material that went to Henry and to the president didn’t end up in the wrong briefing book.

DESTLER: In other words, the people that didn’t know that Henry was going on the flight to China did not get the China papers.

ODEEN: I don’t remember it being a big issue.

AARON: I came on board right at the very end of the SALT I process and really was more involved in the congressional part of it and the goodies that were given to the JCS and all that. I’ll comment on that in a minute.

---

⁶⁸ Woodward & Lothrop was a department store chain based in Washington, D.C.

I was on the delegation, and my impression was this. In the end, the Verification Panel and the analysis it did was very similar in some ways to what had gone on internally in the Pentagon under McNamara. It was a sort of draft presidential memorandum process where there was a real re-thinking of the use of nuclear weapons, what they were good for, what they weren’t good for, and all the rest. There was some really controversial analytical work being done. But the Verification Panel sort of supplanted that process, though some of the same people ended up doing the same kind of work.

On the delegation itself, it was a very difficult piece of machinery. In looking back on it, it was hard to tell whether it had been constructed that way because of the political problem of trying to bring the JCS, the Defense Department, and everybody else on board. (It was a rather revolutionary thing being done.) Or whether it was deliberately designed to be very formalistic because Henry wanted the flexibility to do what he was doing.

The process became marginal because it became very formal. There was only one channel that really influenced the process and aired complaints in discussions with the Russians. There was no way to get to that point through the formal negotiations. The process was full of leaks and it was just too hard to handle.

Let me just go on, if I could, to mention another issue, which bears looking at in analyzing the National Security Council and policy formulation process. That is the MIRV testing position. I think that position was fundamental to the parameters that were established for SALT I and it was a bitterly contested decision at the time. It actually began in the Johnson administration and went over into the Nixon era. I was pretty junior at the time, but I do recall that there was a general position that defined where we wanted to go in the end.

The only other thing that I might add from this early Nixon period is the safeguards that came out of it. The safeguards became the thing that you always did at the end of an arms control negotiation. You had to give the JCS something. Interestingly enough, by the time we got to SALT I, thanks to Phil and others, the NSC had its own list of things that it thought were important that the services and the Defense Department weren’t that interested in. One of them was cruise missiles, which at that point were languishing. The air force was in charge and didn’t want to do anything that might threaten manned aircraft. Part of the program was finally given to the navy, and then, of course, you had a competitive situation, which both services responded to.

CARTER: Let me just try to add a few things. First of all, I came to the NSC in September of 1970, replacing Walt Slocombe who had been there for a year and a half or so. Jim Woolsey did a brief cameo appearance between us before he went to the Senate Armed Services

---

70 Walter B. Slocombe was a member of the program analysis staff of the National Security Council in 1969 and 1970. He later served as the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1977 to 1979, the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy planning from 1979 to 1981, the principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy from 1993 to 1994, and the undersecretary of defense for policy from 1994 to 2001.
I started with Wayne Smith as my boss, and then I had the pleasure to work a second time for Phil Odeen, who had been my boss in the Pentagon. I had started as an army lieutenant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and came to the NSC as a lieutenant. While at the NSC, Henry Kissinger and Phil Odeen asked me to stay on as a civilian analyst at least until the ABM Treaty was signed, which I did through May 1972.

Besides the Verification Panel and backstopping, Ray talked about the back channel between Gerry Smith and Kissinger. There also was another back channel that was very important, and that was the one between Kissinger and Dobrynin.

We were pretty well-informed on the channel between Gerry and Kissinger. Kissinger would often pass us things, or Bill Hyland would be reasonably forthcoming. Phil has already commented on Sonnenfeldt, and Bill was reasonably forthcoming about what was happening with Gerry. But by early 1971 or so, Kissinger was in regular communication with Dobrynin, who would come by and visit him at the NSC and they would talk about things. They agreed to several breakthroughs, and then Kissinger basically told us to give instructions to the delegation to work it out.

We learned about that sometimes after the fact, sometimes before, and we were asked to prepare papers for it. I think Sonnenfeldt knew regularly about it. It got so important that at one point in 1972 before the agreement was finally signed in May, Kissinger went on a secret airplane flight to Moscow. And he didn’t tell us in advance except that he had us prepare the issue papers.

Hyland and Sonnenfeldt were with him, and he reached a number of agreements. He then came back, told us what they were, and told us to prepare the bureaucracy for them. So Kissinger was running a fairly active back channel, which I don’t think he kept Gerry informed much about. And he had us sometimes work things through the committees so they adjusted to the ideas that Henry had already worked out with Dobrynin.

A second item concerns one of your questions about the expertise of the National Security Council adviser. Kissinger was not a detailed, technical person. He obviously had studied strategy. However, to his credit on technical matters, he not only used the bureaucracy and his staff very well, but he also had a little working group that he met with privately. We called it the Doty group: Paul Doty, Sid Drell, Pief Panofsky, and a fourth.

KAYSEN: It may have been Marshall Shulman.

71 R. James Woolsey was a member of the National Security Council staff in 1970 before serving as the general counsel to the Senate Armed Services Committee from 1970 to 1973. He later served as the director of central intelligence from 1993 to 1995.

72 Barry E. Carter later served as senior counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities in 1995 and deputy under secretary of commerce for export administration from 1993 to 1996.

73 Paul M. Doty was a professor of biochemistry at Harvard University. Sidney D. Drell was deputy director and executive head of theoretical physics at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center.

74 Marshall Shulman was a professor at Columbia University who served from 1977 to 1980 as ambassador and special adviser on Soviet affairs in the State Department.
ODEEN: I believe Jack Ruina was there.\textsuperscript{75}

CARTER: Yes, Jack Ruina was the fourth.

My job was to brief them on where we stood on things so they could brief Henry. On the ABM issue, we were stuck at four sites at one point, and there was pressure to reduce the number of sites. I think Kissinger really hesitated until the scientists got there and explained to him why four sites weren’t worth much at all. They would quickly be exhausted and overwhelmed. It was a real tribute to these outside scientists. They had different political views than Henry on a lot of issues. Nevertheless, he sat down with them a couple of times, and I think he listened to them. There was a lot of feedback.

The last thing I would mention is that much of this history, at least from the NSC perspective, is told very well in John Newhouse’s book.\textsuperscript{76}

DESTLER: \textit{Cold Dawn}.

CARTER: \textit{Cold Dawn}, exactly.

ODEEN: We really spilled our guts.

CARTER: That’s right.

ODEEN: Breaking every conceivable security regulation. I have had polygraphs on that from time to time and they start asking you questions and you kept thinking back, “My God, what did I do?!?” This is the honest to God’s truth.

HOWE: So you were there!

CARTER: He felt so uncomfortable. One time I drafted a memo that Phil Odeen signed, where we said, “John’s asking for these items.” We asked Kissinger to check off the items to make sure he approved them. We kept that memo, by the way. We were under instructions to brief John just up to the latest negotiating position, because he was writing the SALT history and we didn’t want a \textit{New York Times} article on it the next day. But John was probably no more than three or four weeks behind us in some cases.

ODEEN: I think he was very close. I don’t think there was ever really a problem though.

McNAMARA: During the Carter administration, it was the same thing.

\textsuperscript{75} Jack P. Ruina is a professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he taught since 1963. Along with other positions in the Defense Department, he served as the director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency from 1961 to 1963 and was a member of the General Advisory Committee of the ACDA from 1963 to 1972.

CARTER: There was never a question with John, and so for the NSC it was a good book.

HOWE: I would just add something on the Dobrynin issue. I think arms control was on practically every one of the agendas. There was this private dialogue going on, but it was really the work that was done by the staff that supported it.

ODEEN: Was Al Haig in the loop on that at all? 77

HOWE: Oh, sure.

ODEEN: So Al ended up going to Moscow and you were Al’s guy at the time.

HOWE: I worked for them both. The other thing I remember – and Phil can probably recall it better because he was chairman at the time – is the 1971 trip, when the chiefs were brought in at six in the morning or so. Kissinger had to have a decision so the chiefs were brought to the White House situation room. Everybody met, unshaven, and decisions were made. But there was at least a degree of concern about getting them all to meet.

ODEEN: That happened in 1972. I think Kissinger was in Moscow and we had a couple of meetings that took place at the crack of dawn. I remember calling at five-thirty or six in the morning.

HOWE: But they surely weren’t going to do something without consulting the chiefs.

GARTHOFF: On the back-channel business, the first Kissinger-Dobrynin back channel was from January to May 1971, which led to the May “breakthrough” of settling for a separate ABM treaty and the offensive arms understanding. 78 Gerry had not been informed about it at all. Gerry, Paul Nitze, General Allison, and I had gone back to Washington and we learned about it two days before the announcement. I had learned about it from the Russians before that. I told Gerry that there was something going on, and I didn’t know the details of it.

   But then in 1972, I saw the whole Kissinger/Smith back channel, but I didn’t know then and don’t know really now to what extent Henry was filling Gerry in. Not fully. He certainly wasn’t briefing him; he wasn’t keeping him fully filled in. Various exchanges to some extent reflected the other back channel, but not directly. And we were not in the loop at the time of the April 1972 meeting in Moscow, where, when Henry arrived on the plane with Dobrynin with him, our ambassador didn’t even know he was coming. Jake Beam was cut out even to the fact that they were arriving. 79


78 On May 20, 1971, in the midst of the SALT I negotiations, President Nixon announced that the United States and Soviet Union had reached agreement on concluding a separate ABM Treaty and agreement on the limitation of offensive weapons.

79 Jacob D. Beam served as the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1973.
KEENY: I think if you wanted Gerry’s views on it, it would be “doubletalk.” To be honest, we needed to ask him what he felt about it and how he was treated. There were other back channels which also created problems. Even though the delegation was supposed to be an “unusual” delegation – isolated and separate – the individual members, like the JCS and the Defense people, had their secure communications going through the intelligence network. They were communicating with their principals back in Washington. So a lot of people had pieces of this that were not in any of the formal reporting, and this created an interesting problem. High-level negotiators, who at the same time you’re negotiating, are informing their principals in Washington, who were themselves engaged in the policy negotiations in Washington. I think most heads of delegations tried to discourage this, but I don’t think they were very successful.

DESTLER: We will be skipping over some important Ford experience, but in the interest of time we should move on to the Carter administration. Maybe David could talk a little bit about the process and how it comes about. I guess the first big event is the reformulation of the strategy and the deep cuts.

AARON: Well, I think the system that was set up by Dr. Brzezinski was actually very similar to what Kissinger had. It was modeled basically on that concept. In the end it turned out to work differently because there was a good deal more to the process. The president wanted to meet with the principal advisers once a week, and so we had elements of the Johnson system.

Secondly, we did not have, at least not at the outset, a lot of back-channel negotiations going on, with one principal exception – arms control. The deep cuts issue really was the hubris of a new administration. Everybody has to do something new, but they had to do something, had to do it better, and had to be more interested in taking a more dramatic step. Interestingly enough, it occurred very much among the principals. It was not something that bubbled up through the staff.

I think the staff was apprehensive about it because that early in the administration most of the staff people had been working in the Ford administration. They knew what the history was, and they knew what had happened at Vladivostok. The whole negotiation could have been closed out quickly if you simply included what had already been negotiated. But the president didn’t want that. He wanted something different. Brzezinski certainly didn’t want it. My impression is that Cy was pretty reluctant about a more ambitious position because I think he...

---

80 Deep cuts was a comprehensive proposal developed in March 1977 for the SALT II negotiations. The proposal called for deep reductions in the ceilings that had been agreed at Vladivostok and it incorporated new cuts in the Soviet heavy-missile force, limitations on flight testing of ICBMs, and any development, testing, and deployment of mobile and new ICBMs. David Aaron and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown were primary proponents of this new policy.

81 Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser from 1977 to 1981.

82 Agreement was reached at a summit meeting on November 23-24, 1974, in Vladivostok between President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on the numerical limits for the next ten years that would form the basis for the SALT II Treaty. While Vladivostok engendered optimism that agreement on a treaty could be reached in the next year, the momentum was lost in 1975 in disagreements and ambiguities over the combination and definitions of weapons for fulfilling the limits and in 1976 with the presidential election cycle.
simply felt that we’d be going backwards too far.\textsuperscript{83} But he was going to be a good soldier and fight it out. In some ways I think Kissinger said it best about the whole episode. He said, “I went to Moscow many times and failed but I didn’t call a press conference to announce it.”

I really think that there was a lot of tactical, political blundering of the whole thing that in retrospect might have been managed a little better.

The only back channeling that took place in any significant way was a little later in the process, when we were trying to convince the Russians that they had to do something about the heavy missiles. Negotiations were going on. There was a formal front channel, and we were saying all the things that we were supposed to say.

But we were getting nowhere. Brzezinski agreed that Bill Hyland and I would go and talk to Dobrynin and his designated person about how we were going to move it forward. We had only one message, and that was that we didn’t have a proposal. It was, “We’ve got to do something about the heavy missiles, or we’ll never get this through the Congress.”

That was all there was. There was no real back channeling beyond that. But there was plenty of it going on with China.

McNAMARA: I started the Carter administration in Moscow, sitting at the embassy when the delegation arrived in March of 1977. I think David’s absolutely right. There was an enormous amount of hubris, and there was also an enormous amount of naïveté. Although the delegation came in solidly united behind the proposal, the Russians reacted within a couple of hours in a most strikingly negative way.

I can give you an example of one incident that crystallized it for me. That was at the lunch right after Vance had presented this proposal to the Russians. We were sitting around the table. The American delegates – Gelb and three or four others, including Hyland – were all very positive about getting to Geneva and starting the negotiations again.

And Semyonov was sitting right next to me, and I was unofficially interpreting the conversation going back and forth across the table.\textsuperscript{84} And somebody said, “Well, we can start in Geneva probably by next Monday or so.” And Semyonov said he didn’t even have any instructions. He had been at the meeting that morning when the proposal had been given to the Russians. All he’d say was, “Nobody’s given me a ticket to go to Geneva.” And their [the U.S. delegates’] reply was, “Well, don’t worry about it. We’ve got to get this going.” After, at the lunch, I went around and said, “This is a very, very negative reaction by Semyonov, but he can’t say anything because he doesn’t have any authority to speak.” I thought it was going to be a terrible reaction and that afternoon was when Vance went back to get the reaction before going back to Washington. And, of course, the whole thing came apart at the seams that afternoon.

That evening Gromyko put on what I think was maybe one of the greatest tours de force

\textsuperscript{83} Cyrus Vance served as secretary of state from 1977 to 1980.

\textsuperscript{84} Vladimir Semyonov was Soviet deputy foreign minister and head of the Soviet SALT negotiations.
by a minister in great detail, with not even so much as a note. He stood in front of the live cameras, a live TV and journalistic audience, and went through the entire thing without missing one nuance and never looked at a piece of paper. And the U.S. delegation was in the plane on the way back to Washington.

AARON: I think one of the critical, tactical decisions, which was taken very off-handedly was: “Do we tell them in advance and telegraph what our position is so they can think about it and know it’s coming? Or do we not?” And that got about two seconds’ consideration. Cy said, “No, no, we’ll go and talk to them about it. Let’s not do anything in advance.” I think that in retrospect we should have tested out our proposal.

McNAMARA: I think the U.S. would have found that something leading to deep cuts might have been possible. But the Soviets believed deep cuts was a way for us to get out of the arms control process for a period of time while we built up. It meant virtually starting anew, when they thought they were on the verge of closing this out. After Vladivostok and everything else in comes the new administration, and it’s clear that there are a couple of years of negotiation even with the best of intentions on both sides.

I also wanted to comment about the process because back channeling and private sessions that were done in the Kissinger years continued, as David said, during the Carter administration. By then, however, it seemed to me there was a mechanism that was built into it. Kissinger was sort of building it as he went along, doing it his way, not paying any attention to aspects that he didn’t think were important, and not paying too much attention to how many toes he stepped on.

By the time we get the Carter administration, there were still back channels. But then there were mechanisms within the administration for keeping everybody informed. One of the best mechanisms that was set up was the BVB [Brzezinski-Vance-Brown] lunch, as it was known in the White House. In the Defense Department it was the BVB [Brown-Vance-Brzezinski] lunch because you had to have the right initial go first.

Vance set up the back channel with Dobrynin and we started exchanging non-papers. The first non-paper came from the Russians asking to open that channel. In fact, the SALT negotiations were concluded within the four years of the Carter administration only because of that back channel and only because that back channel was held so tightly by Vance. He could go use the lunch and a few other mechanisms that had been built up. He could go to Brzezinski and Brown and the president knowing that it would not get outside a very, very restricted circle.

In the State Department, the Soviet non-papers were seen, as far as I know, by Vance, who then would pass it to Les Gelb. I was Les’ special assistant and it was my job to draft the U.S. response. It then went to Marshall Shulman and only Vance could take it outside the State Department. Those of us who had seen these non-papers were allowed to discuss the issues on a technical level because we needed the analysis and the technical expertise, but only Vance was allowed to take the paper itself to the White House or Harold Brown or anywhere else.

---

85 Non-papers are a negotiating device used to convey U.S. thinking in an unofficial way with other governments.
All of the acrimony that there was during the Kissinger years was reduced to much more manageable proportions because the mechanisms had been built up that made back channeling SOP [standard operation procedure]. The bureaucracy looked at it a little bit differently because there was an SOP to it. It wasn’t a bunch of lightning bolts coming out of the White House that no one was prepared for.

It seemed to me that this was one of the biggest differences between the back channeling of the Kissinger years and the back channeling in the Carter administration. David may have a different take on it.

AARON: I think that’s right. It was more institutionalized.

DESTLER: Ted, you said that you couldn’t share the document but you could raise or consult on the issues because you needed the technical expertise. Was there anything like the Verification Panel? Was there a process going on?

McNAMARA: Yes, there was a process that was going on outside of the Vance-Dobrynin back channels. The contents of the non-papers – incoming and outgoing – could be discussed as issues. But what actually was in those non-papers was only known to a very few people.

DESTLER: Right. But they could be discussed in this way.

McNAMARA: Yes, and obviously some of the tensions that came about were with people on the outside who were dying to find out what it was that caused us to ask a particular question. “Why do you need that information in the next 48 hours?”

DAALDER: The reason that the back channel worked was because the principals were part of that. Under Kissinger, there was only one principal.

AARON: I’d make a distinction between a back channel where the White House is operating directly without anybody else’s knowledge and an informal channel. Every negotiation’s got to have an informal channel.

HOLUM: Did Warnke go to BVB lunch? Did he get informed?

McNAMARA: There was no mechanism for passing the non-papers to Paul or the chiefs of the services, for that matter.

DAALDER: Or the chiefs?

McNAMARA: That was Brown’s responsibility to inform them, and I’m sure Brzezinski must have done some of it. I know Vance did it on occasion. He would invite the chiefs over for lunch. Someone would have to go find out from Brown whether or how often the chiefs ever actually saw the documents.

---

86 Paul C. Warnke served as the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 to 1978.
In the State Department there was one copy that was kept by Peter Tarnoff in Vance’s office. The original was kept in the safe in our office down in PM. And that was it. There were supposed to be only two copies, and back then you hand-carried them around. So, therefore, the chances of anybody xeroxing them was zero.

But in any event, there was a mechanism – to get back to the main point – because Vance and Les Gelb were very, very good colleagues of Paul [Warnke]. They needed, first, his expertise and, second, his negotiating savvy. He was an extraordinarily accomplished negotiator. I know he was the best negotiator I ever saw, but people here have a lot more history than I do.

He was an extraordinarily good negotiator, and Vance and Gelb always checked with him. I believe he saw some of these non-papers. Maybe he saw all of them. Someone would have to ask him. In fact, he was consulted on just about all of the changes because, as a negotiator, he’d spend some time in Washington and then he’d be back in Geneva negotiating. In effect he’d be catching the pass that was being thrown from Washington in the form of instructions. And he would have to translate what had been agreed to in this informal back channel – the Vance-Dobrynin channel – into a text and then send the text back through the front channel and get the whole bureaucracy to agree to it. The only way it got done was because all of the principals had already agreed to it in advance.

DESTLER: But Paul knew that he was doing this?

McNAMARA: Paul knew what was going on. Yes, very definitely. He was very much in the loop.

HOWE: I just want to make one short point on the whole business of back channeling. Whether it’s State or the NSC, you can’t look at arms control in isolation. Yes, each point is dear to those immersed in the negotiations, and it’s important to get it technically right. But the White House or the secretary of state looks at the larger context of overall Soviet-U.S. relations. What we’re getting, what they’re getting. There’s a bigger policy agenda that makes it necessary for there to be some other communication. The arms control negotiations move because there’s something in it for the Soviets if they agree.

HOLMES: That’s a very important point, and I’ll elaborate a little bit on it during the Shultz period. It was even more salient in the last four years.

AARON: It was pretty salient on the whole issue of whether we were going to normalize relations with China before we had a SALT.  

---

87 Peter Tarnoff served as the executive secretary of the Department of State from 1977 to 1981.

88 President Carter announced that the United States would normalize its relations with the People’s Republic of China on December 15, 1978, and formally did so on January 1, 1979. An attempt to reach a final agreement on SALT II in Geneva was made by Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko on December 21-23, 1978. While substantial agreement was reached, a number of issues were left to be ironed out. A final agreement was signed by President Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev on June 18, 1979, in Vienna.

The timing of the normalization of relations with China ahead of the SALT agreement was the subject of
DAALDER: That’s right.

AARON: Maybe a little bit more of this has been made than it deserves because I think at the beginning it looked like we might get the strategic arms agreement significantly before normalization. There was a serious question about that, but Brzezinski felt it was more important to get the China normalization done.

DAALDER: At this point, we will break for a half hour. When we get back, we will proceed with the last 20 years.

(Recess)

DAALDER: While we eat, I have asked Jonathan Howe to start off with the early Reagan administration and Allen Holmes to follow. Hopefully by that time we will have finished the main course, and Susan can talk about Reagan and slowly move into Bush and Clinton after that.

HOWE: I really got into the arms control business when I moved from the office of Frank Carlucci, the deputy secretary of defense, at the behest of Al Haig to be director of PM. Of course, Al Haig knew arms control from the Kissinger period and always had an interest in it.

George Shultz, secretary of state, was a very smart man, but started with very little knowledge of arms control. He was very determined to master the subject and interested in it. Within a month after I arrived, we had the PM Bureau chairing most of the arms control committees that did the basic work.

I can remember many of those meetings being the battle between the two Richards. Richard Perle represented a certain ideology from OSD and, of course, Rick Burt represented a certain ideology from EUR. We were trying to get this all sorted out and the bureaucracy to work together.

In that period, Secretary Shultz certainly spent a lot of time listening to what the JCS concerns were and the issues. He went to the Pentagon with regularity.

ODEEN: Who was the chairman then?

HOWE: The chairman was Crowe.  

---

89 Frank C. Carlucci III was deputy secretary of defense from 1981 to 1982. He later served as national security adviser from 1986 to 1987 and secretary of defense of 1987 to 1989.

90 Richard N. Perle was assistant secretary of defense for international security policy from 1981 to 1987. Richard R. Burt served as the assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs from 1983 to 1985. EUR is the designation used by the Department of State for the Office of European and Canadian Affairs.

91 Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. served as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff from 1985 to 1989.

---

DESTLER: Wasn’t it David Jones?92

DAALDER: Jones was in the beginning.

ODEEN: Jones retired in about 1983.

HOWE: The point is that Shultz knew that he wanted the chiefs’ agreement. It wasn’t that he just needed to have it; he wanted to have their advice and know what their concerns were. Often what we would find in those meetings was the State Department’s position and the JCS position would be closely aligned. The OSD position often differed from the JCS. The NSC staff would try to be very helpful. Ron Lehman, Bob Linhard, and others soldiered relentlessly trying to pull together arms control positions.93 There was a huge array of things going on in every aspect of arms control – the Chemical Weapons Convention, MBFR, strategic arms reduction. You name it. We were studying it and trying to do something about it. Allen [Holmes] would take over from there.

The next time I saw this was when I came back to Washington in 1987 to work for JCS Chairman Crowe, and we started shuttling back and forth to Moscow. Secretary Shultz led the delegation which included Colin Powell from the NSC and a State representative. I was working, representing the chiefs, and trying to help bring these agreements to a sensible conclusion from the standpoint of the U.S. military. Of course, we had good negotiators – Paul Nitze and others – who had gone through the INF negotiations and that whole business.94

DAALDER: I have two questions before we move on to Allen. But to clarify things, the chairman was Vessey.95

First, the role of the NSC began, as I understand it, with an interagency process chaired and led by State and the NSC. What was the role of the NSC in that process in this early going?

92 General David C. Jones served as the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff from 1978 to 1982.


94 The INF Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union was the culmination of nearly a decade of arms control discussion. The Soviets initially refused to negotiate after NATO decided in 1979 to follow a “dual-track” strategy of pursuing arms control while simultaneously deploying ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles in Europe. In the fall of 1980, discussions nevertheless were opened. The United States presented a “zero-zero” option, i.e. it would eliminate its cruise Pershing missiles if the Soviet Union did the same with its intermediate-range weapons. The talks reached an impasse when the Soviets walked out in 1983 but the change of leadership in the Soviet Union in 1985 made new negotiations possible. An agreement was finally signed on December 8, 1987, to eliminate all INF systems within three years after the Treaty entered into force. The agreement would then be enforced by a relatively strict verification regime.

95 General John W. Vessey, Jr. was the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff from 1982 to 1985.
Second, you have Paul Nitze, a rather remarkable negotiator, with a stature quite independent of his position as negotiator. How did that fit into the negotiations? By the time they concluded INF, the most politically charged one and the one in which two Richards were really fighting to a considerable extent. How does that play out from a process perspective?

HOWE: It’s complicated. There was the famous walk in the woods.\(^{96}\) This was shortly after Shultz came in. It was a bit of freelancing unknown by the bureaucracy at that point. Paul kind of brought the agreement back and said, “Here it is.” And then he helped us try to evaluate it and see if it made any sense.

Regarding the NSC, I felt they were allies and helpful facilitators trying to make things work and trying to make the process go from their standpoint.

DESTLER: It was hard to force a decision because the president was not always willing to decide. Is that right?

HOWE: Well, I wasn’t on the NSC itself; I was at the State Department viewing this. Shultz would go and do battle at an NSC meeting on an arms control subject. And Shultz had the lead in terms of the heavy work with the Soviets and he had the support of the whole arms control mechanism. ACDA was also involved.

ODEEN: But the NSC didn’t play a really driving central role.

HOWE: Well, I wouldn’t say that. It was the facilitator.

DAALDER: And the coordinator.

HOWE: I don’t know what you would say, Allen. We have several people here with perspectives on this. They may want to say something. The NSC worked hard at this. Ron Lehman and Linhard backstopped trips – they were not nonentities. And they were doing a lot of behind-the-scenes work. They would come over to the Pentagon. They would talk to us. They would try to pull this thing together in a helpful way.

DAALDER: Susan, do you want to jump in here?

KOCH: Yes. I can’t remember exactly when it was, but it was certainly during the second Reagan administration. I’d say it was about 1986. Bob Linhard, who by then was the senior director for defense policy and arms control, established something called the Arms Control Support Group. It was a very unofficial, very informal grouping of assistant secretary-level people from all the relevant places – OSD, the JCS, State, CIA. It was formed to try and forge consensus on major arms control issues, or, at a minimum, to prepare them in an orderly fashion.

---

\(^{96}\) On July 16, 1982, Paul Nitze, who headed the INF negotiations at the time, took a walk with his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky, in the woods outside of Geneva. The two men informally agreed to limit rather than completely eliminate INF deployments – a position which departed from the “zero-zero” position pursued by the U.S. government. For a description of the “walk in the woods,” see George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), p. 120.
for senior-level decision-making. My memory is that developing this interagency team was critical to things actually happening elsewhere. It made some of the tough decisions that led to the INF treaty and some of the key START I decisions.

HOLMES: Let me try to lay this out. I got to the State Department in the summer of 1985 and was there for four years. Jack Chain had been director of political-military affairs for the year proceeding my arrival and he had succeeded Jon.⁹⁷

Shultz had a meeting with me, after he already had one with Roz Ridgway. He said, “I want you to concentrate on arms control, and I want you to chair the interagency groups at the assistant secretary level. I want the leadership to be in-house.” And then to Roz, he said, “I want you to work on the U.S.-Soviet relationship.”

1984 had been a critical year where Shultz won his battles in the White House. He had direct access to the president, but he didn’t want to overuse that. He had to deal with Cap Weinberger and Bill Casey, and they were absolutely opposed to doing anything.⁹⁸ They even balked at the idea of the first meeting with Gromyko, the big breakthrough meeting in January of 1985.⁹⁹ They didn’t want it to be called a delegation, because that sounded like they were going to negotiate.

I did chair, at that level, these interagency groups with the exception of START. Richard Perle and I did that together, but he traveled a lot and he would leave his ISP [international security policy] staff with very tough instructions. Frank Gaffney would double the toughness.¹⁰⁰ He couldn’t negotiate well while Richard was in Turkey.

I have to admit in a shameless way that I tracked Richard down in the men’s room of the British Embassy one night. We were at the same party and I had a piece of paper, a formulation, in my pocket. And I said, “Richard, your staff says that you won’t buy this.” He looked at it and said, “Oh, this is fine with me.”

When you can deal, you can get things done – even in the men’s room at the British Embassy.

NOLAN: What kind of diplomacy is that?

HOLMES: Ode to a Grecian urinal.

Anyway, by that time, the administration had wanted to have an arms control czar in the

---

⁹⁷ General John T. Chain, Jr. served as assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs from 1984 to 1985.
⁹⁸ Caspar W. Weinberger was secretary of defense from 1981 to 1987. William J. Casey was director of central intelligence from 1981 until his death in 1987.
⁹⁹ At their meeting in January 1985, Shultz and Gromyko reached an agreement to begin negotiations in three areas: intermediate-range nuclear forces (the INF negotiations), strategic arms (START), and space arms.
¹⁰⁰ Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear forces and arms control policy from 1983 to 1987 and was acting assistant secretary of defense for international security policy from 1987 to 1988.
White House. Shultz got Bud McFarlane to agree that was not a good idea.\footnote{Robert C. “Bud” McFarlane was national security adviser from 1983 to 1985. He also served as deputy national security adviser from 1982 to 1983.} That was about October 1984.

DAALDER: Who wanted what?

HOLMES: McFarlane wanted to have arms control thrown out of the White House, out of the NSC.

DAALDER: This was McFarlane’s idea?

HOLMES: Yes, McFarlane’s (and Shultz’s) idea, but I think it was in probably a defensive move. Weinberger and Casey were somewhat in agreement, and Shultz insisted that arms control had to be embedded in the four-part agenda with the Soviets. I can’t remember all of them but one was human rights and another regional issues.\footnote{The agenda included human rights, regional issues, arms control, and bilateral issues.}

He insisted this had to be one. You couldn’t separate out arms control. There had to be a mutually reinforcing process and this should be done out of the State Department. He finally took it to Reagan. And in the meantime, it was Shultz’s idea to have Paul Nitze appointed as special assistant to the president and to the secretary of state for arms control so that he would be the key guru on this.

The idea would be that there was an NSC process going on, but Shultz met every day with Nitze. There was a high-level meeting and Nitze would talk with people as well, and the interagency process took place at a very senior level and in the White House. Then the decisions would be made with Shultz, and I would take them into the NSC process and try to get smaller issues hammered out, instructions written and followed up, and mail answered when it came in from the negotiators.

This was all after the first Gromyko meeting since the Soviet walk-out in 1983. I think it was January of 1985, and Shultz took everybody. Everybody wanted to go. Rowny was very unhappy that he was not going to be in the room since there were twenty people there.\footnote{Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny was the chief negotiator and head of the U.S. delegation for strategic arms reduction negotiations from 1981 to 1985 and special adviser to the president and secretary of state for arms control until 1990.} Shultz got the president to agree that there would be only four people in the room when they met with Gromyko. It was Nitze, our ambassador, and Bud. I can’t remember the exact number. This was before I got there.

By the time I arrived, the pattern had been set and Gromyko was gone. Shevardnadze was the new Soviet foreign minister.\footnote{Eduard Shevardnadze was the foreign minister of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1990.} They had met for the first time, I believe, in Helsinki when they celebrated the ten-year anniversary of the CSCE. Bud McFarlane was about to leave
NSC. He went in December of 1985 and we were off and running. That’s the way it was set up.

Shultz was absolutely insistent that he wanted to be very close to the JCS. He had battles with Cap over his insistence that he, as the secretary of state, was a charter member of the National Security Council and had as much right to have direct and continuous contact with the chiefs as Cap did. And Cap said, “Okay, but I’ll always be there.”

In addition, there were a lot of their little side meetings that were private. What had been the White House family group lunch series – there were four participants: Shultz, Casey, Weinberger, and McFarlane – had developed into a more structured Wednesday breakfast. A lot of business was done at the Wednesday breakfast. The two secretaries (SecDef and SecState), their two deputies, the national security adviser and his deputy, Fred Iklé, and Mike Armacost. Colin Powell and I were the guys who set up the meetings, framed the decisions after they were made at the table, and fanned them back out to the bureaucracy.

DESTLER: These breakfasts covered general policy?

HOLMES: They covered all policy, but concentrated on security/foreign policy and arms control. Usually they were on maybe seven to fourteen issues. They were things that had gone bump in the night and the departments hadn’t been able to straighten them out so they brought them to this breakfast. Some of them were resolved and some weren’t. Those that were not resolved were taken by the NSC adviser to the president. This was every Wednesday and it alternated between the State Department and the Defense Department. Quite a few of those were on arms control issues.

I left something out. After the Gromyko meeting, it was decided that there would be three negotiations. There would be INF. Mike Glitman was going to be our negotiator. START was handled by John Tower. Max Kampelman was to be in charge of all three of them but also do the space negotiations. He would be the resident senior arms control negotiator in Geneva since Paul [Nitze] didn’t want to be away from Washington. Actually George Shultz wanted him to be with him in Washington, because Paul was his tutor and really dug into the issues. Paul was his major tutor and Jim Timbie was also a tutor. And it got to the point where Shultz really mastered the stuff.

---

105 Shultz proposed the “family group” lunch to Weinberger in November 1984, to include Casey and McFarlane as well, to “talk over the big issues” in the old family dining room at the White House. Shultz asked Reagan and suggested he attend once in awhile.

106 The two deputies were William H. Taft, IV, who was deputy secretary of defense from 1984 to 1989, and John C. Whitehead, who served as deputy secretary of state from 1985 to 1989. The national security adviser was Bud McFarlane and his deputy was Donald R. Fortier, who served in that position from 1983 until his death in August 1986. Fred C. Iklé was undersecretary of defense for policy in the Reagan administration. Michael H. Armacost was the undersecretary of state for political affairs from 1984 to 1989.

107 Maynard W. “Mike” Glitman led the INF negotiating team; former Senator John G. Tower headed the strategic arms reduction treaty (START) effort; and Max M. Kampelman served as head of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

108 James P. Timbie was a career government technical expert and adviser on arms control issues. During the Reagan administration, he provided advice to the State Department.
It was the same way in the NSC. By that time, Colin Powell had gone briefly to command a corps in West Germany but was brought back to Washington dragging his feet, because Frank Carlucci said he’d take the job as national security adviser only if Colin would be his deputy. Thanks to Bob Linhard’s schooling, Colin got really proficient. He was on top of this stuff. He understood the intricacies of the various formulas and tradeoff systems and the implications for policy.

And so the negotiations continued. Then at a certain point, we hit a plateau. There was no progress. And so periodically Shultz would gather together the interagency group and everybody was included. He didn’t want anybody outside. Ken Adelman was there. He had early on blotted his copy book with a piece that he had published called something like “Arms Control Without Agreements.”

DAALDER: It was in *Foreign Affairs*.

HOLMES: Right, *Foreign Affairs*. And Shultz was livid and he took him to task on it and said, “This is outrageous that you would put something out this important without checking with the rest of us.” And so Shultz learned something from that. He said, “Well, I’d better have Ken working on the inside.” So Ken would come on these trips as well.

The entire interagency group would go. Typically we would fly to Helsinki. Once in a while we went to Geneva; we generally went to Moscow. Why to Helsinki? Rest, have a strategy session in the bubble room, and fly into Moscow the next day. Then we’d be there for about 48 hours with everybody working like hell. We’d start out with a general meeting with Shevardnadze and Shultz chairing. Then we would break up into working groups. I would volunteer for the ones that had made the least progress, namely chemical weapons and nuclear testing. Ken sometimes would join on the nuclear testing. We would meet with our Soviet counterparts. We’d work all night to try to move the process forward, and then the next day we would report like kids in school to the two foreign ministers on what we had accomplished.

That was an extremely interesting process. And I’ll tell you one anecdote, because I think it’s instructive. When we’re learning diplomacy, we try to learn listening skills, right? You have to listen to what the other guy is saying. And my Soviet counterpart was really pushing a proposal that we had made the year before on very rapid, short-fuse, surprise inspections on chemical works anywhere in the Soviet Union.

Well, I didn’t believe it, and so I was a little unsure. I was behaving like an old cold war warrior, and I just wasn’t buying this. When we went before Shultz and Shevardnadze, Shultz was also very skeptical. He turned to Shevardnadze and said, “Do you mean to say that if we think that there’s a lab in the Kremlin we can come in and inspect it?” And the chairman said, “Absolutely.”

---

109 Kenneth L. Adelman was director of ACDA from 1983 to 1987.

That summer Shevardnadze had an arms control symposium in Moscow which included just Soviet diplomats, military, politicians, think tank people, and so forth. He had the proceedings translated and sent the transcript to all of us. I read the part on chemical warfare where he talked about this barbaric weapon which had brought dishonor on the reputation of the Russian people. I thought to myself, maybe we weren’t listening. They seemed to mean it. And sure enough, at the next session in Moscow they really did mean it. At that point, we made some progress.

DAALDER: That was the time when Richard Perle vetoed the notion of “anytime-anywhere challenge inspections.”

HARRIS: It was Richard Perle’s idea.

DAALDER: But he said no.

HOLMES: The other thing that was interesting is that Shultz never went on one of these trips without first having breakfast with the chiefs. He wanted me to have a general officer as a deputy, who later retired and became head of ACDA. Bill Burns had been the JCS rep with Nitze in the walk in the woods in the earlier phase of INF negotiations.¹¹¹

But Shultz went over absolutely everything with the chiefs to make sure that there was no misunderstanding. After those things had been aired, they might be a little uncomfortable about what might come up, like zero option, and probably some of the smaller systems. Shultz would say, “Don’t worry. I won’t accept it until I check with you.” And he was always good to his word.

So through that connection and Bill Burns’ connection at the general officer level, we were very tight with the JCS. That was something that was absolutely insisted on.

DESTLER: This was always in Weinberger’s presence?

HOLMES: Always. He was always there, and the meeting was in the tank.¹¹²

DAALDER: Bill Crowe was chairman then.

HOLMES: Yes, Bill Crowe was chairman, and Bob Herres was the vice chairman.¹¹³ He was the only guy there that knew a lot about space systems. He’d after all been at Space Command at Cheyenne Mountain.¹¹⁴ He frequently had very good suggestions and reminded people around the table of some of the realities. He made a distinct contribution. And then, of course, Bill

---

¹¹¹ Major General William F. Burns was director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1988 to 1989.
¹¹² The “tank” is the popular term used to describe the conference room used by the joint chiefs of staff.
¹¹³ General Robert T. Herres was the vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff from 1987 to 1990.
¹¹⁴ Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, is the location of the North American Aerospace Defense Command.
Crowe had his relationship with Marshal Akhromeyev. Whenever Akhromeyev came, Shultz would privately send a note and say we can make progress today because Akhromeyev’s here. It was sort of a mirror image of his connection with the chiefs.

GARTHOFF: When did Shultz begin to recognize that Akhromeyev’s presence was really important?

HOLMES: I would say probably about 1987.

GARTHOFF: After Reykjavik.

HOLMES: Yeah, after Reykjavik.

HOWE: The Crowe connection didn’t start till late 1987.

HOLMES: Yeah, that was a little bit later.

DESTLER: This situation is now one where Shultz is basically leading a State-driven process. The State-driven process then tries to win support and cooperation in the NSC.

HOLMES: Absolutely. That’s why the premise of your first question was a little bit off. It is right for Vance but definitely doesn’t apply in my view to the Shultz formula.

DAALDER: Carlucci recounted to us at a different roundtable we held that the first thing he had to do when he became national security adviser was to sit down Cap and Shultz in front of the president and say, “Okay, Cap, what do you think on X?” And this was on the whole gamut of arms control issues. “Cap, what do you think on this issue?” And, “Shultz, what do you think of this issue?” Then, “Mr. President, I think this. What do you decide?” And the president would say, “Well, Frank, that sounds about right.”

But there was a change when you move to the new regime – the post-Oliver North National Security Council regime. Actually, the national security adviser becomes an honest broker again in a way that wasn’t really possible when there was a very different emphasis. Is that accurate?

HOLMES: Well, that’s partly true. Except that at a certain point, Frank – in terms of the

---

115 Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, senior deputy to Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, replaced him as Soviet chief of the general staff in 1984.


117 Lt. Colonel Oliver L. North was a director for political-military affairs on the National Security Council from 1981 to 1986. During the investigation of the Iran-Contra affair in which Oliver North played a primary role, the NSC came under intense scrutiny, especially for having become overly operational. President Reagan appointed a Special Review Board – the Tower Commission – to examine the NSC, its operation, and its staff. The Commission concluded that the focus of the NSC adviser and staff should be to manage the national security process and advise the president on it but not to implement and execute policy.
structure of the system – decided to have a look at whether or not the chairmanship of the arms control, the policy formulation, shouldn’t be geared toward the NSC. And he looked very hard at it, talked to a lot of people about it, and in the final analysis decided not to do it. He kind of left it the way it was.

DESTLER: Sort of a “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it?”

HOLMES: He was a very successful player in terms of asserting himself more forcefully as the NSC adviser in the process of policy planning.

DAALDER: And he traveled with Shultz.

ODEEN: That’s right. They were close friends. They were very, very close beforehand.

NOLAN: Two questions. One is how much is the secretary of state’s role here a derivative of the relative weakness at different times in the NSC?

Second, what did Shultz’s special relationship with Nitze do generally in the bureaucracy? I noticed a lot of looking over, trying to make sure that Nitze didn’t get anywhere. He did anyway, but I remember a lot of concern about what Nitze might do.

HOLMES: Yeah, there was a lot of concern. And you’re right. Shultz had his agenda. He had a personal relationship with the president. He felt he understood better than others what the president wanted to do.

He knew, for example, that as governor of California, Reagan had visited Space Command at Cheyenne Mountain. He said to the general officer in charge, “You say this is a very strong structure here. What would happen if an SS-18 landed a few miles away?” And the officer replied, “We would be blown away.” And then Reagan said, “Well, so much for mutual assured destruction. It really is MAD.”

So Reagan had this very strong view that he wanted to do away with offensive nuclear weapons. It was Shultz who had to remind him, “We’re going to do SDI, but we’ve got to have a few weapons, Mr. President.”

There was that type of discussion, but Shultz had this game plan to get control of this. I think you’re right that it was not a strong NSC at the top in the early years. It was not that difficult for Shultz at that point to lead relative to somebody that might have been in the job at that time.

On the Nitze thing. Yeah, they were really on the jungle tom-toms about Nitze. “You have to watch this guy. He gives things away. He takes walks in the woods.” And so forth. It was mostly Rowny. Rowny was very tough and was included in the visits to Moscow. But there was some resentment. I think people who knew him didn’t feel that way. When the issue came down to figuring out something seemingly minute but extremely important, there was a feeling in the community that this would turn out okay if Bob Linhard and Jim Timbie were working on
it together.

GARTHOFF: Allen, you mentioned before Shultz’s particular interest in having Nitze involved. Wasn’t Ed Rowny’s appointment as an adviser really a sop to him when he was also being relieved from his negotiating position but still had influence?

HOLMES: Yes, he did. He was very upset at the beginning, but then he joined in and would make good points and contribute to the dialogue. He could have influence because of Shultz having respect for him and welcoming his contributions to substance.

AARON: What kind of preparations were there for Reykjavik in 1986? You had some freewheelers, and this whole system you describe doesn’t seem to have any place for getting any sort of centralized analytical work done. You’ve got different actors doing it, and then it sounds like a mainly political process beyond that.

HOLMES: I won’t try to resurrect Reykjavik, because, one, I wasn’t there, and Reykjavik for me is a bit of a blank although I remember the outcome. Preparations for Reykjavik were done in a very close hold, in a very small group. Then there were the surprises we all know about. I can’t really give you anything that’s worth reporting upon more than that.

DAALDER: It suggests that there wasn’t a structure or a process, unlike what you had in the 1970s. You had a verification committee and its successor that would do all the analytical work so that there was very little that could be surprising. The structure that existed was a negotiating structure rather than an analytical structure. Is that fair?

HOLMES: Well, there was obviously analysis taking place, but it wasn’t as formal or structured as it had been in the past.

HOWE: I don’t know the inside Reykjavik story.

DESTLER: Well, after the fact Crowe was clearly unhappy with it and made his feelings known about what happened.

HOLMES: A lot of the analytical work was done by a very small group with Nitze, Timbie, Bob Linhard, and ISP to some degree.118

After Richard [Perle] left, Frank Gaffney was acting assistant secretary of defense for a very long time, and it didn’t work very well. Frank was kind of fighting old battles.

DAALDER: Was Perle at Reykjavik?

KOC: Yes, Perle was there.

DAALDER: I think that’s a great review. We can start moving into the 1990s with Bush and on

118 ISP is the designation within the Department of Defense for the Office of International Security Policy.
toward the Clinton administration. Jonathan, do you want to say anything about the last year of
the Bush administration? Susan, you may be able to add in here?

The Bush administration was an interesting time for arms control. In fact, I think one of
the great contributions of the administration was the September 1991 unilateral initiative.\(^\text{119}\) Can
you shed light on where that came from? It was quite an extraordinary initiative, but it was also
well-coordinated, though perhaps at only a very high level.

KOCH: I actually can’t shed that much light on that initiative because I was in ACDA at the
time.

If you don’t mind, I’d like to back up just a little bit and talk about the continuity between
the Reagan and early Bush administration, because the early Bush administration definitely took
advantage of and built on the Shultz/Shevardnadze tie. Admiral Howe, please correct my
memory if I’m wrong, but the Baker/Shevardnadze tie was established very early and was
absolutely critical.\(^\text{120}\) It reached its high point in START II. By then, Shevardnadze was gone,
but the START II negotiators were Baker, while he was secretary of state, and Kozyrev.\(^\text{121}\) And
then at the end of 1992, it was Eagleburger as the acting secretary of state with an interagency
group supporting him.\(^\text{122}\) That was, I would say, the apotheosis of the informal channel.

The Bush administration had something called the “ungroup,” which Arnie Kanter
founded.\(^\text{123}\) Arnie would chair the interagency working groups. At the time I believe it was
called the Policy Coordinating Committee. PCC was the official name. Again, it was an
assistant secretary-level group. Their meetings would be very large, very unwieldy and were
given up fairly early on in favor of the aptly named ungroup, which did not exist officially. That
was by and large the same people throughout the Bush administration.

HOWE: Arnie Kanter was in charge of it, right?

KOCH: Arnie Kanter was chair, and then when Arnie went, it was John Gordon.\(^\text{124}\)

HOWE: John Gordon was his deputy?

KOCH: Yes, and John took over when Arnie went to State.

\(^{119}\) The 1991 initiative was a statement by President Bush on unilateral measures to reduce the levels of nuclear
weapons and lower the alert status of others remaining. For more information, see below.

\(^{120}\) James A. Baker, III was secretary of state from 1989 to 1992.

\(^{121}\) Andrei V. Kozyrev was the Russian foreign minister from 1990 to 1996.

\(^{122}\) Lawrence S. Eagleburger was the acting secretary of state from August 23, 1992, until his confirmation on

\(^{123}\) Arnold Kanter was special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and arms control on

\(^{124}\) John A. Gordon was director for defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council during the
Bush administration.
ODEEN: John was the chairman’s assistant?

KOCH: No, he was NSC staff.

HOWE: He worked for us.

KOCH: The assistant to the chairman was successively Howie Graves, Shali, and Barry McCaffrey. The director of the arms control intelligence staff was Doug MacEachin; the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security was Reg Bartholomew.

DAALDER: And Wisner.

KOCH: Oh, that’s right. Wisner was there in the last six months of 1992. It was a group that really was a team.

DAALDER: And Steve Hadley.

KOCH: Yes, and Steve Hadley. Thank you. That’s right. And the director of ACDA. I forgot my two bosses in the process. The director of ACDA, Ron Lehman. It was truly a team that worked together enormously well. That also was the de facto staff, that included with the somewhat important presence of Dennis Ross, for Baker in his ministerial meetings.

And in my view at least, that was the group that got START II done. Jon [Howe] would have a more senior-level appreciation of it, but it really was a consensus group.

DAALDER: Was Arnie a member when he went over to State?

KOCH: No. He no longer had arms control in his portfolio as undersecretary for political affairs. Also, that group was able to build on all the ten years of hard work that had gone into START I and benefit from the euphoria of the very first days of an independent Russia.

The presidential nuclear initiatives, as I understood it, arose primarily within the Defense Department, where they wanted to make reductions and thought that the time was right to do them in a less formal manner. It was worked in a quite small group.

---

125 General Howard D. Graves served the assistant to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff from 1989 to 1991; General John M. Shalikashvili (“Shali”) held that position from 1991 to 1992; and General Barry R. McCaffrey was the assistant from 1992 to 1994.

126 Douglas J. MacEachin was the special assistant to the director of central intelligence for arms control from 1989 to 1993. Reginald Bartholomew was undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs from 1989 to 1992.

127 Steven Hadley served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1989 to 1993.

128 Dennis Ross was director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council from 1986 to 1988 and director of policy planning at the Department of State from 1989 to 1992.

129 Russia became independent on December 25, 1991. START I was signed on July 31, 1991.
First, the September initiatives and then the second presidential nuclear initiative in January 1992. For a sense of where things were with the Soviet Union in September of 1991 and what I was directly involved in, I can recall that the president announced the first presidential nuclear initiative on September 27, 1991. A group of us – a standard interagency group – went to Moscow arriving there on the 5th of October. Our task was to explain the presidential nuclear initiatives and persuade the Soviets to do something comparable. Three hours after we landed, Gorbachev went on Soviet television to announce his reply to the presidential nuclear initiatives. We were extraordinarily effective – we hadn’t met with anybody! Things were moving just so quickly. It was such a responsive relationship with the Soviet government for some very specific reasons that probably will not be repeatable in history.

DAALDER: But the “ungroup” did more than START. It did the Chemical Weapons Convention and a lot of other agreements.

KOCH: Oh, yeah, the CFE, Open Skies, CWC. The whole gamut of arms control.

DAALDER: Jonathan, do you want to add anything?

HOWE: I don’t have a lot to add because there’s a big gap of time here when I was happily

---


131 Mikhail S. Gorbachev was the Soviet president from 1985 to 1991. Gorbachev unilaterally announced that the Soviet Union would destroy all nuclear artillery ammunition, mines, and nuclear warheads of tactical nuclear missiles; remove all nuclear weapons from ships and multi-purpose submarines; remove strategic bombers from standby alert and place their nuclear weapons in depot storage; remove 503 ICBMs from alert status; reduce Soviet armed forces by 700,000; and suspend nuclear tests for one year. See Fred Hiatt, “Gorbachev Pledges Wide-Ranging Nuclear Cuts,” Washington Post, October 6, 1991, p. 1.

132 Under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, formal negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention began in 1984. A “rolling text” developed in the course of the talks was used as the basis for the treaty text. The CD accepted the text on September 3, 1992, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction was opened for signature on January 13, 1993.

133 A Treaty on Open Skies, a concept originally proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955, was proposed anew by President Bush in a speech on May 12, 1989. The end of the cold war and negotiations beginning in 1990 in Ottawa paved the way for the treaty’s signature in Helsinki on March 24, 1992. The treaty itself allows for reciprocal observation overflights of security installations.
doing something outside Washington. I saw the very beginning when we were starting to think of things that could be done in arms control. I was representing the chairman. Then I was out of there. When I came back to Washington, the Bush administration was in its final year.

DAALDER: There was START II. But then that brings us closer to the present. John Holum, Elisa, Mort, Susan, all of you have been participants in the Clinton administration.

HOLUM: Well, I’ve been listening with fascination to the history, and I’d just as soon keep doing that.

DAALDER: But there’s a lot of history in the last seven years.

HOLUM: One of the things that struck me when I came into the government – this is a fairly personal perspective – was that a whole range of initiatives had been undertaken during the first year of the administration.

I came in at the end of the first year, so I’m not qualified particularly to speak about them. Lynn Davis had been appointed undersecretary of state for international security with the promise, as I understand it, that ACDA would be abolished and she would be in charge of all the arms control processes. And there was a review prior to the election on foreign policy organization that had recommended merging ACDA back into State.

DAALDER: Just for the record, it was a report written by Mort [Halperin] and Mac Destler that proposed it.

HALPERIN: And it was right then and it is right now.

HOLUM: After this three-way negotiation between State, NSC, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I was brought in with the assignment to revitalize ACDA. But a lot of the process had been established already. A lot of the process, from what I’m hearing, was the way things had operated for a long period of time.

In addition to that, we had a CTBT effort getting underway. We were already working on the NPT review conference for 1995. We saw that as a major issue. The CWC ratification effort was getting underway. We were dealing with the land mines initiative. We were

---

134 Lynn E. Davis served as the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs from 1993 to 1997.


136 The CTBT was negotiated in Geneva between January 1994 and August 1996.

137 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. The NPT provided for reviews at five year intervals and after twenty-five years, parties to the agreement would have to decide whether or not to extend the agreement indefinitely. The NPT Review and Extension Conference was held in April-May 1995 where the decision was made to indefinitely extend the NPT’s duration.

138 President Clinton proposed the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land mines in his 1994 address to the UN
pursuing a ban on fissile material cutoff.\textsuperscript{139} We were gradually taking support of a BWC compliance protocol.

We had several initiatives underway with Russia to implement the Wyoming MOU on chemical weapons and the trilateral process on biological weapons that grew out of Russia’s 1992 admission that they had a BW program.\textsuperscript{140} We were trying to strengthen IAEA safeguards.\textsuperscript{141} We were working on demarcation and succession on the ABM treaty.

So there was this huge pattern of initiatives underway. And I think it operated quite effectively with a process which the NSC basically chaired. But in both arms control and nonproliferation with the increasing complexity of the relationship with Russia and more issues being added, plus the fact that we were implementing a lot of arms control agreements – INF, START I, CFE, etc. – meant that we had thousands of issues in arms control, managed largely at the assistant director/assistant secretary level.

It was very rare that issues could be elevated to the deputies or principals at any level. So the process throughout this period really has been fairly inclusive. Who had the lead in terms of negotiations depended on who had it when I came into the administration. It was already established, except that ACDA managed certain institutions and pursued the comprehensive test ban and fissile material cutoff in the Conference on Disarmament.

I’m not quite sure – Elisa may be able to shed light on this – why I ended up working on the Wyoming MOU and Lynn dealt with the trilateral process. They were both equally nonproductive.

HARRIS: Somebody had to do it.

HOLUM: We sort of divided up the areas of responsibility based on who was doing it and where

\textsuperscript{139} The fissile material cutoff is an attempt to limit the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

\textsuperscript{140} The Memorandum of Understanding signed in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State James Baker on September 23, 1989, provided for bilateral verification and data exchange in order to more effectively implement the CWC.

\textsuperscript{141} The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up in 1957 in Vienna. Its purpose is to facilitate cooperation in the nuclear field and to implement on-site inspections and other means of verifying compliance with various agreements. Collectively these measures are known as “safeguards.”
the institutional connections were. But let me stop there and invite others to comment on it. We could go through how the individual processes were managed later.

I’d like to comment on one other institutional innovation that I found very impressive, and that was the various Gore/Chernomyrdin, Gore/Kiryenko commissions. In all of these realms that started with implementation – the Wyoming MOU, CTBT, or the zero-yield decision – we would have several days of meetings in which Gore and his counterpart would sit in these long sessions listening to the various commissions report. We weren’t part of that, but we used those one-on-ones with his counterpart to pursue the arms control agenda, and that became a dominant part of their bilateral discussions. It was a fascinating process because Gore and his counterpart would meet and he would go through the various points and get a response. Leon Fuerth would give us a readout at midnight or whenever the meeting would finish. We’d sit up and write talking points all night and Gore would go back the next morning for breakfast. It was an unusual circumstance where you could have three rounds of prime minister-level engagement with the other side and have a chance to reconvene. I don’t know if that’s ever been duplicated, except maybe at Reykjavik.

DAALDER: One of the clear innovations of the Clinton administration was to separate arms control and nonproliferation. It does that at the NSC and the State Department and it did it initially at the Defense Department and ACDA. Elisa, perhaps you can comment on this.

HARRIS: In fact, I was going to start off by talking about that. At the beginning of the Clinton administration a decision was made by Tony Lake that there should be a separate office to deal with weapons proliferation. Given the end of the cold war, the dominant threat to the United States clearly was not the nuclear or chemical weapons or whatever residual biological capability in Russia. It was rather proliferation, including the leakage of capabilities, both technical and human, from the former Soviet Union to countries of proliferation concern. And so at the NSC, a new office for nonproliferation and export controls was set up, in which I was one of the original people.

In setting up that office, they obviously had to make some decisions as to what was nonproliferation and what was arms control. It was kind of a false question, but they nevertheless made those decisions. Bob Bell, who was responsible for the arms control and defense directorate, which Susan was part of in the Bush administration, picked up all the strategic nuclear issues, ABM, and conventional forces. What else?

DAALDER: Nuclear testing.

---

142 In 1993 Vice President Al Gore established the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Commission to discuss a range of foreign policy issues with his Russian counterpart, the prime minister. The initial contact was Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and later Prime Minister Sergei Kiryenko.

143 Leon Fuerth has been the national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore since 1993.

144 Anthony Lake was national security adviser from 1993 to 1997.

145 Robert G. Bell was senior director for arms control and defense policy on the National Security Council from 1993 to 1999.
HARRIS: Yes, nuclear testing. And the nonproliferation office got what some might consider the dogs and cats – chemical weapons, biological weapons, missiles, export controls, nonproliferation regimes like MTCR, etc.\textsuperscript{146}

DAALDER: And external arms transfers.

HARRIS: That was another one.

Maybe this was done in part because Tony Lake had been on the Kissinger NSC staff – I don’t know – but we began in 1993 by launching a series of policy reviews. They were done in Bob Bell’s shop across the nuclear arena, and it was done in our shop on the full range of so-called nonproliferation issues that we were responsible for. I can’t speak about the nuclear reviews because I had no role in them, but I was very much involved in the nonproliferation policy review that preceded John’s arrival at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The three areas that I was involved in were missiles, chemical weapons, and biological weapons. We tried to ask some basic questions. For example, is there something beyond the Missile Technology Control Regime that we could be looking at to deal with the rolling threat of missile capabilities in the third world? The immediate response back from the bureaucracy was “no.” The nonproliferation mafia at the State Department had spoken.

HOLUM: ACDA was for it.

HARRIS: But ACDA wasn’t a strong voice. The nonproliferation mafia throughout the interagency immediately reared up including the Department of Defense, which had no interest in looking at any sort of regime that could in any way impact their own system, and we got a resounding “nyet” from the bureaucracy.

On the chemical side, as John mentioned, our task largely was to move forward and finish the work that had been done by our predecessor by ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was a fairly non-controversial issue within the administration. It was not as popular on the Hill and it took us longer than we originally thought would be the case.\textsuperscript{147}

DESTLER: We noticed that.

HARRIS: But we got it done as compared to some other very important nonproliferation treaties in recent years. As John mentioned, on the Wyoming MOU and the trilateral BW process we made some progress, but there was more or less a consensus within the bureaucracy as to the need to implement the Wyoming MOU and to deal as best we could with the BW concerns that we had with respect to Russia.

\textsuperscript{146} The Multilateral Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was a Group of Seven (G-7) initiative announced in April 1987. It originally focused on nuclear capable missiles. The definition of missile technology was expanded in 1993 to include delivery systems for chemical and biological weapons and the number of countries adhering to the MTCR also increased.

\textsuperscript{147} The Chemical Weapons Convention was ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997.
Biological weapons, the BWC specifically, was the most controversial issue. At least in the policy review we undertook in 1993 – PDD-13 – what to do about biological weapons was the single most controversial issue.\textsuperscript{148} There were more contentious interagency debates over that question than any other part of PDD-13.

The policy of our predecessors from the Reagan and Bush administrations had been that the BWC was unverifiable, and, therefore, nothing should be done to try and strengthen this agreement. Otherwise we would create a false sense of confidence within the U.S. government, within the Defense Department, or on the part of the American people about the threat posed by these weapons.

President Clinton had a different view, and so did Tony. Their view was that biological weapons were proliferating. Most of the countries that have these programs are parties to the Biological Weapons Convention – a treaty that was negotiated under the Nixon administration but had no verification regime. They wanted to do something in this area. What ultimately emerged from a very difficult interagency process was the idea not to try to verify or adopt verification provisions for this convention. Rather it was a much more modest objective of trying to increase transparency at facilities with respect to activities that could be misdirected for BW purposes.

And this was enormously controversial. Every agency throughout the U.S. government opposed this change in policy. We ultimately were successful in pushing it through with the president’s support and Tony Lake’s support. But as a consequence of that resistance, we have had enormous difficulties in implementing the policy decision that was made in 1993.

One of the points I wanted to make is that when there is a fair degree of unanimity within the U.S. government as to a policy objective, implementation is difficult. The NSC role would be much more of an oversight role, as opposed to an activist role. But when you have a situation in which there is virtually no advocate for a policy except for the individual who happens to occupy the Oval Office, then the challenge of getting that initial policy decision translated into the right set of decisions and negotiating positions that will ultimately lead to a successful end result is really very difficult.

We have tried to utilize many of the same mechanisms that others have mentioned over the last couple of hours. We had the CAL lunches – Christopher, Aspin, Lake – where we would put issues such as BWC or other arms control issues on the agenda.\textsuperscript{149} It would get the principals focused. And that was eventually replaced by the ABC – Albright, Berger, Cohen.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{148} Presidential Decision Directive-13 laid out the Clinton administration policies on nonproliferation and export controls.

\textsuperscript{149} Warren Christopher served as secretary of state from 1993 to 1997. Les Aspin was secretary of defense from 1993 to 1994.

\textsuperscript{150} Madeleine K. Albright became the secretary of state in 1997. Samuel “Sandy” R. Berger has served as the national security adviser since 1997, and William S. Cohen also has served as the secretary of defense since 1997.
We’ve used that mechanism of the three key principals often. More recently, we have borrowed the support group of the Reagan administration and the ungroup of the Bush administration to try and put together a different group of senior-level officials. John Holum is the co-chair together with Gary Samore, with whom I work. The idea is to try and use this senior group to break through some of the bureaucratic resistance to moving forward on BWC protocol questions.

Although we’ve used some of the same mechanisms, a combination of bureaucratic resistance, and, to be very frank, a certain amount of indifference at more senior levels in the agencies has underscored to me after seven-plus years, that having the president’s support for a major policy goal is not necessarily enough to get the job done.

HOLUM: On the BWC, let me just add a point. Maybe David will have the same one. There are new players in the interagency process when you get into chemical and biological weapons. There are not just security implications. They don’t just impinge on defense; they impinge on industry. So for the first time we’ve had the Commerce Department as a major player in that interagency process.

KOCH: And American industry.

HOLUM: And industry played a direct role. The Chemical Weapons Convention wouldn’t have been ratified without industry support and so we all listen carefully to what the biotech industry says. The biotech industry, unfortunately unlike the chemical industry, is hands-off this process.

I’d also add that what we’re trying to find out now is whether the international community is ready to deal with this issue or whether it’s going to be captive to the interests of the nonaligned and making nonproliferation a bargain for more exports. It’s easy to do for exports controls. So that’s really a huge contention.

HALPERIN: I want to make a few observations about the process at the beginning of the Clinton administration, but I should make it clear that I was an observer of that process, not a participant in it. And if you think it’s frustrating to observe the process from outside the government, I can tell you it’s even more frustrating from inside the government.

I think three very consequential policy process decisions were made early in the administration. The first was in the PRD process to confuse insistence on options with inviting agencies to report differences. And the PRDs always said, if there are agency differences, we want to know about them. Anybody that knows anything about the bureaucracy knows that reminds people to hide their differences. So the PRDs consistently produced documents – not only on arms control but on everything else – in which everybody agreed about everything. You’d end up with very long presidential decision memoranda, which were like the documents of the Eisenhower administration. They had a paragraph in them for everybody. Everybody concurred in them because there was at least a paragraph they could point out to justify their

151 Gary S. Samore has served as the senior director for nonproliferation and export control on the National Security Council since 1996.
programs. There were never any choices or issues. And it prevented the administration, not only on arms control but I think more generally, from making choices about issues.

Second was the decision of the NSC and the State Department to cede the nuclear issue to the Pentagon so that the Nuclear Policy Review was done in effect in the Pentagon. I think Lynn Davis made some kind of a deal with the Pentagon that they would show it to her before it appeared in the *New York Times*, but basically the NSC, for reasons that I never understood, sort of gave up completely on that process.

The third thing was the decision within the Pentagon to confuse participation with lowest common denominator. The procedure was not such that the military and civilian side would all get a fair shake. We’d make the sure the secretary of defense and ultimately the president understood everybody’s views, but basically nothing would go forward in any serious way unless everybody agreed to it.

I think the consequence of those three decisions was a failure of the administration to consider whether additional fundamental changes in our nuclear policy and nuclear strategy should be made. In fact, there has been in my view a gradual retreat from the Bush policy. Certainly in terms of NATO policy, it was a clear retreat from it.

And it never got engaged. It still really has not gotten engaged. There are debates now about what to do in START and national missile defense and so on. But the question of whether the collapse of the Soviet Union is permanent can now be accepted as a permanent change. Those of you who go to Berlin will notice that there are not Soviet troops around. But we continue to have the nuclear policy, which was adopted when the Russians surrounded Berlin. There’s a substantive issue as to whether that’s right or not, but in fact, for the last seven years this administration has never had a serious debate on the question. And I think it stems from these three policy processes.

DAALDER: Janne is the person who wrote a book about this.152

NOLAN: I was there and wrote a book. It was totally objective.

I was on the transition team doing some of the work on organizational issues. The question came up about what to do about enhancing the role of nonproliferation issues in the bureaucracy, and in the White House in particular. John was very much part of this. The debate went back and forth on how to enhance the profile of nonproliferation but not the willingness to make it the top priority.

In this administration it’s as close as it’s gotten to the top of the list. The nonproliferation policy of every administration until then was sort of the lesser preoccupation of lesser mortals. And I know because I worked on conventional arms proliferation, which was at the bottom of the food chain. But they elevated it to the point where it actually was being considered to be a center

piece. And a lot of discussion about whether we can have an office of nonproliferation and one for arms control. Of course, we’d have to call it counterproliferation instead of nonproliferation. In the end, on the decision to split the offices, there was a lot of debate about marginalizing the nonproliferation agenda and preserving that separation between the hard-core defense issues from what those other people believed.

So to the extent that there is any validity to the notion of organizational flaw by design, problems arose from that. It was a very definite political conception and I don’t know whether it would have worked if it had been done the other way. But there are very practical, banal reasons for the way it was put together.

The notion of a nuclear posture is something I find endlessly fascinating as a metaphor for American politics. It’s surprising – I mean, it was notable – the absence not just of the State Department or – actually Bob Bell had a similar agreement that he would have to know about before it was leaked to the New York Times.

The absence of the president throughout this process and afterward was significant. Ratification of a process and conclusions that never involved any kind of presidential authority was a pattern repeated again and again. Bob Bell was involved with the diplomacy for the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. His involvement was useful for forcing out the issue of whether nuclear weapons had utility against chemical and biological threats. Bob Bell, I think, ended up being the guy who tried to say, “We’ll sign the protocol, but we won’t necessarily observe it if there’s a crisis involved.”

HARRIS: Could I pick up on the point of presidential control?

I think this is conventional wisdom, but it’s probably worth making sure we don’t forget it. It’s definitely the case that certainly in the first Clinton administration there was a desire on the part of Tony and Sandy, perhaps reflecting the president’s own views about foreign policy issues, to look at all of the issues and present to the president consensus views. They wanted to avoid having the president make the tough decisions, especially when those decisions involved DoD. As a consequence, we either had lowest common denominator decisions or issues that went unresolved for an enormous period of time. I saw this directly in connection with Chemical Weapons Convention ratification. One of the things our predecessors left us with was an open question as to what we could do with riot control agents which under the Chemical Weapons Convention were prohibited as a method of warfare.

We went through a nine- to twelve-month excruciating interagency debate as to whether or not, as a consequence of ratifying this treaty, the United States military would have to forgo certain uses of riot control agents that had been agreed in 1975 in connection with our ratification

---

153 The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty of 1996 established an area in Africa in which states have declared their intention not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, not to in any way help others to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, and not to test nuclear weapons on their soil. The United States is a signatory (but not a ratifier) of Protocols I and II to the treaty, which state, respectively, that it will not threaten signatories of the African NWFZ with nuclear weapons or test nuclear weapons on their soil.
We were able to resolve the issue with direct intervention from Tony Lake and Shali.

But there was just a real reluctance to push the issue to the president. At least it seemed so from where I sat, writing memos that never got any boxes checked. There was a real reluctance to push the issue to the president and have him make this tough decision, even though the NSC staff, supported by all the interagency lawyers except for those in the Pentagon, believed that we did have to forgo certain uses of riot control agents.

NOLAN: This reluctance was entrenched across the boards.

AARON: Let me give you some views. How well-founded they are, I can’t say. My involvement with the NSC has been more peripheral this time around, but I was involved particularly on the nonproliferation side on a very specific issue, which was the issue of encryption and the effort to control spread of cryptography around the world. I’ve seen it also in some of the conventional weapons issues and other areas.

I would say, first of all, the president’s role is absolutely central whenever you talk about the NSC. In this particular case, you cannot underestimate the president’s sense of vulnerability on military issues. And I think the reason he doesn’t take on the Pentagon is that he does not want to have the argument about whether he dodged the draft. It’s as simple as that. I think there’s a very serious concern about that.

Second, I think the president’s focus of interest has not been on international security matters, even if he supported one issue after another. His real heart lies elsewhere. I think almost anyone else would say that. I came out of a different tradition – the Kissinger/Brzezinski tradition. You basically tried to get options, rip the bureaucracy apart, get down there and find out what the issues are, and yank out the options. You let the very senior people worry about building a consensus. But this NSC process is building consensus right from the beginning, and I think that instead of getting after the real issues and getting out the options it sits there and waits for others.

I had never seen before a NSC where consensus building starts right at the very bottom, right at the first working groups, and you’re trying to build consensus all the way. That seems to be the Clinton administration’s style across the board. It seems peculiar to me, because I know, and others who have dealt with the president more directly than I have know, that he’s a policy wonk. He loves to talk about policy. He likes to get into what the issues are, and yet he hasn’t enlisted the NSC side or the NEC [National Economic Council] side, the economic side, for that matter in that same kind of process.

I think the third point is, as John mentioned, that industry now plays an incredibly large role. In my previous service, you never heard about industry in the NSC. I think it’s not just the change in the issues, although that’s obviously important. You can’t deal with a controversial

---

154 The Geneva Protocol of 1925, or Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, was ratified by the United States on April 10, 1975.
matter now without dealing with industry if it has any conceivable interest. That’s just not possible.

I understand we couldn’t have done the verification part of a chemical weapons agreement without industry’s input and recommendations. But even beyond that, there is this outreach mentality that stems from the consensus mentality, which says to touch every button out there. Before you make any decision, you have to know what the politics are. And that makes for a very difficult NSC process.

DAALDER: On your second point, the president is a policy wonk. Yet his staff, on both the NEC side and certainly on the NSC side, provide him with a consensus recommendation. I think one of the unanswered questions about the administration is not whether the president is well-served in that process, where I think the answer is clear, but whether this is what the president wants.

It’s not clear to me at all that this president wants consensus recommendations on many of these issues, even though that’s what he gets. I think it is an interesting issue, because certainly on the domestic side he doesn’t want consensus. He wants to work it out in the seminar-style way that he enjoys. Given that nature, why is it that on other issues and even economic issues, he gets consensus although he might want to be briefed? I think that is the puzzle of this presidency.

HOLMES: Just a quick note of bewilderment. One of your questions was: How do you get these arms control agreements ratified? How do you work with the Senate? And the leading talent that this president had at his elbow, and a guy who was given a lot of responsibility for doing a lot of things, was Al Gore. He was one of the charter members of the Dole-appointed Senate group of nine Senators beginning in 1984 that not only tracked these issues week by week but went to Moscow, went to Geneva, and talked to the negotiators on both sides. Why wasn’t that done as a way of operating in this administration?

KAYSEN: I just had a comment about the last discussions on the president and the NSC process. This is a comment as an outsider sitting in Cambridge. But it seems to me that if the president is going to take on the national security bureaucracy, especially if he wants to change the views of the services as expressed by the chiefs, he needs a secretary as a point man. With all due respect, he didn’t get that in Les Aspin. I don’t think he has it in Bill Cohen either.

DESTLER: Or Bill Perry.  

KAYSEN: That’s a very significant element in considering what we’ve been talking about.

DESTLER: It’s interesting. The president didn’t really compensate for his lack of expertise.

---

155 Senator Bob Dole (R-Kans.) created the Senate Arms Control Observer Group (now called the Senate National Security Working Group) in 1984 to review and be advised on the administration’s arms control efforts.

156 William J. Perry was deputy secretary of defense under Les Aspin from 1993 to 1994 and served as secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997.
HALPERIN: I agree with everything David Aaron said. I think it’s right on the point. I just want to elaborate on it a little bit. I think the president’s initial inclination about taking on the military, for the reasons suggested, was enormously exacerbated by the gays in the military issue, which I think he never understood and never fully recovered from.

I think it’s also a point that Carl and others have made. But we elect presidents who don’t understand anything about the way the federal government works. And no matter how smart you are, you can’t intuit and it’s very hard to learn it after you’re president. It’s especially hard to learn about the way the military works and its relation with the rest of the government.

I think, for example, the president did not understand the relationship between the military and the Congress as it affected gays in the military but also on lots of other issues. He also didn’t understand the rules of the Senate, which meant that these issues could get put on any bill. Nor did he understand the role the secretary of defense and that you needed a secretary of defense who carried your water if you cared about these issues. It is much, much harder to do anything about it from outside the Defense Department than from inside. He did not understand the difference between an issue in which the chiefs would, as they say, fall on their sword and those issues in which they just wanted to be sure the president knew what they thought.

On a different subject, I think the International Criminal Court is an absolutely classic case of this. And I think on land mines it is also true. Certainly for a very long time in the administration, the president never understood those issues. And it’s not clear whether he understands that he’s not getting choices from the system, because it is very hard, I think, to learn about how these things work once you’re in the presidency.

KEENY: I think it has changed a lot from when I was on the NSC, except maybe for the senior people in special situations. You were sort of seen and not heard. You did not solicit constant newspaper interviews. You did not meet groups anywhere to present the latest nuance and position. And you kept a very quiet position. You were supposed to organize the options for the president and present them to him. You stated your opinions and you so identified them.

But that was inside the NSC. My impression is it’s becoming more and more a transparent operation, where relatively junior people on the NSC come out and make statements that in many ways preempt the president’s position. I’m taking national missile defense as an example. They come out and they argue why we’re doing this for the Russians and not doing it, in a way that makes it increasingly difficult for the president to take an independent decision.

This is a process with ups and downs that has been going on for the last fifty years. The NSC is being used more and more as part of the operation to push policy rather than the relatively small elite group that makes sure that the president really knows what the different agencies think.

AARON: First it’s outreach and then it’s outreach with a message.

HOLUM: In terms of presenting options to the president, I think that part of the problem is
related to the increasing complexity of arms control and with the number of issues that are on the agenda. The NSC staff and the national security adviser have a pretty good sense of what are presidential level decisions. You can’t go to the president with a decision on whether you should have a red or a green light filter on a challenge inspection or when you want a clarification of the CWC. Those are things that should be and have to be resolved elsewhere because otherwise you have a thousand decisions a day going to the president. This is now a mature enterprise with thousands of facets that have to be worked out at lower levels.

At the same time, it is the case that more decisions were made on the Nuclear Posture Review at the presidential level. We advocated getting into the process in 1994. The Pentagon had the pen, but we had a briefing ahead of time. I don’t know if there was ever a written Nuclear Posture Review. What I saw were a few drafts.

KOCH: Those were words the Pentagon used.

HOLUM: But there were changes made between the time that it was presented to us and the time that it was presented to the president. I was also there and people spoke and agreed with it. The basic premise was the hedge strategy. We didn’t know what was going to happen with Russia. People were brought on. That was the core of the Nuclear Posture Review, and it’s had a lot of impact on everything that’s happened since. But it wasn’t a mindless task, just accepting what the group proposed. You can argue with the outcome, but there was a process.

There was another big decision which was the decision to go to zero yield on the comprehensive test ban treaty. The argument had been presented that we should keep the ten-year withdrawal option and the permissible nuclear yield should go up from a few pounds to several hundred. We ended up dropping the ten-year withdrawal option and the number went to zero. That was a decision that was made at the principals level.

HARRIS: By the principals.

HOLUM: Well, you have to add to this mix the fact that the NSC, because it leaks, went into a process in the 1995-1996 period of not making decisions at PC meetings. There would be a discussion of views so Jeff Smith or Bill Gertz wouldn’t have it in the paper the next day when it was back-briefed. They’d go around afterward.

In that case, Tony Lake made clear how the president wanted the decision to come out and everybody agreed, and so it was a unanimous recommendation. But there was no question in my mind that the president was involved in that decision. He wasn’t at the meeting, but everybody knew where it was supposed to end up. So on big decisions, I think this system has served the president. But it didn’t and shouldn’t serve up all the tiny nuances that go into an arms control negotiating process.

---

157 The Nuclear Posture Review was a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces and strategy that took place in 1993-94.

158 R. Jeffrey Smith and Bill Gertz are journalists, respectively, for the *Washington Post* and *Washington Times*. 
There may be a better way with more NSC leadership. And, in fact, this is part of the process, too. Very often, and I think increasingly frequently, the agencies agree that they’ll live by decisions that Sandy makes, or they’ll agree to live by a decision that Tony made. They don’t think it should go to the president, but still something has to be decided and agreement reached.

KEENY: One of the things you ought to really look at that is interesting and unusual was the large number of NSC meetings in the Nixon administration. There were also a huge number of Verification Panel meetings. I don’t know what happened in subsequent administrations.

DESTLER: That was early on.

KEENY: In the first administration.

DESTLER: After the first two years, there were very few meetings.\footnote{During Nixon’s time in office, a total of 92 NSC meetings took place of which 67 occurred in the first two years. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/media/pdf/Nixon_Admin.pdf.}

KEENY: I don’t believe there were more than one or two NSC meetings in the Carter administration that really focused on arms control issues. But there were a lot of them in the Nixon administration. Henry made some brilliant presentations summarizing what the situation was. Then after lots of talk Nixon made a forceful statement so that a clear record remained of the subject. Little did I realize all this was being recorded for future memoirs.

But the point was, these meetings did occur, and there were decisions. Nixon always said, a decision would be given shortly, whether it was to educate, organize or direct the administration. It really was quite different than any other administration.

DESTLER: I think that’s right. I think it’s also true that we scheduled this meeting to end at 8:30 p.m. It’s been extraordinarily informative, continuing at least half an hour past our scheduled closing. Thank you all very much.

DAALDER: Thank you very much for coming in.
APPENDIX A: AGENDA

The agenda consisted of the following list of questions, distributed to the participants in advance of the meeting:

A. Looking at experience since 1969, a frequent policymaking pattern has been for the Secretary of State (Vance, Shultz) to be the senior arms control negotiator and the National Security Adviser and NSC staff to lead the interagency arms control policy process setting goals, drafting instructions, etc. This raises several questions:

1) Is this a logical and workable division of labor or a recipe for ongoing State-NSC tension and conflict?

2) How often have there been variations from this pattern, and have they been fruitful?

3) Since the Pentagon has especially important stakes, how are its interests (including those of the JCS) best represented in this process?

4) Where did ACDA fit in? Where should it have fit in?

B. During those periods when arms control negotiations were top priority, how important was it for the National Security Adviser to be an arms control expert? For the Secretary of State to be one?

C. Who were the key individual (and institutional) players in arms control policymaking during your administration?

D. How were conflicts among players resolved? Was the President willing to decide between arguments and protagonists? At what level of detail?

E. If an agreement was reached that required Congressional action, how was the Congressional campaign managed? What was the NSC role? That of the lead negotiator?

F. Were there important differences in how the process operated for nuclear arms control as opposed to non-nuclear? Between bilateral and multilateral arms control?
ABOUT THE CO-DIRECTORS


Prior to joining Brookings, Daalder was associate professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Affairs, where he was also director of research at the Center for International and Security Studies. In 1995-96, he served as director for European Affairs on President Clinton’s National Security Council staff, where he was responsible for coordinating U.S. policy toward Bosnia. Daalder currently serves as a member of the Study Group of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, an examination of U.S. national security requirements and institutions. He has been a fellow at Harvard University’s Center for Science and International Affairs and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is the recipient of a Pew Faculty Fellowship in International Affairs and an International Affairs Fellowship of the Council on Foreign Relations.


Professor Destler has held senior research positions at the Institute for International Economics (1983-87), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1977-83), and the Brookings Institution (1972-77). He served as a consultant to the President’s Task Force on Government Organization in 1967 and on the reorganization of the executive office of the president in 1977. His other books include: Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy (1972), The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-71 (co-authored, 1979); Making Foreign Economic Policy (1980). Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (co-authored, 1984); and Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy (co-edited, 1994).