



THE SABAN CENTER FOR
MIDDLE EAST POLICY
AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

ANALYSIS PAPER
Number 3, January 2005

ISRAEL'S CORE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A TWO-STATE SOLUTION

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the concept of a Palestinian state moves closer to a reality, Israel is faced with the challenge of developing a new national security strategy. A two state scenario opens the door to greater security challenges for Israel, challenges that must be addressed in the present. A common misperception is that peace can substitute for security. While a peaceful environment contributes to security, in reality, only strong and stable security arrangements can lead to a lasting, stable peace.

This paper defines the essence of national security and focuses on Israel's core security requirements for a two-state solution. It outlines the essential pillars for an Israeli national security concept, acknowledging that in a region like the Israeli-Palestinian arena, which has been characterized by instability and upheaval, risks will remain prevalent, and any security concepts and arrangements should take into account the possibility of unexpected changes.

Security consists of both a physical as well as a psychological factor. The state's ability to defend its existence depends on its ability to provide the public with a basic sense of stability, safety, and order. Core security must therefore be measured not only in military strength but also in the existence of an acceptable level of psychological security.

A two-state solution creates at least two unique security challenges for Israel. The first challenge stems from the geographic complexities of Israel and its neighbors, which make it extremely difficult for

Israel to defend its own territory without the ability to monitor and control the territory directly to its east (the West Bank). The second challenge arises from the dual nature of the threats Israel may have to face in the future. One source of potential threat is external and emanates from Israel's neighbors to the east, as some of these countries still do not recognize Israel's right to exist and declare their goal to be its destruction. The other is an internal threat, stemming from the emergence of a Palestinian state most likely ruled by a non-democratic regime and the development of cross border terrorism due to the friction that may be created by two very different societies living side by side with irredentist elements remaining in both.

To address these challenges, Israel's core security concept requires a set of four general principles: conditional strategic depth, demilitarization, security cooperation, and airspace control.

CONDITIONAL STRATEGIC DEPTH

From a professional military perspective, the optimal area required to defend Israel from an eastern threat is the Jordan Valley and the eastern slopes of the Judea-Samaria ridge. If Israel accepts the two-state solution, most of this area will be part of the future Palestinian state. To compensate, Israel needs a bilateral arrangement with the Palestinian state that will give the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the right to deploy its defensive array to a few key areas in the future Palestinian state in a time of emergency. The objective

of these “emergency deployment zones” is to facilitate a rapid and unhindered IDF deployment in these areas in order to cope with any future eastern threat.

DEMILITARIZATION

A detailed analysis of demilitarization requirements would require a separate discussion which lies beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify three main components designed to avoid violations:

- Strict and accountable Palestinian commitments to maintain and ensure demilitarization.
- Effective supervision of demilitarization along the outer perimeter of the Palestinian state and international passages into the Palestinian state, including land, air, and sea routes.
- Monitoring and verification mechanisms within the Palestinian state, established and maintained in cooperation with a third-party monitoring mechanism.

SECURITY COOPERATION

The most crucial lesson is that no security arrangement can be effective without an active commitment by a future Palestinian state to combat terrorism in all its manifestations. In addition, security cooperation requires ongoing, active bilateral mechanisms both to implement cooperation and coordination between the two sides and to monitor the implementation of all security accords.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

Due to the small size of the territory, it is practically impossible to divide military airspace control over the two states. For this reason, Israel cannot assure its core security needs are met unless it retains control over Palestinian airspace.

History has destined Israelis and Palestinians to be entangled; the two peoples must learn to live together in a tiny, densely populated piece of land. Simple solutions such as unilateral separation and partition cannot address the potential risks inherent in such a complicated reality. Rather, both sides must adopt solutions that should consider the needs of the other side.

Perhaps the most important point of this paper, is the need to focus on the long term. Any peace agreement that Israel and the Palestinians may sign must be able to last not just a few months or years, but for many decades to come. The emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state will constitute one of the most dramatic shifts in the history of Israel’s national security. This change may be entirely for the good, but it is essential that Israel try to map out all the possible consequences—and the hidden risks—and to plan any security agreements accordingly. At the same time, there is no way to foresee the exact direction in which Israeli-Palestinian relations will evolve, even in the near future. Thus, this paper has focused on basic principles and concepts and not on the details of implementation, which must be left for negotiations between the parties.

THE AUTHOR

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ISRAEL'S CORE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A TWO-STATE SOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

Since the Camp David meetings of August 2000, which included the broadest and most detailed discussion between Israeli, Palestinian, and American officials of Israel's security requirements in a final status agreement, many myths have emerged about Israel's security demands. On the Palestinian side, some described Israel's negotiating position on its security requirements as draconian, an attempt to continue the occupation through other means. Others charged that the demands were obsessive and unnecessary in the new atmosphere of coexistence and cooperation at that time. On the Israeli side, critics argued that Israel's security demands were not stringent enough, and if implemented would undermine the security of the state. Some of these arguments were simply due to political machinations, but some emerged from a fundamental misunderstanding of basic security-related concepts and security arrangements, and from insufficient or biased information about Israel's security concept.

Critics level a common argument against security concepts: that their proponents exaggerate, prey on people's fears, or block progress with their demands. Yet that is not the intent. Rather, the goal of security concepts developed by military professionals is to guard against possible threats and risks by preparing for the

unexpected. Like risk managers in business, security professionals seek to assess not just the probability of an event, but its probability multiplied by the severity of its consequences. Thus, however unlikely some events may be, their potential impact may be so great that they cannot be ignored. Beyond that, the ultimate test of any security concept is whether it can provide answers to a changing reality and respond to events that were not foreseen at the outset; for by definition, there is no way to know exactly what the future holds. In a region like the Israeli-Palestinian arena, which has been characterized by instability and upheaval, risks will remain prevalent, and any security concepts and arrangements should take into account the possibility of unexpected changes.

Another common misconception is that peace can serve as a substitute for security arrangements. The reality, however, is that peace depends on such arrangements. Only strong and stable security arrangements can fortify and nurture reconciliation and prevent potential friction. While a state of peace positively contributes to overall security, it must be emphasized that peace can never be a substitute for security. That is because "peace" is a desirable future state of mind, while "security" seeks to deal with concrete problems and fears founded in collective

experience—such as the bloody Israeli-Palestinian conflict of the past four years.

Peace is an evolving process that requires commitment and good will, aimed at building mutual trust and confidence between leaders and people on both sides. These elements were neglected and then destroyed during the past nine years of the peace process. Such an important process cannot exist in a vacuum. It can only develop and be nurtured in a supporting and stable environment that provides incentives for peace and suppresses its opponents.

The concept of an independent Palestinian state living alongside a secure State of Israel has been espoused by the U.S. government and adopted by left and right wing governments in Israel. The United States and Israel now need to agree on a comprehensive security concept that reconciles Israel's security requirements with the unique challenges of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such a concept is needed in order to guide Israel's future peace strategy and ensure that any final status agreement will be effective. In this context, we cannot ignore the traumatic events of the last four years, which should be examined through the lens of Israel's security requirements. The detailed requirements for counterterrorism developed in earlier Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, which many considered to be archaic, have proven to be justified and necessary—especially since many of the same principles were adopted by the international community in the wake of September 11, 2001.

THE CORE SECURITY CONCEPT

The concept of national security covers a wide spectrum of related issues and can be approached from many perspectives. Broadly defined, the term “national security” reaches beyond purely military issues to incorporate various political, economic, and social factors, including social welfare, education, and natural resources such as water and oil. The precise definition of the term varies greatly from person to person and from country to country. Some states give the term a vast definition, encompassing such general goals as maintaining the citizens’ welfare and prosperity.

These peripheral aspects of national security are vital to a country’s long-term strategic objectives, and their importance should not be underestimated. In order to arrive at a clear set of basic security requirements, however, one must first concentrate on the core of national security: the state’s physical existence and its territorial integrity, which a sovereign state seeks to defend above all else. Most analyses of national security assume that the state must rely on its own military and defense capabilities to defend its existence and territorial integrity, and cannot afford to entrust them to any other body or external actor. In other words, these issues go to the essence of every country’s national security. Taking a minimal approach and focusing on these core elements facilitate a more precise, professional assessment of basic security requirements, one that does not ignore key peripheral issues, but still

leaves statesmen enough room to meet their political objectives and fulfill their own broader vision of national security.

In reality, it is impossible to meet the core demands of national security without also considering the psychological factor. Ultimately, the state’s ability to defend its existence and integrity depends on its ability to provide the public with a basic sense of stability, safety, and order. Therefore, core security must be measured not only in military strength and the practical ability to meet concrete threats, but also in the existence of an acceptable level of psychological security. This is one reason why the issue of terrorism must be incorporated into any core security concept. Apart from the intolerable loss of civilian life and devastating damage terrorism inflicts on society, such activity has a severe psychological impact, eroding the sense of personal security that is so essential to the conduct of routine daily life. Indeed, the physical damage caused by terrorism may be less important than its psychological impact, which extends to society as a whole.

Any Israeli security concept for a two-state solution should also address the issue of stability. Stability is the real purpose and outcome of security arrangements, because only through stability can the state protect its core security interests. In its pursuit of stability, any state has two distinct but complementary means at its disposal, both of which are necessary: 1) its own

independent defense and military capabilities, and 2) security cooperation with foreign military and intelligence organizations to cope with mutual risks and threats. The state's independent defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantee of its core security needs; but in the era of globalization, when risks and threats are crossing national borders, cooperation is rapidly gaining in importance and will be even more important in the future. Ultimately, stability derives from broad arrangements and built-in processes that prevent the development of friction, both in the present and in the future. If a state is able to recognize possible hostile intentions in time and take preemptive action before they mature into hostile capabilities, it has a better chance of providing basic stability, and thus security to its people.

Finally, a clear understanding of risks and threats is essential to any concept of security. Military capability or hostile intentions, on their own, represent risks; a threat arises only when the two are combined. Security arrangements must not only confront existing risks and immediate threats, but also address larger patterns (such as political and social trends) and potential risks that may develop into threats in the long run. The difficulty in this task lies in identifying which perceived threats and risks are real. However, recognizing future potential risks and addressing them before they mature into threats should be a crucial goal of any security concept. This holds especially true in the troubled climate of the Middle East, with its high potential for friction and upheaval.

Recent history holds many examples of unexpected events that shocked many observers and altered the political and strategic landscape of the Middle East. A salient example is Israel's relationship with Iran prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution, which was based on strong economic and military ties. At a time when Israel was making peace with Egypt, the most militarily powerful Arab country, the 1979 revolution in Iran transformed the region's geopolitical equation by bringing to power a radical regime that preached the destruction of Israel. This has had a profound impact

on Israel's security ever since. Another example is the eruption of violence in September 2000 between Israelis and Palestinians, long after both sides signed agreements committing themselves to resolve all disputes by peaceful means.

As these examples show, *in the past* Israel had not given enough weight to potential risks, such as the continued existence of terrorist elements and structures and the atmosphere of incitement that nourished hostile attitudes. This neglect allowed the risks to grow into credible threats and thus contributed significantly to the collapse of the peace process.

Israel's core security strategy must therefore account for long-term potential risks as well as more immediate threats. In addition, it should be able to offer preventive solutions for those developments, with the goal of reducing future conflict and thereby bolstering stability. In formulating a security concept which both answers the universal questions of core security requirements and addresses the specific complexities of the Middle East, Israel faces a formidable challenge.


SECURITY CHALLENGES IN A TWO-STATE CONTEXT

The security dilemma is even greater in the context of a two-state solution, which creates at least two unique security challenges for Israel. The first challenge stems from the geographic complexities of Israel and its neighbors, which make it extremely difficult for Israel to defend its own territory without the ability to monitor and control the territory directly to its east (the West Bank). The second challenge arises from the dual nature of the threats Israel may have to face in the future. One source of potential threat is external and emanates from Israel's neighbors to the east, as some of these countries still do not recognize Israel's right to exist and declare their goal to be its destruction. The other is an internal threat, stemming from the emergence of a Palestinian state most likely ruled by a non-democratic regime and the development of cross border terrorism due to the friction that may be created by two very different societies living side by side with irredentist elements remaining in both.

Israel's small size and unique geography create a number of extremely tough challenges for strategic defense planning. Israel's vital strategic hinterland is concentrated in a very narrow coastal plain (the so-called "narrow waist"). The majority of Israel's population, its main industrial centers, most of its vital civil and military infrastructure, its only international airport, and the main traffic routes between the northern and southern parts of the country lie in this narrow strip, 80 miles long and 10–15 miles wide (see map 1). The

topographic composition of its narrow waist and the West Bank that abuts it further complicate the security challenge. There the mountainous Judea-Samaria range rises to an elevation of 600–900m, dominating Israel's coastal plain in the west and the natural border (the Jordan River Valley) in the east.





Map 2

A cross section from the Jordan River to the shore of the Mediterranean Sea (map 2) illustrates this fundamental geographic issue.

In modern warfare, such a dominating ridge has the utmost importance as a site for surveillance and air-space control systems, providing an electromagnetic strategic depth that is vital for efficient intelligence gathering and to provide early warning of incoming threats. There is no real technological substitute for physical elevation. Technological solutions such as satellites, balloons, and aircraft can provide only a partial substitute to elevation and are high in cost and sensitive to weather conditions. Thus, despite the technological advances of modern defense systems and

warfare, controlling the high ground remains an essential part of basic security doctrine.

In addition to the narrow width of Israel's hinterland and the strategic significance of the West Bank ridge, the overall size of the land is very small and the distances involved very short, which leaves little room for any viable defense capability. Because of its geography, Israel has no real strategic depth. The small size of the terrain makes classic defensive planning and operations infeasible because the distance between any future border in the east to the coastal line leaves no room to absorb any kind of attack or run a defense plan.

With this geographic backdrop in mind, there are several risks and threats Israel must be prepared to face, now and in the future. These risks and threats can be grouped into two categories. The first is external, emanating from Israel's neighboring countries to the east. Until very recently, the immediate threat was that of a joint Syrian and Iraqi military thrust against Israel through Jordan and/or Syria. Now that Iraq has been liberated from Saddam Hussein and his military capabilities have been destroyed and Syria has weakened militarily, over time, there is no doubt that the threat from the east has substantially decreased. However, it is impossible to rule out the possible fall of the current government in either Jordan or Syria and its replacement by another regime bent on open confrontation with Israel in the long term. In any case, however nebulous the threats and risks may seem at present, the instability of the region to the east is a long-term reality that could rapidly generate new threats and must be incorporated into Israel's strategic calculations.

The second main category of threat is both external and internal, emanating from a future Palestinian state. Israel is already struggling with the threat of terrorism from within the Palestinian Authority, foreshadowing what could happen if a future Palestinian state became a platform for terrorist attacks inside Israel. In addition, there is the possibility that a Palestinian state would pose a conventional military threat, building up its own armed forces over time. This threat is all the more potent since such forces would automatically command the high ground overlooking Israel's vulnerable coastal plain. A further possibility is the combination of both terrorism and militarization. A heavily armed, terror-friendly Palestinian state, possibly allied with the armed forces and capabilities of hostile outside regimes, would be Israel's strategic nightmare.

In light of these considerations, the security concept for a two-state solution should be viewed as a comprehensive security framework addressing multiple threats and risks over the long term. In particular, it is crucial for Israel to seek creative ways to compensate

for the physical deficiencies of its geography, bolstering its "narrow waist" or strategic hinterland, and building a security framework that offsets its lack of geographic and electromagnetic strategic depth when facing potential external military threats. In addition, such a concept must also cope with the potential terror threat which could emerge from a future Palestinian state.

Furthermore, by 2015 Israel and the Palestinian territories are expected to hold a total population of 12 million people, making the idea of a security fence and unilateral separation impossible. A comprehensive security solution must therefore be based on a creative attitude if it is to establish or maintain stability and prevent the development of destructive friction. One of its preconditions should be to make each side more sensitive to the other side's needs and to induce each side to address those needs more extensively than is usual between larger countries with more resources. Israelis and Palestinians not only share a tiny piece of land, they also share the resources on that land such as water, infrastructure, and basic commodities. Palestinians, for example, are regularly employed by Israeli companies and purchase goods from Israeli markets. Even after the establishment of a Palestinian state, Israelis and Palestinians will still need to use each other's roads and share each other's resources in order to conduct their daily lives. Thus two small states coexisting in such a tiny area cannot act as if they were living in separate houses. In reality, they are sharing a condominium.

ISRAEL'S CORE SECURITY CONCEPT IN PRACTICE

Israel's core security concept requires a set of general principles that can address these kinds of complexities. Its working assumption is that there will be another sovereign entity existing between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River alongside Israel—the so-called two-state solution. In order to cope with the unique challenges of such a situation, Israel needs a unique security concept, comprising four essential ideas or pillars:

1. Conditional strategic depth
2. Demilitarization
3. Security cooperation
4. Airspace control

These elements are highly integrated and must be implemented as a whole if the overall security concept is to be effective.

CONDITIONAL STRATEGIC DEPTH

From a professional military perspective, the optimal area required to defend Israel from an eastern threat is the Jordan Valley and the eastern slopes of the Judea-Samaria ridge. If Israel accepts the two-state solution, most of this area will be part of the future Palestinian state. To compensate, Israel needs a bilateral arrangement with the Palestinian state that will give the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the right to deploy its defensive array to a few key areas in the future

Palestinian state in a time of emergency. The objective of these “emergency deployment zones” (EDZs) is to facilitate a rapid and unhindered IDF deployment in these areas in order to cope with any future eastern threat. Israel's right of emergency force deployment, however, would have to be reconciled with Palestinian sovereignty through a detailed agreement that specifies when and how that right could be employed:

- The EDZs will be confined to fixed, clearly demarcated areas of a strictly limited size on the eastern slopes of the Judea-Samaria ridge and the Jordan Valley.
- Israel would have access to these zones only through designated strategic routes (access roads), which would facilitate the rapid movement of IDF troops with minimal contact with Palestinian civilians and population centers, preventing unnecessary friction and lowering the profile of the Israeli presence.
- The duration of the deployment, by agreement, must be limited to the duration of the emergency only.
- The term “emergency” should be defined strictly to mean a clear and imminent threat to Israel, so that the Palestinians do not fear this right will be abused. The details of which conditions constitute an emergency scenario must be agreed to in advance.

Such an arrangement would provide for the interests of both parties. It would address Israel's pressing need for conditional strategic depth versus threats from the east, yet it would give the Palestinians assurance that Israel would deploy its forces in a way that respects Palestinian sovereign rights and statehood. It should also be pointed out that this demand is directed strictly at potential threats from neighboring states to the east, not at the Palestinians. Under existing conditions, it is fairly unlikely that Israel would have to deploy troops to the EDZs; but it nevertheless requires the right to do so in case of future threats from the east.

In addition, Israel must retain control of certain specific early warning sites on the Judea-Samaria ridge. This is due to the lack of electromagnetic depth and the overriding importance of the ridge for surveillance and airspace control—an especially vital need for Israel's military, which depends heavily on rapid call-up and deployment of reservists in case of emergency. The early warning sites would host a fixed and limited number of outposts permanently staffed with IDF personnel; Israel would also have to have undisturbed access roads to these facilities. Such strategic outposts would allow Israel sufficient early warning to prepare for a possible attack from the east.

DEMILITARIZATION

Owing to the limited geographic area and the complexity of Israel's security challenges, there is no room for another military organization between the Jordan River and the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, it is essential that a future Palestinian state be fully demilitarized. Under the terms of demilitarization, the Palestinian state would have the right to keep only certain categories of nonmilitary weaponry; it could not establish an army or other military organizations, nor any military capabilities or infrastructure; and it would be prohibited from signing military alliances with any external actors.

A detailed analysis of demilitarization requirements would require a separate discussion which lies beyond

the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify three main components designed to avoid violations:

1. Strict and accountable Palestinian commitments to maintain and ensure demilitarization.
2. Effective supervision of demilitarization along the outer perimeter of the Palestinian state and international passages into the Palestinian state, including land, air, and sea routes. (Such supervision applies solely to the flow of incoming goods and not passengers or outgoing goods.)
3. Monitoring and verification mechanisms within the Palestinian state, established and maintained in cooperation with a third-party monitoring mechanism.

In order to monitor demilitarization, Israel needs to have a presence to supervise the land, air, and sea passages on the Palestinian state's outer perimeter. The primary goal of this presence is to prevent military equipment and terrorists from filtering through the borders of the Palestinian state and undermining its demilitarization. The mission of supervising the outer perimeter could be accomplished in a variety of ways, but it is important to emphasize that it should be conducted in a low-profile and discreet manner, in order not to undermine the smooth flow of commercial and civilian traffic into the Palestinian state. Such discreet supervision is vital for good will on both sides and is operationally achievable.

At least at the outset, demilitarization will have to be enforced through a Special Security Regime (SSR) along the outer perimeter of the future Palestinian state, based on the premise of Palestinian sovereignty, but with Israeli or international security responsibility. The SSR's main purpose would be to monitor the borders of the Palestinian state and prevent any terrorists or illegal weapons from crossing into the new Palestinian state. It would require some sort of external military presence on the outer perimeter of the Palestinian state, including the Jordan Valley and the Gaza border with Egypt.

One of the main challenges facing the SSR is a fundamental paradox in its mission: it must provide Israel with the freedom to carry out various security responsibilities, yet it must also preserve Palestinian sovereignty and the continuity of daily affairs. There are three viable options for balancing these competing goals:

1. Israel could lease the land directly from the Palestinian state, with full Israeli security responsibility. The number and type of troops as well as the duration of the lease would have to be negotiated. There are a number of precedents for such an arrangement, which presents the least complicated option and is the most optimal from an Israeli operational standpoint.
2. A local joint force could be established, comprising personnel from a number of interested parties, such as Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, and Egypt (though not all of these parties would necessarily have to be involved). Such a force would strengthen the commitments between the parties to carry out respective requirements, and the international component could strengthen each side's motivation for compliance. However, such joint operations increase the potential for friction that may arise from the operational complexity of such a force.
3. A completely international force could supervise and monitor demilitarization. Such a force would have no Israelis or Palestinians, but would be based on troops from outside countries under U.S. leadership acceptable to both sides. The international force would conduct peace enforcement operations similar to the Israeli operations currently underway in the Jordan Valley, with an electronic fence, patrol routes, and observation posts.

It is important to emphasize that the SSR could become problematic over time because of the inherent potential for friction between Palestinian sovereignty and Israeli security responsibilities. Therefore, the use of this mechanism must be limited through agreement, preferably for a limited transition period. In

essence, the SSR should serve as a bridge between the current stage and the final status phase. It should be subject to a periodic review of the performance, scope, and duration of its operations, and it should no longer be needed once confidence between the two sides has been established.

SECURITY COOPERATION

Israel and the Palestinian Authority have gathered a great deal of experience about security cooperation and have learned many lessons during the past nine years. The most crucial lesson is that no security arrangement can be effective without an active commitment by a future Palestinian state to combat terrorism in all its manifestations. Such a commitment—a fundamental component of security cooperation and long-term relations—was absent in previous security arrangements. Over the past three years, Israel has paid the price for this neglect; learning that it cannot afford a passive attitude toward terror supporters, terror infrastructure, or incitement that legitimizes terror activities. Even if a satisfactory arrangement is reached on all the other issues, terrorism can undermine efforts for peace if left unchecked.

Thus the Palestinian state and its security services will need to make a clear commitment to actively confront all organizations that support and carry out terrorist attacks. Such a commitment involves three main tests. First, Palestinian leaders need to make their intentions clear by declaring their consistent opposition to terror—not just for the benefit of a foreign audience, but in Arabic, and in the West Bank and Gaza. Second, they need to take active steps to combat terrorism by all available means. This means they must ban terrorist organizations; arrest, bring to trial, and if convicted, imprison suspected terrorists (and keep them imprisoned); dismantle the terrorist infrastructure (such as fundraising networks, training camps, and bomb-making facilities); and cooperate with Israel whenever necessary to detect and stop possible terrorist activity. They need also to actively combat all forms of incitement and education which undermine the

basic goal of peaceful coexistence. Third, the Palestinian commitment to fight terror will need to be judged by results: fewer terrorists at large, a reduced terror infrastructure, and a decrease in terrorist activity.

In addition, security cooperation requires ongoing, active bilateral mechanisms both to implement cooperation and coordination between the two sides and to monitor the implementation of all security accords. This last point is especially important, since security agreements will be ineffective and meaningless without a comprehensive mechanism to monitor both effort and performance. In practice, security mechanisms will require broader security cooperation on a regional and international level. Bilateral cooperation is the ideal, but initially the parties will need an outside third party “coach” to help them build real mutual confidence and establish solid working procedures. This third party should be ready to accept the responsibility of assisting the parties to implement security arrangements and to achieve positive performance and accountability.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

Due to the small size of the territory, it is practically impossible to divide military airspace control over the two states. The safety of civilian flights depends on unified airspace control, and the security rationale is overwhelming. With the supersonic speed of modern jets, defenders must be able to respond to an air attack not in hours or minutes, but in seconds. For this reason, Israel cannot assure its core security needs are met unless it retains control over Palestinian airspace.

Such control would not negate Palestinian sovereignty over the airspace above the future state. Rather, this would represent a purely functional arrangement between two adjacent states, with precedents in a number of inter-state arrangements. Luxembourg, for example, agrees to allow the surrounding European countries to exert control over its airspace because it is impossible to divide airspace control over such a tiny country. Similarly, the United States and Canada have

a reciprocal arrangement whereby each country cedes military airspace control to the other in the case of certain airbases located close to their mutual border. Neither Luxembourg nor the United States and Canada have given up their sovereignty as a result of these arrangements. Although the future Palestinian state would have to cede airspace control as a practical matter, this would not prevent it from enjoying all the other rights, benefits, and freedoms held by all sovereign states regarding their airspace.

TERRITORIAL CONTIGUITY, DEMOGRAPHY, AND BORDERS

The preceding discussion has tried to outline a solid set of principles for an Israeli-Palestinian security accord. Yet security cannot be considered in isolation, and even the most ingenious security concept may fail unless the overall shape of the peace accord also takes security concerns into account. Here, it is impossible to avoid the issue of territory and borders—a highly charged question that raises numerous political, religious, and social concerns on both sides. Yet from the strict viewpoint of security, Israel has only a limited number of highly compelling interests.

It is clear that the final territorial settlement will not precisely match the 1967 borders. In peace negotiations at both Camp David and Taba, Palestinian negotiators agreed in principle that “border modifications” could be agreed on, in which Israel would annex settlement blocs on the West Bank, possibly with land swaps to compensate the Palestinians. Such revisions could give Israel a unique opportunity to strengthen its security in the long term. On the other hand, they could also undermine Israel’s long-term interests if negotiators fall into the temptation of redrawing borders without carefully considering the implications for security.

A complicated demographic situation has resulted from three decades of Israeli settlement in the West Bank. As a result, much of the territory now resembles

a patchwork, with both Israelis and Palestinians living scrambled together. This is true even in the large settlement blocs that seem most likely to be annexed to Israel, including the greater Jerusalem area. Thus, it is difficult to draw definitive borders that will both satisfy peoples’ national aspirations and still produce a defensible security arrangement. While national aspirations cannot be ignored by any means, a peace agreement will not bring real peace if it creates new borders that are impossible to secure, or that guarantee future tensions between Israelis and Palestinians.

For both Israel and the Palestinians, territorial contiguity is a vital concern. In its simplest sense, contiguity means being able to move from place to place without ever having to leave the territory of one’s own state. In practice, however, real contiguity also means being able to move from one place to another without having to take a long, circuitous route to reach one’s destination—which may be home, work, or family. A small, crowded land inevitably creates a zero-sum game where increased contiguity for one state means less contiguity for the other. In the context of a two-state solution, both sides must realize that absolute contiguity is an unattainable ideal, and they should moderate their demands accordingly. Nevertheless, contiguity not only simplifies daily life, but also contributes to security by reducing the friction between communities; it should thus be a major factor in the demarcation of borders.

The second vital concern is demography. Indeed, Israel has conflicting interests where this issue is concerned. If the goal is to provide maximum contiguity and minimum friction between the two sides, the best solution is a simple border line, following a more or less predictable route and including as few enclaves as possible. On the other hand, such a demarcation has demographic implications that both Israelis and Palestinians may find unpalatable. Because of the complicated ethnic patchwork that now exists in the territories, any simple demarcation line must either leave Jewish settlements outside or bring Arab communities inside the State of Israel. For this reason, it would be tempting to draw a more complicated border, allowing Israel to absorb as many Jewish settlements and leave out as many Palestinians as possible. Such a line would appease demographic sensitivities in the short run, but at the cost of introducing complicated border arrangements that would open up the possibility of conflict over border disputes in the future.

From a security perspective, Israel's main goal must be to reduce the potential for friction with a future Palestinian state. Therefore, Israel should err on the side of a simple demarcation, despite its perceived demographic drawbacks. Inevitably, such a border will leave some sizable Jewish settlements outside Israeli sovereignty, while including some Palestinian neighborhoods and towns. Both parties must learn to accept this outcome rather than try to avoid it by drawing a convoluted border line that will sow the seeds of future tensions. At the same time, strict adherence to the 1967 lines could be just as problematic. In the case of some neighborhoods and towns such as (mainly Arab) Baqa al-Gharbiyah and Baqa al-Sharqiyah, a return to the 1967 border would permanently divide the community and cut off residents from their family, friends, and livelihoods on the other side of the border. Dividing such communities permanently will only make them into potential flash points for trouble. Rather, they should be kept intact, whether that means annexing them to Israel or ceding them to the Palestinian state.

The exact shape of the border should be left for negotiations. From a security perspective, however, Israel should place a high priority on bolstering the narrow waist of its strategic hinterland—specifically, the coastal strip stretching north from the Jerusalem area to the Galilee. This goal can largely be met by annexing existing settlement blocs and other territory along the 1967 line. The coastal strip is not only home to Israel's key industrial and population centers, but also the point of its greatest strategic vulnerability because of its narrow width and lack of high ground. The more of a foothold Israel gains on the western slopes of the Judea-Samaria ridge, the more it can offset this basic vulnerability. While revisions elsewhere on the border may be politically desirable, revisions in this area would accomplish the most for Israel's security in the long term.

Whatever the shape of the final borders, it is important to create a functional security fence between Israel and the Palestinian state. Israelis should not misunderstand the tactical benefits of such a fence, which should only be erected with the agreement and the cooperation of the other side. As a practical matter, security separation can succeed only if it takes place through an agreed framework—not through unilateral “detachment”, which will lead only to tension and resentment on the other side. Israel should seek a bilateral model of security separation, based on both the security fence and a special security arrangement along designated border zones on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. An arrangement of this kind would include regulated passages for civilian visitors and laborers as well as commercial traffic. Its primary goal would not be to isolate the two peoples from each other, but to reduce potential friction while facilitating the flow of people and goods.

CONCLUSION

National security, in its broadest sense, involves many important components that lie beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made here to extract and define the essence of national security, focusing on the core security requirements that Israel cannot ignore in the context of a two-state solution. This minimalist approach to national security has considerable benefits. By focusing only on those questions that are crucial to national security professionals, it leaves political leaders the flexibility to shape a political agreement according to their own views. By contrast, an overly broad focus enables the abuse of the national security issue in the service of political interests, as has often occurred in the past.

This is not to suggest that the foregoing analysis is impartial. It clearly presents the issue of security from an Israeli point of view. At the same time, by making the fundamental assumption that two sovereign entities will someday coexist between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, it has tried to take Palestinian needs into account as far as possible. History has destined Israelis and Palestinians to be entangled; the two peoples must learn to live together in a tiny, densely populated piece of land. Simple solutions such as unilateral separation and partition cannot address the potential risks inherent in such a complicated reality. Rather, both sides must adopt solutions that should consider the needs of the other side. Such arrange-

ments may not be typical between larger states with fewer demographic complexities, but Israelis and Palestinians simply have no other choice.

The importance of the core security paradigm and its principles has become much more clear amid the violence that has consumed both Israelis and Palestinians in the last few years. In retrospect, it is clear that the basic principles of counterterrorism that Israel had laid out were essentially correct. If Israel has learned one lesson from recent experiences, it is that the problem lies not in the principles themselves, but in their implementation. In any future resumption of peace negotiations, therefore, Israel should pay much more attention to enforcing strict implementation of all security accords. A signed agreement simply will not work without a detailed, effective mechanism to ensure both performance and accountability. Such a mechanism would strictly enforce all provisions and agreements of a future security accord, including those addressing less tangible issues such as incitement and education. This is the key to a viable, stable security agreement.

Another issue that deserves comment is the recent war and the end of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Now that the major threat from the east has been removed, some may question whether the core security requirements regarding Israel's eastbound front are still relevant. Certainly, the change of power in

Baghdad has eliminated an immediate threat to Israel and will lead to major changes in the Middle East. The removal of the Iraqi threat may have a positive impact not just on the political situation, but also on the IDF's mission priorities, future force levels, and military structure. Nevertheless, the region's continuing instability and potential for sudden, extreme change means there is still a high potential for new threats to emerge from the inherent regional risks. The fundamental need for strategic depth has not disappeared; it remains a valid element of Israel's core security requirements.

If there is one point that cannot be emphasized enough, it is the need to focus on the long term. Any peace agreement that Israel and the Palestinians may sign must be able to last not just a few months or years, but for many decades to come. The emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state will constitute one of the most dramatic shifts in the history of Israel's national security. This change may be entirely for the good, but it is essential that Israel try to map out all the possible consequences—and the hidden risks—and to plan any security agreements accordingly. At the same time, there is no way to foresee the exact direction in which Israeli-Palestinian relations will evolve, even in the near future. Thus, this paper has focused on basic principles and concepts and not on the details of implementation, which must be left for negotiations between the parties. It is not appropriate to make detailed recommendations here while those discussions remain incomplete.

Still, it is worth noting that the negotiations at Camp David in August 2000 gave both sides the opportunity to discuss the key elements of Israel's security concept, and both the United States and the Palestinians reached understandings on most of Israel's security requirements. Unfortunately, the post-Camp David crisis has brought about a serious regression in Israeli-Palestinian security understandings and the overall security framework that had arisen from the Oslo accords. Yet there is still hope to reach an

understanding in security matters, if and when both sides renew their commitment to the peace process. For the sake of this hope and that future day, this paper was written.

THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY

The Saban Center for Middle East Policy was established on May 13th, 2002 with an inaugural address by His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan. The establishment of the Saban Center reflects the Brookings Institution's commitment to expand dramatically its research and analysis of Middle East policy issues at a time when the region has come to dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

The Saban Center provides Washington policymakers with balanced, objective, in-depth and timely research and policy analysis from experienced and knowledgeable people who can bring fresh perspectives to bear on the critical problems of the Middle East. The center upholds the Brookings tradition of being open to a broad range of views. Its central objective is to advance understanding of developments in the Middle East through policy-relevant scholarship and debate.

The center's establishment has been made possible by a generous founding grant from Haim and Cheryl Saban of Los Angeles. Ambassador Martin S. Indyk, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, is the Director of the Saban Center. Kenneth M. Pollack is the center's Director of Research. Joining them is a core group of Middle East experts who conduct original research and develop innovative programs to promote a better understanding of the policy choices facing American decision makers in the Middle East. They include Tamara Wittes who is a specialist on political reform in the Arab world; Shibley Telhami who holds the Sadat Chair at the University of

Maryland; Shaul Bakhash an expert on Iranian politics from George Mason University; Daniel Byman from Georgetown University, a Middle East terrorism expert; and Flynt Leverett a former senior CIA analyst and Senior Director at the National Security Council who is a specialist on Syria and Lebanon. The center is located in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings, led by Vice President and Director, James B. Steinberg.

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