More than six years after the start of the ‘war on terror’, America and its allies are less safe, their enemies stronger and more numerous, and the war’s key geographic battleground, the greater Middle East, dangerously unstable. In Iraq, thousands of American soldiers, and tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers and civilians, have been killed or wounded while more than 150,000 US troops fight to contain an insurgency and a civil war at a cost of over $300 million per day. In Iran, an Islamic fundamentalist regime remains firmly in power and is defiantly pursuing a nuclear-weapons programme, undermining American efforts in Iraq and subsidising increasingly brazen terrorist groups in the Middle East. The Gaza Strip is now led by one terrorist group, Hamas, while another, Hizbullah, is increasingly influential in Lebanon and increasingly popular on the streets of the Middle East. Syria remains under an anti-American dictatorship allied to Iran, and no real peace process between Israel and any of its neighbours exists.

More broadly, according to repeated public opinion polls, the popularity and credibility of the United States is at an all-time low. Hizbullah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah is far more popular in the Muslim world than President George W. Bush; most Muslims would prefer to see China, Russia or France replace America as the dominant outside power; and majorities even among America’s traditional allies now have a highly unfavourable view of the United States. While the US homeland has not been attacked since 2001, Osama bin Laden remains at large, and there have been far more Islamist terrorist attacks around the world since 2001 than in the six years before the ‘war on terror’ was launched. Far from being ‘on the march’, democracy in the Middle East is in trouble, and where it has advanced, in most cases – including Palestine, Iraq,
Egypt and Lebanon – it has produced unintended and often unwanted consequences. For a war that has now been going on longer than the Second World War, the balance sheet is dismal.

The Bush administration always warned that overcoming the terrorist threat would take time. One possible conclusion, therefore, is that the challenge posed by radical Islamic terrorism is so enormous that the current difficulties are to be expected, and that there is in any case no alternative to the administration’s approach. According to columnist and author Max Boot, a prominent supporter of Bush’s foreign policy, ‘it is far too soon to judge the results of the President’s grand strategy of transforming the Middle East, which is still in its early stages’.¹ This is the argument used by the White House when it claims ‘significant progress’ in the ‘war on terror’, makes the case for resolve and perseverance, and warns its critics that they risk encouraging the terrorists by raising questions about the administration’s approach.²

An alternative explanation of the failure to make more progress could be that the United States is mostly on the right track but failing to put sufficient resources and energy into the war effort. This is the argument made by many of President Bush’s critics on the right, such as former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, who argues that Bush’s ‘strategies are not wrong, but they are failing’. Gingrich believes the struggle between the West and the forces of militant Islam should be considered an ‘emerging World War III’ and argues that it can be won by mobilising more ‘energy, resources and intensity’.³ A similar argument is advanced by writer Norman Podhoretz, who believes that we should think about the ‘war on terror’ as ‘World War IV’ (the Cold War having been ‘World War III’).⁴

It would be comforting to believe that the main cause of America’s difficulties has been the lack of time or resources. But there are in fact few signs that things are moving in the right direction, and there is little reason to believe that ‘staying the course’ – or indeed expanding the fight – will succeed. In its first six years, the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ has cost America hundreds of billions of dollars, exhausted the US military, alienated friends and allies, and squandered America’s moral authority, yet still has made little progress toward its ultimate goals.

Sadly, there is a more compelling conclusion: the administration is failing because it is fighting the wrong war. It has misdiagnosed the most important origins of the problem, put too much faith in military force and tough talk, needlessly alienated friends and allies, and neglected the important ideological aspects of the struggle. Until the administration changes course – or more likely, leaves office – the United States will continue to risk creating more enemies
than it eliminates. There are at least six fundamental problems with the ‘war on terror’ the United States has been fighting so far, all of which offer important lessons for the next US administration.

A flawed diagnosis
Perhaps the most important step in meeting the terrorist challenge is to understand the nature, sources and causes of the threat. That is no easy task, but it has been made even more difficult by Bush’s tendency to mischaracterise them. Bush regularly suggests that terrorists attack the United States and its allies because they are evil and hate the freedoms we enjoy. Just nine days after the 11 September 2001 attacks, he declared that the terrorists hate ‘our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other’. They are ‘at war against us’, he continued to argue more than five years later,

because they hate everything America stands for – and we stand for freedom ... They can’t stand the thought that people can go into the public square in America and express their differences with government. They can’t stand the thought that the people get to decide the future of our country by voting.6

And yet Bush also argues that, even though the terrorists hate freedom, it is the lack of freedom in their own countries that drives them to support terrorism. The picture painted is thus one of some fixed set of ‘evildoers’, driven to terrorism by the absence of democracy in their homelands, who attack America and its allies because they hate the freedoms symbolised by those countries. As a basis for understanding – and therefore dealing with – the terrorist threat, this is a partial and exceedingly misleading explanation.

The idea that terrorists attack because they hate freedom is particularly misguided. The explanation is convenient, because it suggests that there is nothing we can do about it (since they hate ‘who we are’ rather than ‘what we do’), and it is harmful because it suggests that the only way to defeat such terrorists is to kill or capture them all, since we’re obviously not prepared to sacrifice our freedom to appease them. But there is little evidence to suggest that hatred of freedom is in fact a primary cause of terrorism, and much to suggest that it is not.

At the most superficial level, if freedom were the main target for terrorists, they would be just as likely to attack Switzerland, Canada, Costa Rica or Sweden as the United States, which is clearly not the case. Indeed, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt have been much more frequent targets of attacks than the
United States, and it is surely not because the terrorists hate the individual liberties and elected governments in those countries.

Extensive polling in the Muslim world also challenges the notion of a significant link between terrorism and a hatred for freedom. While many Islamist ideologues do often express revulsion with the personal liberties and sexual freedom enjoyed in Western countries, it turns out that even most of the Muslims who support terrorism and trust Osama bin Laden favour elected government, personal liberty, educational opportunity and economic choice. Some Muslim extremists may not like American-style democracy, but that is not why they become terrorists, and not why others support them.

Bush’s link between authoritarianism and terrorism is more accurate, because living in repressive societies probably does contribute to the frustration that helps drive people to commit violent acts. But as a central explanation for the contemporary terrorist phenomenon it is woefully inadequate, and as the primary guideline for policymaking is it counterproductive and even dangerous.

First and most obviously, plenty of non-democratic and even repressive societies have long existed without having produced any terrorism at all. It is thus hard to explain why the absence of democracy in the Muslim world would be the main explanation for Islamic terrorism, when the democracy variable does not seem to have that effect elsewhere – in China, Zimbabwe, North Korea, or Cuba, for example.

Moreover, as political scientist Gregory Gause has pointed out, most recent terrorist attacks have actually occurred in democracies and both the victims and perpetrators are most often citizens of democracies. Of the 526 major terrorist incidents between 2000 and 2003, 51% were in countries categorised as ‘free’, 23% in ‘partially free’ countries, and 26% in countries that were ‘not free’. For the years 2004 and 2005, if the more than 3,500 terrorist incidents that took place in Iraq are excluded, the figures are 39% for free countries, 35% for partially free countries, and 26% for countries that are not free. The recent terrorist attacks in countries like Britain, Spain and India – perpetrated by people who live there – cannot be explained by any lack of democracy in those countries.

The focus on the lack of democracy as a key cause of the terrorism problem also risks implying that promoting elections in the countries many terrorists come from is a promising path to security. At least in the short term, however, holding free elections before the social and institutional conditions for democracy are in place would almost certainly create new problems. In
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recent democratic elections in Palestine, Iraq and Egypt, the winners were the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, Iraqi Islamist parties and Egypt’s Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, not exactly the freedom-loving groups the Bush administration had in mind as an antidote to terrorism. Allowing these groups to come to power and then fail may well be necessary as a means of defeating their ideology, but the damage they can do in the meantime needs to be acknowledged. Iraq is now free from the grip of the horrible dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. But while today’s Iraq is certainly more ‘democratic’ than it was under Saddam – a good thing for many Iraqis – it is also a far greater source of terrorism now than then, a reality that undercuts the assumptions on which the administration’s analysis is based.

Even to the degree that stable democracy is part of the longer-term solution to the terrorist problem, there remains the problem of how to promote it. Democracy seems to be the long-term trend among states based on historic national communities in Europe, North America and Latin America, but it is much harder to install where no strong ‘nation’ exists, which is sadly the case for most of the Muslim world. Only Iran, Turkey, Egypt and possibly Indonesia really meet the nationhood criterion, and even these countries are plagued by serious ethnic and religious divisions. Certainly Iraq – with artificial borders, diverse ethnic and religious groups, and unevenly dispersed natural resources – is not promising terrain for the establishment of democracy, notwithstanding the claims of some of the most prominent supporters of the war.11 In the long run, it is possible to imagine that economic development, social modernisation, a patient process of institution building, and more equitable distribution of resources among different ethnic, religious and social groups might create the conditions necessary for democracy to develop. But a counterrorism strategy based on such uncertainties – the uncertain link between an absence of democracy and terrorism as well as the uncertainty that democracy can be implanted where the right conditions are not in place – will have very limited prospects for success.

People do not, in fact, become terrorists simply because they are evil, hate our freedoms, or do not live in democracies. Instead, people commit acts of terror in response to their personal, political and historical situations. Especially in the Islamic world, they harbour enormous resentment about the fate of their societies and their coreligionists, and they feel a great sense of frustration, humiliation and injustice. Part of the humiliation is personal, often the result of alienation from living in foreign cultures. As terrorism expert Peter Bergen has pointed out, many of the top planners and pilots involved in the 11 September attacks became more militant while living in the West, where ‘perceived dis-
crimination, alienation and homesickness seem to have turned them all in a more radical direction’.

Beyond the personal alienation is a broader sense of victimisation and shame at the fate of Islamic civilisation, in a culture in which both pride and sense of community play even more important roles than elsewhere. A once-great Islamic civilisation famous for its scientists, scholars and artists has seen itself surpassed economically, politically and culturally by its former colonial overlords, distant Asians and even the local upstart, Israel. Many Muslims blame this civilisational decline on the West, which they see as having broken up, occupied and colonised Muslim lands.

Osama bin Laden himself has often underscored the role of Muslim humiliation in explaining and justifying the 11 September attacks. Just three weeks after the attacks, in his first public statement, bin Laden said:

What America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to what we have tasted for scores of years. Our nation [the Islamic world] has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation for eighty years. Its sons are killed, its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked and no one hears and no one heeds.

Al-Qaeda’s recruiting videos successfully play to this sense of injustice and humiliation in their efforts to persuade young Muslims to join the cause.

In April 2006, the US National Intelligence Estimate on global terrorism summarised the underlying factors behind the spread of the jihadist movement. These factors did not include hatred for freedom, desire for democracy, or the absence of Western resolve, but

entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; the Iraq jihad; the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and perceived anti-U.S. sentiment among most Muslims – all of which jihadists exploit.

Similarly, the British domestic intelligence service, MI5, underscores that it was this sense of injustice and anger at British foreign policy – and not the absence of democracy in Britain – that was behind the July 2005 attacks on the London Underground. ‘The video wills of British suicide bombers’, observed Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the head of MI5, in November 2006, ‘make it clear that they are motivated by perceived worldwide and longstanding injustices against
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Muslims; an extreme and minority interpretation of Islam promoted by some preachers and people of influence; and their interpretation as anti-Muslim of UK foreign policy, in particular the UK’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The perception of foreign occupation of Muslim lands also seems to contribute to terrorists’ decisions to carry out attacks. In fact, as scholar Robert Pape has demonstrated, suicide bombers are far more often motivated by a desire to fight against foreign military occupation and for self-determination rather than by a desire to promote democracy at home. Looking at Tamil, Palestinian, Chechen, and al-Qaeda suicide bombers, Pape found that what they most had in common was a perception that their communities were being humiliated by more powerful outsiders, and that they could reverse that humiliation by inflicting pain on those countries and obliging them to withdraw.

None of this means that the United States should simply change its policies to make potential terrorists happy. But to deny any link between political context and an individual’s decision to become a terrorist, or to wilfully misplace blame on a vague hatred for freedom or lack of democracy, is to start the ‘war on terror’ with a huge disadvantage. It is hard to fight an enemy without being honest about its real nature.

Mis-using force

Even more misguided than the Bush administration’s misstatement of the problem is its assumption that demonstrating toughness and deploying military force are keys to solving it. From the start, Bush declared that the new war would ‘not be won on the defensive’, and in the ensuing months and years he proceeded to flesh out a military strategy based on anticipating and pre-empting potential threats. The strategy, codified in the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 and implemented in Iraq, is to ‘find and destroy’ terrorists abroad ‘so that we do not have to face them in our own country’. ‘The only path to safety’, Bush often argues, ‘is the path of action’. He insists that ‘you do not create terrorism by fighting terrorism’.

But though the United States might not be ‘creating terrorism’, it is certainly creating conditions that generate more, rather than less, of it. America has had numerous successful operations against terrorists since 11 September, both military and judicial. Yet by invading and occupying Iraq, indefinitely detaining prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, endorsing and applying methods of interrogation widely considered to be torture, refusing to apply the Geneva Conventions, unreservedly justifying any Israeli military action as a necessary part of the ‘global war on terror’, and failing to prevent or punish those responsible for the atrocities in Iraqi prisons like Abu Ghraib, the United States has reinforced the
grievances that inspire people to become terrorists, negating its efforts to kill or capture as many terrorists as possible. Contrary to Bush’s apparent assumption that there is a fixed number of terrorists to be dealt with through death or arrest, in reality there is a vast pool of potential terrorist recruits, and any strategy that intensifies their motivations will ultimately fail. The images of large numbers of Muslim civilians being killed, broadcast daily on Arab satellite television, risks making the problem worse.

It is easy for disappointed supporters of the administration like Gingrich to argue that the reason Washington’s current strategy is ‘not wrong, but failing’ is because it is not being applied vigorously enough; it is harder, however, to envision what a more vigorous application of that strategy would consist of. Even if the United States could muster the resources and resolve to fight what Gingrich calls ‘World War III’, it is far from clear that even a strategy of invading and occupying major Muslim countries would take care of the problem. The attempt to implant a peaceful pro-Western democracy in Iraq does not recommend itself as a model for the rest of the region.

The Bush strategy is also based on the assumption that the very demonstration of resolve will help deter future attacks. It is an odd suggestion that people willing to die for their cause would be deterred by our greater willingness to kill them, but the president and his supporters have often asserted that America’s failure to impress the terrorists in this way was what led to the 11 September attacks in the first place. The terrorists, Bush has argued,

saw our response to the hostage crisis in Iran, the bombings in the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the first World Trade Center attack, the killing of American soldiers in Somalia, the destruction of two U.S. embassies in Africa, and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. The terrorists concluded that we lacked the courage and character to defend ourselves, and so they attacked us.22

Vice President Dick Cheney has also insisted that ‘the terrorists came to believe that they could strike America without paying any price. And so they continued to wage those attacks, making the world less safe and eventually striking the United States on 9/11.’23 Speaking to Marines at Camp Lejeune in October 2005, the vice president listed the same examples of alleged American weakness as Bush, concluding that ‘time and time again, for the remainder of the 20th century, the terrorists hit America and America did not hit back hard enough’. Cheney then quoted Bush’s argument that ‘the only way the terrorists can win is if we lose our nerve and abandon our mission’.
In ascribing blame for the 11 September attacks on the failures of Presidents Carter, Reagan and Clinton to respond vigorously to previous attacks, it is unclear what precisely Bush and Cheney are suggesting should have been done in these past cases. They do not say whether they believe Reagan should have ordered massive air strikes against Hizbullah targets, or even invaded and occupied Lebanon, after the Marine barracks were bombed in 1983. Nor do they suggest which military targets would have been worth pounding in response to the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, or that they would have advocated sending an overwhelming number of troops to Somalia that same year. Indeed, the Somalia disaster took place because of a military operation to go after the warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed, presumably the sort of tough, retaliatory strategy Bush and Cheney have advocated. They sometimes do invoke Ronald Reagan’s 1986 military strikes on Libya in retaliation for Muammar Gadhafi’s sponsorship of terrorism, again presumably the type of action they recommend for other cases. But reliance on that case conveniently overlooks the fact that the military strikes did not put an end to Libyan sponsorship of terrorism – including the bombing two years later of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 270 people – and that Libya got out of the terrorism business only after a decade of broadly imposed UN sanctions.

Rather, the Bush–Cheney argument is pinned on the view that ‘credibility’ and ‘toughness’ are the best ways to deter terrorist actions. One of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s favourite sayings was that ‘weakness is provocative’. But it turns out toughness can be provocative as well.

The Bush–Cheney emphasis on ‘credibility’ may well apply to states or dictators who value their power and fear retaliation. Unfortunately, it is less relevant to Islamic terrorists who have no power and who see US military retaliation as a recruitment tool. Clearly, the terrorists in Iraq have not been cowed by the US-led invasion; if anything they are inspired. In Iraq in 2003, the United States presumably ‘hit them hard’ enough – to use Cheney’s formulation – with 150,000 troops, a ‘shock and awe’ air campaign, and the arrests of thousands, but the terrorist threat has not gone away. Indeed, the US-led invasion and occupation has turned Iraq into an enormous terrorist training and recruiting ground. Iraq, bin Laden declared, has become a ‘golden opportunity’ to start a ‘third world war’ against ‘the crusader-Zionist coalition’. He has publicly admitted that his goal has been to ‘provoke and bait’ the United States into ‘bleeding wars’ throughout the Islamic world, to bankrupt it as the Soviet Union was bankrupted in Afghanistan.
This problem can be seen in microcosm in the way the American military conducted its operations in Iraq. As journalist Thomas Ricks shows in his devastating analysis of US military operations in Iraq, American troops often failed to appreciate the role of honour in Arab societies and adopted tactics (like kicking down doors in the middle of the night to seize suspected insurgents in their homes) that were guaranteed to provoke members of the suspects’ families and tribes to vow retaliation, creating a vicious circle of violence. Administration supporters such as William Kristol and Lewis Lehman argued in 2004 that the United States and United Kingdom had to ‘crush the insurgents in Iraq’ because ‘decisive military victories in Iraq would be respected by Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds alike’. They failed to see the risk that doing so would not only be difficult but counterproductive. This was the key lesson drawn in the new US army counter-insurgency manual, adopted in December 2006, which states that ‘people who have been maltreated or have had close friends or relatives killed by the government, particularly by its security forces, may strike back at their attackers. Security force abuses and the social upheaval caused by collateral damage from combat can be major escalating factors for insurgencies.’

Military power has its uses: it served America well in destroying al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and in ousting the Taliban regime that backed the terrorists who struck America on 11 September. But the utility of such power is limited even where it works (such as Afghanistan), sometimes counterproductive (such as Iraq), and entirely irrelevant in dealing with other aspects of the terrorism problem, such as those emanating from poor Muslim neighbourhoods in Birmingham or Madrid.

America cannot be shy about eliminating those who wish to do it harm. But it is simply not true, as Bush asserts, that ‘the only way the terrorists can win is if we lose our nerve and abandon our mission’. They can also win if the United States becomes trapped in the obsessive pursuit of demonstrating resolve and loses sight of the fact that, in the long run, force alone is insufficient to defeat its enemies.

Squandering credibility
The outpouring of international sympathy for and solidarity with the United States following 11 September was never going to last forever. America was the focus of a great deal of resentment before the attacks, and combating the terrorist threat was inevitably going to entail difficult decisions, some of which were likely to provoke further anger and resentment. What was not inevitable, however, was that the administration would react to those attacks by taking the view that the United States had a blank cheque to do whatever it wanted in the
name of national security, without abiding by traditional checks and balances or international law. By doing so, it did tremendous damage to America’s credibility and moral authority, undermining allied support for the United States and fuelling support for the terrorists in the Muslim world.

The erosion of US moral standing did not result from a single policy, scandal or transgression but rather from the accumulation of actions and decisions that have damaged the country’s longstanding image as an example to others. Even a partial listing of these actions underscores the extent of the problem.

- In January 2002, the administration decided to declare as ‘unlawful combatants’ all prisoners captured in Afghanistan – with no rights under the Geneva Conventions. In many cases simply taking the word of Pakistani and Afghan allies who had taken the prisoners after the fall of Kabul (only a small fraction of the prisoners were arrested by US forces), President Bush rejected appeals from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to hold status-determination hearings, and he similarly rejected State Department support for applying the Geneva Conventions. Many of these prisoners were then held at a prison on the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for the purpose, as a leading British judge later put it, of putting them ‘beyond the rule of law, beyond the protection of any courts, and at the mercy of the victors’.

- In August 2002, lawyers in the US Justice Department sought to redefine torture in a way that would give US interrogators liberty to practice it without fear of prosecution. They argued that torture only occurred if it led to pain that was ‘excruciating and agonizing’; if it resulted ‘in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years’; and if the person accused of torture had acted ‘with the express purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering’. Moreover, the US lawyers insisted that even if a person had committed torture under all of these narrow definitions, he would still not be guilty if his actions had been directed by the president, who as commander-in-chief had the authority to order whatever interrogation technique he wanted.

- In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq in the face of significant international opposition. In its determination to overthrow Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration made ostentatious claims about weapons of mass destruction that turned out to be false, alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaeda that did not exist,
berated allies for refusing to back an invasion they argued would be unwise, and carried out that invasion without a viable plan for what to do if it produced chaos, civil war and terrorism, which it did. The United States was hardly the only country to have been wrong about the status of Iraq’s nuclear-, biological- and chemical-weapons programmes, but by creating a false sense of urgency based on exaggerated claims, Bush and other administration officials inevitably lost an enormous amount of credibility when no weapons were found.

• From 2002 until 2004, the Bush administration denied attempts by prisoners held at Guantanamo – US citizens and non-citizens alike – to challenge their detention in court. On 28 June 2004, however, the US Supreme Court issued two opinions – *Rasul v. Bush* and *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* – that overturned this practice. In the latter case, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor felt obliged to remind the administration that the Supreme Court had ‘long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens’.

• In April 2004, news reports revealed that US soldiers and prison guards had been systematically abusing Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison outside of Baghdad. The abuses had come to the attention of the army months earlier but were not made public or ended until they were revealed by the press. As documented in photographs published around the world, the practices used at the prison included mock executions, use of attack dogs, sexual humiliation, forcing prisoners to assume painful ‘stress’ positions, and severe physical beatings, some of which resulted in the death of prisoners. While a number of low-level soldiers were court-martialled for these abuses, no senior military officials, CIA personnel or political leaders were held accountable. The administration subsequently acknowledged that Rumsfeld had authorised the use of similar techniques in Guantanamo, yet continued to deny that the abuses in Iraq stemmed from official policy.

• In early 2005, Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona sought to put an end to prisoner abuse and restore America’s reputation with a proposed amendment to a defence authorisation bill prohibiting ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’ of any detainee held by any US authorities. Despite McCain’s standing on the issue – he was a former prisoner of war who had been tortured in a
North Vietnamese prison – and the strong support he received in Congress, the administration vigorously resisted the amendment, Cheney lobbied to exempt CIA operatives from the ban on ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’, and Bush threatened a veto. Although the McCain amendment was overwhelmingly approved by Congress, Bush’s ‘signing statement’ on 30 December 2005 explained that he would construe the new law ‘in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander-in-Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power’. In other words, the president did not recognise a congressional or judicial right to constrain his ability to authorise interrogations as he saw fit, so he would simply ignore the law of the land.

• In late 2005, the Washington Post revealed that the CIA was maintaining secret camps in at least eight countries where prisoners were being held without charge and free from any international or judicial oversight. The Bush administration initially refused to admit the existence of such camps and sought to punish those who passed the information to the press. Eventually, Bush had to admit that the reports were true and acknowledged that the prisoners were being held abroad to allow the CIA to use ‘enhanced’ interrogation procedures that would have not been allowed within the United States. Senior officials like Attorney General Alberto Gonzales had to explain that while it was US policy not to torture, there was ‘no legal prohibition’ on the use of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by US personnel on detainees held abroad.

• In June 2006, the Supreme Court ruled (in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld) that the president had exceeded his constitutional authority by not consulting Congress when he created military commissions to try terrorist suspects. The court also ruled that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions – which prohibits ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ and ‘humiliating and degrading treatment’ – should have been applied to all prisoners in US custody, and called into question the legality of the administration’s secret CIA detention programme. In response, the administration sought to persuade Congress to authorise military commissions almost identical to those the court had challenged and to ‘redefine’ Common Article 3 in a way that would give US interrogators more leeway. A group of Senators led by McCain, Lindsey Graham of South Carolina (a former mil-
tary judge) and John Warner of Virginia (a former chairman of the Armed Services Committee) refused to modify Common Article 3. After a bitter and complicated negotiation, Congress passed the Military Commission Act on 28 September 2006. The legislation gave the administration most of what it wanted, including the ban on detainees using the writ of habeas corpus to challenge their detention, the potential use of evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use of hearsay evidence in trials.

The culmination of all these policies and practices – along with others such as warrantless wiretapping, ‘renditions’ of prisoners to countries that practice torture, and CIA kidnappings in allied countries – has severely damaged America’s reputation as a country that respects human rights and the rule of law. It would be hard to think of a greater gift that could have been given to al-Qaeda recruiters who prey on Muslim perceptions of bias and mistreatment.

Conflating threats
Another serious misconception of the current American approach is the failure to recognise the differences within the Islamic world. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ seems to be directed simultaneously at the most diverse of enemies – the Sunni Islamist al-Qaeda network; Shia Arab extremist groups such as Hizbullah; a Shia Persian state in Iran; secular Sunni autocrats in countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia; the Islamist group Hamas as well as the secular Palestinian Fatah; the minority Alawite regime in Syria; and various Muslim extremist groups in Europe or in the wider Muslim world. In fact, many of these groups are actually enemies of one another even as they are enemies of the United States – Iran and al-Qaeda are bitter rivals; Shia and Sunni groups in Iraq are engaged in violent combat; al-Qaeda’s primary goal is to topple the Sunni autocrats; and Fatah and Hamas are adversaries who have practically waged war against each other.

Each of these diverse groups poses, in its own way, real problems for the United States, but lumping them together into an undifferentiated ‘enemy’ violates all the basic principles of good strategy. It makes it impossible for American policymakers to prioritise among threats, allocate resources, play adversaries against each other, and distinguish between urgent threats requiring action and less serious problems that can be contained. Even worse, as the French scholar Olivier Roy has
pointed out, failing to disaggregate the aims and motivations of such groups, however objectionable each might be in its own right, ‘plays directly into the hands of the Iranian leaders and of bin Laden, who want ... to tie all the existing conflicts together into a “global jihad”’.45

The tendency to lump all these diverse issues into a single ‘war on terror’ started early, with Bush’s division of the world into those who were ‘with us’ and those who were ‘with the terrorists’. Soon thereafter, Bush identified an ‘axis of evil’ that consisted of three countries that had wildly divergent interests and agendas. The trio of Iraq, Iran and North Korea may well have been evil, but in no way was it an ‘axis’. None of the three, moreover, had anything to do with the 11 September attacks.

Nor did it take long for the administration to begin conflating the different problems of states and terrorist groups. Influential senior officials such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were determined from the start to find and demonstrate an Iraqi role behind the 11 September attacks. As early as 13 September 2001, Wolfowitz vowed that the United States would focus on ‘removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism’, and later that month he sent former CIA director James Woolsey to London to investigate Iraq’s possible role in the attacks.46 Wolfowitz, Woolsey and fellow neo-conservative thinker Richard Perle would later endorse a widely discredited thesis that Iraq was behind the first World Trade Center attack.47 In his famous prediction that the war against Iraq would be a ‘cake-walk’, Ken Adelman of Rumsfeld’s Defense Policy Board claimed that such an operation ‘would constitute the greatest victory in America’s war on terrorism’.48 Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, who would later be put in charge of security planning for post-war Iraq, noted that the link between terrorist organisations and state sponsors became the ‘principal strategic thought underlying our strategy in the war on terrorism’.49

Yet that ‘principal strategic thought’ seemed to be largely beside the point. Iraq had nothing to do with 11 September, Iran and al-Qaeda were and would remain enemies, and the terrorists who would attack in places like London, Bali and Madrid were relatively independent actors who had little or no support from states. Support from countries like Iraq, Iran and Syria for terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hizbullah and the al-Aqsa Martyr Brigade existed and was and is a real problem. But it was and is a very different problem, requiring a different type and level of response, from the one that led to the 11 September terrorist attacks.

The Iraq war, of course, was an even more egregious conflation of separate problems. Bush often spoke as if Iraq and the ‘war on terror’ were the same
problem, talking repeatedly about ‘9/11’ when making the case for invading Iraq. Consequently, even four years after the 11 September attacks, nearly half of all Americans still believed that Iraq – and Saddam Hussein personally – were behind the attacks.\textsuperscript{50} On the eve of the Iraq War, Wolfowitz most clearly stated the case for linkage:

\begin{quote}
The weapons of mass terror and the terrorist networks with which Iraq is in league are not two distinct threats. They are part of the same threat. The disarmament of Iraq and the war on terrorism are not only connected. Depriving Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and dismantling its nuclear weapons development program, is crucial to victory in the war against terrorism.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

Years later, after Saddam Hussein had been removed from power and no relevant links with al-Qaeda had been found, the Bush administration was still insisting that Saddam Hussein’s links with terrorism justified the invasion of Iraq. Witness Cheney in September 2006, when challenged on such linkage:

\begin{quote}
I’m not sure what part you don’t understand here. In ... 1990, the State Department designated Iraq as a state sponsor of terror. Abu Nidal, famous terrorist, had sanctuary in, in Baghdad for years. [Abu-Musab al-] Zarqawi was in Baghdad after we took Afghanistan and before we went into Iraq. You had the facility up at Kermal, poisons facility, run by Ansar Islam, an affiliate of al-Qaeda. You had the fact that Saddam Hussein, for example, provided payments to the families of suicide bombers of $25,000 on a regular basis. This was a state sponsor of terror. He had a relationship with terror groups. No question about it. Nobody denies that.\textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}

Cheney’s examples, then, were a Palestinian terrorist from the 1970s and 1980s who apparently went to Iraq in 1999 and died there in 2002; a Jordanian terrorist who went to Iraq in 2002 to prepare to fight against the pending US invasion; a Kurdish terrorist group operating in the part of Iraq that was controlled by America’s anti-Saddam Hussein allies; and Saddam’s support for Palestinian terrorists. That all of these individuals and groups were despicable was unarguable. That they stood alongside Saddam Hussein as central actors in a single, global war, however, was a fantasy, and the idea that they provided a good justification for the costs and risks of invading and occupying Iraq was preposterous. There were always serious reasons to argue that invading Iraq might be necessary: nuclear-weapons concerns, humanitarian concerns, a desire
to ensure respect for UN Security Council resolutions, and even the hope of trying to provoke political change and democracy in the Middle East. But the argument that Iraq had a direct link to the ‘global war on terror’ and to those who had attacked the United States on 11 September was a grave distortion that misled many Americans into believing that the war was worth the risks.

The conflation of diverse threats has also been a problem elsewhere in the Middle East. The Shia Islamist group Hizbullah in Lebanon, for example, has certainly committed terrorist atrocities and is a declared enemy of America’s ally Israel. But even though Hizbullah receives money and weapons from Iran and Syria, it also has predominantly local motivations and aims that are not only different from – but in strong contrast to – those of the region’s autocratic Sunni states and global terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Yet when Hizbullah attacked Israel in summer 2006, killing eight and capturing two Israeli soldiers, Bush declared the attack to be part of the ‘global war on terror’, placing it alongside Afghanistan and Iraq as one of three main fronts. Commentators like Gingrich and Republican Senator Rick Santorum began talking about ‘World War III’, and lumping Hizbullah together with al-Qaeda, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia and others as the enemy in this global war.

This line of thinking ignored not only the many differences among these groups, but more importantly, it ignored the fact that the challenge from Shia Hizbullah was initially viewed with as much concern in the Sunni Arab world as it was in Israel. At an Arab League summit meeting in Cairo in July 2006, representatives of Sunni governments in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and several Persian Gulf states chastised Hizbullah for ‘unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible acts’, and Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, said that Hizbullah’s attacks on Israel would ‘pull the whole region back to years ago, and we cannot simply accept them’. Instead of taking advantage of the divisions in the Muslim world and the potential for Sunni resistance to the Hizbullah threat, however, America offered unreserved support for a poorly conceived Israeli bombing campaign – which had confused and ultimately unattainable objectives and produced high casualties among Arab civilians. This had serious costs. It drove Sunnis and Shi’ites together in an anti-American front, it enhanced Hizbullah’s status within Lebanon and throughout the Muslim world, it made the task of Arab reformers that much harder, and it undermined America’s potential role as an honest broker between Israel and its neighbours.
The same problem plagues the administration’s approach to Hamas. Iranian and Syrian support for Hamas exists and is a serious impediment to peace because Hamas uses that aid to conduct attacks on Israeli civilians. But it should not obscure the fact that Hamas’s origins, and the explanation for its electoral success, are to be found not in the global Islamist movement but in the nationalist Palestinian struggle and the resentment of the corruption and failures of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement. Ironically, Fatah itself was often described as part of the same ‘global war on terror’ even though it is at war with Hamas. During armed clashes between the two groups in late 2006, Fatah supporters taunted Hamas militants with cries of ‘Shia! Shia!’, underscoring the growing depth of the sectarian divide in the Middle East and the absurdity of considering Hamas and Fatah as part of the same, single ‘enemy’. While Hamas’s appeal to Islamist themes and rhetoric is undeniable, to see and treat it primarily as part of a unified, global organisation, and to conflate its aims and motivations with those of other, very different groups, risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Despite all the evidence to the contrary, in his 2007 State of the Union address Bush was still referring to ‘the enemy’ (singular) and insisting that ‘the Shiite and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat’. He implied that his efforts at democracy promotion had been proceeding well during 2005, and only ran into trouble when ‘a thinking enemy watched all of [the progress], adjusted their tactics and in 2006 they struck back’. In reality, however, as Glenn Kessler noted in the Washington Post, ‘his description of the actions of “the enemy” tried to tie together a series of diplomatic and military setbacks that had virtually no connection to one another, from an attack on a Sunni mosque in Iraq to the assassination of [a] Maronite Lebanese political figure’.

The case for acting militarily against any particular threat can be made; but it should be made on its merits and not on the misguided notion that such action is part of a single, global war. Otherwise, US policy will only continue to drive diverse enemies together rather than take advantage of opportunities to pull them apart.

Alienating allies
To fight what was being called a global war, one might have thought a premium would be put on the construction of a global alliance. But the president and his supporters from the start underestimated both the importance and the difficulty of building such an alliance and based their efforts to do so on a very specific, and highly flawed, conception of leadership. They believed that American power and morality were so clearly evident that all the United States had to do was to chart a bold course and its allies would be likely to follow.
‘I’m amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about’, Bush remarked in October 2001. ‘Like most Americans, I just can’t believe it. Because I know how good we are.’\(^{59}\) In fact, even America’s closest allies did not automatically assume its intentions to be pure, and its undoubted power has created much resistance around the world, even among those who tended to follow Washington’s lead.

Bush’s vision of American leadership had been developed and articulated well before 11 September. Indeed, as a presidential candidate in 2000, Bush specifically campaigned on the notion that the Clinton administration had been far too deferential to other countries’ sensibilities in formulating its foreign policies. The new administration’s vision was that important US foreign-policy goals could only be realised through decisive American leadership and, if necessary, through unilateral action. Such leadership entailed staking out firm positions and then demonstrating the capacity and determination to follow through regardless of opposition. The administration was convinced that US allies and partners would eventually follow the American lead while simultaneously allowing the United States to maintain its freedom of action. The argument was that multilateralism had to be ‘preceded by unilateralism’, otherwise the followers would never follow.\(^{60}\)

Bush started to implement this vision of leadership immediately upon taking office, by rejecting international accords on climate change, ballistic-missile defence and the International Criminal Court. But it was 11 September that seemed to convince him that the stakes were now too high to allow foreigners to influence US decisions about its vital interests. As he declared the ‘war on terror’, Bush made clear that he welcomed allies who wanted to join him, but also that he would not be prepared to compromise to win their support. ‘At some point we may be the only ones left’, Bush said in autumn 2001. ‘That’s okay with me. We are America.’\(^{61}\)

The problem is, more than six years into the ‘war on terror’, in some ways America is just about the only one left. Launching the war in Iraq, Bush insisted that ‘we really don’t need anybody’s permission’ to defend US security, and of course that was true.\(^{62}\) But by neglecting diplomacy, ignoring the foreign-policy priorities of allies, mistreating detainees, launching the invasion of Iraq in the face of stiff international opposition and accusing opponents of the war of disloyalty if not dishonesty, the administration has alienated friends and potential allies around the globe.

According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, between 2002 and 2006 the percentage of people with a ‘favorable opinion’ of the United States fell dra-
matically: from 75% to 56% in the United Kingdom, from 63% to 39% in France, from 61% to 37% in Germany, from 61% to 43% in Russia, from 61% to 30% in Indonesia, from 25% to 15% in Jordan, and from 30% to 12% in Turkey.\textsuperscript{63} Also according to Pew, the portion of respondents who believed that the United States took their country’s interests into account was 38% in Germany, 32% in the United Kingdom, 21% in Russia, 20% in the Netherlands, 19% in Spain, 19% in Canada, 18% in France, 17% in Jordan, 14% in Turkey and 13% in Poland.\textsuperscript{64} By the end of 2006, an average of only 29% of people polled in 18 different countries had a ‘mainly positive’ view of the United States, a level that had fallen from 36% earlier in 2006 and 40% in 2005.\textsuperscript{65}

In the Arab world, America’s standing was even lower. According to a 2006 poll conducted in six Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), 57% of those polled had a ‘very unfavorable’ view of the United States, with 21% ‘somewhat unfavorable’ and only 12% either ‘somewhat favorable’ or ‘very favorable’. In the same poll, 38% named George W. Bush as the foreign leader they most disliked (for the first time outpacing two Israeli prime ministers, Ariel Sharon at 11% and Ehud Olmert at 7%), while Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah was the foreign leader most admired at 14%, followed by French President Jacques Chirac at 8% and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad at 4%. When asked which country they would most like to see as the world’s sole superpower, 19% said France, 16% said China, 14% said Pakistan, 10% said Germany, and only 8% said the United States. And 72% percent of Arabs polled said that they considered the United States the greatest threat to world peace; 36% saw France as the country with the most freedom and democracy, compared to just 14% for the United States.\textsuperscript{66}

In 2003, Max Boot, a Bush supporter, argued that ‘resentment comes with the territory’.\textsuperscript{67} William Kristol of the \textit{Weekly Standard} also concluded that ‘we need to err on the side of being strong … And if people want to say we’re an imperial power, fine.’\textsuperscript{68} But it turns out not to be so fine. In an age of democracies, global resentment makes it harder for leaders to cooperate with the United States, and harder for America to achieve its goals throughout the world.

**The resource gap**

Finally, one of the oddest aspects of the Bush approach has been the enormous gap between the rhetoric of war and the resources devoted to it. From the moment Bush declared a ‘war on terror’, he has implied it was an existential threat to the United States – ‘a threat with no precedent’ – and required the most exceptional measures in response. The ‘war on terror’ would ‘begin with
al-Qaeda’ but it ‘would not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated’, he said. By talking of global war, invoking Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, accusing critics of ‘appeasement’, and warning of the threat from ‘Islamic fascists’, Bush and other administration officials did not hesitate to compare the current conflict to the greatest war of all. At one point Rumsfeld even compared the defenders of the president’s policies to those who in the 1930s were ‘ridiculed or ignored’ by people who ‘argued that the fascist threat was exaggerated or that it was someone else’s problem’.

The terrorists who attacked the United States on 11 September were certainly dangerous, and just how great a danger Islamic extremism poses to America and the world is a legitimate debate. And at least some of those, like Gingrich, who argue that America is now engaged in a third world war are willing to call for resources commensurate with the threat. The administration, on the other hand, talks about world wars, but refused (until January 2007) to increase the size of the military, has cut more than $1.5 trillion in taxes, and spends roughly 4% of gross domestic product on defence, about half the average defence spending as a share of the economy as during the Cold War. In the Second World War, by way of comparison, the United States mobilised 16 million men, operated a draft, and spent nearly 40% of gross domestic product on defence. On 10 January 2007, Bush proclaimed that the war in Iraq would ‘determine the direction of the global war on terror – and our safety here at home’, yet he called for a troop increase for that war of less than 22,000 troops – to be accomplished by extending existing tours of duty and accelerating deployments, not by calling up more soldiers. The gap between rhetoric and response suggests that Bush himself may not believe that the threat is as great as he claims, and it breeds cynicism among those who believe that the ‘war’ is being used for political ends.

We will never know if Bush’s critics like Gingrich and Kristol are right when they say that the ‘war on terror’ could have been won and could still be salvaged with enough resources, which they claim would enable America to win in Iraq, destroy terrorist enemies and intimidate Syria and Iran. There are reasons to doubt it. But at least these critics are consistent and willing to call for an alignment of ends and means. To have a strategy based on transforming the greater Middle East and deterring and destroying all enemies, but not backing that strategy with adequate means, was a recipe for failure from day one.

**Fighting the right war**

There is nothing easy about confronting the murderous threat posed by Islamist extremists who use violence to achieve political goals. The Bush administra-
tion’s ‘war on terror’ is failing, however, not only because the job is inherently difficult but because the president launched the wrong war. He misconstrued the nature of the threat, placed too much faith in the use of military force, paid too little attention to the importance of moral authority and ideological combat, conflated a diverse array of threats into a single monolith, failed to appreciate the importance of winning and maintaining friends and allies, and failed to supply the necessary resources for the kind of war he chose to fight.

In my book *Winning the Right War*, I argue that an alternative course of action is both possible and necessary. In such a new approach, the United States and its allies would approach the ‘war on terror’ as a long-term ideological struggle – in some ways like the fight against Communism during the Cold War – that we will win only when we have discredited the extremist ideas of our enemies. This approach would not offer a quick fix to a problem that cannot be quickly fixed, but it would make Americans and their allies safer than the approach that has been followed so far, as well as offer better prospects for eventual victory.

In fighting the right war, we would strengthen our defences against the terrorist threat and sometimes deploy offensive military force while recognising that any policy designed to prevent any conceivable attack does more damage than a policy of defiantly refusing to allow terrorists to change our way of life. We would show confidence in our values and society and act to re-establish our moral authority, which people around the world consider as they decide whether to join us, join the terrorists, or remain on the fence. We would expand our efforts to promote political and economic change in the Middle East, which in the long run will lead that region out of the despair and humiliation that help fuel the terrorist threat. We would launch a major programme to wean ourselves off imported energy, freeing ourselves from the dependence that constrains our foreign policy and helping key Muslim countries emerge from the curse that prevents their modernisation and development. We would stop pretending that our disengagement from efforts to achieve peace between Israel and its neighbours has nothing to do with the problem of terrorism, and we would launch a diplomatic offensive designed to bring an end to this conflict that is so tragic for all sides. We would take seriously the views of our potential allies, recognise their legitimate interests, and seek to win their support and cooperation in confronting the common threat.

In fighting the right war along these lines, we would demonstrate confidence that, in the long run, the hateful, repressive ideology we are fighting will collapse, like communism before it. Ultimately, violent

*Violent Islamism is not likely to win enduring support*
Islamism is not likely to win enduring support. Terrorism is not a strategy with which Muslims will forever want to be associated, and it will create a backlash within Muslim societies. With time and experience, and if the United States and its allies make the right choices, Muslims will themselves turn against the extremists in their midst. They will seek to put their civilisation on a path that will restore its greatest era, when the Islamic world was a multicultural zone of tolerance and of intellectual, artistic and scientific achievement. The agents of this change might come from above – leaders fearful of losing their grip on power if they fail to change – or from below – citizens fed up both with secular autocracy and the fundamentalist alternative – but they will come as the inevitable if destructive effects of modernisation run their course. Islamist extremism, in other words, will end up on the same ash-heap of history as Communism did, so long as we do not play into the extremists’ hands and artificially prolong its life.

Notes

9 See Gause, ‘Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?’.
10 In 2004, the United States government changed its methodology for
tracking terrorist attacks and began to compile data on much more inclusive ‘incidents of terrorism’ rather than the narrower ‘major terrorist attacks’ counted in the State Department’s *Patterns of Global Terrorism*. The data for 2004–05 thus reflect this wider category, but the general pattern is the same. See National Counterterrorism Center, ‘A Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004’, 27 April 2005; and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, National Counterterrorism Center, http://wits.nctc.gov/Main.do for the 2005 data.

11 In 2003, for example, Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol argued that Iraq was ‘ripe for democracy’, the main piece of evidence being that democracy was being practiced in its Kurdish region at the time. See Laurence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, *The War Over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003), p. 99.


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25 In his 15 December 2006 farewell speech after resigning as defense secretary, Rumsfeld stated that ‘it should be clear not only that weakness is provocative, but the perception of weakness on our part can be provocative as well’. See Jim Rutenberg, ‘In Farewell, Rumsfeld Warns Weakness is “Provocative”’, New York Times, 16 December 2006. It was the same message Rumsfeld had been conveying since 2001, when he argued that ‘weakness is provocative … it kind of invites people to do things that they otherwise wouldn’t think about doing’, quoted in Bill Gertz, ‘Rumsfeld Says U.S. Presence in Asia is Vital’, Washington Times, 25 July 2001.


33 This was the view of Lord Johan Steyn, a member of Britain’s highest court, who added that ‘as a lawyer brought up to admire the ideals of American democracy and justice, I would have to say that I regard this as a monstrous failure of justice’. See Lord Johan Steyn, remarks to the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Twenty-seventh F.A. Mann Lecture, 25 November 2003, available at http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/pdfs/FA_Mann_lecture1Dec03.pdf.


In *Rasul v. Bush*, a case that involved an Australian and two British citizens captured in Afghanistan, the court rejected the Bush administration’s argument that US law had no jurisdiction in Guantanamo, ruling that even non-US prisoners there should have access to the court system. In *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, a case that involved a US citizen captured in Afghanistan, the court ruled that the administration had the right to declare US citizens ‘enemy combatants’ but that such prisoners had to be able to appeal that designation before an impartial judge.


The story was broken by the CBS news-magazine *60 Minutes II*, which aired its report on 28 April 2004, and by Seymour Hersh, whose article ‘Torture at Abu Ghraib’ was posted on-line on 30 April and appeared in the 10 May 2004 issue of the *New Yorker*. See also Seymour Hersh, *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004); ‘The Taguba Report on Treatment of Abu Ghraib Prisoners in Iraq’, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html.


Bush administration lawyers tried to argue that such an approach would be legal, since the Senate, when it ratified the UN Convention Against Torture in 1994, had linked the definition of mistreatment to the Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution, which applies only to US citizens. However, Abraham Sofaer, who had served as the legal adviser to the State Department when the convention was signed, insisted that the obvious purpose of the reservation was to give ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’ the same meaning as ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ in the Eighth Amendment – not to constrain the geographic reach of the Convention. See Letter of Abraham D. Sofaer to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 21 January 2005, cited in Margulies, *Guantanamo*, p. 179. See also David Luban, ‘Torture, American-Style’, *Washington Post*, 27 November 2005. On Cheney’s efforts to exempt the CIA, see David Espo and Liz Sidoti, ‘Cheney Appeals to GOP Senators for CIA Exemption to Torture Ban’, Associated Press, 4 November 2005. The *Washington Post* noted that Bush’s veto threat meant that he was ‘proposing to use the first veto of his presidency on a defense bill needed to fund military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan so that he can preserve the prerogative to subject detainees to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’. See ‘End the Abuse’, *Washington Post*, 7 October 2005.

See ‘President’s Signing Statement, HR2863’, Department of the US White
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House, CQ Federal Department and Agency Documents, 30 December 2005.


See Olivier Roy, ‘We’re Winning, Despite the “War”’, International Herald Tribune, 7 September 2006.

For the Wolfowitz quote, see DOD News Briefing – Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Pentagon, 13 September 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=162. On Woolsey’s trip, see Karen DeYoung and Rick Weiss, ‘U.S. Seeks to Ease Rhetoric On Iraq; Officials Urge Wait and See on Anthrax’, Washington Post, 24 October 2001. The article quotes Woolsey as saying that ‘there are too many things, too many examples of stolen identities, of cleverly crafted documentation, of coordination across continents and between states … to stray very far from the conclusion that a state, and a very well-run intelligence service, is involved here’.


Quoted in Nicholas Lemann, ‘After Iraq’, New Yorker, 17 February 2003, p. 72. Several years later, Feith was still arguing that the Iraq war was ‘an operation to prevent the next, as it were, 9/11’. See Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘A Little Learning: What Douglas Feith Knew and When He Knew It’, New Yorker, 9 May 2005.


See ‘President Discusses Foreign Policy During Visit to State Department’, 14 August 2006, http://


65 The average percentages of those with a ‘mainly negative’ view were 52% in 2007, 47% in 2006 and 46% in 2005. Poll conducted between November 2006 and January 2007 among 18,000 adults in 18 countries by GlobeScan together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland. See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/306.php?nid=&id=&pnt=306&lb=hmpg1.


71 See Rumsfeld, ‘Address at the 88th Annual American Legion National Convention’.