The Next Chapter of Global Terrorism
New Realities Transcending Old 9/11 Paradigms

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The views expressed in this monograph are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or the U.S. Government.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“There was a world before 9/11, and another one, drastically different, post 9/11. Shaykh Osama might be dead but his deeds are not. 9/11 has left a permanent scar on the American psyche and will live long after in the hearts of every American.” -- Deceased AQAP editor Samir Khan in Inspire magazine’s 10th anniversary of 9/11 edition. Khan was 15 years old on 9/11.

The 9/11 attacks elevated Osama bin Laden and his group to mythical status in the American psyche. The two wars that followed during the next decade and his 4,300 day stay on the FBI's Most Wanted List only added to bin Laden's mystique, establishing him as the central figure in the post-9/11 chapter of violent global jihad. However, by the time of his death in May of 2011, paradigms associated with bin Laden and the group he left behind to Ayman al Zawahiri and other global jihadists were already shifting significantly. Collectively, these new realities transcend previous 9/11 paradigms and have led to a new chapter of global jihad.

The only constant is change, and the changes underway are part of a more than thirty year evolutionary process in which transnational and local terrorist leaders have set the agenda and priority for action on their own terms. That was true for the thousands of predominantly Arab mujahidin who traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s, with broad-based home support, to aid their Afghan brothers and spend a decade fighting to repel the Soviet invasion. By the time the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan in February 1989, al Qaeda had formed and was ready to enter other battlefields for a new decade of defensive jihad. Global jihad was a reality. By the mid-1990s, while most jihadist groups remained focused on the “near enemy,” al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden crystallized his thinking about the “far enemy” strategy, introducing it into the mix and convincing others to follow him on the path to 9/11. His most important convert was Ayman al Zawahiri; then a 30 year Egyptian jihadist terror veteran focused on the “near enemy” in Cairo.

This paper acknowledges the lasting impact of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden but looks beyond the 9/11 paradigms to examine the state of the next chapter of global jihad, which began to come into focus between 2009 and 2011, and is driving the threat calculations for 2013 and beyond. It examines the efficacy of the far enemy strategy absent its chief advocate, the shifting role of affiliates and allies, South Asia's pivotal role, the Arab Awakening, and the threat of Do-It-Yourself (DIY) terrorism in the U.S. homeland and the West in general. No examination of the evolving threat would be complete without a discussion of the broad technological and societal trends underway that provide unique opportunities and challenges for global jihadists. The Postscript concludes with a cautionary tale of expecting the unexpected in this next chapter.
CHAPTER ONE
Setting the Stage: The Lasting Impact of 9/11

“If our messages can reach you by words, then they wouldn’t have traveled by planes.” -- Osama bin Laden

They were four routine flights from the East Coast to California on a crystal clear Tuesday morning, comfortably less crowded as it was the week after the Labor Day holiday and the end of the summer tourist season. The 256 passengers and members of the flight crews averaged far less than 50 percent load capacity for the four commercial aircraft, which were equipped for cross country hauls. Nonetheless, they were filled for the long flights. The 11,400 gallons of jet fuel would cause massive explosions and burn more than 200 degrees Celsius above steel’s melting point, ultimately bringing down the Twin Towers and burning in the Pentagon for days.1

When the first plane took off from Boston’s Logan International Airport at 7:59 AM, the pre-dawn destination cities of Los Angeles and San Francisco were still dark. It was early afternoon in Hamburg, Germany, where 29-year-old Yemeni-born operational courier Ramzi bin al-Shibh had departed days earlier after learning through a cryptic phone call the date of the upcoming attack from his former Hamburg roommate, 33-year-old operational leader and Egyptian urban architecture student Muhammad Atta. The afternoon breeze off the Persian Gulf combined comfortably with the warm sun in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where 33-year-old Saudi-born al Qaeda facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, had departed just days after receiving $26,000 in excess funds from the more fiscally savvy hijackers. The afternoon rush hour was underway in the teeming urban seaport of Karachi, Pakistan as 37-year-old operational commander Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, of Pakistani descent but raised in Kuwait, was joined by new arrivals bin al Shibh and Hawsawi. They would gather to watch their handiwork unfold not far from where Muhammad had trained some of the hijackers. It was nearing dinner time in Afghanistan, where 44-year-old Saudi-born Osama bin Laden would settle in, tuning into the radio to hear the results of the “Planes Operation” that would come to define him forever.2

Four and a half hours later all the passengers and crewmembers on the four flights were dead. Two massive skyscrapers in the heart of the world’s most important financial district had collapsed into an enormous pile of rubble while a worldwide audience watched live in disbelief. The headquarters of the most formidable military in human history was on fire, filled with smoke and missing one of its oddly shaped
facades. A smoldering field in southwestern Pennsylvania was the resting place for the heroes of a mid-air struggle that spared the U.S. Capitol building from attack. Nearly three thousand had died, and millions would continue to deal with physical and mental scars for months and years to come.

Having spent the last four years in the Pentagon, there was nothing remarkable about reporting to work that Tuesday morning as the Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Current Intelligence Terrorism Chief. But chaos later ensued upon reports that the plane that had crashed into the World Trade Center’s North Tower had been hijacked. I was immediately summoned to a meeting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs’ Director of Intelligence (J2), who issued a set of rapid-fire instructions on how we would deal with the unfolding situation. We had already swung into crisis management when the second plane crashed into the South Tower 19 minutes later. My office chief called from the DIA Headquarters at Bolling Air Force Base to discuss the situation and immediately dispatched five or six people to what would unknowingly become the next attack site only 34 minutes later.

At 9:37 AM Hani Hanjour, the 28 year old Saudi-born hijacker/pilot—who unlike the three other pilots was not a part of the Hamburg cell—advanced the throttles to maximum speed on American Airlines Flight 77, diving towards the world’s largest office building, a five sided maze with 23,000 unsuspecting inhabitants. The flight would include two hijackers who featured prominently in subsequent investigations as the only two of 19 terrorists known to be in the U.S. prior to the attack. For me, Saudi-born Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi were the al Qaeda constant, spanning the time I spent as the chief of the terrorism analysis shop at the U.S. European Command’s Joint Analysis Center (JAC) in Molesworth, England in the mid-1990s and my Pentagon time prior to 9/11. Both men had spent time in Bosnia in 1995 as mujahidin fighting the Serbs at the same time I was supporting the NATO-led forces against the Serbian Army. I returned to Washington, D.C. two months before Osama bin Laden would issue his August 23, 1996 fatwa calling for the death of Americans. I witnessed the results of that call two years later in East Africa. Both men were influenced by the suicide attack carried out by their friend Azzam on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi in August 1998 in which over 200 people were killed and more than 4,000 wounded. Both men traveled to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in December 1999 while en route to the U.S. There, separate meetings were taking place that would advance the plot for the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS COLE during a Brief Stop for Fuel (BSF) in Aden, Yemen.

Ultimately, when American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, our offices on the opposite side of the building shook. Following the explosion, the building quickly filled with smoke, and jet fuel-aided fires flared up in several parts of the building. In the days that followed this tragic loss of life, the Pentagon took on a triumphal survivor’s sense of resolve. The building teemed with patriotic drawings from school children and tributes to the victims, flags flew everywhere around the site,
and an improvised, free outdoor food court sprang up in the South Parking Lot to feed the recovery workers 24 hours a day. But the damage was done. Six days later, a contractor from southern California brought us some new software, arriving that weekend on a flight from Los Angeles that served only nine wary passengers.

Just as Pearl Harbor had propelled the United States into a war that had to be won to ensure the safety of its borders and its place in the world in the midst of Nazism, Fascism, and Japanese Imperialism, there was a nearly all-consuming imperative to stop the next attack, which seemed inevitable on September 12. This imperative was fueled further by the first batch of anthrax letters sent to American media outlets one week after 9/11, the failed attempt on December 22 by al Qaeda shoe bomber Richard Reid to bring down American Airlines Flight 93 from Paris to Miami, and revelations of Khalid Sheik Muhammad’s plan for a second wave of airliner attacks on targets on the West Coast. Collectively, these plots eviscerated forever one of the great American isolationist myths: our two vast oceans served as an insurmountable barrier against overseas threats.

Again, as with Pearl Harbor nearly 60 years earlier, military conflict ensued on multiple fronts. But unlike World War II, there would be no declaration of surrender by a defined nation-state enemy. While Pearl Harbor was the catalyst, the shared sacrifice of a nation at war and casualties of soldiers that impacted every community in the U.S. would soon overshadow Pearl Harbor—a place most Americans had never previously heard of or visited—in the American psyche. That would not be the case with 9/11. New York and Washington defined American power, were visited by millions from around the world each year, and were well-known to all.

A decade later, one commentator would astutely capture the lasting psychological impact.

More than ten years later September 11, 2001 remains the seminal date in the life of most Americans, probably more so for those on the East Coast, just as Pearl Harbor had been for previous American generations. Everyone over the age of 16 can tell you their personal story of that day. We did not just watch 9/11 on TV in a live broadcast that seemingly never ended, we lived it. The very personal nature of watching the second plane go into the south tower of the World Trade Center and then seeing both towers collapse on TV was life altering for millions. It went on for weeks with people standing outside near ground zero with pictures of their missing loved ones. We were a country in mourning at the same time we were mobilizing for war.4

While 9/11 would remain the basis and justification for an unprecedented decade of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, over time the brutal, grinding wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, fought by an all-volunteer force comprising just one half of one percent of the U.S. population, became increasingly disconnected from the lives of most Americans. A 2011 Pew Research Center study timed for the tenth anniversary of 9/11
found that while nine out of ten Americans felt proud of the troops who had fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, only half of those polled said the two wars had made a difference in their lives, just 36 percent said Iraq or Afghanistan came up in conversation with family or friends, and only about a quarter said they paid close attention to either war.\(^5\)

The next chapter of global jihad is rooted in pre- and post-9/11 factors but is being driven by its own set of new geographical, technological and societal realities.

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**Notes**


3. Ibid. 9, 155.


CHAPTER TWO

Closing the bin Laden Chapter of Global Jihad

“Today’s headlines and history’s judgments are rarely the same.” — Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

I have a confession: I am the same age as Osama Bin Laden. That odd fact has been useful through the years in two ways. First, I have been in countless briefings and meetings when someone has asked his age and I impressed the questioner by instantaneously beating everyone else to the correct answer. Second, and more importantly, it has allowed me to think about how different events have shaped him and his thinking through the prism of human development models. Seeing his father’s work in Jerusalem end up in Israeli custodianship in 1967, at the impressionable age of ten, and the weighty world events that swirled around him in 1979 – while a striving 22-year-old college student – affected him in profound ways.

For better or worse, he is an historic figure. He was not a religious authority but his narrative was grounded in credible, albeit radical, religious themes. He was a man of strong convictions and the dogged determination that characterizes true believers in any endeavor, which would be both positive and negative for his life. He learned at an early age the importance of diversity of Muslim communities, hierarchical organizations, and the doors opened up by money and influential contacts. He strived for but largely failed at unifying those he came in contact with. He understood that religion and politics could be intermingled and be separated effectively depending on the topic and situation.

Despite being nearly obsessed with the idea, he was never able to repeat a 9/11-style attack in the U.S. Homeland and never really embraced the conduct of a successful “thousand cuts” small-scale operational strategy in America. Oddly enough, five weeks after his death, the remaining leaders of the al Qaeda core stumbled all over each other to endorse such a strategy in a June 3 video on individual jihad.

He left behind a trail of millions of internally displaced and refugees, innocent victims, broken lives, and grieving relatives. His two signature accomplishments were first, to draw the United States and the West into the longest and costliest wars in U.S. history, and counterterrorism offensive and defensive measures that would challenge the relationship between civil liberty (vis-a-vis the government), civil rights (vis-a-vis
the public) and national security in a way not seen since World War II. These conflicts changed the way Americans live, work, travel, and think.

Secondly, he left behind a narrative that other theorists can claim, rally behind, and adapt to their local circumstances just as he did during his own journey from young student at the King Adul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he was enthralled with Muslim Brotherhood principles; to an Arab Afghan mujahidin. His final transformation, into a global jihadist who embraced the “far enemy” strategy, put him squarely at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood that he once embraced.

In Ayman al Zawahiri's eulogy of bin Laden published five weeks after his death, predictably titled “And the Noble Knight Dismounts,” al Zawahiri takes a more than glass half full approach while describing bin Laden's accomplishments: awakening a sleeping Ummah from a deep slumber; orchestrating a jihadist revival; and creating four devastating disasters- the U.S. and the West (9/11), the Iraq War, the war in Afghanistan, and the Arab Awakening. This is the same Arab Awakening that bin Laden failed to comment on publicly in the four and a half months between its beginnings in Tunisia to his death in Abbottabad.

Osama bin Laden and the Far Enemy strategy are synonymous. It is an outgrowth of his collective narcissism (the belief that one’s cause and organization is superior to others) that he developed in the 1980s while supporting the Afghan mujahidin and forming al Qaeda. Inspired by his reading of history and divine support, bin Laden developed, orchestrated, and declared via a rambling fatwa a “David versus Goliath” strategy that was never universally accepted between August 1996 and his death in May 2011. It never represented a consensus view among jihadists, scholars, al Qaeda members or others who questioned the ideological justification for directly taking on the U.S. and/or feared the result of such a strategy. That was most evident, less than two years later, when the carefully orchestrated but poorly coordinated February 1998 announcement of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders quickly became a bureaucratic fiasco that even he would later admit was a mistake. Most jihadist groups never joined, and other group leaders who were surprised to see their organization’s name on the list, disavowed a “Front” that was effectively stillborn upon birth.

In the mid-1990s bin Laden believed the U.S. could only absorb a few attacks before it would collapse. The 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, the 2000 attack on the USS COLE, and 9/11 were his beliefs in action. But his biggest miscalculation, the consequences of drawing the U.S. “paper tiger” into Afghanistan, was a lifetime in the making.

In 1975, when he was just 17, he watched the final chapter of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Only four years later he watched the Iranian Revolution unfold and
learned that religiously-based revolutionaries could overthrow a U.S.-backed
government in the region. Later that same year he watched the Soviet Union send its
atheist, communist army into Afghanistan to support a Cold War proxy regime. At age
27 he watched the U.S.-Multi-National Force (MNF) leave Lebanon in 1984. History
seemed to repeat itself ten years later when the U.S.-led United Nations Operation in
Somalia II (UNOSOM II) left Somalia after suffering humiliating losses of life. By age 31,
his personal experience had taught him and hundreds of other foreign mujahidin that
they could help defeat a superpower militarily, a defeat that would help lead to political
collapse and the breakup of a union of republics (USSR) and an alliance of nations
(Warsaw Pact). He was particularly seized with his hand in supporting the October
1993 downing of two U.S. Special Forces Blackhawk helicopters in Mogadishu and the
death of 19 U.S. soldiers in what was described at the time as the bloodiest battle since
Vietnam. Throughout his mid-30s and early-40s, he viewed the Clinton and Bush
administrations’ measured reactions to attacks on the World Trade Center, two U.S.
embassies in East Africa, and a U. S. ship in Yemen as signs of weakness. All of these
lessons proved to be of little or no value on September 12th, 2011.

By the end of the post-9/11 decade, his view of the U.S. “paper tiger” had
evolved such that he cautioned AQAP leader Nashir al Wahisi against moving too
quickly in Yemen to declare an Islamic state, for fear it would bring the wrath of the
U.S. In part, his letter read:

Today, America, the guardian of the West, is by far the most influential country in the
region. America is the lifeblood of that region. America is also the biggest supporter of
that region’s status quo. America is strong enough to have toppled the Iraqi regime and
the Islamic government in Afghanistan. Since then, America may have been weakened,
perhaps, tremendously, but it is still powerful enough to topple any state and anywhere,
particularly any newly founded Muslim state. Our work, hence, must go on until we
exhaust and weaken America to the point where it could not threaten or defeat any state
which we create.1

The challenge with being the author, architect, and chief advocate for a strategy
synonymous with oneself is that its currency is tied too closely to your fate, affecting
your ability to get others to follow suit. With the 9/11 attacks, Osama bin Laden
stubbornly rejected the short term objectives of many global jihadists, the Afghan
Taliban, Pakistani militants, and other extremists by disregarding those who voiced
strong opposition to his generally known plan to strike big in the U.S., or by not
consulting with others who were directly impacted by his decision. The details and
extent of the most important and far reaching operation in modern global jihad were
restricted at the leadership level of al Qaeda core to three men: bin Laden, his longtime
de facto deputy and military commander Abu Hafs al Masri (Muhammad Atef), and
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. This self-assured march through history was a trademark
of bin Laden’s bureaucratic, micro-manager decision-making pattern that preceded
9/11, but would be much more difficult to employ effectively thereafter. On the whole,
this would be one of his greatest strengths and weaknesses as the leader of the vanguard of global jihad.

A similar pattern unfolded in 1988-89 when he broke with his long time mentor and partner Abdullah Azzam over the direction that jihad should take following the Soviet Army’s retreat from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989. While Azzam wanted to focus next on Palestine, Bin Laden had already formed the base (al Qaeda) in 1988 with the intent to send now battle-hardened foreign mujahidin to multiple global jihad locations. Bin Laden also rejected al Zawahiri’s call to focus on ousting the Egyptian regime that had signed a peace treaty with Israel in favor of a far enemy-first strategy that put the U.S. in the crosshairs of his new organization. His decision to override local terrorist leaders and conduct attacks in Saudi Arabia in 2003 would turn public opinion in his homeland solidly against him, a trend that would continue in other countries that suffered post-9/11 attacks at al Qaeda’s hands.

Trying to micro-manage a far flung global jihadist movement proved frustrating from his Abbottabad compound where he had no Internet connectivity. That isn’t to say he wasn’t entertained: three wives, multiple children, a small garden, a cow, a rabbit, lots of chickens—he always loved farming—videos of himself, and an ample supply of pornography. But his repeated calls written calls to other al Qaeda core leaders, affiliates, and allies arguing for a laser-like focus on the far enemy strategy, while not totally ignored, no longer carried the same weight.

Notes

"Osama bin Laden frequently assured that our mission is to encourage the Ummah [Verse]. Today, praise to Allah, America is not facing an individual or a group or a sect, but it is facing a rising Ummah that woke up from its deep sleep, via a Jihadist revival that challenges her [America] wherever it may be." -- Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri eulogizing Osama bin Laden in a June 8, 2011 message titled “and the Noble Knight Dismounts”

Bin Laden’s signature strategy is already being replaced by a de facto “Near Enemy Plus” strategy necessitated by new realities. His successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, made no appreciable gains during the first 30 years of his terrorist career focused on the “near enemy” and his belief that “the road to Jerusalem goes through Cairo.” He now finds himself on the outside looking in, as his Egyptian homeland is being reshaped by Muslim Brothers, Salafists, and other Islamists who never accepted bin Laden’s far enemy strategy. Left with a losing hand, Zawahiri has issued a series of lengthy, forgettable Arab Awakening themed statements since President Mubarak’s overthrow, and has continued to mouth the “America first, head of the snake” strategy crafted by his predecessor.

Here is where an important comparison is illuminating. Bin Laden—the soft spoken gatherer of fellow travelers with his checkbook and financier list in hand—employed a stubborn autocratic management style in which subordinate views, including those of his own appointed decision-making central shura council, could be discarded at will. His prison-hardened, fiery replacement al Zawahiri has a similar track record, minus bin Laden’s mystique and more soft spoken approach. Al Zawahiri adopted and agreed to the far enemy strategy for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) without consultation; fracturing the group and paving the way for a beleaguered formal merger with al Qaeda in 2001.

Al-Qaeda’s regional affiliates and allies—like al Zawahiri—continue to lease the brand name and propaganda script of a dead man who spent a decade aiming, and failing, to repeat 9/11, while pursuing their own de facto “Near Enemy Plus” strategy. This was a source of great frustration to bin Laden whether it was with his own al Qaeda core leadership, affiliates or allies. His Abbottabad letters are replete with consternation over attacks conducted by multiple groups against non-U.S. targets. He viewed them as a waste of limited terrorist resources that did little to advance long term goals. Sometime after May 2010 he told then al Qaeda core’s number three Atiyah al
Rahman al Libi, “Given that the difference of the impact of attacks against the foes inside or outside of America is substantial, we need to confirm to the brothers that every effort that could be spent on attacks in America would not be spent outside of it.”

The “Near Enemy Plus” strategy recognizes the importance of striking the U.S., but in the context of a broader prioritized agenda that acknowledges diminished jihadist resources and capabilities. Unlike al Qaeda core in Pakistan, which is engaged almost entirely in terrorism and survival, the affiliates and allies are involved in terrorism, insurgency, criminal enterprises, humanitarian efforts, and governance responsibilities at the local and regional level. Their intent to strike U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland has not changed, but its place on their priority list is calibrated by goals and objectives closer to home.

The announcement of allegiance to al Qaeda core in February 2012 by the increasingly weakened al Shabaab leader Muhktar Abu Zubayr, also known as Godane, had as much to do with internally divided loyalties among clans, nationalists, and long time global jihadists as any meaningful strategy shift. Coupled with battlefield and territorial losses, the newest self-described al Qaeda affiliate is at its weakest point since its inception in 2007. It is also an important indicator of al Zawahiri’s long held stubborn autocratic style. More than a year earlier he had asked bin Laden to reconsider his decision not to publicly endorse a merger with al Shabaab, by arguing that, “I see it to be very essential for Al-Qaeda to confirm and declare its linkage with its branches, in order to become a reported fact; there is no use in denying it. Therefore, please reconsider your opinion not to declare the accession of the brothers of Somalia.” Less than a year after his promotion he reversed bin Laden’s position and collaborated with Godane in the As Sahab media statement announcing the “merger.”

The far enemy strategy and global jihad are not one in the same. One is focused on a specific target priority list; the other focuses on the duty to defend Muslims under attack regardless of the venue. In this context, global jihadists have found themselves dealing with a common foe – the U.S. – in conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and more recently in Libya and Syria.

This next chapter will test the viability of a diffuse multi-generational model that operates in a “local front” approach akin to what al Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al Suri envisioned in 2004, where leadership is separated from open fronts and independent actors. This classic field versus headquarters model is playing out today across the Middle East and Africa, in which affiliates and allies listen attentively, respond politely, and then pursue their own agendas. It is a reflection of the decrease in currency of the vanguard status of the surviving al Qaeda core leadership in South Asia. The increased democratization of science and technology amid a technological revolution are providing multiple avenues for connectivity in this developing form of horizontal
global jihad that is replacing the vanguard-centric, vertically oriented global jihad bin Laden envisioned but never achieved.

The oft stated myth that “only the strongest survive” was never less true than today. One pundit noted that if it were true, the dinosaurs would still rule. Instead, al Qaeda is dealing with the Darwinian reality that it is those who adapt to their changing environment who survive. Al Qaeda core’s leadership’s ineffective adaptation skills since 2008 have cost many of them their lives and all of them their ability to drive transnational terrorism decision-making outside of South Asia. While the dinosaur comparison may be too stark, the decline in fortunes in a part of the world that will play a pivotal role in the next chapter of global jihad is not.

Notes

4 Ibid.
“We also must be careful when we talk about Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda is not the Taliban. Its relationship with the Pashtun Taliban has always been an alliance of convenience, and their agendas do not really match. I don’t want to give Al Qaeda more advice, but if they have one objective in Afghanistan it should be to keep the Taliban away from the negotiating table... Al Qaeda has no realistic political agenda, it is entirely rejectionist. Theirs is a confrontation of beliefs and values. So it is the right thing to do, despite the risks, to go out on the front foot and meet their threat militantly.” -- Richard Dearlove, head of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) from 1999 to 2004

Ironically, key elements of this broadened next chapter of global jihad will still pivot on what happens in the same neighborhood where the last one picked up steam in the 1980s, peaked on 9/11, and is moving toward a significant reset by the end of 2014. South Asia is the only place on the planet where nuclear-armed neighbors – Pakistan and India – share a militarized border and are engaged in a “cold war” utilizing proxies to incite violence while avoiding nuclear brinkmanship. A second, equally long but even less secure border between Pakistan and Afghanistan enables insurgents and proxies to engage in a “hot war” against coalition forces led by the United States- the second superpower in the last 30 years to deploy its military to the region. The 40 million Pashtuns who straddle the border remain one of the largest nations in the world without a state. Most are in Pakistan and many look to the Pakistan Taliban and the Afghan Taliban as their advocates. A third border shared by Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran links the Shia and Sunni worlds that have competed and occasionally cooperated against common foes in their own sectarian “cold war.” That competition is taking on added immediacy and heat in the face of Iranian nuclear calculations, the Arab Awakening, and the countdown to the spring 2014 Afghan national elections and the December 31, 2014 withdrawal of most foreign forces in Afghanistan.

Attrition of the U.S.-led coalition’s role and influence in Afghanistan is inevitable as local, regional and international players and their proxies push their own self-interested agendas. That reality increases the challenges of building on gains during the post-9/11 decade against the remaining al Qaeda core, which largely rendered the group incapable of conducting large-scale complex operations in the West. Ayman al Zawahiri and his diminishing ranks are playing for time in the hopes of making it through 2015, when they can reassess conditions on the ground.
Much of the velocity and trajectory of the next chapter of global jihad hinges on al Zawahiri’s “playing for time” strategy. It is a risky calculation for all sides. The Pashtunwali tribal code of the honored guest has been the saving grace for al Qaeda core since 1996- first in Afghanistan and later in Pakistan. But it has limits. The Afghan Taliban internal debate about what to do about bin Laden after the 1998 East Africa bombings, 2000 USS COLE attack, and 9/11 was only settled by the majority-of-one vote, cast by Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. The Taliban is not a monolith, and Afghan and Pakistani militants operate from a geographically diverse location with multiple motivations: corruption, the drug trade, other criminal enterprises, and territorial hegemony. Local, ethnic and tribal loyalties—not national interests or global jihad—come first.

Even if the insurgents regain some level of dominance in the Pashtun areas in the Afghan south and east and threaten Kabul following the U.S.-led military drawdown in 2014, it is not a given that they will let al Qaeda core operate with the same level of pre-9/11 impunity, regardless of the outcome of nascent negotiations underway. That approach cost the Taliban their 1996 prize – ruling Afghanistan – and more than a decade of fighting. After more than 30 years of war it is unlikely that battle-hardened voices in the Taliban and the broader insurgency will allow Mullah Omar’s one man, one vote, to prevail again. They will keep in mind that “past performance is [probably] not an indicator of future returns” in their post-2014 investment strategy.

No one other than immediate benefactors and their clan and tribal allies liked living under the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Yet, for a period of their rule, they provided what many people longed for in a way that only those who have experienced war torn strife and lawlessness can fully grasp. After more than 10,000 days of war, security is at the top of the priority list for ordinary citizens today. According to a 2011 Asia Foundation survey, insecurity (including attacks, violence and terrorism) was identified as the biggest problem in Afghanistan by over a third of respondents (38 percent). In 2006 the number was 27 percent. More than half of respondents (56 percent) said they feared for their personal safety in their local area. That is a sharp rise from 40 percent in 2006. The departure of foreign troops leaves a security and power vacuum that can provide openings to be filled by national, regional, sectarian, or factional players. How that plays out will directly impact the integrity and glue of a nation-state fraying at sectarian edges.

In Pakistan, nearly all of the militant jihadi groups that successive Pakistani military and civilian leaders have nurtured from 1979 through 9/11 are now active against the state, with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) the most prominent exception. The level of collaboration with al Qaeda that has developed over years of living together, intermarriages, shared training and logistics support, fighting against enemies on both sides of the FATA, and counterintelligence, will be difficult to untangle or deter.
A sharp upturn in attacks in Pakistani urban areas in 2009 represented the success of the al Qaeda core’s alliance with FATA and northwestern Pakistani militant groups, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Student movement of Pakistan or TTP) — formally announced in 2007 and banned by the government in 2008— to strike at the heart of the Pakistani state. The July 2007 nine day siege of the Lal Masjid (Red) mosque in Islamabad, the December 27, 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi, and the September 20, 2008 Marriot Hotel truck bombing that killed 62, including three Americans, were prominent examples of the alliance between Pakistani militant groups and the al Qaeda core. The Marriot bombing was orchestrated by Osama al Kini, just hours after Bhutto’s widower husband and now Pakistani President, Asif Ali Zardari made his first speech to the nearby Pakistani Parliament.2

One of the best examples of the level of collaboration in place by 2009 was the March 19th arrival in Pakistan of 30-year-old Jordanian physician and extremist blogger Human Khalil al Balawi. He had been detained in Jordan for his blogging and then seemingly turned by the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID), or the Mukhabarat. With the backing of the CIA he was sent to Pakistan to infiltrate al Qaeda core. Having initially fooled his GID handler, he would continue the ruse through a long-awaited meeting at a CIA base near Khost on the afternoon of December 30, 2009. After promising to provide information on Ayman al Zawahiri, he detonated his suicide vest killing five CIA officers, two Blackwater security officials, an Afghan driver, and his GID handler.

During his nine months in Pakistan in 2009 al Balawi would gradually overcome suspicions by TTP and al Qaeda core while meeting directly with TTP leader Baitullah Meshud, Baitullah’s cousin and eventual successor Hakimullah Meshud, al Qaeda core’s number three Sheikh Said (aka Mustafa Ahmed Abu al-Yazid), Said’s deputy Atiyah al Rahman al Libi, and paramilitary operational commander Abdullah Said al Libi. By the time he made his way to Khost, al Balwai had been fitted with a suicide vest by the man referred to locally as al Qaeda’s tailor, written two essays, and recorded three martyrdom videos and clips. His attack would quickly be followed by a congratulatory statement by Sheikh Said and claims of responsibility. In addition, video releases by Hakimullah Mehsud intimated that attacks on American targets in the West were coming.3

Hakimullah could make such claims because he knew what others did not. Human al Balawi was not the only operative being trained in late 2009 by the TTP for a high profile attack on America. The TTP would, like AQAP, soon step onto a global stage with the unexpected arrival—four months after al Balawi—in July 2009 of Faisal Shahzad, a 30-year-old ping pong champion with a wife, two small children, and an MBA from the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut. The son of the former head of
Pakistan’s Civil Aviation Authority claimed inspiration from Anwar al Aulaqi and a desire to avenge Muslim deaths at the hands of the U.S. military and CIA in Afghanistan and the FATA. During a five month stay in Pakistan, he spent just five days receiving explosives training and translating a bomb-making manual from Urdu to English, activities in which he did not excel. And only three months after sending the recently naturalized American back to his new homeland, the TTP collaborated with him in a failed car bombing in heart of Times Square on a crowded Saturday night.

LeT’s track record suggests that improved Pakistan-India relations increases the likelihood of an attack as the group pursues a violent agenda regardless of the political and economic benefits that would accompany a thaw in tensions. The potential for LeT to bring Pakistani-Indian relations to a boiling point, as it did with the November 2008 Mumbai attack, are additional inhibitors to avoiding the unthinkable. LeT, TTP, and other Pakistani militants pose the most credible terrorist threat to nuclear security anywhere on the planet. As The Brookings Institution’s Bruce Riedel has pointed out, a failed nuclear-armed Pakistani state of 185 million would have much greater implications for the U.S. than a resurgent Taliban in a failed Afghan state of 30 million.

This year marks the two hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the War of 1812, which ended after three years. Excluding U.S. possessions in the Pacific during World War II, in the last 197 years there have been fewer than 1,500 days of war fought on American soil. Almost all of those days occurred during the Civil War, which ended 147 years ago. In Afghanistan, anyone born after 1979 has seen more than 10,000 days of war in their lifetime. A generation raised on a war footing in both countries is not likely to move directly from war to peace, but rather to sectarian and ethnic conflicts with political, economic, and terrorism dynamics that will have internal, regional, and global implications.

Notes

CHAPTER FIVE
Thirty Years War: Upheavals in Slow Motion

“Sometimes decades pass and nothing happens. Sometimes weeks pass and decades happen.” -- Vladimir Lenin

The onset and speed of the late 2010-11 revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt caught everyone, including the al Qaeda core, by surprise. 28 days in Tunisia and 18 days in Tahrir Square accomplished what Ayman al Zawahiri could not in 45 years. But those heady days already seem like the distant past. Today, local, regional, and international involvement has slowed upheavals and calls for further changes. The seventeenth century’s Thirty Years War in central Europe reset the political order of an entire region by changing the relationship between subjects and rulers and ushered in a new governance model, the nation-state. Similarly, it will take years of problem-solving, instability and experiments in governance to come to a new social contract in the region.

On June 30, 2012, 84 years after the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Mohammed Morsi was sworn in as president of a country where Islamists have been suppressed for decades. In Tunisia, An Nadha's Rashid al Ghannouchi has gone from being the exiled leader of an extremist organization to the office of the Prime Minister. Both Morsi and Ghannouchi have to be mindful of the aspirations of those who brought them to power, the Salafist political parties on their right and the secularists on their left, while trying to carry out broader mandates for their newly democratic societies steeped in mistrust of government. After years of focusing their energy and narrative on the far enemy and local autocrats the removal of autocrats, and the transition for many from subject to citizen are complicating rather than satisfying global jihadist agendas.

The Islamists’ prominent role in governance, with a distinctly nationalist pedigree, is providing a viable alternative to al Qaeda’s caliphate-by-force narrative. It is relegating al Qaeda to the role of quasi-opposition party in exile with no ideological vocabulary to deal with democratic coalitions. In the opposite way that the Reformation pushed a separation of church and state, the Arab Awakening is pushing mosque and state closer, but not close enough for global jihadists.

One of the most important keys to defining the next chapter of global jihad is the question of relevancy, which is being contested on two fronts. The diminution of al
Qaeda core’s vanguard role within the broader movement is being exacerbated by the Arab Awakening’s achievement of similar goals. Militancy has its roots in local politics, and the uneven trajectory of Arab Awakening states increases the likelihood that extremist will focus their energies locally and regionally rather than globally. That presents a direct challenge to a narrative that sees challenges and solutions on a global scale.

The narrative will need other significant revisions to remain applicable as new paradigms take hold. Bin Laden’s defensive jihad narrative initially focused primarily on the Palestinian question, the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, and the flow of oil to the West. They have dominated U.S. foreign policymaking and have an ideological and political component for global jihadists that are subject to revision in this next strategic period. The U.S. will soon no longer need to import oil from the Persian Gulf and is on track to become an energy exporter. Hamas’ ascension coupled with newly empowered Arab Awakening partners in Cairo and elsewhere has shifted the calculations of who are the most effective advocates for the Palestinians. Egyptian President Morsi’s prominent role in mediating the November 2012 Hamas-Israeli violence is a case in point. The often awkward and unwelcomed input from Zawahiri, like bin Laden before him, is becoming increasingly irrelevant to what has been an intractable conflict.

Yet opportunities abound. Recent history is littered with prison releases and escapes resulting in new terrorist leaders such as Ayman al Zawahiri and AQAP leader Nasir al Wahisi. The development of factionalism within Islamist movements could include the emergence of new extremists, some linking up with al Qaeda. Terrorist acquisition of weapons stocks, particularly chemical-biological devices in Syria, could be game changers. Instability in Yemen temporarily allowed al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula an opportunity to provide social services, welcome more foreign mujahidin, and expand its “near enemy plus” external operations portfolio. Iraqi sectarian and ethnic violence and instability in Syria and Libya are providing opportunities for al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to make gains and establish footholds.

The September 11, 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya are reminders of the fragility of newly formed democratic societies juxtaposed with better-formed local militias that are networked regionally with like-minded extremists and global jihadists. To the south of the Arab Awakening, a Tuareg rebellion, military coup, and breakdown of government control of Mali’s north is providing AQIM operating space to plan local and regional attacks as well as building networks with emerging post-Arab Awakening militias and global jihadists throughout North Africa and the Middle East.

Upheavals in slow motion are creating new melting pots of extremism that do not easily fit the models of the post-9/11 decade. Northern Mali, eastern Libya, Syria,
northern Nigeria, and the Sinai contain al Qaeda elements operating with newfound partners on localized agendas. Terrorist organizations in which advice and logistics support trump direction are intersecting with the rise of new local militias and extremists emboldened by the Arab Awakening, increased operating space, and decreased counterterrorism and security cooperation across the Middle East, Maghreb, and the Sahel. A muddled playing field of militias, extremists, and terrorists is emerging that looks less like a global jihad movement and more like a horizontally connected network of associations that are fueled by localized self-interest. Their evolution and focus on a broader globalized threat will hinge on successes locally, particularly in the critical area of tribal engagement, and their view of who they view as the primary enemy.

Nowhere are the stakes higher than in Syria. A localized conflict that began with demonstrations designed to mirror Tunisian and Egyptian protests has become internationalized. Shia leaders in Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq see the fighting through the same sectarian lens as their Sunni counterparts in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and Qatar and across the Sunni-dominated Middle East and North Africa. Western nations and the Russian and Chinese governments are all operating on an even broader international calculus, factoring in political and economic global alliances, stability in Lebanon, and impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Like Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Balkans in the 1990s, and Iraq from 2003 to 2007, Syria offers global jihadists a unique operating space to adapt their narrative to facts on the ground and the next chapter of global jihad. Unlike Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Iraq, the stakes are even higher in Syria, where chemical and biological weapons are present and global jihadists have the chance to carve out a beachhead on the border with Israel.

The resetting of the political order in a region as vast and diverse as the Middle East and North Africa will result in uneven and contradictory trajectories for everyone involved, including global jihadists. At the beginning of 2012 AQAP had captured vast stretches of southern Yemen and had imposed a strict interpretation of sharia law on thousands. By the end of 2012 the group was in retreat and urban attacks in Sana’a rather than governance issues hundreds of miles to the south was once again dominating their increasingly restricted operating space. The trajectory for global jihadists in 2012 in Syria is far different. Beginning as a small offshoot of al Qaeda in Iraq, the al Nusra Front has spent the last two months becoming a force to be reckoned with in the Syrian opposition attracting fighters, money, and materiel from across the region. This same uneven dynamic is playing out farther afield in northern Mali where AQIM is on the rise and in Somalia and South Asia where al Shabaab and al Qaeda core are on the decline. In all those cases the key variable is operating space. That variable will remain influx for years as the Arab Awakening moves beyond the early stages of what, like the seventeenth century Thirty Years War in central Europe imparted, will be a protracted redefinition of the relationship between newly emerging governments and the governed.
CHAPTER SIX
DIY Terror: Fighting Overseas Wars at Home

“While the American president was declaring that the threat to the national security of his country comes from out of the borders of [America], and particularly from Afghanistan and Pakistan at present and Yemen and Somalia in the future— at that time, Major Nidal Hassan of the American army, a Muslim of Palestinian origin, was planning to kill American officers and soldiers inside the world’s biggest U.S. military base, Fort Hood.” -- Anwar al Aulaqi December 23, 2009 interview posted on al Jazeera.net 48 days after the attack and two days before Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab’s attempted bombing of Northwest flight 258 en route to Detroit

Bin Laden failed for ten years to employ or direct an operational infrastructure to successfully conduct attacks in the U.S. despite the fact that hundreds of Americans have traveled to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia and other jihadist battlefields during the last 30 years. Homegrown terrorists who went looking for a fight often found law enforcement rather than al Qaeda. Fighting overseas wars at home (more than 50 percent of homeland plots since 9/11 have targeted U.S. military personnel) more localized grievances for those coming of age in post-9/11 America, and the burgeoning prisoner cause célèbre constituency will be near the top of the DIY priority list. Last June the late Abu Yahya al Libi, then one of the most prominent of al Qaeda core’s remaining ideologues and a 2005 escapee from U.S. military custody in Bagram, Afghanistan, again promoted in-place DIYers by equating one attack in the West to “more than tens of attacks in faraway battlefields.”

Communication is a vulnerability that trips up many plotters whether it occurs with al Qaeda core trainers, cell members, online contacts, family, local communities, law enforcement informants or undercovers. According to research by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Public Policy, looking at jihadist terrorism cases from 9/11 to the end of 2011, informants played a role in 36 percent of the cases, government undercover operatives in 11 percent, and both were involved in a handful of cases. 21 percent involved tips and cooperation by Muslim communities and families.¹

Law enforcement and community partnerships have been a powerful deterrent but can also be a double edged sword in the punch-counterpunch world of terrorism and counterterrorism. Fear of compromise impacts timelines, preparations, cell composition and size, role of intermediaries, and sophistication of the plan. Each factor decreases the likelihood of a large-scale coordinated attack but can also make it more
difficult to detect smaller scale DIY plotting.

The notion that DIYers are less sophisticated than those operatives with group affiliations and support from overseas will be challenged in this next chapter of terrorism. More than 11 years without a successful attack by al Qaeda core on the U.S. homeland and more than seven years anywhere in the West does not point to a sophisticated operating model. While they span the entire motivational and ideological spectrum, Nidal Hassan, Norway’s Anders Breivik, the 2007 Virginia Tech shooter, the July 2012 Colorado movie shooter, and France’s Mohamed Merah, their actions prove the power of unsophisticated DIY terror.

Even those who received training and plotting instructions, like New York subway plotter Najibullah Zazi in 2008-09 and were re-routed back to the West have been left largely on their own after returning home. Zazi’s travel to Pakistan with two cohorts and attendance at an al Qaeda core training camp netted him a set of his own handwritten notes—not unlike the transcription of a Middle Age monk or the early 1990s authors of the 11-volume *Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad*. Zazi spent the next eight months back in the U.S. planning without direction until September 2009 when he inadvertently alerted authorities to his plotting after seeking guidance from an al Qaeda core contact in Pakistan on the correct mixture of two bomb-making ingredients listed in his training notes.

DIYer Zazi, like Merah, who killed seven in Toulouse, France in March 2012, and a host of al Qaeda core trained operatives arrested in Europe in the last two years, have become the rule rather than the exception. A weakened al Qaeda core’s inability to replicate a 9/11-scale operation increases the appeal of using rent-a-terrorist individuals or small cells that travel to South Asia, receive training—which is often rudimentary—and then return home, giving the core its much desired global notoriety.

AQAP has tried to simplify and professionalize DIY terror with its Convoy of Martyrs instruction article in *Inspire* magazine. Would-be terrorists are told to send basic information about themselves to AQAP’s "military committee," which will help them in planning and executing the attack and will also take responsibility for it and provide media coverage. The article includes a list of conditions that the candidates must meet to be approved, a list of possible targets, and instructions for contacting the committee securely by using encrypted emails. In this franchised version of DIY terror, no travel or face-to-face meetings are required.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have combined with personal and local grievances to encompass a shifting narrative attracting DIY terrorists in the post-9/11 chapter. The end of the U.S. military’s role in active hostilities in Iraq and the drawdown in Afghanistan in 2014 will likely impact that aspect of the narrative over time but will have little effect on the personal and local grievances among the
dissatisfied who have increasing access to information, sophisticated weaponry, and can more easily network with like-minded extremists. The powerful enablers resulting from the combination of globalization and the technology revolution will drive DIY terror long after the 9/11 wars are in the rearview mirror.

Notes

CHAPTER SEVEN

Fueling the Wi-Fire

“Twenty or thirty years from now a U.S. president will have a public record of photos and data that includes a lot of boyfriends or girlfriends and parties and so on.” -- Eric Schmidt, Google Executive Chairman

For all his propaganda skill, bin Laden’s overriding security concerns trumped his ability to stay in touch through constantly evolving technologies. When his custom-built, Internet-free Abbottabad compound was ready for occupancy in January 2006, Facebook was sprinting from six million users to over 850 million today. The scope and scale of change is enormous, a technological revolution that British technologist Ben Hammersley has described as easily on par with the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. In 2003, fewer than one billion devices connected to the Internet worldwide. By 2010 that number had grown to over 12 billion on its way to over 25 billion by 2015.¹

Smartphone usage is projected to pass that of personal computers this year, and within four years mobile broadband subscriptions will make up 80 percent of Internet connectivity.² This is especially true in emerging markets. According to Darrell West, the Vice-President and Director of Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution, “Many developing countries have skipped the landline and desktop computer stages of information technology. Rather than progressing from mainframes to desktops to laptops to tablets to smartphones, they have jumped directly to mobile broadband.”³ A good example of this phenomenon is playing out in Afghanistan, where landlines are rare. A 2011 Asia Foundation Survey found that from 2008 to 2011 mobile phone usage increased from 40 percent to 66 percent. Usage was 88 percent in urban households but only 60 percent in rural households. In a country with a literacy rate hovering near 30 percent computer usage, while still limited, nearly doubled from 5 percent in 2008 to 9 percent in 2011, with 22 percent in urban areas and 6 percent in rural areas.⁴ An October 2011 University of Maryland public opinion survey in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and UAE found that online usage was on the rise, with 27 percent acquiring access in the last year, and 40 percent over the last three years.⁵

Imagine 9/11 if thousands at the attack sites had had the iPhone smartphone that Steve Jobs first introduced to the world in 2007, which is now used routinely to capture the mundane and the historic. On that September morning more than half of your friends did not have an email address, a cell phone, or a home computer. None of them were on Facebook or Twitter, and there was no YouTube to post videos to. Most people huddled around televisions to find out what was unfolding. That is a world apart from the breaking news of today.
Today, for those under 30, the smartphone is a major part of life. The Pew Research Center in 2011 found that 83 percent of American adults own a cell phone and 35 percent of all adults own a smartphone. That number is growing daily. A separate survey in the U.S. found that 66 percent of respondents slept with their smartphone next to them and more than half were willing to give up exercise, alcohol, and caffeine for a week rather than their smartphone. Not surprising, according to the American Dialect Society, the 2010 word of the year was “App,” as in “there’s an app for that,” an advertising slogan for the more than half a million applications available for use on iPhones, iPads and competitors’ operating systems. Pew also noted in early January 2011 that with “the arrival of ‘app stores’ for a wide spectrum of operating systems for phones and computers, app really exploded in the last 12 months.”

The advent of this 24/7 online revolution cuts across all age categories but is most pronounced in the age group—bin Laden believed it was 15 to 25-year-olds—most susceptible to terrorism recruitment, radicalization and mobilization. The messenger, message, new media, and operations are now linked together in a dynamic never seen before in human history. The late Wi-Fi terror celebrity ideologue Anwar al Aulaqi, whose English-language sermons are still widely available online, is a case in point. According to January 2012 analysis by the Muslim Public Affairs Council, of 28 plots in the U.S. since Barack Obama was elected, al Aulaqi played an inspirational and/or operational role in 18 of them. Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen rank near the bottom of GDP per capita income, literacy rates, and online connectivity yet host three of the most active terrorist propaganda media machines. In 2011 the Afghan Taliban and the Somalia-based al Shabaab even started their own Twitter feeds.

Al Qaeda’s core narrative evolved over time but always under the watchful guise of bin Laden. Any shift—such as his directive in 1996 not to attack Saudi oil infrastructure, which he rescinded in 2004—was presented in carefully crafted “edit-then-publish” propaganda messages. Once a faxed fatwa or couriered video or audiotape was published it was a completed work. The 24/7 online world of this next chapter is a “publish-then-edit” enterprise where grievances are transmutable and values and social mores are increasingly becoming bottom-up driven and fungible. In this form of digital direct democracy one can shift from a reader of extremist material to a producer or, more worrisome, to a violent jihadist in just a few clicks.

In 2008 18-year-old Fairfax, Virginia resident Zachary Chesser became interested in Islam and obsessed with extremist online content. By the time of his arrest in July 2010 he had threatened the creators of the South Park sitcom for their portrayal of the prophet Muhammad, posted personal Facebook information that he had collected of their supporters, and tried to travel to Somalia to join al Shabaab. In those two short years, Chesser had been directly involved in three YouTube channels, two Twitter accounts, his Facebook profile, one blog, six forums, and two websites. His sites had
hundreds of hits, which he monitored on a monthly basis. According to AQAP emir Nasir al Wahisi, “The media work is half of the jihad...A powerful media production is as hard hitting as an operation in America.”

It is somehow fitting that Apple Computer, Inc. co-founder Steve Jobs would be ahead of Osama bin Laden (and Seal Team Six) and everyone else for that matter on the Global Language Monitor’s list of “Top Names of 2011.” Not only did Jobs top bin Laden, he did it by more than 30 percent. Yet, the two men who viewed themselves as capable of changing the world in very different ways engendered fierce loyalties among global constituents and were contemporaries with striking parallels in both their lives and short legacies.

Both men were born in the 1950s, Jobs in 1955 and bin Laden in 1957. Both were influenced at an early age by strong winds sweeping through the world in the late 1960s. For Jobs it was the Vietnam era counterculture. For bin Laden it was a multitude of related events and movements: the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; the resultant loss of East Jerusalem; the rejection of Egyptian President Nasser’s Pan Arabism in favor of Political Islam. He would later point to 1973 as the year his views began to come of age. Both found their calling at an early age: Jobs co-founded Apple Computer, Inc. at age 21 and bin Laden began to support the Afghan mujahidin at 22. Both were very successful in their 20s, only to stumble and have to start over elsewhere in their early 30s. Jobs was ousted from Apple in 1985 and went on to found NeXT Computer and buy Pixar Animation. Bin Laden left Afghanistan in 1989 fed up with Afghan factional conflict among those who had vanquished the Soviets, failed in persuading the Saudi Royal Family to allow him rather than the U.S. to protect the kingdom from Saddam Hussein, and left Sudan virtually penniless after four and a half years of investment and business ventures.

The year 1996 would be a seminal one for both men. Jobs would return to Apple and embark on the most creative period of his technological life, including the 2001 introduction of the iPod, which would change the way we listen to music, the 2007 roll-out of the iPhone, and the 2010 introduction of the iPad. Along with the “apps store” these devices are transforming the way humans ingest information and communicate. Bin Laden would return to Afghanistan and issue a fatwa against Americans—typed on an Apple Macintosh computer no less— and then embark on his most destructive period of directed operations leading to 9/11; an attack that would change the way the West defines its enemies.

By the time of their deaths—five months apart in 2011—both men were household names. They were responsible for making others part with billions of dollars, and they revolutionized the way people live. Perhaps their greatest legacies would be in global branding. The bitten apple and the Arabic word for “the base” are universal
symbols associated with their founders that will evolve over time but never lose the ubiquitous linkage to their lives.

But here is where important differences outweigh similarities. While bin Laden spent the last decade of his life in hiding, focused on securing his own safety while encouraging others to fight, terrorize, and die for the cause he defined, Jobs was leading the way in pushing forward a technological revolution that was moving faster and faster and would be a key new reality for the next chapter of global jihad today. It is difficult to overstate the lightning speed and fundamental impact of the merging of globalization with the technological revolution underway. And it is equally important to recognize how fast developments are occurring, how recent many of them are, and how applicable they have become to global jihad.

Notes

2 Ibid.
9 Samir Khan, Inspire, September 2011.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Increased Democratization of Science and Technology

“Historically, there have only been two ways to aggregate and amplify human capabilities; bureaucracy and markets. Then in the last ten years we have added a third – networks. They help us work together on complex tasks, but also destroy the power of the elite to determine who gets heard.” -- Modern Management Theorist Gary Hamel

Technologist Kevin Kelly has noted that in every technology's lifespan, there is the period described by computer scientist Marvin Minsky as the “haves and have-laters.” Kelly noted that the first cell phones were the size of bricks, cost around $2,000, and were the provenance of techno-geeks and the wealthy. That would have seemed like a real bargain to Osama bin Laden, who after returning to Afghanistan in 1996 had to put out somewhere in the neighborhood of $15,000 for a reliable Inmarsat satellite phone and thousands of pre-paid minutes. Twenty years later, 90 percent of Americans walk around with cheap cell phones small enough to fit in their shirt pocket and mobile broadband has reached the poorest countries of the world, including Afghanistan.

The Internet began as a tool focused initially on improving itself. Once the early adapters modified and perfected the tool to give it pictures and a point and click interface (the Web), its advantages became clearer and more desirable. But it was not until the price equated that of a TV that the have-laters came onboard in record numbers. As William Gibson famously noted, “the future is here, it’s just not evenly distributed.”

In the ongoing next chapter of global jihad, the increasing democratization of science and technology down to the individual level has emerging implications for the have-later terrorist. The online connected networks are in part supplanting physical hierarchies and speeding up extremists' transformation. In several areas of technological advance, the have-laters – aided by the increased democratization of science – have come onboard.

We tend to think of drones in military terms: Predators and Reapers. It's time to think again. How about having your own personal surveillance drone the size of a large Frisbee, or even smaller, that you can operate with your iPhone? Or one that could be used by the paparazzi to spy on celebrities, track cheating spouses or monitor wandering teenagers? One with a 40-minute flight period could prove as effective as a
terrorist’s surveillance platform. According to the FAA, 30,000 drones could be in the nation's skies by 2020.

It is remarkable that global jihadists, despite making adept use of other ubiquitous tools of the globalized technological revolution and suffering themselves repeated cyber-attacks—six al Qaeda linked sites were taken down in late March 2012—have not made cyber warfare a top priority. That may be changing. In June 2011 al Qaeda core, for the first time, went to some length to encourage individuals to conduct cyber-attacks in the West by declaring:

Hacking on the Internet is one of the key pathways to Jihad and we advise the Muslims who possess the expertise in the field to target the websites and the information networks of big companies and government agencies of the countries that attack Muslims, and to focus on the websites and networks that are managed by the media center that fight Islam, Jihad and mujahidin.¹

Al Qaeda’s first strategic address one month after Osama bin Laden's death focused on individual jihad in the West and an almost pleading appeal to get into the hactivism game by comparing U.S. cyber defense readiness to its physical defenses before 9/11.

The current reality facing information networks is no different from America’s security situation prior to 2001, which allowed, after the grace of Allah, the execution of the blessed Tuesday attacks. So, would the lions of Islam become seriously ready and lead an informational battle the like of September 11th battles to deter today’s Pharaoh America and her allies from continuing aggression on our Ummah, and mock our religion and steal our resources?...Let us destroy the enemy's location, and infiltrate the fortressed of his military, security and political institutions, and above that we lean toward the money of the infidels and distort their economic institution and instill fear in the hearts of those who contribute to it, and shake the trust, because we think that the electronic warfare is from the important and effective future warfare.²

When Sun Microsystems co-founder Scott McNealy said in 1999 that “you have zero privacy anyway get over it,” he was a man way ahead of his time.³ Today several companies have developed apps for those phones that employ GPS that analyze your Facebook, Foursquare and Twitter networks to see if any friends or friends of friends are nearby. This new generation of apps broadcasts your location at all times to friends and in many cases to people you don't even know but have similar interests. That is a far cry from 2009 when Colleen LaRose (Jihad Jane) joined Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks’ online community and became a citizen of his virtual artist enclave to track his movements.

What about money transfers? The ancient hawala system that helped Faisal Shahzad finance his failed attack on Times Square two years ago today is being joined by modern systems like Twit pay, Facebook credits, and a host of other online options
as a means to move money discreetly from point A to point B. Many Generation-Yers who already question why their parents carry cash in their wallets will soon replace their wallets almost entirely with their most prized possession: their smartphones.

The increasing democratization of science and technology down to the individual level has emerging implications for have-later terrorists. In a world in which the ability to seek out and find data, experts, and like-minded individuals in order to complete a task, increased transparency, sharing, and technological advances are providing even more operational options to redefine tactics, select and surveil targets, move money, and execute attacks.

Notes

2 Ibid.
CHAPTER NINE
Identity Pattern Shifts and Pull versus Push Approaches

“The result of the merging of the exponential growth of computing power and human networks [might] not only be the onset of a global brain that does much of our thinking and links us to close associates 24/7 but also increases in volatility as computer networks amplify the primeval emotions of fear, love, and hate as never before.” -- British historian Niall Ferguson

The increasing democratization of science and technology down to the individual level is playing an important role in redefining citizenry in a world where neither nation-states nor other institutions are well constructed to deal with identity pattern shifts to transnational citizens who view borders and networks in a whole new way. In their 2010 book The Power of Pull, John Hagel, John Seely Brown, and Lang Davison sketched out the impact of the shifts underway in the world as moving from push to pull concepts. Push involves programs, products, and processes set up in advance by those who know how best to help us succeed. Think of how education systems, worker training programs, weight loss regiments, production models, and buying habits are forecasted: products are available at the right place at the right time, all employing carefully scripted and standardized processes.

Pull focuses on the individual's ability to find and access people and resources and then attract those that are relevant and valuable to effectively achieve a greater result. Globalization and the technological revolution are making this possible on a scale never seen before. Push programs treat all individuals as consumers who are supposed to consume resources according to a forecast. Pull platforms treat individuals as creators with the opportunity to tailor products or services to meet their needs.

This is not an obituary for institutions, hierarchies, governments or terrorist organizations operating under push programs but rather a recognition that something fundamentally is changing in the way people define themselves and operate. Hagel, Brown, and Davison argue that the locus of power is shifting from institutions to individuals. They note that,

Just as the telephone, automobile, and airplane reshape our society in the first half of the twentieth century, the new digital infrastructure is beginning to reshape institutions in the twenty-first. But there is a key difference between this technology revolution and previous ones. In past technology revolutions a new technology or cluster of technologies emerged in a burst of innovation for a short period of time and then quickly began to experience a flattening of the performance-improvement curve...It gave society a chance
to take a deep breath and catch up...For the first time in history we are dealing with a technology that shows no sign of stabilization in terms of price/performance ratio improvement.¹

The exponential growth of computing power is changing the meaning of nearly every aspect of our lives and is enabling identity pattern shifts in an increasingly pull-oriented world. Moore’s law continues to hold true: since the invention of the integrated circuit in 1958 the number of transistors that can be placed inexpensively on the integrated circuit has doubled approximately every two years. Combine that with Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg’s observation that “the amount of information shared digitally will double every year” and the argument made by Google's Eric Schmidt that “every two days now we create as much information as we did from the dawn of civilization up until 2003,”² and it becomes clear we are living in transformational times.

Push program global jihadists arrive at a terrorist enclave, fill out an application—al Qaeda core’s 1990s version was amazingly detailed—are interviewed, pledge bayat to the group leader, attend a training camp, get selected and directed for a mission, follow the instructions of the operational commander, and provide regular updates of progress along the operational timeline. It is an institution-based hierarchical approach that defined al Qaeda core on 9/11 and one that bin Laden pined for as his grip on his own organization weakened. His inability to effectively direct the actions and targeting priorities of affiliates and allies increasingly frustrated him during the post-9/11 decade.

While push program jihadists have dealt with stiff headwinds from the U.S. led counterterrorism offensive, pull platform terrorists have had the winds at their backs, benefiting from identity pattern shifts enabled by the technological revolution’s democratization of science and technology. The power of pull platforms was on display in 2008 when Colleen LaRose, a twice-divorced 45 year old suburban Philadelphia high school dropout posted on her YouTube channel a video with a new virtual moniker (Jihad Jane) that, not surprisingly, came to the attention of other extremists. By August 2009 she was on her way to Europe as a part of a terrorist cell that had coalesced online with the intent to kill Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks in retaliation for his drawing published in August 2007 of the prophet Muhammad’s head on the body of a dog.

Muhammad Hassan Khalid met LaRose online at age 15 and over the next two years he became a full partner in the Vilks operation. While most young men his age were more interested in playing Halo or Wii Online than dealing with two middle age extremists plotting terror, Khalid worked for months online with LaRose and a 46-year-old Algerian man he never physically met. They devised and coordinated a violent jihad organization consisting of men and women from Europe and the United States who were divided into a planning team, a research team, an action team, a recruitment
team and a finance team. Some would later travel to South Asia for explosives training and return to Europe to wage violent jihad.

The increasing ability of individuals to employ pull platforms to access, attract, and achieve across virtual networks that redefine borders will be an important development in the next chapter of global jihad. Technology transfers, identifying new technologies, linking with those who share similar passions, hatreds, ideology and grievances will increase the number of individual and multinational clusters and ecosystems seeking creative approaches to further their global jihadist goals. Push hierarchies and pull networks will operate side-by-side but in very different fashions.

Notes

POSTSCRIPT

Black Swans: A Cautionary Tale of Expecting the Unexpected

“History is littered with wars which everyone knew would never happen.” -- Enoch Powell

In his 2007 book The Black Swan, Nassim Nicholas Taleb discusses our “blindness with respect to randomness, particularly large deviations.” He notes “that almost all consequential events in history come from the unexpected – yet humans later convince themselves that these events are explainable in hindsight.”¹ Two of the examples he cites, 9/11 and the rise of the Internet, are events whose impact are reiterated throughout this paper and serve as a cautionary tale for 2013 and beyond.²

President Obama knew well the al Qaeda core enemy he would face and had just days after his electoral victory watched Lashkar e Tayyiba hold hostage a city of 14 million for 60 hours. As a junior Senator from Illinois on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he had seen the extent of the wreckage one man could orchestrate: Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq, who like bin Laden on 9/11 would overreach and eventually pay for it with his life. But he could not have known the significance of what Anwar al Aulaqi, Nidal Hasan, Najibullah Zazi, and Mohamed Bouazizi were involved in that January 2009 morning when he took the oath of office nor how their acts months later would impact his policymaking deliberations. He would be the third successive president to be quickly impacted after taking office by the element of surprise as jihadists prepared to execute attacks on the U.S. homeland.

Ten days before President Bush took his first oath of office in January 2001, the 9/11 operational leader, Muhammad Atta, flew back to the U.S. from a trip to Germany where he met with his fellow Hamburg, Germany cell member Ramzi bin al Shibh and gave him a progress report to pass on to the operational commander, Khalid Sheik Muhammad, and to the father of the plot, Osama bin Laden. Muhammad Atta’s deliberate approach would allow President Bush seven and a half months to work on his campaign pledge to be a domestically-focused president before others would choose his path to foreign war.

When Ramzi Yousef arrived in the United States on September 1, 1992, candidate Bill Clinton was two months away from electoral victory and Mir Amail Kasi was contemplating a deadly attack on CIA officers that he would carry out on January 25, 1993, four days after President Clinton’s first inauguration. One month later, on February 26, 1993, 36 days after Clinton’s inauguration address—in which he made no
mention of terrorism—Yousef would mastermind a Ryder truck bombing on the World Trade Center in lower Manhattan. That was the same target his uncle, Khalid Sheik Muhammad, would remain focused on from that day forward, achieving much greater results eight years later after combining his out-of-the-box plan with Osama bin Laden’s organizational acumen in 1999. Every president comes into office with his own unique understanding of the past, while quickly learning to expect the unexpected.

One area where expecting the unexpected will be critical is the intersection between demographics, dissatisfaction, fragmentation, and extremism. As bin Laden knew well, al Qaeda’s tactics have been increasingly rejected but the political and ideological basis for defensive jihad still resonates among recruits drawn from a comparatively tiny pool of a vast demographic, regardless of whether they focus on local or global terror. One important factor in this next chapter will be the battle for the hearts and minds of those who make up the youth bulge in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. It is not unlike the bulge produced by the baby boomers in the U.S., but its near term prospects are much bleaker. 65 percent of the population is under 30, and has come of age during the post-9/11 wars, Arab Awakening, and the decades long stalemate over Palestine. Unemployment has hovered between 20 and 40 percent, twice the world average. The two regional countries with the most pronounced youth bulges are Yemen and Pakistan, the very countries where the greatest external threats to the U.S. homeland have originated since 9/11. Of 185 million Pakistanis, two-thirds are under 30, and 40 million of the 70 million five to 19-year-olds are not in school. The 15 to 24 age bracket is projected to spike by 20 percent in the 2020s. In Yemen, nearly half of the country’s 24 million citizens are under 15. They are coming of age in a country rife with instability, where oil constitutes 90 percent of exports and where oil reserves are estimated to dry up by 2017.

The broader potential recruiting pool encompasses those showing rising dissatisfaction levels in fragmented societies competing for limited resources and movements to large urban centers that house what The Brookings Institution’s Peter W. Singer has described as millions of young urban poor, the angry losers of globalization. He has noted that 60 years ago there were two urban agglomerations of more than 10 million people: New York and Tokyo. Today there are 22 with another 30 or more likely by 2025. They are breeding grounds for a toxic brew of personal, political, and ideological grievances.

A third area where expecting the unexpected will be critical is in calculating the consequences of a new era of fiscal constraint in the United States and the West. The 9/11 wars have been the longest and most costly outside-in approach to national and homeland security. During the last three years of the Clinton administration the federal budget was in surplus for the first time since 1957, according to the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office. On September 27, 2000 President Clinton announced that the federal budget surplus for fiscal year 2000 amounted to at least $230 billion, making
it the largest in U.S. history and topping 1999’s record surplus of $122.7 billion. This represented the largest one-year debt reduction in the history of the United States. In June 2000 the administration predicted the surplus would increase by as much as $1 trillion over the next ten years.

But the post-Cold War peace dividend did not last long. The fundamental reordering that followed 9/11 was boosted by congressional funding at record levels based on Executive Branch requests that former National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Michal Hayden described as “doubling down.” It was to be the largest reorganization since the National Security Act of 1947. The trillion dollar plus wars that followed contributed to a period that saw a broadening gulf between expenditures and revenues, and a 2007-09 Great Recession and financial crisis that would push the U.S. national debt from just under six trillion dollars and 60 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on 9/11 to over 15 trillion dollars and 100 percent of GDP in 2012.

The stakes are equally high for global jihadists. The final chapter of the 9/11 decade that is still being written revolves around bin Laden’s mistaken belief that economic costs on the scale of the Soviet’s Afghan War would also topple the much larger and more diverse U.S. economy. It is a belief he carried to his seaborne grave. In an October 2010 letter recovered from his Abbottabad compound in which he was musing about plans for a propaganda campaign surrounding the ten year anniversary of 9/11, he wrote:

We should shed light on the fact that in some past documentaries on al-Jazirah, some specialists confirmed that the events of 9/11 are the main reasons for the financial crisis that America suffers from. In another undated letter to AQAP leader Nasir al Wahisi he stated I would like to remind you that America will have to withdraw during the next few years because of many reasons, the most important of which is America’s high deficit.4

AQAP propagandist and U.S. citizen Samir Khan, writing in the September 2011 issue of Inspire magazine—his last—held out hope for the successful outcome that remains a key tenet of the far enemy strategy while also capturing the dilemma the U.S. taxpayer is grappling with today.

Between four to six trillion dollars have been wasted on both wars according to Professor Linda Bilmes from the Harvard Kennedy School. That is between 30-40% of the U.S. deficit. So the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have both been fought by borrowing money. This means that the damage isn’t over as it would be with a war that is already paid for; rather, it would carry on as long as America is still in debt. It is a likely scenario that the U.S. has got itself so deep in trouble because of the war on al Qaeda that it would bring its demise, first economically and then militarily. If that is the case, the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq would have been the single most important factors in the downfall of the United States of America.5
Khan and bin Laden, both casualties of the expensive U.S. involvement they cited, will have to leave it to others to answer the economic resiliency question that they posed for this next chapter of global jihad. While they consistently overstated their actions’ impact on the U.S. economy, a form of war fatigue—exacerbated by the 2008-09 Financial Crisis and the continuing economic uncertainties in the West—is settling in just as the Baby Boomer generation is set to retire. This mass retirement will further sap the Treasury through greater Social Security and health care outlays. Collectively, these factors have ushered in new counterterrorism and war fighting fiscal realities. In June 2010 the highest ranking military officer overseeing both wars, Joint Chiefs’ chairman Michal Mullen, told an audience that “our national debt is our biggest national security threat.”

In this next chapter of global jihad, dealing with fiscal constraint has become an overriding counterterrorism and security priority for the first time since 9/11. The balancing act of security and acceptable risks will ultimately hinge on the question of debt and limits on capacity building to ramp up again if required by war, manmade and/or natural disasters.

As outlined in chapters seven through nine, a revolution and evolution of the human experience is underway. Whether talking about the merger of globalization with a world on Wi-fire, the increased democratization of science and technology or identity pattern shifts, fundamental changes in the last few years are altering the threat calculus in a way never seen before. The expected quadrupling of global communications between 2010 and 2015 will include more than two internet connections for every person on earth. One million minutes of video—the equivalent of 674 days—will traverse the Internet every second. The greatest percentage growth will occur in the Middle East and North Africa.

This interconnectivity revolution is contributing directly to the identity pattern shifts of citizens of nation-states to transnational citizens who rely on networks much more than bureaucracies and markets. This rise of the global citizen class has implications for the increasingly connected horizontal global jihad movement where terms like lone wolves lose currency as everyone has a voice and a chance to be heard by and connect with someone. It also ensures that networks vice hierarchies dominate the post bin Laden period as the concept of a vanguard comes face-to-face with localized and regional terrorist agendas enabled by global networking. How global jihadists embrace these fundamental shifts in the human experience will drive their expectations of their own capabilities and limits. It is both a powerful enabler and vulnerability that has the potential to provide the greatest level of uncertainty and caution in expecting the unexpected in the next chapter of global jihad.
Notes

2 Ibid. xix.
5 Samir Khan, Inspire, September 2011.
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With over 26 years of experience in the Intelligence Community, Randall Blake most recently served at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Mr. Blake worked as a substantive issue manager ensuring the president, congressional leaders, and other senior policymakers received current threat and trends-based strategic analysis of broad-based threats to the U.S. homeland.

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