THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

A Discussion on the Protests in Russia and Turkey

Washington, D.C.

Monday, June 24, 2013

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190

PARTICIPANTS:

FIONA HILL

Director, Center on the United States and Europe

JEREMY SHAPIRO

Visiting Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe

KEMAL KIRIŞCI

Director, Turkey Project, Center on the United States and Europe

ÖMER TAŞPINAR

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe

CLIFFORD GADDY

Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe

HANNAH THOBURN

Senior Research Assistant, Center on the United States and Europe

* * * * *

P R O C E E D I N G S

J. SHAPIRO: Let's try to understand whether there is a Putin style of repression, whether he's come up with a new or distinct style of repression and what specifically it is so we know what we're talking about when we're comparing it to Erdoğan.

Can you describe the Putin style of repression? Is it a sort of new modern authoritarianism?

F. HILL: It's not very new. As far as I see it, a lot of it has come out of the KGB playbook that Putin would have been handed (if there was such a thing as a KGB playbook) when he first joined the KGB in the 1970s. This was a period in Soviet history when Yuri Andropov, then the head of the KGB, was trying to figure out how to deal with the dissident movement. In dealing with this current crop of Russian oppositionists, Putin has adopted many of the same tactics that were used by Andropov's KGB and is treating them like Soviet-era dissidents.

Putin's tactics include attempts to co-opt certain members of the opposition. Then there are examples of outright repression and intimidation -- turning the legal system against key individuals.

There have also been reported incidents of the government threatening to use or in fact using psychiatric hospitals to force "treatment" of opposition figures and other Soviet-style tactics that, again, were tried and trusted by the KGB in the 1970s and 1980s. But there is obviously now a much higher level of sophistication than before because the Soviet system didn't really have the same ability to manipulate the Internet and to manipulate the media as Putin does. Of course, the KGB and Soviet leaders did

plenty of manipulation in their own time, in terms of publicly undermining the dissident movement and deliberately linking dissidents with foreign governments, and labeling them foreign agents. And Putin has done this too.

C. GADDY: Right. The key is selective, pragmatic, repression where necessary -- to the degree necessary -- and that's the ideal. These things don't always work out in practice the way they should in theory.

I think one of the key differences in the way the demonstrators have been dealt with in Istanbul as opposed to Moscow is that there are no water cannons. There's no moving in and bashing heads indiscriminately in Moscow. Not yet, at least. The Russians are more selective I think.

H. THOBURN: But there was some *discriminate* bashing of heads.

C. GADDY: Yes

F. HILL: But Putin has swept in on key individuals. He's decapitated the opposition, which in Russia might have been a little bit easier to do over time because there have been identifiable leaders emerge among the opposition. Perhaps the situation in Turkey right now is a bit different because there aren't really opposition parties that have either led or stepped up to try to head the grassroots movement in Turkey. In Russia, some leaders emerged out of the disputes over electoral outcomes. And there were, for example, also political parties that had been struck off the (December 2011 parliamentary) ballot, which people said they would have supported if they had been given chance to run. There were other more established political parties that clearly didn't receive the amount of votes (in the parliamentary elections) that people anticipated they would. In fact, there was clear evidence of falsifications. So those parties, and some of the people associated with them, became de facto leaders even though the opposition

movement was much broader than that.

Then there were also key opposition figures who dominated on blogs, and in social media -- people like Alexei Navalny or Sergei Udaltsov. Through their activism, they became figures that people could look toward as leaders. However, they didn't really start the broader opposition movement.

J. SHAPIRO: From the perspective of the Russian government, are their tactics working? Do they feel as though they have found an effective system for repression? Or are they still struggling with their civil society?

C. GADDY: I think they think it's very successful.

H. THOBURN: And back to the selective repression, the trial starts today for all of the 20 or so people who were detained in last year's May 6th protests. The Russian authorities have really just taken these 20 or so people randomly, indiscriminately out of the crowd of thousands in order to make an example of them. And they're all going to end up in prison. It's again the selective idea that you never know if you could be the one. It's a fear tactic.

K. KIRIŞCI: Well I think in Turkey's case, maybe one has to distinguish between different types of protesters. The Gezi Park people were not politically organized beyond wanting to protect Gezi Park or defend it against this shopping mall project there. But as the protest developed there were a number of different political groupings -- some of them longstanding political groupings -- that became involved in the protests.

Maybe what is striking is that the Prime Minister failed to make this distinction while Abdullah Gul, the President, as well as the Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, were quick in going into pains to try to differentiate between the good youths, the

nice youths in the Gezi Park, as opposed to the seasoned radical groups beyond Gezi Park. However, though the impression that was given was that the police were going to treat the two differently and instead aim for evacuating just or only Taksim Square, the police also moved quickly into Gezi Park. Yesterday there was news that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan himself gave the orders to police to move in.

J. SHAPIRO: That brings us to an interesting question -- the distinction between the man and the system in both cases. What you described, Fiona and Cliff, was a Russian style of repression. But I'm wondering about the degree to which that style of repression is a creature of Putin and whether we can attribute it to the fact that he's been president for so long. Does the system depend on him? Or is it bigger than him?

K. KIRIŞCI: I think there are some similarities there that I see between the methods that Putin has used and the ones that manifested themselves during the Gezi Park and Taksim Square demonstrations. One of them… Fiona, you mentioned how the law is used.

And at the very early stages of the demonstrations in Turkey, there was news that tax inspectors were sent to the companies owned by Cem Boyner, who had very quickly lent his support to the Gezi Park protestors. So this tactic of using the law in a manner to pull people into line seems to be a similarity. Yet I think one should also point out that this is not particular to the current government -- that this is a Turkish habit -- that this has happened in the past.

K. KIRIŞCI: Police brutality is nothing new in Turkey. I have a good friend of mine who is in D.C. He's been living here for a long time and he's very liberal and he kept saying, "what is all this noise about police brutality? I mean, I used to go to

watch soccer games in the '70s as I was a student and there was not one single game where we didn't get beaten up by the police -- either going into the stadium or coming out."

F. HILL: There are two interesting elements here. Cliff pointed out that Putin and the Russian authorities haven't been really using the police as an instrument. If you go back into the Russian and Soviet pasts, you see that previous governments have had a very bad experience with the use of massive repressive force. The Soviet Union collapsed, in Putin's view, because people like Gorbachev, for example, didn't know how to effectively apply repressive force by the police or the interior ministry troops.

There were many incidents under Gorbachev where the use of force wasn't effective or sufficient to suppress the crowds and just aggravated things further. There are similar incidents across the whole history of Russian revolutionary movements and events—and, in fact, in many of the uprisings that happened against Soviet rule. Many people have observed over and over again that, when the government sent in the army or the police to deal with a local disturbance, it simply aggravated the situation. The Russian government recently, for example, declined a request by the Kyrgyz government to help them with inter-ethnic violence in Osh because they know that they don't do this kind of thing particularly well.

So this more sophisticated use of force, behind the scenes, in the Kremlin's view is something that is much more effective. It's certainly something that Putin would ascribe to given his KGB training. And the use of the tax authorities -- this is something that Cliff has written an awful lot about. Obviously, in the Soviet period, you didn't do much of that. People didn't really pay taxes per se. But Putin has developed the use of the Russian tax police and the tax authorities into quite a fine art. He first

developed it during the time that he was deputy mayor in St. Petersburg and then honed it further after he moved to Moscow. The Kremlin tactic that's used most frequently against prominent members of the Russian opposition is sending out a tax inspector to conduct all kinds of investigations of financial wrongdoing.

J. SHAPIRO: So we're hearing, I think, that they both have used tax inspectors and the law. But interestingly, the more democratic state, Turkey, has a less sophisticated use of the repressive apparatus and has relied more on force. So Turkey apparently still has some things to learn from Putin.

Ömer, do you see other ways in which we're seeing Russian-style repression in Turkey during the recent protests there?

O. TAŞPINAR: I've been thinking about the parallels and obviously I know Turkey much better than Russia, but I think there is this sacrosanct view of the state in Turkey as something that needs to be protected from dissidents, from disorder, from anarchy. So the underlying cause -- be it now or during previous governments is often the lack of tolerance for individual rights, liberties, freedom of speech, freedom of association in the name of protecting public order. This gets to the heart of why Turkey has a very hard time becoming a liberal democracy. In that sense, there's a huge difference between liberalism and democracy.

You can become a democracy in a rudimentary, primitive fashion by saying the will of the people is represented. We have elections. This is a very electoral and majoritarian understanding of democracy. We now have in Turkey a government which believes that the national will, the majority of the people, is for the first time in power. So what we see now is a much stronger populist style of democracy where the Prime Minister identifies himself with the silent majority -- the people who have been

oppressed, the people who never had a voice, the pious people who were never really treated as first class citizens by the founders of the republics -- the so-called secularist elite, the White Turks who ruled everything. So there's a narrative of victimhood that the AKP exploits and represents.

J. SHAPIRO: So you see Erdoğan more as Nixon than Putin?

O. TAŞPINAR: Yeah. I mean I see him as someone who basically always sees himself as a victim of the system. Despite being in power, despite owning all the state apparatus, he still sees himself an inch away from the next coup that will put him jail. It is very telling that during the Gezi protests, Erdoğan's supporters immediately started to compare him with Adnan Menderes who was executed by the military after the first coup in Turkey in 1960. Menderes too was in power for 10 years. He won election after election. He was very popular with the Anatolian masses. And at the end he was executed by the military.

So there is this idea in the eyes of AKP and its political base that what is really undemocratic in Turkey is the deep state, the military-bureaucratic elite and the Kemalist establishment. Today, finally, the voice of the people came to power with AKP. And they are now in charge.

What is truly disappointing for liberals like myself is that we see that there is an underlying political culture in Turkey that has effected all different communities, including the AKP. Despite the fact that these guys have this narrative of victimhood, they're not much different when it comes to exerting authority and power than the Kemalists themselves.

So there is a problem of tolerance for dissent, respect for individual rights and liberties. The whole system of Turkey is based on protecting the state from

individuals, from different groups. The AKP has now become the state and they represent the new system. But there is still no tradition of liberalism based on based on protecting individual rights and liberties. It's always the state that needs to be protected.

F. HILL: So does Erdoğan see himself as conflated with the state? In the past, he was always seen in opposition to the state -- to the so-called "deep state." This is where the main difference is with Putin. Unlike Erdoğan, Putin is a product of the deep state in the Turkish sense.

O. TAŞPINAR: That's the major structural difference in my opinion between Erdoğan and Putin. Putin is the deep state. Putin comes from the establishment. He is the epitome of it, an insider and a powerful remnant of the old of this powerful Soviet-style system, whereas Erdoğan is an outsider. He comes from the Anatolian periphery against the old Kemalist elitist center. He is the hero of the people who have been oppressed. After all, he's served time -- four months in jail. He identifies himself with the victims of the old system and with the downtrodden all over the world. I mean he basically says that he represents the underclass globally.

The problem with Erdoğan is that he is now used to exerting power but still sees himself as a potential victim. In the meantime he has learned to rule and govern with an iron fist, because he has won 50 percent of the votes. After 11 years in power and great success, he never thought that there could be really an organized movement challenging his power the way Gezi protesters managed to do. So he immediately resorts to conspiracy theories in explaining this. And he says that this is the work of the deep state again, that the Ergenekon Plot is back in business. They're working with the neocons in the United States, with the banking interest lobby all over the world that wants to weaken Turkey.

And this idea that no one wants Turkey to be strong, that we're surrounded by enemies, that you cannot trust foreigners is a very nationalist, Kemalist narrative that we learn in our elementary schools from day one. At the age of six, we begin learning that Turkey is surrounded by enemies. Erdoğan challenged that siege mindset when he came to power with the "zero problems with neighbors" policy. For instance, he pursued a different policy that challenged the military on the question of Cyprus. He prioritized EU membership. This is why earlier many believed Turkey was becoming more democratic with him. As the economy got stronger, I also thought the AKP would no longer resort to same old nationalist conspiracy theories. His approach to the Kurdish question most recently ironically challenges the conventional wisdom on the Kurdish question. It's ironic because it's the Kurdish question that always creates conspiracy theories in Turkey on the grounds that the Kurds have their supporters in the West.

We are always led to believe that "the West wants to divide Turkey." Here is this guy who is doing all the right things today on the Kurdish question: He wants to change the constitution, change the meaning of citizenship in Turkey, he talks about decentralization and democratization. He does not resort to conspiracy theories in explaining the root causes of the Kurdish problem and is even willing to talk to PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.

Paradoxically, compared to the monumental Kurdish issue, he is now facing this mini crisis with Gezi Park and he resorts to conspiracy theories. In Turkish, we say you cross the ocean only to drown yourself in a stream. Erdoğan was crossing the ocean. He was swimming in the ocean, coming to the very end and he basically lost all his appeal in the eyes of the world -- look at the cover of The Economist. Look at how

the West is seeing him as an autocrat him now. He lost all sense of credibility.

J. SHAPIRO: But does he believe these conspiracy theories?

O. TAŞPINAR: It may be tactless, but we have to admit that he is not very sophisticated in his analysis of the world.

J. SHAPIRO: We always talk about Putin, at least implicitly, as using conspiracy theories in order to create that sort of nationalist backlash and we imply that it's a very cynical operation. But I'm getting from Ömer that in Turkey it's less a cynical operation and more a steady and genuine paranoia.

O. TAŞPINAR: When the West sees conspiracy theories in the Middle East there is always a Western tendency to ridicule them and say "get over it, get real." But in the region, when you've been colonized -- in Iran, for instance. When 1953 happened, when Mosaddegh was ousted by a CIA coup -- try to tell the Iranians that their future is up to them. Turks are a little bit like that. They believe that whatever they do, there are forces out there that will undermine Turkey. They don't want us to be strong, because if we are strong, we're back at the gates of Vienna again, where we'll basically conquer and the West will tremble.

So they don't want us to be strong. They really believe that. This is the Turkish DNA. It's structurally implanted in Turks to think like that because of the education system. We have a very weird relationship with the West.

C. GADDY: All of what you say, beginning with the belief in the state having supremacy over the individual, the conspiracy theories, the belief that 'nobody wants us to be strong' -- it's the same thing in Russia. It's also rooted in the education system. It's exactly the same and it's not a conspiracy. It's not the product of cynical manipulation or Kremlin-promoted conspiracy theories. It's a genuine deep belief and, to

some extent it's based on history and evidence. It produces the same sense as in Turkey. You can play around with these similarities and differences to no end. One thing that strikes you is a couple of really fundamental differences in Putin's situation and Erdoğan's. And one is that -- I think Putin is not Erdoğan. He's actually in many respects Kemal Ataturk. Putin's the father of, the savior of, the nation. He's the guy who reestablished the lost sovereignty and independence of Russia from the colonialist imperialist capitalist West or whatever you want to term it during the humiliations of the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But, you know, one of the big differences -- to get back to the techniques of repression and the reaction and so on, which I'm not actually sure is really all that valuable because leaders react in different ways with different methods all the time -- is that there is a real opposition in Turkey. It's an established opposition —– the opposition from which Erdoğan took power, which resents him having taken power from them and the incredibly powerful established elite that arguably is (or was) more powerful in many ways than the current ruling elite. And, therefore, it is really a serious threat to him, presumably, that there now be any kind of emerging grassroots opposition as well. This current situation could literally lead very quickly to a change in power.

In Putin's case, there is no strong, established opposition. The current opposition is a tiny, tiny minority of people. There's no broad popular support for them in the country. At this point, Putin can afford to use these selected methods because it's popular among the people for the very same reason that you gave in Turkey -- the threat to stability and chaos. The broad majority of Russians, which we also refer to as the silent majority, just don't want to see this kind of thing happen.

I think it would be very different if it were the case that there were an

identifiable, strong, organized -- even politically active -- opposition that Putin had overthrown to take power. That's not the case. I mean, there is no politics in Russia -- formal politics -- that Putin doesn't control. All the other parties that are in Parliament -- and there are several of them -- are manipulated and controlled by him in order to control certain constituencies. But the opposition, of course, is also appealing to those very same constituencies at different levels. And potentially -- very potentially, embryonically -- the Russian opposition represents something that could get out of control. But at this stage, there's no real threat that that's going to happen. I think Putin knows that and therefore can afford to -- and now is the time to -- crack down.

J. SHAPIRO: How much does this weigh on Erdoğan's mind -- the possibility? Because what's interesting about these protests is -- even though there is this genuine opposition in Turkey, which is stronger than the one in Russia, but still not particularly impressive -- there has been very little connection, as far as I can see, between the protests and the formal opposition to the contrary. One might say that the protests have risen up in some part because the formal opposition has been so useless. Is this something -- but Cliff is right. It's at least there. It's at least something that could -- the two of them could potentially hook up and if they did, Erdoğan would have a much bigger problem than Putin could even imagine. So is this something that he is worried about? Is this something that motivates them?

K. KIRIŞCI: I'm not very sure that there is such a strong opposition in Turkey -- at least as things stand or had been standing for the last couple of years. The force that was omnipresent and could really influence the course of politics in Turkey in a very visible, significant, categorical manner was the military. And for all intent and purposes, the military has lost that leverage and accepts that it has lost that leverage.

And then you could talk about the state -- the state elite -- going way back to the early days of the republic, and maybe even the final stages of the Ottoman Empire. But that state has been heavily transformed in many ways. Most of the ministries are very much now staffed by supporters of the Prime Minister as well as his party. I mean when you look at the developments in the last couple of years, one of the strengths of AKP government and Erdoğan's policies back from the early 2000s and mid-2000s, was the introduction of independent regulatory bodies. All those regulatory bodies have increasingly come under the influence of the government.

What makes, I think, the Gezi Park protests very unique is the fact that they were spontaneous and they were coming from a very different type of elite -- an elite that has in many ways emerged as a result of the successes of AKP government. And there are similarities, I think, to what happened in Russia towards the end of 2011 -- many of the protesters don't remember the 1990s. They are not the product of '90s. They are the product of the 2000s. And they are mostly middle class professionals. They have become very savvy about social media. And what I find fascinating about the social media is the way in which -- at least in Turkey now, there is a minority that doesn't buy these conspiracy theories. They constantly challenge them. As I was there, last week on TV, there were a couple of programs and one of them was run by an anchorperson who used to be very close to AKP. At one point, he was literally taking the mickey out of these conspiracy theories by waving his index finger and pretending to press a virtual button representing conspiracies triggering the protests in Turkey.

This is, I think, what is novel and dare I say maybe somewhat promising. What is fascinating is that this is the point at which the Prime Minister hesitated and came back to it in an authoritarian manner while elements within the government -- we

mentioned the President, the Deputy Prime Minister, as well as some other members of the government -- have tried to take a different perspective or tried to underline the need to respond to these people precisely for what you were saying, Fiona -- not to aggravate the situation and not to play into the protestors agenda. One way in which they came forward very quickly was to stress that they were going to investigate the police. And the government -- including the Prime Minister, has accepted that that police mishandled the very first stages of the intervention there. Although, the police continue to use violence and brutal force in the meantime and the Prime Minister has expressed unequivocal support for the police.

So, I think there are some -- you know, I think there's a need to take it with a pinch of salt that he still fears. In his mind, he fears it -- psychologically. When you look at the very first reactions coming from the government and government circles, was precisely a reaction driven by this fear that this might be the beginnings of some kind of an intervention. But also may have been an organized effort.

O. TAŞPINAR: That speaks actually to the strength of Turkish electoral democracy. The fact that Erdoğan fears being unseated, the fact that he is so insecure, despite the 50 percent he has, shows that he can see a future where he loses election. And the CHP, MHP opposition in Turkey can fantasize about coming to power if the economy goes bad, and that's why Erdoğan is a chronic public opinion poll reader. I mean he looks at public opinion polls all the time and tries to understand what people care about.

And the parties early enough realized that it's not the head scarf, the Islamic issues, that really make people tick. It's the economy. So they really turned into a service party. They provide services to the poor. They're very conscious about their

infrastructure projects and municipalities. So they're very concerned about the economic welfare of their base. And I think what Erdoğan really fears is the destabilization of the Turkish economy. And that's the major difference between Russia and Turkey. Turkey does not depend on oil. Turkey needs to depend on economic performance.

J. SHAPIRO: What's odd about this particular reaction is that it's hardly promoted that. In fact, we've seen a huge crash in the Turkish stock market. We've seen the Lira depreciate. We've seen the image of Turkey as a place for tourism and a place for business greatly suffer from the heavy-handed repression. So you would think that if that was a primary concern, he would be more interested in the sort of discriminate Putin-style techniques.

O. TAŞPINAR: You're absolutely right. But the fact that he blames western nefarious forces, gives him also an opening in saying if the economy goes down, he can say 'it's not AKP's fault, these external enemies did it.'

That's how he's going to run the campaign now. Ironically, if the economy goes down -- with interest rates going up, all this will turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. With the Fed changing track now, interest rates will have to go up in emerging markets and the political risk factor in Turkey will make things even worse. This gives Erdoğan the opening to say, you know, 'it's not my policies that led to this. It's all the things that I've been telling you about. They wanted to destabilize Turkey.' And his base may buy this to a certain degree.

If you have eight, nine months of unemployment and low growth in Turkey, the CHP will have an opening during election season to campaign with some economic proposal saying 'we can do better.' It's a low probability but something unimaginable in Russia can happen in Turkey with the opposition winning the elections.

But in a democracy, it's very hard for the opposition to win elections when the economy is doing well. People vote their pocketbook -- the bread and butter. So people will vote for AKP as long as the economy is strong. Erdoğan knows that if the economy goes down, people may change the way they look at AKP. It's not an ideological country in that sense.

K. KIRIŞCI: But there's still something fascinating there. Ömer has talked a lot about conspiracy theories. The difference between the conspiracy theories of the past and today is that in the past, in the 1990s, it was about dividing Turkey and Turkey potentially losing its territorial integrity. Erdoğan never speaks about that. He focuses more on the argument that these conspiracies aim to weaken Turkish democracy and Turkish economics.

However, what is similar to the advocates of the previous conspiracy theories is the belief on the part of Erdoğan as well that he needs authority and control. He needs to be able to control his political party, control the country, to be able to run its policies. And what I find fascinating is that, during the early stages of this crisis, there was a moment when he was away in North Africa that inside the governing political party (AKP), there were different voices emerging. Lots of them. And we have also heard about rumors that were going on inside the party. But as soon as he came back, it's fascinating to see how some of the leading members of the cabinet immediately began to toe the line that Erdoğan is advocating.

I agree that it's backfiring. It's the authoritarian side that is opening the way to the backfiring and Erdoğan falling into this vicious cycle, while the party itself, I think, had signs that it wanted to deal with the crisis in a manner that maybe would have not undermined the economy. But clearly now the economy is in a difficult situation.

J. SHAPIRO: We're seeing sort of a lot of differences emerge. Basically the Putin method is more selective in its use of repression. Turkey has at least a potentially viable opposition, which changes the dynamic. It's very clear that these are very distinct situations, but where we started was from this notion that there are techniques which are useful in both situations. And these are techniques fundamentally for using the mechanisms of a liberal democracy to control civil society, to create a situation in which you can have an electoral democracy, but the results of the election are fairly preordained even though the election itself is conducted fairly.

But somebody in this room, I think, has made the argument that there's a lot of transmission of Russian style repression to other countries, to Azerbaijan, Bolivia and Hungary. Has there been transmission? Putin and Erdoğan have a relationship. They actually see each other quite a bit.

O. TAŞPINAR: I can see Erdoğan being a very proud man. Saying "I have no lessons to learn from Putin." Is there any way I can repress with my own Turkish style?

J. SHAPIRO: Is there any transmission? Is there any link between these two things? Or are we just witnessing similar guys coming up with similar tactics and adapting them to their situations?

F. HILL: Given the fact that we're in a world in which information flows extraordinarily quickly -- we've been talking about opposition movements and the use of social media – then yes. The very fact that protest events in every country are transmitted around the world constantly on every imaginable TV channel means that people can see what works and what doesn't work. And leaders can learn from other people's experiences. We've also had plenty of incidents over the years in western

countries where police repression has triggered even more violence – take poor policing practice in France and the huge upsurge of violence in the banlieues in Paris for example. The UK is another example, where protests have been met with police brutality and people have been killed after demonstrations. The kind of basic backlash we see in Turkey has occurred in all kinds of different European settings over the past few years.

And in terms of the way that governments operate, I think it's fair to say that leaders do watch and see how other governments deal with such events. Certainly from Putin's point of view, this is a very useful reference point. When he is criticized, Putin likes to be able to point out the fact that other people do exactly the same thing as he does in similar situations. I'm not sure if that's the case with Erdoğan, but certainly for Putin -- he says 'how am I worse than anyone else?' He constantly uses other international examples to justify what he's doing.

J. SHAPIRO: The Turkish government referred to the Occupy Wall Street arrests.

O. TAŞPINAR: It's much deeper, I think, than just looking at Putin and learning from him or sympathizing for his style. It's the similarity of political culture between the two countries. The similarity of institutions, in education systems, the way they look at the west. Russia and Turkey's relationship with the West is based on the simple idea that these two countries don't get respect from the West. And haven't for centuries. They come from these great imperial traditions and the West somehow thinks that they're better than them. There are double standards. All the time there's a double standard that the West applies to Turkey. The way they treat Turkish protest, Turkish police is orientalist. Now the Islamists have discovered the meaning of orientalist.

They use 'orientalist' for everything. Like 'it's very orientalist the way the BBC

looks at Turkish protests.' Or 'the economists cover is very orientalist.' 'It's Islamaphobic, you know. They don't like Muslims and they can't take the fact that Turkey is a successful country. Why don't they cover the same way the protests that are happening in Britain, in France, et cetera. They apply this double standard.' Why? It's *Midnight Express* again. They have this image of the Turkish jail and Turkish police, so they don't like us. So it's a very strong reaction towards the west in terms of treating Turkey differently with double standards and it comes from a sense of racism. The West is racist against us.

And I think the Russians have a similar ambiguity in the way they look at the West. I mean they are part of the West. The Kemalists also have an ambiguous relationship with the West because they want to be part of the West, but they can't prove that they have a cultural tradition that would anchor them in the West. Kemalists would love to have a Tchaikovsky in their past that would enable them to say, "you know, we have a classical music tradition too". Russians can think about such things. Kemalists have an inferiority complex and often ask "what has Turkey offered Western civilization?"

But you need to go back to the Islamic roots of Turkish civilization and the Kemalists don't have much sympathy for the Islamic roots.

C. GADDY: It may be true that recently Turkey doesn't have great things to offer, but you also recently don't have really horrible things to offer either. I mean the view of Russia from the U.S. or from the West in general is not just Tchaikovsky.

H. THOBURN: Stalin killed how many millions more people than Hitler ever did. There are a lot of terrible things that Russia, like any other country, has exported.

F. HILL: And, hearing this, Putin, of course, would immediately interject

and say “who was worse?” as Cliff and I have heard him ask many times. He would say that this Hitler, Stalin point isn’t a very good comparison. Putin gets exasperated when people come at him throwing out all the black spots of Russia’s past. From his point of view, we should all just get over it. This is part of history now. Everybody has a brutal history. Let’s just move on, put this all behind us, and be proud of ourselves. This is one thing that Putin has really reversed in Russia in the 2000s after the Russian soul searching of the 1990s. He has no patience and no tolerance for it. Because he’s now trying to make the case that Russia is a separate civilization. It may be part of the West, but why should Russia want to be a poor relation of the West -- the second cousin, not even a first cousin or the brother or a sister of Western countries.

Russia is in Putin’s mind something unique. It’s this unique Eurasian land mass -- this fusion of different cultures and different peoples and different religions. Russia has a history that spans a couple of millennia with all kinds of different elements, including the elements that we’ve just touched upon. Putin wants to emphasize that Russia now is trying to find its own special place.

And I think that’s something that Turkey has also been battling with it -- how to find its place. It’s not part of Europe. It’s not part of Asia. It’s the bridge between the two in the same way that Russia is a much larger landmass and bridge. Turkey also has something unique about it. I guess that Russia and Turkey are in similar positions right now. And it’s their expansion out to the rest of the world that is causing the problems at home. They are trying to find something that specifies, something that makes them unique, at the same time that large segments of their populations are becoming much more integrated with broader global phenomenon -- not just western phenomenon. Some of the population are traveling widely, taking in information from

around the world. We're all today trying to become successful global citizens, not just products of our own environments.

Both Putin and Erdoğan are very much victims of their own success. You were making the same point, Kemal. It's, as Cliff said, it's a minority in Russia that rose up in opposition. But it's a very accomplished minority; and some of the people in and around Putin have been kicked out of the inner circle for saying "but what a minority!".

Vladislav Surkov, who at one point was known as the 'gray cardinal' of the Kremlin, the person who was actually articulating the idea of this new Russianness for Putin -- this unique sovereign democracy of Russia with its own special place there in the world -- was chastised for pointing out that the best and the brightest of Russian society -- the technocrats, the young professionals – were the people who had come out onto the streets and joined the opposition. These were people he knew. People he admired. People who he, Surkov, had also helped manipulate in different kinds of settings. And now the technocratic elements in the Russian government are also being pushed back or, in fact, pushed out of government circles because they've helped to produce this cosmopolitan elite who are looking outside to the rest of the world rather than inside to what's special about Russia.

O. TAŞPINAR: What makes Turkey's relationship with the west different in the last 10 years, I think, is the concept of a Turkish model. Because the West actually started to look at Turkey, thanks to AKP's moderation of political Islam and and largely and because 9-11 turned Huntington's "clash of civilizations" scenario into a self-fulfilling prophecy. So you had basically a success story with the Turkish model, which in theory is the best antidote for conspiracy theories. Because if the West calls you a success story, you build confidence and normally your relationship with the West changes. In

fact, hubris was the norm in Turkey until recently. You would hear Turkish officials saying that "we don't need the EU," "we're better than the EU," "the EU is welcome to join Turkey." And so the relationship with the West went from an inferiority complex into something almost like a superiority complex. So we're better than them now.

And, of course, in the meantime, Turkey is establishing a post-Kemalist society and order. What do you resort to when you want to transcend Ataturk and the strict nationalist terms of a nation state? You resort to the imperial legacy of the Ottoman Empire, which happens to be one of the major ideological tenants of the AKP party. All of a sudden, everyone in Turkey started to glorify the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman past. Social habits of basically buying Ottoman artifacts, discovering the meaning of Ottoman coexistence, romanticizing Ottoman multiculturalism as if everyone was equal under the Ottoman Empire. Ahmet Davoloğlu was fond of saying, when times were tough with Israel, that the Ottoman Empire and Turkey had no history of pogroms unlike anti-Semitic Europe where Nazis and the Holocaust are recent history. This is the kind of defensiveness displayed by the AKP in protecting the Ottoman legacy and the Ottoman Empire.

Because of all that -- because of this growing sense of pride and trust, confidence, bordering on hubris, I never thought that the AKP would resort to conspiracy theories the way they're doing today.

J. SHAPIRO: Is that because they never succeeding even in convincing themselves of their own superiority?

O. TAŞPINAR: Maybe. Maybe it's a sense of weakness that they have. Maybe they never believed in their own narrative of 'we're strong, we're powerful.'

J. SHAPIRO: They've also had quite a few setbacks though in the last

few years in that narrative. Externally more than internally, the whole neo-Ottoman project -- if you want to call it that -- has sort of turned to ash.

O. TAŞPINAR: They have a way of rationalizing the failures. I mean, they say, yes, now we have problems with our neighbors. But why should we want to have problems with Iraq? They believe it's not Turkey's fault if Maliki turned so authoritarian and sectarian. "Do we really want to have problems with Syria? What is Assad's role in this? Do we really want to have problems with Iran? Look at what Iran is doing in Syria, in Iraq. Do we really want to pick fights with these guys? No."

They would be quick to admit that on Armenia they couldn't do what they wanted. But on Cyprus, they keep saying "we did the right thing on Cyprus. We pushed through our referendum. We wanted unification of the island." So they don't see the problems in Turkish foreign policy as their own making. They see it as fate. Well, times have changed. What can we do?

F. HILL: This is very similar with Russia as well. The 1990s basically were a period when it seemed that Russian foreign policy and domestic policy were on a different, negative, track. Russia suffered a number of major political setbacks, which were a result of a combination of factors, but they were perceived as being largely the result of the failures of the West. The West not stepping forward to give sufficient funding for the Russian reform program, for example. And there are always cases that can be made in favor of those kinds of arguments. The West was also blamed for deliberately disregarding Russian views in the Balkans and other areas closer to home, taking advantage of Russian weakness.

From Moscow's point of view, when Russia did the right thing over and over again in restraining itself in major crises, the West kept pushing forward -- for

example, with the expansion of NATO, when Russia was basically at its weakest point, and it had capitulated on a number of issues. You can see the same narrative in Ankara and Moscow because, again, in both the Turkish case and the Russian case there were grounds for making those kinds of cases about the West taking advantage. And for them, there's not a sufficient preponderance of evidence to the contrary -- that the fault lies entirely with them. Although much of the fault certainly lies with them.

K. KIRIŞCI: But there's also the question: why these setbacks, right? You cannot attribute the why to the west, to the conspiracy theories. But there's another element, which you brought up in the case of Russia, how Putin has cleansed his administration of people who may have more liberal, critical or open minds. This is also what happened between Erdoğan's second administration and the third one. A lot of people who were much more critical, much more open minded, have been purged. Some were not reelected as MPs to the Parliament.

So increasingly what you're having is 'yes-people' around him. Erdoğan increasingly becoming insulated is an observation that is increasingly made. So, the failure of foreign policy is not assessed or evaluated in a critical manner, but is taken up from the perspective of those who are producing the kinds of arguments you made references to. It's not our fault. It's the fault of Maliki. It's the fault of the European Union. When it comes to Cyprus, they didn't live up their end of the deal. There's no critical debate or thinking taking place in government circles-- and I'd like to tie this back up to what happened in Gezi.

They were surprised because, though here in the west and partly in Turkey as well, there have been observations that the Prime Minister was becoming increasingly authoritarian, unwilling to hear anything critical. We knew in many ways this

was coming for those very reasons. They were caught by surprise.

J. SHAPIRO: So we're seeing here another strong but simple comparison between the two, which is that being in power for a long time tends to result in this type of dynamic and that the lack of vitality in the political system means that because challengers don't arise really, or because you are successful, you cease to listen, to learn and to change.

F. HILL: But this is a phenomenon in every single physical setting globally. I mean we can think of many examples – in both the United States and the U.K. Mrs. Thatcher and Charles De Gaulle are classic examples of this phenomenon. As is Helmut Kohl. People start to lose their touch after a certain time. And by that I mean their political touch, their feel for events because they become so removed from broader social dynamics. And also as administrations go on over time, people who have differences with the leadership tend to want to move on and to do other things. We're running into the same problem now that we're into the second Obama Administration. We're seeing more of the people who were personally much closer to President Obama rising up within the system.

J. SHAPIRO: Yes, but the way that healthier political systems deal with that is that increasing loss of touch delegitimizes the government and an opposition profits from it. That then essentially renews the political system. It rinses and repeats.

F. HILL: And the political parties deal with it, too.

J. SHAPIRO: And what we're not seeing in either Russia or Turkey is --

O. TAŞPINAR: This may happen in Turkey if the economy collapses.

J. SHAPIRO: Yes, we have a better chance of it in Turkey, but so far we haven't seen the political systems respond with enough vitality for different reasons that I

think we've explored. So you see that people go out to the streets because they are unable to express their frustration through democratic means, which is a sort of a French phenomenon.

O. TAŞPINAR: I still think that despite the idea that Gezi Park protests don't sympathize with the CHP, when push comes to shove, if they need to pick between CHP and AKP, they will vote for CHP.

H. THOBURN: Or will they not vote at all?

O. TAŞPINAR: They will because of civic consciousness, political cautiousness, and their belief that not voting will help the AKP.

J. SHAPIRO: They weren't already voting for the CHP?

O. TAŞPINAR: I don't think so. The problem was also their frustration with the absence of a strong opposition voicing their concerns. But I think we're maybe overplaying the fact that the CHP will not benefit from all this. It will benefit I think. Because, unavoidably, these guys are becoming more political now and they will look at alternatives. Now that they have been suppressed and they are angry about tear gas and water cannon, how do you register your anger? You vote against AKP.

K. KIRIŞCI: These are policies that interfere with their personal lives -- day-to-day personal lives.

O. TAŞPINAR: So I think the CHP will have a bump.

F. HILL: Can the CHP appeal to Turkish youth? Because the big difference between the Russian protests and the Turkish protests is the size of the youth group. Hannah and I just wrote a short piece on this topic.

K. KIRIŞCI: But there the Turkey side doesn't vote.

F. HILL: Well, that's the problem. The average age of people in the

Turkish polling data is 28. And Russia doesn't have that similar cohort of younger people. So Turkey's protests much more match the profile of the kinds of protests that we saw, for example, in France, where it's mostly young people.

Russia was more across the board. There was certainly a younger profile to the protesters, but not overall because you've also got an awful lot of people who had protested in the 1990s or taken part in the perestroika movements of the 1980s as well, who can't really be described here as part of a new youth cohort. Demographic factors are important. So the big question here for you is can that youth vote -- the people who have never voted before and who feel disenfranchised -- be picked up in the Turkish setting?

H. THOBURN: 47 percent of all the people that Turkish opinion groups polled that said "there's no party to vote for." They -- on the Turkish side -- seemed to suggest that they don't see the CHP as even an option. The CHP just wasn't appealing – they feel as though there are no other choices for them.

J. SHAPIRO: There was also a question about whether they would vote or not. The proportion of those who would choose not to vote was high.

F. HILL: And, again, it's average age of 28 in that poll and that's the question – what happens to them.

O. TAŞPINAR: My argument is that Gezi may change things in Turkey because the idea that "there's no party to vote for, therefore we don't vote" was the situation pre-Gezi. Post-Gezi, they may decide okay, we need to do something. And where do we go here -- which brings me to the two points I will make. Kılıçdaroğlu [the head of the CHP] now has to make a decision. He has to figure out how he can capitalize on this. And it's a very difficult issue for him because he has to deal with a

bunch of dinosaurs within the party who see this as secularism versus Islam. This is not secularism versus Islam. This is democracy versus autocracy. But there's a tendency to see the secularism versus Islam.

But on that second point, there is a dimension of this that can be seen as secularism versus Islam. There is a clear dimension because -- what in Russia you don't have, in Turkey you have -- in terms of lifestyle issues. Alcohol is not a polarizing issue as far as I know in Russia. Everyone drinks. In Turkey, you have alcohol, gender, head scarves, sex -- which is polarizing the whole society. So is Turkey the solution to the clash of civilizations? Or is Turkey the microcosm of the clash of civilization? And I think Turkey is more the microcosm, because people who have a secular way of life, who do not think about the world in terms of God and morality have a big problem with Erdoğan. They believe his references to three kids, adultery, abortion, and alcohol have their roots in his Islamic world view and way of life. So you can couch all the debate in Turkey in terms of these cultural issues. They are polarizing to society. Despite the issue of democracy versus authoritarianism there is still a strong Islam versus secularism strain in the societal polarization of Turkey.

J. SHAPIRO: Does that strengthen Erdoğan or does that weaken him? Is he able to then justify his authoritarianism and call on that deep well of support?

O. TAŞPINAR: This is the scary part. It strengthens his base. Whenever he resorts to religion, there's 25 percent of the country - the Islamic base of AKP -that is strongly behind him and he strengthens the base. But then he loses the moderates.

J. SHAPIRO: The 47 percent.

O. TAŞPINAR: Yeah, the people who basically vote for AKP because

there's no alternative between CHP and AKP. Liberals, for instance, who are faced with a choice between AKP and CHP used to vote for AKP because they believed that AKP better understands the dynamics of the world and it's more democratic than CHP. Now they will have second thoughts about supporting the AKP

F. HILL: There's an element of this that is paralleled in Russia. You mentioned alcohol and abortion. These and some other issues became phenomena in Russia partly as a result of the degradation of society during the Soviet period. They are both related to poor public health provisions and an overall sense of societal decay -- which the Soviet authorities were well aware of, as were Russians themselves. There's been an awful lot of literature on both of these topics.

But if you put those particular aspects aside, and look at these same issues from another point of view -- associated with a more conservative Western political profile -- then, Putin is a classic conservative politician. He has also said that three children would be the ideal number for each woman to have. He hasn't gone out to campaign against abortion the same way that they have in Turkey, but I imagine that over time that will also be something that will become an issue in Russia.

Putin does like to play with these conservative values. He plays with the Orthodox Church, because the vast majority of the population associate themselves with Russian Orthodoxy as being the dominant religion. He also makes common cause with an Islamist base inside of Russia, including among the more conservative Islamic population. Putin recognizes Islam as one of the indigenous religions of Russia along with Buddhism and Judaism. And the Kremlin emphasizes the more conservative elements among all of them saying 'we have similar values.' And this is why although we haven't seen an anti-alcohol campaign by the government in Russia, we have seen a

similar kind of campaign to Turkey in many respects -- in terms of the Kremlin-sponsored movement against gays including recent legislation. The legal action against the girl punk group, Pussy Riot for denigrating the Orthodox Church.

J. SHAPIRO: It's like drinking alcohol in or near a Mosque.

F. HILL: This is exactly the same thing, the same approach. And it's also very dangerous, because Putin also knows that the Russian Orthodox Church, which has always been pretty much under the control of the state one way or another -- either the tsarist state or the Soviet state -- still could forge its own independent constituency. And there is a similar concern -- for Erdoğan no doubt with Islam. I mean Erdoğan cannot claim to be the country's spiritual leader. He's still Turkey's secular leader, and Islam doesn't operate in quite the same way. But the Russian Orthodox Church could very easily use its own powers -- its own constituency -- to push for something else. So, on the one hand, Putin plays with the Orthodox Church -- panders to the conservative base of the church. On the other hand, Russia is really a much more conservative country in spite of all these seemingly liberal attributes -- at least what people might call liberal attributes. They are actually anything but -- in terms of the use of alcohol and other social phenomena like high rates of abortion. Russia is a very conservative country in terms of people's mindsets and attitudes and Putin plays with this knowledge the same way as Erdoğan does. So there are those common elements.

K. KIRIŞCI: The way out though for Turkey -- and that's where this analogy you made to Turkey not being a rentier state is important – is to keep the economy vibrant. You made references to a core 25 percent that he can mobilize. But that's not enough to stay in power. So inevitably he has to build coalitions to sustain stability and economic growth unlike Putin who commands a rentier state. And this is the

way Turkish democracy may find an exit for itself without authoritarianism becoming consolidated. And this is also where, I think, a role falls on the CHP.

My fear is that if the economy deteriorates to a very large extent, that the country will become so unstable that electoral democracy will begin to encounter difficulties. That's what I fear. And that's an extension of your summary on Huntington's model -- that Turkey is not a model to -- argument that Turkey is not a model for a panacea to avoid a clash of civilizations. But I can see -- and I hope it won't happen -- a scenario where things could get out of control and Turkey itself become a victim of a clash of civilization. Because now I was struck -- never in my life have I seen a Turkish leader say the following, which Erdoğan has said – "53 of my Sunni citizens have died in Reyhanlı" as a result of that bomb that went off on the border. Such discriminatory language is absolutely shocking and polarizes society.

F. HILL: To specifically say a Sunni citizen?

O. TAŞPINAR: Sunni -- for a number of reasons. One reason is possible that they're not all Sunni. I don't know if he actually had someone check on it, because the town itself is part of Hatay and has an Alawite minority. It's shocking also because it polarizes the country in a very obvious, conspicuous manner. It's shocking because I doubt he said it unconsciously. If he said it unconsciously, that's shocking in itself, too, because he tells where his instincts lie.

J. SHAPIRO: So it's shocking in every regard. I think this has been sort of a model Brookings conversation: I've learned a lot, but I understand less than when I started. And we've drawn almost infinite parallels and disjunctures between the two countries. But one of the things that was intriguing to me about what you all said was that the West -- the United States, in particular -- in both cases plays an almost Freudian

role in this -- in these domestic dynamics as well as the foreign policy dynamics in both countries. And that actually puts a huge burden on U.S. and western policy and to listen to you, I can't help but thinking that you're damned if you do and damned if you don't. But I'm wondering what is the appropriate role for the United States. First in the Turkey situation, but also in the Russian situation we're finding a very difficult western interaction -- trying to be involved in these domestic dynamics, but always to seeming to wrong foot. Is there a role for the west in both cases and what should it be?

K. KIRIŞCI: The role for the west, from my point of view -- although I appreciate the complication surrounding it -- was, in 2006, not to let go of Turkey from the EU project. This, to me, and as a -- you know, I was given the Jean Monnet Chair and I thought was part of my job to go out there and to make a case for it. I always saw Turkey's EU membership project as part and parcel of Jean Monnet's philosophy of reconciling these big cleavages in Europe. The first cleavage was between the French and the German. And then the Protestant and the Catholics. Then finally between the west and the east of Europe. The missing element was not only the Christians-Muslims, but also the Ottomans/Turks and Europe!

F. HILL: No, but also Eastern Orthodox.

K. KIRIŞCI: As a result of the 2004 EU enlargement and partly earlier on with Greece -- although at the time, I don't think that was particularly seen from that perspective. I think this whole project fell victim to the Cyprus problem. I do. And then subsequently, things turned sour economically in Europe and it played straight into the hands of those who always had question marks about Turkey's place in Europe, starting with, obviously, Nicolas Sarkozy.

J. SHAPIRO: One of the things that I've learned from Putin in the course

of this conversation is that I'm tired of you focusing on the mistakes of my past. The larger point is: where should Europe and the United States be now on these issues? The mistakes -- if there were mistakes -- have been made as you just pointed out.

K. KIRIŞCI: Engage Turkey. That's all I can say. Engage Turkey. And where maybe I disagree with Putin is that you do have to look back at history and try to extract some lessons from it. But there was a moment, when the most unexpected circles in Turkey advocated EU membership and engaged in it. But look at the way they are treating the European Union. I completely agree that this is going to have to be a two-way street.

J. SHAPIRO: Let me get just a little more precise with what I'm talking about in terms of western policy. I don't mean western policy toward Turkey as a whole, which is an interesting and important question. But I mean western policy toward these protest movements and toward Gezi Park and the sort of general political upset and worry that Ömer is having.

O. TAŞPINAR: I would say first rule is Hippocratic: do no harm. So, don't go public with your criticism of Turkey because it backfires and makes thing worse in domestic politics. Try to keep the criticism as private as possible, but also as clear as possible in your wording and messaging in meetings with top officials.

I think Erdoğan really cares about what Obama will say. And the language is important. I think the message that should come from the United States is the following: you are a source of inspiration for the Islamic world. We've been supporting you for all these years because you've done all the right things. Now that Turkey is tackling the Kurdish question in a decisive way, the last thing we want is for you to stumble. We want you to succeed.

J. SHAPIRO: There have been examples where Obama has been influential on Erdoğan in specific cases. There have been more examples where he hasn't. But the other problem that you have with a phone call like that that you have the phone call and then you agree to some very neutral lines about what happened and then an entirely fallacious interpretation of what happened is leaked. And you're stuck in a situation of either denying it or --

O. TAŞPINAR: If that becomes the case the president can always go for the more direct route of giving an interview to the Turkish press, the way he did with Milliyet last time where he could say the things that he wants to say. Again, the tactic with Turkey should be first to praise Turkey. Show empathy. Tell Turkey how great they are. Friends speak clearly. But, at the end of the day, we do it knowing full well that the U.S. and the EU have diminished leverage over today's Turkey. This Turkey is not the Turkey of 1990s, 1980s. People, including the government and the opposition, care less about the message coming from Washington. They have bought into this post-American world and say 'what is the relevance of the U.S.?' 'Look at them. I mean, who are they to tell us what to do? They should take care of their own problems.' That's the kind of men in the street reaction I think to the United States.

F. HILL: I think we're also seeing plenty of evidence of that with the Russians right now. They're having a field day, dancing in the street with joy around the Kremlin over the Snowden affair. This couldn't have happened at a better time to make the point that the United States is certainly no better than Russia. It's probably a lot worse. It's a threat to people over all. Every accusation that the United States has thrown at the Russians and the Chinese about cyber-espionage can be laid right back at the U.S. door again, so why should anybody, particularly Putin, listen to anything that

Obama or anybody else has to say on any particular topic?

H. THOBURN: Putin says that all the time. He says "Europe is irrelevant. Why should we care about them?" When Obama was in Northern Ireland, for their meeting at the G8 Summit, Putin was specifically very, very harsh to Obama, but Obama made some sort of, you know, remark about how he was getting old and playing basketball and judo was getting more difficult, and Putin's response was "he just wants to make me feel better by talking about his weaknesses."

O. TAŞPINAR: Humor does not translate.

F. HILL: And this leads into something that you've just experienced, Ömer. The point is that we don't know how to talk the same language as the Russians and the Turks. It doesn't matter how good an interpreter we have, it's basically a cultural interpretation. And it's only by being really steeped in this that you understand how things resonate. I don't know whether Obama ad-libbed at his press conference, but if somebody gave him the advice to begin like that -- I'm presuming he ad-libbed -- it couldn't really have been worse. Basically the whole persona of Putin is steeped in his own vigor. And any rumor about his ill health, anything that looks like it smacks of an infirmity, undermines this carefully calculated image at home. So to actually point out that Putin is getting old was just a recipe for a policy disaster. You have to be extraordinarily careful in advising what people should say. Sometimes people should just stay quiet.

J. SHAPIRO: I have found that that's actually never an option.

F. HILL: Well, it isn't an option in our own policy approach. In our own policies, we always have to do or say something. It's very American. And as to humor not translating, Ömer has just had this experience of something that resonated well in a

U.S. context on the *Colbert Report*, but played extraordinarily badly -- at least at the highest levels -- in the Turkish government who picked it up later on You Tube.

O. TAŞPINAR: I think something Jon Stewart said on a comedy show in Egypt recently summarizes the dilemma really well. He said: "if your regime cannot handle a joke, you don't have a regime. A joke has never gassed people in a park or created a police force that clubbed people." So, he basically tried to make a point about how we should be more tolerant about these humor and satire. But it doesn't translate well in the Turkish context because of the linguistic differences. We've been talking about political culture, et cetera. Well if there are serious differences in political cultures between the West and Turkey and Russia, it's only normal that people have a different interpretation of humor.

So, to me, what is really sad is that, when I half-joked in the Colbert Report that the Prime Minister has a tendency to micromanage everything by using the term "control freak," the reaction I received in Turkey was in the form of hundreds of pieces of hate mail. This shows there is no tolerance for criticism.

J. SHAPIRO: I guess I can't ask you guys to be any more consistent than the conspiracy theorists, but I'm getting a little bit frustrated. You, in the first instance, told me in both cases that the West had this sort of psychological hold on both political cultures. And then when I asked, well, given this, how should the West approach the problem, you said that, in both cases, they don't care what the West thinks anymore. And I'm struggling to reconcile those two propositions.

F. HILL: They care and they don't care.

K. KIRIŞCI: That's the face of it.

O. TAŞPINAR: They don't take criticism well. They care when the U.S

praises them. They want to be liked. That's human psychology.

K. KIRIŞCI: And whenever Turkish soccer teams have a game in Europe, and especially if they win, all Turkish newspapers, from left to right, reflect on what European media said about their performance. So they do care.

J. SHAPIRO: So it does matter greatly what we say and what we do?

O. TAŞPINAR: No. I think they want to be praised. They want to be liked. But when there is refusal and rejection, they don't care that much anymore. That's the difference. In the past, when there was refusal and rejection, there was a sense that okay, we need them. Now the mood in Turkey about the EU, is that the EU needs us more than we need the EU. The U.S. needs us more than we need the United States. They need us for Iran. They need us for Iraq. They need us for Syria. So they can't really afford to alienate us.

C. GADDY: I don't think that's true of Russia. Not now at least. I don't think they look for any positive feedback -- and that includes from the top and on down. They feel they're in a different situation now. They feel they're on top. Their economy might not be doing as well as it was doing before. But it's not like Europe. And I think that they look around and see it's always the West needs us to do this or that. There's nothing in particular that we need the West for. That's the attitude. I think it's genuine -- it's not just posture. So for the moment, I don't think they're looking for approval in Russia. In fact, I think it would actually be counterproductive. They wouldn't trust any Western leader that started profusely praising them for doing anything. So the problem with Russia right now is that things are clearly going in a very bad direction, but there's nothing that will really have an impact -- Western comments, advice or action. Instead, it would be very counterproductive.

The one thing that's driving all of this -- and certainly in the case of Russia, I think, implying that in Turkey as well -- is that sliver of the population that has decided to orient themselves towards the West, towards some sort of universal values. The way it breaks down in Russia is, it's Russianness versus universal values. And Russia is going to be in the forefront of fighting against the attempt to impose so-called universal values on our sovereign civilization. And there are other countries around the world that seem to have the same issue. The Chinese and Indians and the Turks and everybody who has a proud tradition of civilization. This code word "universal values" we all know is just a cover for the U.S. -- in their view -- and the Western European countries are nothing but the lackeys of the U.S. For them, it's always the U.S. that's trying to do it.

F. HILL: This is essentially Putin speaking.

C. GADDY: So, as Putin would say, therefore, we'll fight against that. But there is also a segment of the population that -- through the internet, but also through physical presence in the West -- doesn't buy that. I mean they really do think there are universal values and that Russia has also made a contribution to them. They see Putin as now pulling them in the opposite direction from the rest of the world. And so, eventually those people from within Russia have to drive change. If Russia gets closed off from the outside world more, because of a reaction to Putin's policies, that's a very bad thing because that diminishes the chance for that sentiment to expand. But, on the other hand, to go in and try to preach -- you'll get the same reaction as you'll get from real hardcore nationalists inside Turkey.

F. HILL: So what Cliff is basically saying here, which I would also subscribe to, is that we need a very minimalist approach when it comes to Russia. And with all due respect to everybody who pushes legislation to counter Russian action

through Congress, they will usually get the opposite reaction to what they want to get. Unless you actually do want to push Russia away and alienate it.

C. GADDY: USAID, for example, should be spending money to bring Russians to the United States, not to give money to Russian organizations, which they can't do now anyway. It sounds trivial, but just keeping all the doors open right now for Russians in their professional lives and in their normal lives to engage with people on the outside is pretty important.

F HILL: Be it in Europe, be it anywhere: Singapore, China, Australia.

C. GADDY: Yes. Peer-to-peer programs work really, really well. But my basic principle is that the professional segment of the Russian population that is leading these protests, are not the only ones, because there's a bunch of what we might see as "nasty" people in the protests too -- they are, on the one hand, the hope for Russia's modernization in terms of its economic transformation into a real modern economy, and obviously for democracy and liberalization. And, opportunities need to be given to them -- and for others to be created like them. If Russia closes off -- that's the one thing that would set everything back. Putin hasn't shut down borders the way the Soviets did.

O. TAŞPINAR: It won't take long for things to change in that way. I was at the State Department on Friday -- the Bureau of Human Rights -- they were thinking about what to say, what to do about the protests in Turkey. Henri Barkey and I were basically trying to figure out a way to help them. But they were panicking because the guy who started the standing protest -- the standing man -- apparently, in 2006, he had a Kennedy Center exchange program in Washington financed by the State Department. So now this gives room for the Turkish government to say "see this is a CIA plot unfolding."

F. HILL: Which is exactly what the Russians also do with opposition

blogger Alexei Navalny because he was once a Yale fellow.

Just a quick point in all this though, this is a phenomenon in many, many countries right now. We're seeing, with Europe under strain, a kind of a domestic anti-globalization focus turning inwards at home. The U.K. Independence Party, for example, plays against fears of Europe, and the fear of loss of English identity, in particular. We see a Scottish independence movement, with the referendum on this issue coming up next year (2014) -- and Scotland wanting to basically determine its own path forward, because of feeling alienated from the larger body politic. Catalonia is in a similar situation in Spain. And we have strong reactions in Greece and elsewhere in Europe to the imposition of policies from the outside. So it's not that Russians and Turks are in a place that's completely unfamiliar and entirely unique.

We're also talking about all of this against the backdrop of unprecedented protests in Brazil. Again these have been somewhat leaderless protests sparked by social concerns, and they are also talking in Brazil about the fast pace of development, and of economic and social change that people can't keep up with. So I just want to just emphasize that there's a much broader context to look at where people have very similar approaches and reactions.

J. SHAPIRO: I don't want to be in the position of defending U.S. democratization policy, but I think that it's a view that needs to be represented. It's, of course, normal and to be expected that there would be elements of any society that, when confronting U.S. efforts at, let's say, encouraging their civil society or creating political contestation, would push back at that and that would specifically try to link it to foreign conspiracy theories. And they might, even in some instances, be successful. So it's a policy which has an inherent problem. I think everybody recognizes that.

But on the other side of the coin, there is, in some corridors, a lack of faith in the sort of organic capacity of any civil society -particularly when confronted with a repressive apparatus as sophisticated as Putin's - to really be able to take that sort of sliver that you referred to and challenge the powers that be without some sort of outside assistance. And what the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor would say in reaction to what you said is "well, these people want help from the outside, they need help from the outside, and if we had never given it to anybody, we wouldn't have freed Eastern Europe. We wouldn't have created democracy in lots of parts of the world." We always hear this and it's always exaggerated.

So, I'm trying to lay out an argument, not precisely one that I hold, but I think it's an important one. And I'm wondering, is this an excuse for pulling the U.S. back and getting us out of these problems? Do we really believe that in either Turkey or Russia that these indigenous movements are capable of fostering the organic growth of civil society? And do we believe that the outside world, whether we want it to or not, can't be involved given this sort of interconnections between all of these societies?

C. GADDY: I'd like to pose the question differently and just say, can we make it better? If we can't make it better, we shouldn't be doing anything. You're saying that we could do something. But the negative effect of doing something may be greater. And maybe it's not possible for them in any foreseeable future to change the situation. But to me that's not an argument why we necessarily have got to go in and do our best, when we actually risk making it worse. You have to think if -- and I do in this case, I do think that there is -- there are definitely steps that can be taken. You have to be really careful about supporting and fanning the flames of all the inevitable arguments about U.S. interventionism and meddling in their affairs.

O. TAŞPINAR: I'm more on that side, too. I mean the kiss of death argument. Receiving American money when there is such anti-Americanism becomes counterproductive. Even when George Soros supports a cause there are conspiracy theories.

J. SHAPIRO: It's interesting though. What we find in the State Department at least is that civil society organizations specifically in Russia and Turkey, but also in the Arab world want that funding

F. HILL: Some do. Some don't.

C. GADDY: Some of them do because you created a specific class of rent-seekers, if you ask me. I mean that certainly happened in the '90s.

O. TAŞPINAR: But they don't flag it. They don't want people to know about that.

C. GADDY: There are some people who clearly wouldn't have careers -- – even, as you know -- political careers without the initial provision of U.S. money. So, is that necessarily a good thing?

F. HILL: But what is that actual proportion in the totality of civil society organizations? Most likely it's quite a small number.

I mean, if you look much more broadly across the whole spectrum of what is defined as a civil society organization, you're not just talking about those that are engaged in electoral politics, electoral monitoring or basically watchdog groups. You're talking about a huge range of things -- patient advocacy groups, student exchanges, ecology, etc. They get money from all kinds of different sources, not just from the U.S.

J. SHAPIRO: The U.S. gave a lot of assistance in Russia to organizations that were engaged in resolving road traffic issues.

F. HILL: And those kinds of things had a great deal of positive effect. I think there have been a lot of very interesting successes from assistance provided through USAID. But the thing is that a lot of Russian and other civil society groups did, and will still, set up themselves independently. Some of them are, of course, also set up very specifically in conjunction with larger international groups. So there's a big set of differences to keep in mind.

I think we just have to be very careful in talking about what we mean by saying that civil society is completely and entirely dependent on its linkages with U.S. or other international counterparts.

J. SHAPIRO: Yeah. Well, we need the other side represented. I'm sort of trying, but I'm having a little bit of difficulty. When you talk to eastern European leaders from the Cold War days, the sort of Vaclav Havel types --

F. HILL: Leaders from Poland, Czech Republic, old Czechoslovakia, Hungary.

J. SHAPIRO: They will say to a man that both the rhetorical U.S. support and the direct U.S. and western support, in terms of Freedom House and NDI and places like that, were absolutely essential for their ability to organize and to challenge and to be ready for the opportunities that presented themselves. And, of course, they believe in these things as fundamentally indigenous movements. But they give a tremendous amount of credit and importance to what the West did.

F. HILL: But they were also part of Europe until World War II. We're talking here about the Soviet Union and an old Ottoman Turkey that are completely different.

C. GADDY: They were trying to overthrow the Soviet yoke in Eastern

Europe. The biggest mistake ever made was to try to take the Polish economic liberalization program, for example, and apply that into Russia. And that's essentially what led to Putin.

F. HILL: I think it's the same in the political realm.

C. GADDY: In economic policy, it leads to the emergence of Anatoly Chubais, it then leads to the appointments of Putin and his eventual finance minister Alexei Kudrin. Poland just is so different from Russia. In Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe you're trying -- you're willing to do anything in order to remove that threat of Soviet domination -- Russian domination. You're willing to, you know, stand up. This is not the case in Russia. –In Eastern Europe, you're coming in supporting -- in Poland or Czechoslovakia or somewhere else -- an underground that has the support of the population. In the late 1980s and 1990s, there's nobody left in these countries that's in favor of the Russians dominating them. But you go into Russia with that attitude and you get something else. I always ask this hypothetical question: How popular do you think it would have been to have U.S. troops land in the Soviet Union to free the prisoners in the Gulag? Ask Russians today how many would vote for that. It's not just a question of, you know, their lack of freedom and the horrible conditions. It's a question of national sovereignty.

J. SHAPIRO: So the distinction is potentially that nationalism in Poland was anti-Soviet and therefore could be pro-American.

F. HILL: And democracy promotion still seems pro-American for many people in the Russian context, which means anti-Russian. That's in Putin's view. And many Russian people see that same anti-Russianness in the dissident movement that dates back to the 1970s and goes through the 1980s. The dissident movement that was

supported from the outside through the Helsinki networks and many others. It was very easy for the KGB to make a connection between them being agents of the West or associated with the West. Because their activism was directed against the system, the KGB said it was also directed against their own country. The way that this was depicted in the Soviet era means that an awful lot of people still believe it. And it's very easy now to use similar tactics to turn the Russian opposition movements into the lackeys of the West and to give them the labels of 'foreign agents.'

In addition, as Cliff was pointing out, there's also a view on the outside, from us, that there are "bad people" in some of the Russian opposition groups. These are the nationalists, who we see as anti-western, anti-liberal. Well, the nationalists who were also protesting against Putin and the Kremlin's policy, see themselves as the guarantors of Russianness. They just don't like the way that Putin is promoting it.

So we don't reach out to the more popular nationalist figures within the Russian opposition who see themselves as defending their country. This reinforces the idea that we in the West have our own favorites, our own 'agents', among the opposition. When we write about the opposition, we scoot over the nationalist groups as if they're not there at all. They're quite a large element of the Russian protests. They just have a very different view of how they want their society to be organized.

So we impose too often our own frames on events and we also transfer from other settings frames of reference and models and approaches that are not linked to conditions in Russia itself. And I am sure that that's pretty much the same kind of thing in Turkey. We even approach it by calling Turkey a model. It's a model from our perspective -- a model for something that we want. But is that necessarily a model for what Turks want or even for what Erdoğan wants for the country? And I think that's why

we're in such a difficult situation right now with both Russia and Turkey.

J. SHAPIRO: So do you all agree that in Turkey there's a role for U.S and western development of civil society, but that it is very constrained?

O. TAŞPINAR: It is constrained. I think the analogy with Eastern Europe would not hold because Turkish civil society, including the CHP opposition, is very skeptical of the United States. So there is a view of the U.S. that is very different than what Eastern European societies had of them. Their vision of the U.S. was much different.

J. SHAPIRO: Historical context.

F. HILL: That last comment about historical context is really important because when USAID and other groups went into Russia, they looked at the history of the Soviet period. And all of us know from studying countries for a long period of time, that it's the whole totality -- a greater sweep of history that is really important. Because the Soviet period came out of the tsarist period, it didn't just emerge in isolation. Just like the Kemalist period in Turkey. The period of Ataturk came out of the collapse and the dislocation and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. So this is something that we have to be really aware of. We can't just take snapshots of country's histories and then use those as our reference points. We have to think of them in a much larger context.

K. KIRIŞCI: An historical context was important, for example, when Stalin made those territorial demands on Turkey right at the end of World War Two and then United States arrived. Actually, it was Turkey that pulled the United States in. There was a very different mood then. The warship Missouri, for example, was received with cheers in Istanbul. But 15 years down the line, after Cuba and the Cyprus problem, the U.S. was being booed. And poor sailors when they ended up coming in the early to

mid-'60s, they were thrown back into the sea. So the historical context can play a very important role.

K. KIRIŞCI: But Brazil would have also been interesting to compare. I keep looking at what's happening in Brazil.

H. THOBURN: Again, these protesters are abnormally highly educated in Brazil as well.

K. KIRIŞCI: But what fascinates me is yes, there may be some police brutality, but for the size of these demonstrations and the size of Brazil, the number of people who have been hurt by the police is so much lower. And the reaction of the president is different.

H. THOBURN: And Dilma Rousseff is also taking heed and not calling the protestors "capulcu," not calling them the equivalent of "Bandar-logi" as Putin termed the Russian opposition.

F. HILL: We can have an even a broader discussion after this one bringing in Brazil.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

Carleton J. Anderson, III

(Signature and Seal on File)

Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Virginia

Commission No. 351998

Expires: November 30, 2016