"Managing Allies and Adversaries: A Critique of U.S. National Security Policy"

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November 19, 2002

Good Evening, Ladies and Gentlemen. Thank you to the University of Delaware for welcoming me so warmly. Thanks especially to Ralph Begleiter, for inviting me to join you this evening, despite my rather precarious state. It takes a brave man to schedule a speech by a pregnant woman two weeks before her delivery date, and perhaps a foolish woman to accept. But, it is nevertheless a great pleasure to be with you tonight.

I have been asked to critique current U.S. national security policy – in short, to address the question: are we on the right track? Let me begin by acknowledging that it is impossible to do this topic justice in an evening's speech. I will not pretend to be comprehensive, but rather focus on what I believe to be the most salient issues at present. Nor will I pretend to be entirely unbiased. While I do not view myself as a partisan when it comes to national security affairs, I did serve in the previous Administration. And, as you will see, I do have significant policy differences with the current one. However, I think the critique I will present tonight is anything but partisan. In fact, it reflects what I believe are many concerns now shared broadly among a cross-section of national security experts from both political parties.

Tonight, I'd like to address our subject in three parts: first, to consider what track we are on, and is it the right one? Second, how did we get here? And third, where do we go from here?

The Current Track: Where We Are At Present

So where are we today? I intend no hyperbole or fear-mongering when I begin with the following categorical statement: I believe the United States and its people today face one of the most dangerous moments for our national security in recent history.

I say this for several reasons.

First and foremost, it is fair to assume that we await imminently another massive and deadly attack on our homeland orchestrated by Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network. I, like many others in government, learned the hard way that when Bin Laden threatens a deadly attack, he delivers – usually within a matter of weeks rather than months. Such was the case before the bombings of our East African embassies, before the bombing of the USS Cole and before 9/11. Moreover, major attacks often follow a pattern of scattered violence of escalating intensity. Taken together, the recent Bali bombing, attack on the French tanker, murder of U.S. military personnel in Kuwait as well as various assaults on western targets in other parts of the Muslim world from Tunisia to Pakistan to Jordan bode ill.

Bin Laden's latest warnings last week should be and, I believe, are being taken extremely seriously by the U.S. Government. Our friends in Europe are also likely to be hit. But having warnings does not mean we possess the knowledge or the capability to thwart such attacks, merely the wisdom to know that we must do everything to try. When, where, and how the next attacks will come are unclear. A big unanswered question is whether Al Qaeda has the capability to employ weapons of mass destruction this time – a chemical or biological attack or detonation of a so-called "dirty bomb" laced with radioactive materials.

Second, notwithstanding Tom Ridge's efforts to reassure the American public, we are not appreciably more secure today than we were a year ago. Aviation security has improved somewhat, although baggage will not all be screened by the original December deadline, as promised. Yet, our critical infrastructure remains largely vulnerable. State and local budgets are over-stretched, and our public health system is far from capable of coping with a bio-weapons attack. The Department of Homeland Security will soon become a reality but, realistically, it will be years before it is positioned to effect significant change. In the meantime, we must look to other means to strengthen homeland security, and urgently.

Third, we are on the verge of war with Iraq. This war could see Saddam Hussein unleash weapons of mass destruction on U.S. forces or on Israel, sparking a wider regional conflict. It could also prompt Saddam Hussein to forge alliances of desperation or convenience with his erstwhile adversaries like Al-Qaeda, which to date have not substantially materialized.

Despite the return of weapons inspectors, I believe there is a high probability that we will end up at war – due to Saddam's deception, American impatience, or both. The real question is when and how this war will be conducted – sooner and with minimal international support, or later and possibly with a larger, more committed coalition of international partners. How and when this war is waged matters greatly to our national security, in that it will influence reactions in the Arab world, give greater or lesser impetus to would-be terrorists, and impact the cost and duration of our post-conflict military and financial commitments in Iraq.

Fourth, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to smolder and probably escalate, with no end in sight. The corrupt Palestinian authority remains as intractable as ever – dodging reform while failing to curb terrorism. Given the electoral battle underway for the hearts and minds of the Israeli Right, we can expect more aggressive Israeli responses to increasingly bold Palestinian provocations. This tit-for-tat conflict, perhaps more than any other, coupled with the largely negative international perceptions of the American role in it, fuel widespread hostility to the U.S. in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Such hostility does not come without a cost. It's a large part of the answer to the question: "Why do they hate us?" This hostility can also be manipulated into a rallying point for terrorists and other U.S. adversaries.

Fifth, we face a North Korea that now claims unabashedly to be embarked on a nuclear weapons program. The United States Government has thus far refused to negotiate with North Korea to cease its enriched uranium production and dismantle any weapons. The result is a stubborn stand-off. At best, this stand-off will lead to a new North Korean nuclear capability that remains unchecked. At worst, but perhaps necessarily, it could lead to an extremely costly war involving the over 30,000 U.S. troops presently stationed on the Korean Peninsula.

Sixth, we face a set of traditional allies – our G-8 partners and others – that are increasingly wary of U.S. power and intentions. They fear and distrust what they perceive to be a growing U.S. tendency towards unilateral action in world affairs. This fear has been reinforced by the doctrines of preemption and zero tolerance for competitor states, as outlined in President Bush's recently-released National Security Strategy. Too many of our traditional partners view their role as to check U.S. power rather than to join with us in advancing our shared interests. Meanwhile, our adversaries are taunting and testing us – from Kim Jong Il and Saddam Hussein to Osama Bin Laden. Fearful friends and emboldened adversaries are far from an optimal combination.

Finally, we are arguably worse off domestically than at any time in the last decade. Our economy is stagnant. Jobs and pensions are evaporating. Corporate corruption has driven confidence in the U.S. market to a low. All of this could serve to erode both the economic basis of our global power and a not inconsiderable share of our international moral authority. Further, any semblance of balance between our branches of government disappeared overnight due to the Democrats' pathetic failure to articulate a credible vision or muster a compelling leader. Civil liberties are under assault, not just for Muslim Americans and immigrants, but potentially for all of us, if John Poindexter and his Orwellian "Total Information Awareness" program in the Pentagon get their way. Each of us may soon be subject to electronic tracking and surveillance in many aspects of our lives.

In short, we face multiple dangers, some at least partially of our own creation. Having recited this gloomy litany, I am reminded of the famous line: "But other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how was the play?" I realize I paint a dire picture. It is hardly an uplifting after-dinner message, but I am afraid it is a realistic one.

How Did We Get Here?

So how did we get in such a mess? Let's start with the war on terrorism and be plain. This was not a war the U.S. sought or provoked. It is not President Bush's fault or President Clinton's fault or even the result of bad intelligence or the perceived arrogance of U.S. power. There are hostile, murderous forces out there that hate not just our policies but our principles and our people. They will not be deterred, and nor can we. It has been and will be a long war of attrition. The battles began in the early Nineties, even if few noticed until last year when the battleground shifted to our homeland. These battles will continue and probably intensify for some time to come. Al Qaeda and its allies can probably eventually be defeated but only with great, concerted international effort and resolute perseverance.

President Bush's war on terrorism began well. He effectively crafted a large coalition, built on deep-felt sympathy for the U.S. in the wake of 9/11. He rightly pursued a pragmatic and multi-faceted approach, combining the tools of diplomacy, military force, intelligence and law enforcement to go after everything from Al Qaeda's finances to its various cells around the world. And he orchestrated an initially successful military campaign in Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban and disrupted Al Qaeda's operational bases, if even it failed to put Al Qaeda out of

commission. Finally, the Administration lent valuable military support to governments trying to cool other hot-beds of terrorism from the Phillipines to Yemen.

Yet, over the last six months or more, the war on terrorism has faltered. We have failed thus far to capture Bin Laden or most of his top lieutenants. This is not surprising, by the way. Having seen first hand how difficult it was to capture Mohammed Aideed in Mogadishu, Somalia, I was among the dubious when President Bush defined capture of Bin Laden as a key goal of his war on terrorism. But having failed thus far to achieve it, the President in recent months has tried to hypnotize the American public into forgetting that getting Bin Laden "dead or alive" was a critical element of his definition of success. For many months, until this most recent audio tape surfaced last week, Bin Laden's name was rarely, if ever, uttered by senior Administration officials. This kind of evasion insults the intelligence of the American people and reinforces suspicions that the Administration is trying to change the subject to Iraq rather than remain focused on the necessary but difficult tasks of winning the war against Al Qaeda.

We have also managed to squander much of the global good will and sympathy we enjoyed in the wake of 9/11. This we accomplished in various ways: by employing bullying rhetoric ("you are either with us or against us"); by making some unfortunate targeting mistakes in Afghanistan; by reinforcing perceptions of American bias in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and by suddenly demanding that the world fall in line behind our decision to oust Saddam Hussein or watch us do it alone on CNN. While many countries continue to cooperate with us in the war on terrorism, their will to continue to take difficult steps that serve our interests may prove to be diminished, as a consequence of the high-handed manner in which we have dealt with many countries at the very time we need them most.

In Afghanistan, important progress has been made, but the country remains highly unstable and vulnerable to regression. President Karzai is making noble efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, but its future remains uncertain. Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants are still active, especially near the Pakistan border; yet, the U.S. is now scaling back its efforts to pursue Al Qaeda in the border region. Instead, we have refocused our forces on important reconstruction tasks. Thus, Afghanistan remains a partial and fragile success, at best. And here again, we risk changing the subject prematurely.

On the home-front, we remain exceedingly vulnerable. In part, this was inevitable, as it was unreasonable to expect that we could dramatically improve homeland security in short order. But, we could have done more in the time we have had. President Bush dropped his opposition to a Department of Homeland Security only last June. Valuable time was wasted. Establishing the Department is indeed an urgent task, albeit far from a panacea.

More significantly, the Administration has seemed overly focused on fighting the last battle – aviation security. It has not given sufficient priority or resources to other aspects of homeland security, such as bio-preparedness, port, container and tanker security, hardening chemical and nuclear facilities, enhancing truck and rail security, or pressing the private sector into cooperating sufficiently to dramatically improve cyber-security. As a result, key facilities and infrastructure remain vulnerable.

With respect to Iraq we face a crisis, though not a threat, that is largely of our own making. Let me be clear, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein and his possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose a grave threat to the security of the region, to the U.S. and the larger international community. His decade-long defiance of the UN itself arguably justifies military action. However, there is no reason to be certain that Saddam Hussein cannot continue to be contained and deterred from using WMD against his external adversaries, as he has been for the last ten years.

Though the threat is real and has been present for a decade, the timing of the current crisis is our own creation. Someone or several people in the Administration woke up six months ago and decided suddenly now is the time to confront Iraq finally and decisively come hell or high water. In doing so, they set in motion a complex of forces that we now will have great difficulty controlling. First, by persistently and aggressively threatening unilateral action, we may have increased the chances of effective UN action. But we have also broken a lot of crockery and strained relations with several of our allies. We have put at risk our partners in the region, by fueling further unrest in already unstable but critical countries from Jordan to Saudi Arabia to Egypt. We have given Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein an opportunity at least to feign common cause. We have left the world and the American public wondering whether our true goal is regime change or disarmament.

And we have failed to answer convincingly the question of how the Iraqi threat relates directly to the present war on terrorism. The Administration's unsubstantiated claims aside, there is no clear evidence of significant Iraqi collaboration with Al Qaeda and absolutely none to suggest (as many Americans believe) an Iraqi role in 9/11. These are, in fact, *presently* two separate threats, and we need to recognize them as such.

Does Iraq pose a more imminent and urgent threat to the U.S. than Al Qaeda? I think not. If not, then can the U.S. fight two simultaneous wars effectively? Again, I think not. Having served eight years at senior levels in the White House and State Department, I have seen first hand many times how single issues can consume, if not overwhelm, the attention of top policymakers for months at a time. Examples during my tenure included the Middle East peace process, Bosnia, Kosovo and North Korea. And these were not even full-scale wars. I am highly skeptical of Administration claims that they can walk and chew gum with two hot wars underway. One, if not both, will suffer. And if we are in a hot war in Iraq, it will be the colder war on terror that will take a back seat.

On Iraq, President Bush was right to heed Secretary Powell's plea that the U.S. proceed multilaterally, if possible. The passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was a victory for patient diplomacy and for U.S. interests, but it has also complicated the path ahead. Now we must decide whether we are prepared to play out inspections long enough to try to build a case against Iraq convincing even to Saddam's greatest apologists in the region and on the UN Security Council. This will be essential if we are to preserve the fragile international coalition that agreed to this resolution and carry it into an eventual conflict, assuming Saddam Hussein fails to disarm. Alternatively, the U.S. could determine by itself when enough is enough and launch our military operation with minimal international support, presumably early next year

before the summer heat kicks in. So, the key question remains not whether we need to deal more effectively with the Iraqi threat, but when and how?

Compounding our ability to confront effectively the threats we face from Al Qaeda and Iraq is the collapse of the Middle East Peace Process and the volatility of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Here, too, U.S. policy is partly to blame. By neglecting the Middle East Peace Process for most of its first fifteen months in office out of disdain for President Clinton's active engagement, the Administration let go unchecked serious excesses and escalations on both sides.

Then, when the Administration did intercede, it did so with a perceived lack of balance that cast us as Israel's unquestioning ally and Yassir Arafat's enemy. Without arguing here the merits of these characterizations, they surely did not enhance our ability to broker peace. Worse still, our aim has not been to broker peace. Despite Colin Powell's efforts to the contrary, the Administration is content to let the situation fester so long as it does not prevent the U.S. from acting against Iraq. The Administration posits an enlightened vision of an eventual Palestinian state but allows a series of nearly impossible pre-conditions to continually impede its realization. How dangerous is all of this, given the hostility we are engendering in the region? In the context of the war on terrorism, how consistent is this approach with U.S. national security interests?

Against this dismal back-drop, we also encounter an international community increasingly skeptical of U.S. intentions and resentful of our power. How did we get here? In large part, we did so by almost reflexively spurning collective instruments – from international treaties such as the ABM treaty, the Bioweapons Convention and the International Criminal Court to multilateral gatherings such as the UN Conference on Racism. Further, we have implied we believe the U.S. stands above international law, for example by seeking exclusive immunities for U.S. soldiers serving in UN peacekeeping operations and by justifying potential unilateral U.S. military actions through a far-reaching doctrine of pre-emption, while warning others not to follow suit. This posture undermines the moral basis of our leadership, or "soft power", and weakens international support for our legitimate objectives.

Finally, we have managed to aggravate, even alienate, large swaths of the globe by our perceived neglect and inattention to their concerns. The countries of Latin America, promised by this President more active engagement than ever before, feel betrayed – perhaps none more than Mexico, whose President invested a great deal of his personal capital in improved relations with the U.S. in exchange for the lost promise of immigration reform. New free trade agreements for the rest of the Americas have not materialized. Instead, we have met the region's financial crises with studied ambivalence.

Elsewhere, the Balkans have largely fallen off the United States' radar screen. Washington mainly chastises Japan publicly for its economic failings, while hanging South Korea's leaders out to dry in their so-called "Sunshine Policy." The Administration has variously villanized and embraced Russia and China, leaving them and many others to wonder whether they are still, in our eyes, strategic competitors or, finally, strategic partners.

Africa, a part of the world I know well, feels largely taken for granted by this Administration, which has pocketed fairly broad African support for the war on terrorism but given insufficient attention to many of the Continent's most pressing concerns. African countries are well aware that we have failed to fight HIV/AIDS with the massive resources it requires. We have enacted farm subsidies that harm developing country producers, neglected to become actively involved in regional conflict resolution (except in Sudan), and not bothered to consult with them in a genuine way on pressing international problems from Iraq to the Middle East Peace Process.

Given that the threats we face are increasingly transnational in nature – from terrorism to proliferation to environmental degradation and disease – is it wise to foster fair-weather or ambivalent bilateral relationships across the globe when our security interests necessitate unwavering and fully committed international partners?

Where Do We Go From Here?

All of these problems and concerns beg the question: where do we go from here? How do we dig out of the hole we are in? Well, the good news is I believe we can recover much, though not all, lost ground and build a more secure foundation for U.S. national security policy. The Bush Administration could begin to do so, starting tomorrow, if it saw fit.

Though I have no illusions that President Bush will substantially change course, allow me to outline some steps I believe the U.S. ought to take to reduce the risks we face and to position ourselves more effectively to confront those threats we cannot mitigate.

First, we need to be absolutely clear and consistent in setting our priorities. Above all, we need to make the war on terrorism, not Iraq, "Job One" for the foreseeable future. This means intensifying our own domestic efforts as well as our collaboration with other nations' intelligence and law enforcement authorities to disrupt Al-Qaeda cells, round up its members, and halt its financial flows. We need to stay focused on the hunt for top Al Qaeda leaders, including Bin Laden, and quit pretending that they don't matter.

Similarly, the Administration and Congress must accelerate their efforts to improve critical infrastructure security and bio-preparedness throughout the homeland and recognize that this cannot be achieved on the cheap. Nor can state and local governments do much more without substantially increased federal assistance. At the same time, President Bush should be candid with the American public about our continued vulnerability and continue to remind us of the long-term nature of the war on terrorism.

Second, the U.S. needs a long-term strategy for fighting the war on terrorism, in particular for easing the frustrations and privations that make many parts of the world fertile ground for terrorist operators and recruiters. This war for the world's hearts and minds is not one we can win through Hollywood-style public diplomacy alone. We need to show we genuinely care for those beyond our borders. From Mexico to Ethiopia, we need to be seen as interested in, sympathetic to, and generous in addressing the concerns and critical needs of the world's poor

and disaffected. This may sound like wooly, liberal humanitarianism in the extreme, but let me assure you, I'm talking about our hard-core national security interests.

As long as we continue to be perceived as miserly (which comparatively we are), hypocritical, protectionist or arrogant in many parts of the world, we will not only fail to engender the loyal partnerships that are so critical to our ability to shut down terrorists operating around the globe. We will also give rise to a new generation of young people steeped in anti-American sentiment and distrustful of our intentions.

As a practical matter, the U.S. should view it as our fight, not just the developing world's, to close the gaps between rich and poor. It must be our fight to educate the uneducated, prevent and treat infectious diseases (especially HIV/AIDS), to open our markets fully to goods and services from the developing world, to foster growth through increased aid, trade, investment and debt relief, to fight corruption, and to strengthen democratic institutions.

The Administration's proposed Millenium Challenge Account is a good idea. It will increase by 50% our assistance to developing countries, starting in 2006. But most of these additional funds will go to a small cadre of high-performing countries without regard to their significance to us in fighting the war on terrorism. Thus, many countries in the world will still feel left out and lacking a perceived stake in America's security. Without changing perceptions of the U.S. throughout much of the developing and Muslim world, we should expect bin Laden and future such enemies to find a growing constituency for their radical form of Islam, whose chief tenet is hatred of America and our success.

Third, we must all recognize, as President Bush has rightly stressed, that failed states pose a direct threat to U.S. national security. Failed states are countries in which the central government does not exert effective control over, nor deliver vital services to, significant parts of its territory due to conflict, ineffective governance, or state collapse. Few Americans would have thought that events in Afghanistan could affect us so directly. Yet, as we all learned after September 11, failed states serve as safe-havens and staging grounds for terrorists. They can also afford them easy access to diamonds, uranium, or narcotics that help finance illicit activities. Terrorist organizations take advantage of failed states' porous borders and their weak law enforcement and security institutions to move men, weapons and money. Terrorists may also recruit foot soldiers from their poor, disillusioned populations.

Thus, if we are serious about our anti-terrorism commitment, whether we like it or not, the U.S. must become more rather than less engaged in the difficult tasks of peacemaking, peacekeeping and nation-building in failed states – from Central Africa to Afghanistan, from Sierra Leone to Somalia. In short, there is no part of the world that we can safely view as unimportant to U.S. national security interests. When our battlefield is the globe, our strategies and tactics must be adapted accordingly.

Fourth, we need to exercise great caution on Iraq. Having done the right thing in seeking and obtaining a strong, unanimous UN Security Council resolution, we need to give the inspectors a genuine opportunity to do their job or to conclude that they cannot. Unless Iraq stonewalls the inspectors, we need to resist the temptation to declare "material breach" and then

war at the first, inevitable Iraqi lies or provocations, which could come as soon as their December 8th declaration.

Why should we resist? For several reasons. As a purely practical matter, we will not yet have the forces and equipment in the theatre to launch our campaign and would put our deploying forces at risk of terrorist attacks in the period between our declaration of war and our readiness to wage one effectively. We also need more time to enhance homeland security, which will be further threatened after we unleash massive American military power against yet another Muslim country.

Moreover, if we proceed without UN support (which we will not have at the outset if we declare foul), we will fuel popular discontent on the "Arab street" and increase instability in important countries like Jordan. We will also jeopardize the willingness and ability of key states in the Gulf region to allow us to use their bases, which are critical to any U.S. operation in Iraq. In addition, we will lose most of our key international partners whose resources we need, if not their troops, to share the cost of post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq. We will also squander the fragile international good will we engendered by agreeing to act, in the first instance, under UN auspices.

I acknowledge there are significant risks to proceeding with caution, but I believe they are outweighed by the risks of launching a precipitous strike against Iraq without broad international support and at least regional acquiescence. We should maintain the credible threat of the use of force against Iraq. Yet, we ought to let good judgment drive the timetable for any eventual U.S. military action, not the impatience of the civilian hawks in the Pentagon or the false fear that we must act swiftly because U.S. credibility is on the line. If military action is deferred even to next year or beyond, it will not necessarily be a bad thing, if the U.S. can then proceed with sufficient support in the region and UN. Nor would it be bad if we used the intervening time to make further progress on the war on terror and homeland security. Moreover, we might then find ourselves fighting against an at least partially disarmed Iraq, if weapons inspectors are able to obtain even half a loaf of cooperation.

Fifth, we need to get off the sidelines and tackle seriously the increasingly dangerous Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The U.S. must insist on pressing forward with the peace process as soon as Israeli elections are over. In the meantime, we need to lay the groundwork. This should entail robust condemnations not only of Palestinian terror attacks but also of Israeli excesses, from continued settlements to deadly incursions into the West Bank and Gaza. The U.S. should signal clearly that Foreign Minister and candidate Netanyahu's policies do not mesh with American objectives and that we intend to put U.S. interests first in our dealings with the countries of the region. The Administration should not only reiterate its commitment to a Palestinian state but also be prepared to press for swift progress towards that goal through negotiations *without* cumbersome preconditions. As former Prime Minister Shimon Peres recently recommended, we should use the full weight of our influence to catalyze the peace process in parallel with, not solely in response to, other necessary steps such as reform of the Palestinian authority and maintenance of a viable ceasefire.

Finally, the Administration needs to make affirmative moves to allay international concerns about what many perceive to be our often brazen and selfish exercise of American power for dubious objectives. We need to demonstrate that our stewardship of the globe as the world's remaining superpower will aim to benefit others as well as ourselves, that we seek power not merely for its own sake but to enhance the security, liberty and prosperity of our own and other peoples.

We can begin by proving a consistent preference for cooperation and consultation with international partners rather than for knee-jerk unilateralism. We can build up regional and international institutions rather than sideline or undermine many of them. We can jettison the convenient fiction that it is often us against the United Nations, ignoring the fact that for over fifty years we have been the UN's most influential member and that the UN's failings are therefore U.S. failings. We can find ways to commit to, or if not, to modify international treaties and instruments rather than merely toss them aside and walk away. In short, we can change the tone and substance of our international engagement as a first and relatively easy step in repairing battered relationships.

Let me conclude by summarizing. At this especially dangerous moment in history, I believe the U.S. should exhibit strong, steady, principled leadership in pursuit of our national security objectives. We should recognize our limitations and prioritize the threats we face and dealing with them progressively and in a manner designed to arouse minimal additional international hostility. We should seek to strengthen our international partnerships with countries large and small through collaborative leadership and compassionate policies. We should show our adversaries and allies alike both our determination to defend our interests and our patient resolve. For instance, North Korea should be left with no doubt of our determination to rid the Peninsula of destabilizing nuclear materials or weapons. Yet, we should aim to achieve this goal first through skillful negotiation, perhaps combined with sanctions, rather than swift resort to a cold or even hot war.

We almost certainly face tough and likely deadly battles ahead, but we can fight them with greater strength, more committed partners and perhaps even shorten their duration, if we have the vision to adjust, as necessary, our strategies, tactics and tone. The U.S. and its leaders must take the long view, recognizing that to preserve our power and defend our interests most effectively, we need to lead more justly, openly and generously. We are more than capable of doing so, if only we have the confidence and the will to change.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.