The Future of NATO Enlargement

The accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as members of the Atlantic Alliance in early 1999 has settled the question over whether NATO should expand. While critics of enlargement derided the NATO decision, in the words of George Kennan, as “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era,” the sixteen NATO governments thought otherwise when they agreed in July 1997 to invite three new countries to join the Alliance. In making this invitation, the allied leaders underscored that this was only the beginning of the process by reaffirming “that NATO remains open to new members,” a commitment that itself is enshrined in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nine other European states have formally applied for Alliance membership: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Over time, traditionally neutral countries that recently joined the European Union (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) might also wish to join a growing Euro-Atlantic security organization.

NATO’s open door policy raises important questions that the allies will have to confront at the Washington summit and beyond. These include when a second round of invitations will be issued, which countries will be invited to join, and how the enlargement process will be managed so as not to further antagonize Russia. Equally important for the United States is the domestic political question of how future rounds of enlargement can secure the support of the two-thirds of votes necessary to ensure the U.S. Senate’s advice and consent for ratification of the accession amendments to the Washington Treaty. At least in the short term, the answer to the first set of questions depends on how the Clinton Administration and its successor answer the domestic political question. Before turning to these issues, however, it is useful to review how this point was reached.

NATO Enlargement: The First Round

The process of NATO enlargement started in 1993 when the United States and Germany for quite different reasons decided that adding new members represented an appropriate response
to the changes in post-cold-war Europe. For the United States, enlargement was part of its vision for the new Europe – to make “Europe whole and free,” as President Bush argued in 1989, and to forge a “peaceful and undivided Europe,” as President Clinton urged in 1994.³ For Germany, enlargement was part of its post-unification strategy of securing a positive role for Berlin in the new Europe. On the one hand, this implied filling the political and security vacuum between Germany and the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, it meant placing Germany in the center of the new Europe rather than leaving it at the (exposed) eastern flank of the old Europe. Whatever the rationale, the possibility of enlargement received the backing of allied leaders at their Brussels Summit in January 1994: “we are undertaking initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability, and well-being in the whole of Europe, which has always been our Alliance’s fundamental goal. We have agreed … to reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries.”⁴

In December 1994, the North Atlantic Council initiated a “process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will be enlarged, the principles to guide this process, and the implications of membership.”⁵ The outcome of this examination was the Alliance’s “Study on NATO Enlargement,” which was completed the following September.⁶ According to the study, the fundamental purpose of enlargement was to “provide increased stability and security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, without recreating dividing lines.” It could do so by:

- Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military;
- Fostering in new members of the Alliance the patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building which characterize relations among current Allies;
- Promoting good-neighbourly relations, which would benefit all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, both members and non-members of NATO;
- Emphasizing common defence and extending its benefits and increasing transparency in defence planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defence policies;
- Reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic values and thereby curbing the countervailing tendency towards disintegration along ethnic and territorial lines;
- Strengthening the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security, including through peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council as well as other new missions.”⁷
As for membership criteria, the allies agreed to a long list of political and military steps that aspiring members were expected to take. These came to be known as the “Perry Principles,” named for then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry. In early 1995 Perry indicated that there were four principles that underpinned NATO’s past success: collective defense, democracy, consensus, and cooperative security. Applied to enlargement, this meant that new members must: have forces able to defend the Alliance; be democratic and have free markets, put their forces under civilian control, protect human rights, and respect the sovereignty of others; accept that intra-Alliance consensus remains fundamental; and possesses forces that are interoperable with those of existing NATO members.³

Following NATO’s decision in December 1996 to invite new members the following year, the issue of who to invite and how to square enlargement with maintaining good relations with an increasingly unstable and, at least domestically, paranoid Russia came to dominate intra-Alliance discussions. The Russia issue had to be settled first. At least rhetorically, Moscow’s opposition to any enlargement suggested that the future of its partnership with the United States and other western countries was at stake in the decision. This was also a key concern of those in the United States and other NATO countries who opposed the addition of new members. Opponents of the Alliance’s “expansions” argued that the process would unnecessarily antagonize Russia, thereby feeding nationalist and xenophobic sentiment in Russia and reducing the possibility for cooperative efforts to reduce the former Soviet Union’s military potential, notably its large and unwieldy nuclear weapons infrastructure.⁹

For the Clinton Administration (and other proponents of enlargement), the Russia issue was less clear cut. On the one hand, NATO could not accept the notion that Russia, or any other non-NATO member, might exercise a veto either over whether Alliance membership should be expanded or over who could apply and be invited. At the same time, the Administration had placed improving relations with Russia at the very top of its foreign policy agenda and it wished, if at all possible, to avoid a rift in the budding strategic relationship over this issue. The matter dominated President Clinton’s Helsinki Summit meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in March 1997. The two leaders concluded that while both sides would continue to disagree on
whether NATO should be enlarged, they would spell out the future of Russia’s relationship with an enlarged NATO in a new document that “would reflect the transformation of NATO and the new realities in Russia. As defined in the document, the NATO-Russia relationship would include: consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern.”

Two months later, President Yeltsin joined NATO’s leaders in Paris to sign the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, which established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council for the purpose of consulting, coordinating, and (wherever possible) joint decision-making and action on security issues of concern.

With Russia thus mollified, the Alliance turned to the question of who should be invited to join. There was general agreement among the allies that five of the applicants – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia – were more or less ready to join. All agreed that the first three would be invited by the allied leaders at the Madrid Summit in July 1997. The question remaining was whether additional countries ought to be invited and, if so, which ones. After initial reluctance about the prospects of enlargement and once it was clear that the process could not be stopped, France led the way in supporting the inclusion of Romania. French reasoning was twofold. It wanted to counter the image of NATO as a U.S.-dominated alliance by strongly supporting the one applicant Washington least favored; once inside the Alliance, Romania would, given Paris’ longstanding ties with Bucharest, be the country most likely to share its perspective. Slovenian membership was most strongly supported by Italy, its only NATO neighbor. Paris and Rome agreed to push for the inclusion of both countries, a position also supported by at least seven other NATO countries (Belgium, Canada, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey). In contrast, Iceland and Britain (the latter having been unenthusiastic about enlargement throughout the process) were happy to see membership extended to only three countries. Four other countries (Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway) remained officially undecided as to whether the allies should invite three, four, or five states to join.

As always, the critical vote on NATO matters belonged to the United States, which took its time to decide what it wanted (reflecting in part continuing, deep divisions within the
Administration about both the wisdom and the extent of the enlargement process). In the end, it opted to invite just three – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – and make clear that the door to others would remain open. There were four reasons for this decision. First, while Romania and Slovenia had supporters in the U.S. Senate, it was believed that it would be easier to gain the necessary Senate support for only three new members. Second, at least initially, NATO needed to digest enlargement in sizeable bites rather than large chunks. As one senior official said, “NATO enlargement is a great leap into the unknown and it will be anything but easy to make it work.” Third, since the cost of enlargement was beginning to play a major role, especially on Capitol Hill, the fact that a small first round would be cheaper than a large one argued in favor of three. Finally, since the Administration was strongly committed to an open door policy following the first round, not taking one or two qualified candidates would ensure that a second enlargement round could follow soon after the first. Despite the deep unhappiness of some key allies about both the U.S. decision and the preemptoriness of its announcement, Washington made clear that it would stick to its position and would block any attempt to add more invitations. Confronted with this fait accompli, the allies had little choice but to limit their formal invitation to three.

At NATO’s Madrid Summit meeting in July 1997, the allied leaders formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO and to secure ratification of their entry prior to the Washington Summit in April 1999. Having made the decision to limit the number of invitations, the allies reaffirmed that the door to membership remained open: “The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability.” The allies concluded by specifically referring not only to Romania and Slovenia as possible future members, but also by recognizing “the progress achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the Baltic region which are also aspiring members.”
Keeping the Door Open

Although ratification of the accession of the three central European countries to NATO engendered less debate in the U.S. Senate than many had feared (or hoped), the Senate’s consideration of the issue demonstrated a distinct unease about further enlargement of the Alliance. In particular, questions were raised about the underlying purpose of enlargement. Some Senators feared that the addition of many new members would dilute NATO’s effectiveness as a cohesive political-military organization by adding too many voices to the council table and too little real military capacity to the Alliance’s military structure. This led forty-one Senators to vote for the amendment offered by Senator John Warner to delay consideration of additional new members for at least three years.  

Similarly, concern was expressed about the extent of NATO’s future enlargement, including its end. Some Senators worried that further enlargement would alienate Russia too much, while others feared Russia’s eventual inclusion in the Alliance, something which would transform NATO’s character from a collective defense alliance into a collective security organization.

Although the Senate voted to provide its advice and consent on the instruments of ratification by a vote of eighty to nineteen, the concerns expressed during the debate had a major effect on NATO’s original plans for ensuring that the door to membership remains open. When allied leaders met in Madrid in mid-1997, there was a general assumption that the second round of enlargement would follow soon, perhaps as early as the next summit. Once the Senate debate was over, however, a consensus emerged within the Alliance that no new countries should be invited at the Washington meeting. Expressing this new-found reservation, Secretary Albright told her Alliance colleagues shortly after the Senate vote that in noting that the Alliance’s door will remain open no one should “assume that our parliaments will always agree. The U.S. Senate rejected an arbitrary pause in the process of enlargement, but I can tell you there is zero chance it will ratify the admission of future candidates unless they meet the high standards set for Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.”

Instead of naming names in Washington, the Alliance planned to focus its open door efforts on preparing a package of measures to help aspiring members to achieve the political and
military transitions necessary to qualify for membership. This open door package, also referred to as the “membership action plan” (MAP), would consist of NATO political and military authorities interacting directly and intensively with applicant countries in identifying shortcomings on the political and, especially, military steps that needed to be taken prior to being invited. There would be systematic reviews within NATO – possibly at the council or ministerial level – to assess the progress each applicant country has made. This would enable individual NATO members to provide direct and targeted assistance when and where needed. In this manner NATO would help aspiring members, as Secretary Albright proposed, “to accelerate their efforts to become the strongest possible candidates. Without designating them in advance, we need to provide a road map that shows aspirants the way ahead.”

By not singling out countries and instead concentrating on helping them to prepare for membership, NATO may hope to avoid facing the difficult questions that its open door policy has raised: who to invite in the next round; how many more rounds the Alliance should consider; and what the end point of the enlargement process will be (including whether the possibility of Russia’s membership should be left open). On the question of whom to invite in a second round, there is considerable sentiment in the Alliance (led by France and Italy) for inviting one or more southeastern European countries (Slovenia, Romania, and possibly Bulgaria) in order to “balance” the invitation of northeastern countries in the first round. However, the notion that NATO membership should be a matter of regional balancing is one most allies reject. Secretary Albright warned her NATO colleagues, “If a European country is important to our security, if it demonstrates that it is ready – politically, economically, and militarily, to contribute to our security, it will be in our interest to welcome it through the open door. This is the central logic of a larger NATO…. A country’s place on the European map should neither rule it in nor rule it out.” By that standard, of the respective southeastern European applicant states under serious consideration for a second round, Slovenia is closest to meeting the test, followed by Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria.

Just as many NATO countries bordering the Mediterranean favor Alliance membership for their neighbors, so do the Nordic countries support possible inclusion of theirs. This includes membership not just to Sweden and Finland (which have not applied) but also for the three Baltic
states. The Clinton Administration has uttered similarly positive sentiments, when it signed a Charter of Partnership with each of the three countries in January 1998 that formally expressed support for NATO membership. However, it has not set a timetable for their possible inclusion or promised that one or all would be included in a second round. Of course, membership of one or more of the Baltic states, which regained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, poses a particular challenge to efforts to enlarge the Alliance without further antagonizing Russia. Given Moscow’s predictable reaction and the fact that the Baltic states have little to contribute militarily to NATO, it is difficult to see how their inclusion in the Alliance meets the oft-repeated test for all new members, namely that “their accession to NATO will contribute to wider European stability and security.”

Finally, there is the question of Russia’s possible membership. For those who view NATO’s core purpose as one of collective defense, Russian membership is excluded \textit{a priori} (unless Russia’s defense against a possible Chinese threat becomes the definition of that core purpose). As former German Defense Minister Volker Rühe put it, “if Russia were to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO apart.” Almost from the beginning of the enlargement process, however, the Clinton Administration (led by the President himself) has taken a different view of Russian membership. As early as 1995, President Clinton assured Russia that the United States favored membership in NATO of the “new Russia.” Clinton also rejected the notion that NATO enlargement would isolate Russia:

You can only believe we're isolating Russia if you believe that the great power, territorial politics of the 20th century will dominate the 21st century; and if you believe that NATO is inherently antagonistic to Russia's interest and that Russia inherently will have to try to exercise greater territorial domination in the next few years than it has in the last few. I dispute that. I believe that enlightened self-interest, as well as shared values, will compel countries to define their greatness in more constructive ways. And the threats that we will share that will be genuine threats to our security will compel us to cooperate in more constructive ways.

\textit{Options}

At the heart of NATO’s enlargement policy resides a fundamental paradox. Whereas the Madrid decision to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join and to keep the door open to future members reflects an Alliance-wide consensus in favor of enlargement, there is no agreement on where this process is – or even should be – taking the Atlantic Alliance in the
future. The differences over who, if anyone, should be included in a second round of invitations, how many more invitational rounds should be considered, and whether the process should stop short of including Russia remain unresolved. Although none of these issues is likely to be settled soon (and certainly not in time for the Washington summit), NATO does face the immediate task of making sure the credibility of enlargement is preserved. That requires taking steps to ensure not only that the door to membership remains open, but that friends and foes of enlargement perceive it to be open as well. The allies have at least three options for making sure the door is open in 1999:

- **Agree to Pause in the Process:** With growing uncertainty about Russia’s political and economic future following its financial collapse in 1998, now is not the time to pose what is sure to been by many in Moscow as a new challenge to its security by further enlarging NATO. Whereas the first round of enlargement had a logical strategic rationale (notably by bridging the strategic vacuum in central Europe separating Germany and Russia), none of the prospective members offers similar strategic benefit at this time. Their inclusion would be either militarily meaningless or, in provoking an adverse Russian reaction, weaken rather than strengthen security and stability in Europe.  

- **Reaffirm Open Door and Assist Aspirant Members:** At the very least, NATO must reaffirm its commitment, first made in London in 1994 and strongly reiterated in Madrid in 1997, that the door to Alliance membership remains wide open. The same criteria that applied in the first round will apply in subsequent rounds. In addition, the Alliance can adopt a package of measures to help all aspirant countries – Albania, the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia – to take the necessary political and military steps to prepare for membership. This membership action plan would go beyond the enhanced Partnership for Peace measures to be announced at Washington to help aspiring members determine exactly what needs to be done to qualify for membership in NATO.

- **Invite New Members:** The only sure way to demonstrate that the door to membership remains open is to invite new members to join. Slovenia is an obvious candidate. By all accounts, it was ready for membership in 1997 and, unlike Romania, nothing has occurred in the interim to make Slovenia any less qualified. Although the Senate may not welcome the prospect of considering another member, one of its leading members, Senator William V. Roth, has proposed this very option.

- **Set Timetable for Making Decision on Second Round:** Rather than risking a major battle within the Alliance and possibly in key NATO countries by trying to forge agreement on new invitations in time for the Washington Summit, setting a clear timetable for the second round would help to demonstrate the Alliance’s open door commitment. One possibility is for the NATO Foreign Ministers in their December 1999 meeting to identify the next potential candidates, with formal invitations issued a year or so later.
Recommendation

To the extent that NATO’s primary purpose is collective defense, it makes sense to limit enlargement, even perhaps to halt the process altogether. The Alliance’s newest three members may have been the only prospective members whose joining made arguable strategic sense. Each is a relatively stable country with military forces capable of contributing to NATO’s primary missions. At the same time, following NATO’s assiduous courting of Russia, their accession will not likely add to the Alliance’s collective defense burden in any substantial way. Few other countries in Europe will be able to meet this standard for some time. With the exception of Sweden, those that are stable contribute little in terms of added military capabilities (e.g., Austria and Slovenia) or their inclusion in NATO would be cause of grave concern to Russia (e.g., the Baltics). Those that could contribute militarily to the Alliance either lack the requisite degree of political and economic stability (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine) or would meet strenuous Russian opposition (e.g., Finland and Ukraine). From this narrow strategic perspective, a pause (if not a halt) in the enlargement process may be called for.

However, it would be a grave mistake to view NATO enlargement only or even mainly from a narrow strategic perspective. Indeed, from this perspective the first round made little strategic sense, as many of enlargement’s opponents argued. Enlargement only makes sense if viewed from a much broader perspective, one that looks beyond NATO as a collective defense organization to NATO as an alliance dedicated to promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The strategic contribution of prospective members is merely one among many considerations taken into account in the process of enlarging Alliance membership. The degree to which the prospect and eventual reality of NATO membership contributes to the development of political stability and economic growth in aspirant countries (e.g., in Austria and Slovenia) and the extent to which this can help to resolve both internal and international sources of conflict in Europe are at least as important. In fact, it is only from this broader perspective that the very notion of an open door makes both political and strategic sense.

For these reasons, the allies have rightly rejected the notion of a pause. At the same time, NATO’s hesitancy in naming new candidates runs the risk of indicating that the door may closing rather than remaining wide open. On the one hand, the reluctance reflects well-placed
concern that the new invitees may not get the necessary parliamentary approval, especially in the U.S. Senate. Since a ratification failure is likely to shut the door permanently to future membership, not naming names in an effort to keep the door open to what is admittedly becoming a longer tunnel is viewed as the least risky alternative. On the other hand, a failure to identify new members at the earliest opportunity would confirm to supporters and opponents of enlargement that the NATO governments are not willing to run the political risk necessary for enlargement – in which case the door to membership is closed in all but name.

These differing perspectives suggest that for the door to NATO membership to be truly open it must be seen to be open. Issuing an invitation to new members would be the most direct way to do this. Slovenia is both the obvious and least controversial candidate that could be invited in a small second round. However, an invitation to Slovenia alone is unlikely to be sufficient to demonstrate that the door remains open. Since the Clinton Administration decided to exclude Slovenia in the initial round in large part to have an option for an early second round, naming Slovenia in 1999 would be little more than an appendage of the original, first round decision. Such an invitation would say nothing about prospects for future enlargement – including when, or even if, the Baltic states will be asked to join and whether Russia could eventually be a member.

Even if Slovenia is asked to join in 1999, NATO will need to take additional steps to make sure the door to future enlargement rounds remains wide open. First, the Alliance should identify those countries that its military and political authorities believe could be ready to receive an invitation for membership in the next round. This list could include both those countries that have formally applied for membership and that have made sufficient progress (e.g., Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and those that have not applied but would otherwise qualify (e.g., Austria, Finland, and Sweden). Second, NATO should set a specific timetable for making new invitations, starting with a foreign ministerial review in mid-2000 of the progress made by applicant countries in meeting agreed standards and a commitment to consider issuing new invitations at the next NATO Summit meeting in 2001. Finally, the Alliance should adopt a specific membership action plan designed to assist applicant countries prepare for membership. Assistance under this MAP would be open to all applicant countries that are taking active steps
to become members (i.e., all applicants except Albania, which is in no position to participate effectively).

Only by making clear that NATO enlargement is truly an open door policy can the Alliance’s fundamental purpose of serving as an instrument for overcoming Europe’s divisions be credibly maintained. This also applies to the question of Russia’s future membership. To exclude even the possibility of Russian membership in NATO is to ensure that dividing lines will always remain in the Euro-Atlantic area, separating those that belong from those that do not. While the issue of Russian membership is not now on the table (both because Russia has displayed no interest in joining and because Russia would not meet the standards of membership in its current state of political and economic uncertainty), the Alliance cannot exclude this possibility if it wants to remain faithful to its vision of itself as an organization dedicated to a Europe that is whole and free, peaceful and undivided.
NOTES


2 “Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation,” Issued by the Heads of State and Government, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Madrid, Spain, July 8, 1997, paragraph 8. According to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”


7 *Study on NATO Enlargement*, p. 2.


15 “Madrid Declaration,” paragraph 8.


23 For an argument along these lines, Bruce Russett and Allan C. Stam, “Courting Disaster: An Expanded NATO vs. Russia and China,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 113, no. 3 (Fall 1998), pp. 361-382.


26 “Press Conference by the President” (Madrid: Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, July 9, 1997).

