Shaping DHS Doctrine for Operational Success

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Executive Summary

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was criticized for its efforts during Hurricane Katrina. Changes in organization and doctrine have been recommended – such as adopting a structure similar to the Joints Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Any reorganization is expensive and disruptive. There are enormous barriers to adopting a JCS style organization that will work for DHS. It has many more agencies to coordinate, and that is just at the federal level. There are physical and "scope of duties" jurisdiction barriers that prevent reducing the number of agencies, and another reorganization would disrupt existing DHS command and control.

Doctrine, however, can produce significant improvements if done correctly. Sound doctrine would help clarify jurisdiction boundaries and hint at improvements. It would reduce "mission creep" and prevent over-stepping authorities between DHS agencies and outside the Department. And, it can be vital to improving communications and to improving training.

Doctrine is a set of fundamental principles which guide actions - authoritative, but requiring judgment in application. They are most important during periods of great chaos, such as on a battlefield or during a major natural disaster when communications and unity of command are difficult.

DHS has some effective doctrine, such as its highly capable Incident Command System (ICS) to guide current operations. But, it lacks formal doctrine in many other areas including coordination of prevention efforts and cross-agency incident mitigation and infrastructure restoration. It has no Department doctrine for command and control or for logistics, and doctrine is not coordinated between DHS agencies or with DoD and other Departments.

To conduct operations well, DHS must adopt the doctrine-training-operations cycle. Feedback on operational improvements must make it into doctrine changes which can then be taught so that subsequent operations are more effective.

DHS must also create a doctrine pyramid with tiers that provide increasing level of detail with each level down. This pyramid can then guide the creation of doctrine pyramids in each DHS agency and service. DoD can provide a good example with its joint doctrine pyramid, and other good examples are available in the U.S. Marine Corps doctrine pyramid, and in the U.S. Navy doctrine pyramid. (The latter already partially binds one member of DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard.) These pyramids can be used by new members to quickly learn about their duties, and their Department. This includes new political appointees who currently must rely on verbal briefs or on often outdated procedural guides.

The first and most important step for DHS is to create a good DHS doctrine process publication. A great example is the Navy's process publication, The Navy Warfare Library. DHS can adapt this publication and save years of development work.

There are barriers to DHS doctrine development, but these can be identified and overcome. Progress must be made now to avoid a repeat of the Katrina response.

Introduction

Within days of Hurricane Katrina's landfall, national debate quickly focused on the federal response and the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Some informed scholars and experienced managers keyed in on Congressional findings that normal procedures were not followed, asserting that DHS requires a more effective doctrine and a common set of operating principles similar to those used by the military.[1] Others have argued that DHS should be further re-organized.[2] Reorganizations are expensive, and frequent reorganizations induce confusion, internally and externally, particularly in an already complex managerial environment. Any new Department will need time for the talent within to make connections that work and to sort out how best to accomplish published goals. Doctrine, however, defines how problems are attacked and solved. Any organization will continually improve its doctrine to remain efficient and effective. Doctrine can and must be addressed constantly. Following Katrina, DHS and its components have begun a massive effort to update the doctrine that governs incident management and to train people in all agencies at all levels in how to implement this doctrine.

Any DHS doctrine that is developed will fail unless certain basic building blocks are created in the process. DHS must keep and expand training for its Incident Command System (ICS). DHS must also place ICS (which is essentially guidance on current operations) into the heart of a classic doctrine pyramid that guides its component agencies before, during and after operations. Doctrine, training and operations must reinforce each other and feedback mechanisms must be integrated to improve doctrine. DHS doctrine must be initiated by a process publication that outlines terms and procedures.. This needs to be done in concert with the Department of Defense (DoD) in order to synchronize terms and procedures. Anything short of this will lead to a repeat performance during the next major incident or disaster.

The Vice of Re-organization …

Some have argued that a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) model might work for DHS.[3] The JCS, representing each military service, are mandated to plan and operate jointly and efficiently through the Goldwater-Nichols Act by looking for their unique contribution to the overall national defense effort. While this model has worked very well for DoD, there are limits to its application in DHS.

In DHS, there are many more federal agencies. Depending upon inclusion criteria, there are seven agencies within DHS alone, but overall fifty-four agencies and services have significant jurisdictional interests within the federal government.[4] In addition, there are hundreds of state agencies and thousands of local responder organizations, not including any private or volunteer groups that could potentially have enormous impacts on disaster prevention and response.[5]

Instead, staff meetings within DHS and at the National Operations Center (NOC) are used to coordinate daily activities within DHS, and the NOC and the Office of Operations Coordination work to coordinate activities externally (short term and long term respectively). The NOC is located at the Nebraska Avenue DHS complex in Washington, D.C. It currently provides seats for eighty-two representatives from federal, state and local agencies.[6]

Further reshuffling of DHS by Congress, as argued by some, is not likely to produce benefits.[7] DHS is maturing and working out its own problems. Given time and support, problems can be solved without the massive stalemates and delays that often accompany major reorganizations. What can be taken from Goldwater-Nichols and applied to DHS is the work toward analyzing procedures, overlaps, and force multipliers. These are all best accomplished through the establishment of sound doctrine for the Department and for its component services and agencies.

DHS reorganization, particularly to a JCS style management system, will raise serious debates over jurisdictions. Jurisdictions for services and agencies within DHS are mandated by complex laws drafted over many years. They vary widely in scope, detail, and in geographic extent and limits. Redistributing jurisdictions would be required and focus on agency geographic and "scope of duties" boundaries. The shear complexity of identifying all relevant legislation is a daunting task, and has thus far prevented such an effort. Senior DHS officials have discussed creating operational regions which might attempt to exercise greater control over component services and agencies, but as of yet they have not been able to solve these jurisdiction concerns.[8]

While some consolidation will eventually be possible, cost and distraction from missions are the two main reasons not to attempt this task in the near term. Even if reorganization is at some point undertaken, a sound doctrine must still be implemented for DHS and all its components.

Infrastructure is also a problem in reorganizing. All DHS components have Operations Centers (OPCENs) whose current boundaries are established on operating regions and span of control. Some of these OPCENs have been around for many years working effectively for their DHS components. Many of them have solved complex command and control issues, and are continually pursuing upgrades demanded by the public DHS doctrine would facilitate inter-agency coordination while allowing necessary operational independence. Once completed, doctrine might set the ground work for for consolidation and improvement.

… and the Virtue of Doctrine

DoD combatant commanders adhere to a joint doctrine pyramid and a service component doctrine pyramid. Combatant commanders further develop OPLANS to ensure that specific threats, geography, and local factors are considered. DHS can and does operate in a similar fashion. DHS would benefit from similar doctrine pyramids for the department and its components, and it too would need regional plans to ensure that specific regional threats, geography, and local factors are considered. This model for doctrine allows DHS to be more flexible to accommodate a greater range of possible threats, participants, and missions.

Due to its very recent creation, DHS will derive immediate benefits from a Department doctrine pyramid that will inevitably streamline capabilities and operations. The clear definition of boundaries between DHS components, other federal, state and local governments, and private interests will ensure that overlap savings in DHS eventually become significant.

Further, doctrine reduces "mission creep." The Coast Guard, for example, has long prided itself on "getting the job done" no matter what was asked of it, completing unusual missions timely and effectively. Over a number of decades, missions accreted even while resources dried up, eventually resulting in a "dull knife"[9]. Doctrine outlines what a service or agency must be competent in and, in general or specific terms, how it should do it. With only 40,000 active duty members, the Coast Guard cannot be all things to all people. Doctrine will describe what can be done and what can't without reducing its flexibility. Similar challenges have plagued CBP and ICE for years and thus they would benefit similarly. .

Sound doctrine also prevents violations of "posse comitatus" (essentially unwarranted control of civilians by federal military forces), jurisdictional limitations, and other legal limits and mandates.[10] Each of the agencies and service within DHS must adhere to a complex web of laws and regulations. DHS members need to know their own legal limits, and how the of other law enforcement agencies. They must also know how DoD authorities differ from law enforcement authorities. While military forces cannot arrest and enforce laws (with the specific exception of the U.S. Coast Guard), they can provide much needed manpower and expertise during major incidents. DoD already has doctrine regarding help to civil authorities and DHS needs to be involved in its future development. Likewise, DoD should be involved in DHS doctrine development.

Clear doctrine prevents or at least reduces miscommunication by creating common frames of reference. It shows at a glance what other organizations will do, and therefore improves clarity of purpose and definition of roles in disaster prevention and response.

For DoD, lessons learned from the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980 led to minor improvements in communication between the services. Real improvements in roles and doctrine came following Grenada in 1983. As a young Coast Guard officer in Grenada (assigned to a Navy warship for two years), I knew the Navy playbook. I knew in general what the Navy ships and aircraft would be doing, as did every Navy officer involved. We had a rough idea of what the U.S. Army was trying to do, but none of us had read any doctrine about their favored tactics, how fast they were likely to move, or how they could be reached by radio. And we certainly did not know what the U.S. Air Force was doing. Subsequent friendly fire incidents and lessons learned resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act which mandated joint tactics and joint doctrine. This doctrine is now available to members of all services; it is used and it is improved every few years. We now have a common play book that we train to. We know who is in charge, how to reach each other, and what each of the services brings to a fight. Although DoD has undergone reorganization as a result of the Act, the key change that improved effectiveness was the creation of joint combat doctrine that every service member reads and follows during training and then during operations.

In emergencies, people fall back on their training. Pressure can encourage actions that are illegal or ill advised, sometimes with drastic consequences. Regional natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, will always place elected officials, first responders, and follow-on responders under great stress as they

react to a horrific situation and extreme public outcry. More than at any other time, during these major emergencies sound DHS doctrine that includes all participants will ensure the most efficient collective response possible within the limits of capabilities. Sound doctrine enables sound training, and it is training that permits thoughtful action during periods of chaos.

What is Doctrine

The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines doctrine as the "fundamental principles by which…forces guide their action in support of…objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."[11] Doctrine is important because it provides the members of an organization the framework within which to operate. It establishes unity of command, so that, even in moments of great turmoil, members know who to report to and who to take instructions from and have a grasp of general organizational goals and procedures even when communication is difficult or impossible. Military officers understand this critical issue. Seldom is the need for coordination greater or the level of chaos higher than on a battlefield; therefore, doctrine is studied very carefully by professional military officers.

The mandate (not doctrine) of DHS is specified by The National Security Strategy (NSS) 2006[12] which outlines the plan of how 22 federal entities were brought into DHS to focus on three national security priorities: preventing terrorist attacks within the U.S., reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing damage and facilitating the recovery from attacks that do occur. While focused primarily on terrorism (and in need of broadening), in general it can be thought of as mandating three types of planning: 1) preparing for threats and disasters, 2) operating during threats and disasters, and 3) recovering from threats and disasters.[13] DHS doctrine will have to flow from these three mandates of the department.

A classic example of this came in 1798 when Admiral Nelson gathered his commanding officers before the Battle of the Nile (and other actions) to discuss his revolutionary tactics of cutting through the enemy lines of battle vice going alongside, but then allowing each captain to exercise judgment in inflicting maximum subsequent damage. His captains knew what he wanted even when his signals could not be seen through the gun smoke and his subsequent fleet victories are legendary. Field tested military officers understand

the need for a plan and the need for a plan to be adapted as conditions shift. They are also quick to notice parallels in other forms of operations besides combat. Many of the best criticisms of and suggestions to DHS on improving operations during emergencies through improved doctrine come from military officers.[14]

As with combat, a large natural or man-made disaster places organizational members under extreme stress. It produces conditions of maximum chaos and often minimal capabilities for communication. DHS (its civilian agencies and its military service – the U.S. Coast Guard) requires a doctrine structure that permits graet flexibility of operations. It must facilitate planning, training, certification, and coordination by federal, state, and local agencies, by private businesses donating or charging for services, and by various concerned groups and volunteer citizens. It must describe how to quickly generate a unique command and control structure for a given incident or event with unique circumstances from a wide range of possibilities varying greatly in size and location within the U.S. (and in certain cases beyond), and it must guide effective external interactions with dozens, if not hundreds, of agencies and entities. It must also guide preparations for such events and recoveries from events so that each DHS component makes a unique and efficient contribution to the Department – before, during, and after services are needed.

Among the main conclusions of the Final Report of the Bipartisan Committee Investigating the Response to Hurricane Katrina was the assertion that agencies and individuals within DHS failed to follow established protocols for ensuring unity of command.[15] Examples cited include the blurring of the lines between the Federal Coordination Official in charge of directing all operations and the authorization of funds, and the Principal Federal Official tasked with coordinating cross-Agency support in accordance with recent laws passed as DHS was formed. This disconnect was not solved until Admiral Thad Allen of the U.S. Coast Guard replaced the Federal Emergency Management Directorate's (FEMA) Michael Brown and was officially designated as both. Another example cited was that DoD's Joint Task Force under General Honoré operated independently and failed to serve under the Joint Field Office as required and that DHS, which had the authority to correct this improper procedure, failed to assert itself and take effective action in accordance with doctrine. Thus, the committee felt that what doctrine DHS had was poorly understood and not followed. Undoubtedly, there was also poor coordination of media needs and outputs related to an initially confused chain of command.[16]

Efficient domestic disaster planning requires more than just the coordination of federal agencies and services to provide the maximum benefit achievable in a given situation. It must also be able to take into account and coordinate voluntary efforts by private businesses, cooperatives, and citizens where their interests lead them to want to assist or where they have been directed to assist by competent authority. Therefore, the mandate in the NSS is not only to coordinate preparation, operations, and recovery among federal agencies within DHS; it is to coordinate the efforts of all levels and all types of assistance.

What We Currently Have in DHS

To meet the "operating during threats and disasters" portion of the three major mandates mentioned above, DHS uses the National Incident Management System (NIMS)[17] which outlines the Incident Command System (ICS). ICS was developed in the 1970s to formalize efforts in combating regional forest fires that required the participation of many people from different backgrounds on short notice and without the benefit of prior team training. It describes a workable generic structure with standardized methods and reports that can be quickly scaled up or down and broadly tailored to fit an incident. Basic components include an Incident Commander, often with a command staff that includes a Public Information Officer, a Safety Officer, and a Liaison Officer, and at least four Section Chiefs (Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Admin). For a small incident, all of these roles can be filled by one individual and for an incident of national significance like Katrina the Incident Commander can be re-designated a Federal Coordination Official and the Planning staff alone may include hundreds of people subdivided into pre-described components enabling proper span of control.[18] Additionally, the National Response Plan (NRP) lays out which federal agency leads and which agencies support each of the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) such as Transportation and Communication.

However, ICS and the NRP do not provide doctrine that indicates how DHS components shall operate before or after incidents. They only provide doctrine and indicate how they shall operate together during an incident. This is analogous to joint warfare doctrine pertaining to conducting operations involving all U.S. military services so that a unified and efficient effort is carried out. ICS governs "unified" domestic incident operations and it is excellent for this purpose.

Just considering federal components, DHS is comprised of many widely differing services and agencies including the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and Federal Emergency Management Directorate (FEMA). The Office of Operations Coordination within DHS must address how these and other DHS components and their missions work together and share information, and DHS must ultimately provide a common over-arching guide (doctrine structure) that improves coordination without hindering flexibility before, during, or after incidents.

Additionally, DHS must be sensitive to specific agency and service abilities and demands. As an example, the U.S. Coast Guard is both a military service within DHS and one which continually provides uniquely capable assets to DoD for various ongoing national defense missions around the world. Coast Guard men and women must train and adhere to DHS doctrine and also to DoD doctrine, as parts (or all of the service) come under DoD tactical control from time to time. To prevent Coast Guard service members from having to learn and understand two widely differing doctrines structures, DHS operations coordinators and doctrine coordinators must be sensitive to military doctrine formats and definitions outlined in joint warfare doctrine. In particular, since the Coast Guard must frequently operate with or for the U.S. Navy, this means being sensitive to the format and requirements of The Navy Warfare Library.[19] Conversely, to prevent confusing DHS, the Coast Guard must adapt DHS overarching mandates to its own unique requirements in a way that doesn't conflict with DoD terms. The Coast Guard must enable DHS planners familiar with other DHS components to understand Coast Guard terms and doctrine as well. An example of a publication that would need this care is the U.S. Coast Guard's Incident Management Handbook, where the Coast Guard has further clarified NIMS and ICS terms and procedures for its own personnel. [20] Ideally, the Coast Guard would carefully ensure that content and terms in this publication do not conflict with the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, with the Dictionary of Naval Abbreviations, and with DoD and Navy publications on civil support. But even in its own publication on ICS the Coast Guard has not taken this step, and so disconnects between DHS and DoD doctrine and terminology remain. (Note: this task could be facilitated by the Coast Guard's Liaison Officer at the Navy Warfare Development Command which coordinates the Navy dictionary and coordinates with those updating the overarching joint dictionary.)

Figure 1. The Doctrine-Training-Operations Cycle

The Doctrine-Training-Operations Cycle

Any organization that tries to stay efficient creates a structure that enables a cycle of continuous improvement. New procedures (doctrine) and methods are taught to new members and to senior staff in refresher courses. Training results in operations that are consistent with the new and improved doctrine. Based upon feedback, the procedures are further modified and new training is given until the desired end result indicates that doctrine and training are producing the best results reasonably achievable.

Figure 1 illustrates this point, and shows how the U.S. Navy uses this cycle. [21] Their feedback method is the Navy Lessons Learned system and their doctrine is contained in the Navy Warfare Library. Similar methods are used by all DoD services and by the joint DoD warfare community. Names and

systems would require adaptation, but this cycle can be used to make DHS and its components more effective. It should be noted that while doctrine modification is coordinated and spearheaded by doctrine commands in each of the services, individual doctrine publications are actually updated by teams of members currently engaged in operations or in teaching operations. These personnel often have the greatest ability to perceive the need for improvements and to visualize how to carry out the improvements. This is particularly true when they are actively involved in testing and evaluating new systems and participating in discussions with headquarters program managers regarding anticipated or desired changes.

Doctrine Pyramids

For any Department or organization, doctrine should assume the shape of a multi-tiered pyramid (as shown in Figure 2) that guides operations in increasing detail with each level down. [22] Each component of an organization or service within the Department should have its own doctrine pyramid that is guided by the overarching Department's pyramid. The highest level doctrine is typically summed up in a single book so that a new member or student can quickly get a sense of key concepts (by convention this single book is often titled Doctrine Publication 1). Then, as the need arises for more detailed information, underlying tiers and the books or booklets which they contain are available. By convention, in each DoD service and in the Joint Publication library a book is provided (sometimes in the first tier, and sometimes in the second) for Intelligence (usually titled Publication 2) which discusses how intelligence is gathered and obtained in general within the organization, how it is evaluated and fused, how it is disseminated, and how it should be used and updated. Operations (usually Publication 3) usually includes preparation operations, execution operations, and recovery operations. Logistics (Pub 4) covers the various levels of maintenance in the organization and its organizational maintenance and supply philosophies and goals. Planning (Pub 5) outlines general planning requirements and methods, and may include procedures for doctrine and strategy development. Command and Control (Pub 6) describes how unity of command and control is maintained and outlines key nodes and systems as well as methods of communication.

Some of these publications are UNCLASSIFIED and some are CLASSIFIED according to national security requirements. Ultimately, at the third level down, books on specific topics are available for technicians, agents, and operators that provide in depth knowledge needed for execution of specific roles and functions (often information this specific does require security protection). For example, each major

type of operation may be detailed in a series typically numbered 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3, etc. or each major area of logistics and maintenance might be detailed in publications numbered 4-1, 4-2, and so forth. An example of this convention is that Joint Pub 3-07.4 is on Joint Counterdrug Operations. Clearly there will be a greater number of publications at each level down within a pyramid. And, for each pyramid, one critical book will detail how doctrine shall be developed and maintained - this book will be discussed in greater detail in a moment.

In DoD, each military service has its own doctrine pyramid that enables the service to function in its own unique environment (air, land, sea or interface). This pyramid is specifically developed to


Figure 2. The Navy Doctrine Pyramid

complement the joint doctrine pyramid that guides all its DoD components, enabling action in concert for maximum efficiency. Similarly, DHS should developed a detailed doctrine to guide opreations. A simple comparison of doctrine for the two Departments, DHS and DoD, is shown in Figure 3. A minimalist approach is best – doctrine that is not needed is a hindrance, not a help. DHS doctrine should be drafted with full representation from DHS components to ensure that no inefficiencies or unnecessary constraints

are created. It has taken DoD decades to refine its current methodology and it will take DHS just as long to reach similar levels of efficiency and coordination.

By aggressively studying and adapting DoD methods and systems, DHS could jumpstart its doctrine process and move ahead much faster than it has. In doing so, the department could help its component agencies to align their doctrine to the needs of this new Department. Using the methods and teams already in use and time-tested, especially the Navy's process publication (The Navy Warfare Library, NTTP 1-01) would further accelerate the process.

Fig 3. Overarching Doctrine Pyramids – DoD vs. DHS

One of the great advantages of such an approach to improving DHS isthe continuity that such a doctrine pyramid provides when much of the Department is supervised by political appointees who turn over frequently. Well meaning but new and unfamiliar appointees need to be able to read and quickly learn about their new Department. Currently they must rely on the opinions of their new staff, or upon dated books and procedure manuals. DHS and component doctrine pyramids will enable appointees to read about and learn the roles, authorities and guiding principles of DHS and subordinate DHS components and to make changes and updates carefully.

Necessary changes desired by a new administration and its teams would be effected through changes to the pyramid, but the doctrine pyramid would enable the appointees to see clearly how their mandated changes should fit in without harming the larger doctrine context. DHS components impacted by changes would quickly get a vision of the changes imposed, have a forum for feedback (usually through senior level standing doctrine committees), and have a guidebook for how to adapt their doctrine pyramids to ensure cross-consistency following the changes.

In DoD, doctrine is hotly contested. This lively and critical ongoing debate often prevents funding blunders and political blunders by ensuring that both the Department and its service components know what can and cannot reasonably be done with the tools available and what should be funded or changed to move in a new direction. While this process has worked better under some administrations than others over the course of our national history, DHS will also need a venue for such discussions. Debates held openly and "above the table" can prevent disasters in homeland security through doctrine that is wrestled over and thoroughly understood.

As doctrine improves for DHS as a Department and within its components, a "virtuous cycle"[23] can be set up where the doctrine guides operations and training which then provide feedback for improved doctrine. Additionally, the flow of information between the Department and its components will improve and shape both Department and component doctrine with time. While DHS doctrine will always require great flexibility, the methods and procedures for doctrine development within DoD can be adapted and used to great effect within DHS.

The U.S. Navy doctrine pyramid shown graphically in Figure 2 actually consists of hundreds of binder-sized publications, which average about 250 pages in length. They are distributed electronically, and then

read on computer screens or printed locally. As a goal, publications are each updated every three years –
some by the Navy Warfare Development Center which provides central oversight, but many by various
"Centers of Excellence,"[24] which are best qualified or capable to update a given publication. These
"Centers" are simply training or specialty centers that are empowered to guide improvements in the
organization through leading changes to its doctrine on behalf of a program manager, and are identified as
such on a short list in the service's publication on its doctrine process.

A particularly useful doctrine system that should be studied and perhaps adopted by DHS is the
U.S. Marine Corps Doctrine Publications library (see Figure 4). These publications are also distributed
electronically (often on CDs), but in print they are small paperback books that fit into a single cardboard
box, smaller than a lunchbox. The books are each easy to read in just a few sittings. They emphasize
clarity and brevity and do not often repeat material covered in another books unless necessary. As a result,
they are widely read and easily carried. They provide a basic grounding in topics and set the stage for
subsequent more complex and more specific tactical training.

A sound concept used by the Navy is one that outlines Primary Review Authorities (PRAs) and
Coordinating Review Authorities (CRAs). The PRA is the coordinator, funding provider (often), and tie
breaker for a team of commands that are the CRAs – each of which has an interest in the doctrine
publication and each of which is considered a valuable member by the PRA who is ultimately responsible
for the adequacy of the doctrine pub. Normally reviewed every three years, a publication can be updated
earlier if deemed necessary by the PRA who sends out a coordinating message, convenes publication
review conferences (best thought of as 3-5 day line-by-line debates), ensures all written inputs are
specifically addressed and adjudicated with approvals and denials normally explained in writing line-by-line,
and ultimately ensures that the new modified version is printed and distributed.

Figure 4. U.S. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication Hierarchy

It can be argued that this lengthy process (often a year or more to develop or revise) is expensive and manpower intensive. But, doctrine is a case of "pay me now or pay me later" and the consequences of poor or outdated doctrine can be horrific and massive. To reduce costs, some commands now fund only the conference meetings and update the publication themselves using a word processor and photographs or diagrams constructed locally. The publication, once approved, is simply sent electronically to a central clearing house – NWDC handles this function for the U.S. Navy.

Doctrine Pyramids for DHS

What should an over-arching DHS doctrine pyramid look like? Figure 5 shows one notional example. The actual titles and groupings presented should be carefully considered by the Department. Major categories for doctrine will be difficult to change later, and a first attempt should at least be able to survive for a decade. The pyramid shown is one viable construct and can form a basis for discussion by a central doctrine guiding committee composed of senior DHS and component leaders.

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HSDP 1
Homeland Security
                    ├ HSDP 1-0
                    │ Doctrine Development
                    ├ HSDP 1-1
                    │ Strategy
                    ├ HSDP 1-2
                    │ Major Incidents
                    └ HSDP 1-3
                      Tactics

HSDP 2        HSDP 3        HSDP 4        HSDP 5        HSDP 6
Intelligence  Operations    Logisitics    Planning      Command &
                                                        Control
              ├ HSDP 3-1
              │ Internal
              │ Operations
              ├ HSDP 3-2
              │ Border, Boundary and
              │ Coastal Operations
              └ HSDP 3-3
                Offshore and Overseas
                Operations
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
Figure 5. Notional DHS (Homeland Security) Doctrine Pyramid

       The Coast Guard, as part of the DHS structure, currently lacks its own cohesive doctrine pyramid. For military operations the Coast Guard currently relies upon the Navy Warfare Library which contains its Navy Warfare Publications (NWPs), Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (NTTPs), and Navy Tactical Reference Publications (NTRPs) and it coordinates operational plans (OPLANS) geographically with DoD combatant commanders. But the Coast Guard has other missions (e.g. law enforcement, search and rescue, marine hazard prevention and response) and has not yet completed its own doctrine pyramid for these missions. It has drafted a CG Pub 1 similar in scope and flavor to the Navy's NDP-1[25] and U.S. Marine Corps MCDP-1.[26] But, it has not fleshed out the next two or three tiers down. It does have broad strategies, stand-alone publications and Commandant Instructions that bear on various topics, such as its

"Maritime Sentinel; Coast Guard Strategic Plan for Combating Maritime Terrorism."[27] And some of the earlier publications, such as America's Coast Guard; Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century, have proven both prophetic and extremely useful in positioning the service prior to the changes following the September 11th attack.[28] But, traditionally the Coast Guard has taken great pride in this flexibility, and past efforts to formalize procedures through doctrine have been sporadic and half-hearted. This is about to change. A major reorganization is underway in the Coast Guard to improve command unity and more closely parallel the other military services but, in the process, a significant doctrine staff has been created by Coast Guard leadership to specifically target this doctrine deficiency.

The timing is therefore fortuitous. The Coast Guard is committed to fleshing out its own multi-mission doctrine pyramid. Since it will need DHS doctrine to guide it, the Coast Guard can help DHS think through steps at the Department level while it works through steps as a DHS component. By including representatives from CBP, ICE, and others a Department-wide framework can be started.

Process and Implementation

The first step in constructing a DHS doctrine pyramid should be defining the process. A process publication must be issued to that end. It should present the process, format, and timeline (update cycle length) for subsequent doctrine publications, the method of maintaining and updating publications, and who the central coordinator and distributor will be. It should present the roles and responsibilities of drafters, contributors, and approvers, and it should designate Department level Centers of Excellence.

The publication should also address what trainers are responsible for and how operators should provide feedback for improvement. And, in the case of DHS components, it should address participation by other components and external sources such as DoD, state and local governments, and private organizations.

The previously mentioned Navy process publication, The Navy Warfare Library, NTTP 1-01 can be used as a model. The Coast Guard is not only already bound by it for coordination with the Navy and other military services, the Coast Guard maintains a Liaison Officer on staff at the Navy Warfare Development Command which drafts and updates this publication. The expertise of this Liaison can be

used by DHS, the Coast Guard, and by other DHS components. Pre-established relationships and functional knowledge will greatly accelerate duplication or adaptation of procedures for DHS. Ultimately DHS, the Coast Guard and all other DHS components need their own doctrine process publications. Each component needs to own the process for completing its doctrine just as it owns the responsibility for its own operations and doctrine.

The Way and Obstacles Ahead

Ultimately DHS needs a doctrine pyramid that guides its components in creating their own component doctrine pyramids. The DHS doctrine pyramid needs to be compatible with DoD (using commonly agreed upon terms and frames of reference) particularly to assist members of the U.S. Coast Guard who from time to time serve under both Departments.

By studying and adapting DoD doctrine pyramids and procedures, DHS will greatly facilitate the integration and compatibility of DHS and DoD doctrine pyramids. The next step will be sharing the terminology and framework information with state and local responders so that they can ensure the compatibility of their doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and so that subsequent inter-agency training is effective.[29] Some information will have to be CLASSIFIED but much can be thoughtfully UNCLASSIFIED and even aggressively shared with private and volunteer organizations, thereby greatly improving incident prevention, response, and mitigation.

Some factors which may hinder DHS progress must be carefully considered. These include a lack of knowledge of the value of doctrine. Many DHS personnel have no experience in the military or law enforcement. Those who have not spent careers conducting life or death operations are not as aware of the need for procedures that save lives. Katrina may have helped convince DHS leadership that there is a doctrine gap, but the urgency may not be as readily apparent as it would be to a military service. Department outreach may be necessary to all of its employees understand the value of doctrine..

Another factor which may hinder doctrine development is a lack of knowledge regarding the best methods for developing doctrine. DHS does not have a doctrine "command" and none of its components have large doctrine staffs with operational and training experience. Upward mobility of civilians in most

agencies is less than the upward mobility of military personnel, so leaders have not necessarily felt the daily sting of poor doctrine and have not therefore spent years learning how to impact and improve it. Military doctrine is changed and improved by personnel of all ranks submitting valuable feedback to the collection sources clearly listed in each military doctrine publication. DHS training centers will help if asked, but until a process publication specifically tasks them with assisting in doctrine drafting, there will not be an expectation that their leadership and input is sought. Agents and members of each DHS agency and service will not know to speak up if they are not specifically instructed to do so by their leaders.

The creation of any new organization takes energy and momentum. In order to overcome the current lack of momentum in doctrine generation, DHS leadership will have to have a plan and then energetically push at all levels to achieve its implementation. Katrina needs to be the catalyst, not the next big incident of national interest. There will be another major incident at some point in the future; the only question is when and how big. The sooner DHS tackles doctrine energetically, the greater the chance that we as a nation will be ready.

In fairness to DHS, progress in operations is being pursued aggressively. In fact, it has been difficult keeping abreast of the changes just during the year this paper has been in progress. DHS is now running a Common Operating Picture (COP) at its NOC. Through the NOC, DHS shares two-way information with its component agencies and service, and with all others invited to chair a watch stander at the NOC (full or part-time). This includes members of other federal, state, and local governments agencies needed, and temporary watch standers brought in from time to time to man an associated situation command room for various large scale incidents.[30] Building upon this structure, DHS plans to increase connectivity between the NOC and DHS component regional command centers. Additionally, ICS is now taught and practiced by all DHS components for current operations, and proficiency in its use should rapidly grow.

But real progress will come when DHS creates a Department doctrine pyramid that is guided by a senior standing doctrine committee. The pyramid will guide DHS components, facilitate dialogue, and ultimately produce efficiencies. Once DHS components can develop doctrine pyramids consistent with their parent Department, component training can be developed to match the doctrine, and operational feedback will flow in to fine tune both the component and the Department. A "common culture" within DHS will

eventually result, and the Department will ultimately become more internally consistent across its components.

In conclusion, this paper has provided both a template and a guide for DHS doctrine, and, at the very least, a platform for discussion. Until DHS and its components can begin fighting as vigorously and as effectively over doctrine as DoD and its components currently do, DHS is failing to realize the degree of promise which Congressional creation of this new Department portends. DHS needs a process guide and a doctrine framework. Building these will not be easy, but there are ways to make the job easier. Ultimately it is both possible and essential.

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[1] Lauritzen, LtCOL Brian W. "Homeland Security: Leveraging Army Expertise to Develop Join-Interagency Doctrine." MS Thesis, Army War College Carlisle, 2004.

[2] Charles R. Wise, "Organizing for Homeland Security After Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What's Missing?" *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 3 (2006): 302-319.

[3] Stephen Flynn, *Edge of Disaster*, (New York: Random House, 2007), 110-131.

[4] Parent, Wayne, Deputy DHS Operations Coordinator. Interview by author, 15 December 2006 (clarified on 9 May 2007), Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC.

[5] The absence of state representation would be a very serious handicap to a national level homeland security policy team or board. States by law have the lead in any disaster, and even if a community is overwhelmed the federal government can (at the time of this writing) only enter and assist at the request of the state. There is not provision in the law for when a state is overwhelmed, as in the case of Katrina, and the state fails to request assistance in a timely manner. (Until this fundamental states rights vs. federal sovereignty issue is settled differently by voters, a recurrence of delay in federal response is quite possible should a state again be overwhelmed by a regional disaster.)

[6] Parent, Wayne, Deputy DHS Operations Coordinator. Interview by author, 15 December 2006, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC.

[7] Wise, "Organizing for Homeland Security After Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What's Missing?", 302-319.

[8] Parent, Wayne, Deputy DHS Operations Coordinator. Interview by author, 15 December 2006, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC.

[9] Christopher M. Lehman, "Stranded at Sea; Coast Guard's Coffers are Hurting." *Washington Times*, 24 February 2000, A-19. Op-Ed in which the author quotes ADM James M. Loy, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.

[10] The Posse Comitatus Act is a U.S. federal law (18 U.S.C. 1385) that was passed on June 16, 1878 after the end of the civil war reconstruction period. In general the act was meant to prohibit federal troops from supervising elections in formerly Confederate states. The act prohibits federal military (Army and National Guard) soldiers and units from acting in a law enforcement capacity within the United States, except where expressly authorized by the Constitution or by Congress. The Air Force was added to this prohibition in 1956, and the Navy and Marine Corps were later prohibited by Department of Defense regulation.

[11] DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, amended 22 MAR 2007.

[12] The White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. March 2006.

[13] These three phases are often expanded in homeland security strategy papers into prevention, preparation, response, mitigation, and recovery. It can be argued that "preparing for" includes both prevention and preparation and that "operating during" includes both response and mitigation. Just what is included in the recovery phase is open to question. This paper does not address "exit criteria." The recovery phase must have pre-existing exit criteria which are used to generate goals that indicate when success has been achieved during the recovery phase. Otherwise, as with post-Katrina, success is a moving target and the questions of how much recovery is needed and how much can be afforded leave the operational realm and enter the political realm.

[14] Ibid.

[15] U.S. Congress. Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. *A Failure of Initiative*. 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., 15 February 2006, p. 195.

[16] First responders are taught or learn quickly the hard lesson that when a death occurs, or is likely to have occurred, that proper management of the press is critical. Families are already under a great deal of stress and can suffer even more harm if not given due consideration. During a major regional disaster or any incident of national significance with numerous victims, the stakes are correspondingly higher. Any chain of command that cannot speak with a clear and single voice will poorly manage press issues. And, any effort which fails to take the press into account will ultimately be deemed a failure

[17] On March 1, 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a memorandum formally adopting the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The creation of NIMS stemmed from an earlier system called the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) first adopted in 1982 by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group based upon its successes during the 1970s.

[18] Detailed information is available through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) website at http://lstrng3test.fema.gov/Courses/IS100G/ICS01summary.htm).

[19] The Navy Warfare Library, NTTP 1-01, amended April 2005 defines Navy doctrine drafting procedures and is often used by the U.S. Coast Guard when it drafts its own shipboard doctrine such as cutter class tactical manuals and provides input to the Navy on publications pertaining to coastal warfare, maritime interception operations, search and rescue, etc.

[20] U.S. Coast Guard. *Incident Management Handbook*. April 2001.

[21] Diagram borrowed from and used with the permission of the Doctrine Department of the Navy Warfare Development Center in Newport, Rhode Island.

[22] Ibid.

[23] This and similar terms of reference are used within the doctrine department of the Navy Warfare Development Command which has overall doctrine coordination responsibilities for the U.S. Navy. This term pertains to the cycle (or spiral) of improvement possible when doctrine guides operations which lead to improved training which results in feedback toward better doctrine.

[24] U.S. Navy Centers of Excellence are listed in The Navy Warfare Library, NTTP 1-01, and they include commands like the Surface Warfare Development Center, Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fleet Information Warfare Center, and Navy Special Warfare Command. Possible U.S. Coast Guard Centers of Excellence might include C2CEN, Command and Operations School, Special Mission Training Center at Camp Lejeune, Aviation Training Center Mobile, the National Strike Team, and National Motor Lifeboat School at Cape Disappointment. Some minor re-staffing might be necessary to enable doctrine development but much of the work is required already just to update training curriculums and interact with program managers in Headquarters. Other components within DHS will have their own training and coordination centers to flesh out their lists of Centers of Excellence.

[25] Naval Warfare, NDP-1, amended 28 MAR 1994. This publication provides the basis for the detailed doctrine of the U.S. Navy. It is a capstone publication that highlights the distinctive characteristics of warfare in a maritime environment and outlines the employment of U.S. Navy forces. The Navy Warfare Publications (NWPs) form the next tier and contain operations, logistics, and other major topic areas. The tier below the NWPs is the Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures publications (NTTPs), most of which are classified. A level of detail even finer grained than these are contained in the Navy Tactical References Publications (NTRPs) – some of which are classified and some of which are not. While the entire Navy library is now available electronically, it is enormous and cannot be read in its entirety by any one individual.

[26] Warfighting, MCDP-1, amended 20 JUN 1997 is the capstone U.S. Marine Corps doctrine publication. The Marine Corps doctrine publications are unique in that the ten capstone publications are in paperback format (UNCLASSIFIED), and easily fit into a single cardboard box that can be easily passed around a mobile command and shared with new officers and enlisted personnel.

[27] U.S. Coast Guard. *Maritime Sentinel; Coast Guard Strategic Plan for Combating Maritime Terrorism*. March 2006.

[28] U.S. Coast Guard. America's *Coast Guard; Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century*. Stubbs and Truver, January 2000.

[29] Roger C. Huder, "Shall We Play a Game?" *Fire Chief* 49 no. 10 (2005): 38.

[30] Noted during author's tour of the NOC, 15 December 2006, DHS Headquarters, Washington, DC.