

OVERVIEW



The 2000s were a tumultuous decade for Americans. The oscillating state of the economy, which careened from a mild recession, to a historic boom in house prices, to the worst downturn since the Great Depression, complicates the task of summarizing what the decade meant for the future of American society. The 2000s were less a coherent era than a series of dramatically different economic epochs. Moreover, it is difficult to know whether, or how long, several of the recession-induced trends we identify in this report—slowed migration, increased enrollment in higher education, declining median wages and incomes, rising levels of poverty—might persist into the coming decade.

But even as the economy spun through a remarkable series of astronomical highs and abysmal lows, demographic and social trends that continue to transform our population proceeded apace. If anything, the decade accelerated America's longer-term approach toward a number of critical demographic and social junctures. This report shows that our nation now faces a series of "new realities" about who we are, where and with whom we live, and how we provide for our own welfare, as well as that of our families and communities. These new realities relate to: the continued growth and outward expansion of our population; its ongoing racial and ethnic diversification; the "rapid" aging we are about to undergo; our increasing but selective higher educational attainment; and the intensified income polarization experienced by our workers and families. In each of these five areas, the nation reached important milestones in the 2000s that make those underlying realities too large to ignore any longer.

If these trends position the United States as a whole at a demographic crossroads, then our large metropolitan areas have already forged ahead.¹

Because of their size, and their historical and contemporary role in America's economy and society, our major cities and suburbs stand on the very front lines of these dynamics. They are thus the places where the nation is feeling the challenges that accompany these new realities first, and where the responses that will shape our next society must ultimately be co-produced.

THE FIVE NEW REALITIES

Growth and Outward Expansion

Unlike many of its peers in the industrialized world, the United States retained a robust rate of population growth in the 2000s. The nation's population passed 300 million, and over the course of the decade, the nation will have added roughly 28 million people, about a 10 percent growth rate. The healthy levels of fertility and immigration present in the United States confirm that, despite economic tumult, our population—and those around the globe—remains

hopeful about the opportunities our society provides. Indeed, our growth will ultimately provide a demographic cushion that may help us cope better with another new reality—supporting an increasingly aging population (see below).

Our nation's large metro areas remain at the cutting edge of the nation's continued growth. As **Population and Migration** shows, between 2000 and 2009, the 100 largest metropolitan areas grew by a combined 10.5 percent, versus 5.8 percent growth in the rest of the country, and by the end of the decade housed two-thirds of all Americans. While, on net, people move from large metro areas to other parts of the country in the aggregate, these places gain from births to their relatively younger populations, and from the migrants they attract from abroad in large numbers.

Yet the 2000s, particularly the go-go years of the housing bubble, fueled growth patterns in which the outermost reaches of metropolitan areas expanded at several times the rate of cities and core urban communities. In the 100 largest metro areas, cities and high-density suburban counties grew by a little under 5 percent from 2000 to 2008, while less developed, generally smaller counties grew at more

than three times that rate. By 2008, 40 percent of the metropolitan population lived in these spread-out areas.² This pattern of growth poses stark challenges for efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Homes and cars account for a significant portion of U.S. carbon emissions, and lower-density development is associated with higher energy and vehicle

usage.³ Indeed, while **Commuting** confirms that the share of Americans getting to work via public transit grew marginally for the first time in decades, it did so against the backdrop of a society in which three out of four commutes occurred alone, in a car.

The bursting of the housing bubble ushered in at least a temporary retreat from the longer-run march toward outer suburbia and lower-density metropolitan areas in general, a pattern also chronicled in **Population and Migration**. Whether a move toward more environmentally sustainable modes of living and transportation, in both cities and suburbs, will persist into the 2010s will depend on a range of factors. If recent history is any guide, public policy tools—both national and local in scope—will be needed to ensure that future development reflects the full range of its economic and environmental impacts on communities and society.

Population Diversification

In a country that recently elected its first African American president, it can be easy to forget that not so long ago, we were a considerably more racially and ethnically homogeneous society than we are today. In 1970, non-Hispanic whites accounted for roughly five in six Americans, a share that has dropped to less than four in six today. Immigrants that year were less than 5 percent of U.S. population; their share topped 12 percent in 2008. Today, our nation's population is one-third non-white (including Hispanics), and those groups are projected to reach majority status by 2042.

Immigration helps explain this transition toward a more racially and ethnically diverse society. In the 2000s, immigration accounted for roughly one-third of U.S. population growth. The majority of the remainder came from a natural increase of native-born racial and ethnic minorities. Nearly a quarter of

Growth and Outward Expansion

309 million
U.S. population

40%

Share of large metropolitan population living in lower-density counties

all U.S. children in 2008 were the sons and daughters of at least one immigrant parent. This coming-of-age generation, a little over 30 years from now, is projected to stand on the precipice of our transition to a non-white majority nation.


Large metropolitan areas will get there first. As **Race and Ethnicity** reveals, in 2008 these areas contained 68 percent of the nation's multi-racial population, 74 percent of its blacks, 80 percent of its Hispanics, and 88 percent of its Asians. Roughly one in six of their residents was foreign-born, a share exceeding that of the United States as a whole during the last great wave of immigration at the turn of the twentieth century. Notably, the under-18 population across the 100 largest metropolitan areas reached majority non-white status by 2008.

America's largely successful history at integrating immigrants into its social fabric remains one of its greatest economic and societal strengths. That strength is being tested anew, however, both by the large volume of immigration the country has recently experienced, and by the socioeconomic challenges that many of those immigrants and their children face. This is especially pronounced in the metropolitan communities that most of these new Americans call home. **Immigration** shows that some of these communities, especially suburbs, experienced rapid immigrant growth over both the 1990s and 2000s. Meanwhile, the nation's track record with respect to helping African Americans climb the socioeconomic ladder is mixed at best. Yet that group will remain a large and growing part of an increasingly diverse workforce as well. It shares some challenges with other minority groups, as well as disadvantaged portions of the white population, that metro areas on the front lines of this transition will be unable to fully address on their own.

Aging of the Population

Given the baby boomers' outsized influence on (among other things) our economy, our popular culture, and our politics, the move of the first members of this cohort into seniorhood—scheduled to begin in 2011—has not gone unnoticed. The demographic impact will be monumental, a veritable “age tsunami” compared to the smaller World War II generation immediately preceding them. Foreshadowing this, the number of 55-to-64 year-olds nationwide grew by nearly 50 percent from 2000 to 2010, as detailed in **Age**, with an even larger number of younger boomers (44 to 54 years old) looming in their wake. Together, U.S. boomers and seniors now number more than 100 million. Their impending retirements have provoked much analysis on the future of health care, our entitlement systems, the labor market, and the stock market.

Attracting somewhat less attention have been the questions of how and where aging will transform America's communities. Once again, large metro areas find themselves at the forefront of the trend. They are in one sense aging faster than the nation as a whole, experiencing a 45 percent increase in their 55-to-64 year-old population from 2000 to 2008, versus 40 percent nationally. More than one-third of their populations are now over the age of 45. And **Households and Families** reveals that metro areas' single-person households are growing more rapidly than the national average as well. As noted below, these increases are registering largely in the suburban communities that much of this



generation has always called home, but which were not designed with the boomers of 2020 in mind.

Moreover, because they are the locus of both America's diversifying and aging populations, large metro areas register a larger "cultural generation gap." Although more than 50 percent of their combined child population is non-white, their over-65 population remains 75 percent white. Metropolitan communities thus face particular challenges not only in how to preserve a high quality of life for the growing cadre of elderly who will age in place there, but also in how to reconcile the distinct needs of that population with very different next generations of workers, homeowners, and voters.

Uneven Higher Educational Attainment

The 2000s continued a trend that has made the United States one of the most highly educated nations in the world. More than one-third of U.S. adults held a post-secondary degree in 2008, up from one-quarter in 1990. These higher levels of education have helped propel our economic growth, and the quality of our higher educational institutions has

attracted talented individuals from all over the globe.

Yet as **Educational Attainment** demonstrates, the trend that has recently propelled growth in U.S. educational attainment—each generation "out-attaining" the one before it—may be faltering. Enrollments are rising, but rates of completion appear to be stalling among young adults. Moreover, the African American and Hispanic groups projected to

make up a growing share of our future workforce lag their white and Asian counterparts dramatically on post-secondary attainment.

Large metro areas at once lead the nation in this regard, while exemplifying even more strongly the disparities that lie beneath. Their residents earn four-year degrees at a much higher rate (31 percent) than those living elsewhere (21 percent). But 35-to-44 year-olds in large metro areas post higher degree attainment rates than their 25-to-34 year-old counterparts. And the attainment disparities between whites and Asians on the one hand, and blacks and Hispanics on the other are more pronounced in large metro areas. By 2008, that racial/ethnic gap in bachelor's degree attainment had passed 20 percentage points.

The issues that lay behind these trends are numerous, and extend well beyond the purview of the higher education sector alone. But with decent-paying jobs in the U.S. labor market poised to demand ever-greater levels of education and skills from their workers, the economic and social future of metropolitan areas may hinge on the ability of their economic and social institutions to propel a younger, more diverse population toward post-secondary success.

Income Polarization

The economically tumultuous 2000s were not kind to the typical American household, which saw its inflation-adjusted income decline by more than \$2,000 between 1999 and 2008—and probably even further by 2009 when the economy hit bottom. This will likely mark the first census decade in recent U.S. history in which real median household income declined. Nor was the decade a good one for Americans living at the economic margins; the number of people living below the poverty line rose

Aging of the Population

117 million

Population of U.S. boomers and seniors (age 45 and over)

38%

Share of large metropolitan population age 45 and over

15 percent, and the U.S. poverty rate increased from 12.4 percent to 13.2 percent.

One could chalk these trends up to purely cyclical forces, but this would overlook what appear to be longer-run, structural changes that led to continued polarization of wages and incomes over the decade. **Work** details how low-wage workers lost considerable ground in the 2000s, with hourly earnings declining by 8 percent. Middle-wage workers suffered a wage decline of more than 4 percent. At the top of the distribution, however, high-wage workers saw hourly earnings rise by more than 3 percent. Not surprisingly, these wage trends accompanied a further relative decline in the size of the middle class, building on a trend from past decades.⁴

Large metro areas stood at the vanguard of this troubling trend, too. Their low-wage workers suffered greater losses, and their high-wage workers made greater gains, than the national average during the 2000s. By 2008 high-wage workers in large metro areas out-earned their low-wage counterparts by a ratio of more than five to one, reflecting an especially stark divide between the haves and have-nots in metropolitan America. This holds by race/ethnicity, too, with non-Hispanic whites in large metro areas out-earning their black and Hispanic counterparts by larger margins than in smaller communities. And as explored below and in **Income and Poverty**, large metro areas demonstrated household income polarization of a different, equally important kind in the 2000s—a regional “pulling apart” that pummeled some corners of the nation even as it left others relatively unscathed.

These trends called into question the sufficiency of overall macroeconomic growth—and metropolitan economic growth, too—for improving living standards for most Americans. Broadly shared prosperity is important at both levels for the future of our society

and our democracy, and much more purposeful public policies may be needed in the decade ahead to ensure that the next round of economic growth delivers on that goal.

NEW REALITIES VARY IN THEIR INTENSITY ACROSS METROPOLITAN AMERICA

Large metropolitan areas as a group are noteworthy for exhibiting a forward-leaning position across the five new demographic and social realities that America confronts. Like any group with 100 distinct members, however, variation abounds. In some ways, large metropolitan areas actually became *more* different from one another in the 2000s. Still, much can be gleaned about the present and future of large metro areas from a basic demographic typology of these areas, the results of which confound simple regional ways of viewing the country and its population.

Metropolitan Distinctiveness

The 100 largest metro areas span a wide range of social, demographic, and economic experience. Across the nine subject areas of this report, enormous differences separate the metropolitan areas with the highest and lowest rankings in 2008. The New York metro area, for instance, has nearly 40 times the population of the Modesto metro area. The non-white

Uneven Higher Educational Attainment

35%

Share of U.S. population age 25 and over with a post-secondary degree

21%

Difference in bachelor's degree attainment rate, whites/Asians versus blacks/Hispanics in large metro areas

share of population in McAllen is roughly 16 times that in Portland (ME), and immigrants make up nearly 20 times the share of population in Miami as in Youngstown. Boomers and seniors are a majority of the population in Bradenton, but just one-fifth in Provo. And adults in the Washington, D.C. area are more than three times as likely to hold a college degree as those in the Bakersfield area.

Over the past decade, these major metropolitan areas diverged on many aspects of the emerging realities defining and challenging our society:

- On **growth and outward expansion**, the 2000s brought hyper-growth in some parts of the Sun Belt, along with population decline in struggling parts of the Great Lakes region. Provo, Raleigh, Las Vegas, and Cape Coral each had at least one-third more people in 2008 than in 2000. Meanwhile, something of a “lake effect” produced population losses in Syracuse, Rochester, Buffalo, Youngstown, Cleveland, and Toledo, along with the nearby metro areas of Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Scranton. Even as many declined in population, Midwestern metro areas sprawled outwards, experiencing more than half of

their population gains in low-density counties. By comparison, only 20 percent of population gains in Northeastern metro areas, and 16 percent in Western metro areas, occurred in these farther-flung locations

- On **population diversification**, while America’s racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants continued to disperse in the 2000s, reaching significant thresholds of population in a growing number

of metro areas, they remained highly concentrated in a handful of very large places. A majority of Asians, and a near-majority of Hispanics, lived in just 10 metropolitan areas in 2008 (versus 25 percent of total U.S. population), producing wide variation across metro areas in the share of children who are “second generation” Americans (from 4 percent in Jackson to 60 percent in Los Angeles). Meanwhile, the number of blacks shrank in Midwestern and coastal California metro areas, and nearly one-fifth of black population gains in the 100 largest metro areas occurred in the Atlanta region

- On **aging**, already youthful metro areas such as Austin and Boise augmented that profile in the 2000s by adding large numbers of younger families with children, both white and minority, and now have relatively low shares of their populations aged 45 and over. At the same time, rapidly aging metro areas in the Northeast and Midwest such as Youngstown and Pittsburgh saw their numbers of married-with-children households drop at alarming rates, and now the boomer/senior share of their populations approaches half

- On **higher educational attainment**, the metro areas with the most highly educated populations essentially pulled farther away from the pack in the 2000s. Boston, New York, and San Francisco ranked among the top gainers of college graduates over the decade, while progress largely stalled in lower-attaining metro areas such as Chattanooga, El Paso, and Modesto. The degree attainment difference between Washington, D.C. and Bakersfield (#1 and #100, respectively) grew from 26 percentage points in 1990 to 34 in 2008. This clustering of the highly educated generally added to racial gaps in attainment within metro areas; the white/black college degree gap, for instance, grew considerably in “talent magnet” locations such as San Jose, Seattle, and Minneapolis

Income Polarization

-\$2,241

Change in U.S. real median household income, 1999 to 2008

5.25

Ratio of high-wage worker to low-wage worker hourly earnings, large metro areas

The Seven Types of Large Metropolitan Areas Are Distinct Along Several Demographic Dimensions

Metro Type	Number of Metro Areas	Total Population (millions)	% Growth in Core Areas, 2000 to 2008*	% Population Age 45 and Over	% Population Foreign-Born	Educational inequality Ratio**	Wage inequality Ratio***	% Commuters Driving Alone
Diverse Giant	9	58	50	38	28	2.8	5.7	65
Skilled Anchor	19	31	n/a	41	9	2.1	4.6	77
Next Frontier	9	29	41	35	18	2.6	5.4	74
New Heartland	19	28	44	36	9	2.0	4.7	79
Industrial Core	18	22	n/a	40	6	2.1	4.5	82
Border Growth	11	19	30	33	19	2.7	4.9	77
Mid-Sized Magnet	15	13	29	41	8	2.0	4.5	81
100-metro average	100	199	33	38	16	2.4	5.2	74

Low

Medium

High

Note: all metro type averages weighted by 2008 population; statistics are for 2008 unless otherwise noted

* Share of metropolitan growth in primary cities and high-density suburbs ("n/a" indicates population loss in these areas)

** Ratio of college degree attainment rate, whites/Asians versus blacks/Hispanics

*** Ratio of hourly earnings, high-wage (90th percentile) workers versus low-wage (10th percentile) workers



• On **income polarization**, the recession that began in 2001 never really ended throughout much of the Midwest as its manufacturing base shed jobs throughout the decade. All 19 of the region's large metro areas experienced an inflation-adjusted decline in median household income in the 2000s, averaging more than 8 percent across those households. By contrast, incomes held steady in Northeastern metro areas, even rising modestly in areas such as Albany, Allentown, and Worcester. Meanwhile, metropolitan areas with among the lowest wages and incomes at the beginning of the decade, such as Bakersfield, El Paso, and Scranton, suffered losses in the 2000s

The Great Recession that took hold during the last two years of the decade may have, at least temporarily, moderated some aspects of this growing regional inequality. This is because migration fell significantly

due to crippled housing and labor markets. Growth in much of the Sun Belt and the outer suburbs cooled off, immigration slowed, and Americans everywhere went back to college in higher numbers. Yet these shifts neither reversed the full extent of the "pulling apart" that occurred across the 2000s, nor did they necessarily "lock in" new patterns of regional growth and change that will persist once economic growth resumes.

A Demographic Typology of Metropolitan America

While each metropolitan area possesses a unique social, demographic, and economic profile, the distinctions among these places on many of the "new realities" are also apparent among different groups of metro areas. These groups do not break neatly along traditional regional lines, such as Sun Belt



versus Snow Belt, east and west of the Mississippi, or even the four Census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). What differentiates them are simple metrics of population growth, population diversity, and educational attainment, as compared to national averages.⁵ Grouped into seven categories, the particular issues facing the nation's 100 largest metro areas become clearer, as do the places to which individual metro areas might look for common solutions.

- **Next Frontier** metro areas exceed national averages on population growth, diversity, and educational attainment.⁶ Of these nine metro areas, eight lie west of the Mississippi River (Washington, D.C. is the exception). They attracted immigrants, families, and educated workers during the 2000s thanks to their diversified economies (including government employment in several) and relatively mild climates. In some ways the demographic success stories of the 2000s, Next Frontier areas are generally younger, growing more densely, and more transit-oriented than other metro areas. One price of their success is their higher levels of both educational and wage inequality


- **New Heartland** metro areas are also fast growing, highly educated locales, but have lower shares of Hispanic and Asian populations than the national average.⁷ These 19 metro areas include many in the "New South" where blacks are the dominant minority group, such as Atlanta, Charlotte, and Richmond, as well as largely white metro areas throughout the Midwest and West, such as Indianapolis, Kansas City, and Portland (OR). The service-based economies of these metro areas attracted many middle-class migrants, both white and black, during the 2000s. That diverse in-migration has given the New Heartland areas a more racially equitable educational profile than other metropolitan types

- **Diverse Giants** feature some of the largest metro areas in the country, including the three largest (New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago), as well as coastal anchors such as Miami, San Francisco, and San Diego.⁸ These nine regions post above-average educational attainment and diversity, but below-average population growth, owing in part to their large sizes. Like the New Frontier areas, they are growing more densely, but exhibit wide educational

DIVERSE GIANT
 Low growth
 High diversity
 High educational attainment



BORDER GROWTH
 High growth
 High diversity
 Low educational attainment




These new demographic realities do not break neatly along traditional regional lines, such as Sun Belt versus Snow Belt.

and wage disparities. With more than one-quarter of their residents born abroad, these areas are home to sizeable populations of “second-generation” children of immigrant parents⁹



- **Border Growth** metro areas are mostly located in southwestern border states, and as such are marked by a significant and growing presence of Mexican and other Latin American immigrants.¹⁰ Only Orlando lies outside the main orbit of this group of 11, which stretches from central Texas, through Arizona and Nevada, and up California’s Central Valley. Many of these metro areas are suffering “migration whiplash,” as they built large swaths of single-family housing for tens of thousands of newcomers through mid-decade, only to see growth largely halt with the bursting of the housing bubble. For those workers and families that stayed, especially less-skilled Hispanics, the challenge now before these areas is to diversify the local economy in ways that provide sustainable growth opportunities well beyond the housing sector

- **Mid-Sized Magnet** metro areas are similar in their recent growth and educational profile to

MID-SIZED MAGNET
 High growth
 Low diversity
 Low educational attainment



Border Growth centers, but are distinguished by lower shares of Hispanic and Asian minorities.¹¹ These 15 mostly mid-sized locations, largely in the Southeast but with a couple of Western representatives, lack some of the high-value industries that characterize the New Heartland. Similar to the Border Growth centers, some got caught in the growth spiral of the 2000s that ended abruptly with



the housing crash—particularly Boise and the six Florida metro areas. Having attracted many boomers and seniors over time, Mid-Sized Magnets contain the oldest populations among the metropolitan types, but have grown in a distended fashion that has left them among the most car-dependent of the seven groups

- **Skilled Anchors** are slow-growing, less diverse metro areas that boast higher-than-average levels of educational attainment.¹² Seventeen (17) of the 19 lie in the Northeast and Midwest, and include large regions such as Boston and Philadelphia, as well as smaller regions such as Akron and Worcester. Many are former manufacturing and port centers that some time ago made the difficult transition to service-based economies, with significant representation of medical and higher educational institutions. Others like Pittsburgh and St. Louis still specialize in non-auto-related manufacturing sectors that remained relatively steady over the 2000s. These characteristics have kept Skilled Anchors demographically more vibrant than other parts of the North (see below), even as they post lower levels

of inequality than faster-growing locales. Still, all of the modest recent growth across these areas has occurred in lower-density suburbs

- **Industrial Cores** are in some ways the most demographically disadvantaged of the metropolitan types.¹³ These 18 metro areas are largely older industrial centers of the Northeast, Midwest, and Southeast. Their populations are slower-growing, less diverse, and less educated than national averages, and significantly older than the large metropolitan average. A remaining industrial base combined with lack of diverse in-migration to these metro areas has kept educational and wage inequalities in check. But these metropolitan areas lost population in the aggregate during the 2000s, yet still saw growth in their outer suburbs, even as their cities and high-density suburbs declined in size.

Viewing metropolitan America through this lens offers a more nuanced view of the country and its variable challenges than conventional regional generalizations. The South, for instance, counts at least one member in each of the seven metropolitan

categories, as very different demographic destinies confront Atlanta versus Augusta, or Miami versus Palm Bay. Similarly, the notion of a unified “Rust Belt” stretching across large portions of the Northeast and Midwest overlooks the important factors that distinguish populations in Rochester, Cleveland, Indianapolis, and Chicago from one another. As explored further in **Policy Implications**, these population distinctions dictate different priorities for metropolitan leaders seeking to forge a prosperous future for their communities.

CITIES AND SUBURBS SHARE MORE THAN EVER IN THE NEW REALITIES

Even as large metro areas “pulled apart” demographically from one another in some ways in the 2000s, they also “came together” at the individual metropolitan scale. Several trends in the 2000s further put to rest the old perceptions of cities as declining, poor, minority places set amid young, white, wealthy suburbs. As this report outlines, the decade brought many cities and suburbs still closer together along a series of social, demographic, and economic dimensions. In this way, the five new realities are, more than ever, metropolitan—rather than purely urban or suburban—in scope. Examples include:

Growth—notwithstanding the general outward expansion of metropolitan areas over the full decade, the period from 2006 to 2008 saw a retrenchment of population toward cities and high-density suburban counties as outer suburban housing markets crashed. Indeed, high-density suburbs are increasingly similar to cities in their overall growth trajectory and commuting patterns than mature and outer suburbs

Population diversification—by 2008, a majority of members of all major racial and ethnic groups in metropolitan areas lived in suburbs, as did more than half of all immigrants nationwide. At the same time, the white population grew in many older cities where it had previously declined, such as Atlanta, Boston, and Washington, D.C.

Aging—a growing share of elderly and smaller households are found in suburbia, a trend that will only accelerate as the boomers—more than 70 percent of whom live in suburbs—enter seniorhood. Meanwhile, many Sun Belt cities added younger populations during the 2000s, slightly narrowing the “married-with-children” household gap between cities and suburbs

Educational attainment—the distinction between city and suburban educational attainment remained almost negligible, given the regional nature of labor markets and the concentration of high-value jobs in denser urban areas that lure highly educated workers. Thirty-one (31) and 32 percent of city and suburban adults, respectively, held bachelor’s degrees in 2008. The most highly educated communities were in fact high-density suburbs that surround many cities, where 36 percent of adults held a college degree

Income—the income and poverty gaps between cities and suburbs, while still wide, narrowed in the 2000s. As overall metropolitan median income fell, the difference between city and suburban median incomes declined by about \$800. Meanwhile, the poverty rate in cities rose marginally, but jumped a full percentage point for suburbs, as their poor population grew five times faster. A majority of metropolitan poor now live in suburbs, and their income, labor market, and educational profiles largely mirror those of their city counterparts

The urban/suburban boundary, it should be noted, blurs more easily in some types of metropolitan

areas than others. For instance, in Next Frontier, New Heartland, Diverse Giant, and Border Growth metro areas, racial and ethnic minorities represent a 10 to 20 percent larger share of population in cities than suburbs. But that gap ranges from 20 to 40 percent in Mid-Sized Magnet, Industrial Core, and Skilled Anchor metro areas. Similarly, the city/suburban median household income difference is relatively muted in Border Growth and Mid-Sized Magnet centers (\$6,000 to \$7,000), but a substantial \$27,000 in the Skilled Anchors.

Nonetheless, most of these gaps, regardless of metropolitan type, narrowed during the 2000s. And where sizeable differences in population shares and median characteristics prevail, the locus of the new reality (e.g., immigrants, older population, the poor) continues to shift in new, mostly suburban, directions. In an era of severe fiscal restraint and increasingly shared demography, governance must begin to transcend the parochial 18th-century administrative borders that frustrate shared approaches to increasingly shared challenges.

CONCLUSION

The 2000s found large metropolitan areas on the front lines of America's demographic transformation. Together, they confront a series of new realities more intense than those buffeting the rest of the nation, on measures of growth and diversification, aging, and increasingly uneven outcomes in educational attainment and income. Those realities—and the challenges they imply—are shared more than ever across city and suburban lines. Nevertheless, the diverse economic and social histories of metropolitan areas persist in their contemporary demographic profiles. For each of seven types of large metro areas, a

distinct set of issues comes to the fore, some within metro areas' own capacities to tackle, but others fundamentally beyond their reach. Chronicling the unprecedented demographic changes afoot in America generally, and their specific metropolitan manifestations, the *State of Metropolitan America* brings these new realities into sharp focus as the nation enters a new and undoubtedly challenging decade. ■

ENDNOTES

1. See "About the State of Metropolitan America" for more on the definition and importance of metropolitan areas.
2. These areas (counties and county remainders) were defined as "lower-density" based on their having less than 95 percent of their population living in urbanized areas in 2000. It is likely that based on population growth patterns from 2000 to 2008, that some of these areas would no longer qualify as "lower-density" based on their contemporary settlement patterns. Still, their share of metropolitan population rose from 39 percent in 2000 to 42 percent in 2008. The results of the 2010 Census will reveal changes over the decade in the rate of population urbanization in U.S. counties.
3. Marilyn A. Brown, Frank Southworth, and Andrea Sarzynski, "Shrinking the Carbon Footprint of Metropolitan America" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2008).
4. Jason Booza, Jackie Cutsinger, and George Galster, "Where Did They Go? The Decline of Middle-Class Neighborhoods in Metropolitan America, 1970-2000" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2006).
5. Specifically, statistics for each metropolitan area were compared to approximate national averages on three indicators: (a) population growth from 2000 to 2008 (above or below 8 percent); (b) share of population

other than black and non-Hispanic white (above or below 22.5 percent); and (c) share of adults 25 years and over with a bachelor's degree (above or below 28 percent). This produced the seven groups of metro areas described in the text.

6. Next Frontier metro areas include: Albuquerque, NM; Austin, TX; Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX; Denver-Aurora, CO; Houston, TX; Sacramento-Roseville, CA; Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA; Tucson, AZ; and Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV.
7. New Heartland metro areas include: Atlanta, GA; Charleston, SC; Charlotte, NC-SC; Colorado Springs, CO; Columbia, SC; Columbus, OH; Des Moines, IA; Indianapolis, IN; Kansas City, MO-KS; Knoxville, TN; Madison, WI; Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI; Nashville, TN; Omaha, NE-IA; Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA; Provo, UT; Raleigh-Cary, NC; Richmond, VA; and Salt Lake City, UT.
8. Diverse Giant metro areas include: Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI; Honolulu, HI; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA; Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL; New York-Newark, NY-NJ-PA; Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA; San Diego, CA; San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA; and San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA.
9. "Second generation" is used here to refer to children of one or more foreign-born parents living in the United States, and includes both foreign-born and U.S.-born individuals under age 18. See Immigration for further details.
10. Border Growth metro areas include: Bakersfield, CA; El Paso, TX; Fresno, CA; Las Vegas, NV; McAllen, TX; Modesto, CA; Orlando, FL; Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ; Riverside-San Bernardino, CA; San Antonio, TX; and Stockton, CA.
11. Mid-Sized Magnet metro areas include: Allentown, PA-NJ; Baton Rouge, LA; Boise, ID; Bradenton, FL; Cape Coral, FL; Chattanooga, TN; Greensboro-High Point, NC; Greenville, SC; Jacksonville, FL; Lakeland, FL; Little Rock, AR; Ogden, UT; Oklahoma City, OK; Palm Bay, FL; and Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL.
12. Skilled Anchor metro areas include: Akron, OH; Albany, NY; Baltimore, MD; Boston-Cambridge, MA; Bridgeport-Stamford, CT; Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN; Hartford, CT; Jackson, MS; Milwaukee, WI; New Haven, CT; Philadelphia, PA-NJ-DE-MD; Pittsburgh, PA; Portland, ME; Poughkeepsie, NY; Rochester, NY; St. Louis, MO-IL; Springfield, MA; Syracuse, NY; and Worcester, MA.
13. Industrial Core metro areas include: Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC; Birmingham, AL; Buffalo, NY; Cleveland, OH; Dayton, OH; Detroit-Warren, MI; Grand Rapids, MI; Harrisburg, PA; Louisville, KY-IN; Memphis, TN-MS-AR; New Orleans, LA; Providence, RI; Scranton, PA; Toledo, OH; Tulsa, OK; Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC; Wichita, KS; and Youngstown, OH-PA.