Japan’s Defense Policy
The View From Washington, DC

Colonel Seiki Kageura,
Japan Air Self-Defense Force
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FELLOW

21st CENTURY
DEFENSE INITIATIVE
POLICY PAPER
13 August 2012
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the government of Japan, Japan Self-Defense Forces or Japan Air Self-Defense Force.
## CONTENTS

**ILUSTRATIONS** ................................................................................................................ IV

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS** ........................................................................................................ V

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** ..................................................................................................... VI

**CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION** ......................................................................................... 1

**CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND TIMELINE** .............................................................. 4
  - Research Time Span ........................................................................................................ 4
  - Search of American Media and Think Tanks .............................................................. 4
  - Interviews with American Experts ............................................................................. 5

**CHAPTER 3: JAPAN’S DEFENSE IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA** ....................................... 6
  - What Issues Interest the American Media? .............................................................. 6
  - Whose Voice is Biggest? ............................................................................................. 7

**CHAPTER 4: JAPAN’S DEFENSE IN AMERICAN EXPERTS’ MINDS** ............................ 9
  - Brief Summary of Results .......................................................................................... 9
  - Specific Opinions ........................................................................................................ 9
    - Highest Priority Issues the U.S. and Japan Must Deal With Together ................. 10
    - Evaluation of Current JSDF Capability, In-Depth Attacking Capability ............ 11
      Deterrence Capability, Three Non-Nuclear Principles ........................................... 13
    - The U.S. Forces’ Will to Fight in Asia ................................................................. 15
    - Possibility to Deter Wars Through Economic Ties With China ......................... 16
    - Handling the Senkaku Islands, Takeshima, and the Northern Territories .......... 16
    - Acceptance of Female Personnel Into the JSDF .................................................. 17
    - Regional or Security Expert? Republican or Democratic Sympathies? .......... 18
  - Analysis .................................................................................................................... 19
    - High Expectations for the Japanese Economy ...................................................... 19
    - Straddling Misgivings and Hope for the Future American Economy ............... 20
    - How to View a Rising China ................................................................................... 20
    - "Security Consultative Committee Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance
      Transformation and Realignment for the Future" ................................................. 21
    - Views on Japan’s Self-Evolution in Defense Policy-Making ............................... 22
    - A Crisis is an Opportunity; Time to Make Drastic Changes ............................... 23
    - A Human Network Among the American Experts .............................................. 23
ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 2. Persons Quoted ....................................................................................7
FIGURE 3. Quoted Persons' Affiliations.................................................................8
FIGURE 4. Locations of Think Tanks and the Executive and Legislative
    Authority in Washington, DC ...........................................................................27
FIGURE 5. Locations of Think Tanks and the Executive and Legislative
    Authority in Tokyo .............................................................................................28
FIGURE 6. Numbers and Affiliations of Speakers for Public Hearings in the U.S.
    and Japan ............................................................................................................29
FIGURE 7. Think Tanks' Categorization by Political Affiliation .........................31
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper is the result of a four-month visiting fellowship with the 21st Century Defense Initiative (21CDI), Foreign Policy Studies, at The Brookings Institution. The author particularly would like to thank Peter W. Singer, Brendan Orino, and intern Jeffrey Lin at 21CDI.

I also extend my sincerest appreciation to the 32 American experts, whose opinions comprise much of this paper, for graciously accepting my interview requests and engaging in frank discussions. Without these experts, who are listed in Appendix 1, this paper would never have come to fruition.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

When it comes to Japan’s defense, the Japanese political system and the Japan Self-Defense Force independently decide the national policies as they are ultimately responsible for Japan’s safety and security. However, due to the crucial nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Japan’s overall security, it is impractical not to take into account American thinking. As a result, it is important to better understand where and how American thinking on Japanese security is influenced.

The scope of this research goes beyond the official statements of the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government. The author sought to explore the role that experts and think tanks play in American discourse and opinion of Japanese security. This included extensive research of American media reports on Japanese security issues as well as interviews of key American experts and opinion leaders on Japan, mostly located in and around Washington, DC. During that process, the purpose and objectives of American think tanks in the discourse were also clarified.

The research yielded several notable findings. It quickly showed that the U.S. media featured topical Japanese defense issues almost as equally as their Japanese media counterparts. They did not single out any particular topics or favor quoting certain experts.

Second, with the recent military rise of China and concerns about the American economic and financial situation, the U.S. expects Japan to establish more formidable deterrence and defense posture, which will assure stability in East Asia and the rest of the world.

Third, American experts are satisfied with the direction in which Japanese defense policy has been moving but hope that Japanese soft and hard power will increase to make up for future shortfalls in bilateral operations under the Security Treaty. This includes a reinterpretation of the right of collective self-defense for enhancing defense. At the same time, however, they do not want Japanese defense policy changes to be extremely provocative to neighboring nations, as drastic changes could lead to increased tensions among East Asian countries.

With such stakes, the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance has tremendous possibilities, especially given the economic situations of both countries. But it is also important that each nation recognizes the other’s circumstances and opinions. In other words, the Japanese are generally more pessimistic about the beefing up of their defense budget in the foreseeable future and instead have higher expectations for
America’s rebalancing toward Asia. At the same time, most American experts believe that Japan should and still can enlarge its defense capability and that the U.S. might be unable to commit to that region in the future.

Therefore, this recognition gap must be bridged in upcoming bilateral exchanges. Based on that mutual understanding, the U.S. and Japan can jointly maintain and improve their present bilateral deterrence capability in the long term. Any defense buildup will take time and require thinking ahead.

To achieve such effective measures, not only should the international environment but also the domestic situations in each country be considered. Just laying one’s hopes on the other party does not get either nation anywhere. However, Japan still needs to think on its own about what sort of bilateral relationship it wants and to what degree it should hedge its bets. Without this preparation, it will be difficult for Japan to earn true trust from the U.S.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

There is no doubt that Japan’s defense policy is determined by Tokyo. However, as its Basic Defense Policy or National Defense Program Guidelines states, the basic principles of the defense of Japan stand on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Hence, it is impractical to make security plans without considering the bilateral engagement. Consequently, it is natural that Japanese defense policymakers closely watch U.S. thinking and opinions about Japanese defense. Also, defense issues in Japan have been one of the most conflicted policy areas between ruling and opposition parties as well as between Japanese conservatives and liberals.

Thus, the author wondered what kind of Japanese defense issues have interested Americans, how they view them, and if there are the same kinds of internal conflicts in the U.S. itself?

To confirm schools of thought in the U.S. government, the fastest and surest way may be to ask government officials themselves. But in a democracy there are many influences on government thinking, including both public opinion and key experts. Moreover, in the author’s judgment, government officials frequently interact and consult with private counterparts to establish official positions. Therefore, the author conducted a survey of all articles about Japanese defense in American daily papers and magazines for the first research phase in order to answer important questions. For example, before and after the strategic “rebalance” or “pivot” toward Asia being publicized, what are the hottest issues in the United States with regard to the defense of Japan? Who has a loudest voice on Japan’s defense issues in America?

Adding to this research, the author took advantage of his residence at a think tank in Washington, DC, to directly interview (or exchange emails due to time constraints) with key American experts on Japanese security. Of course, opinions and proposals of such experts may not necessarily have direct influence over U.S. government policy. Nevertheless, the consideration given to them by government officials and lawmakers,1 and reports such as those put forward by the Foreign Affairs Policy Board,2 which consists of outside experts chosen by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for matters of U.S. foreign policy, the author can identify the leverage that individual scholars have in forming U.S. policies toward Japan. For the purpose of listening to a wide range of people, the author picked experts in diverse fields. They included significant players today, as well as those who have been involved in past bilateral negotiations or wrote and made key proposals on Japanese defense. Their
backgrounds included think-tankers, professors at universities, and CEOs of private companies. Some of them are already famous in Japanese media, while others have not yet appeared there.

During this research, the author focused on American think tanks because they are home to many of the experts whose voices are most common in the American media. Many Japanese reports mention that think tanks carry great weight in influencing U.S. government policy toward Japan, and people quoted in the papers and selected for my interviews were, as it turned out, mostly think-tankers. U.S. think tanks hold, at least from Japan’s viewpoint, such a prominent role in policy formation that the Japanese are unable to ignore their views. So the study also explored the sorts of opinions that representative American think tanks have expressed. In that process, by comparing each think tank’s perceived ideology (Conservative, Centrist, Liberal and so forth) with their real proposals and comments, this study also attempts to analyze whether the overall political bent reflects their actual views on Japan’s defense.

This project is therefore unique and novel in its approach to this key topic in Japan and the U.S. A number of Japanese reports have been published in the past about American experts’ views towards Japan, yet few incorporate both a survey of media and interviews with key current figures or focus exclusively on Japanese defense. Moreover, such viewpoints and thoughts are always changing; therefore, it is meaningful to spot the current status at such a crucial time of change, both in the U.S. and Japan, not to mention the wider Asia-Pacific region.

Notes

1 Annual reports of think tanks introduce such voices.
3 For example, Masakazu Kobayashi, Oubei Media Chinichiha no Nihonron (What is Japan? : How Japan Has Been Seen in Foreign Eyes), (Tokyo: Koubunsha, 2006). p.106.
4 Recent examples of interviews with American experts are as follows: Yoshihisa Komori, “Chuugoku no Shoutai” wo Abaku (Revealing China’s Identity), (Tokyo: Shougakukan, 2012)., Kan Ito, Chuugoku no Kakusenryoku ni Nihon wa Kuppukusuru (Japan will yield to Chinese nuclear power), (Tokyo: Shougakukan, 2011)., Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Nichibei doumei vs Chuugoku Kitachousenn: Armitage Nye Kinkyuu Teigenn (US-Japan Alliance vs. China/ North Korea:Armitage & Nye Urgent Proposals), (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2010)., Kobayashi, Oubei Media. The first compiles interviews with 12 American experts and mainly focuses on Chinese military strategy. The second addresses Japanese defense policy through interviews with U.S. Congresspeople, government officials, and scholars. It also examines political theses. The third covers a wide range of Japanese defense issues including “the right of collective self-defense,” “amendment of the Japanese constitution,” and “nuclear arming,” and uses interviews with Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The last deals with overarching topics, including the U.S.-Japan alliance, transformation of
U.S. forces, Article 9, as well as economic and social issues. It relies on interviews with eight think-tankers.
CHAPTER TWO
Methodology and Timeline

Research Time Span

This paper mainly attempts to survey and analyze the range of opinions and proposals regarding Japan’s defense that are now being expressed by American experts, particularly think-tankers in Washington, DC.

Internet research was conducted to survey all online American newspapers and journals, as well as key think tank articles published between December 17th, 2010 and March 31st, 2012. December 17th, 2010 was chosen as an appropriate starting point because it was the day when the current “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011 and beyond,” and “Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011-FY2015)” were issued. These were authorized in the Japanese Cabinet and are pillars of Japanese defense policy and planning. They roughly correspond to the U.S. National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review. The concluding date was fixed by the author’s tenure at The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.

During this time, a number of significant events occurred for U.S.-Japanese defense policy. Notably, on December 24th, 2011, the FY2012 budget plan was approved by the Japanese Cabinet.1 In January 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued “National Defense Strategy” and “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices.” And on March 16th, 2012, North Korea declared its “satellite” launch plans. The author anticipated significant American comments on and evaluations of those milestones to appear in the aforementioned timeframe.

Search of American Media2 and Think Tanks

In researching the daily papers and magazines, the author first used the academic research engine “Nexis” and checked American-published articles (The Economist is an exception and was included the count) in “Sources by Category”-“Newspapers” and “Magazines & Journals.” When finding articles, “Japan, defense,” and “Japan, security” were put into the search terms section. Adding to this, the “Google” search engine was used in the same way. In Google search, each article was screened to ensure that a paper version existed.

For think tank website research, the author narrowed more than 1,000 American think tanks3 into the most representative, which are shown in Figure 7.
Interviews with American Experts

Additionally, the author conducted interviews with 32 American scholars and experts in an attempt to understand their basic mindset on Japanese defense. Interviewees selected included those who were involved in bilateral negotiations and/or have written on or were quoted in the past on Japanese defense issues during the above timeframe. The interviewees were concentrated in the Washington, DC area. Of course, the interview set does not include all key American experts on Japanese defense, but is certainly a representative sample of the key figures and opinions. The honorable interviewees are listed in Appendix 1.

The prepared questions for the experts can be found in Appendix 2. However, the author must note that not all questions were asked to all the interviewees. Some interviews were more conversational, focused on the experts’ specialty field, or were constrained by time.

In interview requests, the author promised not to: 1) quote any expert’s words or phrases; 2) directly attribute opinions to a specific person. The experts were informed of this to encourage greater disclosure.

Notes

1 Japan’s FY2012 budget passed through the Diet on April 5th, 2012, in the same way that the Cabinet proposed.
2 In this case, mass media does not include TV or radio broadcasts or website-only articles like those on blogs, but only daily newspapers and journals. Because American radio commentary is often more conservative than daily papers in their political rhetoric, and Internet articles often have significant impact, this report would have benefitted from a broader media search. With limited time and resources, however, this was not feasible.
CHAPTER THREE
Japan’s Defense in the American Media

According to the latest survey carried out by the Cabinet Office in March 2012, 1 82.9 percent (multiple responses allowed) of Japanese citizens list the primary reason for the existence of the SDF as disaster relief dispatch (rescue activities in times of disaster and/or emergency transport of patients, etc.), while 78.6 percent list it as maintaining national security (prevention of invasion from foreign nations). With regards to efforts the SDF should concentrate most on in the future, disaster relief dispatch ranked highest (76.3 percent: multiple answers allowed), followed by maintaining national security (71.5 percent). These priorities are the same as those reported three years ago, although each response share has increased. Hence, highly praised SDF relief activities resulting from the March 11 disaster do not seem to be the primary reason for Japanese nationals’ expectations for disaster relief.

These results best characterize Japanese citizens’ expectations for its defense forces and policy. But what are Americans’ expectations for Japan’s defense? As a first step toward discerning this, the author researched American media, which has a major impact on its public opinions.

What Issues Interest the American Media?

As was touched on in Chapter 1, Japan’s “National Defense Program Guidelines” document defines the upcoming ten years for Japanese defense policy and build-up. Since its establishment (December 17th, 2010), what were the most covered issues regarding Japan’s defense in American media and journals? Figure 1 below indicates the research results from 238 American articles that discussed Japanese defense issues of some sort.

With the timeframe and the research methods the author set, no issues related to the Great East Japan Earthquake or the Fukushima nuclear plant were reported. As a result, U.S.-related issues such as the U.S. bases/camps relocation, the next combat fighter of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance were most frequently covered in terms of Japanese defense issues. With regards to base relocation, these articles were mostly found in the U.S. Armed Forces oriented papers (Stars and Stripes, Army Times, Navy Times, Air Force Times and Marine Corps Times) and accounted for 48 of the 80 articles on the relocation issue. However, even with those papers excluded, the relocation issue is still the most cited. This shows how much the issue interested America last year.
Figure 1: Japan’s Defense Issues Featured in American Media

As for the exclusively Japanese defense issues, they received almost even amounts of coverage and were featured in American news media as they occurred.

Whose Voice is Biggest?

Figure 2 below shows who, among non-government officials, has been quoted in American dailies and journals with regard to Japanese defense. As the figure shows, no single expert stands out.

Figure 2: Persons Quoted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>Names in Alphabetical Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Peter Woolley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ralph Cossa, Dave Scott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Richard Aboulafia, Brad Glosserman, Bruce Klingner, Steve O'Bryan, Richard J. Samuels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Michael Auslin, Peter Ennis, Richard Danzig, Daniel Pinkston, Richard Fontaine, Mike Green, Jeffrey Hormung, Sam Jameson, Walter Lohman, Denny Roy, Sheila Smith, Scott Snyder, Loren Thompson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Next, Figure 3 below indicates where those experts work.

Figure 3: Quoted Persons’ Affiliations

![Bar chart showing the number of times each type of affiliation was mentioned.]

As this result shows, many of the nongovernment officials belong to think tanks. This would be a bit surprising to the average Japanese citizen, who often read quotes from university scholars and nonaffiliated, retired government officials in Japanese newspapers. More than that, the average Japanese citizen is not aware of American think tanks. Therefore, before going into “Japan’s Defense in American Think Tank Publications” in Chapter 6, the author touches on American think tanks and compares them with its Japanese counterparts in Chapter 5.

---

Notes

1 Home pages of the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defense publicize the result.
CHAPTER FOUR
Japan’s Defense In American Experts’ Minds

It may be natural for newspaper and magazine articles, seen in the previous chapter, to primarily deal with current issues. Therefore, in this chapter, the author reviews the questions asked of 32 top American experts and their responses regarding Japan’s defense. The questions are not limited to current affairs and are related to key debated defense issues back in Japan.

Brief Summary of Results

First, the author confirmed there were far fewer differences among American experts’ opinions on Japan defense than in Japan. Compared with Japan, where defense policy is one of the most divisive and conflicted issues in Parliament and the academic fields, the fact that American opinions were so consistent was one of the more surprising results of the interviews.

As to tasks that the U.S. and Japan should deal with together, maintenance of deterrence capability and regional stability were the most common responses. To achieve that, they argued that close and frequent strategic talks and campaign planning were most required at all levels.

Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) capability, which is in Japan is considered “sufficient” (60.0%),¹ was viewed by the American experts as not enough under the current security environment. Most hoped the capabilities would be augmented, but with a caveat. There was no support for Japan holding an autonomous nuclear deterrence capability.

Respondents believed the thorniest issues for Japan’s basic defense policies to be: 1) revising the interpretation of the right of collective self-defense; 2) ongoing and what could be prolonged attempts to amend the Japanese constitution; 3) changing the three non-nuclear principles.

Specific Opinions

In this section, the author outlines the 13 questions (which can be found in full in Appendix 2), sorted out comprehensively into eight categories, and then details the 32 experts’ opinions. Figures in parentheses at the end of each items show how many experts referred to that particular issue.
Highest Priority Issues the U.S. and Japan Must Deal with Together

This was the only question that was open-ended, identifying the highest priority issues in the relationship. Therefore, the author received answers ranging from strategy to defense buildup. The key answers are categorized below:

**Strategic Items**
- Realistic strategic talks on global/regional strategy, visions and bilateral contingency planning. (8)
  - Strategic objective, roles and missions, priorities, asset allotment of both nations should be identified.
  - In-depth planning for Taiwan incidents.
  - Strategic talks will lead to appropriate weapons systems and a specific defense buildup.
  - Close and frequent talks between bilateral uniformed members whose results would be the basis of policy-level discussion. More shop-level coordination is required.
  - In the long run, the U.S. and Japan should think about force structure in Asia. Importance of Kadena Airbase would not change but Marines’ role might.
  - Bilateral war games are strongly encouraged. In the games, real participants should join every level (from politico to campaign) of decision-making to better simulate real war situations.
- Regional stability, security and order-building by the U.S. and Japan to improve credibility, maximize deterrence capability (both visible and invisible) and presence. (5)
  - Offensive capability should be regionally increased.
  - Resolving alliance disagreements.
- Practical handling of rising China. (5)
  - Guiding China in the right direction.
- Overcome economic and financial problems of both countries. (3)
  - The basis for any defense buildup.
- Enhancement of defense exchanges with Southeast Asian nations. (1)
  - Key nations for handling China.

**Bases and Camps**
- Collocation of the U.S. forces and SDF. (6)
  - Diversified access points are a key in tactical viewpoints.
  - Emotions of local Japanese may be mitigated.
  - Interoperable collocated air base and surrounding civil airport should hopefully be pipelines for exchange of materials and reduce redundancy.
Collocated base/camps are the first step. Commanders and staff should pursue closer coordination in command and control.

- Mitigating frictions between Okinawa locals and the U.S. bases/camps. (3)
  - The U.S. base closure in Germany could be a good reference.

**Defense Buildup**

- Handling cyber attacks. (4)
  - The attacks have actually happened. It is of vital importance to crack down at this stage. The current handling of cyber attacks looks parallel to that taken against terrorism (although the crackdown was not launched before the attacks of 9.11, which were predated by other minor attacks).
- Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). (2)
- Redundancy, particularly overcoming the vulnerability of Kadena Airbase. (2)
- Maritime security, anti-submarine warfare capability. (2)
- Higher level intelligence sharing. (1)
- Sharing common operation picture through interoperability. (1)
- Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Asia. (1)
- Development of (ship-/airborne) laser weapons. (1)

**Evaluation of Current JSDF Capability, In-depth Attacking Capability**

All the experts responded that Japan should do more. While admitting that JSDF capability is high, they claimed in a similar way that in the international context it is far from enough. For example, an expert commented that the defense budget should be increased to two percent of GDP.

The author then asked, “What functions should be enhanced?” The following items and related comments came from the experts. In the interviews, they explained each items in the context of how to implement the presently advocated Air-Sea Battle concept in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty framework.

- Enlargement of maritime forces. (13)
  - Japan Coast Guards, submarines, anti-submarine capability, mine sweepers, offensive mine warfare.
  - Coast Guards can be effective when formidable “billy clubs” (i.e., the Navy, the Maritime Self-Defense Force) are available for backup.
- Air superiority, air defense capability. (10)
  - Acquisition of F-35 is favorable but the purchase is too small in number.
  - Ship-based, air-to-air capability.
- Establishment of data-link and networking. (6)
  - Particularly: command and control system, information system, offensive network (all of which should be used by way of satellites).
- Information/intelligence collecting and sharing. (6)
- Information/intelligence sharing with South Korea, capability enlargement of ballistic missiles’ information at boost phase.
- UAVs are particularly useful for maritime surveillance.
  - JSDF shift toward Southwest. (5)
    - U.S. forces in Japan should be shifted to the North instead.
    - Ground-to-ground missiles deployed along the remote islands could serve as a wedge at key straits.
  - Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). (3)
    - Ship-based ballistic missile capabilities.
  - Marine Corps-like amphibious capability. (2)
    - The experts seemed thinking of adding this to the Ground Self-Defense Force.
  - Redundancy. (2)
    - Particularly, air stations should be connected to surrounding civil air fields.
  - Cruise missiles. (2)
    - Preemptive self-defense is approved under the U.N. Charter and such missiles are required for that.
  - Strengthening response to cyber attacks. (1)
  - More international cooperation and peacekeeping operations. (1)
    - Japan seems to have contributed for international cooperation far less than other developed countries. Both the rise of China as well as peacekeeping activities should require more robust defense capability.

Some experts added the following two items for consideration in a much-improved future economy:

  - Stand-off missiles. (5)
    - Offense is defense and vice-versa. In-depth attacking should be conducted bilaterally. (Some experts were against them, saying BMD capability would be enough.)
  - Nuclear-powered submarine. (3)
    - The increase in submarines introduced in the 2010 NDPG is still too small to cope with growing Chinese naval forces.

The author then introduced the expected budget ceiling resulting from the current Japanese financial situation. The experts generally responded as follows:

  - Defense build-up and capability should be gauged by net assessment.
  - Japan is by nature a maritime country. With that in mind, Japan should think about a most probable contingency - what an actual campaign would be like and what is the real threat – so as to force a choice.
  - It would be better to study about rebalancing the size of active and reserves.
During past defense budget difficulties, the U.S. imposed “burden sharing” on Japan, creating tensions between the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. should not let this happen again this time.

The Constitution, the Right of Collective Self-Defense, Autonomous Nuclear Deterrence Capability, Three Non-Nuclear Principles

Most American experts mentioned at the outset that these issues were purely domestic and should be independently dealt with by Japan. This did not preclude the majority of them from expressing the following: amendment of the Constitution is not urgent or even politically possible for the time being; the right of collective self-defense should be altered; the status quo three non nuclear principles are desirable; Japan should not pursue autonomous nuclear deterrence capability.

Amendment of the Japanese Constitution

Article 9 is the main article at issue. Most experts stated that Japan did not need to amend its constitution for the following reasons: 1) Even under the present constitution, the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty do not contradict one another and given loose interpretations of the constitution in the past, the amendment is not necessarily required to solve other problems; 2) There are other more urgent and backlogged political issues that need priority; 3) It would break Japan’s peaceful image that has endured since the end of World War II and has served the stability of East Asia well. In particular, the expressed stressed that Article 9, Clause 1, need not to be amended.

It is important to note that one third of the interviewees, however, viewed Article 9, Clause 2 differently. In their opinion, the clause should be amended, or at least constructively examined, so that SDF operations can be more easily authorized to reflect modern needs and circumstances.

The Right of Collective Self-Defense

On this issue, the author received a near-unanimous response from the experts: the constitutional interpretation should be revised. The experts say: 1) non-exercise of the right of collective self-defense hinders deterrence capability; 2) American public opinion would reach a culmination of distrust if Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels did not support their U.S. counterparts in a Korean Peninsula contingency or if Japan ignored any ballistic missile overflight towards America.

Another opinion was that it would be feasible to partially revise the interpretation according to circumstances before full revision. For example, an expert proposed to put aside the situation in which both forces share common operational
areas. Another individual mentioned anti-piracy missions and other international activities.

On the other hand, about one-third of respondents made positive statements that it was already just a matter of interpretation and that, if needed, the Prime Minister could choose to alter policy abruptly. Referring to former Foreign Minister, Mr. Okada, and former Prime Minister, Mr. Koizumi’s remarks to the public on such issues, they said Japanese domestic opinion should be moving toward revision of this interpretation.

The opposing experts, who were a small minority, believed that other Asian countries would see Japan as threat, which is not desirable.

**Three Non Nuclear Principles**

On this matter the experts were divided. One half was non-revisionist. Their reasons were almost identical to those expressed against constitutional revision; that is to say, fear it would degrade Japan’s peaceful image. Another reason is that the revision is no longer needed, although it used to be motivated by nuclear deterrence. That was why President George H. W. Bush in September 1991 declared the destruction of all American ground-based tactical nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the other half asserted that “not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons to the country” was tactically doubtful. And one expert proposed that the U.S. should return to a “Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NSND)” policy.

**Autonomous Nuclear Deterrence Capability**

Some Japanese experts have claimed that Japan should hold an autonomous nuclear deterrence capability, particularly since China reportedly is acquiring new long-range ballistic nuclear missiles and are concerned with the demise of the American “nuclear umbrella.” Nevertheless, all the American interviewees were opposed to it.

First, almost all the experts reasoned that it risked hurting Japan’s image as a “peaceful nation” as established by the Constitution and participation in the IAEA and NPT, and could lead to international ostracization, vis-à-vis India. And more than that, Japan would be viewed a threat by surrounding countries, including another U.S. ally, South Korea. Those changes would negatively affect Japan and lead to instability in East Asia.
Second, more than four fifths of the experts were concerned that if Japan depended less on the U.S. extended deterrence, it would be perceived to be weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance, which would destabilize the region.

Third, more than half of the respondents compared the present situation with that of the Cold War era. They saw it as illogical that the nuclear umbrella would not work against the contemporary Chinese nuclear arsenal just as it was expected to during the Cold War era. They added that the nuclear deterrence capability of the present U.S. is far more capable than that of China, so it is unreasonable to see the umbrella as ineffective.

Fourth, about one fifth of the respondents said, with steps or stages in deterrence, the more pressing need is to build conventional warfare capability that would prevent invaders from escalating “before” having autonomous nuclear capability. They added that the aggressors would already be aware of U.S. nuclear superiority.

Lastly, other experts expressed their understanding that nuclear deterrence had traditionally been a U.S. role and that Japan has other needs to finance. Additional views included that the Obama Administration would not accept adding a nuclear capability because it would undermine the President’s declared policy of rolling back nuclear proliferation. Others commented that Japanese domestic opinion would not allow it.3

The U.S. Forces’ Will to Fight in Asia

The author asked whether U.S. forces, if needed, have any intention of fighting again in Asia in defense of Japan or for security in East Asia.

Every respondent replied, “Yes, if needed.” Some specifically noted America has significant national interests in the region and specific agreements bind the U.S. to defend Japan. Others expressed concern with the question itself: Why would Japan not trust America, even though the U.S. has promised to defend it in every treaty?

Yet the author took note of very precise wording in some of the responses. One scholar said that “Yes” is be the official and legal answer, and that was right. Two experts added that military officials would want to avoid “land” wars. Another said that if a contingency broke out in and around the Senkaku Islands, the U.S. Army would not land, and its Navy and Air Force would be the main responding forces. Last but not least, an expert assumed that the decision-making at that moment would depend on the American economic situation at that time.
Possibility to Avoid Wars Through Economic Ties with China

The current relationship between China and the U.S. and Japan seems very different from that with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Most importantly, economic interdependence is proceeding. Therefore, the author asked whether China, if it were more economically intertwined with the U.S. and Japan, would be less likely to resort to arms to solve bilateral conflicts (a question prompted by an extrapolation of the commercial peace theory in international relations).

All the interviewees’ responses dovetailed perfectly: it would decrease the possibility but not eliminate it. Many cited the economic relationship that existed at the start of World War I. They stressed that war actually broke out among interdependent countries, which then bore large economic costs.

A scholar who previously lived in China for an extended period commented that its local TV programs had been portraying the U.S. and Japan in a negative light, leading to unhealthy nationalism that was worth taking note of. He commented on the importance of watching “what they are actually doing,” such as cyber-espionage, and implied that China would not hesitate to resort to war.

Another individual stated that economic exchange was a “sub-national” matter, so it did not link to security at all. And another individual stated in a different way that major wars had been caused by politics, not economics, and misperceptions by each party.

Handling the Senkaku Islands, Takeshima, and the Northern Territories

Recent tensions surrounding the Senkaku Islands have deepened as Japan-China economic relations have developed. This single example could explain why it is risky to place exceedingly high hopes on economic ties to prevent wars. Thus, the author attempted to get a feel for the experts’ thinking about Japan’s handling of three territorial security issues, including Senkaku.

The majority of the experts said it was understandable that the current Japanese government would deal with those issues, but the most important factor is Japan’s will, which will decide diplomatic actions. An expert mentioned that such seemingly external disputes are actually a continuation of domestic affairs and nearly impossible to solve.

As for Takeshima and the Northern islands, all the respondents said that as they are currently under non-Japanese administration, neither area is covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and that the U.S. should keep a non-interventionist position,
leaving the problems to Japan, South Korea, and Russia. Half of them mentioned that they are not vital security issues, especially when compared with Senkaku. As for Takeshima, three experts mentioned that it should not be a hindrance to Japan-ROK relations or cooperation at this time, noting that cooperation is too important to be held up by this dispute. One individual cited an agreement on shared sovereignty rights and resources as an example for working out this dispute. As for the Northern Territories, a chain of four islands between Russia and Japan, the same expert stated that restoring Japanese administration to two of the islands could help normalize bilateral relations and leave the Cold War behind.

On the other hand, all of the respondents claimed that Senkaku is the most vital security area to be guarded under the Security Treaty and that the Japanese government should stand firm. Having said that, the majority said both nations should make every effort to avoid militarization and escalation. Three experts recommended Japan boost the Japan Coast Guard’s (JCG) capability ahead of the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF). Similarly, another three proposed a massive JCG buildup to cope with the “Five Dragons.”4 One expert touched on an operational affair, saying that the JMSDF should stay far removed from front lines in case of a contingency. He said he had spoken with Chinese authorities regarding the 2010 Chinese fishing vessel incident, who said that China should not dispatch their Navy.

At any rate, American experts generally do not want Japan to “rock the boat” in the Senkaku marine area and would instead like to see minimal measures. One scholar commented that there has been no solid evidence of gas fields in Senkaku area except for the past U.N. survey, and that the gas fields should not be a casus belli. Another mentioned that Japan and other involved nations must take stock of the consequences of potential action in the region and follow up with one another.

At this junction, the author introduced an opinion regarding the Senkaku Islands: If the islands, which are currently under Japanese administration, were occupied by another power, would U.S. forces no longer recognize the Security Treaty or be obliged to guard the islands, leaving Japan to unilaterally fight to take them back?5 All four experts who heard this opinion disagreed and even questioned its logic. They explaining that if that were the case, even an occupied Tokyo would fall outside the U.S.-Japan bilateral agreement and hence under this logic, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would not apply under any situation.

Acceptance of Female Personnel into the JSDF

Despite disclaimers like “Japan’s cultural and social background, which is different from America’s, needs to be considered,” or “firstly, it depends on how eagerly Japanese females are to work as Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel,” most American experts spoke positively of the integration of women into the JSDF.
One of the most important reasons was that it is a waste of human assets to restrict female employment given the shrinking Japanese population. As one expert mentioned, the options for solving the Japanese demographic problem are limited: allow for more immigration or accept more females at the workplace. He specified that while the U.S. could utilize more immigrants, Japan might be better served by promoting women, particularly highly educated women. Another expert pointed out that the country should not prematurely narrow its options at such an early stage.

In assigning jobs, all the respondents stressed the need to assess the roles and missions for servicewomen in modern wars. They commented that a growing part of modern warfare, especially cyber war, does not require physical strength but intelligence. However, while a recent journal report on the U.S. armed forces notes that they are beginning to introduce women to combat roles, more than half of the U.S. experts still raised objections to women in combat roles.

One expert confessed that although U.S. forces have had positive experiences with servicewomen, there are a myriad of potential problems in implementation. So Japan might benefit from further study on the best proportion of female to male officers and enlisted corps or the best ratio at certain workplaces. That is, they considered it a grave mistake to promote women in the force solely as a sociological experiment.

Regional or Security Expert? Republican or Democratic Sympathies?

The author tried to categorize the American interviewees by academic bias and political affiliation: regional versus security expert; Republican versus Democratic supporter. In the end, many answered “Both” or “Neither,” respectively.

Some security experts worked previously as regional experts, and vice versa, so it was difficult to differentiate between them. As for which party they support, several experts indicated that defense policies of both parties are essentially analogous and that most think tanks are declared nonpartisan. In fact, some scholars who had served in the government worked in both Republican and Democrat administrations.

There are a number of other ways to classify these experts, however. One method, which another expert suggested, is to classify them according to their past careers. That is to say, there are general differences in the perspectives between those who have studied Japan academically in universities and think tanks, and those who have ever dealt with Japanese defense issues as government officials.

Experts studying Japan from a purely academic viewpoint tend to make softer proposals for Japan’s defense, respecting Japan’s standpoints and policies more and
valuing Japanese cultural, historical and emotional characteristics. Former U.S. government officials, by comparison, tend to be harder on Japan, putting American national interests higher than others’ and using realist analyses.

Another lens to view American scholars through is the “Chrysanthemum Club.” In a narrow sense, the club is defined as the group of people who served as Deputy Chief of Mission in the American embassy in Tokyo and studied the Japanese language at the State Department. In a broader sense, both in the U.S. and Japan, the club includes academic scholars who have worked in Japan and are viewed as mainstream. However, this expert said that the power of the Chrysanthemum Club has been declining and the audience for their opinions is shrinking. This perspective has already received attention in Japan, and in their stead, think-tankers’ opinions are now eclipsing Club members’. One concern then is that the U.S. could become less deferential to Japanese cultural differences and domestic affairs and instead take only cost-benefit and realist approaches. Japanese officials may have already experienced this, but even for non-government officials, it is a break from the past.

The two aforementioned alternatives make sense to some degree, but again, these categories not exclusive. Actually, many American academic scholars are involved in forming U.S. policies, and many think-tankers and ex-officials teach at universities. And hard-nosed proposals for Japan’s defense in the interviews often followed remarks like, “I understand the Japanese economic situation and its ageing society.” The important point is how deeply rooted American understandings of Japan might now be changing little by little. The Japanese would do well to remember this trend.

Analysis

Analysis of the interview feedback above revealed several key findings.

High Expectations for the Japanese Economy

The author started every interview by asking if the current Japan Self-Defense Forces’ capability is enough. After repeatedly receiving the same answer from experts – “No” – the author followed up by mentioning Japan’s economic travails and the likelihood that a flattening or shrinking of the defense budget will continue in the foreseeable future. Even after acknowledging these factors, the experts still said that JSDF capability is insufficient.

Considering Japan’s security environment and other countries’ defense expenditures, the experts felt that Japan should reexamine budget allotments in order to boost its defense budget. In other words, they seem to see some remaining capacity in
Japan’s economic resources which can be allotted to defense. This view differs significantly from that of Japanese defense planners.

**Straddling Misgivings and Hope for the Future American Economy**

One of the conflicting opinions among American experts was the way they see the future of America, particularly its economy. Among the positive views, which were in the majority, was the belief that the U.S. will stop declining and renew its power given its comprehensive technology, natural resources and healthy demography. Continued commitment to East Asia will require healthy economic growth, and belief in that recovery should lead to further assertions of commitment to partners in Asia.

On the other hand, the minority saw the U.S. economy in steep decline and that there is the possibility of shrinking commitments Japan’s defense. Two experts mentioned that even the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is not untouchable. Another commented that the economic situation might affect America’s involvement in a Senkaku-type contingency, for example.

The U.S.’s massive fiscal deficit, driven by baby boomer retirement and increasing entitlement spending, could portend a shrinking American military budget. This could lead the U.S. to think twice about the U.S.-Japan Alliance. The author interpreted the experts’ pessimism on the future American economy as a warning for Japan to anticipate the potential of a totally different U.S.-Japan Alliance in the future.

One expert shared the following insight: even in the U.S. government and Congress, there are two schools of thought on the future of American power. One is “continuous decline;” the other is “revival sometime soon.” Therefore bipartisan diplomatic strategy in the U.S. is nonexistent. If that is the case, then Japan must be read to prepare for every defense contingency. The author strongly feels that there are compelling reasons to establish a long-term Japanese defense strategy based on these unprecedented assumptions, in addition to working towards economic recovery.

**How to View a Rising China**

The majority views of American experts were as follows:

- China is seeking hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Its communist system of rule is far different from democracy, with ingrained human rights problems, and its observance of international law is doubtful. However, it seems hardly possible to constrain China because partner nations that could help in this effort are unwilling. Therefore, it is a mistake to try.
Chinese growth is not a bad thing. But democratizing nations or rising powers tend to become, by nature, violent. Neighboring countries should pay utmost attention to China, whose change is in progress.

In the U.S. there are two schools of thought on dealing with China: The first is continental thinking, which puts consolidation of the U.S.-China relationship before bilateral alliances with China’s neighbors; the second is maritime thinking, which emphasizes developing a hub-and-spoke alliance network before turning directly to China. The experts felt that the Obama administration initially took the first approach, but soon switched to the second.

In addition, there were some notable minority opinions:

- The themes of a Rising China versus declining U.S. and Japan are overstated. When we look at the per capita GDP, for example, both America’s and Japan’s are ten times that of China’s. It takes a wide array of statistics to look at real China, the U.S. and Japan. Some experts say that Chinese economy has already reached its zenith, which will be followed by a decline.
- PLA and Chinese Foreign Ministry are intermingled in the central leadership, so neither body will be able to act on its own in emergency situations, yet they have no interaction in peace time. Not all the actions they take are controlled by the national leadership. No approval or orders were given in the vessel-smashing incident in the Senkaku Islands.
- Japan should plan for an eventual strategic agreement between the U.S. and China under which the U.S. halts arms sale to Taiwan and military training for the Taiwanese.


In sorting out the JSDF capabilities that American experts suggested for enhancement, the author noticed they were similar to those listed in the “Security Consultative Committee Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future (October 29, 2005).” In a section of the document entitled “Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved,” the following items appear.

- Air defense.
- Ballistic missile defense.
- Counter-proliferation operations, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Counter-terrorism.
- Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic.
- Search and rescue operations.
- Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, including increasing capabilities and effectiveness of operations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and maritime patrol aircraft.
- Humanitarian relief operations.
- Reconstruction assistance operations.
- Peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations’ peacekeeping efforts.
- Protection of critical infrastructure, including U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
- Response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of WMD.
- Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV).
- Transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other related activities for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).
- Use of seaport and airport facilities, road, water space and airspace, and frequency bands.

And in the section “Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation,” the following are also listed.

- Close and Continuous Policy and Operational Coordination.
- Advancing Bilateral Contingency Planning.
- Enhancing Information Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation.
- Improving Interoperability.
- Expanding Training Opportunities in Japan and the United States.
- Shared Use of Facilities by U.S. Forces and the SDF.
- Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).

No American interviewees referred to this document during the interviews, but even if they did not have the document specifically in mind, after juxtaposing the two lists the author thinks that the similarity is good proof that the document outlines common wisdom in both countries. Yet, unexpected incidents and changes in various sectors have occurred in both nations, so the means and objectives should be updated to reflect the new environment.

Views on Japan’s Self-Evolution in Defense Policy-Making

Interviewees expressed consistent opinions on the “direction” of Japan’s defense policy as well as its evolution over time. They expressed no alarm about it, and they felt positively about its direction.
What is more, the experts agreed on the “speed” of Japan’s defense evolution. In short, the strategy is correct but progress is too slow. One expert described the cultural distinction between Japanese and U.S. policymaking as resembling the differences between a Japanese tea ceremony and American instant coffee.

There is, however, a wider range of responses regarding Japan’s slowness. For example, many experts who had been involved in governmental negotiation expressed their doubts about Japan’s future defense, noting how many successive prime ministers had taken office who each promised to the review the right of collective self-defense. An expert realistically mentioned that no alliance is eternal, only fragile, in clear reference to the bilateral alliance.

On the other hand, some individual scholars expressed more positive opinions: Japan will, if needed, change its policy to reflect the situation. For example, they felt that a prime minister would alter the constitution’s collective self-defense language at the needed and appropriate moment.

A Crisis is an Opportunity; Time to Make Drastic Changes

While the security environment in Japan gets more challenging, defense budget restraints seem to be permanent due to the deteriorating domestic financial situation. An expert asserted that now is the time to abolish irrational Constitutional constraints and to assume an operationally rational posture. Another scholar claimed that an “efficient” defense buildup could lead to increased capabilities without sacrificing force structure.

These changes require a shift in “mindset,” not specific measures. But this kind of attitude adjustment will bring about a big change in the breadth and speed of Japanese decision making, which suffer from institutional malaise. If Japan can emerge from these hard days with a new, effective, and efficient way of building up defense forces, then its new capabilities would benefit even more so from a future economic recovery.

A Human Network Among the American Experts

There are a number of possible explanations for concurrence of the experts’ views toward Japan’s defense. Firstly, the scope of interviewees was limited. The author selected each after researching the individual’s publications or citations in American print media and their career paths. And as will be repeated in Chapter 5, no think-tankers from decidedly liberal think tanks were involved due to their small proportion of Japanese defense-related articles in America and their geographic location. Moreover, not every individual contacted by the author responded.
Besides these practical reasons, one expert noted that the human network may be at work. His belief was that a small network has been established intentionally or unintentionally among American experts on Japanese defense through attendance at seminars where they share views and thinking. One particular security seminar that he mentioned is one of the most successful regular conferences for bilateral policy experts in every field. As was above, the experts value bi-directional, not one-way, communications regarding the U.S.-Japan strategic talks, defense build-up and operational procedures. Hence, such seminars should serve as a best opportunity to unite those steps and be developed as forums where a diverse group of participants can gather.

Notes

1 See footnote 1 of Chapter 3 for the websites of the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defense.
2 An expert remembered that former Foreign Minister Mr. Okada, unlike his LDP predecessors, had acknowledged some progress on this matter in Japan. Another expert reminded the author of Mr. Koizumi’s 2001 remark on TV, a few days before taking office, on revising this interpretation. Nevertheless, Mr. Koizumi remarked to the House of Councilors Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee (July 25, 2003) that he saw the Constitution as allowing the right of collective self-defense and that he did not intend to amend the Constitution.
3 On the assumption of Japan’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons, one expert speculated that the U.S. would respect Japan’s decision, and that the Franco-British model of a submarine based nuclear arsenal would be probable.
4 This term was used by Professor Lyle J. Goldstein at Naval War College in describing Chinese maritime institutions, and it has become popular among American experts (Komori, p. 80). Several interviewees actually used this term so as to refer to such forces.
5 Sunohara, Nichibeidoumei, p.42. (Introducing a remark by Mr. Richard Armitage); Ukeru Magosaki, “Nichibi-Doumei wo Zettaishi Subekarazu (Do not Absolutely Trust in the US-Japan Alliance” URL: http://www.bitway.ne.jp/bunshun/ronten/sample/ron/12/010/r12010BNB1.html. Mr. Magosaki shares this view in his books too.

Speaking about Japanese unilateral missions, 1976 NDFG stated that “Japan will, in principle, independently fend off limited and small-scale invasions,” but in 1995 NDPG and the following NDPGs, this statement has disappeared.

Mr. Magosaki expresses his understanding that Japan is forced to deal with the Senkaku contingency on its own due to the Security Consultative’s wording “Committee Document U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” (October 29, 2005), “II-2. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities,” “Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands.” (emphasis by the author)

On the other hand, the interviewees pointed to the following sentence, “The U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan,” arguing that the following statement did not mean the absence of the U.S. forces’ support in case of the Senkaku contingency.


7 Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Japan Hando (Japan Handlers), (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2006), p.38. Examining the recent use of, the “Chrysanthemum Club” moniker, the author found that its most recent use in The New York Times was December, 2000, and October, 2002 for The Washington Post. Its usage should have increased with the number of Japan-related articles, but its recent use is scarce. And even when the “Chrysanthemum Club” was referred to in articles, the term seems to have negative connotations. A couple of expressions used in both dailies are as follows; “those who applaud Japan a bit too heartily” (New York Times, 08 Apr 1998), “they are generally apologists for Japanese points of view and policies” (The Washington Post, 11 Feb 1990), “diplomats too sympathetic to the Japanese point of view” (The Washington Post, 31 May 1989).

8 Sunohara, Japan, p. 47.


10 See footnote 5 for the websites of Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

11 For example, “Annual Japan-U.S. Security Seminar,” which was held in March, 2012, in San Francisco.
CHAPTER FIVE
U.S. Think Tanks Viewed from Japan

As mentioned previously, many individual scholars who wrote about Japan’s defense or served as a point of contact for bilateral issues also serve at American think tanks. To better understand the importance of American think tanks in American policymaking on Japanese issues, this chapter compares American think tanks to those in Japan.

Definitions of Think Tanks

It is difficult to properly define a “think tank,” but whether you use a broad or narrow definition, all think tanks generally “link knowledge and power” or “fill the ‘operational gap,’ – policymakers’ lack of access to the information and tools needed to respond to contemporary issues.”

Because think tanks in the U.S. are so influential, it is natural for the rest of the world to be interested in what connections they have to the President and Congress. And since 2012 is a Presidential election year, the global community is also curious about what links Republican nominees have with them. Japan is no exception, and some studies that cover relationships between the nominees and think tanks already exist at this early stage.

American Think Tanks Compared with Those of Japan

Numerical Comparison

A recent report says that the number of think tanks in the U.S. compared to those in Japan is of a whole different scale: 1,815 to 103, respectively. Japan, however, ranks ninth in world for total think tanks of 182 countries (6,545 think tanks in total around the globe). Therefore, Japan only has a small number relative to the U.S., which has an extremely large concentration of think tanks. In fact, America’s total almost equals the sum of all think tanks in the countries ranked second through tenth in the report (1,822).

The report also published the general influence “rankings” of think tanks worldwide according to various measures. According to the list, 12 American think tanks (ten of which are headquartered in Washington, DC, and one which is located in a Washington suburb) are in Top 30 Worldwide, whereas no Japanese think tank is included in the Top 30. Yet, four Japanese think tanks appear in Asia’s Top 30.
Distance from Politics

At the start of this chapter, the author introduced an expression for think tanks to “link knowledge and power.” This section aims at confirming proximity between think tanks and politics, which is related closely to influential power itself.

It is conceivable that think-tankers have direct influence over politics with personal ties to politicians, and indirect influence in writing for the newspapers, magazines, and their think tanks’ websites. As for some think tanks, they accept research contracts from lawmakers and government departments in such large part that they are labeled “semi-government?.” Other than these assumptions, the author would like to use here some numbers to gauge proximity.

The sayings “Proximity is Power,” and “Location, location, location” express the common sentiment that geographic position has tremendous leverage. Figures 4 and 5 below show where the eleven American and four Japanese think tanks referenced previously are located around the executive and the legislative authorities of both nations. As they indicate, in both countries most think tanks fall within an area just three kilometers in diameter. Geographic proximity to seats of power is clearly shown on this map; and in this respect, Japan is very similar to America.

Figure 4: Locations of Think Tanks and the Executive and Legislative Authority in Washington, DC
Figure 5: Locations of Think Tanks and the Executive and Legislative Authority in Tokyo

As another gauge of the think tanks’ closeness to politicians, particularly Congress, the author counted the number of witnesses to appear at public hearings for particular Congressional committees during 2011, and calculated what percentage of them were from think tanks. The author used the following defense and security related committees for comparison: Senate/House Committee on Armed Services, Senate/House Committee on Foreign Relations/Affairs for the U.S., and Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the House of Councilors, Security Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives for Japan. Figure 6 shows the results.

As Figure 6 indicates, in the committees of security and diplomacy, a large portion of Japanese witnesses are government officials (93.8%), and the rest of the speakers are professors. No think-tankers were called for such committees in Japan. In the U.S., four times more think-tankers (17.0%) were called than professors (4.0%). Although just under twenty percent of the total may not be massive, the distance between think tanks and politics in American is far shorter than in Japan.
Remarks 1: Speakers who belong to university-affiliated organizations are classified as think-tankers as long as the affiliated organizations are recognized in the references used to construct Figure 7 on page 31.

Remarks 2: “Others” include defense contractors, retired government personnel, special interest groups (veterans and religious groups, etc.), private citizens and nongovernmental organizations (disaster relief, development and human rights organizations, etc.) among others.

Categorization of American Think Tanks by Political Affiliation

There are various benchmarks to be used for categorization of the U.S. think tanks. One of them is based upon the political thoughts or affictions. The most simple one is to label “conservative,” “centrist” and “liberal.” The individual think-tankers in them are, needless to say, not generally labeled in the same way, and yet it should be noted there would be some tendencies in their opinions to be called that way.

But defining the political thoughts of each think tank is not an easy task because of the following reasons:

1) The definitions of “conservative,” “centrist” and “liberal,” and where the dividing lines lie, are different from country to country and vary among experts. As to the dimensions for the use of categorization, it is said that “American political ideas can best be viewed in terms of quadrants.
(conservative, liberal, populist, and libertarian), rather than in terms of a single right-left axis.”\textsuperscript{10} There are some others who assert more detailed divisions.\textsuperscript{11}

2) Where you stand in the field of political ideology differentiates the meaning of each school. For example, conservatives tend to trust “Heritage Foundation more than they trust Brookings -regardless of Brookings’ objectively verifiable research quality. And so in the eyes of Republicans and many conservatives, Brookings is a liberal tool.”\textsuperscript{12}

3) Above all, the evaluation changes as time passes by. The Brookings Institution used to be described as a liberal heartland in the sixties, but now most documents refer it as centrist.\textsuperscript{13}

Having said that, the author expected that all-inclusive categorization can be done by using several references\textsuperscript{14} and eliminating minor differences; for example no one refers to the Heritage Foundation as liberal. The matrix below is all-inclusive “locations” of think tanks of the author’s own making from three references.

Remarks 1: Top three lines are political afflictions that each reference uses. The think tanks appearing in this figure are those which are 1) treated in more than one resource of the three references; and 2) designated the political affliction.

Remarks 2: Two think tanks (circled with dotted lines) are placed in separated two sections because of totally different evaluations. Ten think tanks enclosed by a heavy line (one of them by heavy dotted line) have permanent fellow(s) who specialize in Japan affairs particularly of political and security issues. Four colored think tanks have an in-house organization whose name is headed with “Japan” such as Japan Chair/Program/Forum and so forth.

Through sorting out think tanks, the author came up with a question: Whether opinions and comments on Japan’s defense coming from these think tanks’ experts are correlated with the organization’s political affliction? In the next chapter, think tank opinions are seen for further analysis with this viewpoint included.
Figure 7: Think Tanks’ Categorization by Political Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Founded Year</th>
<th>Liberal/Progressive</th>
<th>Centrist</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Cons/Libertarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old</td>
<td>Research and Development Corporation (RAND)</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace (USIP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Institute for Peace Studies (IPS)</td>
<td>Aspen Institute</td>
<td>American Enterprise Institute (AEI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institute for Policy Analysis (IFPA)</td>
<td>Atlantic Council</td>
<td>Hudson Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center for Defense Information (CDI)</td>
<td>Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)</td>
<td>Cato Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center on Budget and Policy Priorities</td>
<td>Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprise Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carter Center</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)</td>
<td>Manhattan Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Policy Institute (EPI)</td>
<td>National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>Progressive Policy Institute (PPI)</td>
<td>Stimson Center</td>
<td>Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)</td>
<td>New America Foundation (NAF)</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprise Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center for American Progress (CAP)</td>
<td>Center for a New American Security (CNAS)</td>
<td>Competitive Enterprise Institute</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1 James Allen Smith, *The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite*, (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1991), p. xiii-xiv. It is also said to draw the line between Non-Profit Organizations and think tanks because the former originally do some research related to public policies, according to Yokoe, p. 20.

2 Smith, p.xv.

Of course, there is an alternative voice in the U.S., which does not necessarily view think tanks positively. Think tanks have been cynically and jokingly portrayed as untrustworthy on political TV shows, and there is an expert who laments that they have made discourse in American less credible since Iraqi War.


5 Think Tanks and Civil Societies. “GLOBAL GO TO THINK TANKS.”

6 According to a reference, Japanese think tanks are viewed not to be necessarily independent from the national executive branches in terms of their finance and staff members’ backgrounds, and its definition is different from that of the U.S. (Yokoe, p. 222.) However, this kind of financial situation also suities for RAND, Wilson Center and some American think tanks, hence, a reference calls them “semi-government.” (Asia Policy Point, handout delivered at Brookings Presentation on March 14, 2012.) The author deals with all of them in this paper as think tanks because other plural references sort them as think tanks.

7 Ibid.

8 In search of data, the following websites were accessed.

Senate Armed Services Committee URL: http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings2011.cfm.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee URL: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/?year=2011.

House Armed Services Committee URL:
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings?ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=13e47f8a-0753-47a7-ad5e-1ba7592015c9&MonthDisplay=0&YearDisplay=2011&Label_id=&Label_id=.


Japan’s Representatives’ Security / Foreign Affairs Committee URL:

9 The difference in definition among nations is notable. Japanese scholars point out that there exist big differences even between the U.S. and Britain, which heavily influences the former. Simply put in the words of the author, current major conservative thought in the U.S. corresponds to British classical liberal or liberalism. (According to Takahiko Soejima, *Sekaihakenkoku Amerika wo Ugokasu Seijika to Chisikijintachi (Modern American Political Intellectuals)*, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1999) p. 87. Also Tsuyoshi Sasaki, *Amerika no Hoshu to Riberaru (American Conservatives and Liberals)*, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993) p.15.)

Another example would be an article in National Interest, which is considered conservative or neocon in the U.S. This article treats Japanese Imperial Army’s conducts in the same way as the Nazi

10 Smith, p. 221.
13 Yokoe, p.115.
14 In order to make this figure, the following and above mentioned references are used: Asia Policy Point, handout; FAIR, “Right Ebbs, Left Gains as Media ‘Experts’.”; FindeTheDate, “COMPARE THINK TANKS.”
CHAPTER SIX
Japan’s Defense In American Think Tank Publications

The author began this survey under the assumption that American think-tankers would be making numerous proposals for Japan’s defense in relation to the U.S. military posture and shifting security environment, for example saying “Japan should or should not do X and Y.”

That is because of the precedent set in the bilateral economic field, “The U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative,” which consists of annual government to government dialogue.1 In the field of security, instead of annual governmental exchanges, the so-called “2+2 Joint Communiqués” are agreed upon, along with think tank reports such as “Managing Unmet Expectations” (NBR, 2009) or “The U.S.-Japan Alliance -- Getting Asia Right through 2020” (CSIS, 2007) that highlighted Japan. Thus, the author thought similar civilian reports would be influenced by a large number of proposals from think tanks in Washington, DC.

Brief Summary of Results

When searching for Japanese defense commentary on the websites of the aforementioned American think tanks (See Figure 7), the author noticed a far smaller number of Japan-directed defense articles compared to American-directed defense articles almost exclusively directed to the U.S. government. For example, the think tanks often state that the U.S. government should undertake specific actions for East Asian security. Contrary to the author’s initial assumption, there were far fewer documents specific to Japanese defense options.

Second, findings confirmed that despite partisan inclinations, American centrist and conservative think tanks share very similar views toward Japan’s defense. As for liberals, they published fewer articles on Japan’s defense during this study’s timeframe. They tend to emphasize economic considerations and, as a result, recommended the closure of U.S. military bases.

What was most interesting, however, was that the same kind of U.S. forces’ withdrawal proposals came from a conservative think tank in Figure 7, promoting a similar withdrawal of American forces. That “conservative” think tank also asserted that Japan should use that opportunity to become militarily independent. Therefore, when the views toward Japan’s defense were used as a litmus test for think tank
categorization, it would be more appropriate to make a three-dimensional, cylinder-shaped figure with the right and left edges of Figure 7 overlapping rather than the two-dimensional Figure 7.

Details of interviewees’ opinions and proposals follow in the next section. Topics range from strategic talks to defense buildup including specific numbers, and to defense exchange.

**Specific Opinions**

In introducing diversified opinions from think tank publications, the author sorts them out into five categories: defense policies, defense build-up, defense exchanges, Futenma relocation issues and Miscellaneous. The order of each item in a category is rearranged in a numerical order. Figures in parentheses at the end of each items shows how many articles referred.

**Defense Policies**

- Practical approach toward the right of collective self-defense. (6)
  - Needed for the missile defense.
  - North Korea keeps developing missile while Japan is struggling with recovery from the 2011 earthquake disasters.
- Harmonized approach between the U.S. and Japan on the issues of non-proliferation and the extended deterrence. (5)
  - Concerning the extended deterrent’s credibility - doubts persist and the Japanese want further assurance.
- Regional contingency planning. (4)
  - The U.S. and Japan need to prioritize cooperation for this practice.
  - Prepare for Taiwan contingency.
  - Japan played a leading mediation role in 2001 EP-3 incident, but with a deteriorating Japan-China relationship, Japan may not be able to do so in the future.
- Strategic dialogue. (3)
  - Prioritization of military, diplomatic and economic measures to deal with security threats.
- The U.S. withdraws from Japan to let Japan defend itself autonomously. (3)
  - The U.S. cannot help shrinking its commitment in the future; instead allied countries may be asked to contribute more.
- Bilateral security and threat assessment. (2)
  - Through exchanging intelligence and military data on security challenges.
- Thinking about how to cope with a rising China. (2)
  - That should come before further developing the AirSea Battle concept.
- More aggressive international activities. (2)
National debate on Japan's involvement in Afghanistan.

**Defense Buildup**

- Increase in defense budget. (7)
  - Under current fiscal austerity, the Japanese defense budget has been sustained well so far, but its present defense budget is mainly allotted to maintenance and life-extension. Lack of funding for equipment procurement will lead to a massive decline in capability.
- Modernization of air force capability. (7)
  - Fifth-generation fighter aircraft (F-35 is the right choice).
  - New aircraft for transport, aerial refueling, more modern helicopters, effective (mobile) air and missile defenses.
- Maritime surveillance system, long-range anti-ship missiles, submarines, anti-submarine detection system. (5)
  - More submarines, around 30, than was increased in 2010 NDPG.
- Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, which are strategically important in peacetime. (4)
  - Improved intelligence-collection assets, from upgraded AWACs to more reliance on advanced unmanned systems and even space platforms.
  - The Indo-Pacific rim common network of IRS
- Bilateral co-use of bases, then bilateral and civil-military use of civil airports. (2)
  - A must to achieve sustainable basing.
  - Agreements for this required.
- Information and communication network enabling exchange of classified information. (2)
- Software of effective joint and combined strategic planning. (1)
  - From regional disaster response to warfighting concepts like AirSea Battle.
- Military-to-military cooperation in research, development, standards testing and deployment in areas like ballistic missile defense and bio fuel. (1)
- Continual improvement of interoperability. (1)
- Mergers or amalgamation of Japanese defense industry to strengthen production and research. (1)

**Defense Exchanges**

- Japan-U.S.-Australia-India coalition. (7)
  - Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India share common challenges and opportunities in the Indo-Pacific region.
  - Their shared interests include sea-lane security, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and disaster relief.
- Japan-ROK cooperation. (4)
  - Independent North Korea missile launch.
The U.S. can act as an arbitrator.

- Japan-U.S.-ASEAN cooperation (3)
  - Promotion of ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+)
- Japan-Taiwan partnership. (1)
  - Both Taiwan and Japan are feeling pressure from a rising China.
  - Strategic partnership based on the model of Japan’s relations with Australia and India, which started with bilateral cooperation on nontraditional security issues like disaster relief and then evolved into an informal trilateral alliance with the U.S.

**Futenma Relocation Issues**

- Go forward with the Futenma replacement facility. (4)
- Japan lacks the Marines’ expeditionary function, so the U.S. Marines must be present in Japan. (1)
- Pre-positioning military supplies on ships in Japanese waters (with Marine personnel off-site). (1)
  - If needed, Marines can fly to Japan to do missions with the prepositioned equipment.

**Miscellaneous**

- Decline in the U.S. military budget and its withdrawal from Asia would increase Japanese interest in developing a national nuclear deterrence capability or risk falling victim to Chinese hegemony. (3)
- Chinese nuclear weapons are a possible motivation for Japan to develop its own, which China wants to avoid. (1)
- China and Japan should agree to exclude the Islands as a basis for generating EEZ or continental shelf claims. (1)
- Peaceful resolution for the Northern Territories dispute. (1)

**Analysis**

In reviewing the articles issued by the American think tanks, five other aspects emerged that would be of interest to a Japanese security reader.

*Why Japan Defense-Related Articles are so Few in Number*

The initial assumptions and expectations of the author on what U.S. think tanks would report were formed by reading American articles published in Japan and translated into Japanese. But considering their target audience, it should not be surprising that their relative focus and number were not matched in the U.S. American think tanks, which supply much of the cited media experts and even full articles, are
generally focused on influencing Washington. In addition to that, the narrower definition of think tanks, which stipulates that U.S. think tanks are supposed to be non-profit organizations that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has given tax-exempt privilege (501 (C) 3), enables the think tanks to be financed by donations. Hence, some think tanks’ research is naturally influenced by their largest donors and grants. Japanese benefactors are not as influential in the U.S. compared to other sources.

This leads to another question here. What if large donations were made by Japanese citizens or organizations? Logically speaking, there would be more Japan-related proposals and recommendations by a larger number of Japanologists. Although the author did not go into detail, it is important to note that the U.S. think tanks that most actively hold events and publish articles on Japanese issues are endowed by Japanese donors.

Another reason for the reduced coverage is that American think tanks usually do not consider Japan to be a high priority topic compared to other research areas. Even when they do produce Japan-related research, it is usually after a long period of after-the-fact analysis, which means the papers come about after a sort of “ageing period.” For example, even CSIS, the only think tank that has a Japan Chair, mostly uploads data heavy Japanese fact sheets. And only after a longer period of time do they then issue proposals or convene Japan-related seminars.

**Conservative Looking Liberal**

From a Japanese perspective, another notable finding was that one conservative outlet in the U.S. seemed very liberal from a Japanese standpoint. The Cato Institute, which is categorized in America as conservative and said to be a libertarian stronghold, published several Japan defense-related articles that took liberal positions from the Japanese standpoint (for example, on the U.S. withdrawal from Okinawa). But on the other hand, they argued in the same way as Japanese conservatives that Japan should establish a more autonomous and independent defense posture. Hence, they might look conservative to a part of the Japanese population.

The political power of the libertarians may not be as pronounced as compared with those of other political camps. But their power has grown in recent years with the arrival in the U.S. of the Tea Party and the campaign of a libertarian politician, Representative Ron Paul, for President. It would be better for Japanese to pay more attention to libertarian political trends in the future.

**Liberal Think Tanks and a Potential Alarm Bell**

By contrast, there were few liberal think tanks in the U.S. that published articles on Japanese defense issues. Like liberals in Japan, they seem to stand against enhancing
the JSDF’s role. As opposed to JSDF roles and missions, however, their research focused far more on the relocation of U.S. Marines in Okinawa, supporting closure of such bases. One primary driver behind this assertion is cost-effectiveness for the U.S. They introduce how much could be saved in closing without regard to the effects on deterrence in the Asia-Pacific.

These opinions in the U.S. may be cause for concern from a Japanese perspective. They state that the U.S. rebalance to Asia-Pacific does not mean simultaneously increasing American military expenditures in the region. Rather, they feel it should involve Japan paying a larger share for U.S. bases in Japan. But as things stand, Japan’s faltering economy does not seem to allow enormous increases in defense expenditures. It may seem like good news for Japan that the U.S. is rebalancing towards Asia. Japan, however, may need to think more about what new requests the American government will make.

**Personnel Issues Rarely Discussed**

Compared with hardware, the numbers of SDF personnel were rarely touched upon in the American articles, even though they were decreased in the new NDPG and FY2012 annual budget. Given the importance of the size of the force, this might be a bit surprising to a Japanese reader. The reasons that this issue may have been overlooked include the fact that modern defense buildups allow increases in capability through augmented hardware; JSDF retrenchment is relatively small compared to proposed American reductions, which have little to do with U.S. defense industrial capabilities.

However, the personnel number is not always related to equipment augmentation. Take for example the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s increase in destroyers and submarines. The current NDPG states that the number of destroyers and submarines will be increased without additions to total personnel. It may be true that buying more platforms gives only the appearance of a buildup, but that assumption ignores the multiplying effective of technology on force strength. Hence, although this topic was relatively unmentioned in the think tank reports, some interviewees recognized that this downsize may be desirable.

**Partial Misunderstanding of the Facts**

A number of articles included minor misunderstandings. Firstly, one article stated that the Three Principles on arms exports were law, but actually they are political statements. And although the Japanese defense “one percent of GDP” budget ceiling was described as “constitutional,” this restraint is neither stated in the constitution nor is it law and is instead is an artifact of an older NDPG, which actually cited GNP, not GDP. Secondly, the defense budget ceiling was a tool to restrain annual defense
budgets in older NDPGs. Since FY1986, the defense budget ceilings have been expressed in monetary amounts instead of a share of GNP.

Notes

1 Launched in November 2010, the U.S.-Japan Economic Harmonization Initiative (EHI) is the present form of the bilateral Initiative. URL: http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2578.

2 Yokoe, p.23.

3 For example, on Stimson Center homepage, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, ITOCHU Corporation, Japan External Trade Organization, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are introduced as “Donors.” URL: http://www.stimson.org/about/donors/
CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusions

The opinions collected here from American media and American experts are not those of the government and capture only their views at a particular time. These natural limits of the study should be kept in mind. Nonetheless, considering the role that American think tanks play and the influential power that the media and experts have over U.S. policy, it would be a vital mistake to ignore them.

That said Japan’s domestic decision-making cannot and should not address the individual views or proposals of American experts. As these U.S.-Japan experts often stress, Japan’s defense responsibilities rest exclusively with Japan itself and for that reason Japan must decide what is best for its future defense.

One such decision is the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, through which bilateral actions are taken in order to deter invasion, and if needed, defend Japan. Although there has been debate in Japan regarding the possibility of early unilateral action during military campaigns in Senkaku, for instance, the need to consolidate the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty still cannot be stressed enough. But to do so, parties will need to raise the value of alliance. For Japan, one step would be to listen to and better understand these American voices. It is the author’s hope that this paper will aid in that goal. It is telling that the U.S.-Japan Alliance will not necessarily move forward in the same way as it has in the past, which will require greater Japanese flexibility.

American experts often expressed their misgivings about the U.S.’s economic and financial situation. Given their own travails and the view that the Japanese economic situation is very favorable, they seem to expect Japan to beef-up its defense capabilities in the near future. On the other hand, general Japanese opinion is so pessimistic about the domestic economy that the American shift to Asia is welcome, but for the very opposite reason that the U.S. might expect.

It is critical to fill this recognition gap in order to maintain and strengthen the Alliance. Both Japan and the U.S. must, simultaneously, prepare for a diversified environment and think outside of the box. Looking back, this might be one of the most important things that the American experts recommended.
Alliances are, by nature, established in accordance with the national interests of each signatory; but differences will naturally still exist. The U.S. sees its vital national interest in regional and global stability, and for that purpose, stations American forces outside its borders during peace time in order to minimize cost and causalities that may otherwise increase if wars were to break out. This American strategy can have positive results for the nation’s allies, but it can also create frictions in the relationships.

However, what the author recognized again and again from the media survey as well as the extensive interviews with American experts was that the U.S. attempts to deter war through stability. As long as Japan and the U.S. share this ultimate goal, there will always be common ground to build upon. The author strongly believes that it is of vital importance to spot the mutual understandings and solve bilateral problems as soon as possible, so as to better deepen the U.S.-Japan alliance and enhance our deterrence capabilities.

Notes

1 See footnote 5 of Chapter 4 for Japanese unilateral missions.
**APPENDIX I**

*Honorable Interviewees*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Middle Name</th>
<th>Family Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David</td>
<td></td>
<td>Asher</td>
<td>CNAS (New American Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James</td>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Auer</td>
<td>Vanderbilt University, Institute for Public Policy Studies (VIPPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td></td>
<td>Auslin</td>
<td>AEI (American Enterprise Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeffrey</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Bader</td>
<td>Brookings Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Blumenthal</td>
<td>AEI (American Enterprise Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Bush, III</td>
<td>Brookings Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Calder</td>
<td>SAIS (The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick</td>
<td>M.</td>
<td>Cronin</td>
<td>CNAS (Center for New American Security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rust</td>
<td>M.</td>
<td>Deming</td>
<td>SAIS (The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>J.</td>
<td>Finnegans</td>
<td>NMV Consulting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>S.</td>
<td>Giarra</td>
<td>Global Strategies &amp; Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace</td>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Gregson, Jr.</td>
<td>Center for the National Interest/ Avascent International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce</td>
<td></td>
<td>Klingner</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindy</td>
<td>L.</td>
<td>Kotler</td>
<td>Asia Policy Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew</td>
<td>F.</td>
<td>Krepinevich</td>
<td>CSBA (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>P.</td>
<td>Lawless</td>
<td>NMV Consulting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth</td>
<td>G.</td>
<td>Lieberthal</td>
<td>Brookings Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satu</td>
<td>P.</td>
<td>Limaye</td>
<td>East-West Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin</td>
<td>K.</td>
<td>Maher</td>
<td>NMV Consulting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Wess</td>
<td>Mitchell</td>
<td>CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>E.</td>
<td>O'Hanlon</td>
<td>Brookings Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas</td>
<td>H.</td>
<td>Paal</td>
<td>Carnegie Endowment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Preble</td>
<td>Cato Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan</td>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Romberg</td>
<td>* Stimson Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregg</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Rubinstein</td>
<td>* GAR Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin</td>
<td>H.</td>
<td>Sakoda</td>
<td>Armitage International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randall</td>
<td>G.</td>
<td>Schriver</td>
<td>Armitage International /Project 2049 Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheila</td>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>CFR (Council on Foreign Relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas</td>
<td></td>
<td>Szechenyi</td>
<td>CSIS (Center for Strategic &amp; International Studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>CSBA (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toshi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yoshihara</td>
<td>Naval War College</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Interviews and email exchanges (* added to the end of names) were conducted from April through June, 2012.
## APPENDIX II

### Sample Questionnaire

In the following closed questions, the answers “a: Yes” from questions 2 through 4, 6 through 9, and “b: No” of 1, 5, and 10, would be generally considered more conservative, while the opposite answers liberal in Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numbered questions are main questions, and the alphabetical ones are what follow each main question according to the answers.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> Do you think the current JSDF (Japan Self-Defense Forces) capability is enough?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes: What are the reasons? Is it enough in the midst of rising Chinese military power? Do the US forces balance powers in the North East Asia?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No: What sort of functions should JSDF enlarge? Why? Under the budget restraints, beefing-up usually accompanies scaling-back. What sort of functions could be cut instead?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> Japan's capabilities against Chinese ballistic missiles are said to be limited. In order to deal with those concerns, do you think Japan should hold the capability to attack in-depth missile sites?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes: What can be the role sharing between US Forces and JSDF?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No: Does the US Forces do that mission instead? Such attacks need to be conducted so as to stop damages and casualties in Japan “before” ballistic missile attacks, that is to say, “before clear military attack occurs.” On what grounds US Forces conduct that attacking mission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong> Do you think the US has the intention, if it needs to, to fight militarily in Asia?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes: Beyond Vietnam and Korean War experience? And even if you take risks in fighting other nuclear club members?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No: Meaning US-Japan Security Treaty invalid?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.</strong> In the diplomatic relationship with China, Russia and South Korea, Japan has disagreement with each country regarding territories, and they are Japan's security concerns. What are the ways to deal with those issues?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Go strong: How?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Leave as the way they are: It means the continuation of tensions. Why do they become the benefits for Japan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Pull or Compromise: How?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5.</strong> The current relationship between China and US-Japan seems to have many differences, particularly in the field of economic ties, from that with the ex-Soviet Union during the Cold War. Some say the more economically intertwined China becomes with the US and Japan, the less chances it will resort to arms to solve bilateral conflicts. Do you agree with them?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes: How could it be explained that rising tensions surrounding the Senkaku Islands and Japan-China economic relationships seem proceeding in tandem with each other?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. No: Do you think it won't be able to halt Chinese military actions even by freezing of Chinese overseas assets?

6. Do you think the Japanese constitution should be amended?
   a. Yes: What parts of it should be altered? In detail? Why?
   b. No: Can such a constitution as has no reference on national defense forces be a sound constitution?
   c. Japanese citizens should decide.

7. Do you think that Japan's official interpretation on collective self-defense under the Japanese constitution (i.e., Japan has that right, but is not allowed to exercise it) hinders or will hinder the relationship between the U.S. and Japan?
   a. Yes: Some say that non-exercise of collective defense and the stationing of US Forces in Japan (plus, massive facility charge for the US Forces) is a sort of “give-and-take” in the US-Japan Security Treaty. How do you see their logic?
   b. No: Do you think the US-Japan Treaty one-sided?

8. Do you think Japan should abandon its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons to the country?
   a. Yes: Which of the three should be abolished? Why?
   b. No: Why?

9. (Additional Q for the Q8's answer “Yes”) Should Japan hold its autonomous nuclear deterrence capability?
   a. Yes: Will the U.S. accept the change of power balance in East Asia?
   b. No: Risking the casualties of American citizens, does the US give “nuclear umbrella” to Japan?
   c. The Japanese government should decide: What are the benchmarks of the U.S. to determine which country could or could not go nuclear.

10. What do you think about including more female personnel in the military? Japan has about 5 percent of entire personnel, while the U.S. about 15-20 percent.
    a. Yes: Increase of female causes, without the increase of entire force of numbers, decrease of male in the forces. Even so, are you for the increase?
    b. No: How do you explain the differences between US and Japan?

11. In your judgment, what are the highest priority issues that the U.S. and Japan deal with together?

12. Do you identify yourself, relatively speaking, as a regional or a security expert?

13. Are you, relatively speaking, a Pro-Republican or a Pro-Democrat?
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Henry Stimson Center, “Donors”, http://www.stimson.org/about/donors/

Kan Ito, Chuugoku no Kakusenryoku ni Nihon wa Kuppukusuru (Japan will be yield to Chinese Nuclear Power), (Tokyo: Shougakukan, 2011).


Masakazu Kobayashi, Oubei Media Chinichiha no Nihonron (What is Japan? : How Japan Has Been Seen in Foreign Eyes), (Tokyo: Koubunsha, 2006)


Josh Rogin, Clinton starts “Foreign Affairs Policy Board,” Foreign Policy, [On-line].


Takahiko Soejima, *Sekaihakennkoku Amerika wo Ugokasu Seijika to Chisikijinntachi (Modern American Political Intellectuals)*, (Tokyo: Kkodansha, 1999)


Tsuyoshi Sunohara, *Japan Hando (Japan Handlers)*, (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2006)


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Colonel Seiki Kageura served as a 2012 International Security Fellow in the 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings. He has served in the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) for over 23 years. His diverse career has included work as a weapon assignment controller, with deployments throughout Japan, and as a staff member at Air Staff Office and Joint Staff, Tokyo. Following extensive operational experience, including as a senior director at the Defense Center in the western sector of Japan, Colonel Kageura has undertaken a wide variety of staff work, from organizing the FY2012/2013 JASDF Annual Plan and chief-leading secretariats for Japan’s Joint Chief of Staff, to drawing up JASDF/Joint Staff midterm defense programs and editing “Defense of Japan 2007,” Japan’s annual defense white paper.

Colonel Kageura holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from the National Defense Academy and two master’s degrees: one in Human Resource Management and Development from Chapman University, and another in Public Administration from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. His military education includes the Air Command and Staff Course, Air University, Republic of Korea Air Force.