A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. AND JAPAN FOREIGN AID POLICIES FOR DISASTER REDUCTION

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I. Introduction

The international community faces a variety of challenges caused by population growth, environmental problems, and an increase in the frequency of natural disasters in the last half century. In many parts of the world, calamities such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, storm surges, and tsunamis have caused a number of tragedies by creating socio-economic disorder, sometimes leading to unprecedented physical and human disruption.

Relatively well-governed countries have sufficient capabilities for rapid reaction and long-term recovery efforts, and are able to build resilience against adverse situations in their societies. Unfortunately, however, in a number of developing countries adequate social institutions and infrastructure have not been established to deal with such situations due to political, economic or historical factors. These regions remain relatively vulnerable to natural catastrophes, and their people are outside the circle of prosperity.1

In the global context, as described in 2011 in the initial Policy Framework document from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), providing assistance in disaster-stricken areas is a fundamental expression of common humanity, representing a visible manifestation of a common belief that is both morally right and strategically sound.2 While nation states must take the primary responsibility for dealing with their own catastrophes, it is essential for the international community to help others help themselves, based on partnerships.3 Large-scale disasters in developing countries inevitably cause enormous damage with wide-ranging and long-lasting effects, often eventually resulting in the deterioration of society as a whole. In relation to disaster reduction efforts in developing countries, the significance of international technical and financial cooperation is now shared as a global consensus. In fact, emergency relief and disaster reduction, particularly in developing countries, have become a main focus of international cooperation.4 Donors have committed themselves to lending life-saving humanitarian assistance through rapid response to emergencies in poorer countries and sharing lessons and technologies to support adequate preparation for disasters. These new techniques and practices are expected to be institutionalized in recipient societies over the long term.

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1 They are more likely to suffer from extremely serious damage from natural disasters and may even be displaced nationally and internationally in some cases. It should also be noted that people in these nations additionally tend to suffer from secondary effects such as a deterioration in sanitary conditions and food shortages, which may last a long time.
3 Looking at past catastrophic natural disasters, the international community has recognized the importance of disaster reduction and promoted international cooperation in and with vulnerable countries.
4 In fact, numerous countermeasures against natural phenomena have been designed and implemented.
Recent theories and policies have emphasized the importance not only of effective responses after events, but also of natural hazard prevention and preparedness during normal periods. Despite the fact that the international community has made continuous efforts to tackle these matters, partnership among donors remains a key challenge in realizing more effective and efficient approaches. To facilitate and enhance such partnership, the international community should try to establish a well-organized mechanism based on the comparative advantages and strengths of individual donors. However, as individual donors have their own policies, priorities and domestic decision-making processes, the international community has not yet developed an ideal, effective mechanism to tackle the challenge of providing timely, complementary, and effective aid in the wake of natural disasters. Nevertheless, it seems feasible that stakeholders can develop and maintain a favorable form of tie-up architecture at the political and operational levels, at a minimum by sharing information and priorities among donors and by identifying and highlighting the comparative advantages in disaster relief that each actor possesses.

For example, the governments of the United States and Japan have played major roles in the foreign aid community in past decades, and both have committed to supporting disaster reduction and mitigation efforts in vulnerable countries. Both have assisted, to varying degrees, in many catastrophic situations depending on their political priorities and programs under a given condition. Both have a variety of aid tools for emergency relief and disaster reduction, ranging from swift emergency response including military participation to long-term technical support for reconstruction. Each boasts certain advantages that the other doesn’t have. For example, while the comparative advantages of the United States focus on urgent emergency relief which occasionally includes military participation, the Japanese government’s forte is providing technical expertise. Japan can also provide effective knowledge and lessons learned toward reconstruction and long-term preparedness, based on its own internal experience and its coherent Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy. These fundamental characteristics of the two countries are complementary and can count on each other.

Therefore, a complementary, collaborative architecture featuring those two major actors may be a useful way to make their aid programs more efficient and effective. If the governments of the United States and Japan could move toward closer

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5 Recent theories have covered ways of reducing socio-economic vulnerability by building resilience based on well-functioning partnerships among actors in society. It is considered feasible to at least take certain types of action to reduce the degree of suffering, loss of life and economic damage through effective, comprehensive planning and preparation. Preparedness should be developed based on efficient partnerships among all entities and individuals in society. The scope of these approaches is broader than that of conventional emergency relief efforts.

6 In this context, partnerships do not necessarily involve any legal commitments agreed upon by governments. It may simply be a platform for sharing political views or realizing operational synchronization, as ‘loose partnerships.’ It awaits further investigation.
collaboration in their roles as principal foreign aid contributors, the international community may see the benefit and follow along. This is the basic assumption of this research.

This working paper is designed to make a proposal for possible collaboration between both countries, focusing particularly on the post-emergency relief and recovery phase, because most actors invest a variety of resources and programs in this most critical phase. As a case study, this research examines the foreign aid policies and concrete programs implemented by both countries in Haiti following the January 2010 earthquake there. Although a number studies have been conducted on the policies and projects pursued after the earthquake, there have been little discussion of concrete partnerships between these two major donors in this specific area.

II. The process of establishing international principles and sharing values

As mentioned above, progress is being made in the international community to establish principles and values related to global disaster reduction efforts. This section of the paper attempts to describe the evolution of global principles and frameworks, and to identify shortcomings that should be addressed in the near future.

1. The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) and the first World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (WCDR)

In the 1960s, the international community began to face a significant increase in the occurrence of natural disasters. As a first step toward the construction of a framework that involved multiple stakeholders in disaster response and management, in 1987 the United Nations General Assembly designated 1990-2000 as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), with the stated purpose of increasing common awareness of the importance of addressing the issue of disaster reduction.7

In 1994, the first World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (WCDR) was held in Yokohama, Japan. This milestone event not only reviewed the guidelines established by IDNDR and further increased the profile of disaster risk reduction in development planning and practice, but added to the global framework the “Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World.”8 The Yokohama Strategy established a number of concrete guidelines which emphasized the importance of risk assessment, prevention, and preparedness in an attempt to prevent, reduce, and mitigate disasters for the coming ten

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7 IDNDR’s ultimate goals were to reduce physical damage and human loss as a result of disasters, particularly in developing countries, and to encourage global partnerships in science and engineering to achieve this goal.
8 This conference was hosted by Japan, and more than 5,000 people participated, representing 148 nations and international development organizations, humanitarian groups, and civil society.
years. These principles arose from the consensus that stakeholders on all levels should focus on preventive and preparatory measures.

The WCDR and the development of the Yokohama Strategy provided the international community with a common understanding and broader recognition of the issues surrounding disaster prevention and response. By the end of the decade, in more than 140 member countries, domestic committees had been established to promote and support the established concepts of IDNDR and the WCDR’s Yokohama Strategy. In 1999 the UN Secretary General’s report presented to the General Assembly stated that “it is essential that the pioneering work carried out during the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction be continued.”

2. The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)

In view of this recommendation, in 2000 the United Nations General Assembly endorsed Resolution 54/219 which implemented the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and established a secretariat to carry out its mission. In terms of the emphasis on addressing natural disasters, ISDR prompted important new thinking global calamities issues, ultimately shifting from the conventional emphasis on response to prevention and preparedness.

ISDR can be described as a system which aims to support the reduction of global disaster risks through the building of a culture of prevention and reduction in each participating society. The overall objective of the ISDR system is to generate synergistic effects among a broad range of stakeholders. These stakeholders include nation-states, inter-governmental and regional organizations, non-governmental entities, international development and financial institutions, scientific and technical institutions, and the private sector. These bodies are considered to have essential roles in reducing disaster risk through supporting their respective countries and communities. UNISDR was mandated by the UN General Assembly to serve as the focal point for the coordination among these bodies. One of the outstanding contributions of UNISDR, in 2003 and 2004, was a thorough review of the Yokohama Strategy; this review provided the agenda items for the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe in 2005.

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10 A/54/497.
11 In 1999, the last year of the decade, the IDNDR International Programme Forum was held to conclude the overall experience of those ten years. “The Geneva Mandate on Disaster Reduction” adopted at the Forum concluded that “these last 10 years have shown the multisectoral, interdisciplinary and cross-cutting nature of broad risk management and its contribution to disaster reduction. Continued interaction and cooperation on the above basis, among all disciplines and institutions concerned, are considered essential to accomplish commonly agreed objectives and priorities.” UNISDR, A/54/132; accessed November 26, 2012, http://www.unisdr.org/2011/docs/genevamandate/Geneva-mandate-EN.pdf.
3. The second World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction

At the UN General Assembly in 2003, 141 nations affirmed the importance of holding an international conference on disaster reduction. With clear support, it was decided that a second World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction (WCDR) would convene in 2005, one decade after the first. Japan hosted once again, and the second WCDR was held in Kobe in 2005. At the event the UNISDR review the implementation, successes, and failures of the Yokohama Strategy were examined, taking into account the progress, accomplishments, and experiences of the international community in disaster response and management since the first WCDR Conference in 1994. Based on the findings, a new strategy for disaster reduction called the “Hyogo Declaration” and the “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters” (HFA) were established. This strategy was to serve as a guideline for the next ten years.

The HFA, adopted by 168 member countries, continued to draw all stakeholders into a more common system of coordination. It also detailed the steps that needed to be taken in different sectors to reduce devastation caused by natural disasters in society as a whole. In pursuit of those objectives, the HFA stated five priorities for action (as

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12 According to the UN General Assembly resolution (A/RES/58/214), the Conference was expected “To conclude the review of the Yokohama Strategy and its Plan of Action, with a view to updating the guiding framework on disaster reduction for the twenty-first century”; “To identify specific activities aimed at ensuring the implementation of the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg Plan of Implementation) on vulnerability, risk assessment and disaster management”; “To share best practices and lessons learned to further disaster reduction within the context of attaining sustainable development, and to identify gaps and challenges”; “To increase awareness of the importance of disaster reduction policies, thereby facilitating and promoting the implementation of those policies”; and “To increase the reliability and availability of appropriate disaster-related information to the public and disaster management agencies in all regions, as set out in the relevant provisions of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.”

13 This year was a very special commemoration for the host country because it was just 10 years after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake that occurred in Kobe and neighboring areas in 1995. The number of participants at the Conference was more than 4,000. These participants were from 168 member countries, 78 international organizations, and 161 non-profit organizations from around the world.


(a) Governance: organizational, legal and policy frameworks;
(b) Risk identification, assessment, monitoring and early warning;
(c) Knowledge management and education;
(d) Reducing underlying risk factors;
(e) Preparedness for effective response and recovery.
described below), and declared both major principles and practical means for achieving disaster resilience. The HFA’s ultimate goal was to reduce loss of life as well as loss of social, economic, and environmental assets through fostering resilience in as many nations and communities as possible by 2015. The adoption of the HFA was the culmination of a process which began in 1987 with the proclamation of IDNDR.

The HFA’s main points are:

Priority Action 1: Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.

Countries that develop policy, legislative and institutional frameworks for disaster risk reduction and that are able to develop and track progress through specific and measurable indicators have greater capacity to manage risks and to achieve widespread consensus for, engagement in and compliance with disaster risk reduction measures across all sectors of society.

Priority Action 2: Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.

The starting point for reducing disaster risk and for promoting a culture of disaster resilience lies in the knowledge of the hazards and the physical, social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities to disasters that most societies face, and of the ways in which hazards and vulnerabilities are changing in the short and long term, followed by action taken on the basis of that knowledge.

Priority Action 3: Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels.

Disasters can be substantially reduced if people are well informed and motivated toward a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, which in turn requires the collection, compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities.

Priority Action 4: Reduce the underlying risk factors.

Disaster risks related to changing social, economic, environmental conditions and land use, and the impact of hazards associated with geological events, weather, water, climate variability and climate change, are addressed in sector development planning and programs as well as in post-disaster situations.

Priority Action 5: Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

At times of disaster, impacts and losses can be substantially reduced if authorities, individuals and communities in hazard-prone areas are well prepared and ready to act and are equipped with the knowledge and capacities for effective disaster management.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
Since the HFA’s launch in 2005, UNISDR has pushed forward the implementation of the framework. In 2006, the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction was established as the primary global forum to address disaster related issues by providing strategic and coherent guidance among stakeholders. UNISDR led the preparation and follow-up of the Platform by expanding its integration with actors in the social development and humanitarian fields.

Eight years later, due in no small part to the principles and frameworks established by the HFA, political progress and concrete actions have been taken around the world. For example, “The Future We Want,” which was the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 2012, reaffirmed the international community’s commitment to the philosophy of the HFA and called for all stakeholders to accelerate the implementation of this framework in order to meet its goals. This development indicates that HFA remains one of the most cutting-edge set of principles on global disaster reduction to date. The establishment of the Coordination Center for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America (CEPREDENAC) is an important concrete action springing from the HFA.

4. After the HFA and beyond

With the HFA concluding in 2015, however, several international dialogues have been held recently to prepare for a second global framework of disaster-related policy. The World Ministerial Conference on Disaster Reduction in Tohoku, Japan, was held in July 2012. The Conference produced a Chair’s Summary, which was published to both underscore the urgent need to build resilient societies and to encourage the streamlining of disaster reduction in all levels of public policy making. While underlining a central government’s responsibility to address disaster reduction in each nation, the Summary also affirmed the significance of promoting international cooperation. Moreover, the Chair’s Summary concluded that after 2015, cutting-edge policies of disaster reduction should continue to be integrated into the evolving global framework for development (such as the post-Millennium Development Agenda). A similar meeting, the Sendai Dialogue, was carried out in October 2012 on the margins of the Tokyo annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Sendai Statement, the produced report of the meeting, stressed both the importance of increasing technical and financial support to vulnerable countries and applying lessons learned from previous

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17 A/66/L.56.
19 A series of sessions were held in Miyagi Prefecture, Iwate Prefecture, and Fukushima Prefecture, all of which were devastated by the tsunami in March 2011. This event, though hosted by Japan, was co-hosted by relevant international bodies and local governments. Around 500 people participated from 63 countries, including international development, humanitarian, and private sector organizations.
disaster experiences. Ultimately, new findings and outcomes discovered during the ten year period of the HFA are expected to be reviewed at the third World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, likely to be held in Japan in 2015.\footnote{The Government of Japan has already expressed its intention to host the third WCDR.} This conference will look to deepen discussions about disaster management and establish a new vision as a post-HFA framework.

While this examination of the progress of international frameworks and relevant recent discussions surrounding them is intentionally short, several shortcomings should be noted. Specifically, partnerships among multiple stakeholders need to be further explored and refined. The UN, donor countries, development agencies, and NGOs make attempts to provide assistance out of their respective capabilities. Nevertheless, there are difficulties, especially at the state level. Even though disaster reduction policies are implemented for humanitarian purposes, they carry diplomatic implications for the countries that carry them out. However, should the comparative advantages of each actor be organized into a complementary framework, these synchronized efforts would result in synergistic effects that could avoid—or transcend—political considerations. This type of coordination could be synchronized further by the sharing of political views and information, which could render the establishment of sensitive legal obligations among the parties unnecessary. A collaboration between capable actors, such as the United States and Japan, to seek a way of bringing together their strengths, could be an appropriate and useful experiment. The following sections attempt to sketch out just such an approach.

### III. Post-disaster phase: Responding to the Haiti earthquake

The following section discusses the disaster relief responses carried out by the governments of the United States and Japan immediately following Haiti’s catastrophic earthquake in January 2010. This is a useful case study for this paper, as Japan and the United States contributed to Haiti disaster relief in different ways and according to their respective strengths. This section includes an overview of the Haiti earthquake; and the political priorities, means of engagement, and specific contributions by both governments are reviewed. The emergency relief and recovery/reconstruction efforts that were carried out by respective development agencies and military elements are examined in depth.

#### 1. Overview of the Haiti earthquake

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and its economic and social instability are entrenched due to a great many political and historical circumstances that, for brevity’s sake, cannot be addressed here. Although country’s geography makes it prone to damage from storms, floods, and other disasters, the Government of Haiti...
(GOH) has chronically lacked the capacity and resources to mount swift and effective responses to such natural events.

A mega-earthquake with a magnitude recorded at 7.0 struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 at 16:53 local time. The epicenter was approximately 25 km (16 miles) southeast of Port-au-Prince, the country’s capital and its most populated, congested area. A United Nations report estimated that approximately 222,000 people perished as a result of the earthquake, and around 2.3 million were displaced from their homes. This catastrophe devastated not only Haiti’s human capital but its infrastructure and communications. Due to the increased vulnerability of the country, this earthquake was the “worst humanitarian and economic disaster recorded in the Western Hemisphere” as labeled by the U.S. government. The tragedy in Haiti immediately captured the world’s attention. In addition to pledging aid funds, a number of countries rapidly responded to urgent humanitarian needs through the dispatching of search and rescue squads, medical teams, and other personnel.

In the early stage of relief efforts, however, the malfunction of fundamental infrastructure such as communications systems, transport facilities, and electrical networks critically disrupted aid workers from conducting efficient disaster relief. The deaths of many Haitian government officials, as well as UN officials serving in the country, further harmed the ability to organize an immediate response. This chaos made voluntary international cooperation by outside donors and responders all the more important.

2. Contribution by the United States of America

(1) General policy of the U.S. on international disasters

The United States Government (USG) is one of the major donors in the foreign aid community and is active in emergency relief and disaster reduction efforts. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the principal federal agency for foreign emergency relief and disaster response. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the office within USAID that is responsible for coordinating the entirety of U.S. responses to overseas disasters and crises. OFDA’s mission is broad in scope: it deals with a variety of global natural disasters, from earthquakes to droughts to disease outbreaks, and implements assistance projects to deal with catastrophic

23 United States Agency for International Development, Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy, Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity (2011): 3. The USAID document reports that two months after the quake, the World Bank estimated that the earthquake caused a total of $7.8 billion in damage and losses, which amounted to 120 percent of Haiti’s 2009 GDP. In addition, the World Bank estimated that in order to rebuild infrastructure and services to pre-earthquake levels, Haiti would need at least $11.5 billion and a strong commitment from the international community.
situations caused by civil conflict, acts of terrorism, or industrial accidents. Along with emergency relief, OFDA offers long-term assistance programs to reduce the social and economic impacts of future disasters. For example, it provides financial support to projects intended to reduce the damage caused by “recurrent natural hazards and provides training to build local capacity for disaster training and response.”

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) often works in concert with USAID to respond to global disasters. DoD possesses outstanding ability to provide self-sufficiency, logistics, and security in emergency relief operations. USG responds to approximately 70-80 natural catastrophes across the globe each year. DoD typically joins in approximately 10-15 percent of these operations and dispatches military personnel and equipment that are subsequently integrated into U.S. disaster relief operations as a whole. DoD utilizes varied assets in its response activities, which in large part correlate to the magnitude and complexity of the crisis at hand. The department’s contribution can be as small as one aircraft delivering necessities to the “full-scale deployment of a brigade-size or larger task force.”

(2) Reaction to the Haiti earthquake

The Haitian earthquake’s severity was quickly obvious to American leadership. Owing mainly to Haiti’s geopolitical importance, USG promptly announced a strong commitment to emergency relief for Haiti. A few hours after the event, President Obama promised the Haitian people full support and called for a swift and coordinated response to the exigency, stating “I’ve directed my administration to launch a swift, coordinated and aggressive effort to save lives and support the recovery in Haiti. The losses that have been suffered in Haiti are nothing less than devastating, and responding to a disaster of this magnitude will require every element of our national capacity -- our diplomacy and development assistance; the power of our military; and, most importantly, the compassion of our country.” In this, the USG became one of the first responders to the emergency.

Simultaneously, President Obama designated USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah as Unified Disaster Coordinator, and USAID as the leading entity to coordinate the USG’s relief efforts. The President characterized the USG response to Haiti as a

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25 United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below), July 13, 2011: i.
27 USAID Administrator Shah was sworn into office on January, 7, only five days before the earthquake.
“whole-of-government” approach to be applied for the first time in an international emergency. Its focus was on simultaneous instant reactions by multiple federal departments and agencies. Those agencies mobilized resources and staff within the week following the earthquake and carried out their relief activities under the coordination of USAID.

(3) USAID as a coordinator and executor of aid programs

Prior to the earthquake, USAID as a development agency had for some time been assisting Haiti in mitigating the negative results of the country’s political instability and resulting social disorder. For many years USAID had encouraged long-term economic growth and security improvement through various development initiatives, including but not limited to tourism, nature conservation, export promotion, public health, and civil participation. However, as a result of the crisis, the Agency was instantly required to expand its engagement to emergency relief as well as post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction. Reflecting its coordinating function among U.S. federal agencies, on the evening of January 12, USAID set up the Haiti Response Management Team at its headquarters. Then, an Inter-agency Task Force was established, which operated as an ad hoc body to promote coordination across all U.S. governmental agencies. Along with providing donor coordination in Haiti, USAID represented USG and played a critical role in the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), where Haitian authorities and donors tried to make their individual strategies and projects converge to meet common goals.

USAID itself conducted several emergency relief operations in Haiti including deploying search and rescue teams, providing basic supplies, removing rubble, installing latrines and water systems, and bringing basic shelter materials to affected people. Additionally, USAID financially supported a number of NGOs that were conducting similar relief operations on the ground. As time went on, the Agency launched several initiatives to bridge the gap from emergency assistance to recovery.

28 The federal departments and agencies which were involved: USAID, the Department of State (DOS), DoD (including all branches of the U.S military), the Department of Homeland Security (including the U.S. Coast Guard), the Department of Health and Human Services, the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Interior, U.S. Office of Personnel Management, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). See “Haiti relief,” The White House, accessed October 3, 2012; http://www.whitehouse.gov/HaitiEarthquake.
30 Right after the earthquake, USG rapidly dispatched six urban search and rescue (USAR) teams to Haiti. USAID deployed two (Fairfax County and Los Angeles County) of them. As for rubble removal, as of May 31, 2012, the U.S. had removed more than 2.4 million cubic meters of rubble in total, which is equivalent with approximately 51 percent of total rubble removed from the streets of Haiti. As of May 31, 2012, USAID and its partners had constructed over 28,600 shelters and repaired more than 6,000 structures to shelter over 8,100 households. See “USAID Haiti Earthquake overview,” USAID Haiti office, accessed October 3, 2012; http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/latin-american-and-caribbean/haiti/earthquake-overview.
reconstruction, and long-term development, including a program that employed local people in cash-for-work jobs helping to construct temporary buildings.

In January 2011, a year after the earthquake, USG published the U.S. Government Post-Earthquake Reconstruction Strategy as a medium and long-term assistance plan. This report outlined a comprehensive aid policy that followed the Government of Haiti’s Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (itself released in March 2010). The USG report clarified both the United States’ exit strategy and its engagement with Haitian relief operations in prioritized support areas and geographic regions. The strategy provided an account of how the United States would both coordinate with other actors and invest its resources to further recovery goals that were grounded in Haiti’s ownership of the recovery process. Since the establishment of this strategy, the activities of USAID have been guided by these policies.31

(4) Contributions by the U.S. military

The Department of Defense played a complementary role in U.S. relief in Haiti. The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is one of ten Unified Combatant Commands and is responsible for humanitarian response in Latin America and the Caribbean.32 On January 13 President Obama ordered DoD to immediately launch Operation Unified Response (OUR) and deploy several military units under the direction of SOUTHCOM. The initial military response centered on carrying out swift emergency relief and attempting to prevent Haitian society from falling into political and social chaos. The first U.S. military units to arrive in Haiti established transportation and communication pathways and supported fundamental logistics recovery. These contributions helped other American and international aid actors access devastated regions and execute their relief activities. What follows is a brief summary of the military’s rapid and critical response in the week that followed the earthquake.33

On January 13, only 28 hours after the earthquake, the U.S. Air Force reopened Toussaint Louverture International Airport and delivered military equipment to Haiti. Immediately after the reopening, aircraft began delivering relief supplies and evacuating U.S. citizens who were in Haiti. At the same time, DoD ordered a number of military

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31 The strategy focused on the four essential pillars of Haiti’s reconstruction and development; infrastructure and energy, food and economic security, health and services and governance and rule of law. Also, in order to ensure that U.S. assistance could have a lasting effect, the strategy targeted three prioritized areas of Haiti; Port-au-Prince, St. Marc and Cap Haitien. Department of State, Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity, 2011.
ships to join the operation. On January 14, due to the deterioration of Haiti’s governing capacity, SOUTHCOM and Haiti’s functioning authorities established the Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H), which soon conducted large-scale operations to assist major international actors which were engaging Haiti. On January 15, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and the destroyer USS Higgins arrived off the coast of Port-au-Prince and began providing emergency relief and medical services. On January 20, the hospital ship USNS Comfort joined the operation. The Comfort alone carried 250 beds, 550 medical professionals, advanced medical treatment facilities, and a helicopter deck. In the initial stage of emergency relief, personnel, materials, and disaster response knowledge were provided by these military elements. Within a few weeks, JTF-H had become established as an indispensable presence in the Haiti relief effort.

When it comes to humanitarian operations on the ground, it goes without saying that command relationships among multiple logistics actors, including military and civil elements, are fundamental. But in the case of Haiti, a variety of international aid actors rapidly deployed to a theater of operations suffering from a leadership vacuum created by the unprecedented absence of local authority and UN country experts. In response, JTF-H played a meaningful role in accelerating coordination among the diverse stakeholders.

After several months, as the effects of the disaster had been controlled or mitigated, civilian partners could once again take over responsibility for supplying necessities, and JTF-H began to implement its exit strategy. However, the withdrawal of the U.S. military was delayed until the beginning of June, almost six months after the disaster, in large part because Haiti suffered further recovery setbacks as a result of its rainy season in May. Entities other than the U.S. military seemed unable to cope with these complicating circumstances. On June 1, DoD officially announced the end of relief support in Haiti, leaving ongoing humanitarian and construction projects.

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34 Combined, medical military and civilian medical teams treated over 9,000 patients, conducted 1,025 surgeries, evacuated 255 patients to hospitals, and filled over 70,000 prescriptions

35 During the six month after the earthquake, JTF-H controlled over 22,200 personnel, 30 ships and 300 aircraft both on the ground and offshore. JTF-H established sixteen distribution sites in the territory of Haiti, where U.S. military personnel provided necessities to Haitian people. U.S. military members delivered more than 2.6 million bottles of water, 2.2 million food rations, 17 million pounds of bulk food and 149,000 pounds of medical supplies into the country.


37 In fact, after the earthquake response effort was over, the U.S. continued humanitarian and construction projects in Haiti throughout the summer and fall hurricane season. There is a joint and combined humanitarian exercise between SOUTHCOM and Latin America and Caribbean countries called New Horizon. It began in the 1980s and includes building schools, clinics and community centers.
(5) Research findings

(a) The U.S. response to Haiti was unprecedented in its size, and its political implications. Both the proximity of Haiti to the U.S. and the historical ties between the two countries determined U.S. policy in response to the effects of the earthquake. The U.S. political commitment to this relief operation was more visible than that of other major donors such as Japan and European Union. During the six months following the event, USG’s spending was evaluated at over $1.1 billion (mostly through USAID and DoD). USAID played a leading role and implemented broad relief programs that were explicitly related to its established mission. Despite both the unexpected nature and severity of the catastrophe, USAID demonstrated its ability to deal with an overseas mega-disaster.

(b) The U.S. military showed its unique capacity in other areas. The immediate restoration of Haiti’s only international airport in Port-au-Prince was widely acknowledged by the international community. In an exceptional situation in which local authorities and the UN field office were not at full capacity, the joint command between U.S. military and remaining Haitian leadership absorbed the majority of responsibilities associated with organizing multi-national relief operations. Without the U.S. military’s contribution, relief in Haiti could not have been accomplished in the successful manner that it was, particularly in the early stages of emergency relief.

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39 In response to the disaster, the U.S. Government contributed more funding to relief in Haiti than any other foreign government. The total sum contributed was also greater than any amount previously pledged by the U.S. Government to a foreign disaster. Independent Evaluation Team of USAID, Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake-Final Report (2011): 8.

40 An independent evaluation indicated that USAID should be empowered to lead international disaster response effectively. However, there is a need to strengthen USAID’s institutional structures, increase its staff size, develop its capacity, broaden its interagency agreements at higher levels, and upgrade its technological systems. Independent Evaluation Team of USAID, Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake-Final Report (2011): 13

41 One of the remarkable contributions by the U.S military to global emergency relief was the Operation “Tomodachi” conducted in Japan in 2011. On March 13, two days after the quake in Tohoku in Japan, the US military had a meeting with SDF and around 24,000 personnel, 190 aircraft, and 24 ships joined this operation which lasted by the end of April. The total cost of the operation estimated 80 million dollars. Yomiuri Online, Article of Apr 6, 2011, accessed October 25, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20110406-OYT1T00031.htm.
(c) However successful the U.S. military was in emergency relief, overwhelming military involvement often introduces political complexity. In this case, the presence of significant U.S. military assets in the Caribbean region exacerbated inter-regional tension that has existed for the last century. Following U.S. relief efforts, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and Bolivian President Evo Morales expressed concern over the U.S. military’s presence in Haiti. While these protests could perhaps be dismissed as the ordinary rhetoric of anti-American leftist leaders specific only to the region, some European countries also expressed concerns. The French minister in charge of humanitarian relief obliquely accused the U.S. military of “occupying” Haiti.42 Similarly, an Italian government official criticized U.S. military personnel for a lack of “rapport with the international organizations and aid groups.”43 These criticism could in part be a result of a logistical issue that arose immediately following the reopening of Toussaint Louverture International Airport. In the first days following the disaster, cargo planes could not freely land at the airport as it was under the control of U.S. military, which initially gave priority to military equipment and personnel.44 Facing urgent needs, the unparalleled military capacities and abilities can make significant contributions from a humanitarian point of view, but at the same time the political implications of a military deployment can turn out to be controversial to some extent.45

While the presence of the Japan Self Defense Force (SDF) in Latin America may be accepted without criticism, for example, that may not be the case should the SDF assist in disaster relief operations in Asia.

3. Japan’s response to Haiti

(1) Broad outline of Japan’s policy on global disasters reduction

Along with USG, the Government of Japan (GOJ) has been one of the major donors in the foreign aid community and has been highly involved in emergency relief and disaster reduction. By making maximum use of lessons learned from internal experiences and technology developed at home, Japan has contributed to a broad range of multilateral and bilateral disaster reduction efforts. Multilaterally, as mentioned in the

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45 Other countries also deployed military elements, not within MINUSTAH, to support to Haiti; Colombia, France, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Uruguay.
previous section, Japan has hosted a series of major international conferences that have enriched international disaster response frameworks in the past two decades.

To facilitate bilateral activities, the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) was formed under the Law Concerning Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team in 1987. JDR teams form one of Japan’s main tools in foreign natural disaster response, and consist of four distinct units: a rescue team, medical team, team of prevention of epidemic, and a unit composed of Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel.46 Along with this organizational framework, GOJ maintains warehouses in four sites around the world—Frankfurt, Johannesburg, Singapore, and Miami—where emergency relief supplies are stocked. Depending on the scale of damage caused by a specific disaster incident, and at the request from affected countries, the deployment of a combination of the aforementioned four teams is carried out. Apart from JDR teams, GOJ implements official development assistance (ODA) projects to address recovery/reconstruction and long-term development needs in countries dealing with the aftereffects of disasters. Japan’s ODA policy regarding disaster reduction emphasizes in particular policy recommendations, building institutional capacity, human resource development, economic and social infrastructure, and enhancing disaster-resilience.

(2) Bilateral support to Haiti

While Japanese ODA provided to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has helped establish strong ties between Japan and the region, LAC has not been the principal destination of Japanese ODA. Since the distribution of ODA is largely influenced by diplomatic priorities, the majority of Japan’s resources have historically been allocated to neighboring countries in Asia as well as impoverished regions of Africa. A principal factor may be that the average income of LAC is comparatively higher than those in recipient countries in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, Japan and LAC have never faced complicated political situations which have required the implementation of diplomatic instruments, including ODA, to soothe tensions.

Only nine percent of Japan’s total ODA in 2009 was directed toward LAC, while 59.3 percent went to Asia and 11.8 percent to Africa. Among LAC countries that year, Haiti received US$24.84 million, which ranked seventh after Costa Rica ($58.29 million), Honduras ($41.72 million), Paraguay ($37.31 million), Panama ($33.75 million), Bolivia ($31.78 million), and Guatemala ($25.97 million).47 Despite the fact that Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, Japan’s ODA contribution to the country before the 2010 earthquake disaster was invisible, and subsequently any substantial aid directed to Haitian disaster reduction does not seem to have existed. This may be explained in part by the physical distance between Haiti and

Japan and the fact that the former had not previously requested such aid. Considering the magnitude of devastation and the broader political importance after the earthquake in 2010, GOJ displayed its first sincere engagement to Haiti at that time.

On January 13, in the first official statement of GOJ in response to the disaster in Haiti, the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement. It offered condolences and indicated that Japan was “extremely shocked” and that GOJ was “prepared to offer the full range of assistance in an effective manner to the people of Haiti as soon as their needs have been determined”\(^4\)\(^9\). The following day, then-Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama stated that as a result of the enormous earthquake near Port-au-Prince and suffering across the country, Japan was assessing immediately what it could do in support.\(^5\)\(^0\) Prime Minister Hatoyama further articulated how important it was that Japan do its utmost to save the lives of as many Haitians as possible.\(^5\)\(^1\) Simultaneously, GOJ officials began preparing to extend humanitarian relief.

That same day, January 14 in Japan, GOJ dispatched an emergency survey team headed by the Japanese Ambassador to Haiti (residing in the Dominican Republic). This team comprised members from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Operating on limited information, GOJ organized a JDR medical team for first aid and public health and an SDF unit for epidemic prevention and medical services. From January 16 to 29, a total of 26 Japanese civilian medical experts with emergency relief experience were on the ground in Haiti. Between January 16 and February 18, a total of 183 SDF medical personnel joined this JDR team, taking over operational responsibility after the civilian medical team left the field on January 29.\(^5\)\(^2\) The most notable medical service provided by the JDR team was the specialty medical examinations it was able to provide through utilizing high-tech X-ray and ultrasonography equipment. The JDR team shared this equipment with other medical teams who were not outfitted in the same manner. Unfortunately few relief teams made maximum use of advanced technologies in the early stage of emergency relief.\(^5\)\(^3\)

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\(^4\) When the earthquake struck on the afternoon of January 12 in Haiti, it was already January 13 in Japan.
\(^5\) Ibid.
In addition to dispatching medical personnel, GOJ provided material assistance, to the total equivalent of 30 million yen. JICA’s warehouse in Miami immediately dispatched relief supplies. GOJ also provided grant aid to several international organizations operating in Haiti so that these organizations could distribute basic supplies through their existing logistics networks. These contributions included: construction of shelters (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the International Organization for Migration), prevention of the spread of infectious diseases (UNICEF and the World Health Organization), as well as food distribution and assistance for agriculture (World Food Programme and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization). The total sum of Japan’s aid to Haitian relief was estimated at more than $55 million, compared to the 2009 ODA assistance to Haiti of only $24.84 million that was mentioned above. It should also be noted that the cost of this emergency relief was appropriated on top of Japan’s annual ODA budget to Haiti.

(3) Collaboration with the UN Peacekeeping Operation

The Government of Japan stressed the importance of collaboration with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) in responding to the crisis in Haiti. As a result of chronic political and social instability in Haiti that could threaten regional stability, a United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established in 2004 and tasked with helping the then-Transitional Government in Haiti to establish and maintain rule of law, public safety, and public order. Following the country’s 2010 earthquake, however, the mission lost significant capacity as a number of its leaders were killed by the collapse of its headquarters building. Consequently, on January 19, one week after the earthquake, the UN Security Council (drawing on the UN Secretary-General’s recommendation) adopted resolution 1908 which authorized the expansion of MINUSTAH personnel. As a result of this resolution, the UN requested member states, including Japan, to dispatch skilled personnel to the crisis area.

GOJ dispatched SDF personnel to the UNPKO mission in Haiti by way of the Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (the PKO law) which was enacted in 1992. The PKO law enables SDF personnel and Japanese police officials to join international peace efforts undertaken by the UN, particularly in post-conflict situations. It had never been applied by Japan to support the deployment of SDF personnel in international disaster relief, but the Cabinet in 2010 recognized the importance of the request from the UN and began dispatching SDF engineering troops in small detachments to MINUSTAH on February 5. The entire unit

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was composed of approximately 350 personnel. As assigned by the UN, SDF engineering troops completed assignments including rubble removal, road repair, and facility construction. All of this aimed to reinforce the engineering capacity of MINUSTAH.

In general, UNPKO activities typically include monitoring cease-fires, separating hostile forces, and maintaining buffer zones. In these tasks, PKO personnel may face armed conflict against hostile parties. However, Japan’s PKO law strictly regulates the tasks for which SDF units participating in UN peacekeeping operations are eligible. Based on this law, and on prior coordination with the UN, SDF units are not to be assigned to security-related activities in situations which hold a relatively high risk of armed conflict. Instead, SDF personnel can assume logistical tasks, including transportation and engineering, to support other nations’ troops operating in a hostile environment. SDF troops operating in logistical capacities have joined several UNPKOs in the past two decades, and their skillful contributions have been praised by both the UN and recipient countries. The quality of expertise with technology that SDF brings to crisis situations has been particularly welcomed by the international community. It is for this reason that the tasks of SDF engineering personnel in MINUSTAH were concentrated on logistics. Ultimately, the SDF operated in Haiti for more than two years and began withdrawing in October 2012.

(4) Triangular cooperation for Haiti’s reconstruction

During the course of Haitian relief, targeted efforts in emergency response soon gave way to and broad based plans for recovery, reconstruction, and long-term development. Japan offered financial support to several initiatives for reconstruction including road construction in Léogâne and hospital rehabilitation in Jacmel. Aside from these traditional aid projects, a unique approach introduced by GOJ was triangular cooperation, in the case among Japan, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. GOJ launched this technical assistance program through JICA, formally titled “Project on Technical Training in Agricultural Production System in Mountainous Areas to Technicians of the Republic of Haiti,” in October 2010. This project, which will last until September 2013, aims to transfer adequate agricultural technology to Haiti from the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic has for some time been a recipient of Japanese technical assistance in the agricultural sector, and has experienced agricultural development under natural conditions similar to those of Haiti. The improvement of agricultural productivity and infrastructure Haiti were considered top priorities to

58 Léogâne is located to the west of Port-au-Prince, and was at the epicenter of the 2010 earthquake. Jacmel is located to the southwest of the capital and was also affected by the earthquake.
promote long-term development there. Through trilateral cooperation among Japan, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, GOJ helped Dominican experts transfer their expertise to Haitian technicians. Increasing the transfer of adequate agricultural technology through interpersonal exchanges between Haiti and the Dominican Republic will strengthen the bonds between these two neighbors, and amplifies the positive effects of Japan’s previous assistance to the Dominican Republic.

(5) Research findings

(a) In a bilateral context, GOJ responded to Haiti’s needs by dispatching JDR teams, sending supplies through JICA, and supporting international organizations. In the context of the severity of the disaster, the total amount of money spent was not extraordinary. Comparing this relief effort to Japan’s engagement in past relief operations, resources and expenditures provided were on a smaller scale than is commonly assumed. Japan’s contribution to multilateral activities, most notably its dispatch of SDF troops to MINUSTAH for more than two years, deserves special mention and needs to be highlighted as a tool that GOJ can utilize in future overseas disasters needs. As noted above, MINUSTAH was established years before the earthquake to help maintain peace and security. Under these conditions, the SDF would not have been eligible to participate. The earthquake, and the creation of missions in which the SDF can participate, enabled GOJ to take this step and demonstrate its commitment to the international community. Dispatching SDF to MINUSTAH was an exception and was agreeable under certain conditions. This precedent suggests that SDF is able to participate in overseas disaster relief operations only within the framework of participating in the activities of a JDR team. This precedent is the probably the most that supporters of a more active role for the SDF in international activities can hope for, for the time being. Due to the political climate in Japan that has prevailed since the 1940s, it is difficult to see how an amendment to the PKO law allowing more international deployment would win public support.

(b) Although the size of Japan’s response was small compared to that of the United States, Japan utilized its full arsenal of diplomatic and relief operations capabilities to respond to the Haiti crisis. Why was Japan so eager to help Haiti? Problems in Haiti

For example, following the massive earthquake in Sichuan, China in 2008, GOJ provided a rescue team (61 personnel, 3 dogs); medical team (23 personnel); assistance in kind (equivalent to approximately 60,000,000 yen). After the Indonesia-Java earthquake and tsunami in Java, Indonesia in 2006 Japan provided a medical team (26 personnel); SDF troops (264 personnel); and assistance in kind (20,000,000 yen). After Algeria’s earthquake in 2003, Japan contributed a rescue team (61 personnel, 2 dogs); medical team (22 personnel); and quarantine expert team (7 personnel). To help deal with the 2003 SARS crisis Japan dispatched a quarantine expert team (6 personnel to Vietnam, 4 to China). See Japan International Cooperation Agency, “JDR examples,” accessed October 22, 2012, http://www.jica.go.jp/jdr/case.html.

The assessment by the Democratic Party of Japan argues that “[t]he major difference between the Haiti earthquake and other natural disasters is that countries are engaging in ‘disaster relief diplomacy.’ The earthquake has been labeled as a ‘major global disaster’ and therefore countries have been judging the political and diplomatic significance of responding to this disaster, determining their degree of support and commitment in a top-down manner.”
had previously not been a major issue for Japan, unlike the United States. It has been suggested that Japan increased interest in further assisting in Haiti’s relief not only on humanitarian grounds but also to follow through on political promises: the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) had come into power in September in 2009, only four months before the earthquake, and had expressed a strong commitment to international institutions and cooperation. Haiti’s crisis was the first opportunity for the DPJ to act on its promises, promises made not only to the Japanese public but also to major international partners such as the U.S. and the UN. Responding to Haiti’s crisis in January 2010, the new DPJ administration dispatched JDR teams based on Japan’s aid standards, but in addition boldly dispatched SDF personnel under the PKO law, a first.

(c) Despite the fact that the JDR teams’ arrival was not as timely as that of other nations’ relief teams due to geographical distance, one of the comparative advantages that the JDR team demonstrated was its capacity to operate technologically advanced emergency equipment, much of which was shared with other international medical teams. This unique capability demonstrated Japan’s commitment to relief operations and may be comparable to that of the United States’ deployment of a hospital ship.

(d) Broadly speaking, aid from developed countries to poorer countries is can be characterized as a short-term or superficial investment rather than a long-term one. characterized as a fleeting way. However, to facilitate sustainable development, stakeholders need to ramp up coordination to larger and wider scales compared to the narrow and swift early-stage emergency response. In this point, triangular cooperation is one such unique program that fortifies partnership between neighboring countries. This approach is a strategy that allows experts from developing countries to network, build relationships, and ultimately find solutions to common development challenges. If neighboring countries are at a similar stage of development, each no doubt has experiences to share from which others can learn. Unlike conventional foreign aid architecture, triangular cooperation urges closer personal exchanges among developing countries. The social bond brought about by these exchanges reinforce integration on many levels. These personal exchanges eventually diversify and expand development options and economic links among developing countries. While the international community traditionally tends to calculate “benevolence” based on the scale of financial investment, positive impact brought to recipient countries should not be limited to financial contributions and should expand to include cooperation and exchange. It is widely understood that the international community needs to help recipient countries build leadership capacity and expertise to be effective engines for homegrown development. Triangular cooperation is one initiative to encourage just that.
IV. Policy proposals based on comparative analysis of the United States and Japan

The ultimate objective of this working paper is to introduce several conclusions with implications for future disaster reduction efforts by means of analyzing the respective strengths in disaster response of both the United States and Japan. Both countries have the unique ability to meet both short-term emergency response needs and long-term development goals in areas struck by disaster. However, in light of the discussions in the previous sections, the following set of policy recommendations, if implemented, could improve understanding between the United States and Japan, as well as among other stakeholders which might collaborate with them in future emergency relief operations.

1. Do not forget that diplomatic priorities and domestic political situations of donor countries affect their commitments to overseas emergency assistance.

Both the United States and Japan have independent instruments to tackle overseas emergency relief and recovery in pre/post-disaster situations. It would be foolish, however, to conclude that these instruments represent the maximum capabilities of each respective country. As in Haiti, USG can adopt a “whole-of-government” approach and carry out large scale relief operations only when disaster occurs in a country prioritized in U.S diplomacy. On the other hand, as explained in Japan’s response to Haiti, a domestic political situation can give rise to a worthy deviation from the standard set by previous allocation of foreign aid. Under a different set of domestic political conditions, Japan’s strong response in Haiti may not have happened.

2. Military capacity is quite useful for humanitarian relief, but it may provoke political controversy. Bilateral and multilateral policy coordination, sharing information, and promoting mutual understanding prior to the event is a key for smooth military engagement.

In emergency relief, the swift and integrated deployment of skilled personnel and supplies is indispensable. Common sense and experience reveal that the use of significant military assets and support can be indispensable in conducting humanitarian operations. The international community can rely on U.S. military capabilities in most cases. It might be unwise however, to conclude that military participation is justifiable in all humanitarian operations. While military components are expected to actively engage with global emergency operations from a humanitarian point of view, policymakers need to be aware of political and historical circumstances prior to decision making. In other words, the validity of military mobilization in disaster response must be deliberately tested on a case by case basis. On the other hand, it might be a good way for potential recipient countries to gain skillful diplomatic experience to try to utilize

military capacity of donor countries for their present-day benefits, rather than remaining cursed by the past.

3. **U.S. and Japan emergency relief teams provide high levels of medical services and equipment that other relief actors may utilize.**

It merits mention that both nations can provide high levels of medical services in emergency relief. In the case of Haiti, a U.S. military hospital ship and a JDR team deployed by GOJ provided people affected by the earthquake with appropriate services through the use of high-tech medical equipment on the ground. The medical equipment brought to Haiti by the JDR team was shared with other medical teams which did not bring their own. It is likely that other humanitarian actors, including NGOs, could rely on these capacities in emergency relief in the foreseeable future.

4. **Japan’s “triangular cooperation” should be applied to other situations, where appropriate.**

Japan’s policy toward Haiti now emphasizes long-term development efforts through ODA. Triangular cooperation in particular accelerates technology transfer and knowledge sharing among developing countries to meet long term goals. It is expected that this unique approach may generate positive impacts on Haiti’s domestic circumstances and its bilateral relationship with its neighbor the Dominican Republic.

5. **Common operational practices for the United States and Japan as major donors should include space for activities of civil society and advocacy services.**

Although this paper does not pursue this concept, for brevity’s sake, it is essential that the foreign aid community strengthen its association with and commitment to civil society is disaster relief. For instance, in Haiti relief, many national and international non-profit organizations carried out relief activities, and major donors including USG and GOJ provided them with financial support. Since the capacity of the public sector is limited, the active participation of civil organizations for the purpose of executing quick, thorough relief services in every conceivable arena of disaster relief is integral. Only through civil society’s engagement of major actors, such as the United States and Japan, will this foreign aid framework improve.

Another challenge is advocacy services. It is reasonable to assume that leaders of developing countries are generally interested in investing their limited resources in projects that will lead to visible and tangible developments in economic and social sectors, rather than in non-lucrative disaster reduction efforts which may not be utilized for some time, if ever. Regardless of their investment choices, natural disasters will occur, and it is likely that they will occur in vulnerable areas. In Haiti’s case, despite an awareness of the probability of natural disasters (Haiti had for years been warned by geologists), the Haitian government took no measures to prepare for them before the
event in 2010. It came as no surprise that the entire cost for rescue and reconstruction quickly became a burden that the international community shared. In light of this example, it is essential for donors, relief experts, and victims of past disasters to highlight how essential and inexpensive preparation is in comparison to the costs associated with disaster relief operations. Recognizing this sensible approach, it is possible for leaders in developing countries to include disaster reduction efforts in their public policy. In addition, the international community may encourage disaster prevention or mitigation—rather than simply disaster response—upon a sincere request by those countries. To encourage a culture of prevention in the long term and to put an associated disaster response framework into practice is a crucial step that the international community needs to take. The United States and Japan have a lot to contribute.

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