Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt

Omar Ashour
Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt

Omar Ashour
# Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. 1

II. Introduction: On Brothers and Officers ........................................................................... 4

III. On Coups ......................................................................................................................... 6

IV. Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt: An Overview .......................................................... 9

V. Crackdown or Compromise: How do the Generals Decide? ........................................... 16

VI. The Ever-Elusive Victory: How does the MB Decide? .................................................. 23

VII. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 30
Acknowledgments

Researcing the subject of Islamist-military relations in a period of transitions, upheavals, and extreme political and social polarization can be difficult, dangerous, and draining. Thus, I am very grateful to family, friends, and colleagues in Egypt and elsewhere in North Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and North America for their help and support throughout this journey.

I would like to thank all my colleagues at the Brookings Doha Center (BDC), especially Salman Shaikh, Ibrahim Sharqieh, Sultan Barakat, and Tamara C. Wittes at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy. I would also like to thank Bill Hess and Vittoria Federici for their guidance, feedback, and editorial help.

I am also grateful to several military and security generals and officers and several leaders, members, and affiliates of Egyptian Islamist movements for the generous sharing of their knowledge on the subject matter in times of crises.

I would finally like to thank Rex Brynen, Robert Springborg, Arie Kruglanski, Monty Marshall, and two anonymous peer-reviewers for their insightful comments and critical feedback during the preparation of this study.

Omar Ashour
London, March 2015
The military’s overthrow of President Muhammad Morsi, longtime member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), in July 2013 marked the latest chapter in an ongoing struggle between Egypt’s most organized, armed state bureaucracy and its most organized non-state actor. Historic trajectories of conflict and cooperation between these two groups have been driven by unbalanced civil-military relations; the political supremacy of the military over all other institutions has plagued the country’s politics since the 1952 coup.

Relations between Islamists and the military are a key factor in determining prospects for democratization in Egypt. Levels of popular support for the military and the MB are much greater than that for any of the other political forces in the country. On the one hand, this may be problematic for the future of democracy in Egypt. On the other, Egypt is less likely to make political or economic progress without a thorough reconfiguration of its Islamist-military relations.

Egyptian political transitions in 1952-1954 as well as 2011-2013—the former begun by a coup, the latter effectively ended by one—have generally entailed initial coordination between Islamists and dominant military factions at the outset, followed by a violent falling-out. This paper focuses on Islamist-military relations and performs a comparative analysis of their interactions during those two critical transition periods. It addresses two research questions:

1. How does the military reach decisions when dealing with the MB during transition periods?
2. How does the MB reach decisions regarding the military establishment during transition periods?

The paper has five sections and follows a particular logic of analysis. The first section addresses patterns of the political contexts in which military coups have been staged against democratically elected leaders or democratization processes. It reflects on how coups are risky endeavors, making the decision to stage them complicated. The second section is an overview of the legacies and patterns of conflict and cooperation between the leaderships of Egypt’s military and Egypt’s MB. This section provides the necessary empirical background for the analysis. The paper then analyzes the decision-making processes within the military establishment by considering four approaches: a rational
actor approach, an organizational one, a factional one, and a psychological one. The fourth section focuses on the MB’s decision-making process in a similar fashion.

The aforementioned decision-making approaches help illuminate the drivers of this bloody confrontation between the two groups. The military’s leadership, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), aimed to protect the independence of its economic activities and complexes, its veto power over Egyptian high politics, and its legal immunity, while avoiding any attempt at comprehensive security sector reform during the 2011-2013 transition period. It benefited significantly from the transition process. Hence, a rational-actor approach of perceiving Morsi’s government as a threat to their interests does not provide a full explanation.

The standard operating procedures (SOPs) of armed institutions before the revolution suggest clear continuity in how they are trained to address political instability, principally relying on intimidation and brute repression to restore order. At the same time, popular political polarization against the MB may have encouraged hardline “eradicator” factions within the armed institutions. The overall psychology of the military, given its superiority complex towards the civilian population in general and the MB in particular, also eased the decision to carry out a coup and embark on a violent crackdown in the aftermath.

For the MB, an initially rational policy of gradualist, hands-off interaction with the military eventually worked against the group, as major factions within the armed and security forces resisted and ignored presidential directives. Factionalism mattered. A centralized “Iron Organization” faction pushed the MB to field a presidential candidate in 2012, while MB revolutionary youth factions spurred the group to embark on a path of resistance in the aftermath of the coup in 2013. Additionally, historic memories of the MB’s acquiescence to Nasser’s growing repression back in the 1950s likely haunted the MB’s 2013 leadership, imbuing them with a defiant psychology of “never again” in the face of the military coup.

Improved civil-military relations hold the key to Egypt’s political future. Egypt has little hope of social stability, and thereby economic recovery, if the relationship between the highly organized, once widely popular MB and the politicized military cannot play out via democratic political competition. The military stands to gain directly from such a process, as the armies of democracies are far more effective in combat and less likely to clash with civilian populations.

Restructuring relations will not be easy. At a minimum, Egyptian institutions and foreign training programs should begin to promote security studies to educate politicians and officers alike on the nature of civil-military relations. At the same time, U.S. military aid to Egypt should not be fully resumed until the current military-dominated regime takes real steps toward supporting a democratic transition. Furthermore, the Egyptian parliament, whenever it is reconvened, should exercise greater oversight as to how this aid reaches military budgets.
With regards to the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization should draw on the legacies of post-coup experiences in South America and Southern Europe to endure repression while pressuring the regime for democratization and reform. This will require working to build a sustained, solid, and cross-ideological civilian front—something currently lacking from the Egyptian political scene. To participate in such a front, the MB will have to confront its own internal rivalries and the conspiratorial outlook bred by the harsh campaign against it.

The economic, social and humanitarian damage engendered by the 2013 military coup is considerable, with ongoing post-coup repression sure to prove even more harmful. The heavy costs of the status quo will likely force all sides to reconsider their positions, leading to a process of “forced maturation.”
Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt

“States [like ours] ranged across to Syria and down to Iraq. Neither Iraq exists nor will Syria keep on existing. You know why? Because when the army intervened [and] took the side of a party… The favored party began to use force against the other parties, regardless of who they are, and regardless of how successful they were or how strong their reasoning. I, as an army, do not care. I am saying this today because… we currently have a situation in Egypt. Don’t you dare think that patriotism means for us to stand with one party against another,” said General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi to a group of military officers.

A few weeks after delivering this clear warning against the military intervening in politics, the general led Egypt’s 2013 military coup. “As for the revolution, the Muslim Brothers neither think about it, nor depend on it. They neither believe in its usefulness nor its results,” said Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Society of the Muslim Brothers, or Muslim Brotherhood (MB), in a speech at the organization’s fifth general conference in February 1939. He argued that revolutions have usually led to negative consequences and are therefore not a viable method for reformist “Islamic” change, a point he stressed multiple times. More than seventy years later, the MB strongly supported a “revolution” leading to elections that brought them into the presidential palace.

This contradiction between the rhetoric and the behavior of both the military and the MB merits thorough analysis. The most organized state bureaucracy and the most organized non-state actor have occasionally cooperated and almost constantly clashed, affecting the political past, present, and potentially the future of Egypt. At the core of these conflict-and-cooperation trajectories is the issue of unbalanced civil-military relations. The supremacy of armed institutions over elected and judicial civilian institutions has plagued Egyptian politics since the country’s 1952 military coup—a coup in which junior military officers and the MB were partners and co-plotters. Like in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, the relations between Islamists and the military have been a core determinant of the prospects for democratization in Egypt. This paper focuses on that subject and performs a comparative analysis of military-MB interactions during two of Egypt’s critical transition periods: 1952-1954 and 2011-2013. The paper addresses two research questions: how does the military reach decisions

On Brothers and Officers

“States [like ours] ranged across to Syria and down to Iraq. Neither Iraq exists nor will Syria keep on existing. You know why? Because when the army intervened [and] took the side of a party… The favored party began to use force against the other parties, regardless of who they are, and regardless of how successful they were or how strong their reasoning. I, as an army, do not care. I am saying this today because… we currently have a situation in Egypt. Don’t you dare think that patriotism means for us to stand with one party against another,” said General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi to a group of military officers.

A few weeks after delivering this clear warning against the military intervening in politics, the general led Egypt’s 2013 military coup. “As for the revolution, the Muslim Brothers neither think about it, nor depend on it. They neither believe in its usefulness nor its results,” said Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Society of the Muslim Brothers, or Muslim Brotherhood (MB), in a speech at the organization’s fifth general conference in February 1939. He argued that revolutions have usually led to negative consequences and are therefore not a viable method for reformist “Islamic” change, a point he stressed multiple times. More than seventy years later, the MB strongly supported a “revolution” leading to elections that brought them into the presidential palace.

This contradiction between the rhetoric and the behavior of both the military and the MB merits thorough analysis. The most organized state bureaucracy and the most organized non-state actor have occasionally cooperated and almost constantly clashed, affecting the political past, present, and potentially the future of Egypt. At the core of these conflict-and-cooperation trajectories is the issue of unbalanced civil-military relations. The supremacy of armed institutions over elected and judicial civilian institutions has plagued Egyptian politics since the country’s 1952 military coup—a coup in which junior military officers and the MB were partners and co-plotters. Like in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, the relations between Islamists and the military have been a core determinant of the prospects for democratization in Egypt. This paper focuses on that subject and performs a comparative analysis of military-MB interactions during two of Egypt’s critical transition periods: 1952-1954 and 2011-2013. The paper addresses two research questions: how does the military reach decisions
when dealing with the MB, and how does the MB reach decisions regarding the military establishment? This is done using a comparative-historical, qualitative approach. While aiming to analyze Islamist-military relations, the paper will not attempt a thorough review of the history of these two transition periods.

This paper has five sections and follows a particular logic of analysis. The first section addresses patterns in the political contexts in which military coups have been staged against democratically elected leaders or democratization processes. It reflects how coups are risky and have a high likelihood of negatively affecting states as a whole. This complicates the decision to stage them, especially in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. The second section is an overview of the legacies and the patterns of conflict and cooperation between the leaderships of Egypt’s military and Egypt’s MB. This section provides the necessary empirical background for the analysis. The paper then focuses on the decision-making processes within the military establishment. It analyzes how the military has made its most critical decisions by considering four models: a rational actor model, an organizational model, a factionalism model, and a psychological model. The fourth section focuses on the MB’s decision-making process in a similar fashion. The paper concludes with a discussion of the way forward.

This paper does not focus on regional and foreign patronage and its impact on decision-making. This is mainly due to space limitations, but also in an attempt to isolate the domestic environment and its factors. Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that the military is by far the largest and the most consistent recipient of foreign funding, equipping, and training in Egypt, outpacing any and all other institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) put together. Between 1948 and 2014, the United States, by itself, has provided Egypt’s military with $74.65 billion in aid, with more than half of that coming since 1979. No other state institution, NGO, or any other entity in Egypt receives that level of funding. It should also be noted that the MB has a transnational component. Whereas the influence of its international organization on the local “chapters” is limited (and in some cases negligible), the transnational links of the MB matter in terms of logistical and moral support as well as for networking and recruitment dynamics.

This paper argues that the levels of popular support for the military and the MB are much greater than for any other political force in the country. While this reality may be problematic for the future of democracy in Egypt, the country is less likely to make political or economic progress without a thorough reconfiguration of its Islamist-military relations.
The debate in Egypt between supporters of President Muhammad Morsi and anti-coup activists, on one hand, and the supporters of General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi and the military takeover, on the other, can be represented by the following question: Was the July 3, 2013 event in which Morsi was deposed and the military assumed power a coup or a revolution? For scholars, the answer is clear—the event was a coup. For politicians and activists, however, the core of the issue is not about scholastic definitions, but legitimacy. Casting the ouster of an elected president, the dissolution of an elected parliament, the suspension of a constitution, and the repression of the political opposition as a revolution legitimates anti-democratic actions and the political comeback of the military. Casting it as a coup removes that legitimacy—hence, the problem.

Definitions and Features of Coups

There are indeed multiple definitions of coups in political science literature. One that captures and summarizes most of them defines a coup as “an illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.” This is regardless of the amount of popular support that exists for the coup and its plotters.

Coups are usually classified based on four dimensions: the perpetrators, their motives, their tactics, and their targets. While Finer limits coup perpetrators to the armed forces, Luttwak, Ferguson, Janowitz, Taylor and Jodice, O’Kane, Marshall, and other scholars include civilian parties or groups and non-military elites as coup co-perpetrators. These latter scholars agree that coups may be undertaken by any elite in collaboration with the military and security services. In terms of tactics, scholars agree that the illegal use or threat of force is the principal feature of military coups, though the levels of violence and bloodshed vary greatly. Moreover, coups consistently correlate with gross human rights violations and are linked to future civil war. Military coups even have numerous common features with terrorism, as both are forms of political violence that include the illegitimate use of force against civilians or non-combatants to achieve a political objective, influence a government, or intimidate the public. When it comes to targets, coups are classified based on the regime type they attempt to depose, whether a military dictatorship, constitutional monarchy, democratically elected civilian government, or something else.
Coups that target democratically elected governments correlate with high levels of bloodshed and repression. The freely elected figure or institution that is deposed usually has significant support among segments of the society, subsets of which choose resistance over submitting to the coup’s perpetrators. To assert supremacy and control, the perpetrators turn to massive repression. Such cases are prevalent over the past century from Spain in 1936 to Egypt in 2013.

In general, coups have a negative impact on democratization processes and correlate with the inhibition of democratic consolidation. Some patterns have emerged based on what type of regime the coup plotters target. If the target of the coup is an elected institution or electoral process, the likelihood of a wave of repression is high while the probability of democratic transition is low. Globally, out of the 217 coups staged between 1945 and 2008, only 14 (6.4 percent) have led to initiating a democratization process. If the coup deposes an authoritarian regime, however, there is a significant chance of the perpetrators limiting their domains of power and prerogatives and initiating a democratic process. This was the case in Portugal in 1974, for example. Of the 88 successful coups that occurred in Africa between 1945 and 2008, only 4 (4.5 percent) led to initiating a democratization process, but all 4 of those coups were staged against military regimes that had themselves taken power by coups.

When coups do negatively impact democratization, the effect usually does not last. Powell and Thyne have shown that within several years of both successful and failed coups, countries’ mean “Polity scores” recover to pre-coup levels, if not improving. This rise in Polity score is usually preceded by a period of persistent civil resistance, social polarization, economic deterioration, or political unrest that may ultimately lead to compromise and a political opening.

“Brumairean Moments”

There were 457 coup attempts globally between 1950 and 2010, 227 (49.7 percent) of which succeeded in removing a government. Many of these coups had significant support from specific segments of the society. When the coups targeted democratically elected leaders or institutions, those supportive segments usually included most of the losers in the electoral process, influential members of the upper and upper-middle social classes who negatively perceived the new ruling elite, and the supporters and beneficiaries of military rule. This pattern was evident in General Franco’s 1936 coup against the Popular Front in Spain, General Zahedi’s 1953 coup against Muhammad Mossadegh’s

In most of the aforementioned cases, narrowly elected governments were ousted by military juntas that enjoyed the support of some segments of the political spectrum and society. Such periods constitute what Alfred Stepan calls “Brumairean moments.” He is referring to Karl Marx’s seminal 1852 essay entitled “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” Marx was explaining why influential segments of the urban upper-middle class in France supported a military dictatorship under Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, as well as the suppression of their lower class socio-political rivals. Indeed, the types of societal segments that have supported coups as brutal as Franco’s, Pinochet’s, Videla’s, and Evren’s raise eyebrows as they include political parties, civil society groups, and even religious institutions and figures such as Catholic priests in the cases of Chile and Argentina. In explaining the support for Branco’s coup, Stepan concludes, “Fear created a social base and the Brumairean moment. But as the Sao Paulo entrepreneurs learned in the late 1970s, the receding of bourgeois fear does not mean that power once yielded to the military will be given back without a struggle.”

Egypt has had its own Brumairean moments. In 1952, an army faction staged a coup not only against the monarchy, but also against an elected parliament. Once King Farouk I departed, a minority within the junta wanted to recall the parliament and resume constitutional democratic politics. The majority, however, wanted a military dictatorship. Due to the significant firepower held by the minority, the competing factions compromised, agreeing to refer the matter to the judiciary. On July 31, 1952, a highly politicized State Council ruled in a nine-to-one decision that the parliament should not be recalled. Abdel-Razzaq al-Sanhouri, the head of the Council, and Suleiman Hafiz, the deputy of the Council, opposed the Wafd party, which was the most popular at the time, and aimed to block it from controlling the parliament. At a later stage, the Council also ruled that it was constitutionally legitimate for an army officer to preside over a civilian government. Nine unelected, politicized judges voted to bring down their elected political rivals, and with them Egypt’s fledgling democracy. Significant segments of the public supported the decision, but seemingly not a majority. On December 29, 1952, some of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s army colleagues and leading members of the MB asked him to hold elections. He replied, “If I held elections today, al-Nahas [the leader of al-Wafd party] would win. What have we achieved then?”

“When coups negatively impact democratization, the effect usually does not last.”
The aforementioned meeting with Nasser was attended by members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the MB. It reflects a pattern of relationships in Egyptian political history. The military, represented by its controlling faction, and Islamists, represented by the MB’s leadership, coordinated at the beginning of a transition process. Then the visions and the interests of the two sides would diverge. At this point, given the structural weakness of non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms (whether institutional, legal, cultural or political) and the superior capacity of the military to utilize violence, the Islamists have historically ended up losing out. Ultimately, after initially cordial interactions, the military usually ends up repressing the Islamists, and in extreme cases perpetrating massacres, like in Tora Prison in June 1957 and at Rab’a Square in August 2013. The repression engenders waves of resistance that take various forms, from classic civil resistance to violent armed tactics. Depending on the timeframe, these waves expand or shrink in their scope, geographical scale, intensity, and duration.

The First Round: 1952-1954

In the past hundred years, Egypt witnessed three major transitional periods that significantly affected its contemporary politics. The first occurred between 1919 and 1923, when Egypt reclaimed partial independence from Great Britain and established a constitutional monarchy through the promulgation of the 1923 constitution. This transitional period yielded a relatively liberal constitution, a system of institutionalized party politics, and a parliament, though its powers were greatly inferior to those held by the ruling monarch and the British consul-general. However, social injustices, corruption, and the co-optation of the political elite by the palace and the former colonial power, as well as the humiliating 1948 defeat against Israel, all contributed to the popularity of the Free Officers’ military coup, staged on July 23, 1952. This was the first major coordination between army officers and the MB to oust a ruling regime.

This coup sparked another transitional period, which lasted until 1954. By then, the victorious faction within the army had put an end to Egypt’s limited democratic experience. That transition yielded a military-dominated system, a state-controlled economy, and a ban on political parties. From this point onward, the military establishment became the most powerful political actor in Egypt, wiping out or co-opting every rival and creating a new set of political rules.
The MB coordinated with the army officers in various ways and forms before and after the 1952 coup. Several MB members were also army and police officers. The graduations of MB students from the military academy were publicly celebrated in MB headquarters as early as 1940. When preparations for the 1952 coup started in late 1949, MB officers were an integral part of it. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Mun‘im Abdul Ra‘uf, a leading figure in the MB, was one of the seven officers who co-founded the first Free Officers cell in the Egyptian army.32

Looking further back, by 1946, the MB had two main armed wings: the Special Apparatus (SA) and the Units Department (UD). The SA was mainly composed of civilians that received various levels of paramilitary training—Nasser and other Free Officers were among their instructors.33 In preparation for the coup, the SA had several roles, including securing the Cairo-Ismaïlia highway and blocking any advance of British troops from the Canal Zone if they decided to support the monarchy in Cairo. SA elements were also assigned to secure embassies in several districts of Cairo.34

The UD, meanwhile, was mainly responsible for propagating the ideology of the MB in the army and the police force as well as for recruiting officers. Some MB army officers referred to the group as Tanzim al-Dubbat al-Ikhwan (Organization of Brothers’ Officers).35 A secret list of the names, ranks, and divisions of these officers was handed over to Nasser by Major Mahmoud Labib, the founder of the UD, in 1949 so the Free Officers could recruit them to help with the coup.36 The last major military coordination between the MB and the Free Officers was on July 26, 1952 when Ra‘uf led the siege of Ra‘s al-Tin Royal Palace in Alexandria and exchanged fire with the Royal Guards. By the end of the day, Battalion 19, commanded by an MB officer, forced King Farouk I to abdicate.

Cooperation between the faction controlling the Free Officers and MB members did not last for long after the coup. Major sources of contention quickly came to the fore, including civilians’ place in the transition, constitutional crafting, political freedoms, land confiscation and redistribution, MB alliances with anti-Nasser army factions, and the army’s role in politics.37 By December 1952, Nasser made it clear to the MB that there would be neither free elections nor a re-installation of civilian leadership. In January 1953, the RCC dissolved and banned all political parties in Egypt. The MB did not oppose this decision because it did not affect them (they were not a political party) and also to avoid a costly clash with Nasser’s powerful faction in the RCC and the army, an opportunistic stance that would prove costly in the future. By January 1954, however, the RCC banned the MB itself. A crackdown followed during which around 450 MB leaders and members were arrested.38

The confrontation between the leaders of the Free Officers and the MB intensified. On February 28, 1954, tens of thousands of protestors besieged General Naguib, then the president, and Colonel Nasser, then prime minister and minister of interior, in Abdin
Palace in downtown Cairo. The demands were clear: a return to civilian rule, the release of all political prisoners, the reinstatement of democratic institutions, and that the army return to its barracks. Nasser asked Abdul Qadir Audeh, the Secretary-General of the MB, to dismiss the protesters. Audeh complied, hoping to reach a compromise, but was arrested that same night by Nasser’s loyalists in the military police and was executed a year later. In 1993, leftist historian Abdel-Azim Ramadan, who is notably critical of the MB, wrote that Audeh was a “martyr of democracy who entered history” and that the show-trial that ordered his execution was “the worst disgrace in Egypt’s contemporary history.”

On March 29, 1954, Nasser’s supporters organized a counter-demonstration, chanting slogans that included “down with democracy” and “down with educated people.” Another crackdown on the MB and other political groups followed. This time, given the level of repression, the MB did not have the capacity to stage a massive protest. In October 1954, however, a mid-ranking SA leader and one of his subordinates carried out an amateurishly organized, failed attempt on Nasser’s life. Nasser’s crackdown subsequently intensified with thousands of MB leaders and members being arrested and jailed, and those in the military being court-martialed. Six MB members were executed, and the General Guide, Hasan al-Hudaybi, was sentenced to death. Ultimately, Nasser’s military faction won its 1952-1954 confrontation with the MB, crushing, though not quite destroying, the group.

**The Second Round: 2011 – 2013**

Karl Marx’s oft-quoted phrase, “history repeats itself, the first time as a tragedy, the second time as a farce” was about military coups ending political transitions. The “tragedy” that Marx was referring to was Napoléon Bonaparte’s 1799 coup that ended one of France’s revolutionary phases—a coup supported by large segments of the French population. The “farce” was the repetition of almost the same scenario at the hands of his nephew, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte. The latter staged a coup against a parliament in 1851, also with the support of segments of the French population.

Nineteenth century French revolutionaries and twenty-first century Egyptian Islamists do not have a lot in common, but Marx’s quote applies well to both. For Egypt, the similarities between the 1952-1954 and 2011-2013 periods are numerous. In 1952, the MB did not initiate the coup, but strongly supported and participated in it. The execution of the coup hinged on their support and approval. The same applies to the 2011 uprising. The MB leadership did not plan or initiate it, but strongly supported it, contributing to the resilience of the Tahrir Square demonstrations in February 2011, and ultimately to Mubarak’s abdication.
Between 2011 and 2013, the interactions between the MB and the military establishment can be divided into five phases. The first phase was March-December 2011, a period of cooperation between them. As opposed to Tunisia, where a civilian body led the post-dictatorship transition, almost all of the pro-uprising parties and groups accepted the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)—an unconstitutional, politically conservative military body—as the leader of a “revolutionary” transition process. The SCAF devised a transitional roadmap in February and March 2011, and a seven-member, SCAF-appointed committee introduced 11 amendments to the 1971 constitution. One of the committee members was a renowned lawyer from the MB, Sobhy Saleh. The MB successfully campaigned for a “yes” vote for the amendments and 77.2 percent of voters complied on March 19, 2011. The final constitutional declaration of March 30, 2011 was alarming, though—the SCAF not only suspended the amended 1971 constitution, but also added 51 other articles to a constitutional declaration that enhanced its powers. The MB and most of the “yes” voters did not oppose these changes.

Between March and December 2011, there were no strong reasons for an MB-SCAF conflict. Both sides emerged as winners. The MB wanted legitimacy via votes and institutions, and it had enough popular support to ensure it. The Democratic Alliance, a multi-ideological coalition led and dominated by the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), won 235 seats in Egypt’s first free and fair parliamentary elections, only 20 seats short of an absolute majority. The SCAF did not mind because its March 2011 constitutional declaration limited the mandate of elected institutions. Egypt’s first freely and fairly elected parliament, for example, could not appoint or sack a minister. The SCAF was also interested in having a final say in the transition process, especially top national security and political issues, and the MB played along.

While the SCAF and the MB had no reason to clash during this phase, many parties and groups that struggled in the parliamentary elections and referendums were less content. These included entities as different as the pro-revolution “Revolution Continues” Coalition, and the anti-revolution, pro-Mubarak offshoots of the National Democratic Party (NDP). The strategy adopted by some of these losing parties was to play “spoilers” by persistently trying to ally themselves with the military, calling for the prolonging of SCAF’s rule, as well as demanding the disbanding of elected institutions via various methods, including legal appeals and outright calls for a military coup. This strategy ultimately paid off, at least temporarily, for some of these parties and groups, such as the Social Democratic Party. It won only 16 seats (3.1 percent) in the parliamentary elections, but after the 2013 coup, the junta appointed two of the party’s founders and leading figures, Hazem al-Beblawi and Ziad Bahaa Al-Din, as prime minister and deputy prime minister. Both publicly defended a wave of repression and exclusion against their political rivals; Beblawi went as far as saying that “atrocities have to be
committed sometimes,” comparing the storming of the Rab’a Square sit-in to World War II and Vietnam.\textsuperscript{52}

The level of cooperation between the MB and the SCAF started declining from January 2012 with the convening of Egypt’s first freely elected parliament. This second phase of MB-SCAF relations lasted until June 2012. It was a phase of controlled conflict, summarized by the words of influential SCAF member General Mukhtar al-Mulla: “Whatever the majority in the People’s Assembly, they are very welcome, because they won’t have the ability to impose anything that the people don’t want.”\textsuperscript{53} The statement reflected the balance of power in the country. Despite more than 26 million Egyptians voting for the lower house of the parliament, the People’s Assembly, it was an institution with a weak mandate. Additionally, the performances of many of the Islamist members of parliament (MPs), mainly from the Nour Party bloc, were lamentable and made a mockery of Egypt’s first freely elected lower house. In June 2012, a SCAF decision dissolved the lower house following a constitutional court ruling that part of the electoral law was “unconstitutional.” This decision vested all legislative powers in the SCAF only days before Egypt’s first civilian president was scheduled to take office on June 30, 2012. It was, in effect, a bloodless coup, one that passed without any international condemnation and limited domestic criticism. Because the winner in the parliamentary elections, the MB, had also won the presidency, it did not mobilize its supporters and coalition partners. The majority of the losers in the electoral process had been calling for the dissolution and cheered for it when it happened.

The third phase in the MB-SCAF relationship was an outright conflict between Morsi and the SCAF, which was headed by Field-Marshall Muhammad Hussein Tantawy. This confrontation played out between July and August 2012. On July 10, 2012, the constitutional court, with the public support of the SCAF, struck down a presidential attempt to reinstate the dissolved parliament. The SCAF aimed to keep its legislative powers, appoint a constitutional assembly, and ensure that the civilian presidency remained weak, but it was unexpectedly thwarted. A massacre of 16 soldiers by an armed group on August 5, 2012 in Sinai gave the President Morsi political space in which to undertake a daring purge of some of the most powerful generals.\textsuperscript{54} On August 12, Morsi issued decrees removing Tantawy, his deputy (General Sami Anan), and the heads of the General Intelligence Apparatus (Murad Mowafi), Presidential Guard (Muhammad Nagib Abdel-Salam), Military Police (Hamdy Badin), Cairo Security Directorate (Mohsen Murad), and Central Security Forces (Emad Al-Wakil) from their positions. The common features among those generals was their publicly known anti-reform stance, defiance of elected civilian rule, and efforts to preserve as many of the policies, practices, and even figures of the Mubarak regime as possible.

“The third phase in the MB-SCAF relationship was an outright conflict between Morsi and the SCAF.”
While the dramatic dismissals increased Morsi’s support among some of the relatively weak and decentralized revolutionary youth groups, the stronger and more centralized actors in the armed and judicial institutions, as well as pro-Mubarak forces, were quite alarmed. “I thought: This man is not just a scarecrow, he is starting to show fangs … that made a lot of people uncomfortable,” said a former member of Mubarak’s NDP.

Between August and November 2012, however, the president started losing some of his non-Islamist, pro-revolution allies. This was due to disagreements on cabinet appointments (dominated by Mubarak-era holdovers), constitutional assembly tensions over articles (especially Salafi-supported ones), and the polarizing political narrative employed by the Islamist forces, as well as the deep mistrust between the MB/FJP and its former allies. Morsi’s next big move—the constitutional declaration of November 2012—turned this tension into outright animosity. The constitutional declaration aimed to remove the Mubarak-era public prosecutor, protect the remaining elected and indirectly elected institutions—all of which had an Islamist majority—from dissolution by the Constitutional Court dominated by mostly Mubarak-era holdovers, bring about retrials of acquitted security generals, and compensate the victims of repression during and after the uprising. This declaration made rival politicians, senior bureaucrats, and armed institution leaders even more wary of Morsi’s potential power. “Regardless of his intentions, so far we only have a complete dictatorship. I will only believe judicial reform when I see it,” said a human rights and political activist who was campaigning against Morsi.

While most pro-revolution forces may have supported Morsi’s aims, for many, attempting to attain them through such a dramatic expansion of presidential power was a step too far. Given Egypt’s extreme polarization and the distrust between political forces, the level of resistance the declaration engendered was not surprising. A “zero-sum” attitude, which viewed any achievement by Morsi as a loss by his opponents, was the main feature of the political game. “It was imperative for the President to neutralize politicized Constitutional Court judges, whose rulings kept on striking down elected institutions. But the means used [were] not good,” said Dr. Muhammad Mahsoob, the former Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.

Somehow, the security institutions, both army and police, ultimately emerged from this crisis as winners. On the one hand, the army became a powerful “arbiter” between increasingly polarized political forces. Mohamed ElBaradei, for example, would refuse to meet with the elected president, but would instead ask to meet with the defense minister. Following the constitutional declaration, he said, “You cannot exclude that the army will intervene to restore law and order.” The other winner was the police force. Part of the police leadership and many officers decided to disengage from their duties and go on an undeclared strike. This began in February 2011 and gradually intensified...
after the election of Morsi in June 2012. In December 2012, when demonstrators attacked the Ittihadiya presidential palace with Molotov cocktails and attempted to remove its gates with a crane, the Central Security Forces were nowhere to be found. A similar stance was taken by some units from the Presidential Guards. When asked to send protection to the palace, Minister of Interior Ahmed Gamal al-Din asked the president to comply with the protesters’ demands before he would send any.

On December 22, 2012, some of the police units stationed in front of the president’s residence almost joined the riot. “You son of … you will be in jail in a matter of hours … the likes of you cannot be in the presidential palace...” yelled a senior police officer in charge of securing the home of the president, where his wife and son were present. “I strongly protested and informed the Presidential Guard of what was happening,” said Brigadier General Tarek Al-Gohary, a police officer who was among the units securing the house. When Al-Gohary protested, he was told by one of his colleagues that “he will be facing the fate of General al-Batran,” a Police General who was shot on January 29, 2011—allegedly by two of his colleagues—after refusing to carry out the orders of General Habib al-Adly, Mubarak’s minister of interior, to open the gates of al-Qatta prison to release the convicts in an attempt to save the Mubarak regime by creating nation-wide chaos.

In March 2013, the army made a mockery of Morsi in the Canal Zone. Facing bloody turmoil in Port Said, the minister of defense advised the president to declare a curfew, but instead of upholding it, the army held a soccer tournament in the Canal Zone cities during the curfew hours. Overall, especially from December 2012, the MB and the military were headed toward an open confrontation. The president faced a silent mutiny, initially from the police force, and then from the army.
Coups have their own costs, benefits, and consequences. As previously established, they are high-risk, illegal endeavors. Coups are especially risky when they target recently elected institutions or figures due to those figures’ significant popular support and therefore a higher possibility of resistance. So why did the Sisi-led SCAF decide to stage the July 2013 coup? A few explanations exist, but before outlining them, it is useful to review the aims of the SCAF since it took power February 2011.

The January 2011 uprising was a product of the struggle of several socio-political forces that challenged the Mubarak status quo, but these pro-change forces had different motivations. The pro-revolution forces, whether Islamist or non-Islamist, were motivated by the regime’s corruption and repression. In contrast, the military establishment, led by the SCAF, believed that some of Mubarak’s policies, mainly those influenced by his son Gamal and his wife Susan, were undermining the interests of the establishment’s leaders. They nevertheless believed that the principal elements of the status quo should be maintained, especially the military establishment’s veto power over political decision-making. This difference in perceptions and objectives caused tensions and clashes throughout the SCAF’s rule, as well as Morsi’s. For example, to the SCAF, comprehensive security sector reform, bringing the armed forces under the control and oversight of democratically elected civilians, and budgetary transparency are at a minimum radical concepts and at a maximum threatening taboos that should be eliminated or rendered meaningless.

Between February 2011 and July 2013, the SCAF would have liked to combine a parliament with limited powers, a presidency that was subordinate to the military, and constitutional prerogatives that legitimized the military’s autonomy and potential control over high politics. The minimum the SCAF insisted on was a veto on foreign and security policy, independence for the army’s budget and economic complexes, legal immunity from prosecution on charges stemming from corruption or repression, and constitutional prerogatives to guarantee these arrangements. The veto power over political decision-making would include any issues that touch on national security or sensitive foreign policy, most importantly the relationship with Israel. To control high politics, the SCAF decreed a constitutional addendum in July 2012 that gave it the prerogatives of the dissolved parliament, including legislative authority, and the rights to form a constitutional assembly and veto constitutional articles. The addendum also
ordered the formation of a national defense council dominated by the military and granted military intelligence and military police the power to arrest civilians on charges as minor as traffic disruption and “insulting” the army.

The independent military-economic complexes, which benefit from preferential customs and exchange rates, tax exemption, land ownership and confiscation rights (without paying the treasury), and an army of almost-free laborers (conscripted soldiers) are the source of much military influence and thus another thorny issue for any elected civilian. With the Egyptian economy suffering, elected politicians might well seek to improve conditions by moving against the military's civilian assets by imposing a form of taxation and revising the preferential rates and land confiscation policies. Corruption and immunity from prosecution are no less salient.

Despite its power, the SCAF was quite sensitive to certain factors. Pressure from the United States was one of them, due to its provision of arms, training, and funds. Street mobilization was another factor. Most of the SCAF’s pro-democracy decisions came as a result of massive pressure from Tahrir Square protests. These included the removal of Mubarak, his trial (and that of other regime figures), and bringing the date of the presidential election forward from June 2013 to June 2012. Another factor that influenced the SCAF’s decision-making was the army’s internal cohesion. It is no secret that internal reports about potential mutiny within the middle and lower ranks were among the factors that caused the SCAF to abandon Mubarak and disobey his orders to crack down on protesters. “The sight of officers in uniform protesting in Tahrir Square and speaking on Al Jazeera really worries the Field Marshal,” said a former officer.

If those were the minimum objectives and the visible constraints, then what explains the decision to stage the July 2013 coup and the repressive follow-up? There are several explanatory models to consider in this regard.

**Rational Actor Model**

Rational explanations for state and non-state political violence exist. Morality aside, the benefits of repression simply outweighed the costs of accommodation or inclusion in the calculations of the generals. If the generals perceived the elected bodies as potential future threats, and they could suspend a publicly approved constitution, dissolve an elected parliament, arrest an elected president, and kill, injure, or detain thousands who opposed these measures without accountability, why would they risk a future change in the balance of power?

Yet the military was by no means a loser in the 2011-2013 transition process. Not only did it enjoy multiple domains of power under President Morsi, but these domains were constitutionally legal. In the 2012 constitution, supported by the MB/FJP and
approved by 63.83 percent of voters, the defense minister had to be a military officer (article 195), and the National Defense Council would have a majority of military commanders (article 197). This effectively gave the military a veto over any national security or sensitive foreign policy issue. Article 198 allowed military tribunals for civilians “when a crime harms the armed forces.” Legal immunity from civilian courts was granted and there were no public indicators showing that civilian politicians were capable or willing to move against the military’s industrial complex, a black hole in the Egyptian economy. “[Morsi] did not really harm us….I mean the things [officers] care about like the salaries, the benefits, the pensions were all fine,” said a mid-ranking army officer three months before the July 2013 coup. Given the costs, benefits, and high probability of a bloody aftermath, the rational actor model alone does not explain the July coup, unless there was a miscalculation of the likely scale, scope, and intensity of popular anti-coup reactions.

Organizational Procedures and Factionalism

Another explanation for the military’s decisions and behavior lies in its organizational routines. Every institution has a set of “standard operating procedures” or SOPs: formal and informal rules according to which actions and reactions are determined. In the case of confronting anti-government protests, the use of intimidation and repression has been SOP for both the army and police forces over the last six decades of Egyptian politics. The January 2011 uprising posed a serious challenge to that model by directly challenging the power of coercive institutions such as the Central Security Forces or the Military Police, while also demanding greater accountability from security services of all stripes. It is clear that the military felt uncomfortable with this new state of affairs. “What police officers have been faced with in the last two years has created a new environment... In that new environment, the police officer would stand up to you up to a certain point. [But he] won’t be prepared to use tear gas, grenades or shotguns. If someone dies, if something happens to somebody, [the officer] might get tried... [The officer] is not going to do it. And I want to tell you all--the protestors have realized this,” General Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi was compelled to explain to several officers in a widely disseminated video. He stressed that the police would be of less help to the military in the event of a crackdown given fears of being held liable for any abuse or killings.

Despite these concerns, continuity rather than change seemed the order of the day. This was certainly true for Egypt’s security services. One police officer, speaking in the wake of an October 2013 crackdown that killed 50 protestors, said, “Look, this is how we used to work for two decades. We played by the book in October … it is a bad book but...
there is no chance of replacing it now.” Even before Muhammad Morsi took office, the military was only too willing to play by the same book. Military forces condoned or participated in harsh responses to demonstrations and sit-ins throughout 2011, most notably against Coptic Christian demonstrators in front of the Maspero government television building in October 2011.

A third potential explanation for how the military makes decisions has to do with factionalism within the security establishment and its political allies. Coup perpetrators and supporters often divide into two coalitions after the coup, one that advocates the eradication of the ousted party while the other calls for limited inclusion and controlled repression. The *erradicadors* versus *diálogistas* (eradicators versus dialogists) saga is common in the history of South American juntas. O’Donnell and Schmitter refer to them as “*duros*” (hard-liners) and “*blandos*” (soft-liners). In addition to their stance on eradication and limited inclusion, the first group believes “that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible and desirable, if not by rejecting outright all democratic forms, then by erecting some façade behind which they can maintain the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of their power.” The second group agrees with the first on using repression in the initial phases, but believes it is necessary to reintroduce certain freedoms and some degree of electoral legitimation to maintain the system. Such divides have played out elsewhere away from South America, including in Greece in 1967, Algeria in 1992, and, as described above, in Egypt following its 1952 coup.

By August 2013, major parts of the pro-coup factional map were clear for analysts and observers. Speaking about General Mohammad Farid al-Tohamy, the head of the General Intelligence Apparatus, one Western diplomat told the New York Times, “He was the most hardline, the most absolutely unformed.” ‘Tohamy was a strong advocate of the August 2013 crackdown on Rab’a Square that yielded more than 1,250 fatalities. Within that faction, there is a strong belief that Field Marshal Tantawy was lenient in dealing with protestors. Therefore, the lesson learned from Mubarak and Tantawy’s days was to crack down harder. The SCAF understood that if it used Qaddafi- or Assad-like tactics following the coup, the likelihood of a NATO intervention to save the revolution (as in Libya) or any significant armed resistance (as in Syria) would be almost nil. If parts of the latter scenario did materialize, however, the army and the police would have a superior capacity to utilize violence and win any armed conflict, as it did in Upper Egypt in the 1990s. It would also have the legitimacy to do so, due to the armed dimension of the conflict.

In August 2013, European Union envoy Bernardino León and Deputy U.S. Secretary of State William Burns led a mediation process aimed at containing and potentially resolving the post-coup crisis. “They told us that there are moderates in the government…”
they meant Dr. Mohammad ElBaradei,” said Dr. Amr Darrag, the former Minister of Planning and International Cooperation and an FJP politician. The core of the plan was to release the heads of two political parties, FJP leader and former parliament speaker Saad al-Katatny and al-Wasat Party leader Abu al-Ila Mady, to negotiate a resolution with international guarantees in exchange for calling off the sit-ins in Rab’a and al-Nahda Squares. On August 6, León phoned Darrag to tell him that the crisis was about to be resolved peacefully, but over the following week, the dialogist side, a weak minority within the military-appointed government, was successfully marginalized. On August 14, hours after the Rab’a crackdown, León said, “We had a political plan that was on the table, that had been accepted by the [MB]…. [The SCAF] could have taken this option. So all that has happened today was unnecessary.” ElBaradei, the Nobel laureate who plotted the coup with the junta and served as a vice president in the post-coup government, but was marginalized after calling for limiting the repression after a third major crackdown against anti-coup activists on July 27, 2013, resigned the same day as the Rab’a massacre.

“Since the 1952 coup, a superiority complex has steadily developed within the military.

It is important to note that the eradicator and dialogist categories by no means correspond to a military-civilian divide. In almost all of the aforementioned cases, including in Egypt, civilian figures have strongly supported and lobbied for “eradication” policies, including journalists, politicians, clerics and other religious figures, businessmen, youth activists, and even “human rights” activists. One former human rights activist and academic called for turning mosques and schools into concentration camps for 750,000 alleged members of the ousted party.

In a conversation with a pro-dialogue brigadier general who focuses on negotiations within the Egyptian armed forces, the author asked if he or other specialists within the military were consulted on how to resolve the crisis without further bloodshed. “Our [pro-dialogue] opinions were not welcomed at that moment,” he replied.

The Psychological Factor

There is also a psychological explanation for the military’s decision to perpetuate a coup and the subsequent repression of its opponents. This aspect of the military’s decision-making is perhaps the least studied and is certainly harder to research. Since the 1952 coup, a superiority complex has steadily developed within the military. General Gamal Hammad, a member of the Free Officers and author of the first communiqué of the 1952 coup, mentioned that newly ruling officers had become “crazy with power” once they gradually realized that their “words have become laws … and that they became the new masters of Egypt.”
Sixty years later, having a civilian declare himself as the “supreme commander of the armed forces” was unacceptable for many military commanders, not only because “civilian” is believed to be an inferior category, but also because an *ikhwan* (Muslim Brother) is believed to have low status within that inferior category, and is usually associated with lower-middle class, rural migrants. “Every time [Morsi] says ‘I am the supreme commander of the armed forces,’ I want to hit him with something,” said an army officer in April 2013, three months before the coup.89

The effect of this superiority complex on behavior and decision-making was reinforced by interactions between the SCAF and various civilian politicians and activists during the transition period. “The SCAF would weigh them, analyze them, dissect them, understand what they want, what they crave...the [SCAF] member in charge of this was Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the head of the military intelligence,” said a retired army Major General.90 “They [civilian politicians] certainly did not earn their [SCAF] respect. By March 2011, the question became: how can we [military] handover the country to these people (civilian politicians)?... Ideas such as a ‘safe exit’ for the SCAF were laughable. We [military] should give them a safe exit if we were generous, not the other way around…. that was the thinking,” said the general.

Far from “handing over the country,” the issue of civilian oversight, even within a weak institutional arrangement, was psychologically problematic. This was reflected in General Sisi’s comments while meeting with military officers: “We haven’t seen the end of this yet …. there is a coming parliament, it may ask questions, and I wonder what will we do about that … we have to prepare to confront this without negatively affecting us.”91

This pre-coup, forthcoming parliament would have probably had a significant percentage, if not a majority, of Islamist MPs.

The military’s superiority complex is not limited to civilian politicians and civilian institutions. It is also directed at other armed institutions, such as the police force. Despite a dominant military dimension in the police force hierarchy, rankings, laws, organizational structures, training and curricula, the force is described in its bylaws and constitutions as a “civilian entity;” hence—in terms of prestige—it is seen as inferior to the military, especially after the January uprising. “Military officers believe that they saved the Ministry of Interior from protesters, and protected police stations and prisons…and without them the Ministry [of Interior] would have collapsed,” said a police officer attempting to the explain the military’s superiority complex over the police force following the January 2011 uprising.92

Finally, the aforementioned decision-making frames are not mutually exclusive and can sometimes be applied in combination. Overall, within a domestic framework, they help
explain why the military leadership decided to pursue the risky course of carrying out a coup followed by a violent crackdown in its aftermath.
The main question raised in this section is how the MB made decisions when faced with the sensitive crises of the transitional 2011-2013 period. Some of these critical decisions include supporting the uprising in January 2011, fielding a presidential candidate in April 2012, and resisting the coup in July 2013.

It should be mentioned here that based on its historical behavior, the MB is a highly pragmatic organization. It is more reformist than revolutionary in its political objectives and more gradualist than radical in its political behavior. The organization has always lagged behind its state-affiliated political rivals in terms of capacity and resources. This includes not only the military establishment, but also the parties that became parts of the state machinery, such as Mubarak’s NDP and Nasser’s Socialist Union. In other words, the MB has been a threat to Egypt’s authoritarian institutions, but through its 86 years of history, it has never been strong enough to defeat them.

A Rational Actor?

Given the above, one can assume a rational actor model of decision-making. The MB would have wanted to maximize its gains by making use of the opportunities presented by the transition process. The leadership, represented by the MB’s Guidance Office, knew that it could win elections and survive within institutions. At the same time, the organization was quite wary of the military and its intentions. The MB lost every confrontation it had with Egypt’s military regimes in the 1950s and 1960s. Rationally, the MB needed to enhance its influence in less prominent, and thereby less risky, spheres and avoid direct clashes with a stronger actor.

Between February 2011 and August 2012, the MB generally behaved in the aforementioned fashion. It attempted to maximize its gains within relatively safe spheres and avoided overly provocative actions. The organization participated in elections, joined institutional frameworks, and mostly avoided unnecessary protests and escalatory rhetoric regarding the ruling junta. There were some exceptions, however. In November 2011, the MB, along with other political and revolutionary forces, rallied their supporters in Tahrir Square in reaction to the SCAF’s “supra-constitutional” document that effectively made the military establishment an independent authority. The document was proposed.
Another controlled clash came in June 2012, prior to the announcement of the presidential elections results. As a retired major general who was following the MB-SCAF talks at that time explained, “The SCAF wanted the MB to acknowledge what was in al-Selmi’s document, or else Morsi’s victory will be declared null due to rigging.... Some of the MB leaders did not accept. But in the end they opted for a compromise.”

During these hard talks, the response of the FJP/MB and other pro-Morsi groups was to stage a sit-in in Tahrir Square between June 17 and 24.

Regardless of what happened during the June talks, Morsi was elected by the end of that month, and the SCAF did not annul any results via the judiciary. Moreover, in December 2012, the SCAF got some significant privileges in the new constitution supported by the MB/FJP. The MB’s strategic choice appears to have been to gradually advance, avoid clashes with the SCAF, and possibly make some changes in moments they deemed “correct.” One such moment was in August 2012, when Morsi was not only able to freeze the constitutional addendum enacted by the SCAF in June 2012, but also to carry out the aforementioned purge of top generals. Morsi was only able to do this because of the acquiescence of other army generals and some active public support for these measures.

There were, however, challenges to such a gradualist, risk-averse strategy. It was very clear that major factions and bureaucracies within the military and security establishments were not interested in complying with the new political order. Morsi’s friendly rhetoric (he would refer to army officers as “men of gold” and the police forces as “at the heart of the January revolution”), the doubling of police and army officers’ pay, benefits, and pensions, and the prerogatives the constitution granted to the military failed to endear the elected civilian to the military-security establishments. This was becoming quite visible during and after the events of December 2012 (see above). By then, major factions and bureaucracies, including figures within the Ministry of Interior, the Presidential Guards, and the Second Field Army were acting independently of any presidential influence.

At that point, the MB’s rational options were limited to two tracks. The first track was to try to limit the damage via various forms of tactical retreats, ranging from acquiescing to the demands of the opposition and agreeing to change the government to having Morsi resign and calling for early presidential elections. The second track was one of tactical defense: to seek out powerful allies within the armed institutions, possibly starting with loyalists in the Presidential Guards Corps or other units. The first track was, partly, the choice of President de Gaulle in France’s May 1968 crisis, as well as of Prime Minister Erdogan in Turkey’s April 2007 crisis. The second track was the choice of President Sadat in Egypt’s May 1971 crisis. In these cases, presidents were able to tactically outmaneuver the military leadership and come out victorious, partly due to
the support of loyalists within the military. A riskier track would have been to attempt to establish a parallel armed institution from army and police generals and officers and other recruits, a tactic that failed Salvador Allende in Chile and Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, but was more successful for Leon Trotsky in Russia, Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, and Tancredo Neves in Brazil.

Organizational Procedures and Factionalism

The organizational procedures and factionalism models can hardly be separated in the MB case for several reasons, including the underdeveloped decision-making structures within the organization. All 16 MB figures interviewed for this section agree on two issues. First, the MB has no national SOPs that are carried out in times of crisis. Second, the organization has some ad-hoc arrangements that are produced by the administrative offices—the highest regional executive bodies in each of Egypt’s 27 governorates—based on reports coming from observers on the ground.

There are, however, two national, internal bodies that are quite important to focus on: the Maktab al-Irshad (Guidance Office) and the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council). The Guidance Office has acted as the highest national executive body in the organization since its establishment in July 1931. In 2012, it had 18 elected and 1 appointed members. The Consultative Council acts as a representative assembly of the organization. It had 123 members in 2012. According to the internal regulations of the MB, both bodies are involved in major political decision-making.

In general, from the early 1980s onwards, the political behavior of both entities can be categorized as “pragmatic gradualism.” Both often lean toward comprises and are relatively risk-averse in most of their decisions. Three major exceptions exist, however: the decision to fully support the January 2011 uprising, the decision to field a presidential candidate in 2012, and the decision to resist the July 2013 coup. To explain these three decisions, factionalism needs to be investigated.

The Egyptian MB is a very complex organization whose estimated number of “working” and “regular” members may reach 750,000. This is in addition to hundreds of thousands in the lower “supporter” and “affiliate” membership categories and the group’s large pool of sympathizers. MB leaders, including several members of the Guidance Office, asserted that the MB has no official statistics of its membership and is unwilling to compile any. As a result of the large numbers, the internal factional map of the organization is complex. While reviewing all of the MB’s major factions is outside the scope of this analysis, the impact of the group’s influential “revolutionary youth” component and “Iron Organization” on its aforementioned decisions is discussed below.
Revolutionary Youth

In January 2011, a decentralized, urban faction that the media dubbed Shabab al-Ikhwan (MB youth) was quite active in organizing the protests of January 25. The older leadership of the organization was quite hesitant and worried about a crackdown if the protests failed. Islam Lotfy was a leading member of the youth faction and an MB representative in the multi-ideological Youth of the Revolution Coalition before the MB leadership expelled him. He said, “We asked the leadership to support the sit-in by food, blankets, and sound-systems, but the support was late. So we had to go to the Guidance Office at 22:30 to convince them of [providing] full support. It was hard.”

Multiple leading MB figures joined the scattered protests on January 25, but many of them thought it would be another normal day and left in the early evening. It was mainly the youth faction that insisted on a prolonged sit-in and dragged the leadership into the 18-day confrontation. The same scenario was repeated on February 2, 2011, when Mubarak loyalists attacked the Tahrir sit-in. Most leaders of various pro-uprising political forces asked their youth to retreat due to the imbalance of (hard) power. The MB leadership was no exception, but many of the youth ignored the orders.

The resistance to the July coup followed a similar pattern. When the author asked two members of the Guidance Office how they arrived at the decision of pursuing civil resistance against the coup despite the balance of power (and terror) being heavily tilted toward the military, their answer was complex. They cited distrust and the lack of a credible commitment to or guarantor for any solution as primary reasons, but they also spoke of having to take into consideration the organization’s youth, who were not only in a revolutionary, confrontational mode, but had lost many friends and colleagues during the crackdowns.

“Iron Organization”

Another important MB faction is the one sometimes referred to as the “Iron Organization.” It is a well-disciplined group headed by the General Guide’s second deputy, Khairat al-Shater. The Iron Organization is inward looking and generally focused on internal capacity-building and empowerment. It is also known for its uncompromising loyalty to al-Shater. The term “iron” does not refer to political violence or arms, but rather to the centralization of its authority structure. This faction was quite influential, if not dominant, in various critical decisions, including the decision to field its leader as a presidential candidate in March 2012.

Factional competition within the MB was intense at that point in time. The MB expelled Abdel-Moneim Abu al-Fotouh in April 2011 for defying a Consultative Council decision by declaring his presidential candidacy the prior month. Abu al-Fotouh belonged to rival faction whose main distinction is its preference for less centralization. Rhetorically, at least, Abu al-Fotouh’s faction also leans more toward cross-ideological cooperation.
with political “others.” The struggle for influence and leadership within the MB was tilting towards al-Shater’s side, which, combined with other reasons, prompted Abu al-Fotouh to take the daring step of running for president in an effort to extend his influence outside of the organization. Al-Shater later announced his own candidacy, following that of Abu al-Fotouh.

By mid-March 2012, the MB leadership had reached two conclusions. The first was that the parliament had very limited influence on the SCAF or the government it had appointed. The MB’s leadership also understood that the dissolution of the parliament was only a matter of time. The parliament’s speaker, Dr. Saad Al-Katatni, publicly announced on April 25 that SCAF-appointed Prime Minister Kamal Al-Ganzouri had told him “the ruling to dissolve the Parliament is in the drawer of the Constitutional Court.”

The second conclusion was that all non-MB presidential candidates the MB wanted to support had declined to run in the elections. This happened after months of discussion and negotiations, including with senior judiciary figures such as Tarek Al-Bishri, former first deputy of the Council of State, and Hossam al-Gheriani, former head of the Cassation Court and Supreme Council of Judiciary.

These conclusions contributed to the MB’s decision to pursue the presidency. “We fielded a candidate at this point out of necessity, not in attempt to challenge the SCAF,” said Ibrahim Mounir, the MB’s representative in the United Kingdom. But the MB’s decision was also the result of the organization’s factional map. The MB’s Consultative Council voted at least two times on the decision of whether to field a presidential candidate. At the first vote in mid-March 2012 the proposal was rejected, 52 to 13. The second vote took place on April 3, 2012, following a meeting between Morsi and the heads of the SCAF. This time, the council narrowly approved fielding a candidate, 56 to 52. The revote, reversed decision, and candidacy of al-Shater can be explained mainly by the factional balance of power within the organization and the presidential candidacy of Abu al-Fotouh. It remains, however, that 48 percent of the Consultative Council opposed running a candidate in the presidential elections, regardless of which candidate was going to run.

The Psychological Dimension

A thorough understanding of the MB’s policy choices cannot dismiss the psychological impact of the organization’s repression on its decision-making. The memories of brutal repression under Nasser (1954-1970) were well-integrated into the MB’s literature and indoctrination process. The majority of the top-tier of the group’s leadership suffered under it. Moreover, the crackdowns and military tribunals of Mubarak (1981-2011) were too fresh to be ignored when the uprising started on January 25, 2011. That partly explains the official leadership’s hesitation to fully support the uprising in the beginning.

“All non-MB presidential candidates the MB wanted to support had declined to run in the elections.
It also explains the rush to the negotiating table (along with other political and youth forces and figures) when Mubarak’s head of General Intelligence, Omar Suleiman, called for it. “If that uprising had failed, we would have been the first to be hanged…. It won’t be just the youth who called for it,” said a member of the Guidance Office.111

The MB leadership is captive to its history of repression. This was reflected in how it sought rushed, and sometimes irrational, compromises in exchange for guaranteed legitimacy that would potentially fend off future repression. The cautiousness in any revolutionary decisions, such as the full mobilization in the Muhammad Mahmoud events of November 2011 and the lack of any serious reaction to the dissolution of Egypt’s first elected parliament, can be partly attributed to that dimension.112 The decision to resist the military coup of July 2013 came as an anomaly. On a rational level, the balance of (hard) power was clearly not on the side of the elected president, but instead heavily tilted towards the armed institutions that ousted him. On a psychological level, civil resistance in the form of protests, marches, sit-ins, and strikes meant a likely repetition of the past horror of waves of brutal repression by an armed, mobilized opponent.

The MB leadership is captive to its history of repression. Indeed, the MB had faced a similar episode in February 1954, which came to be known as “Abdel Qadr Audeh’s decision.” Many leaders and mid-ranking members believe that his decision to dismiss protesters without a guaranteed compromise with Nasser’s military faction was a major mistake that led to the collapse of the last preventive wall against Nasser’s repression. On July 17, 2013, Audeh’s son Khaled, a university professor, reminded the hundreds of thousands of protesters in Rab’a Square of that mistake. “Our stance here is our way to success. I swear I will never dismiss you like my father, the martyr Abdel-Qadr Audeh, dismissed the protesters on 28 February 1954…. They tricked him and told him to dismiss the protestors and that the army would go back to its barracks and democracy would be resumed. He believed them. And then he was arrested at night and executed afterwards.”113

The psychological burden of 1954 and its aftermath blurred important factors in the 2013 comparisons. Perhaps the most important factor was that the 1954 army was not united behind Nasser. Army officers, mainly concentrated in the artillery and armored corps, did not approve of Nasser’s style of military rule. Moreover, important military figures in the Free Officers movement and others wanted to recall the parliament and resume constitutional democratic politics, including General Naguib (from February 1954 onwards), Colonels Ahmad Shawky, Yusuf Siddiq, Rashad Me Hanna, and Major Khaled Mohyiddin. This was in addition to many junior officers (captains and first lieutenants) who never received enough merit for attempting to undermine a military dictatorship in the making and to reinstate a parliamentary democracy. These types of pro-democracy officers were either not present or did not act in July 2013.
Lastly, a senior Egyptian official who supported the January 2011 uprising suggested that there was an irrational, metaphysical element to the MB’s decision-making. He said: “…Don’t think about the French or the American [revolutions]… those [MB officials] are not revolutionaries. They believe that if they have patience, the stick will be broken on their back, rather than their back getting broken. Then God is going to intervene last minute to save them as a reward for their patience.”114
Civil-military relations in general, and Islamist-military relations in particular, are key determinants of Egypt’s political future. They will directly impact national reconciliation, the functioning of state institutions, civil society, citizen security, and human rights. Egypt’s prospects for social stability, and thereby economic recovery, will remain bleak if the relationship between the highly organized, once widely popular MB and the politicized military is not redefined and brought under the control of institutional, democratic rules of political competition. Several other conclusions and a few recommendations can be deduced from the above analysis of the parties’ decision-making. They target two issue-areas: civil-military relations in Egypt and conflict resolution mechanisms for the worst crisis in Egypt’s contemporary history.

In terms of rational calculations, Egypt’s military as a whole would likely benefit in the long-term from a balanced civil-military relationship within a democratic framework, regardless of the specific political party or coalition that would initially and temporarily come to power. A study of interstate wars between 1816 and 1982 found that democracies are more likely to win wars, whether they are the targets or the aggressors. This finding is part of a wider literature on why the armed forces of democratic countries are likely to be superior in combat. The reasons for that superiority include accountability, transparency, political considerations of elected leaders, more prudent choices of when to fight, better resource marshaling, and greater public support. Additionally, the appointment, promotion, and payment of junior officers, which make up the majority of the officer corps, are part of a much more transparent, and therefore less corrupt and fairer, system. Choosing not to democratize and instead maintaining a military-controlled authoritarian rule will have negative consequences for the military, almost inevitably dragging it into further confrontations with one or more segments of the Egyptian society. Such confrontations can be persistent and even pose a credible threat to social peace, security, and political stability in the country.

Security studies in general and civil-military relations in particular are not widely taught in Egypt’s higher education institutions, whether civilian or military. To enhance democratic civil-military relations, Narcis Serra, the former long-serving civilian defense minister of Spain (1982-1991) and one of the main architects of its military reform process, recommends “an energetic policy of dialogue with the legislature to encourage the training of members of parliament from all political formations, the promotion of security studies in universities and the opening of centers of advanced military studies to civilians.”
Externally, two major democratic powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, are involved in the educational training of Egyptian military officers. The United States is involved through its Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. FMF supports purchases of U.S. arms, defense equipment and services, and military and technical training. The IMET program is, generally, an exchange program for foreign military officers to study and train in the United States and at U.S.-affiliated regional centers. Civil-military relations courses should be introduced in the curricula of the IMET program, and added to the many training courses provided to Egyptian officers and students by the United Kingdom’s Royal College of Defense Studies, Joint Services Command and Staff College, and other institutions.

The two U.S. programs have been the most consistent and largest sources of financial assistance to Egypt’s military. After an initial military loan of $1.5 billion in 1979 and a reduction in 1981 to $550 million, annual U.S. military assistance to Egypt leveled off in 1987 and remained constant at $1.3 billion in FMF grants. Funding for IMET has fluctuated between $200,000 and $2 million annually, averaging roughly $1.3 million a year. This type of assistance should not have been partly resumed until the conditions and certification requirements in the U.S. government’s appropriations bill for the 2014 fiscal year had been met. Egypt’s military regime has certainly not met the congressional condition of taking “steps to support a democratic transition” needed to release suspended military assistance. In the context of unprecedented human rights violations—including tens of thousands imprisoned, mass trials, reports of widespread torture and sexual abuse in detention, and the wholesale exclusion of dissenters from politics—the Egyptian authorities’ adherence to superficial electoral procedures is meaningless.

On April 29, 2014, Senator Patrick Leahy summarized this problem succinctly: “I am extremely disturbed by the Egyptian government’s flouting of human rights and appalling abuse of the justice system, which are fundamental to any democracy. I am not prepared to sign off on the delivery of additional aid for the Egyptian military until we have a better understanding of how the aid would be used, and we see convincing evidence that the government is committed to the rule of law.” Moreover, without Egyptian parliamentary oversight of the aid, it actually strengthens the independence of a repressive, politicized, autocratic military institution—an unintended consequence that ultimately undermines the prospects for democratization and balanced civil-military relations.

The military’s superiority complex and its perception of civilians, and particularly civilian politicians, as inferior, will need to be thoroughly addressed, ideally from the first year in the Egyptian War College and Police Academy. Changing these attitudes will be a long-

“A rational reevaluation of the decisions taken during 2011-2013 and their consequences is critical.”
term process, one that will confront an institutional culture and psychological complex built and nurtured in the military and security establishments over seven decades. The principle of equality can be legitimized by stressing the concept of citizenship in these institutions, as well as a basic understanding of human rights and their importance. Such concepts should also be introduced in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. But overall, the shift in this dimension has to be sponsored from above, whether by a reformist leadership or a strong reformist faction in the leadership. This type of leadership is also critical for altering repression-intensive SOPs and the official and unofficial policies that generally violate basic human rights.

On the MB side, a rational reevaluation of the decisions taken during 2011-2013 and their consequences is critical for the organization, even during the current heavy crackdown. The ousting of narrowly elected leaders by a military junta seeking to preserve its privileges is a centuries-old saga, repeated in different versions on five continents. The strategies and tactics for altering or minimizing such actions’ impact on democratization are also quite old. Perhaps one of the most important lessons from South American and South European experiences is the effectiveness of a sustained, solid, and cross-ideological civilian front that constantly pressures the junta for democratization and the depoliticization of the military. The likelihood of a successful democratic transition in Egypt will hinge on the availability, sustainability, and tenacity of such a front. Whereas there is some basis for such a movement, the Egyptian opposition is still far from establishing it. Additionally, former MB leaders have suggested that the organization cannot compete in elections except in a consolidated democracy where the institutional rules of the game are well established and respected by all sides. If that is the case, then the MB should rethink its role in any transition period, and relegate itself to being a secondary political player. That would entail, at a minimum, foregoing the pursuit of leading executive positions during such periods.

Crackdowns have produced a victims’ complex and a conspiratorial outlook among the leadership.

Historically, factionalism and internal rivalries within the MB have been the main determinants of organizational behavior and decision-making, especially during times of crises such as in 1954, 1964, and 2011. As with the military, the MB’s internal factional map is a good indicator of where the organization is heading. Rival factions can undermine rational calculations and lead the organization into disastrous courses of action. Psychologically, crackdowns by the military and security services, along with the support of the MB’s civilian political rivals for such repression, have produced a victims’ complex and a conspiratorial outlook among the leadership. This constantly undermines the organization’s ability to pursue transparent decision-making and contain or neutralize the polarization of its rivals.
The levels of popular support for the military and the MB are much greater than that for any of the other political forces in the country, including the decentralized, under-resourced youth groups that initially called for the January 2011 uprising. At first glance, this may be problematic for the future of democratization in the country. But the humanitarian, political, and economic costs of the 2013 military coup are high and the costs of the post-coup eradication policies are even higher, and will likely increase in the coming months. As other historical cases suggest, all sides are likely to reconsider their positions. Sparked by the costs of repression and the aggressiveness of the status quo, a process of “forced maturation” may ensue. Egypt is less likely to make political or economic progress without a reconciliation process and an institutional, conflict-resolution arrangement between its two major political actors, the military and the Islamists. Egypt's current and future political crises will not be adequately resolved without a thorough reconfiguration of its Islamist-military relations.
Endnotes


4 Those parts include Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and most of the Gulf monarchies.


This pattern is consistent in many cases, including Franco’s 1936 coup in Spain, al-Zaim’s 1949 coup in Syria, Zahedi’s 1953 coup in Iran, Branco’s 1964 coup in Brazil, Pinochet’s 1973 coup in Chile, Videla’s 1976 coup in Argentina, Evren’s 1980 coup in Turkey, Bashir’s 1989 coup in Sudan, Nazar’s 1992 coup in Algeria, and Musharraf’s 1999 coup in Pakistan, to cite a few.


The four were Sierra Leone (1968), Ghana (1978), Sudan (1985), and Niger (1999). See Miller, “Debunking the Myth,” 50.

Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, “Coup d’Etat or Coup d’Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratic Accountability” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10, no. 2 (April 2014): 3-4. For each year and country, a “Polity Score” ranging from -10 to +10 is determined; -10 to -6 corresponds to autocracies, -5 to 5 corresponds to “anocracies” (a midway between autocracies and democracies, where power is not vested in public institutions but spread amongst elite groups constantly competing with each other for power), and 6 to 10 corresponds to democracies.


Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups,” 255.

Collusion to Crackdown: 
Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt


27 Ibid.


29 Abd al-Khaliq, interview, part 10.

30 There are major differences between the two massacres in terms of scale, scope, numbers of fatalities and injuries, duration, and publicity. The Tora Prison massacre left 21 political prisoners dead and twice as many wounded. See John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). The Ra’ba Square massacre killed at least 1,260 MB supporters with national and international media documenting what happened. It was, by far, Egypt’s worse massacre in its modern history.


36 Hammad, interview, part 1, November 10, 2008; Abd al-Ra’uf, *Arghamtu Faruq ’ala al-tanazul*, 45.


38 Abd al-Khaliq, interview, part 10; Baghdadi, *Mudhkarat al-Baghdadi*, 56.


40 Farid Abd al-Khaliq and other MB leaders perceived this action as a disastrous mistake and political naivety on the part of Audeh, since the latter dismissed the demonstrators without any guarantees. Audeh was arrested in the very same night and was executed with other MB and SA leaders in January 1955, see Ramadan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Tanzim al-Sirri*, 137-139.


42 Hammad, interview, part 4, December 8, 2008.

43 Ramadan, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Tanzim al-Sirri*, 220-225; Abdul Khaliq, interview, part 13. However, Colonel Siddiq, a leftist member of the RCC, mentions in his memoirs that Duwayr’s confessions came under brutal torture, including stripping his wife naked in front of him and threatening to rape her. Siddiq implies that Duway was also raped. See Siddiq, *Awraq Youssef Siddiq*, 27.

44 Estimates of the number of MB members and others arrested following the assassination attempt range from 17,000 to 24,000. See, for example, Ibrahim Qa’ud, *Umar al-Tilmisani: shahidan ’ala al-`asr [Umar al-Tilmisani: a witness on the times]* (Cairo: Al-Mukhtar al-Islami, 1985), 121.

45 Hudaybi’s sentence was later reduced to life-imprisonment due to his age, and he was released in 1957 due to his medical conditions.

46 The execution of the coup was delayed by at least one day because Hudaybi, who was in Alexandria, had not yet authorized the MB to support it. The MB figures and Nasser were making their arrangements in Cairo and their final meeting was held in the house of Guidance Office member Abd al-Qadr Helmi on July 18, 1952. The MB sent a five-member delegation to seek Hudaybi’s approval of the plan. See, for example, Hammad, interview, part 2; Salah Shadi, *Safahat min al-tarikh [Pages from history]* (Kuwait: al-Shu’a’, 1981), 68-72.

47 Brigadier General Tarek al-Gohary, telephone interview with the author, February 19, 2014; Major General Ibrahim Abd al-Ghaffar, interview with the author, Cairo, April 17, 2013.

48 The exceptions were small, decentralized, leftist and Islamist, urban, middle-class youth groups which were too weak to influence the course of the transition.


50 A prime example of the MB-SCAF legislative cooperation on national security matters was
General Abbas Mukhaymar, who was voted in on an FJP list and became the head of the National Security Committee in the lower chamber (Majlis al-Sha'ab). General Mukhaymar was the former commander of the Security-Military Apparatus (Jihaz al-Amn al-Harbi) in the Egyptian military intelligence. Among the mandates of that apparatus was to counter and eliminate any ideologically inspired activism and any political discussions in the army, with specific focus on Islamist activism.

That happened as early as February 2012. The author attended some of the meetings in which the aforementioned reactions to the result of the elections were discussed by politicians, activists, and even some of the MPs from the underperforming parties.


The group attacked an Egyptian border post, killing 16 guards and stealing 2 armored vehicles before crossing into Israel.

Former NDP member, interview with the author, Cairo, October 5, 2012.

These complex issues are important to understanding developments in Islamists/non-Islamists relations in Egypt and certainly merit further investigation, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.


Muhammad Mahsoob, interview by Ahmad Mansur, Shahid 'ala al-'asr, Al Jazeera, April 20, 2014.


Gohary, interview.


Gohary, interview; Abd al-Ghaffar, interview; Major General in the Egyptian Armed Forces,
interview with the author, April 4, 2014.

64 Gohary, interview.

65 Ibid.

66 Colonel in the Egyptian Armed Forces, interview with the author, Cairo, April 15, 2013. The same information was confirmed by two members of the presidential staff.

67 Those conclusions are based on several conversations with more than 20 army and police officers, as well as the author’s observation of the SCAF’s behavioral patterns between February 2011 and July 2012.

68 After a tug-of-war, a 100-member constituent assembly was formed in June 2012 to draft a new constitution.


70 Former officer in the Egyptian Armed Forces, interview with the author, Cairo, January 16, 2012.

71 Lieutenant Colonel in the Egyptian Armed Forces, interview with the author, Cairo, April 2013.


74 “Al-Sisi: al-dabit illay yadrub qanabil gaz wa khartoush wahid yamut yahsaluh haja fi ‘ainuh mish haithakum,” [Al-Sisi: Officer using gas canisters and shotguns, somebody dies, something happens to his eye, won’t be tried], posted by “Shabka Rasd,” 3 October 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rF8Yz8J3MH1>.


This is not a comprehensive survey, but just the bodies that the leftist Egyptian Center for Social and Economic Rights was able to document. The fatalities include 932 fully documented bodies (name, birth place, date of birth, employment status, etc.), 294 partly documented bodies, 29 John Does and five missing bodies (reported dead by their relatives, but the bodies were never found).


“Amr Darrag yakshif tafasil al-mufawadat munthu al-inqilab hatta fad Rab’a,” [Amr Darrag reveals the details of the negotiations from the coup until the breakup of the rab’a sit-in], posted by “Al-Jazeera Mubasher Misp,” 15 August 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7q9z_kGwV58. On the dialogist side, Mohamed ElBaradei, a prominent civilian politician who plotted the coup with the junta, emerged. After a third major massacre of anti-coup activists in Nasr Road on July 27, 2013, he called for limiting the repression.

Ibid.


Brigadier General in Egyptian Armed Forces, telephone interview with the author, March 2014.

Major in the Egyptian Armed Forces, interview with the author, Cairo, April 16, 2013.

Former Major General in the Egyptian Armed Forces, interview with the author, Cairo, April 14, 2014.

See “Sirri wa khatir: al-fariq al-Sisi wa niyyat al-‘askar lil saitara ‘ala al-‘ilm wa hurriyat ma ba’d al-thawra” [Secret and dangerous: Team Sisi and the military’s plan to control the media and freedoms after the revolution], posted by “Mohammed Salah,” 2 October 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Ol6iL3VpyM>.


There are a few constants in the organizational behaviour of the MB. One of them is that ideological beliefs are usually marginalised in times of crises and inconveniences. Supporting a foreign invasion, for instance, is an ideological red line for the MB. But it was compromised in 2003 by the Iraqi affiliate, which backed the US-led invasion. Two of the Iraqi MB affiliates became members of the Iraqi Governing Council appointed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. In Algeria, throughout the 1990s, the local MB affiliate, the Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP) Party, sided with the military junta of 1992 and was strongly critical of the Armed Islamic Group’s armed tactics and Islamic Salvation Front’s radical rhetoric. As a result, the MSP became a partner in several Algerian coalition governments and held several ministerial portfolios in post-coup Algeria. That level of pragmatic, ideologically light behavior has been consistent in Egypt and outside it since the 1930s.

Former Major General in Egyptian Armed Forces, interview with the author, Cairo, April 13, 2014.

However, these measures were not celebrated by some of Morsi’s political rivals, including some of the pro-revolution youth groups and political parties, as they feared Morsi’s empowerment and therefore aimed to disregard any achievement. Moreover, these measures alarmed many of the pro-Mubarak status-quo forces, including senior bureaucrats, military and security generals, and media and business tycoons.

Morsi exhausted the first choice by offering a national unity government and the suspension of November’s Constitutional Declaration to the National Salvation Front and other opposition figures on December 6, 2012. The offer was rejected.

Sadat was not, however, freely or fairly elected and came from a military background.


The author conducted 16 interviews in Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and the United Kingdom between April 2013 and March 2014.

Al-Shorouk estimated that the MB had more than 861,000 working members in a May 30, 2011 report. The general guide of the MB, Professor Muhammad Badie, mentioned that there are no official data or internal organizational surveys, but he asserted that the number exceeds 750,000. Gomaa Amin confirmed Badie’s assertions to the author in a recent interview. See “Hasr sirri li ‘a’da’ al-Ikhwan” [Secret survey of the members of the Brotherhood], Al-Shorouk,


103 Ibid.


105 Amin, interview.

106 Mounir, interview.

107 Former MB leader, interview with the author, London, March 29, 2014. However, other MB leaders and Guidance Office members interviewed insist that the voting on presidential candidacy happened only once on April 3, 2012, and the result was 56 approvals versus 52 rejections.


109 Other sources mention that voting on the presidential candidacy happened three times. See, for example, Youssef Nada, interview by Ahmad Mansur, Bila Hudud, Al Jazeera, April 16, 2014.

110 For the impact of repression on the decisions regarding democratization, relations with political/ideological rivals, and political violence see Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists; Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

111 Guidance Office member, interview.

112 Mohammed Mahmoud was one of the deadliest clashes between pro-revolution activists and the security forces in November 2011. The spark of the protests was the aforementioned “al-Silmi document” but it quickly escalated to a siege laid on the Ministry of Interior by activists with various demands, including accountability and transitional justice, and handing over power to elected civilians. Over 50 protestors were killed in the clashes and it culminated in the announcement of Field Marshal Tantawi that the SCAF will hand over power to an elected president by June 2012 (as opposed to the initial date of June 2013).

Senior Egyptian official, interview with the author, Cairo, April 2013.


For further details, see “Background Note on Egypt,” U.S. State Department, 19 March 2012, <http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/egypt/196332.htm>.


Nada, interview.
About the Author

Dr. Omar Ashour is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Doha Center (Qatar) and a Senior Lecturer in Security Studies at the University of Exeter (United Kingdom). He is the author of *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements*, “From Bad Cop to Good Cop? The Challenges of Security Sector Reform in Egypt,” and “Libyan Islamists Unpacked: The Rise, Transformation and Future.” He can be reached at O.Ashour@exeter.ac.uk or @DrOmarAshour.

About the Brookings Doha Center

Based in Qatar, the Brookings Doha Center is an overseas center of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., that advances high-quality, independent policy analysis and research on the Middle East. The Center maintains a reputation for policy impact and cutting-edge, field-oriented research on socio-economic and geopolitical issues facing the broader Middle East, including relations with the United States.

As a hub for Brookings scholarship in the region, the Brookings Doha Center undertakes research and policy activities that engages key elements of business, government, civil society, the media, and academia on public policy issues in the following four core areas:

(i) Democratization, political reform, and public policy; (ii) Middle East relations with emerging Asian nations, including on the geopolitics and economies of energy; (iii) Conflict and peace processes in the region; (iv) Educational, institutional, and political reform in the Gulf countries.
Brookings Doha Center Publications

2015

Collusion to Crackdown: Islamist-Military Relations in Egypt
Analysis Paper, Omar Ashour

Fortress Jordan: Putting the Money to Work
Policy Briefing, Sultan Barakat and Jordan Leber

Back to Gaza: A New Approach to Reconstruction
Policy Briefing, Sultan Barakat and Omar Shaban

2014

Profiling the Islamic State
Analysis Paper, Charles Lister

Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement
Analysis Paper, Sultan Barakat

Gaza’s Reconstruction: The Case for a Collaborative Council
Policy Briefing, Sultan Barakat and Omar Shaban


Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War
Analysis Paper, Gregory Gause

Dynamic Stalemate: Surveying Syria’s Military Landscape
Policy Briefing, Charles Lister

Personnel Change or Personal Change? Rethinking Libya’s Political Isolation Law
Brookings Doha Center – Stanford Paper, Roman David and Houda Mzioudet

Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda’s Approach to Tunisia’s Constitution
Analysis Paper, Monica L. Marks