

India, Pakistan and Kashmir

Stephen Philip Cohen

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India has for several years been regarded as an emerging or rising state.¹ After decades of unfulfilled promise, it now seems to be inching ahead, with more rapid economic growth, new attention from the major powers, and the development of a modest nuclear arsenal. These adding these developments to India's traditional strengths— a unique and persistent democracy and an influential culture—it is no wonder that many have predicted the emergence of India as a major Asian power, or even a world-class state. However, this remains a problematic development as long as India's comprehensive and debilitating rivalry with Pakistan continues, including that dimension of the rivalry that encompasses the fifty-year old Kashmir dispute.

Further, the India-Pakistan conflict is now especially alarming because it has implications for the international system itself. The region is the site and the source, of some of the world's major terrorist groups. Aside from Al Qaeda, these include a number of groups based in or tolerated by Pakistan, and India itself has tolerated or encouraged various terrorist groups operating in nearby states, and has its own internal terrorist problem quite apart from Kashmir. India and Pakistan have fought three wars in Kashmir and their conflict now contains the seeds of a nuclear holocaust. This chapter attempts a deeper probe of the India-Pakistan relationship, including the difficulties that India faces in managing, let alone resolving, the Kashmir dispute.

A Paired-Minority Conflict

The origins of the India-Pakistan conflict have been traced to many sources—the failure of the British to manage a peaceful and politically acceptable Partition; the deeply rooted political rivalries between the Subcontinent's major religious communities, Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims; the struggle for control over Kashmir; Kashmir's

importance to the national identities of both states, and the greed or personal shortsightedness of leaders on both sides of the border—in particular, Nehru’s romance with Kashmir and his Brahminical arrogance (the Pakistani interpretation), or Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s vanity, shortsightedness, and religious zeal (the Indian interpretation.) All of these and other factors play a role, but the conflict is greater than the sum of its parts.

The world’s most intractable disputes are paired minority conflicts.² Such conflicts are rooted in perceptions held by important groups on both sides—even those that are not a numerical minority, and which may even be a majority—that they are the threatened, weaker party, under attack from the other side. Paired minority conflicts are most often found within states, although many of these, such as the bitter Sinhala-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka, have international implications. Others occur between states, including that between Israel and some of its Arab neighbors. Another state-level paired minority conflict is that of Iraq and Iran, where Iraq fears the larger (and ideologically threatening) Iran, which in turn sees Iraq as the spear point of a hostile Arab world. South Africa and Northern Ireland are two other sites of such conflicts, and in South Asia, Sri Lanka has a paired minority conflict between its minority Tamil population and the Sinhalese. The former believe they are under a comprehensive threat from the more numerous Sinhalese, and the latter believe *themselves* to be the threatened minority, given the fact that there are sixty million Tamils across the Palk Straits. The Tigers argue that Tamils can never be secure unless there is a Tamil homeland on the island.

These conflicts seem to draw their energy from an inexhaustible supply of distrust. It is difficult for one side to compromise on even trivial issues, since doing so might confirm one’s own weakness and invite further demands. Nevertheless, leaders entrapped in such conflicts are resistant to make concessions when they have the advantage, believing that as the stronger side they can bend the other party to its will. As if they were on a teeter-totter, the two sides take turns in playing the role of advantaged/disadvantaged. They may briefly achieve equality, but their state of dynamic imbalance inhibits the prospect of long-term negotiations and tends to abort any effort to have an institutionalized peace process.

These paired minority conflicts are also morally energized. Politics takes place where the search for justice overlaps with the pursuit of power. In South Asia, goaded by a sense of injustice, conflict is legitimized because it seems to be the only way to protect the threatened group. Additionally, the group sees itself as threatened because it is morally or materially *superior*. Even past defeats and current weaknesses are “explained” by one’s own virtues, which invite the envy of others.

Psychological paired minority conflicts are characterized by distrust of those who advocate compromise, whether outsiders or citizens of one’s own state. The former may be fickle; they may shift their support to the other side for one reason or another.

Time is a critical component of these conflicts. One or both parties may be looking ahead to a moment when they can achieve some special advantage or when the other side will collapse. Do long-term demographic trends, real or imagined, appear to be threatening? Is your country, or your group, acquiring some special advantage in terms of technology, alliances, or economics that will change your relative position of power in the future? In brief, does the calendar work for or against you? If either side believes that time is on its side, and waiting will improve its position—or damage that of the other side—then “step by step” efforts to reduce suspicion or promote confidence are doomed to fail.

Indian Insecurity

One of the most important puzzles of India-Pakistan relations is not why the smaller Pakistan feels encircled and threatened, but why the larger India does. It would seem that India, seven times more populous than Pakistan and five times its size, and which defeated Pakistan in 1971, would feel more secure. This has not been the case and Pakistan remains deeply embedded in Indian thinking. There are historical, strategic, ideological, and domestic reasons why Pakistan remains the central obsession of much of the Indian strategic community, just as India remains Pakistan’s.

Generations and Chosen Grievs

The first generation of leaders in both states—the founding fathers, Mahatma Gandhi, Sardar Patel, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and Jawaharlal Nehru—were devoted to achieving independence and building new states and nations. With the exception of Gandhi, they did not believe that partition would lead to conflict between India and Pakistan. On the Indian side, many expected Pakistan to collapse, but did not see the need to hasten that collapse by provoking a conflict with Pakistan. On the Pakistani side, once Independence was achieved, Jinnah hoped that the two countries would have good relations. In several important speeches delivered after Independence Jinnah played down his earlier emphasis on Hindus and Muslims constituting “two nations.” He set forth the vision of a predominately Muslim but still-tolerant and multireligious Pakistan counterpoised against a predominantly Hindu India—in effect two secular states, in which religion was a private, not a public matter.³ Implicit in this arrangement was that the presence of significant minorities in each would serve as hostage to good relations.

A second generation of Indian and Pakistani leaders was unprepared to solve the problems created by partition. Nothing in their experience had led them to place reconciliation ahead of their own political advantage and the temptation to “just say no.” They did reach several agreements that cleaned up the debris of partition, and there were trade and transit treaties, hotlines, and other confidence-building measures installed as early as the 1950s.

However, two great post-partition traumas aborted the process of normalization. For India, it was the humiliating defeat by China in 1962, and for Pakistan, the vivisection of their country by Indian hands in 1971. The ten-year difference is important: the present generation of Indian leaders are further away from their national humiliation than are their Pakistani counterparts, even though the rise of China as a major economic power rekindled anti-Chinese fears in New Delhi.

In each case, the other side denies the seriousness of the other’s grievances, and doubts the sincerity of the other side’s claim.⁴ In 1962, Ayub Khan stated his skepticism that there was a real India–China conflict, and Pakistanis still belittle Indian obsessions

with Beijing. Indians seem to assume that Pakistanis have more or less forgotten the events of 1971 and cannot understand why Pakistani officials remain suspicious when New Delhi professes its good intentions.

Further, these two conflicts had profound domestic consequences, not a small matter in a democracy. No Indian politicians have been able to admit publicly that the Indian case vis-à-vis China is flawed.⁵ None have dared suggest, as V.K. Krishna Menon once did, that the two states exchange territory. As for Pakistan, there have been few scholars or journalists—and no politicians—bold enough to suggest that Islamabad settle for anything short of “self-determination,” or a plebiscite, leading to accession, lest they be attacked for being pro-Indian and anti-Islamic.

Finally, each trauma led directly to the consideration of nuclear weapons and the further militarization of the respective countries. In India’s case, the lesson of 1962 was that only military power counts and that Nehru’s faith in a diplomacy that was not backed up by firepower was disastrously naïve. The linkage between the trauma of 1971 and the nuclear option is even tighter in Pakistan—and for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto a nuclear weapon had the added attraction of enabling him to reduce the power of the army. Ironically, Pakistan has wound up with both a nuclear program and a politically powerful army.

Traditions: New and Invented

While many Hindu and Islamic traditions suggest ways of reducing differences and ameliorating conflict, each also has elements that contribute to the idea of what Elias Canetti terms a war-crowd. Indians and Pakistanis draw selectively from these traditions and point to those aspects of each other’s traditions that seem to “prove” that the other intends to conquer and dominate. For example, Pakistanis like to cite the *Arthashastra* as “proof” of the an Indian/Hindu approach to statecraft that emphasizes subversion, espionage, and deceit.⁶ For their part, Indian strategists, especially on the Hindu nationalist end of the spectrum, emphasize those aspects of Islamic teachings that portray a world divided between believers and unbelievers, and set forth the obligation of the former to convert the latter.

While Pakistani ideologues see the spread of Islam to South Asia as having purged and reformed the unbelievers, their Indian counterparts read this history as reinforcing the notion of a comprehensive civilizational and cultural threat to India. When the Muslims arrived, India was temporarily weaker, but morally greater. India's riches and treasures attracted outside predators, who despite their momentary technical or military superiority, lacked the deeper moral qualities of an old and established civilization. The first predators were the Islamic invaders; these in turn betrayed India and failed to protect it from the subsequent wave of Western conquerors. In the history of Islam and Christianity in India, Hindus were the odd men out.

Indians also see Pakistan as an important example of neo-imperialism. The Indian view is that when neighbors (i.e., Pakistan) are allied to powerful intruders (such as Britain, the United States, or China), their domestic politics *and* their foreign policies are distorted.⁷ The U.S.-Pakistan alliance is widely believed to have militarized Pakistani politics and foreign policy through the connection between the Pakistan army and the United States, making it impossible for Delhi to come to an accommodation with Islamabad over Kashmir. Most Indians also believe that Pakistan compounded the error by allowing its territory to be used for Cold War alliance objectives, introducing a superpower into the region. The American tie is also seen as encouraging Pakistan to challenge the rightfully dominant regional power by providing the advanced weapons that enabled Pakistan to attack India in 1965. The preferred Indian solution to such a distortion of the natural regional power structure is the international recognition of benign, accommodating, liberal regional dominant powers—not the meddling in one region by either a global hegemon or adjacent regional powers.

Pakistan is seen as an essential element in a shifting alliance between the West, Islam, China, and other hostile states directed against New Delhi. In recent years the emphasis has expanded to include the sea of extremist Islamic forces led by Pakistan, with China as a silent partner. Samuel P. Huntington's thesis of a grand alliance between Islamic and "Confucian" civilization was greeted warmly by that portion of the Indian strategic community that had long since made the connection. The ring of states around India provides a ready-made image of encirclement, of threat from all quarters. India has

threats from the north, the east, the west, and over the horizon, as naval theoreticians eagerly point out the threat from the sea, from whence both the Arabs and the Europeans came, and—thirty years ago—the *USS Enterprise*.

Why is India threatened by some combination of Pakistan, Islam, China, and the West? It is because outsiders are jealous of India, and they try to cut it down to size. This sense of weakness, of vulnerability, is contrasted with India's "proper" status as a great power, stemming from its unique civilization and history. It is India's very diversity, long regarded as a virtue, which offers a tempting target for Pakistan, the Islamic world, and others. Even India's minorities (tribals, Sikhs, Christians, and Muslims) are seen, especially by the Hindu Right, as a potential fifth column, awaiting foreign exploitation.

Pakistan as an Incomplete State

Finally, the very nature of the Pakistani state presents a threat to India. In a survey of India's security problems written in 1982-3, U.S. Bajpai, a distinguished retired diplomat offered not so much an analysis of the "Pakistan factor" as an indictment of Pakistan's many shortcomings.⁸ Pakistan's limited cultural and civilizational inheritance, its military dictatorship, its theocratic identity, its unworkable unitary system of government (as opposed to India's flexible federalism), the imposition of Urdu on an unwilling population, the alienation of Pakistan's rulers from their people, Islamabad's support of "reactionary" regimes in West Asia (India identified its interests with the "progressive" segments of Arab nationalism, such as Saddam's Iraq), its dependency on foreign aid, and the failure to develop a strong economic base were Pakistan's embarrassment. This perspective has enjoyed a renaissance in the ten years after Pakistan began open support for the separatist and terrorist movements that emerged in Indian-administered Kashmir.⁹

Why should India fear such a state? Pakistan is a threat because it still makes the claim that Partition was imperfectly carried out, because some Pakistanis harbor revanchist notions towards India's Muslim population, and because it falsely accuses India of wanting to undo Pakistan itself. Thus, Pakistan still makes a claim on Kashmir, and had deeper designs against the integrity and unity of India itself.¹⁰ Because Pakistan

continues to adhere to the theory which brought it into existence—the notion that the Subcontinent was divided between two nations, one Hindu, one Muslim—and because it purports to speak on behalf of Indian Muslims, Pakistan’s very identity is “a threat to India’s integrity.”¹¹ More recently, Pakistan has served as the base for Islamic “jihadists” who not only seek the liberation of Kashmir, but the liberation of all of India’s Muslims.

Pakistan Views India

If Indian strategists regard Pakistan as a major threat to Indian security, then Pakistani leaders, especially the powerful military, regard their country as even more threatened. Yet, some even see Pakistan as better able to withstand the challenge than the much larger and more powerful India.¹² Pakistan’s leaders have a profound distrust of New Delhi, and the latter’s reassurances that India “accepts” the existence of Pakistan are not taken seriously.

The dominant explanation of regional conflict held by Pakistan’s strategic community is that from the first day of independence there has been a concerted Indian attempt to crush their state. This original trauma was refreshed and deepened by the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Many Pakistanis now see their state as threatened by an increasingly Hindu and extremist India, motivated by a desire for religious revenge and a missionary-like zeal to extend its influence to the furthest reaches of South Asia and neighboring areas. There is also a strand of Pakistani thinking that draws upon the army’s tradition of geopolitics, rather than the two-nation theory or ideological explanations to explain conflict between India and Pakistan.¹³

Like Israel, Pakistan was founded by a people who felt a sense of persecution when living as a minority, and even though they possess their own states (which are also based on religious identity), both remain under threat from powerful enemies. In both cases, an original partition demonstrated the hostility of neighbors, and subsequent wars showed that these neighbors remained hostile. Pakistan and Israel have also followed parallel strategic policies. Both sought an entangling alliance with various outside powers (at various times, Britain, France, China, and the United States), both ultimately

concluded that outsiders could not be trusted in a moment of extreme crisis, leading them to develop nuclear weapons.

Further complicating India-Pakistan relations, the 1971 defeat was of central importance to the Pakistan army, which has governed Pakistan for more than half of its existence. Thus, to achieve a normal relationship with Pakistan, India must not only influence the former's public opinion; it must also change the institutionalized distrust of India found in the army. The prospects of this are very slim.

Finally, Pakistani hostility to India has roots other than the tortured relationship between the two countries. Indians assert that Pakistan needs the India threat to maintain its own unity. There is an element of truth in this argument—distrust of India, and the Kashmir conflict, do serve as a national rallying cry for Pakistanis, and thus as a device to smooth over differences between the dominant province, Punjab, and the smaller provinces of Baluchistan, Sind, and the Northwest Frontier. India-as-an-enemy is also useful to distract the Pakistani public from other concerns, such as social inequality, sectarian (Sunni-Shi'ia) conflict, and the distinct absence of social progress in many sectors of Pakistani society. These factors do partially explain Pakistan's fear of India—but there remains a real conflict between the two states, Kashmir.

Stratagems in a Paired-Minority Conflict

States or groups that see themselves as threatened minorities have at least five strategies to cope with the situation. In the abstract, these include fleeing the relationship, either physically or psychologically; assimilation (joining the dominant power); accommodation (living as a weaker state by yielding, compromising with the dominant power); changing the perceptions of the enemy state (by people-to-people diplomacy, persuasion or bribery); using outsiders to redress the balance of power; and finally, changing the balance of power by war or other means (such as increasing one's economy or population faster than the other side). Over the past fifty years India and Pakistan have contemplated each of these strategies.

Fleeing the Relationship

India and Pakistan, created as a “Homeland” for Indian Muslims, have tried to flee their relationship several times. The first instance was literally a physical escape; the others symbolic, psychological, and strategic flight. The key West Pakistani leaders were from Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and Bombay, the key East Pakistani leaders were Bengali Muslims. While Pakistan was deemed to be homeland for Indian Muslims, most of its founders were fairly secular politicians worried about being outnumbered in democratic India where Hindus would have a controlling majority. They had no interest in creating a theocratic state, but favored a tolerant Muslim majority state where Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians would live as contented minorities.¹⁴ Indeed, some Islamist groups such as the Jamaat-i-Islami originally opposed Pakistan on the grounds that Islam could not be contained within a single state.

Intermittently, India has pursued a policy of psychologically escaping the relationship with Pakistan by simply refusing to engage in serious negotiations with it, in the hope that time would eventually lead to the maturation of Pakistan. Eventually, Islamabad would have to realize that Pakistan could not hope to compete with the larger and more powerful India, until that moment came, then India would be best advised to ignore Pakistan.

Demonization is a variation on fleeing a relationship. If the leaders of the other country are evil, misguided, or corrupt, then there is no need to talk to them. Indeed, dialogue with such a country, or its leaders, is immoral and dangerous. For many Indians Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, has long personified the evil leader who was triply misguided. Jinnah challenged India’s civilizational unity by his two-nation theory, he began the militarization of Pakistan by seeking arms from the West, and he was aloof, cold, and undemocratic, jealous of Indian rivals, whipping up hatred and fear of India.¹⁵ His successors, largely military officers, are thought not to have even Jinnah’s leadership qualities and lack the moral authority to place their country on a solid footing. Many Hindu Indians believe that Pakistanis are insecure because most were converts to Islam from Hinduism, and their new faith creates additional problems for India because

Islam is seen as a religion that is notably illiberal.¹⁶ A former Director of Military Intelligence of the Indian army has written at length on how the “psychological” origins of the India-Pakistan dispute are entirely the responsibility of Pakistan’s leaders: they carved Pakistan out of India, their hatred of India has permitted them to become “the plaything of external forces,” and they are content to be dominated by the military. Concluding, General Kathpalia sums up: “There is no doubt that the troubles of India and Pakistan are basically of the making of the leadership. In the last 41 years the leadership of one country has consistently fanned popular hatred and suspicion and pursued it as an instrument of policy.”¹⁷ Today, Indian diplomats despair of negotiating with Pakistan, a chronically weak state under the control of the most anti-Indian elements, such as the military, the intelligence services, and the Maulvis.

Pakistan’s image of the Indian leadership is no less hostile. An important component of Pakistan’s founding ideology was that Muslims could not trust the “crafty” Hindus, who still suffered from an inferiority complex.¹⁸ While Gandhi and Jinnah were once respected rivals, their successors in both states lacked even professional respect for each other.

Assimilation

The opposite of fleeing a relationship is assimilation, and one of the fundamental differences between India and Pakistan is the expectation by some Indians that Pakistan might rejoin India. Assimilation has never been contemplated by Pakistan’s leaders, although there are important linguistic and ethnic minorities who would have accepted a place in the Indian Union. In the last elections before independence, the dominant political party in the Punjab was the Unionist Party, an alliance of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, and both the Northwest Frontier Province and Sind had Congress governments. As for India, most of its leaders assumed that the Pakistan experiment would fail and Pakistan would come back to the fold.

Indians no longer talk of the reintegration of Pakistan into India, but there are widespread (if generally private) discussions of how India might establish friendly relations with successor states to present-day Pakistan. Many Indians regard Bangladesh

as an acceptable neighbor, and believe that they could develop a similar relationship with a Sindhu Desh, Baluchistan, Northwest Frontier, and even a militarily diminished West Punjab. Bangladeshis may not like or love India, but they fear and respect Indian power, and would not dream of challenging New Delhi the way that Pakistan has.

Accommodation

If Pakistan cannot rejoin India, many Indians expect it to eventually accommodate Indian power. Such a Pakistan would not challenge India militarily or internally, it would tone down its Islamic identity, and it would settle the Kashmir dispute by making major concessions to New Delhi. It would also acknowledge India's regional economic dominance, and would not impose restrictions on the import of Indian films and other cultural artifacts.

However, Pakistani strategists view the accommodating strategies of Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and even Bangladesh as precisely the wrong model for Islamabad. These states have lost their freedom of action, they have been penetrated by Indian culture, and New Delhi has undue influence on their domestic politics, even intervening by force, where necessary. The absorption of Sikkim is often cited by Pakistani strategists, as is the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka and its military presence in Bhutan. The view of many Pakistanis is that because Pakistan is larger and more powerful than any of these states it does not need to accommodate India. This resistance to accommodation or compromise with India is especially powerful in the Pakistan armed forces. Pakistan, its officers argue, may be smaller but it is not weaker. It is united by religion and a more martial spirit than India, and need not lower its demands of India, especially on Kashmir.

Altering Perceptions

From time to time, there have been attempts to change perceptions of Indians or Pakistanis. A number of outside countries, foundations, and private individuals have supported efforts to change the perceptions of Indians and Pakistanis, to promote better understanding between the two. Over the past ten years, there have been at least one hundred programs to bring together students, journalists, politicians, strategists, artists,

intellectuals and retired generals from both countries. Much of the good will created by such efforts was washed away by the hawkish television coverage of the Kargil war and the Indian Airlines hijacking in 1999.¹⁹

Most of the India-Pakistan dialogues, intended to promote understanding, wind up rehearsing old arguments, often for the sake of non-South Asian participants present. History is used—and abused—to emphasize of the legitimacy of one’s own side, and the malign or misguided qualities of the other. Such dialogues take the form of a duel between long-time adversaries, each knowing the moves of the other and the proper riposte to every assertion or claim. Any discussion of the way in which India can work out its differences with smaller neighbors is likely, sooner or of certain issues (nuclear proliferation, trade, water, and so forth), or laterally to the responsibility of outside powers for regional disputes.²⁰ Meetings between Indians and Pakistanis rarely last long enough to systematically discuss the differences between the two sides and how those differences might be ameliorated or accommodated.

The Indian and Pakistani governments have also tried influence deeper perceptions across the border. Several Indian governments have undertaken major initiatives in an attempt to win over Pakistani opinion. This was especially the case of non-Congress governments, beginning in 1979 with the prime minister, Morarji Desai and his foreign minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee. Subsequently, major initiatives were taken by Inder Kumar Gujral, both when he was foreign minister and then prime minister; Vajpayee undertook yet another good will mission when he traveled to Lahore in the Spring of 1999 to meet with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Lahore. These recent efforts seem to have failed dramatically, with the Lahore meeting discredited by the subsequent Kargil war, and the Nawaz linkage destroyed by the army coup of October 1999. The Indian proponents of a conciliatory line towards Pakistan came under strong attack from both the opposition parties and more hawkish elements of the BJP itself. On Pakistan’s part, President Zia’s “cricket diplomacy” of the late 1980s raised the prospect of a more forthcoming Pakistani policy.²¹ Nevertheless, Pakistan’s two democratically elected prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif both assumed a very hawkish policy towards India, especially after the 1989 uprising in Kashmir.

Several non-regional states and organizations have tried to promote India-Pakistan cooperation or dialogue. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States wanted to broker a *détente* between the two states so that they might join in a common alliance against threats from the Soviet Union and Communist China. Considerable diplomatic energy was expended on these efforts but the only result was to provide each with enhanced diplomatic leverage against the other, sometimes with ironic results. In 1949 Nehru had offered Pakistan a “no war” pact, but Pakistan did not respond. Then, in 1958, Ayub Khan offered India a “joint defense” agreement provided the Kashmir dispute was solved, after which Nehru again reiterated India’s offer of a no war pact. Several years later, with the U.S.-Pakistan alliance revived after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, President Zia-ul-Haq offered Delhi a “no war” proposal, flabbergasting the Indians. Of course, neither proposal was serious, their purpose being to impress outside powers of Indian (or Pakistani) sincerity.

Much the same can be said of recent proposals for the institution of confidence building measures (hotlines, summits, dialogues, and various technical verification proposals) between the two countries. Outsiders regard such measures as no-risk high-gain arrangements. However, in the India-Pakistan case cooperation is seen as low-gain and high-risk. If cooperation fails, losses will be public and politically damaging; there might also be a multiplier effect in that the risk of conflict might increase if an active attempt at cooperation fails and if the costs of conflict are very high.

In South Asia the regional organization, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), has provided a venue for meetings between Indian and Pakistani leaders and sponsors some cooperative projects on regional issues.²² However, SAARC cannot deal with bilateral issues, and the smaller members are vulnerable to Indian pressure concerning the focus of SAARC initiatives. India has twice been able to force a postponement of its annual meetings when it was displeased with developments in Pakistan.

Seeking Outside Allies

Seeking outside allies against each other has been India's and Pakistan's most consistent policies for over fifty years, and one of the most important ways in which they have constructed their relationship. Sometimes these allies have been willing, usually they have been reluctant. Pakistan has enlisted several Arab states, Iran, the United States, China, and North Korea in its attempt to balance Indian power. Washington usually felt uncomfortable in this role, resisting Pakistan's efforts to extend the security umbrella to include an attack by India. The Reagan administration drew the line at calling India a communist state, which would have invoked the 1959 agreement to take measures to defend Pakistan against communist aggression. The Chinese have been less restrained, and while there is no known treaty which binds Pakistan and China together, Beijing has provided more military assistance to Pakistan than it has to any other state. Beijing saw its support for Pakistan as serving double-duty, since a stronger Pakistan could counter the Soviet Union and resist Indian pressure. Yet, China has moderated its support for Pakistan's claims to Kashmir, and gradually normalized its relationship with India. In turn, New Delhi saw an opportunity after 1988 to weaken the Beijing-Islamabad tie by moving closer to China, and has been circumspect in its criticism of Chinese policies in Tibet and elsewhere.

On India's part, the Soviet Union was seen as a major ally in its competition with Pakistan. The Soviets provided a veto in the United Nations, massive arms supplies, and general sympathy for New Delhi. However, this support was not directed so much against Pakistan as it was against China; when the Gorbachev government began to normalize relations with Beijing, its support for India gradually declined.

It can be expected that these permutations will continue indefinitely, with India and Pakistan seeking outside support against the other. This has been the dominant feature of Indian diplomacy for decades, and it is unlikely to change soon.

Changing the Balance of Power

Both India and Pakistan have also attempted to use their armed forces to change the regional balance of power. The closest the two have come to a decisive turning point was in 1971, when the Indian army achieved the surrender of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan. However, rather than pressing on to a decisive victory in the West—which would have been very costly and might have brought other states into the contest—India settled for a negotiated peace and the Simla agreement. Both the United States and China provided verbal support for Pakistan in 1970-71, but neither seemed prepared to take any direct action that would have prevented India from defeating the Pakistanis in East Pakistan.²³ A second opportunity came in 1987 during the Brasstacks crisis, when India had conventional superiority and Pakistan had not yet acquired a nuclear weapon.²⁴

By 1990 both India and Pakistan had covertly exercised their nuclear options, and seem to have concluded that the risk of escalation had reached a point where the fundamental balance between the two could not be achieved by force of arms. This did not prevent the discrete use of force, and Pakistan adopted a strategy of hitting at India through the support of separatist and terrorist forces, and in 1999, a low-level war in Kargil. This now raises the prospect of escalation to nuclear war, but so far there has been no Indian or Pakistani advocacy of a *decisive* nuclear war.

Kashmir

Kashmir is both a cause and the consequence of the India-Pakistan conundrum. It is primarily a dispute about justice and people, although its strategic and territorial dimensions are complicated enough.²⁵ As in many other intractable paired-minority conflicts, it is hard to tell where domestic politics ends and foreign policy begins.

There are two Kashmirs. Besides the physical territory, another Kashmir is found in the minds of politicians, strategists, soldiers and ideologues. This is a place where national and sub-national identities are ranged against each other.²⁶ The conflict in this Kashmir is as much a clash between identities, imagination, and history, as it is a conflict

over territory, resources and peoples. Competing histories, strategies, and policies spring from these different images of self and other.

Pakistanis have long argued that the Kashmir problem stems from India's denial of justice to the Kashmiri people (by not allowing them to join Pakistan), and by not accepting Pakistan's own legitimacy. Once New Delhi were to pursue a just policy, then a peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem could be found.²⁷ For the Pakistanis, Kashmir remains the "unfinished business" of the 1947 partition. Pakistan, the self-professed homeland for an oppressed and threatened Muslim minority in the Subcontinent, finds it difficult to leave a Muslim majority region to a Hindu-majority state.

Indians, however, argue that Pakistan, a state defined and driven by its religion, is given to irredentist aspirations in Kashmir because it is unwilling to accept the fact of a secular India. India, a nominally secular state, finds it difficult to turn over a Muslim majority region to a Muslim neighbor *just because* it is Muslim. The presence of this minority belies the need for Pakistan to exist at all (giving rise to the Pakistani assertion that Indians have never reconciled themselves to Pakistan).²⁸ Indians also point to Bangladesh as proof that Jinnah's call for a separate religion-based homeland for the Subcontinent's Muslims was untenable. In contrast, India's secularism, strengthened by the presence of a Muslim-majority state of Kashmir within India, proves that religion alone does not make a nation. Indians maintain that Kashmir cannot be resolved until Pakistanis alter their views on secularism. Of course, this would also mean a change in the identity of Pakistan, a contentious subject in both states.

These same themes of dominance, hegemony, and identity are replicated within the state itself. The minority Buddhist Ladakhis would prefer to be governed directly from New Delhi, and (like their Shi'ia neighbors) fear being ruled from a Sunni Muslim-dominated government in Srinagar. In Jammu, much of the majority Hindu population has long been discontented with the special status lavished upon the Valley by the Union government in New Delhi. Finally, the small Kashmiri Pandit Brahmin community in the Valley is especially fearful. It has lost its privileged position within the administration of the state and much of its dominance in academia and the professions. After the onset of

militant Islamic protests, most of the Pandit community fled the Valley for Jammu and several Indian cities (especially New Delhi), where they live in wretched exile. Some of their representatives have demanded *Panun Kashmir*, a homeland for the tiny Brahmin community within Kashmir.

There are other “causes” of the Kashmir problem. The original problem, caused by a failed partition, was followed by a process by which Indian and Pakistani leaders turned Kashmir into a badge of their respective national identities. For Pakistan, which defined itself as a homeland for Indian Muslims, the existence of a Muslim majority area under “Hindu” Indian rule was grating. After all, the purpose of Pakistan was to free Muslims from the tyranny of majority rule (and hence, of rule by the majority Hindu population). For Indians, their country had to include such predominantly Muslim regions to demonstrate the secular nature of the new Indian state; since neither India nor Pakistan, so-defined, could be complete without Kashmir, raising the stakes for both.

Kashmir also came to play a role in the respective domestic politics of both states. In Pakistan Kashmir was a helpful diversion from the daunting task of nation building and there are powerful Kashmiri-dominated constituencies in several Pakistani cities. In India the small, but influential Kashmiri Hindu community was over-represented in the higher reaches of the Indian government, not least in the presence of the Nehru family, a Kashmiri Pandit clan that had migrated to Uttar Pradesh from the Valley.

Further, Kashmir acquired an unexpected military dimension. Not only has the “line of control” (the former cease-fire line) become a strategic extension of the international border to the south, China holds substantial territory (in Ladakh) claimed by India. From 1984 onward advances in training and high altitude warfare have turned the most inaccessible part of Kashmir—the Siachin Glacier—into a battleground.²⁹ The recent limited war in Kargil raised the stakes considerably, as it was the first time that offensive airpower has been used between Indian and Pakistani forces since 1971.

Kashmir was also tied to the Cold War. Washington and Moscow armed India and Pakistan (often both at the same time), they supported one side or the other in various international fora and the Soviets wielded the veto threat on behalf of India in the UN

Security Council. However, the superpowers reached an understanding that they would not let the Kashmir conflict (or India-Pakistan tensions) affect their core strategic relationship.³⁰ Ironically, the process by which the Cold War ended had an impact on Kashmir itself because the forces of democracy and nationalism that destroyed the Soviet Union and freed Eastern Europe were at work in Kashmir.³¹

Finally, Kashmir has been the scene of a national self-determination movement among Kashmiri Muslims. Encouraged by neither India nor Pakistan, this burst into view in late 1989 after a spell of particularly bad Indian governance in the state. Angry and resentful at their treatment by New Delhi, and not attracted to even a democratic Pakistan, younger Kashmiris looked to Palestine, Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe for models, and to émigrés in America, Britain, and Canada for support. This emergence of a movement for self-rule by a younger generation of Kashmiris was the result of decades of mismanagement, but more specifically the manipulation of Kashmiri politics in the 1980s first by Indira Gandhi and then by Rajiv Gandhi. It coincided with the slow and imperfect growth of political mobilization of the valley Kashmiris.³² Kashmiris were mobilized too late, too quickly and, imperfectly.³³ “Kashmiriyat” (the refined amalgam of Hindu-Muslim culture that characterizes the Valley and surrounding areas) remains; it has been a rallying point for some separatists, but must now compete with more virulent forms of militant Islamic doctrine, a form of Islam that had been alien to the Kashmiri population before the 1980s.

Undoubtedly Pakistani support was provided—it was never hidden—and Pakistanis speak proudly of their assistance to the Kashmiris and their right to help the latter free themselves from an oppressive Indian state. However, Pakistan’s role was not the decisive factor in starting the uprising, although it has been a critical factor in sustaining it.

Since the uprising of 1989, the situation in Kashmir has become a bloody stalemate. India continues to apply a mixture of pressure and inducement, organizing its own counter terrorist squads made up of ex-terrorists and sent by them against the Pakistan-sponsored “freedom fighters.” Numerous bomb blasts in major Indian and

Pakistani cities, several unexplained railway wrecks, the occasional air hijacking, and miscellaneous acts of sabotage seem to be evidence of organized attempts to exploit local grievances and extract revenge. While Indian officials claim a decline in “militancy,” international human rights groups and independent observers report little change, and within Kashmir the death toll mounts. Most of the Kashmiri population remains alienated, whether they are the Pandits (many of whom have fled their homes), or the Valley Muslims, bitterly divided and increasingly terrorized by radical Islamic groups.

Resolution: a Record of Failure

The failure of diplomacy to address, let alone resolve the Kashmir dispute is remarkable, given the amount of attention paid to it. After the 1948, and 1965 India-Pakistan wars, and the India-China war of 1962, there were concerted efforts to resolve Kashmir. In 1948, the United Nations became deeply involved—Kashmir is the oldest conflict inscribed in the body of UN resolutions and is certainly one of the most serious.³⁴ After the 1962 India-China war there were intensive but fruitless American and British efforts to bridge the gap between Delhi and Islamabad. The end of the 1965 war saw the Soviet Union as a regional peacemaker. The Soviets did manage to promote a general peace treaty at Tashkent, but this could not prevent a civil and international war in 1970-71 over East Pakistan/Bangladesh.

The most consistent feature of great power influence on the Kashmir problem has been its ineffectiveness. Beyond their regional Cold War patronage, both the United States and the Soviet Union have played significant, often parallel and cooperative roles in the subcontinent.³⁵ Over the years the United States had considerable influence with both India and Pakistan; at one point the Soviet Union, generally regarded as pro-Indian, moved closer to Pakistan, even providing military assistance to Islamabad and brokering the 1966 Tashkent agreement. Yet neither superpower seemed to be able to make a difference. This suggests that any outside power should step carefully if it seeks to end or even moderate this conflict.

Kashmir was important only insofar as it concerned their respective regional partners, yet both resisted being dragged into the Kashmir issue by those same partners.

While Indians and Pakistanis often based their regional calculation on the assistance of outside support for their position on Kashmir, this support has been limited and constrained. For years the Soviets provided India with an automatic veto in the United Nations on Kashmir-related resolutions, and otherwise backed New Delhi diplomatically. The Pakistanis became more dependent on the United States for political and military support, but could never get the United States to commit itself to firm security assurances against India, precisely because Washington was afraid of being sucked into a Kashmir conflict. Both Washington and Moscow made several inconclusive efforts to mediate the dispute or bring about its peaceful resolution, but were wary of anything more. It took the 1990 crisis with its nuclear dimension, to bring the United States back to the region, and then only briefly.

After India defeated Pakistan in 1971, India kept outsiders at a distance as it sought to reach a bilateral understanding with Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met in the Indian hill station of Simla in late June and early July 1972.³⁶ There, after a long and complicated negotiation they committed their countries to a bilateral settlement of all outstanding disputes. Presumably, this included Kashmir (which was mentioned only in the last paragraph of the text). The Simla Agreement did not rule out mediation or multilateral diplomacy, if both sides agreed.

Divergent interpretations of Simla added another layer of India-Pakistan distrust. While there is a formal text, there may have been verbal agreements between the two leaders that have never been made public. According to most Indian accounts, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto told Mrs. Gandhi that he was willing to settle the Kashmir dispute along the Line of Control, but a final agreement had to be delayed because he was still weak politically. Pakistani accounts claim that Bhutto did no such thing, and that in any case the written agreement is what matters. For India, Simla had supplanted the UN resolutions as a point of reference for resolving the Kashmir dispute. After all, Indian leaders reasoned, the two parties had pledged to work directly with one another, implicitly abandoning extra-regional diplomacy. For Pakistan, Simla supplemented but did not replace the operative UN resolutions on Kashmir.

After the Simla Agreement, the Kashmir dispute seemed to subside. The Indian government began to view the LOC as a more or less permanent border, but both sides continued to nibble away at it when an opportunity arose—most spectacularly in the case of India’s move to occupy much of the Siachin Glacier.³⁷ For Pakistani diplomats the Simla Agreement neither replaced the UN resolutions nor did the conversion of the ceasefire line into a LOC produce a permanent *international* border. Guided by these varied interpretations both sides continued to press their respective claims whenever the opportunity arose, but for seventeen years Kashmir was widely regarded outside the region as either solved or on the way to resolution. Other regional issues displaced Kashmir—the 1974 Indian nuclear test, Pakistan’s covert nuclear weapons program, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Between 1972 and 1994 India and Pakistan held forty-five bilateral meetings, only one was fully devoted to Kashmir.³⁸

Towards a Solution?

Over the years many solutions have been proposed for the Kashmir problem.³⁹ These included partition along the Line of Control, “soft borders” between the two parts of Kashmir (pending a solution to the entire problem), a region-by-region plebiscite of Kashmiris, referendum, UN trusteeship, the “Trieste” and “Andorra” models (whereby the same territory is shared by two states, or a nominally sovereign territory in fact is controlled jointly by two states), revolutionary warfare, depopulation of Muslim Kashmiris and repopulation by Hindus from India, patience, good government, a revival of “human values,” and doing nothing.⁴⁰ The dispute has not been resolved because of at least three factors.

First, over the long run, the existence of the Cold War led both Americans and the Soviets to see this regional dispute not for what it was but as part of the systemic East-West struggle.

Second, both states have been inflexible over the years. India’s strategy has been to gradually erode Kashmir’s special status under Article 370 of the Constitution of India, which grants the state a special status in the Indian Union. It also pretended that the problem was “solved” by the Simla Agreement. This dual strategy of no-change within

Kashmir, and no-discussion of it with Pakistan failed to prepare New Delhi for the events of the late 1980s. India rejected the political option, it rejected a strategy of accommodating Kashmiri demands, it excluded Pakistan from its Kashmir policy, and it has stubbornly opposed outside efforts to mediate the dispute. Yet, New Delhi lacks the resources, the will or a strategy to deal with the Kashmir problem unilaterally. Pakistan, on the other hand, has often resorted to force in attempting to wrest Kashmir from India—further alienating the Kashmiris themselves in 1947-48 and in 1965 and providing the Indian government with the perfect excuse to avoid negotiations.

Third, it must be said that the Kashmiris, while patently victims, have not been reluctant to exploit the situation. A significant number of Kashmiris have always sought independence from India *and* Pakistan. The two states disagree as to *which* should control Kashmir and the mechanism for determining Kashmiri sentiment, but they are unified in their opposition to an independent state. Thus the seemingly well-intentioned proposal, heard frequently from Americans and other outsiders, that Kashmiris be “consulted” or have a voice in determining their own fate is threatening to both Islamabad and Delhi.

Like proposals to resolve other complex disputes, such as those in the Middle East or China-Taiwan and the two Koreas, “solutions” to the Kashmir problem must operate at many levels. The examples of the Middle East, South Africa, and Ireland, indicate that seemingly intractable disputes can be resolved, or ameliorated, by patience, outside encouragement, and, above all, a strategy that will address the many dimensions of these complex disputes. If a strategy for Kashmir had begun in the early or mid-1980s, then some of the crises that arose later in that decade might have been averted, and it would not now be seen as one of the world’s nuclear flash-points.

Any comprehensive solution to the Kashmir problem would involve many concessions, and changes in relations between India and Pakistan (and within each state) It would require a change in India’s federal system; it might require changes within Kashmir between its constituent parts; it would necessitate a re-examination of the military balance between India and Pakistan and provisions that would prevent the two states from again turning to arms in Kashmir. Above all, it would require major

concessions on the part of Pakistan—and India might have to accept a Pakistani *locus standi* in Kashmir itself. There also would have to be incentives for Pakistan to cooperate in such ameliorative measures, since its basic strategy is to draw outsiders into the region and to pressure India. In brief, India has to demonstrate to Pakistan that it would be willing to make significant concessions, but also pledge that if Pakistan ceased its support for Kashmiri separatists Delhi would not change its mind once the situation in the Valley had become more normal.

Doing nothing is likely to be the default option for Kashmir. At best, there might be an arrangement that would ensure that the state does not trigger a larger war between the two countries. However, this does little to address Kashmiri grievances or the widespread human rights violations in the state, nor does it address the deeper conflict between India and Pakistan.

Both India and Pakistan regularly pass through a point where both sides momentarily agree that the time may be right for talks. Just as regularly, one or the other side decides that the risk of moving forward is too great. Often, they believe that time will be on their side, and delay will weaken the case of the other side or strengthen its own. To some degree, both sides also believe that the other will not compromise unless confronted by overwhelming force. The greater Kashmir problem is persuading both sides—and now the Kashmiris themselves (whose perception of how time will bring about an acceptable solution is not clear at all) to examine their own deeper assumptions about how to bring the other to the bargaining table and reach an agreement, and to objectively assess the costs incurred by waiting to address a problem that has crippled both states for over fifty years.

Resolution or Permanent Hostility?

The presence of a paired minority conflict implies that sustaining a dialogue that leads to regional peace will be difficult. It does not imply that war is more likely. Other paired minority conflicts have been moderated; others appear to be on the road to resolution, or at least management. The Indian debate on Kashmir and relations with Pakistan is particularly wide-ranging (far more so than that in Pakistan) and no future can

be absolutely ruled out.⁴¹ One arrangement unofficially supported by many Indians is to draw the international boundary along the cease-fire line, although with minor adjustments.⁴² This is rejected out of hand by Pakistan, although it keeps cropping up in Indian discussions and has been proposed by third parties.

At one end of the spectrum it is possible to envision a peace process for India and Pakistan that could resolve or ameliorate the core conflicts. Drawing upon the experience of other regions, as well as South Asia's own history, such a process would require major changes in policy on the part of India, Pakistan, and the most likely outside "facilitator" of such a process, the United States.⁴³

A regional peace process now seems improbable, given the difficulty of getting political acceptance in both countries at the same time on a problem so closely identified with their respective national identities. From India's perspective any such process cannot go very far without running afoul of India's hostility towards the two-nation theory—a theory that Indians claim is Pakistan's sole reason for existence. Indians point out that this concept is an incitement to revolt for India's large Muslim population, and encourages other separatist groups, such as the Sikhs, Nagas, and Mizos. If we take the Indian argument at face value, then there can be no real peace process between India and Pakistan as long as either retains its identity. Any peace process is bound to fail if it does not recognize these core differences, yet no peace process that does not address them will get very far.

Second, such a peace process would eventually require a change in India's policies towards Kashmir itself. Indians are deeply divided on this question.⁴⁴ Some favor absolutely no change in the Delhi-Srinagar relationship, others urge a degree of autonomy for Kashmir, and a few are willing to see the state partitioned, perhaps along the Line of Control. One reason for Indian disarray is the uncertainty over the actual loyalty of Kashmiri Muslims—if a measure of autonomy were granted to the state, or at least to its more discontented elements—would that not lead to the slippery slope of a renewed movement for a separate state? Given the profound alienation of many Kashmiris, and the growth of extremist Madrassas in the state, some fear that Kashmir is

irretrievably lost to a secular India, and a few Hindu extremists have advocated the repopulation of the state by Hindu settlers. The recent defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan give new hope, however, that the extremist trend has been halted in Kashmir, but Pakistan's cooperation may be necessary if Islamic extremism is to be marginalized in Kashmir.

The obstacles to the inauguration of a peace process are even greater on the Pakistani side. While the Indian strategic community has debated India-Pakistan relations for fifty years, and has generated dozens of prospective "solutions" for Kashmir, the Pakistani debate is dominated by the civil and military security establishment, and moderate or dovish views are rarely heard. In recent years an increasingly shrill Islamic element calls for even tougher measures against India, but this is likely to change as a result of the complete misjudgment of Pakistan's Islamist hawks concerning Afghanistan, and the anger felt by the Pakistan army when Pakistan's Islamist leaders started to attack the army for its support of the American-led operation in Afghanistan. Pakistan could be on the verge of a major re-evaluation of its relationship with Islamic extremism, and will come under increasing American pressure to reduce or eliminate its support for terrorist-inclined groups operating in Kashmir itself.

Complicating the prospect of Pakistan as a partner in a peace process is the intense debate on state identity that Pakistanis have been engaged in for many years. While Pakistan began as a homeland for Indian Muslims, and justified this identity because Hindus and Muslims were "two nations," the debate over Pakistani identity has moved well beyond this. After the Punjabi-dominated military assumed power, Pakistanis came to see themselves as Fortress Pakistan: a state (that happened to be Muslim) threatened by India. This was a Punjab-centric view of Pakistan. Subsequently, after the loss of East Bengal, Pakistanis turned toward Islam as a way of asserting a national identity. In the midst of a debate over their own national identity, Pakistanis find it essential to agree on at least one point, and that is the unremitting hostility of India.

In the end, a comprehensive peace process may require an outside power or powers. The only state that could now initiate such a process would be America, but

since 1964 Washington has been reluctant to become deeply engaged in South Asian conflicts. Recent American studies stopped well short of recommending a regional peace process, and there appears to be little interest in an enhanced American role although since the 1998 tests it has become more active behind the scenes, fearful that events in might slip out of control between the two South Asian nuclear rivals.

More likely than a peace process involving Kashmir are steps that encourage accommodation in other areas—the strategy of the indirect approach. The past fifteen years have seen considerable interest in measures that might reduce conflict and increase regional stability. The uprising in Kashmir, the 1998 nuclear tests, and the Kargil war of 1999 all stimulated interest in track II diplomacy between India and Pakistan, and the role that third-parties might take in promoting the India-Pakistan dialogue. There has been considerable discussion about enhancing regional economic cooperation, which might create new domestic “lobbies” in each state. These could eventually provide the political backing for a peace process. Others, especially the European and American foundations, have actively supported Track II and Track III diplomacy (the first being quasi-official, the second involving “people-to-people” exchanges) in the belief that more contact between Indians and Pakistanis would help dispel misperceptions and point to areas where agreement might be possible. All of these efforts seek to moderate, if not transform, a relationship that seems to be based on fear, hatred, and distrust. They emphasize the gains and benefits that each side may reap from cooperation.

Both India and Pakistan have agreed to a wide variety of CBMs, including pre-notification of troop movements and exercises, the location of nuclear facilities, hotlines between military commanders, regular meetings between prime ministers, and restrictions on propaganda and other steps that might exacerbate India-Pakistan relations.⁴⁵ The best that can be said for these CBMs is that neither India nor Pakistan has yet boasted of breaking the arrangements. In time of crisis most have simply ceased to function, and whatever “lessons” about cooperation have been learned seem to evaporate. Nevertheless, there is a strong feeling in both countries that they can avoid major conflict and that South Asia is not as unstable as outsiders believe.

Besides these long-term efforts to change perceptions, build trust, and clarify areas of agreement and disagreement, the prospect of a major transformation of the India-Pakistan relationship cannot be ruled out. There are several scenarios; some of these seem far-fetched at the moment, but all are worth at least a brief mention.

- Pakistan could collapse under the weight of its own contradictions and cease to exist in its present form, perhaps splitting into several states. This seems to be the formula of many Indian strategists who expect the Kashmir problem will be solved in the same way that East and West Berlin were merged, the smaller simply ceasing to exist. Such a Pakistan might continue as a united state (few Indians would welcome the addition of a hundred million Muslims to the Indian union), but it certainly would not be able to stand up militarily and politically to Delhi.
- India could cause Pakistan to change its identity or cease to exist in its present form. One precedent is the creation of Bangladesh, an Islamic state which is unwilling to challenge India in any significant way. However, India could alter Pakistan's national identity by other means. Delhi could support dissident ethnic and linguistic groups in Pakistan, especially those who were less "Islamic" or less anti-Indian than the Punjab.
- Some RSS and Hindu ideologues believe that India's "civilizational pull" will triumph over the idea of Pakistan, and Pakistanis will simply succumb to India's greater cultural and social power. They do not expect Pakistan to necessarily merge with India, although many Indians who hail from towns and villages that are now in Pakistan would like to see some parts of Sind and West Punjab reincorporated into India. This school is prepared to wait Pakistan out, and thinks in terms of generations and decades, rather than months or years.
- India might underestimate Pakistani nationalism and power, and take some action which would lead Islamabad to actually use its nuclear weapons in a Masada-like last attempt to defend Pakistan, and if that fails, to bring India down with Pakistan by attacking India's cities.

- A no less dramatic transformation in the relationship could come about if Pakistan itself changed its priorities, putting development ahead of Kashmir—at least for a while. This would confront India with a peculiar situation: a former enemy seeking peace. The question is whether India would or could, respond in a positive fashion and be willing to negotiate a long-term settlement of the Kashmir dispute. After Kargil, this seems less likely.
- India could accept Pakistan’s identity as an Islamic state. It could declare that it disagreed with this identity, that it rejects such a theory of religion-based statehood for itself, it could point to the accomplishments of a secular democracy—and the general willingness of Muslim and other religious and ethnic minorities to live in such a state—but it could acknowledge that on this irreconcilable point Pakistanis chose and have the right to continue to choose, to live a different life. It could then move to cooperate on a whole range of shared economic, cultural, strategic, and political interests.

None of these extreme outcomes seems likely, but together they add up to a possibility that the India-Pakistan relationship could take a dramatic and even dangerous turn.

India’s Dilemma

The most likely outcome to this dispute is one of continuing stalemate. The future is likely be one of hesitant movements towards dialogue, punctuated by attempts on both sides to unilaterally press their advantage in Kashmir and in international fora. This is a conflict that Pakistan cannot win and India cannot lose, a true “hurting stalemate.” Without some fundamental social or political changes in India and Pakistan, the stalemate is likely to continue indefinitely.

Reinforcing this prospect is the fact that stalemate is more attractive to each side than some solutions that have been put forward. From the perspective of the Pakistan military which has an absolute veto over any policy initiative regarding Kashmir, the ability to tie Indian forces down in Kashmir is an important consequence of the dispute;

cynically, it could be said that Pakistan is willing to fight India to the last Kashmiri. As long as Pakistan sees itself as militarily disadvantaged, it will try to equalize the military balance by any means possible. This includes the nuclear program, but also a strategy aimed at forcing India to divert important resources to a military front (Kashmir) where the terrain and political situation are in Pakistan's favor. For India, Kashmir has so many links to India's secular political order—especially the place of Muslims—any settlement which appeared to compromise this order is unacceptable. Clearly, Kashmir is linked to broader issues of the military balance between India and Pakistan, and the very identity of the two states, and while more could be done to ease the suffering of the Kashmiri people—a ceasefire, and some drawdown of regular and paramilitary forces on the Indian side, and some reduction in support for extremists coming from the Pakistan side—no lasting settlement is possible without dealing with these larger strategic and ideological concerns.

India has much to gain by a normal relationship with Pakistan. Such a relationship could contribute to India's assuming a place among the major Asian and even global powers. It would not be a question, as it is now, of Indian power *minus* Pakistani power, but of an India free to exercise its influence without the distraction—and the cost—of a conflict with a still-powerful Pakistan.

However, events seem to outrun India's capability to adapt to them. In recent years there has been a summit, a war, a coup in Pakistan, another summit, and a major American war in Afghanistan. This war forced Islamabad to abandon its extremist Taliban allies, with potential far-reaching consequences for Pakistan's domestic politics and its support for the radical jihadis in Kashmir. Yet India seems to have responded to the crisis in Afghanistan by reverting to an earlier strategy of encirclement of Pakistan, hoping that its relationship with the United States plus a revived tie with the new Afghan government will again put it in a strategically dominant position. This strategy is only likely to reinforce Pakistani suspicions of India.

The prognosis, then, is yet another decade of deadlock. Both states will continue to acquire--and probably deploy—nuclear weapons. India is likely to remain resistant to

outside mediation or facilitation of the Kashmir dispute, and domestic political turmoil in both countries will make it even more difficult for the next generation of Indian and Pakistani leaders to forge a relationship that is not grounded on distrust, hostility, and, now, the threat of nuclear holocaust. There may be limited agreement between New Delhi and its western neighbor, but the most problematic issue is not whether Indians or Pakistanis can be trusted to fulfill obligations incurred in agreements where they had little incentive to comply, but whether, under the influence of a pessimistic vision of the region's destiny, they can be trusted in cases where it *is* in their self-interest to comply.

At best the Pakistani generals may conclude that persistent hostility towards India and an obsession with Kashmir has done great damage to Pakistan, and Indian leaders will conclude that some normalization with Pakistan is necessary for India to play a wider role in the world. This is the basis for a truce between the two countries, but not the basis for a peace. For that to occur, there will have to be more profound changes in their deeper relationship, for they will remain two states allergic to each other without the development of strong economic, cultural and political ties.

Endnotes

1. For a fuller explication of the “India emerging” literature and a more comprehensive assessment see Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
2. This term is my own. The most insightful thinker on how hostile groups or crowds are generated is Elias Canetti, whose book *Crowds and Power* (New York: Seabury Press, 1978) is a modern classic. For the perspective of a clinical psychologist who has studied the origins of ethnic conflict and war, see Vamik D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships* (New York: Jason Aronson, 1988).
3. For a sympathetic explication of Jinnah’s views after Partition, especially in his speeches of 11 and 14 August, 1947, see Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997.
4. For discussion of this process see Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*, pp. 155 ff.
5. However, several distinguished military experts have discussed the India-China border conflict with insight and imagination. See Maj.-Gen. D.K. Palit, *War in High Himalaya: the Indian Army in Crisis, 1962* (London: C. Hurst and Co, 1991).
6. An influential and authoritative Pakistan army interpretation of India can be found in Brig. Javed Hussain, *India: A Study in Profile* (Rawalpindi: Army Press, 1990).
7. For a comprehensive statement of this view see the writing of Dr. Ayesha Jalal, especially *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
8. U.S. Bajpai, *India's Security: The Politico-Strategic Environment* (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1983), pp. 70-71.
9. For a selection of contemporary Indian writing on Pakistan, much of it by present and former police and intelligence officials, see Rajeev Sharma (ed.), *The Pakistan Trap* (New Delhi: UBSPD, 2001)
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
12. For a fuller discussion of Pakistan’s approach to India see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army, 2d ed* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998).

13. Ibid., pp. 141 ff.

14. For a contemporary Pakistani discussion of Jinnah's secularism see Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997).

15. This image is vividly conveyed to a second and third generation of Indians (and others) by the portrayal of Jinnah in the Attenborough film, *Gandhi*. A concern with this negative image led the distinguished Pakistani academic-administrator, Akbar Ahmed, to produce several films that offer a more realistic portrayal of Jinnah's personal and professional life.

16. The civilizational gap between Islamic Pakistan and (largely Hindu but formally secular) India was a theme of Girilal Jain, one of India's most brilliant journalists. In the last ten years of his life (he died in 1988) Jain wrote feelingly about Hindu-Muslim affairs and the phenomenon of Pakistan; he was, in many ways, the most successful popularizer of BJP views well before the party came to power. For an overview of his arguments see Jain, *The Hindu Phenomenon* (New Delhi: USBSPD, 1994).

17. Lt. Gen. P. N. Kathpalia, (ret.), "Indo-Pak Relations: The Concept of National Security," *Indian Defense Review*, January, 1989, p. 116, 124.

18. See Hassan, *India: A Study in Profile*, for a summary of these perceptions.

19. A partial list can be found in Sundeep Waslekar, *Track-Two Diplomacy in South Asia* (ACDIS Occasional Paper, Program in Arms Control, University of Illinois, October 1995) and Navnita Chadha Behera, Paul M. Evans and Gowher Rizvi, *Beyond Boundaries: A Report on the State of Non-Official Dialogues on Peace, Security and Cooperation in South Asia* ((Toronto: University of Toronto, 1997).

20. Some of these dialogues are more thoroughgoing and reach a younger generation of scholars, strategists, journalists and diplomats, such as the many workshops organized by the Colombo-based Regional Centre for Strategic Studies. See www.rcss.org

21. In conversations with the author and others, Zia stressed his interest in a long-term agreement with India, although one that would preserve vital Pakistani strategic interests and its heavy moral investment in Kashmir. It was impossible to measure the sincerity of these claims, but he did make a series of extraordinary proposals to India that were rejected—including a desire to purchase Indian-manufactured weapons.

22. The SAARC home page is at <http://www.saarc.com/spotential.html>

23. For an account of the diplomacy of the war see Leo Rose and Richard Sisson, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
24. For a comprehensive overview, Kanti Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervez Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, *Brasstacks and Beyond: Crisis Perception and Management in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995, Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1996; Columbia: South Asia Books, 1996)
25. For two overviews of the Kashmir problem see Jonah Blank, "Kashmir: Fundamentalism Takes Root," *Foreign Affairs* November-December 1999 and Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War and Hopes of Peace* (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1997).
26. For an excellent survey of these issues see Navnita Chadha-Behera, "J&K (& L & D & G . . .): Making and Unmaking Identities," *Himal South Asia*, Nov.-Dec., 1996, pp. 26-33.
27. For the Pakistani perspective, see Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan, India, and Kashmir: A Historical Review," in Raju G.C. Thomas, editor, *Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
28. For an extensive review of the Indian position see, Ashutosh Varshney, "Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir has been a Problem," in Thomas, *Perspectives*.
29. For a vivid press account see W. P. S. Sidhu, "Siachin: The Forgotten War," *India Today*, May 31, 1992.
30. For a discussion of the impact of the Cold War on Kashmir and South Asia by one of the chief architects of American policy during the Kissinger era, see Peter W. Rodman, *More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994.). For an excellent academic study covering the U.S.-Pakistan relationship see Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
31. This point is made by several Indian and Pakistani authors in Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, eds., *South Asia After the Cold War* (Boulder: Westview, 1993). See especially the chapters by Pervaiz I. Cheema and Lieut. Gen. M. L. Chibber.
32. Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*, p. 27.
33. The distinguished Kashmiri Indian scholar, T.N. Madan, has been a close observer of developments in his home. See T.N. Madan, *Modern Myths, Locked Minds* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.

257 ff. For a remarkable, if sometimes erratic, survey of Kashmir see the voluminous memoir-history by a former Governor of Kashmir, Jagmohan, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Allied, 1991).

34. For a brief UN history of the conflicts in Kashmir, plus information about the UN peacekeeping operations in the state see the web site of the United Nations Department of Public Information, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan), <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmogip.htm>, (October 31, 1997).

35. See Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in South Asia," in Roger Kanet and Edward Kolodziej, eds., *The Cold War as Cooperation* (London: Macmillan, 1990 and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1991).

36. For a rare attempt to juxtapose Indian and Pakistani interpretations of Simla see P.R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *The Simla Agreement. 1972: Its Wasted Promise* (New Delhi : Regional Center for Strategic Studies and Manohar, 2001).

37. One of the most comprehensive accounts of Siachin is to be found in Robert G. Wirsing, *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 196-216.

38. See 'Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema "The Kashmir Dispute and Peace of South Asia," *Regional Studies*, Vol. XV. No. 1, Winter 1996-97, pp. 170-88.

39. One of the most important groups to have undertaken a fresh examination of the problem is the Kashmir Study Group, composed of senior retired officials, academics, and other interested parties drawn from America and Europe. See Kashmir Study Group, *A Way Forward* (Livingston, N.Y., 1999).

40. Some elements of the Bharatiya Janata Party have recommended that Kashmir be repopulated with Hindus, once its special constitutional status (Article 370) was eliminated. The Andorra precedent of the thirteenth century—a treaty between Spain and France guaranteeing Andorra's internal autonomy—has been discussed by Jean Alphonse Bernard of Paris; Jagmohan, one of the key principles in the most recent crises in Kashmir, has written that the long-term solution rests in a revival of the Indian spirit. See his own record of Kashmir's crises of Kashmir in *My Frozen Turbulence*.

41. A survey of centrist thinking, which might well evolve into official policy (if the circumstances were right), can be found in Kanti P. Bajpai and others, *Jammu and Kashmir: An Agenda for the Future* (Delhi: Delhi Policy Group, 1999).

42. Nehru suggested this arrangement in conversations in 1953 with John Foster Dulles. See Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941-1991* (New Delhi: Sage, 1993), p. 116.

43. I have discussed a peace process for South Asia in several places. See Stephen P. Cohen, "A New Beginning in South Asia," *Brookings Policy Brief No. 55*, (January, 2000), www.Brookings.edu.

44. An excellent source for divergent Indian views on Kashmir is the "Kashmir" page of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies; which offers a succinct presentation of the major Indian positions. See <http://www.ipcs.org>.

45. The Regional Centre for Strategic Studies has issued a number of studies on CBMs. See two anthologies edited by its Director, Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Dipankar Banerjee: *Confidence Building Measures in South Asia* (Colombo: RCSS, 1999) and *CBMs in South Asia: Potential and Possibilities* (Colombo: RCSS, 2000).