

***HOW AMERICA VIEWS
CHINA-SOUTH KOREA BILATERALISM****

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The South Korea-United States alliance has come a long way from being an indispensable front-line checkpoint against Communist aggression in East Asia. The Cold War structure firmly anchored in the region has now been largely dismantled, a transformation most clearly evidenced by South Korea's diplomatic normalization with both China and Russia. While North Korea still remains a security threat to the South, the evolving strategic configurations of the region are likely to precipitate certain changes in the half-century alliance relationship between Seoul and Washington.¹ The ever-expanding South Korea-China bilateralism, in particular, has become the locus of much interest and concern on the part of an increasing number of American policy experts that, in the long run, Seoul may eventually choose to depart the U.S.-led security framework and instead join the orbits of Beijing's diplomacy.²

The Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea) has of late been attracting diplomatic, economic and strategic attention from both the United States and China. The curious relationship between Seoul and Beijing has come a long way from antagonistic enemies to cooperative partners for the future. While South Korea has been quite successful in engaging China, that success has at the same time generated an intricate dilemma for South Korea and its alliance with the United States. Whereas South Korea seeks to maintain amicable and beneficial relationships with both the United States and China, from America's perspective, Seoul's unprecedented efforts to devise a strategic balance between Washington and Beijing have been a source of sour feelings and grave concern.³

¹ See Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, *A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of US-Korean Security Cooperation* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995); Morton I. Abramowitz, James T. Laney, and Michael J. Green, *Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998); and *A Blueprint for US Policy toward a Unified Korea: a working group report of the CSIS international security program* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2002).

² See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton, and Richard Lugar (eds.), *Foreign Policy into the 21st Century: The United States Leadership Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), p. 49; and Eric A. McVadon, "China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula" in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), pp. 149, 169.

³ While Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross have characterized Seoul as shying away from hedging between Washington and China, different findings are also available. For this viewpoint, see "Conclusion," in Johnston and Ross (eds.), *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 288. For contrasting findings, see Jae Ho Chung, *The Korean-American Alliance and the "Rise of China": A Preliminary Assessment of Perceptual Changes and Strategic Choices*, Occasional Papers, Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, February 1999 (available under "Publications" at

South Korea's decision in 1999 not to join the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) plan and Seoul's sensitivity to discussing China-related issues at the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) displeased the United States. Furthermore, in the fall of 2002 when the South Korean news media were literally flooded with special reports commemorating the tenth anniversary of the diplomatic normalization between South Korea and China, America's popularity was at a record low, catalyzed by the deaths of two schoolgirls overrun by a US armored vehicle. Anti-American candle-light protests ensued and, contrary to Washington's wishful expectations for Lee Hoi-Chang, Roh Moo-Hyun was elected as the new President.

While some have depicted this situation as South Korea being "sandwiched" between the United States and China, the flipside of such an interpretation would be that both Washington and Beijing wish to pull Seoul toward its side of the fence.⁴ In this vein, some have even gone so far as to argue that "China has moved to cultivate close relations with the government in Seoul – perhaps in anticipation of an eventual United States withdrawal...The United States must make *special efforts* to sustain its close alliance ties to South Korea" (emphasis added).⁵ It appears that South Korea is once again poised in the "center" between two competing – continental versus maritime – great powers.⁶

Two dimensions are particularly pertinent to such concern over the prospect of South Korea's eventual "realignment" with China. First, the history of Korean-American relations is deemed too brief and recent to be compared with that of Korea-China relations of over two millennia. Added to that is the factor of "cultural affinity" found - despite the half-century

<http://aparc.stanford.edu>); and Jae Ho Chung, "South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, No. 5 (September-October 2001), pp. 778-779.

⁴ For the notion of being "sandwiched," see Eric A. McVadon, "China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula," in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), pp. 149, 169. For an alternative interpretation, see Kurt M. Campbell and Mitchell B. Reiss, "Korean Changes, Asian Challenges and the US Role," *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 59-60, 63.

⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee Hamilton and Richard Lugar *Foreign Policy into the 21st Century: The United States Leadership Challenge* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1996), p. 49.

⁶ While China denies any inspiration to become a hegemon, it is nevertheless willing to assign itself a great-power (*daguo*) status. See Ye Zicheng, "Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shi zai bixing" (It Is Inevitable that China Perform Great-Power Diplomacy), *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (World Economy and Politics), No. 1 (2000), p. 10.

ideological divide - in the ways of thinking and mutual perceptions of the two nations. The rise of China as South Korea's number one investment destination and second largest export market, as well as the ever-expanding human and cultural exchanges - dubbed the "Korea/China fever" (*hanliu* or *hanryu*) - may not have been mere coincidence.⁷

Second, the pace with which South Korea and China have enlarged the base of their cooperative ties during the last two decades has been remarkable beyond anyone's reasonable predictions. Seoul and Beijing have come to view each other as indispensable partners in trade, investment, technology, tourism, and cultural and educational exchanges.⁸ Now, gradually but steadily, cooperative linkages have been developing between the two militaries, making the relationship more worthy of the "comprehensive cooperative partnership" (*quanmian hezuoxing huoban*) officially designated in 2000.⁹

During the Kim Dae Jung presidency (1998-2003), the "Sunshine Policy" – engaging North Korea without making *quid pro quo* a prerequisite – landed Seoul in the driver's seat as far as inter-Korean relations were concerned. China, which has long argued for an inter-Korean resolution of the Korean problem, supported the "Sunshine Policy" much more actively than did the United States. The historic inter-Korean summit in June 2000 further highlighted Seoul's pivotal role in mitigating tension on the Korean Peninsula. These developments, however, made Washington feel increasingly sidelined. The inter-Korean summit communiqué, for instance, confirmed Beijing's long-held position of "independent and peaceful unification" (*zizhu yu heping tongyi*) as opposed to Washington's "peaceful unification."¹⁰

⁷ For a persuasive cultural-affinity argument posed by a Korean-Chinese scholar, see Han Zhenshe, "Fazhan Zhonghan huoban guanxi yingjie 21shiji de tiaozhan" (Challenges for the Development of China-Korea Relations in the 21st Century), *Dangdai yatai* (Contemporary Asia-Pacific), No. 1 (2000), p. 39.

⁸ As of the end of 2002, South Korean students in China numbered 36,093, accounting for 42.1 percent of all foreign students studying in China. The number of South Korean students in the United States was, at the same point in time, 49,046, accounting for 8.4 percent. See *South China Morning Post*, November 23, 2002 and *Hanguok Ilbo* (U.S. edition), March 18, 2003.

⁹ According to Chinese sources, since the abolition of "alliances sealed in blood" (*xiemeng*), "comprehensive cooperative partnership" is considered the second best designation – only after the "traditionally amicable ties" (*chuantong youhao guanxi*) – accorded by Beijing. See Zhang Jianhua (ed.), *Jiejue zhongguo zaidu mianlin de jinyao wenti* (On the Resolution of the Urgent Problems China Has Faced Again) (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 2000), pp. 523-524.

¹⁰ For instance, compare *Washington Post*, June 21, 2000 with *Renmin ribao* (Peoples' Daily), June 16, 2000.

The inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001 and the tragedy of September 11 introduced fundamental changes into American perspectives on world politics as well as on the Korean problem. President Kim was given the cold shoulder during his state visit to Washington in March 2001, and most of the U.S.-North Korean agreements reached under the Clinton administration – including the Albright-Cho Communique - were nullified. Seoul suddenly found itself entangled in myriad webs of policy problems, and the United States has since gradually taken the helm by way of branding North Korea an “axis of evil” nation. Pyongyang’s admission of its high-enriched uranium (HEU) program in October 2002 further added fuel to the already flammable situation.

While Washington has not presented or maintained a coherent position on the North Korean problem, U.S.-South Korean relations have not been as smooth as they used to and should be. Quite paradoxically, North Korea has become an obstacle – rather than the glue – to the Seoul-Washington relationship.¹¹ The deaths of the two schoolgirls and subsequent explosion of anti-American sentiments in South Korea in the latter half of 2002 constituted a stark contrast with high-profile celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the South Korea-China diplomatic normalization. Furthermore, the North Korean challenge, be it over nuclear weapons or the long-range missile program, seems to have only enhanced China’s overall profile in the affairs of Northeast Asia vis-à-vis that of the U.S.

While the Northeast Asian region has been characterized by fluidity since the early 1990s, the rapidly emerging Sino-South Korean ties – along with the North Korean *cul-de-sac* – signify an important strategic trend under formation. The United States, in particular, has begun to pay significant attention to whether the rise of anti-Americanism is a function of the emerging South Korea-China bilateralism or if it in fact works the other way around. America’s rising concern with the burgeoning Seoul-Beijing ties constitutes the starting point of this research endeavor, which aims to explore American perceptions of South Korea and of its rapidly expanding bilateralism with China.¹²

¹¹ For instance, William Safire depicts South Korea as “neutral” – on a par with Indonesia – rather than as an ally of the U.S. See his “The Asian Front,” *New York Times*, March 10, 2003.

¹² Detailed studies are available on the perceptions of the South Korean elite and general public toward the United States and China. See Jae Ho Chung, *The Korean-American Alliance and the “Rise of China”: A Preliminary Assessment of Perceptual Change and Strategic Choices*, (Stanford: Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, February 1999), also available under “Publications” at <http://aparc.stanford.edu>; and Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon,” pp. 783-788.

This study delves into three questions in particular. First, how do Americans perceive the world around themselves? This question is vital to understanding the perceptual map of Americans – both the elite and the public - which operates as the baseline for U.S. foreign policy toward Asia in particular. Second, this article also surveys American perceptions of China. Highly contentious and controversial as it may be, the way in which America perceives China’s future will determine its views of Seoul’s expanding ties with Beijing. Third, and most importantly, this research examines how American policy experts view the expanding bilateralism between Seoul and Beijing, thus shedding light on a prospective policy framework for the future.

A brief note is due on research methodology. In surveying the perceptions of the American policy elite, face-to-face interviews were conducted with fifty-six foreign policy experts working inside the Capital Beltway (I-495). Since there was no readily available method of random-sampling the elite as such, both “convenience sampling” and “snow-balling” were used over a time-span of ten months during 2002-3. The interviewees came from six functional pools of the executive, congress, military, academia, think-tank, and media. When possible, efforts were made to maintain a balance in terms of age, partisan affiliations, and geographical and functional expertise.¹³ All fifty-six interviewees met with the author in person, filled in the nine-page structured questionnaire and were subsequently asked follow-up questions on the basis of the choices they made on the questionnaire.

The American foreign policy elite is a sub-group of the American people. More importantly, due to the nature of American politics, elites are often subject and vulnerable to the public pressure generated and expressed via opinion polls, media, and interest groups politics. Viewed in this vein, analyzing elite perceptions alone is not sufficient: surveying American public attitudes toward the world, China, and South Korea becomes necessary. A wide range of cross-national and domestic opinion polls conducted in various years - by Harris Interactive, the Pew Research Center, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, and

¹³ Appendix-I provides the list of these 56 interviewees and Appendix-II offers a summary of their profile characteristics.

many other one-shot surveys - have been analyzed and contrasted with the perceptions of the American foreign policy elite.¹⁴

This article consists of four sections. The first maps out the American public's perceptions of the world around them. Primarily, the findings of various opinion survey series are summarized to distill the core characteristics of American views of world affairs. The second aims to reconstruct American perceptions – both elite and public – of China and its future prospects. The third concerns American elite views of South Korea and Sino-South Korean ties.¹⁵ Finally, the article concludes with observations concerning the future of U.S.-South Korea relations in the context of the “rise of China.”

America's Views of the World

The United States of America is a peculiar case in the sense that its self-perception of being “exceptional” has over the years shaped its view of the world. While many have taken pains to stress that being exceptional only denotes the attribute of being *different* and by no means implies any property of being *superior* or *better*, American pride has occasionally translated into such attributes as ethnocentrism, moral superiority, and unilateralism so often resented by many nations around the world.¹⁶ It is ironic that the United States, a country so fervently preoccupied with the global mission of propagating democracy, human rights, and freedom, is also seen to be closely associated with ethnocentric, non-consultative, and black-and-white ways of thoughts and deeds in managing world affairs.¹⁷

For most Americans, the United States is *the* world. Average Americans believe that over half of the world population – 52 percent – speaks their English. Surprisingly, the figure for younger Americans – respondents in their twenties – is even higher, with 58 percent. The

¹⁴ For the crucial role of public opinion in affecting America's foreign policy, see Richard Sobel, *The Impact of Public Opinion on US Foreign Policy Since Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press 2001). And for the utility of “good” polls, see Kenneth F. Warren, *In Defense of Public Opinion Polling* (Boulder: Westview, 2003).

¹⁵ To date, no public opinion survey has contained questions pertaining to South Korea-China relations. Therefore, only the elite view of the issue is presented here.

¹⁶ For an excellent account of American exceptionalism, see Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), chapters 1, 2, and 5.

¹⁷ Two separate works by the same author testify to this American paradox as such. See Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1991) and *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

actual number of people whose native tongue is English accounts only for 6 percent of the world population – or roughly 380 million people – while the number of people who can get by in the language amounts to 1.68 billion, or approximately 27 percent of the world population.¹⁸

Given that only 14 percent of Americans have passports and some experience with the outside world (other than Canada and Mexico), average Americans’ parochial knowledge about the world is hardly surprising.¹⁹ American elite – as interviewed by the author – fared much better as 83 percent replied that about 20 percent of the world population speaks English. Given that the elite is so often vulnerable to the pressure imposed by public opinion polls and media reports on the “national moods,” however, the perils of ethnocentrism still loom large.

Table 1. American Public’s Favorite Countries for Vacation, 1998-2002

<u>Rank</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>
1	Australia	Australia	Australia	Australia	Australia
2	Great Britain	Great Britain	Italy	Italy	Great Britain
3	France	Germany	France	Great Britain	Italy
4	Italy	Italy	Great Britain	France	Canada
5	Germany	France	Ireland	Germany	Ireland
6	Ireland	Canada	Germany	Ireland	France
7	Canada	Ireland	Canada	Jamaica	Germany
8	Swiss	Jamaica	Israel	Swiss	Swiss
9	Mexico	Swiss	Swiss	Canada	Jamaica
10	<i>Japan</i>	Mexico	Jamaica	<i>Japan</i>	Barbados

Sources: The Harris Poll #37, July 22, 1998; #41, July 7, 1999; #45, August 16, 2000; #39, August 10, 2001; and #40, August 14, 2002. All the data are available at <http://www.harrisinteractive.com>.

Note: One key condition for the survey was that cost was not an issue in making the choices.

¹⁸ For the American general public’s figures, see Harris Interactive Survey #61, November 4, 1998 available at <http://www.harrisinteractive.com>. For the actual figures of English-speaking people in the world at large, see *South China Morning Post*, November 21, 2002.

¹⁹ See Mark Hertsgaard, *The Eagle’s Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates the World* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002), p. 10.

Despite the popular perception that over half of the world population can speak English – i.e., communication is not a major problem – America’s top ten overseas vacation sites have been predominantly Western and European in particular (see Table 1). According to the annual Harris Interactive surveys for 1998-2002, eight European/Western countries – Great Britain, Italy, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland - were *constants* on the list, while Mexico, Jamaica, Israel, Barbados, and Japan – the only Asian nation - made up for the rest in different years.

The extent to which Americans’ preferred overseas vacation sites overlap with their perceptions of “close allies” is striking. Given the preclusion of the cost constraint that enabled the respondents to express their favorable feelings uninhibited, the overlap between the American public’s favorite vacation spots and their perceptions of “close allies” is unmistakable (see Table 2). Five countries – Britain, Canada, Australia, Germany, and France - have always been selected as both favorite vacation sites and close allies. Seven “Western” countries were represented in both categories in 1998, 2000 and 2001, while six were in 1999 and 2002. Mexico, Israel, and Japan always made it on the close-allies list while Taiwan, Brazil, the Philippines, the Netherlands, and Spain did so in some years during that period.

Table 2. American Public Perceptions of “Close Allies,” 1995-2002

<u>Rank</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>
1	Canada	Canada	Canada	Canada	Britain	Britain
2	Britain	Britain	Britain	Britain	Canada	Canada
3	Australia	Australia	Australia	Australia	Australia	Australia
4	France	France	France	France	France	Israel
5	Israel	Mexico	Israel	Israel	Mexico	Italy
6	Mexico	Israel	Germany	Germany	Germany	Mexico
7	Germany	Germany	Mexico	Mexico	Israel	Germany
8	<i>Taiwan</i>	<i>Philippines</i>	<i>Japan</i>	Italy	Italy	France
9	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Taiwan</i>	<i>Taiwan</i>	<i>Japan</i>	Spain	<i>Japan</i>
10	Brazil	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Philippines</i>	Netherlands	<i>Japan</i>	Netherlands

Sources: The Harris Poll #45, September 2, 1998; #51, September 1, 1999; #50, August 30, 2000; #54, October 31, 2001; and #47, September 11, 2002, available at <http://www.harrisinteractive.com>.

Whereas the number of Asian allies on the top-ten list declined from three during 1998-1999 to only one (Japan) during 2000-2002, “Western” and European representation has increased from six to eight and from three to five, respectively. More importantly, Taiwan, with which the United States had terminated its formal alliance relationship at the time of these surveys, was included on the questionnaire and chosen by the respondents, but South Korea, with a formal security treaty, was not. In 2002, when the survey finally did include South Korea in the questionnaire, it ranked fourteenth out of 25 countries.²⁰

Despite America’s West-oriented and “Euro-centric” perceptions, Europe’s attitude toward the United States has been steadily deteriorating over the years. Various polls suggest that America is increasingly seen as acting unilaterally and making decisions that cater to U.S. interests only. According to a cross-national survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2001 in four European countries (Britain, Germany, France and Italy), the average rate of approval for Bush’s foreign policy was merely 21 percent compared to that of Clinton’s, 73 percent.²¹ According to another cross-national survey done in 2002, America and Europe are seen as increasingly drifting apart over such crucial policy issues as Arab-Israeli conflicts, Iraq, immigration, and China. The survey’s introduction section is even subtitled “a wider Atlantic.”²²

Debates go unabated as to what should be done vis-à-vis Europe. Some argue that “old Europe” is like the hunter with only a knife, who therefore should lie down and play dead when encountering a wild boar. America is compared to the hunter equipped with a rifle and can therefore shoot to kill. Different capabilities, therefore, justify different responses – i.e., unilateralism. Others suggest, however, that America’s tendency to pronounce rather than explain or understand the legitimate concerns of Europe and other parts of the world is

²⁰ The Harris Poll #47, September 11, 2002, available at <http://www.harrisinteractive.com>.

²¹ See “Bush Unpopular in Europe, Seen as Unilateralist” by the Pew Research Center (August 15, 2001) available at <<http://people-press.org/reports>> (access date: December 9, 2002). The June 2003 Pew survey also finds that a majority of German (74%), French (74%), Italian (67%), Canadian (60%) and British (59%) respondents attributed the problem to Bush rather than to America in general. See The Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Views of a Changing World June 2003* (The Pew Research Center: Washington, D.C., 2003), p. 22.

²² See *Worldviews 2002: American and European Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations available at www.worldviews.org/detailedreports/compreports/index.htm (access date: December 9, 2002); and Rita Hauser et al., *Elusive Partnership: US and European Policies in the Near East and the Gulf* (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, September 2002).

undermining the very cause the U.S. seeks to represent. That is, America’s impatience and audacity more often than not frustrate its good intentions.²³

Table 3. The World’s Favorable Perceptions of the US: 2000, 2002 & 2003 (%)

	<u>2000</u>	<u>2002</u>	<u>June 2003</u>	<u>Percentage Change</u>
Turkey	52	30	15	-37
Germany	78	61	45	-33
Argentina	50	34	N/A	-16
Indonesia	75	61	15	-60
Pakistan	23	10	13	-10
Great Britain	83	75	70	-13
Italy	76	70	60	-16
Japan	77	72	N/A	-5
South Korea	58	53	46	-12
Mexico	68	64	N/A	-4

Source: The Pew Research Center, *What the World Thinks in 2002* (December 4, 2002), pp. 53-55. <http://people-press.org> (access date: December 9, 2002); and The Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Views of a Changing World June 2003* (access date: June 10, 2003).

Important is the fact that Europe has not been alone in witnessing the rapid diminishment of positive and favorable views of America. Of forty-two countries around the world whose views of the U.S. were compared in 2000, 2002 and 2003, the Pew Survey finds that the image of America has generally deteriorated around the globe and declined considerably even among its allies (see Table 3). Concerning the tragedy of the September 11, only 18 percent of American respondents believed that U.S. policy caused the event, while the figure for non-U.S. respondents was 58 percent.²⁴ Regarding U.S. foreign policy after September 11, much concern is voiced over America becoming an empire propagating the motto “in arms we trust.”²⁵ In fact, while 93 percent of the fifty-six elite interviewees believed that the U.S. possessed very much or some “soft power” (i.e., an ability to bring

²³ For the former, see Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World order* (New York: Basic, 2002); and for the latter, see Clyde Prestowitz, *Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions* (New York: Basic, 2003).

²⁴ The Pew Research Center, “America Admired, Yet Its Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing,” December 19, 2001 (<http://people-press.org> : access date: December 9, 2002).

about voluntary compliance of other nations) prior to September 11, 54 percent now see that declining.

Table 4. American Perceptions of “Not Friendly” States (i.e., “Enemies”), 1995-2002

<u>Rank</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2000</u>	<u>2001</u>	<u>2002</u>
1	China	China	China	China	China	China	China
2	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Russia	Pakistan
3	Japan	Israel	South Africa	South Africa	Japan	Japan	Columbia
4	Israel	Japan	Japan	Japan	Chile	Israel	Russia
5	Argentina	Philippines	Israel	Philippines	South Africa	South Africa	<i>South Korea</i>

Sources: The Harris Poll #45, September 2, 1998, Table 3; #51, September 1, 1999, Table 3; #50, August 30, 2000, Table 3; #54, October 31, 2001, Table 3; and #47, September 11, 2002, Table 3. All the data are available at <http://www.harrisinteractive.com>.

Let us now turn to Americans’ perceived threats and enemies. Table 4 is a tabulation of poll data along the scale of how the American public views “unfriendly” countries. First, none of the “not friendly” states are European or Western nations in conventional terms. Second, American perceptions of Japan reflect a sort of “dualism,” in that Japan was consistently listed as one of America’s top ten “close allies” (Table 2) but at the same time also viewed as an “unfriendly” nation in all years except for 2002. Third, China has topped the “unfriendly” country list for the entire nine-year period during which survey data are available. Other poll series – like the Pew Surveys - are confirmatory in this regard.²⁶ Fourth, when South Korea was for the first time included in the survey, it was chosen as the fifth most “unfriendly” nation out of twenty-five in 2002. Finally, if the above data is any guide, Americans are not likely to view the emerging ties between their number one and five “unfriendly” states very positively.

²⁵ For such concerns, see Husain Haqqani, *Foreign Policy* (May-June 2003); and *Renmin ribao* (People’s Daily), March 11, 2003.

²⁶ See, for instance, two polls conducted by the Pew Research Center in April 1999 and June 2001 available at <http://people-press.org/reports> (access date: December 9, 2002).

America Views China

America's view of China is perhaps the most crucial determinant of future U.S. policy toward East Asia. The American public's perception of China has been evolving rather significantly over the last decade or so. According to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) poll conducted in 1994 and 1998, over two-thirds – 68 and 74 percent, respectively - of American respondents believed that the U.S. had vital interests in China, while the comparable figure for the 1990 poll had been only 47 percent. Despite this recognition of America's vital interests in China, however, the public did not express "warm" feelings toward China as they placed it in the bottom quarter of all countries ranked and just above Haiti in the 1994 poll.²⁷

More importantly, both the 1994 and 1998 CCFR polls revealed that 57 percent of the American public regarded China as a possible critical threat to U.S. interests, while the figure had been only 40 percent in the 1990 poll.²⁸ These findings are further supported by two other poll series. The Pew Research Center found that the share of those viewing China as an "adversary" or as a "serious problem" – as opposed to "not a problem" or "don't know" – was 60, 68, 61, 61, and 70 percent in the five surveys conducted between 1999 and 2001.²⁹ Several Harris Interactive polls also found that Americans viewed China as the most "unfriendly" state during the period of 1995-2002.³⁰

American policy elites seem to have a more nuanced perception of China. Whereas 47, 68 and 74 percent of the general public considered China as vital to the U.S. interest in the CCFR polls in 1990, 1994 and 1998, the comparable figures for the "leaders" (represented by the Luce scholars) were 73, 95 and 95 percent for the same years. The proportion of elite who viewed the rise of China as a possible critical threat to the U.S. also

²⁷ See The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1995*, chapter 3, pp. 4-5; and *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1999*, pp. 13, 15. These are available at <http://www.ccf.org> (access date: December 9, 2002).

²⁸ Two Pew surveys – in September 1997 and April 1999 – also found that 46 and 48 percent of Americans saw China as a serious problem. Fifty-two percent even went so far as to argue that keeping a close watch on the development of China as a world power should be America's top priority. See "Americans Divided on China Policy," April 8, 1999 (<http://people-press.org/reports> - access date: December 9, 2002).

²⁹ See "On China," by the Pew Research Center, June 11, 2001 (access date: December 9, 2002).

³⁰ The Harris Poll #45, September 2, 1998, Table 3; #51, September 1, 1999, Table 3; #50, August 30, 2000, Table 3; #54, October 31, 2001, Table 3; and #47, September 11, 2002, Table 3.

rose substantially during the last decade. While the pertinent figure for 1990 was only 16 percent, those for 1994 and 1998 jumped to 46 and 56 percent. According to the 1998 CCFR poll, the rise of China as a world power turned out to be the general public's number five threat to U.S. interest and elites' number four.³¹

The author's interviews during 2002-3 produced some interesting outcomes regarding America's elite perceptions of China. Of 56 interviewees, 63 percent believed that China would become a real competitor against the U.S. by 2030. And 57 percent viewed the competition to be mainly in economic terms while only 18 percent did so in military terms. Although 46 percent of the interviewees projected that China's democratization might materialize by 2020, 61 percent viewed the collapse of the Communist Party as unlikely in ten years. Most interviewees were hesitant to speculate on China's future, as 70 percent replied that it was difficult to determine at this point.

It appears that the American public believes that there is much less ground to be shared between the U.S. and China than between the U.S. and Japan in terms of common values cherished, particularly with regard to democracy and human rights. The dominant view of China in American minds as a socialist dictatorial regime – mostly cast in the visual images of the Tiananmen Incident – has certainly played a key role in reinforcing such negative beliefs. Table 5 indicates that such views of China are held among the American public. American policy elites seem to share these views with their public counterpart. According the author's interviewees, 77 percent believed that it would be much more difficult for the U.S. to work with China than with Japan on values that America regards important.

³¹ See *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1995*, chapter 3, pp. 4-5; and *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1999*, pp. 13, 15.

Table 5. Perceived Value Sharing among the U.S., Japan and China

	<u>US</u>	<u>Japan</u>
U.S. and Japan will be able to work together on the same values	52%	55%
U.S./Japan will be able to work with China on the same values	29%	30%

Source: Harris Poll #26, April 21, 1999.

One crucial ramification of this finding is that the United States will continue to find it much more comfortable to work with Japan, which it has considered quite unique as an Asian nation.³² As a matter of fact, America's image of Japan has come a long way in the last decade or so. The three CCFR polls conducted in 1990, 1994, and 1998 provide pertinent information on this trend. Compared to 1990, America's views of Japan are currently no longer colored by grave concern about the stiff economic competition Japan had previously posed. The percentage of those who chose Japan's economic competition as a vital threat to U.S. interest declined from 62 in 1994 to 45 in 1998.³³

In light of this decline in the perception of Japan as a threat, an increasing number of the American policy elite have advocated an expanded role for Japan in the military-security realm. Certainly, this is connected to the "rise of China." Such a role by Japan would no doubt further amplify the economic, diplomatic, and security cooperation between Washington and Tokyo in East Asia and beyond (such as the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan). Of the fifty-six interviewees, 28 chose Japan as America's number one supporter in checking China (number two being Taiwan). Yet, at the same time, this might reopen the historical wounds inflicted on Korea and China by Japan, thereby drawing Seoul closer to Beijing.³⁴

³² See Lipset, *American Exceptionalism*, ch. 6.

³³ See *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1995*, chapter 3, p. 4; and *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1999*, pp. 31-32.

³⁴ Perhaps the U.S. has been much less sensitive than it should to the history-induced emotions in Asia, which belong to "intergenerational transmission of historical enmity." See Rita R. Rogers, "Intergenerational Transmission of Historical Enmity," in Vamik D. Volkan *et al.* (eds.), *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 91-96. Only 9 percent of the interviewees agreed that

America's Views on Korea and South Korea-China Bilateralism

During the last half century, the Korean-American alliance has been sustained with ebbs and flows expected of an "asymmetrical" alliance between two states with markedly different capabilities. South Korea, however, did not remain simply a loyal "client." As the South Korean economy grew at an extraordinary pace, the Seoul government often sought to transform itself into an "agent," with increased discretion commensurate with its enhanced capabilities.³⁵ Yet such efforts proved largely futile due to structural constraints inherent in the asymmetric alliance and to the threat posed by North Korea. The "legitimacy debts" of the authoritarian regimes in Seoul during the 1970s and 1980s rendered the cost of dependency acceptable as far as the ultimate security objectives were concerned.

Following South Korea's near-complete democratization - with little internal threat to regime stability - the Seoul government has now been able to scrutinize its alliance ties more closely. The post-Cold War strategic environments have also permitted new possibilities and options, most notably, Seoul's normalization of relations with both Beijing and Moscow under President Roh Tae Woo (1988-1992). As an analyst has aptly put it, "[L]eaders in Seoul display a new appreciation that security means more than perpetuating the U.S. connection....[I]t still remains vital, but so are Seoul's new-found diplomatic levers."³⁶

Above all, South Korea's emerging ties with China have been extraordinary. Bilateral trade expanded 2,158 times from US\$ 19 million in 1979 to US\$ 41.2 billion in 2002, making China South Korea's second largest export market after America. China currently accounts for 13 percent of South Korea's foreign trade and is South Korea's number one investment destination. More people visit between China and South Korea than between the

America's Asia policy was based upon a good understanding of the history of the region. For America's insensitivity, see Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 37-49.

³⁵ For President Park Chung Hee's "arms-for-allies" bargaining with the U.S., see Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 85-94, 101-108.

³⁶ Edward A. Olsen, "Korean Security: Is Japan's Comprehensive Security Model A Viable Alternative?" in Doug Bandow and Ted Carpenter (eds.), *The US-Korean Alliance: Time for A Change* (New Brunswick: Transactions, 1992), pp. 146-148.

U.S. and South Korea. Building on the foundation of economic cooperation, South Korea and China have also recently begun to develop bilateral relations in the security-military realm.³⁷

TABLE 6. Public Perceptions of China and the US, 1996-2002

	<u>chose China</u>	<u>chose US</u>
<u>1996</u> *	47%	24%
<u>1997</u> **	56%	31%
<u>1999</u> ***	33%	22%
<u>2000</u> ****	45%	43%
<u>2002</u> *****	41%	30%

*MOI survey, p. 354. The question: "which country will become closest to Korea in ten years?"

**1997 *Sejong Survey*, pp. 11-13. The question: "with which country Korea should strengthen its relations?"

****Dong-A Ilbo*, January 1, 1999. The question: "which country Korea would be closest to in the twenty-first century?"

*****Hanguk Ilbo*, June 9, 2000. The question: "with which country should Korea cooperate most for the success of the inter-Korean summit?"

******Sisa Journal*, March 2002, cited in *Korean Journal* (December 2002), p. 30. The question: "which of the four major powers do you feel most favorably toward?"

More importantly, China also seems to have managed to “win” South Korean hearts. For example, as Table 6 illustrates, five nationwide public opinion surveys conducted during 1996-2002 found that more respondents felt favorably toward China than toward the U.S. and chose Beijing rather than Washington as Seoul’s closer future partner. While there has been a fine line between the elite and public views of the U.S. and China – the South Korean elite, for instance, is more concerned about the “rise of China” than the general public appears to be – there can be no denying that a significant shift is underway.³⁸

Against the backdrop of rising popular hope for China and declining favorable views of America, the South Korea-U.S. alliance has come under serious strains. Since the “sunshine policy” of President Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002) was designed to “de-enemize” North Korea by way of engagement, the natural outcome has been a divergence in Seoul and Washington’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis North Korea. While the South Korean elite has retained some ambivalence toward the rise of China as a benign civilized power, the multi-

³⁷ Sino-South Korean mil-to-mil ties have included high-level visits and exchanges between defense policy planners and research institutions. In 2001 and 2002, South Korea and China had their navy vessels make port calls at Shanghai and Incheon.

³⁸ For this elite-public divergence on China, see Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon,” pp. 785-787.

faceted troubles in Seoul's relations with Washington have considerably expanded room for China to wedge into the Seoul- Washington relationship.³⁹

These changes have generally been difficult for the U.S. to swallow, given its conviction that South Korea should always be grateful for what America had done for it during and after the Korean War.⁴⁰ The disparity in capabilities between the U.S. and South Korea has been constantly replicated in the inequality of attention paid by each to the other.⁴¹ While a wide range of problems and tension in the alliance – stemming from the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the military base issue, everyday street-level conflicts involving American soldiers, and so on – were simply taken for granted in earlier years as the cost of accepting America's defense shield, the level of tolerance in South Korea has been steadily declining.⁴²

The core problem appears to have to do with the tendency of most Americans to be poorly informed on world affairs and mostly indifferent to South Korea.⁴³ Very few Americans, experts and the public alike, are aware that South Korea is America's seventh largest trading partner. According to a Gallup Korea survey conducted in 1995, less than 10 percent of American respondents knew the name of South Korea's president at the time (Kim Young Sam), while the comparable figures for Japanese and Chinese respondents were 20 percent and 66 percent, respectively.⁴⁴ Concerning the extent of interest in South Korea, the 1995 Gallup survey revealed that 58 percent of American respondents replied negatively and only 6 percent expressed substantial interest. A 2001 survey by Harris Interactive also found

³⁹ It is interesting in this regard that many Chinese experts interpret the "stability" on the peninsula to mean that, in the long run, South Korea will tilt increasingly toward China at the expense of the U.S.

⁴⁰ Major American newspapers frequently included criticisms, written by Safire, Novak, Krauthammer, and so on, that Seoul has not been grateful for Washington's generosity.

⁴¹ This is perhaps the logical conclusion of Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*.

⁴² For South Korea's widespread resentments of these problems, see Chung, *The Korean-American Alliance and the "Rise of China,"* pp. 16-22.

⁴³ This is not applicable only to Americans' perception of South Korea. For the overall ignorance of the American public about the world at large and international affairs, see Hertsgaard, *The Eagle's Shadow*, chapter 1.

⁴⁴ See *Chosun Ilbo*, July 23, 1995.

that 60 percent of American respondents held no opinion whatsoever regarding the question “how do you perceive South Korea?”⁴⁵

Furthermore, the 1995 Gallup survey found that only 31 percent of American respondents believed that America’s relations with South Korea would further improve, while 68 percent of Chinese respondents predicted that China’s relations with South Korea would improve in the future. When juxtaposed with South Korean perceptions of Seoul’s future relations with major powers (see Table 6), this finding sheds light on the recent problems in South Korea-U.S. relations. According to a Harris poll, the American public’s projection for the likelihood of Korean reunification is also much lower – 38 percent - than South Korea (73%), China (63%) and Japan (50%), respectively.⁴⁶

A rare survey finding by Harris Interactive (Table 7) provides useful information as to how South Korea is perceived by the U.S., Japan and China. The U.S. and Japan appear almost identical in their perceptions of South Korea in that a quarter of respondents possessed favorable views of South Korea, while the comparable figure for Chinese respondents was higher by 12-15 percent. On the other hand, the same survey shows that, in regards to Japan, South Korea and China held almost identical views: their favorable views accounted for 17 and 19 percent, while unfavorable views were 42 and 43 percent, respectively.

Table 7. Perceptions toward South Korea among the US, Japan and China (2000)

	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
US	23%	15%	60%	3%
Japan	20%	17%	60%	3%
China	35%	16%	45%	5%

Source: Harris Poll #8, January 31, 2001.

A similar perceptual discrepancy is found in a 2000 poll regarding the U.S. and South Korea’s views of Japan and China. Whereas South Korea listed Japan as the second biggest

⁴⁵ Harris Poll #8, January 31, 2001.

⁴⁶ Harris Poll #1, January 3, 2001.

threat (21%) after North Korea (54%), it ranked China only as a distant third (8%). In stark contrast, America's public threat perception was very much different; its top threat was China (38%), followed by Russia (21%), North Korea (6%), India (3%) and Japan (3%).⁴⁷ More startlingly, concerning projections of the future – which country do you think will have the most influence over peace and security overall in Asia during the next ten years? – South Korean perceptions differed significantly from those of Americans. Only 19 percent of American respondents chose China, compared to 53 percent of South Korean respondents.⁴⁸ According to a survey conducted in the United States in 1999, 46 percent of the general public and 62 percent of the elite (in this case composed of the Luce Foundation Fellows) were in favor of Japan's rearmament.⁴⁹ According to two nationwide surveys done in 1997 and 2000, however, over 90 percent of the South Korean general public believed that preventing Japan's rearmament should be Seoul's top foreign policy priority.⁵⁰

If South Korea's relations with China continues to expand at the current pace - beyond what is now officially designated a "comprehensive cooperative partnership" - and if the U.S. and China engage in a hegemonic competition, what is most likely to happen and what, according to the American elite, should be Seoul's response? In the minds of the 56 American policy elite with whom face-to-face interviews were conducted, 82 percent thought that China considers the Korean Peninsula within its core sphere of influence. At the same time, 68 percent of the interviewees concurred that South Korea is more important than Taiwan to America's vital interests. Hence, gaining a competitive edge over Seoul will be a contentious issue for both Washington and Beijing. Yet, no interviewees selected South Korea as the number one country supportive of America's efforts to check China while only four listed it as number two.⁵¹

⁴⁷ See Harris Poll #8, January 31, 2001, Table 2.

⁴⁸ See Harris Poll #8, January 31, 2001, Table 3.

⁴⁹ See William Watts, *Americans Look at Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Asia Society Washington Center, 1999), p. 42.

⁵⁰ See *1997 Sejong Survey*, p. 12; and *Dong-a Ilbo*, December 5, 2000. In the Sejong survey, preventing Japan's militarization was considered much more crucial than checking the rise of China.

⁵¹ Japan and Taiwan were chosen as the number one and two supporters on this front.

While 86 percent of the interviewees expected South Koreans to choose China, rather than the U.S., as the most influential country ten years from now, no one said that Seoul would leave the U.S.-led alliance within ten years. In fact, 46 percent projected that South Korea would never depart from the America-based alliance network. Sixty-four percent of interviewees replied that the U.S. would certainly ask South Korea to provide support in case of a conflict with China over Taiwan. The same percentage of people suggested that the support requested by the U.S. would be in the form of military – either combatant or non-combatant – assistance.

When asked to predict the result of Washington assigning more military-security roles to Japan, 65 percent of the interviewees chose closer Seoul-Beijing relations, while 26 percent selected closer Seoul-Washington ties. Given that 66 percent of the members of the Korean National Assembly surveyed in early 2002 selected Japan as the biggest potential threat to East Asia – as opposed to 28 percent for North Korea – South Korean’s fear of Japan is real and present.⁵² In yet another survey of the South Korean elite conducted in 2002, the following results were reported.

Table 8. Projections for South Korea’s Future Ties with Major Powers (%)

	U.S.	China	Russia	Japan
Closer	14	86	45	39
Unchanged	78	14	47	55
Weaker	8	0	8	6

Source: William Watts, *Next Generation Leaders in the Republic of Korea: Opinion Survey Report and Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, April 2002), p. 12.

Most importantly, regarding South Korea’s best option in the case of U.S.-China strategic rivalry, the following results were produced by the author’s two separate interviews with South Korean and American policy elites during 1997-8 and 2002-3. Neither American nor South Korean elites consider – at least for now – Seoul’s jumping on Beijing’s bandwagon either feasible or desirable. Some have considered the option of establishing a multilateral security framework, but it has not been a dominant thread of thought. The U.S.-

⁵² *Chosun Ilbo*, February 24, 2002.

South Korea alliance relationship is still deemed the most important framework for and instrument of diplomacy. It is interesting, however, that more American elites think Seoul’s best choice is to remain in the U.S.-led alliance but join no action against China. Whether this compromise would be accepted by Washington remains quite unclear.

Table 9. American and Korean Elite Views on Seoul’s Future Choices

Options	American interviewees (%)	Korean Interviewees (%)
Remain in the U.S. alliance system but join no action against China	67	50*
Remain in the U.S. alliance system against China	9	39
Rely on a multilateral security regime	17	11
Develop a self-help system	2	N/A
Bandwagon with China	0	0
Other	4	0

Note: *includes those who chose “issue-based support.”

Concluding Observations

In retrospect, the Cold War structure so laboriously established and sustained for almost half a century was the most stable after all. The dismantling of the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist bloc has since the 1990s opened a Pandora’s box of old wounds and new tension. The sudden “evaporation” of the Soviet threat – and perception that China was seemingly on the verge of another gigantic collapse – initially led the U.S. to pursue a policy of scaled-down engagement with Asia, best represented by its *East Asia Strategic Initiative* (EASI). The “rise-of-China” controversy, however, soon prodded America to reaffirm its continued involvement in the region, repeatedly demonstrated by the *East Asia Strategy Report*, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, *Joint Vision 2020* and *Asia 2025*. America’s dominance again became the key word in Asia just as South Korea began to expand its ties with China and scope of discretion vis-à-vis the U.S.

The September 11 tragedy fundamentally changed the context and mode of international affairs. America has since become more unilateral, even at the expense of its old allies – including France, Germany, and Turkey. The space for South Korea has also become much smaller not only because it matters little to the U.S., but also because South Korea’s complex entanglement in the North Korean conundrum has further reduced Seoul’s room for discretionary maneuvering. Since the summer of 2002, much of the U.S.-South Korea relationship has been unduly emotionalized and no sign of a crucial breakthrough is in sight, the visit by President Roh Moo-Hyun to Washington in May 2003 notwithstanding. Ironically, the gravest crisis in the bilateral relationship has developed during the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

Yet the inevitable dilemma is looming large for Seoul. South Korea’s geopolitical and economic stakes in China are increasing rapidly, to the point of surpassing those in the United States. Yet South Korea’s reservations about China’s intentions, particularly on the part of the elite, and the physical distance of the U.S. from the Korean Peninsula, produce a resilient hope that the U.S., lacking China’s and Japan’s immediate geopolitical interests, will be able to assume the necessary role of “honest broker.” Most importantly, to Seoul’s insurmountable frustration, U.S.-China relations are beyond South Korea’s control. If they should become conflict-ridden, due either to a power transition or to a clash of civilizations, Seoul will be in a very delicate situation.

In the short- and mid-term, South Korea’s choice will be to stick with the U.S.-based alliance and, at the same time, to expand ties with China. As supported by the results of the author’s interviews with both American and South Korean elites (Table 9), who predominantly suggested the option of “remaining in the U.S. alliance system but joining no action against China,” South Korea’s decision will increasingly resemble hedging. The only remaining question is whether Washington will be willing to accept that.

Kagan was correct to point out in his highly acclaimed work, *Of Paradise and Power*, that strong powers naturally view the world differently than weaker powers. That may be true but Kagan’s book offers no advice on how to cultivate increased rapport between old allies and new friends. This is, in my view, what U.S. foreign policy should aim to foster. America has been particularly good at demonstrating its military prowess, but not so skilled at showing what it really stands for. It is not clear that America has successfully convinced its

own people – or intellectuals – of the validity of its foreign policy deeds. After all, it is not military power per se that will ultimately determine the relationship between America, as the empire, and its followers.⁵³ Viewed in this vein, America has much to work on. It should perhaps direct more attention - benign, rather than malignant - toward persuading and inducing smaller powers, like South Korea, to comply voluntarily with its beliefs.

⁵³ See Morris Berman, *The Twilight of American Culture* (New York: Norton, 2000), chapter 2. Also see Seyom Brown, *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

Appendix 1: Interviewee List

- *Muthiah Alagappa, The Washington East-West Center
- *Guy Arrigoni, Department of Defense
- *Peter Beck, Korea Economic Institute
- *David Brown, Johns Hopkins University, formerly State Department
- *Richard Bush, The Brookings Institution
- *Victor Cha, Georgetown University
- *Paul Chamberlin, Korea-US Consulting
- *Stephen Costello, ProGlobal
- *Bonnie Coe, formerly Atlantic Council
- *Bernard Cole, National War College
- *Ivo H. Daalder, The Brookings Institution
- *Toby Dalton, Department of Energy
- *Bruce J. Dickson, George Washington University
- *William Drennan, United States Institute of Peace
- *Kerry Dumbaugh, Congressional Research Service
- *Robert Dujarric, The Hudson Institute
- *Nicholas Eberstadt, American Enterprise Institute
- *Joshua Eisenman, The Nixon Center

- *Gordon Flake, Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs
- *Banning Garrett, The Atlantic Council
- *Bates Gill, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- *Bonnie Glaser, Center for Strategic and International Studies
- *Selig Harrison, Center for International Policy
- *Robert Hathaway, The Woodrow Wilson Center
- *Balbina Hwang, Heritage Foundation
- *Frank Jannuzi, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
- *James M. Lindsay, The Brookings Institution
- *Lonnie Henley, Department of Defense
- *Shirley A. Kan, Congressional Research Service
- *Chad Kirkley, US Marine (Colonel)
- *David M. Lampton, SAIS and The Nixon Center
- *Kirk Larsen, George Washington University
- *James Lilley, American Enterprise Institute
- *Scott Livezey, US Navy Commander
- *G. Eugene Martin, Asia Pacific Strategies
- *Jamie McCormick, International Relations Committee of the House
- *Eric McVadon, former rear-admiral of the United States Navy

*Michael Meserve, State Department

*Mike Mochizuki, George Washington University

*Larry Niksch, Congressional Research Service

*Dean Nowowiejski, US Army Colonel

*Don Oberdorfer, Johns Hopkins University,

*Kongdan Oh, Institute for Defense Analysis

*James Przystup, National Defense University

*Kenneth Quinones, International Center

*Alan Romberg, The Stimson Center

*Steven Schlaikjer, US-China Security Review Commission

*David Shambaugh, George Washington University

*David Steinberg, Georgetown University

*James B. Steinberg, The Brookings Institution

*Robert L. Suettinger, Mayer, Brown, Rowe and Maw

*Robert Sutter, Georgetown University

*Michael Swaine, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

*James K. Swanson, US-China Security Review Commission

*Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Georgetown University

*Larry Wortzel, Heritage Foundation

Appendix 2: Interviewee Profile

During October 2002-June 2003, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 54 American policy experts. The following are the summary characteristics of the interviewees.

- a. Average age: 50.8 years old

- b. Partisan affiliations:
 - Democrats: 21
 - Republicans: 13
 - Independents: 20

- c. Terminal degree held:
 - Ph.D.: 24
 - M.A.: 18
 - B.A./B.S.: 7
 - MBA: 3
 - J.D./L.L.D.: 2

- d. Years of average government service: 18.0 years

- e. Branch affiliation:
 - think-tank: 19
 - executive: 11
 - academic: 9
 - military: 8
 - congress: 6
 - media: 1

- f. Area of expertise:
 - China: 14
 - East Asia: 13
 - Korea: 12
 - Asia in general: 7
 - foreign policy: 6
 - Japan: 2

- g. Own perception of policy influence:
 - substantial: 6
 - some: 29
 - very little: 19