THE SABAN CENTER
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ISRAEL'S LESSONS FOR FIGHTING TERRORISTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

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Executive Summary

The United States has much to learn from Israel's experience fighting terrorists.

One of the most complex challenges for the United States arises when a foreign government is passive, half-hearted or recalcitrant in its counterterrorism efforts, such as Saudi Arabia was before 9/11 or Pakistan is today. Effective local partners are vital for counterterrorism and building up their capabilities is a long process, but the will to fight is critical. The lesson for U.S. policymakers from Israel's experience with recalcitrant administrations in the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Lebanon is that sustained pressure is necessary. No one measure will force a regime to aggressively fight terrorism. Success against regimes that are passive in the face of terrorism will take years and will often be partial.

Another challenge for the United States is how to best combine offensive and defensive measures in the fight against terrorism. Arrests are a particularly useful way of weakening terrorist groups. Arrests, however, must be carefully targeted to gain the maximum intelligence benefit and to ensure that resources are directed first and foremost against the most dangerous terrorists. Governments must also step up their defensive measures, because these render it far harder for terrorist groups to conduct successful attacks. Israel has benefited in recent years from the effective use of checkpoints to thwart terrorists and from the well publicized measure of building the security barrier.

Like the United States, Israel has used targeted killings because in many circumstances key terrorists who are actively masterminding attacks are difficult to arrest without significant risk to the security forces. Accurate, timely and actionable intelligence is necessary for targeted killings. Rapid intelligence sharing and avoidance of "stovepiping" (when an agency retains information or intelligence and does not share it with other agencies) is essential. Israel also goes through a range of measures to minimize the loss of innocent life.

The United States must have a high standard for targeted killings because, unlike Israel, it relies heavily on the cooperation of foreign governments to arrest terrorist suspects and to disrupt terrorist plots. If a targeted killing operation, particularly one that goes awry, alienates allies, the strategic effect could prove disastrous. The bar for approving a targeted killing should therefore be set high.

The United States must recognize the interconnectedness of various counterterrorism methods. Offense and defense work together. By reducing the number of skilled terrorists through arrests, and targeted killings, and making it more difficult for the terrorists to communicate with each other, a state can make it far harder for the remaining terrorists to plan attacks that can overcome significant defenses such as the security barrier.

Perhaps the greatest lesson the United States can draw from Israel is the need for policy transparency. While the Israeli government does not share specific

intelligence on its operations, the targeting criteria are widely understood by all political parties and the general public. The result is a broad political consensus in favor of the careful use of targeted killings. As Israel has learned, although transparency may lead to restraints on targeted killings that could result in missed opportunities, the result will be a policy that is sustainable over the long-term.

Israel's experiences and the lessons of these policies for the United States suggest six principles that must be borne in mind in any fight against terrorists.

First, *the number of effective terrorists is limited.* By eliminating the most skilled and dangerous terrorists through arrests (the preferred method) or by targeted killings (if absolutely necessary), a state can greatly disrupt the operations of a terrorist organization.

A second, related principle is that *not every terrorist need be killed or arrested for a counterterrorism strategy to be successful.* If the pace of arrests and killings is rapid enough, then the terrorist organization can lose the critical mass of skills and capabilities that it requires to function.

Third, *it is far better that a local government's forces are used to fight terrorism than to call on outside forces, no matter how skilled.* The locally based government can use its manpower, its legal system, its knowledge of the terrain, and most importantly its intelligence and police assets to fight terrorists far more effectively than any foreign government coming in

from the outside. In addition, foreigners are likely to alienate the local population.

Fourth, *while terrorists can be highly skilled, they are far from perfect and they often make mistakes.* Terrorism is a grave threat, but all too often the terrorists are analyzed as if they were superhuman and their actions are misunderstood in the light of this overestimation of their abilities.

Fifth, *while many governments are weak, they will almost always prove stronger than the terrorists in the event of an open confrontation.* Therefore, the argument that some governments want to crack down on terrorists but cannot is an argument that should not be accepted.

Sixth, and finally, *arrests, targeted killings, and defensive measures are means of managing a conflict, not means of solving it.* A lasting settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires a political settlement, but such a settlement is only possible once security services can reduce the problem of terrorism to manageable levels.

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Israel's Lessons for Fighting Terrorists and Their Implications for the United States

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States began its war against terrorism. Suddenly, U.S. policymakers had to confront a daunting and often controversial array of counterterrorism issues. These ranged from the types of defense needed to protect the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks to the use and scope of targeted killings of terrorist leaders abroad. Many aspects of U.S. counterterrorism policy have attracted strong criticism. Some have challenged the effectiveness of U.S. policy. Other critics have blasted the Bush Administration for failing to protect civil liberties.

Fighting against terrorists, whose form of warfare targets civilians and so rejects basic moral and legal norms, has always been inherently difficult for liberal democracies. Many of the issues in front of U.S. policymakers today have previously been faced by other liberal democratic states, in particular Israel, a country that has always been under terrorist attack. U.S. policymakers and analysts have much to learn from Israel as they grapple with the inherent difficulties of counterterrorism. Fighting terrorism has been a primary concern for Israel since its foundation. After September 11, the battle against terrorism assumed a similar strategic priority for the United States. Although the specifics of the terrorist threats facing the United States and Israel vary considerably, there are many relevant similarities from which U.S. officials and analysts can learn. These lessons relate directly to U.S. counterterrorism strategy and to how the United States deals with its counterterrorism partner governments abroad. There are three key areas which this paper explores where Israel's experiences are directly relevant and offer specific lessons for the United States: coercing governments that are reluctant to crack down on terrorism to take effective counterterrorism measures; broader defensive measures; and techniques for striking at the leadership of terrorist groups.

COERCING PASSIVE GOVERNMENTS

One of the most complex challenges for the United States arises when a foreign government is either passive or half-hearted in its counterterrorism efforts. Effective local partners are vital for counterterrorism to succeed. Not only does the United States lack both the capacity and the desire to be omnipresent, but local partners bring capabilities, knowledge and a degree of political acceptability to their counterterrorism efforts that a foreign country cannot possess. At the same time, pushing foreign governments to take a more active stance against terrorists can be difficult and time-consuming.

Two examples of such recalcitrant and conflicted states that the United States has been forced to deal with are Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Before September 11, the Saudi government knowingly allowed *jihadist* groups to raise money in Saudi Arabia, even while the Saudi

government at times cooperated with the United States against terrorism. An even greater challenge for the United States today is Pakistan. Over four years after September 11, the administration of President Pervez Musharraf is often passive in the face of *jihadist* terrorism, including *jihadists* that threaten the United States. This tolerance persists even as the Pakistani government sporadically assists some U.S. counterterrorism efforts, such as by participating in the apprehension of such major al-Qa'ida figures as Abu Zubaydah in 2002 and Khalid Sheikh Muhammad in 2003. Pakistan is, of course, balancing a wide range of political issues which affect the rigor of its counterterrorism operations. The Pakistani government faces strong internal opposition to its alliance with the United States, which means that it can sometimes be wary of undertaking rigorous counterterrorism cooperation.

The United States has sought to address the problem of Pakistani passivity with a policy of incentives—the provision of massive financial support to Pakistan as well as extensive U.S. official cooperation with Pakistan's military and security services. American proponents of this approach claim that money is needed to augment Pakistan's counterterrorism capabilities and to ensure that the Pakistani authorities continue to take action against al-Qa'ida. U.S. financial aid is therefore both a means of building up Pakistani counterterrorism capacity and a bribe in all but name to ensure good behavior and continued counterterrorism efforts. Other defenders of the policy of incentives argue that to take the opposite approach, of cutting financial support, would have two disadvantages. A decreased flow of U.S. funds would diminish the incentives to the Pakistani authorities to cooperate with the United States and would render the Pakistani security services and other counterterrorism agencies less effective due to lack of funds. The problem with this approach, however, has been that by relying so heavily on "carrots" and avoiding the use of the "stick" the United States has found itself dependent on an ally that often does the bare minimum necessary to maintain the influx of U.S. financial support.

Such experiences with passive states, especially ones that are conflicted in their attitude to terrorism, are not new, as Israel discovered in over a decade of dealing with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Lebanese government. Israel found that inducing other governments to fight terrorists, especially when these governments may sympathize with or support terrorists, requires different forms of pressure. Coercion, for example, had mixed results and applying financial pressure was diplomatically challenging. Symbolic acts had little effect. Pressure on the passive state's population did at times yield results, but was risky and diplomatically costly. International isolation, a tool used by the United States, has proven to be highly effective, but only if properly enforced.

For Israel, the PA was both a major ally in fighting terrorism while also an incubator of terrorism, tolerating an array of terrorist groups and sometimes supporting them directly. Yet removing financial assistance to the PA proved to be a difficult measure to enforce. Even when it was clear that PA Chairman Yasser Arafat was passing money to various militias involved in terrorism and was not clamping down on groups like Hamas, European Union leaders in particular opposed breaking off assistance. The EU argument was that aid was necessary to convince Arafat to fight terrorism more aggressively and that any financial aid cutoff would only make matters worse. At different times, the Bush Administration also endorsed this argument for keeping funds flowing.

As a result, when Israel attempted to stop the flow of funds to exert pressure on the PA it attracted bitter international criticism. Reluctantly, the Israeli government of prime minister Ariel Sharon bowed to U.S. and EU pressure and continued to transfer tax receipts to the PA as per the 1994 Paris Agreement. As much as 45 percent of the PA's $1 billion annual budget came through Israel. What is more, the Israeli government continued providing this money to the PA even though Arafat's administration was allowing terrorists to operate or was supporting them. Arafat also exploited this money to enhance his domestic political position

at the expense of his rivals. To do this, Arafat appeased terrorist groups such as Hamas and undermined voices in the PA that opposed his leadership. Arafat also gave money to terrorists within his Fatah organization. Consequently, because of their desire to influence PA behavior through financial assistance, both Israel and the international community in effect subsidized terrorism and corruption while strengthening a regime that had repeatedly demonstrated it would not fight terrorism.

Israel's response to the failure of unmitigated financial flows to alter PA behavior was to attempt to coerce the PA, with mixed results. Some of the terrorists being protected or funded by the PA were politically influential, enjoying sympathy both from leading PA figures and significant segments of the Palestinian population. Moreover, as the PA repeatedly demonstrated, even when it regarded some terrorist groups as its enemies, it feared that it lacked the capacity to crack down on them. PA leaders also often hesitated to be seen to act at the behest of a foreign power (particularly Israel, which it has long portrayed as an archenemy) for fear of damaging their nationalist credentials.

Israeli efforts to induce a change in PA behavior during Arafat and Abbas' time in power faced an additional problem: the lack of PA control over much of its own territory, in particular the Gaza Strip. That institutional weakness was compounded by a personal vulnerability—many PA leaders have family members living in the Gaza Strip. In the event that the PA were to crack down on Hamas on the West Bank, where the PA is relatively strong and Hamas relatively weaker, Hamas could extract revenge by targeting PA leaders' relatives in the Gaza Strip. Unfortunately, the PA did not move the family members of key officials to safety nor did it appoint individuals in their place who could act without fear of retribution. Indeed, the PA further weakened its ability to deter terrorists by failing to respond to Hamas attacks on high ranking PA officers. Although the PA knew who was responsible for these attacks, it did nothing.

The Israeli experience also suggests that pressure, when it is applied, must be more than symbolic. An example of this comes from October 2000 when Israel destroyed the Palestinian security forces' headquarters in Ramallah following the lynching of two Israeli soldiers within the same building. Before carrying out the attack, however, Israel gave prior warning to the Palestinians to ensure that there would be no casualties. The result was a feeble, symbolic strike that did little to deter future PA complicity in terrorism.

A complementary strategy is to indirectly coerce a change in behavior by putting pressure on the civilian population. In theory, an administration can be compelled to alter its indulgent attitude towards terrorism when its civilian population suffers discomfort and dislocation because it may risk widespread popular anger or even a loss of control of its population. As noted below, such a strategy can entail numerous complications. Israel used this tactic with a degree of success in Lebanon in 1993 and particularly in 1996. In both cases, Israel launched military operations in Lebanon (Operations Accountability in 1993 and Grapes of Wrath in 1996) in part to target Hizballah directly but also to force refugee flows from southern Lebanon into Beirut by targeting infrastructure and creating the risk of accidental death in military operations. The result was massive refugee flows, with hundreds of thousands of Lebanese flooding into Beirut.

The refugee influx created considerable pressure on the Lebanese government. In response, the Lebanese administration, with the support of Syria, placed restrictions on Hizballah's activities. Hizballah accepted certain "rules" in its conflict with Israel, a major shift for a terrorist group that in the past boasted of its attacks on Israeli civilian targets. As a result of the Lebanese, and Syrian, governments responding to Israeli pressure, Hizballah agreed not to fire Katyusha rockets into Israel proper (and Israel agreed in turn not to shell Lebanese villages). The conflict between Israel and Hizballah would instead be limited to the military and guerrilla forces fighting each other in Israel's "security zone" in southern Lebanon. Hizballah

increasingly respected certain "red lines" set by Israel and focused only on attacking Israel's military presence in southern Lebanon. Although Hizballah rocket attacks on Israeli civilians continued, many of these were in reprisal for Israeli targeted killings of Hizballah leaders or Israeli bombings of Lebanese villages believed to have a large Hizballah presence.

Although indirectly pressuring the Lebanese authorities through their civilian population had some effect, the Lebanese example also illustrates the perils of such an approach. Israel's offensives in Lebanon were met with international outrage, particularly after civilian deaths. On April 18, 1996 Israel mistakenly shelled an open area at Qana in southern Lebanon where hundreds of civilians had sheltered, killing 107 people. Despite Israeli claims that the attack was a mistake and that Hizballah was using the civilians as a shield for its activities, the Israeli attacks were widely criticized and characterized as deliberate strikes on noncombatants. Israel's mistakes bolstered Hizballah's claim that it was fighting a war of liberation against Israeli occupation, not engaging in terrorism. In addition, Israel's military operations created sympathy for Hizballah among many Lebanese, including outside of its traditional Shi'ah constituency. As a result of the deaths at Qana, Israel ended its 1996 military operation in Lebanon.

Forcing a government to either change sides against terrorism or to get off the fence and stop being passive in the face of terrorist activity therefore requires using many different forms of pressure. The most obvious, and one of the most important that the United States has successfully used is international economic and diplomatic pressure. Almost every economy in the developing world is highly vulnerable to financial pressure, whether in the form of aid cutoffs or the withholding of foreign investment or assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. For example, Libya eventually succumbed to international isolation and economic pressure exerted in retaliation for its sponsorship of terrorism. Similarly, the support of other Arab regimes for airplane hijackings fell dramatically once it became clear that the international community would not accept their excuses that they did not control a particular patch of their own territory. Once these regimes understood that continued tolerance or support for hijackings would result in ostracism or economic punishments, state sponsorship and indifference to such acts of terrorism diminished.

Yet orchestrating such an international campaign can be difficult even under the best of circumstances. Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya were both isolated in a concerted manner, but these were exceptions. In both cases, the regimes had no friends because they threatened otherwise indulgent regional powers and their behavior was egregious even by Middle Eastern standards. By contrast, the Palestinians continue to enjoy considerable international sympathy and reports of the Palestinian population suffering as a result of foreign pressure make it difficult to orchestrate an international campaign.

The lesson for U.S. policymakers from Israel's experience with recalcitrant administrations in the PA and Lebanon is that no one measure will force a change in behavior. Finding means of inducing foreign governments to stop tolerating terrorism is, however, at the heart of global counterterrorism. Local partners are necessary for successful counterterrorism, as Israel found even with its physical proximity to the PA and its ability to carry out direct operations without PA cooperation. For the United States, the problem is even more acute as in most places it must operate through others.

The best way for the United States to put an end to the passive sponsorship of terrorism is to integrate its efforts against terrorist groups with its policies for pushing foreign governments to become more effective at counterterrorism. These two approaches of pressure and assistance are complementary and reinforce each other. Although the Israeli security forces have scored numerous successes against terrorist groups, they are still less effective against terrorists than a fully committed PA would be. Thus, the top priority of the United States should be to ensure both

the continued commitment of existing reliable allies in the war against terrorism and pressure on other, less reliable governments to step up their efforts. As importantly, the United States must continue its efforts to strengthen the security services of its partners, with financing, training and equipment, and must broaden the scope of this policy, because it is the security services of U.S. allies that often do much of the heavy lifting in counterterrorism. Such integrated efforts will be hard and time-consuming and for the United States will require assessing the multiple ways that it can have an impact on terrorist activity abroad, picking multiple complementary tools that compensate for specific shortcomings on the part of its local counterterrorism partners, and then structuring its plans and operations to take these constraints into account.

The United States cannot easily coerce passive states like Pakistan, that are recalcitrant and conflicted, into becoming more serious in their counterterrorism efforts. In addition to building the capacity and capability of the Pakistani security services, the United States can use economic pressure to demonstrate to Musharraf that its calls for stringent action against terrorism are serious. The United States can also threaten to tilt more toward India should Pakistan prove unresponsive. Nonetheless, as Israel's experience with the PA suggests, pushing a passive government to aggressively confront terrorists remains exceptionally difficult.

FIGHTING TERRORIST GROUPS: THE NEED FOR OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

Israel's experience suggests that changing the attitude of a reluctant government is time consuming and therefore needs to be supplemented with a careful mixture of offensive and defensive counterterrorism measures. Time is a valuable commodity for terrorists. Committed terrorist groups have shown that they will respond to state inaction by using the time granted to them to become stronger, more capable, more dangerous and more difficult to defeat when the state eventually decides to confront them. Both the local authorities, unenthusiastic though they may initially be, and

the external ally (such as the United States or Israel) must therefore target terrorist groups with a blend of offensive and defensive steps or else risk repeated terrorist attacks. While the tactical gains from pursuing a terrorist group with the offensive and defensive measures described below are not a substitute for convincing local administrations (such as Pakistan or the PA) to become an active partner in fighting terrorism, daily intelligence and disruption of terrorist activities saves lives in the short-term. In the long-term, however, curbing terrorism will depend upon having an effective local partner that is induced to end its passivity, that is trained and equipped to fight terrorism and that adopts the correct mix of offensive and defensive measures. As a result, many of the lessons outlined below apply as much or more to the United States' local counterterrorism partners as to the United States itself.

On the offensive side, Israel has used targeted killings (which have attracted considerable attention and are discussed in detail below) and targeted arrests.

Arrests are a particularly useful way of weakening terrorist groups because they provide valuable intelligence that can disrupt attacks or lead to the apprehension of further terrorist suspects. Over time, a sustained pattern of arrests can devastate a terrorist group, with many of its leaders in jail and their lower-level operatives and followers demoralized and directionless.

As Israel has found, it is important to think strategically about arrests. For both legal and operational reasons not all suspected terrorists can be arrested. In Israel, those arrested cannot be remanded in custody for more than seven days without a judge's approval. There are also two operational reasons to carefully target arrests. First, when a suspect is arrested his or her accomplices often change their behavior or go underground, fearing that they will be next to be pulled in by the authorities. The Israeli services therefore often initially limit the number of arrests and wait until they have more a complete picture to hand, thereby allowing them to disrupt an entire terrorist cell. Such a tactic is risky as the suspects may plan and

execute new terrorist plots in the interim. Second, Israel prioritizes arrests, with particular emphasis placed on those who organize the plots, the recruiters and the bomb makers.

One group of terrorist operatives who are of particular interest is the couriers. A cell of terrorists whose members cannot communicate securely is an ineffective cell. Arresting couriers is therefore tremendously important. Couriers often know individual terrorists in multiple cells. Moreover, couriers are often apprehended in possession of documents or money, which makes it easier to secure convictions. Given this vulnerability, couriers are often easier to "turn", making them valuable sources of intelligence. Yet despite the problems that come with using couriers, Israel's electronic interception capabilities have over the years forced Palestinian terrorist groups to rely more and more on couriers, thereby creating more intelligence opportunities.

Israel has managed its proximity to the terrorists in such a way as to capitalize on the advantages (having security forces close to where the terrorists live, which allows for rapid offensive measures) while neutralizing the disadvantages (using the security barrier to protect Israeli civilians from the terrorists who live just miles from them, a defensive measure). Having its troops deployed close to where the terrorists are based has been an important instrument for arresting terrorists. A comparison between the Israeli position on the West Bank and that in the Gaza Strip is instructive. After Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, when the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) entered West Bank population centers that they had previously evacuated in 1995, Israel in essence cut Palestinian areas on the West Bank into small and isolated segments. The IDF, the Israeli police, and Israeli intelligence personnel were thereafter able to deploy from nearby settlements or newly established military posts, which allowed them to reach terrorists targets extremely quickly. In addition, terrorists now have to cross through Israeli lines to conduct attacks (see Map 1 West Bank post-security barrier). Thanks to this strengthened position on the West Bank, Israel has been able to opt for arresting suspected terrorists rather than use the less preferable and riskier instrument of targeted killings.

By contrast, Israel's position in the Gaza Strip has hindered such rapid counterterrorism deployments. Israel has been far more cautious in the Gaza Strip, declining, for example, to penetrate deep into the area to push back Qassam rocket launch sites. The difficulty for Israel has been that perhaps half of the population of the Gaza Strip lives in Gaza City and its sprawling suburbs, which provides a sanctuary for many terrorists. Israel could not deploy rapidly in the city, making arrests more difficult than on the West Bank (see Map 2 Gaza Strip).

Now that Israel has fully withdrawn from the Gaza Strip, however, it is far less vulnerable. The disengagement of the remaining Israeli military and civilian presence during August-September 2005 completed the process began with the initial military withdrawal of 1994. Since leaving the area, Israel declared a security zone along the northern and eastern edge of the Gaza Strip in December 2005 to provide a buffer for the Israeli civilian population living near the Gaza Strip against Palestinian rocket attacks. This allows Israel to deny territory to the terrorists while relieving Israel of the need to deploy its forces again in the Gaza Strip. In addition, the Gaza Strip has only two functioning entry points for passengers, Erez and Rafah (see Map 2 Gaza Strip), and these can be carefully monitored. Egypt has an incentive to close the Gaza-Egypt crossing point at Rafah in the event that violence from the Gaza Strip increases, both to prevent any spillover into Egypt and to prevent Egyptian terrorists from finding haven in the Gaza Strip.

Thanks to its military operations, redeployments and static defenses, Israel is now well placed to respond should violence break out again in the Palestinian territories at levels comparable to 2002. On the West Bank, Israel retains many of the positions it acquired during Operation Defensive Shield, enabling it to quickly reach targets throughout the area. Palestinian

terrorists are less able to hide or surround themselves with the protection of the Palestinian security forces. In addition, Israeli forces can easily establish checkpoints that greatly impede the movement of terrorists. Although Israeli forces are no longer present in the Gaza Strip, they can still exert pressure on Gaza Strip-based terrorists thanks to Israel's strong position on the West Bank. Israel can respond on the West Bank whenever Hamas terrorists launch attacks from the Gaza Strip. For example, when several of Hamas' Qassam rockets went off accidentally during a parade in Gaza's Jabaliya camp on September 23, 2005, killing 20 Palestinian civilians and injuring more than 100 others, Hamas predictably blamed Israel and launched rocket attacks against Israel. Israel responded with a wave of arrests on the West Bank, greatly weakening Hamas there just when the organization was starting to rebuild itself following the blow that had been inflicted by Operation Defensive Shield.

Israel has, however, found that going on the offensive is not enough. Governments must also step up their defensive measures, because these render it far harder for terrorist groups to conduct successful attacks. On the defensive side, Israel has benefited in recent years from the effective use of checkpoints to thwart terrorists and from the well publicized measure of building the security barrier.

Static defenses such as checkpoints work well because they force terrorists to change their behavior and help to expose them. Palestinian terrorists often attempt to bypass checkpoints because they fear that the Israelis manning the position have intelligence that will allow terrorists to be identified. Ironically, it can be these terrorist efforts to evade scrutiny that allow the Israeli security services to identify the terrorists. The anxiety that checkpoints create in the minds of terrorists has been confirmed by Palestinian detainees who have reported aborting attacks because of what they thought was increased scrutiny at an Israeli check point when in reality the level of activity was normal. Checkpoints also provide the security services with an additional advantage, allowing them to use intelli-

gence without compromising ("burning") a source. It is not apparent to the terrorists that intelligence has been used at a checkpoint to detain them. Instead, it can often be made to appear as if a security officer is simply doing his or her job effectively. By contrast, when a terrorist is arrested in transit, it strongly suggests that that one of the terrorist's associates has revealed information about their movements.

Another important shift in tactics has been the construction of the security barrier separating much of the West Bank off from major Israeli population centers. The impact of the barrier has been particularly important in the Samaria administrative region of the northern West Bank as it is now far more difficult for Palestinians to enter Israel to conduct attacks. Terrorists coming from the Samaria administrative area were responsible for more than 50 percent of Israeli fatalities from 2000 to 2005, killing more than 500 Israelis. Of those 500, 90 percent died before the barrier was completed around the Samaria administrative area in October of 2003. The number of deaths from terrorist attacks also declined dramatically in the Judea administrative region of the southern West Bank, with a drop in fatalities of around 60 percent.

Israel's experience of combining offensive and defensive measures suggests that the United States and its local counterterrorism partners must recognize the interconnectedness of various counterterrorism methods. Israel's electronic interception abilities have forced the Palestinians to use more couriers, who are more vulnerable to interception, interceptions that are now easier thanks to the Israeli deployment on the West Bank. The same will apply to the United States and those counterterrorism forces with which it works around the world, that as it strengthens one aspect of its counterterrorism efforts other elements of counterterrorism will benefit in turn.

There is also value in recognizing how Israel's defensive efforts such as the use of checkpoints and the security barrier have reduced the number of terrorist attacks. Too often analysts forget that offense and defense work

together. By reducing the number of skilled terrorists through arrests, and targeted killings, and making it more difficult for the terrorists to communicate with each other, a state can make it far harder for the remaining terrorists to plan attacks that can overcome significant defenses such as the security barrier.

Another lesson from Israel's experiences for American policymakers and for American allies is that they must broaden their focus beyond the operational level of a terrorist group. Americans are understandably keen on detaining terrorist masterminds. They are correct to view the leaders, bomb makers and terrorists who carry out attacks as important, priority targets. However, the support elements, the couriers and logisticians, should not be neglected because they are also vital to the survival of a terrorist organization. The United States must think creatively about its priorities for arrest and disruption and recognize that a terrorist organization is much deeper than the few who actually order and commit the attacks.

The importance of arrests, and how they are prioritized and used as a counterterrorism tool, argues strongly for the United States to constantly preserve and strengthen its ability to arrest terrorists. This entails cooperation and assistance. The Bush administration has done a good job of systematically cooperating with law enforcement and security services around the world. It has forged partnerships as part of joint efforts to arrest *jihadist* terrorists and disrupt their operations and networks. The United States must also work to strengthen foreign security services that seek to fight terrorism but are too weak to do so.

There is, however, a key difference between the United States and Israel in terms of arrests is the degree of reliance on foreign partners for arrests. Most of the terrorists who pose a threat to Israel live nearby or within its area of control and are detained by the Israeli services. For the United States, however, the terrorists may be operating half a world away, which makes foreign cooperation vital. Consequently, U.S. policymakers must consider the impact of their other counterterrorism measures, including such controversial steps as secret prisons or targeted killings, on the willingness of foreign countries to extend such cooperation.

LESSONS FROM TARGETED KILLINGS

Many Israeli policies for fighting terrorism are controversial. Perhaps the most controversial of all has been Israel's use of targeted killings of terrorists. While targeted killings can successfully eliminate key terrorist leaders, they can also cause the deaths of innocents and lead to significant international criticism.

Understanding the Israeli policy and experience with targeted killings is crucial for the United States as it also uses targeted killings to fight terrorism. In January 2006, the United States tried to kill Ayman al-Zawahiri, the al-Qaʻida number two who was believed to be in Pakistan. Although the attack appears to have successfully killed several senior al-Qaʻida members, it missed al-Zawahiri himself. More critically, the United States killed over a dozen noncombatants. The strike against al-Zawahiri was only the latest U.S. effort to kill senior *jihadists*. Previous, successful strikes killed Mohammed Atef, al-Qaʻida's military chief, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Herethi, its leader in Yemen, and Hamza Rabia, a senior operative in Pakistan.

Targeted killings are usually less valuable than arrests—you cannot question the dead. However, Israel has used targeted killings because in many circumstances key terrorists who are actively masterminding attacks are difficult to arrest without significant risk to the security forces. Furthermore, some terrorists are difficult to isolate from potential innocents or from other members of their terrorist group who can protect them from an arrest team. Indeed, Israel has sometimes encountered opposition from PA security forces that have fought against Israeli forces engaged on counterterrorism missions as a means of improving their image with the Palestinian public.

The Israelis have developed an entire method for implementing targeted killings. The key requirement

is superb intelligence. Accurate, timely and actionable intelligence is necessary for targeted killings. Israel has invested considerable resources to develop robust human and signals intelligence capabilities, and to ensure that intelligence is quickly passed to the appropriate security organizations. Speed is of the essence, as in counterterrorism wasted time costs lives. Intelligence sharing and avoidance of "stovepiping" (when an agency retains information or intelligence and does not share it with other agencies) is essential. Often intelligence is sent from one intelligence officer to another ("horizontally"), without first being shared with headquarters ("vertically"). During the second *intifada* that began in September 2000, Israel initiated procedures to ensure that intelligence is rapidly given to the IDF to allow forces on the ground to act on it while it is still fresh. Again, cooperation and information sharing depend not only on action from headquarters but from line officers in all the different security agencies working together.

Israel also goes through several steps to minimize the loss of innocent life. Only those individuals who cannot be easily arrested can be considered for the list of targets. The Israeli intelligence services then carefully evaluate these individuals, with only the most dangerous arch terrorists put on the list to be killed. Israeli officials define an arch terrorist as leaders, senior terrorist planners, or bomb-makers whose removal would have a significant impact on the terrorist group's operations. Officials from the Israeli Ministry of Defense are also involved in this process of target identification, as are senior political officials because in the end the decision to kill must be approved by the prime minister.

Inclusion on the list is not the end of the process, however. Even after the Israeli authorities' initial decision to list a terrorist, information is constantly gathered to confirm an individual's responsibility for acts of terrorism. Information is repeatedly cross-checked and only the most reliable sources are used

Whenever possible, Israel uses Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or additional sources to confirm the

suspect's identity and to assess whether innocents have unexpectedly entered the target's immediate vicinity. The government prohibits targeted killings in crowded areas, such as narrow streets where many innocents may be present. As a result, Israel has passed up a number of opportunities to kill terrorist leaders during parades because of crowded conditions and because the inevitable panic that would follow such an attack would lead to innocent deaths.

The targeted killing of Salah Shehada, a military chief of Hamas, illustrates both how the process works and its limitations. Israel would have preferred to arrest Shehada, who had masterminded several waves of bombings during the first years of the second *intifada*. Shehada had spent most of the 1990s in an Israeli jail, but he was released as a gesture to the PA which had requested he be let free. Shehada, however, chose to make his home deep in Gaza. He was also very careful about how he traveled. Israel could not have deployed an arrest team without risk to its soldiers and without a significant chance that the arrest operation would be discovered in advance.

Israel also repeatedly avoided hitting Shehada because he was often with his daughter. Several operations against Shehada were cancelled because Israel received information that Shehada was surrounded by innocents. When the eventual attack on Shehada was launched on July 23, 2002 there was nonetheless loss of innocent life, with 14 others killed including Shehada's daughter. Part of the problem was an intelligence gap. Israel recognized that the bomb that it intended to drop to kill Shehada would damage neighboring buildings, but it believed that they were empty. The buildings turned out to be occupied and several children were killed. Similarly, information about when Shehada's daughter would be away from her father's home also proved to be incorrect.

In addition to potentially killing innocents, the most important pitfall of targeted killings, they can also run the risk of increasing the number of terrorist recruits. Israel's killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Yasin

on March 22, 2004 was widely condemned, partly because Hamas portrayed Yasin as a purely political leader and partly because his age and handicapped status made him appear a victim rather than a murderer. Yasin's killing did lead to Palestinian outrage and almost certainly increased the number of recruits for terrorist organizations. Yet deprived of key leadership and fearful of further attacks, the reaction from Hamas and other terrorist organizations to Yasin's killing was not as substantial as most Israeli and Palestinian experts would have expected.

In any event, contrary to popular belief, more recruits do not necessarily increase a terrorist organization's effectiveness. Hamas' problem historically has not been a shortage of recruits, but rather a lack of experienced personnel to fully exploit the potential of its recruits. Additional recruits are highly ineffective without leaders or skilled operatives to train, equip, and direct them. They are far more likely to make mistakes than experienced operatives and they often have little sense of how to attack a target. As the pace of Israeli arrests and targeted killings increased during 2004, Hamas' operations on the West Bank proved to be increasingly amateurish, resulting in few Israeli deaths.

There is an important political aspect to the policy of targeted killings. Many of Israel's policies have generated anger around the world and Israel has shaped its counterterrorism policies in response to some of this criticism. Whether justified or not, Israel did suffer increased international condemnation for many of its targeted killings, particularly those that involving the deaths of innocents or so-called "political" figures such as Sheikh Yasin. The United States, for example, embargoed spare parts on Israeli helicopters shortly after the second *intifada* began in 2000, and several EU states also joined in.

Following the outrage over the Shehada killing, Israel conducted an attack on a meeting of senior Hamas figures on September 6, 2003 dropping a small bomb from an aircraft. Although the Israeli jet that conducted the attack was capable of dropping a 1,000 kg explo-

sive, Israel decided to use a 250 kg bomb instead to minimize the risk to innocents. This decision proved to be costly. The explosion was too small and the arch terrorists escaped. While it is impossible, and gruesome, to do an accounting of lives on both sides, allowing senior terrorists additional years or months to live makes terrorist organizations stronger, and allows them to conduct more numerous, more sophisticated, and more fatal attacks. On the other hand, responding to international engagement can prove valuable. Israel has made its interrogation and incarceration procedures more transparent to the International Committee of the Red Cross and has punished security service members for indiscipline if they violate procedures. The United States needs, therefore, to sustain a constant and effective dialogue with international partners to build consensus on acceptable counterterrorism strategies, and to mitigate the fallout when operations become politically controversial. Just as Israel's dialogue with, and support from, the United States has enabled their close relationship to weather occasional disagreements, so a regular and active American dialogue with international actors can also keep cooperation going when international public opinion is not necessarily supportive.

Fortunately for Israel, international opinion has shifted on the issue of counterterrorism tactics. After September 11, the United States became far more aware of the danger of terrorism and far more willing to support assertive action against terrorists. The attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, as well as a heightened concern about terrorism throughout the European Union, have made EU governments more understanding about the threat that Israel faces. The steady decline in Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel has also convinced many critics that, as Israel had long argued, the targeted killings did indeed damage the capabilities of the terrorist groups.

The final political aspect that Israel has taken into account is the risk that a targeted killing might have disrupted the peace process and made it more difficult for moderates within the PA, for example, to make

peace with Israel. There were occasions when the Fatah-controlled PA delayed meetings or suspended cooperation with Israel in response to targeted killings. Israeli political leaders therefore at times ordered the security forces to hold off attacking to avoid disrupting negotiations or angering a visiting foreign delegation. In many cases, however, Palestinian officials privately told the Israelis that they were glad a particular individual was dead as it made it easier for them to assert control.

The Israeli experience of using targeted killings therefore contains many lessons for U.S. policymakers, but there is a key difference that has to inform the U.S. policy debate. Unlike Israel, the United States relies heavily on the cooperation of foreign governments to arrest terrorist suspects and to disrupt terrorist plots. International cooperation is a valuable asset for U.S. counterterrorism. The advantages that targeted killings may bring have to be weighed against the risk of alienating allies, especially if a targeted killing operation goes wrong. The strategic effect could prove disastrous. For example, while Musharraf almost certainly signed off on the attempted killing of al-Zawahiri in January 2006, continued U.S. mistakes could make Musharraf and his administration less likely to assent to similar operations in the future. Similarly, a decision by Germany, Malaysia, Morocco, or other states with a *jihadist* presence to reduce or suspend cooperation with the United States in response to what they considered an objectionable U.S. policy would be devastating for U.S. counterterrorism efforts. From a broader perspective, the United States has famously tried to "win the hearts and minds" of the Muslim world. A targeted killing of a terrorist, particularly if it led to the deaths of innocents, could backfire and create sympathy for the *jihadists*. The bar for approving a targeted killing should therefore be high given the potential cost of a mistake for the broader U.S. counterterrorism campaign.

For the United States, therefore, the preferred approach is to work with local partner state security services that share the same goal. These services may not always be capable and involving them can entail the risk of leaks. Moreover, their governments have their own objectives, not all of which are in harmony with U.S. interests. Yet not involving them could damage prospects for ongoing counterterrorism cooperation, with likely detrimental results for the United States.

Similarly, politicians need to exercise considerable strategic judgment given the likely popularity of targeted killings with a public victimized by terrorism. Arrests are always preferable to targeted killings because of the possible information gained from interrogation. The long-term strategic gain of detaining and interrogating a key terrorist operative has to be weighed against the more obvious, but short-term, political gain from killing the terrorist.

Perhaps the greatest lesson the United States can draw from Israel's use of targeted killings is the need for policy transparency. Israel has a robust public debate on this controversial policy. While the Israeli government does not share specific intelligence on its operations, the targeting criteria are widely understood by all political parties and the general public. The result is a broad political consensus in favor of careful use of targeted killings, with most parties accepting the tenets of the policy. In the United States, by contrast, the targeted killings process is secretive and there has been little debate over the policy. As a result, should a high-profile mistake occur, a political backlash against targeted killings is possible. As Israel has learned, although transparency may lead to restraints on targeted killings that could result in missed opportunities, the result will be a policy that is sustainable over the long-term.

CONCLUSION:
PRINCIPLES OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Israel's experiences with coercing passive regimes, blending offensive and defensive operations and targeted killings, and the lessons of these policies for the United States suggest some core axioms of counterterrorism. There are six principles that must be borne in mind in any fight against terrorists.

First, *the number of effective terrorists is limited: there is a bottom to the barrel of skilled terrorists.* Although the number of potential recruits for a popular cause such as Palestinian terrorism or the Sunni *jihad* against the United States may be large, the number of generators of terror is limited. Generators of terror are the skilled operators who provide the organizational framework and logistics that enable a terrorist organization to be effective. They are the leaders, the bomb-makers, the trainers, the document forgers and the recruiters. To learn their skills and gain expertise requires many months if not years, which is why their number relative to the overall membership of any terrorist organization is so relatively small. By eliminating these generators of terror through arrests (the preferred method) or by targeted killings (if absolutely necessary), a state can greatly disrupt the operations of a terrorist organization. Bereft of the generators of terror, the terrorist organization may still have many willing recruits, but will be less dangerous as it will not be as effective an organization. Of course the strength and competence of the counterterrorist forces relative to their terrorist adversaries matters, but as important is that a government adopts the right tactics and that it not take the self-defeating view that terrorism is an inexhaustible threat.

The counterterrorism experiences of France and Egypt illustrate this point. In the late 1990s, the French government found that it was able to crush the Algerian *jihadist* network in France by shifting its focus from targeting the bomb-throwers to the terrorists' logistics base. Similarly, by the mid-1990s Egypt had killed, imprisoned, or exiled much of the skilled cadre of the Jamaat al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) and al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad) terrorist groups. The terrorists who replaced the previous generators of terror repeatedly made mistakes, making these groups far less dangerous and far more vulnerable to state counterterrorism. In neither case did terrorism end, but in both cases the problem became more manageable.

A second, related principle is that *not every terrorist need be killed or arrested for a counterterrorism strategy to be successful.* If the pace of arrests and killings is rapid enough, then the terrorist organization can lose the critical mass of skills and capabilities that it requires to function. The terrorist operatives who remain at large will be too busy hiding, or will be too fearful of being exposed by further arrests, that they will be unable to plan long-term attacks or to trust each other. Again, as was the case in France and Egypt, some of the terrorists still survive and will be able to carry out attacks—killing unprotected innocents is not difficult. Nonetheless, the tempo of attacks will slow, and the terrorists' ability to conduct sophisticated operations will decline dramatically. A good illustration of this principle in action was that Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (aka "Carlos the Jackal") was neutralized as a generator of terror despite remaining at large for a considerable amount of time.

Third, *it is far better that a local government's forces are used to fight terrorism than to call on outside forces, no matter how skilled.* The locally based government, be it Iraq, Pakistan, the PA or Yemen, for example, can use its manpower, its legal system, its knowledge of the terrain, and most importantly its intelligence and police assets to fight terrorism far more effectively than any foreign government coming in from the outside. In addition, foreigners are likely to alienate the local population, who may resist or fail to cooperate with legitimate counterterrorism because of nationalist sentiment. The foreigners will not be seen as legitimate defenders of the peace, and those locals who cooperate with the foreigners will risk being labeled as collaborators. Such resistance is more likely if the foreigners are from a different culture or religion.

Fourth, *while terrorists can be highly skilled, they are far from perfect and they often make mistakes.* Terrorism is a grave threat, but all too often the terrorists are analyzed as if they were superhuman and their actions are misunderstood in the light of this overestimation of their abilities. Israel has repeatedly exploited Palestinian mistakes. Indeed, many of Israel's defensive policies have been designed to increase the probability that Palestinian terrorists will commit errors. An

important weakness of most terrorist groups is travel, particularly international travel. When terrorists have to cross through domestic or international checkpoints that require considerable documentation, they become vulnerable to detection by skilled officials who are able to spot suspicious activity. The result is often that information is discovered that can cause a terrorist plot to unravel. Similarly, it is the terrorists' lack of capabilities that often explains their actions. Al-Qa'ida, for example, has not used chemical weapons because of any restraint on its part. Rather, the most probable explanation for the lack of any al-Qa'ida chemical weapons attack thus far is that the organization does not yet possess these weapons.

Fifth, *while many governments are weak, they will almost always prove stronger than the terrorists in the event of an open confrontation and, in any event, should be encouraged to build their strength for a confrontation.* Therefore, the argument that some governments want to crack down on terrorists but cannot is an argument that should not be accepted. It is also best to take action early rather than late, because the damage of the eventual contest between the state and the terrorists can be substantial. There are many ways that the United States can push such governments to change their attitude. In particular, the United States can build up international pressure in concert with close U.S. allies to demonstrate to such countries that there is no alternative to fighting terrorism and that incapacity is a poor excuse and a cover for a lack of will.

Jordan's experience with the Palestinians in the years following the Six Day War in 1967 illustrates this principle. The Hashemite monarchy appeared to be on its last legs after its devastating defeat by Israel. The armed forces and the monarchy were humiliated and the regime's legitimacy and prestige were gravely damaged by the loss of the West Bank and, worse, of Jerusalem. There was also a growing domestic challenge from the Palestinian majority in Jordan which was disillusioned with the monarchy and which became enamored of terrorist groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Fatah. King

Hussein was eventually left with no choice but to crack down hard, despite tolerating years of Palestinian cross-border attacks from Jordan against Israel. The creation of a terrorist haven on the East Bank of the Jordan endangered the kingdom's survival and it appeared that some Palestinian radicals wanted to overthrow the monarchy. The fighting between the Jordanian security forces and the Palestinians was long and bitter. By the end of this conflict, King Hussein and the Jordanian state were responsible for killing more Palestinians than any other country or leader. The Palestinian threat to Jordan's stability was ended for many decades, at terrible cost.

Sixth, and finally, *arrests, targeted killings, and defensive measures are means of managing a conflict, not means of solving it.* This paper has focused on the tools of counterterrorism, but we recognize they are only part of a broader effort. A lasting settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires a political settlement. If terrorism is rampant, however, no political solution is possible. Once security services can reduce the problem of terrorism to manageable levels that allow society to function without fear, then politicians will have more options and the ability to gain public support for negotiations leading to a settlement without giving in to violence or being seen to have made such a concession.

MAP 1: WEST BANK POST-SECURITY BARRIER

Security Fence Route Approved by Israeli Government February 20, 2005

- **1967 Green Line**
- **Approved route**
- **Route to be completed after further authorization and planning**
- **Temporary route**
- **Local fence**
- **The October 2003 fence route**
- **Fence protecting a road**
- △ **Israeli settlements**
- ○ **Palestinian communities**
- **Municipal Jerusalem**

Salim
JENIN
Al-Mutilla
TULKAREM
Qedumim
NABLUS
Qarne Shomeron
QALQILIYA
Ma'ale Shomeron
Immanu'el
ARIEL
TEL AVIV–YAFO
Ben Gurion International Airport
Rantis
Bet Arye
Ofarim
WEST BANK
Ofra
Bet El
MODI'IN ILLIT
RAMALLAH
Bet Horon
Route 443
Giv'at Ze'ev
Ring Road
JERICHO
Jordan River
JORDAN
ISRAEL
JERUSALEM
GUSH EZYON
MA'ALE ADUMIM
Betar Illit
BETHLEHEM
Efrat
Giv'at Eitam
Dead Sea
N
HEBRON
Qiryat Arba
0   10 mi
0   10 km
Eshkolot
Metzadot Yehuda

This map shows the route and planned efforts of Israel's security fence on the West Bank.

MAP 2: THE GAZA STRIP

The Gaza Strip

- ■ Israeli settlements
- ■ Palestinian communities

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

ELEI SINAI

Erez Crossing

NISANIT

Ash Shati Camp

Jabalya

Future site of Gaza Seaport

Gaza City

Salah al-Din Street

Eastern Road

NETZARIM

Nahal Oz Crossing

Karni Crossing

Salah al-Din Street

al-Bureij Camp

ISRAEL

KFAR DAROM

GUSH KATIF

Khan Yunis

Gamal Abdul Nasser Street

N

0   1
mile

MORAG

Rafah

Salah al-Din Street

PHILADELPHIA CORRIDOR

Rafah Crossing

Sufa Crossing

Gaza Airport (non-operational)

KEREM SHALOM

EGYPT

LEBANON

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Tiberias

SYRIA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

WEST BANK

Jordan R.

Tel Aviv

Amman

Ashdod
Ashkelon
Gaza City
GAZA

Jerusalem

Sderot

Dead Sea

Port Said

al-Arish

ISRAEL

EGYPT

JORDAN

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This map shows population concentrations in the Gaza Strip and entry points from Gaza to Israel. The population concentration near Gaza City and the limited number of entry points into Israel both have tremendous implications for Israeli counterterrorism. Around 600,000 people, 50% of the population in the Gaza Strip, live in Gaza City and its suburbs.

THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY

The Saban Center for Middle East Policy was established on May 13, 2002 with an inaugural address by His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan. The creation of the Saban Center reflects the Brookings Institution's commitment to expand dramatically its research and analysis of Middle East policy issues at a time when the region has come to dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

The Saban Center provides Washington policymakers with balanced, objective, in-depth and timely research and policy analysis from experienced and knowledgeable scholars who can bring fresh perspectives to bear on the critical problems of the Middle East. The center upholds the Brookings tradition of being open to a broad range of views. The Saban Center's central objective is to advance understanding of developments in the Middle East through policy-relevant scholarship and debate.

The center's foundation was made possible by a generous grant from Haim and Cheryl Saban of Los Angeles. Ambassador Martin S. Indyk, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, is the director of the Saban Center. Kenneth M. Pollack is the center's director of research. Joining them is a core group of Middle East experts who conduct original research and develop innovative programs to promote a better understanding of the policy choices facing American decision makers in the Middle East. They include Tamara Cofman Wittes, who is a specialist on political reform in the Arab world; Shibley Telhami, who holds the Sadat Chair at the University of Maryland; Shaul Bakhash, an expert on Iranian politics from George Mason University; Daniel Byman, a Middle East terrorism expert from Georgetown University, and Flynt Leverett, a former senior CIA analyst and senior director at the National Security Council, who is a specialist on Syria and Lebanon. The center is located in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings, led by Carlos Pascual, its director and a Brookings vice president.

The Saban Center is undertaking path breaking research in five areas: the implications of regime change in Iraq, including post-war nation-building and Persian Gulf security; the dynamics of Iranian domestic politics and the threat of nuclear proliferation; mechanisms and requirements for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; policy for the war against terrorism, including the continuing challenge of state-sponsorship of terrorism; and political and economic change in the Arab world, in particular in Syria and Lebanon, and the methods required to promote democratization.

The center also houses the ongoing Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World which is directed by Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies. The project focuses on analyzing the problems in the relationship between the United States and the Islamic world with the objective of developing effective policy responses. The Islamic World Project includes a task force of experts, an annual dialogue between American and Muslim intellectuals, a visiting fellows program for specialists from the Islamic world, and a monograph series.