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A COUP TOO FAR:
THE CASE FOR REORDERING U.S. PRIORITIES IN EGYPT

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The military's ouster of Muhammad Morsi, Egypt's first freely elected president, and the deadly crackdown on his supporters have brought to the fore a set of challenging questions about what America's role in the country can and should be.

Despite President Barack Obama's pledges to support Egyptian democracy and place the United States on the "right side" of history, American policy had stagnated well before the coup. Conventional wisdom on the U.S. role has remained largely the same: American influence over this, or any, Egyptian government is minimal. With Cairo consumed by a seemingly unbreakable political impasse, Washington lacks the money and leverage to do much more than help along the margins.

It is our contention that this prognosis on U.S.-Egypt relations is fundamentally flawed. The Obama Administration's decision to maintain its aid flows in early July 2013 – despite a legal obligation to suspend assistance after a military coup – suggested not a lack of leverage, but the absence of the political will to use it. Even before the army's intervention, there were at least two clear points where the United States could have used its leverage with the Egyptian military but chose not to, including the March 2012 NGO crisis and the June 2012 dissolution of the country's first democratically elected parliament. While the army represents the institution with which the United States has the closest working relationship, Washington's failure to call Egypt's leaders to account also extends to Muhammad Morsi's presidency, which had exhibited growing authoritarian tendencies. The extent of the leverage that the United States has or does not have cannot be assessed outside the broader context of American policy. Rather, leverage either accumulates or atrophies depending on past decisions.

Questions of U.S. influence are as relevant as ever, as Egypt finds itself in danger of entering a period of sustained civil conflict and political violence. The coup has also set a precedent that will likely lead to the legitimation and institutionalization of military intervention in political life, which could hamper Egyptian democratization for not just years but decades to come.

In the near term, it makes little sense to act as if Egypt is in the midst of a democratic transition. After what Human Rights Watch called "the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history" on August 14 and a total of four mass killings targeting Morsi supporters in the span of just six weeks,[1] the more urgent question for the United States and its allies is how to temper the Egyptian army's excesses and its use of overwhelming, indiscriminate force against its political opponents. This requires not just the suspension of military aid but extensive coordination with European partners and international financial institutions to maximize combined leverage. The threat of diplomatic isolation must be made credible.

If the army and security forces are willing to halt their campaign of repression and begin re-integrating Morsi supporters into the political process, then – and only then – should the U.S. posture shift from sticks to carrots. The latter would include pledges to support Egypt in negotiations with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Additional assistance should also

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be made available through new channels, such as a "Multilateral Endowment for Reform," which would aggregate multi-year contributions from donor nations with an initial target of $5 billion in new assistance for countries undergoing transition.

In the longer run, sustained efforts to support democracy in Egypt can serve as a new anchor for U.S.-Egyptian relations and one that, over time, is likely to produce greater goodwill toward the United States. Concrete and consistent support for democracy over a significant time period – reflecting the fundamental policy reorientation that we propose in these pages – will make the United States the kind of partner that more Egyptians would like to work with. This, in turn, will make other policy initiatives easier to pursue.

A NEW RATIONALE FOR U.S.-EGYPT RELATIONS

The profound shifts in Egyptian politics over the past several years – and the striking rise in anti-American sentiment – offer an opportunity to reassess the basic rationale behind U.S.-Egyptian relations. (Anti-U.S. agitation reached new heights when the state-owned *al-Akhbar* newspaper ran the headline "Egypt refuses advice of the American Satan."[2])

One commonly held view, particularly in the U.S. security establishment, is that Egypt's primary strategic value lies in its role as chief regional guarantor of peace with Israel – alongside a host of security functions including over-flight rights, Suez Canal access, and counter-terrorism cooperation. Without a doubt, these aspects have been instrumental to U.S. global force projection over the last four decades. Washington has also been able to count on Cairo's diplomatic assistance on a wide range of issues, from multiple rounds of Arab-Israeli peace efforts to its robust contribution to the coalition that forced Iraq out of Kuwait. It is worth noting, however, that Egypt does such things not as a favor to U.S. policymakers, but because they are also in Egypt's national interest.[3]

Considering Egypt's regional importance, there are any number of reasons for the United States to preserve a close diplomatic partnership with Cairo. While it is unlikely that Egyptian cooperation can be taken for granted in quite the same way as under Mubarak, Cairo and Washington still share a broad alignment of strategic interests. To reduce the relationship to security cooperation, or to pretend that the United States should be satisfied with a partnership based on merely satisfactory compliance in this area, however, would be a serious mistake. By signaling impunity to undemocratic actors in the region, the United States encourages the kind of authoritarian behavior that is the source of instability and insecurity in the long run.

A meaningful shift in the relationship requires revisiting the various premises and assumptions that have governed it to date. To begin, there is a need to question the long-held belief that U.S. military assistance to Egypt (to the tune of over a billion dollars per year since 1983[4]) is a price that needs to be paid to ensure Cairo's compliance with the Camp David Accords. For some time now, it has been in Egypt's own strategic interest to maintain the peace treaty with Israel. In other words, Washington has been "paying" Egypt billions of dollars to do something it would have done anyway.

Today, there is no longer any real relationship between this money and Egypt's willingness to comply with regional security arrangements. Egypt has too much at stake in terms of its regional and global relationships to withdraw from Camp David. What is commonly described as "aid" does not in any case involve actual cash transfers to Egypt. The annual $1.3 billion essentially represents a procurement budget for the Egyptian armed forces that allows – requires, actually – it to purchase American military systems and equipment. Ironically, the big ticket items purchased through this mechanism, such as fighter jets and main battle tanks, are weapons platforms that would likely only be used in the event of renewed hostilities with Israel. So while military aid to Egypt may represent a nice subsidy for the U.S. defense industry, it certainly does not underwrite peace with Israel.

Moving beyond the mythology of Camp David is a necessary first step in reimagining the U.S.-Egypt relationship. It represents the start of a broader shift that needs to occur – one which should constitute a wholesale reconfiguration of the bilateral relationship. This relationship should now be centered on building a strong, democratic Egypt that stands on its own, rather than one that must be propped up as part of a regional geopolitical balance. In the long run, U.S. strategic interests will be best served by an Egypt whose government is legitimate in the eyes of its population. Ultimately, this is what can provide genuine stability. At this time, the prospects of having such an Egyptian partner are dim. Still, even policy in the near term should be understood in terms of a longer-term approach that makes the support of democratization, rather than a misplaced, narrow focus on security cooperation, the anchor of a forward-looking partnership.

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DEMOCRATIZATION AND U.S. LEVERAGE

Part of the problem with U.S. policy in Egypt and the Middle East more broadly is that even "good" things like supporting democracy have been ceaselessly instrumentalized. Even a seemingly significant shift such as the Bush Administration's "Freedom Agenda," was ultimately about finding ways to more effectively guarantee American interests. As Jason Brownlee explains in his book *Democracy Prevention*, "The Bush White House used democracy promotion as an instrument to anchor Egypt's alignment before Hosni Mubarak passed away."[5] The goal wasn't to weaken Mubarak's grip on power but rather to strengthen it by pushing the Egyptian regime to embark on reform and, in so doing, pre-empt and absorb popular anger. The inevitable consequence of this sort of short-term instrumentalization is that it renders democracy promotion inconsistent and, therefore, ineffective. If Arab leaders know that the United States will not back up its pro-democracy rhetoric with policy changes that go beyond tinkering around the margins, they are unlikely to take U.S. objections over human rights concerns seriously.

Of course, some degree of "instrumentalization" is inevitable from a policy standpoint. Considering the scope of its regional interests, the United States can never become the kind of altruistic actor that some would like it to be. But there is a need to make a clear distinction between short- and long-term interests, something that both the Bush and Obama Administrations failed to do.

There will be times – especially when Arab populations vote into power Islamist and nationalist parties – that U.S. efforts to promote democracy will, in fact, undermine its short-term interests. To the extent possible, policymakers should acknowledge this reality and "stay the course" in the knowledge that policy consistency will bring dividends for U.S. policy, not necessarily right away, but in the longer run. The seemingly contradictory nature of American policy after Egypt's uprising has alienated both sides of the country's political and ideological divide. This lack of clarity makes Egyptian interlocutors more likely to misinterpret American objectives and make major miscalculations as a result.

Due to the day-to-day pressures of policymaking, we acknowledge that establishing a degree of long-term policy consistency is easier said than done. With this in mind, we suggest finding ways to insulate democracy promotion mechanisms from domestic policy constraints and the interests-based calculations of the White House and State Department. One such idea (which we have discussed in greater length elsewhere) is the aforementioned Multilateral Endowment for Reform, which would be governed by an independent board that would disburse aid against rigorously benchmarked reform commitments.[6]

But even if the United States prioritizes a transition to democracy as a long-term objective, there remains the question of capability and leverage.

Assuming that Washington wanted to, could it actually play a constructive role in pushing Egypt to respect minimal standards on human rights and establish an inclusive political process? All too often the United States either underestimates or under-uses its leverage, for reasons that we will briefly outline below. And leverage – which depends on the credible threat of sanction or the promise of reward – atrophies when unused. Our assessment of how the United States might seek to better use its influence and leverage draws in part on a series of three "Transitions Dialogues" hosted by the Brookings Doha Center from January 2011 to November 2012, which included a diverse group of leftists, liberals, Muslim Brotherhood members, and Salafis, along with U.S. government officials.[7]

In recent years, a growing academic literature has pointed to the critical role of international actors in undermining autocratic rule. In their book *Competitive Authoritarianism*, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way provide extensive empirical support to what many have long argued. "It was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions," they write, "that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s." Levitsky and Way conclude that "states' vulnerability to Western democratization pressure ... was often decisive."[8]

The key, then, is not to create leverage where it does not exist, but to begin applying leverage – in a serious and sustained fashion – to matters of human rights and democratization.

However, despite significant economic, political, and military ties, Levitsky and Way find that Western leverage in the Middle East is actually relatively low.[9] The reason cited is instructive: Middle Eastern states are strategically vital, and strategic interests take precedence over human rights and democracy. Accordingly, Western threats – when they concern democracy – are simply not credible. Arab leaders know full well the traditional hierarchy of Western priorities, a hierarchy that remained largely intact after the Arab Spring. Newly elected Islamist parties – such as Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood or Tunisia's al-Nahda – focused considerable attention on establishing stronger relations with the United States (perhaps more so than with their own domestic opposition). Furthermore, fully aware of American priorities, the Morsi government dialed down anti-Israel rhetoric, maintained the peace treaty, and cooperated with Israel on Sinai security. It is no coincidence that Morsi came out with his infamous November 22 decree – arguably his most controversial move as president – the day after he had worked hand in hand with the United States to secure a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel (a move which did not occasion a particularly firm response from the Obama Administration).[10]

All of this suggests that allied governments do make an effort to respect Western concerns on "hard" interests, because they know that these are the issues that matter most to American policymakers. The key, then, is not to create leverage where it does not exist, but to begin applying leverage – in a serious and sustained fashion – on matters of human rights and democratization. Steve Simon, a former senior National Security Council official, and others have argued that the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations tried to use leverage in such a manner but failed.[11] Yet these were relatively weak efforts under a seemingly stable and intransigent Mubarak, with both presidents quickly reversing course.

In assessing what leverage the United States does or does not have, it is critical to consider the ingredients of bilateral ties, which go well beyond mere aid dollars. In an effort to assess these relationships more systematically, political scientists Anne Zimmerman and Sean Yom point to six "provisions of order" that governments receive from the United States, including: economic assistance and food aid; technical assistance and infrastructure enhancements improving their ability to provide public services; access to economic markets; means to augment internal coercion through intelligence sharing; and protection from external threats.[12] To

be sure, countries like Egypt are less economically dependent on the United States today than they once were, with American aid representing only a small fraction of overall GDP. If one looks beyond economic assistance, however, it becomes clear that Middle Eastern states need the United States (more than the other way around) and would suffer considerably if the Washington withdrew its "provisions of order."

Let us take, for example, the $1.3 billion in U.S. military aid to Egypt. It may not sound like much, especially in light of pledges of $12 billion in grants and loans from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. But only the United States can provide the specific equipment, particularly crucial spare parts, that are needed to keep Egypt's tanks and fighter jets operational. (Maintenance costs alone account for 15 percent of the $1.3 billion in assistance.[13]) Re-export licensing requirements would make it very difficult for third party nations, including U.S. allies, to sell similar weapons to Egypt without Washington's approval.

Beyond equipment and parts, there is the provision of American advice and training, which are likely to grow in importance as Egypt battles a gathering insurgency in the Sinai. As the world's most powerful army, there is also an important but less easily quantifiable prestige factor that accompanies security cooperation with the U.S. military, and this undoubtedly plays into the calculus of Egypt's generals.[14] The United States is still the strongest and most advanced military power, and therefore the partner of choice for armed forces around the world. Joint exercises, war games, and training, including tours at the U.S. Army War College, have provided the United States with personal connections at various levels of the Egyptian military. As Joshua Stacher points out, "[Egypt's generals] feel like proximity to U.S. generals generates a kind of honor and respectability."[15] In short, the military-to-military relationship, while far from perfect, is one that has been built over not just years, but decades. Letting most of that go and opting for other patrons would be costly, time-consuming, and ultimately damaging for a military that has grown used to the perks and benefits of U.S. backing.

Beyond military aid, the United States is also critical to any Egyptian government's hopes of securing a deal with the IMF that altogether could bring in as much as $15 billion, including associated grants and commitments.[16] The United States has the largest share of voting rights on the IMF's Board and it is unlikely that a deal with the Fund can go forward without a nod from Washington. Unconditional Gulf aid can fill the gap in the short run, but no amount of assistance, absent long-overdue structural reforms, is likely to address the root causes of Egypt's chronic deficits and general economic dysfunction. Diplomatic isolation – and continued repression – are also certain to keep investors and tourists at arm's length. Egypt's military may be able to withstand such pressures for the time being, but, over time, the effects would be difficult to ignore.

If taken together, European Union aid and loans – coming at around $5 billion – along with IMF and World Bank assistance are at least comparable to amounts offered by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. Moreover, additional pledges from Qatar, Turkey, and Libya would boost this number even higher, which only underlines the importance of aid coordination among the United States and its allies.

The larger concern, however, is the growing effort on the part of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to challenge and even undermine U.S. interests in the region. Saudi officials have publicly stated they are willing to replace any aid that is cut by the United States and the EU. These Gulf efforts to insulate the Egyptian army from political pressure threaten to prolong civil conflict and fuel insurgency in Sinai and Upper Egypt. This is a clear national security threat to the United States and demonstrates, once again, how American values and interests are increasingly intertwined in Egypt.

Moreover, Gulf allies have threatened to withhold cooperation on key U.S. interests, including counterterrorism efforts and support for the Syrian rebels. Attempts to "blackmail" the United States in such a manner should not be encouraged, particularly since these tensions are likely to become a mainstay of U.S. relations with certain Gulf countries. Similarly, Egyptian officials have suggested that they too may be less cooperative. There is also little

reason to think that such threats are credible. First, as Michael O'Hanlon notes, Suez Canal access and overflight rights, while convenient and helpful, are not needed "in any absolute sense."[17] For their part, Gulf countries support counterterrorism efforts and back the Syrian rebels because it is in their interest, not because it is in America's.

With these concerns in mind, the United States may need to do something it has generally avoided after the Arab Spring: exert pressure on its Gulf partners. Here, too, the points of leverage are obvious, though often underestimated. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries have depended on America for decades for vital security provisions, which remain particularly important today in the face of security threats from Iran and Hizballah. Effectively, the United States provides the Gulf with a "security umbrella," which no other power is in a position to offer.

THE STRATEGIC CASE FOR EGYPTIAN DEMOCRACY

In our view, the route to a new strategic rationale for the bilateral relationship necessarily begins with the state of democracy in Egypt. To some extent, the Obama Administration has already recognized this, at least rhetorically. Washington's major speeches and talking points since 2011 have generally contained the appropriate messages – including recognition that democracy and stability are not antithetical and support for democratic reform as a new imperative. Yet the United States has done little to translate this rhetoric into a set of new policies. Trying to do so would have been hugely challenging, of course, but it was never actually attempted.

In many respects, it seems as if the United States did its best to maintain a policy of business as usual in post-Arab Spring Egypt. Indeed, the basic tenets of the old, grand bargain with the Mubarak regime, which involved turning a largely blind eye to Egypt's lack of democracy in return for security cooperation, continued to define American policy throughout the post-Arab Spring transition. To be sure, the Obama Administration regularly criticized first the SCAF-led government and then the Morsi administration for restrictive measures against the press, civil society, and political opponents,[18] but there was little to suggest this went beyond rhetoric. (And even relatively mild criticism turned out to be a difficult sell within the government bureaucracy.[19]) Here, as ever, hard interests took precedence. The United States prioritized getting Morsi's help to broker a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel and to apprehend a suspect in the attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya.[20]

The July 3 military coup signaled the end of a deeply flawed but still salvageable effort at a democratic transition. In those first days after the coup the army hadn't yet moved decisively against the Muslim Brotherhood and there was still a possibility of bringing the group and its supporters back into the political process. This would have been the time to signal clearly to military interlocutors that mass killing, at the very least, would be grounds for the suspension of aid. Yet the United States failed to outline a clear set of enforceable standards by which to judge the army's future conduct. As in previous instances, Washington appeared uncomfortable with the very notion of putting military aid on the table.

Some will contend that it could not be any other way. And not because Washington is unwilling to veer from its familiar entrenched course, but rather due to a marked decline in U.S. influence in the region. There are, of course, budgetary constraints and an American electorate suffering from Middle East fatigue. In addition, anti-American sentiment and xenophobia have reached unprecedented levels in Egypt, making it more challenging for the United States to play a more hands-on, activist role.[21] However, the narrative of diminished American influence too easily becomes an excuse for doing less than the United States otherwise might.

To be sure, changing Egyptian perceptions of the United States is a generational project and, even in the best of circumstances, expectations should be set low. This very fact, though, allows Washington to rid itself of the illusion that saying the right things will improve America's image, since it almost certainly won't. It may not be popular

among a large sector of Egyptians, but there is much that can be done to support a more inclusive political process in the short-to-medium term, with the hope of helping push Egypt toward democracy in the longer term. Obviously, this is a considerable undertaking, and it raises the question of why the United States should be so heavily invested in Egyptian democracy in the first place, particularly when its vital interests – for example, counterterrorism and maintaining the peace treaty with Israel – can be secured regardless of the nature of the Egyptian regime.

This is where we believe the Arab uprisings represent a major point of departure. First, autocracy, no matter how seemingly "stable," is unsustainable. Furthermore, domestic instability and civil strife in a country like Egypt cannot be isolated. Such instability will negatively affect Egypt's regional role and its ability to cooperate with the United States on key points of mutual concern.

GETTING BACK TO DEMOCRATIZATION

Given the mass violence and intensifying repression Egypt is now witnessing, there is little point in discussing support for democratization in Egypt. If, however, the United States can use its influence to rein in the Egyptian military's excesses, then there is some hope of a return to a wickedly tough – but, crucially, nonviolent – politics of transition. This, as discussed earlier, requires the willingness in Washington to take concrete action on suspending military assistance and make clear that tangible consequences follow from the army's decisions. The United States should also suspend export licenses for equipment used by Egypt's internal security forces to commit acts of violence against its citizenry. If and when the army commits to an inclusive political process and ceases its campaign of repression against Morsi supporters (and, increasingly, secular critics of military rule), then the suspended aid can resume.

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After the army takes these first steps, new economic assistance, including IMF support, should be made conditional on holding free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections in a timely fashion coupled with robust international monitoring to ensure that the legitimacy of results are broadly accepted. Critically, any elections must include the full range of political groups. All parties must be free to contest – and win – elections. It is not a democracy if the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups are blocked from meaningful participation.

The first tranches of short-term "stabilization" funding should be granted once good faith efforts are made to begin reintegrating Morsi supporters within the new political order. This would require releasing senior Brotherhood leaders and providing explicit guarantees regarding their future participation. If the Brotherhood is dissolved, then the group should be allowed to contest elections through the Freedom and Justice Party or another legal party.

Subsequent tranches of stabilization support would be dispersed after parliamentary elections were certified reasonably free, fair, and competitive. After short-term stabilization, additional medium-term economic assistance, whether from the United States, EU, or international financial institutions, must be made conditional on meeting a series of explicit, measurable political benchmarks.

With regards to longer-term economic assistance, discussions with representatives of all main political camps in Egypt during the aforementioned "transitions dialogues" suggest a number of areas where U.S. aid might be able to play a useful role in the future, if and when democratization again becomes a realistic possibility.

First, the United States should use its convening power to aggregate multilateral contributions designed to rehabilitate the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector and create sustainable growth. Amidst much talk and aspiration for Egypt's technology sector, it will also be crucial for

the country's external partners to assist in identifying and building out industrial sectors that can provide large numbers of low-skilled jobs and in which Egypt has some prospect of competing globally. This effort will need to be accompanied by commensurate attention to educational reform such that vocational training better corresponds to sectors likely to generate jobs in the coming years. But Egypt's socioeconomic development needs to be more than a U.S. "ask" in order to be successful. Egyptian government officials will need be persuaded to buy into such an approach because it is in their country's own interest to do so. If successful, such initiatives would both reduce social tensions at home and augment Egypt's global standing.

Other areas include enhancing the capacity and professionalism of police and reforming the central security forces, in contrast to the traditional emphasis on Egypt's military. After decades of endemic corruption and authoritarianism, there is also a need for a significant overhaul of the bureaucratic apparatus and civil service through which basic functions of governance are carried out, a task made even more vital in light of the newfound assertiveness of Egypt's deep – or as Nathan Brown terms it, "wide" – state.[22] When it comes to doling out democracy support funds and providing technical assistance, such an approach would also respect the need to prioritize institutional capacity and quality of governance over trying to pick political winners.

Throughout all of this, the rights of opposition parties and civil society groups to organize and convey their message to the Egyptian public must be ensured. The United States should not take sides in Egypt's internal politics by supporting one group over the other, but rather by ensuring that all parties across the ideological spectrum have the ability to compete on an even playing field and to monitor and criticize the government without fear of persecution. America cannot propel any party – Islamist, liberal, or leftist – to victory; but it can help create the conditions so that they *can* win, if and when enough Egyptians decide to vote for them.

Finally, we believe that the United States needs to spearhead a more ambitious and integrated multilateral strategy for Egypt's economic future. Once the country's finances have stabilized, there will be a need to craft large-scale solutions that can place Egypt's economy on a pathway to long-term growth. While Washington cannot be expected to fund this itself, it can use its convening power to aggregate contributions from a diverse range of actors, including traditional donor nations; emerging economies (many of whose own experiences – e.g. Brazil and Mexico – hold valuable lessons for Egypt); Qatar and Turkey; and even the private sector. Elements of the post-Arab Spring U.S. response, such as enterprise funds and relatively sizeable, albeit complicated, debt swaps, have pointed in the right direction. The scale of Egypt's needs, however, is such that the country will only see sustainable progress through a more ambitious multilateral approach. Elsewhere we have offered ideas – including the Multilateral Endowment for Reform – on tying international economic assistance to explicit political reforms in countries undergoing transition.[23] (The Endowment would have an initial funding stream of $5 billion, with a goal of increasing the amount to $20 billion by 2020. As mentioned earlier, receiving aid would be conditioned on measurable democratization benchmarks.)

CONCLUSION

Taken together, the ideas discussed in this paper provide the outlines of a paradigm shift – from a security-focused relationship to one anchored by Egypt's commitment to democratization – that is both long overdue and urgently needed as Egypt tries to steer past economic collapse, intense polarization, and political violence. For too long, the economic and the political have been treated as discrete concerns in the sequencing of reform. This has undermined the international community's ability to play a constructive role – a role that today, as the promise of the January 25 revolution slips farther away each day, is as vital as ever. U.S. strategic interests and American national security are ultimately best served by making the hard and sometimes uncomfortable decisions necessary to speak *and act* in support of genuine democratization in Egypt.

NOTES

[1] "Egypt: Security Forces Used Excessive Lethal Force," Human Rights Watch, August 19, 2013, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-excessive-lethal-force>.
[2] "*Masr tarfud maw'idhat al-shaytan al-Amriki* (Egypt refuses advice of the American Satan)," *Al-Akhbar*, August 8, 2013, see <https://twitter.com/shadihamid/status/365875460602736642>.
[3] Michele Dunne argues that when the United States exerted pressure on the country's leaders over the course of the Bush Administration, "Egypt at no time withheld or even seriously threatened to withhold cooperation on military, counterterrorism, or regional diplomacy due to the freedom agenda. If anything, Cairo tried harder to please Washington in these areas in 2002-2006 in the hope of relieving pressure for political reform," (Dunne, "The Baby, the Bathwater, and the Freedom Agenda in the Middle East," *The Washington Quarterly*, January 2009, 133-4).
[4] Jeremy Sharp, "Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, June 27, 2013, <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>.
[5] Jason Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
[6] For more on the Multilateral Endowment for Reform, see Shadi Hamid and Peter Mandaville, forthcoming, *The Washington Quarterly,* Fall 2013. See also Shadi Hamid, "Prioritizing Democracy: How the Next President Should Re-orient U.S. Policy in the Middle East," Brookings Institution Campaign 2012 Paper, June 2012, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/06/20-middle-east-hamid>; and Shadi Hamid, Proposal for Multilateral Reform Endowment, in *Moving Beyond Rhetoric: How Should President Obama Change U.S. Policy in the Middle East*, Project on Middle East Democracy, January 2013, 12, <http://pomed.org/moving-beyond-rhetoric/>.
[7] For more on the Brookings Doha Center's "Transitions Dialogues," see <http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/doha/publications/democracy-dialogue>.
[8] Steven Levitsky and Lucan A.Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 24.
[9] Ibid, 41.
[10] See for example: "The United States' Reaction to Egypt's November 22 Decisions," U.S. Department of State, November 23, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200983.htm>; Victoria Nuland, "Daily Press Briefing," U.S. Department of State, November 26, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/11/201015.htm>.
[11] Steven Simon, "America Has No Leverage In Egypt," *New York Times*, August 19, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/opinion/america-has-no-leverage-in-egypt.html>.
[12] Anne Zimmerman and Sean Yom, "International Hierarchy: Sovereignty and Order in the Modern World," Unpublished manuscript, 15.
[13] Eric Schmitt, "Cairo Military Firmly Hooked to U.S. Lifeline," *New York Times*, August 20, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/world/middleeast/cairo-military-firmly-hooked-to-us-lifeline.html?smid=tw-nytimesglobal&seid=auto&_r=0&pagewanted=all>.
[14] We thank Tamara Cofman Wittes for drawing our attention to this point.
[15] Joshua Hersh, "Egypt Military Sees U.S. Aid Package As Key Part Of Honor-Bound Relationship," *Huffington Post*, August 21, 2013, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/21/egypt-military-aid_n_3789668.html?utm_hp_ref=tw>.
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