

BRAZIL'S RISE

Seeking Influence on Global Governance

Harold Trinkunas

APRIL 2014

AUTHOR

Harold Trinkunas is the Charles W. Robinson Chair and senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program. His research focuses on Latin American politics, particularly on issues related to foreign policy, governance and security. His current research studies Brazil's emergence as a major power, and Latin American contributions to global governance on issues including energy policy, drug policy reform and internet governance. Trinkunas has also written on terrorism financing, borders and ungoverned spaces.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Thomas Bruneau of the Naval Postgraduate School and David Mares of the University of California, San Diego for their thoughts and expertise on Brazil and on rising powers. I would also like to thank Brookings colleagues Richard Feinberg and Bruce Jones for reviewing drafts of this paper and providing valuable comments and insights, as well as Brookings Research Assistant Emily Miller for her skillful research and editorial support. Of course, the contents and recommendations are my own.

I also appreciate the assistance of Tina Trenkner and her colleagues at Brookings in the editing and production of this paper.

Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recommendations of the Institution's scholars are not determined by any donation.

BRAZIL'S RISE

Seeking Influence on Global Governance

HAROLD TRINKUNAS

INTRODUCTION

When President Dilma Rousseff first took office in 2010, Brazil's future looked exceptionally bright. The country had benefited from Asia's enormous appetite for its commodities for nearly a decade. With this economic tailwind, Brazil quickly recovered from the global financial crisis in 2008, and it became an attractive destination for foreign capital. Global powers—particularly the United States—acknowledged Brazil as an important country whose voice deserved to be heard. Regionally, Argentina's decline and Mexico's focus on North America opened up room for Brazil to secure leadership in South America through new regional institutions such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Brazil was recognized as a global leader in poverty reduction through its social programs such as Bolsa Família and witnessed a substantial growth in the middle class during the Luis Inacio da Silva (Lula da Silva) administrations (2003-2010). In the international system, Brazil sought prerogatives commensurate to major power status, campaigning for a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council and joining the G-20 group of Economy and Finance Ministers created during the global

financial crisis. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that Lula da Silva was one of the most popular outgoing presidents in Brazil's history, and that Dilma Rousseff took leadership of a country widely thought of as a rising global power.

As Brazil nears the end of a decade of economic and political exuberance in Latin America, questions about its trajectory arise. The ability for Brazilian commodity exporters to meet demand for their products is constrained by poor export infrastructure. Its currency is also significantly overvalued, undercutting the competitiveness of its non-commodity-based export sectors. Globally, the two most significant global trade negotiations in a decade, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, are transpiring without its participation. Mercosur once showcased Brazil's leadership in robust regional integration initiatives but now ties it to two of the most troubled economies in South America—Argentina and Venezuela. Domestically, political support for President Rousseff has softened. There are continuing concerns in the middle class over its economic prospects, and some of its ire has focused on Brazil's major international prestige projects, the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Sum-

mer Olympics. Social protests were widespread in 2013, including some that ended in violence.

Brazil stands at a crossroads in its road to major power status. It can either continue its ascent, or can remain a middle power, albeit a critical one, within the existing international status quo. A major power is characterized by more than size, population, and economic achievement. It is distinguished by its intentions regarding its role in the international system. To assess a rising power, we have to examine the degree to which a state is able to successfully participate in shaping the rules and forming the regimes that govern the international order.¹

Brazil has sought major power status to facilitate its own economic development and to maximize its autonomy in the international system. It has historically valued the norms of sovereignty, non-intervention, and peaceful resolution of disputes in international relations. So while Brazil would like to be a rule shaper rather than a rule taker in the international system, the rules it would find acceptable tread lightly on the sovereignty of states.²

This paper argues that Brazil's aspirations to major power status have been a constant, but that its attempts to rise have fallen short historically due to the mismatch between its capabilities and the available opportunities to emerge as a great power. In particular, Brazil has been attempting to solve a difficult puzzle: how to emerge as a major power without resorting to the traditional use of hard

military and economic power to compel others to accept its rise.

In comparison to other rising powers such as India and China, Brazil's recent regional security environment is enviably peaceful, at least at the interstate level. This has diminished Brazil's interest in developing the kinds of military capabilities characteristic of other rising powers. Its history as a developing country has limited its willingness to accept the costs of using economic power through sanctions or aid to induce other states to change their behavior. Additionally, there is a normative dimension in Brazilian foreign policy that resists the employment of hard power in international affairs.

Brazil's path also differs from other rising powers because of the great emphasis it places on cooperation with others. This cooperation is designed to compensate for the enduring obstacles to Brazil's rise, which are: a shortfall of hard power, particularly military power; unwillingness to commit its economic power to provide incentives and side payments so that other powers might follow its lead; opposition within Brazil's own region to its rise to major power status; and the inability of soft power, no matter how skillfully deployed, to make and maintain the international order. Brazilians are not reconciled to the traditional demands and costs of major power status, both in its military and economic dimensions, and they seek a different path.

¹ Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Major Power Strategies and the International Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). For a discussion of rule shaping and the international order, see Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Bruce Jones, "A Hesitant Rule Shaper?," in *Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order*, ed. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Bruce Jones (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 3–22.

² Gabriel Cepaluni and Tullo Vigevani, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: The Quest for Autonomy from Sarney to Lula* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012).

Brazil's path to major power status has also been erratic. At different times, it has tried to rise by accepting the status quo as an ally of the United States in World War I and World War II; joining a block of developing countries critical of the superpowers beginning in the 1960s; and working jointly with the BRICS, a club of rising powers, to shape the rules governing the present international order. Each stance Brazil takes is an attempt to advantageously position itself with respect to emerging opportunities and new partners, but the positions taken are not necessarily compatible with each other. Moreover, Brazil's efforts to advance through partnerships with other states is hobbled by a historical reluctance to pool its sovereignty. In addition, turbulent domestic politics or major economic crises have occasionally undermined Brazil's credibility and capabilities, interrupting its rise.

This paper explains Brazil's attempts to rise in the international system over time. First, it examines

the challenges faced by all rising powers as they attempt to improve their position in the international system. It then turns to Brazil's attempts to rise during the 20th century, illustrating how the mismatch between capabilities and opportunities impeded attempts to emerge as a major power. The paper then focuses on Brazil's most recent attempt to rise during the first two decades of the 21st century. Changes in the international system today provide Brazil with an unprecedented opportunity to participate in shaping the global order. This section examines how Brazil uses its capabilities, mostly diplomatic and soft power, across three domains: security, economics, and the global commons. Brazil's successes and failures across these domains highlight the ways in which its present capabilities limit its rise. The paper concludes with implications for Brazilian and U.S. policymakers.

RISING POWERS: INTENTIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

There is a rich international relations literature on rising powers that looks beyond size and focuses on countries' intentions and the implications of their rise for other states in the international system. Originally, this literature was particularly concerned with power transitions between rising and major powers. It was grounded in the observation that power transitions are a period of higher risk for international conflict, particularly when the rising power is dissatisfied with the existing norms and structure of the international system.³ Today, some scholars argue that peaceful transitions are more likely since major systemic wars are improbable in the nuclear era. At the same time, globalization and growing regional interdependence engender a convergence of interests among rising and traditional powers that reduces the probability of conflict among them. Although much scholarly attention has focused on China, other powers such as India and Brazil are also knocking at the door of major power status, driving new interest in this debate.⁴

Discussion on the effect of rising powers on the international order has become more nuanced. Sidhu, Mehta and Jones argue for a standard of 'rule shaping' rather than 'rule making' to evaluate a rising powers' effect.⁵ They observe that historically,

very few powers have been able to make the rules governing the international order by themselves. Using a 'rule making' standard would exclude from study most cases of rising powers. In addition, scholars increasingly distinguish between the types of power available to states to shape the system. Power is understood here using Robert Dahl's classic 1957 definition of the ability of one state to cause another to perform an action they otherwise would not have undertaken. This paper relies on Joseph Nye's distinction between hard power (the power to compel others) and soft power (the power to attract others towards your preferred outcome). Military power is often categorized as hard power while economic power can be viewed more ambiguously, either as hard power when it is used to impose sanctions or to buy off other states, or as soft power when a country with a successful economic model is able to attract others desiring a similar outcome to its cause. Soft power includes a range of cultural, economic, political, and ideological dimensions of a state that make it an attractive model for other states. Implicit in this is a recognition that power is not just about material capabilities, but is also about the norms and values to which states appeal to externally legitimize their behavior in the international system.⁶

Identifying an emerging power and distinguishing it from a merely large country requires an *ex ante* indicator of its intentional pursuit of a higher position in the international system. For the purposes

³ Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, and Ronald L. Tammen, *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (New York: Chatham House/Seven Bridges Press, 2000).

⁴ Steve Chan, "Is There a Power Transition between the U.S. and China? The Different Faces of National Power," *Asian Survey* 45, no. 5 (October 2005): 687–701, doi:10.1525/as.2005.45.5.687; G. John Ikenberry, "Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America," *Foreign Affairs* 90 (2011): 23; Jeffrey W. Legro, "What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power," *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 3 (September 2007): 515–534; Legro, *Rethinking the World*.

⁵ Sidhu, Mehta, and Jones, *Shaping the Emerging World*.

⁶ Although it has been criticized on conceptual grounds, soft power captures a dimension of state actions to advance their interests in the international system that is particularly useful for discussions of Brazil. For an extended discussion, see David A. Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes and Thomas Risse, First (London: Sage, 2002), 177–191.

of this paper, a state is recognized as attempting to rise when it seeks membership in a major power institution.⁷ This distinguishes emerging powers from middle powers, the latter of which are countries with significant capabilities that nevertheless accept the status quo and do not seek to participate directly in the shaping of international order. Historically, rising powers might have acquired dreadnaughts or sought membership in the Council of the League of Nations. Today, it would include states campaigning to become a permanent member on the U.N. Security Council or join the small group of states possessing nuclear weapons. These traits have been characteristic of the few states that have historically had the power to participate in shaping the rules and regimes governing the international system.⁸

By seeking access to these exclusive clubs, rising powers reveal their intention to join the group of states that devise the world order, but the question then becomes what kind of order they seek.⁹ Scholars distinguish between rising powers with reformist, revisionist, and revolutionary intentions towards the global order.¹⁰ Reformist rising powers are those that accept the rules of the existing order, but pursue changes in the system to accommodate their interests. Revisionist powers may accept many rules of the existing international order, but they also seek changes in the way the rules are implemented. The United States began its

rise in the late 19th century as a reformist power, but both President Wilson and President Roosevelt adopted decidedly revisionist positions when U.S. power peaked in the wake of World War I and World War II respectively, advocating for self-determination of nations and the end of European empires. Revolutionary rising powers are those that seek to replace the existing international order with a new one of their own devising, as was the case with revolutionary France in the late 18th and early 19th century or the Soviet Union. Revolutionary powers, because they threaten the order devised by the established powers, are the most likely to provoke systemic conflict. Reformist or revisionist powers, on the other hand, may be able to rise peacefully, especially if the changes they demand in the international order can be accommodated by the existing major powers at a lower cost than the alternative, i.e. continuing to exclude them from membership in exclusive rule-making bodies or preventing them from acquiring greater capabilities.

Finally, becoming a major power requires more than intentions; it requires the opportunity to shape the rules and regimes governing the international order. Power is relative, and shifts in the power, capabilities, and intentions of other states in the system, particularly among the existing major powers, also produce opportunities for rising powers. The conclusion of major wars and consequent

⁷ Middle powers are traditionally viewed as states with regionally significant capabilities, but who accept the rules governing the international order rather than participate in making them. Major powers have the capability to participate in shaping and maintaining the rules governing the international order.

⁸ Hart and Jones have a discussion of contemporary *ex post* indicators for emerging powers in a recent article. See Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones, "How Do Rising Powers Rise?," *Survival* 52, no. 6 (December 2010): 63–88, doi:10.1080/00396338.2010.540783. These indicators are useful for confirming the trajectory of emerging powers today, but they cannot be fully replicated in earlier historical periods. They may also miss some 'failed' cases of attempts to rise.

⁹ Deborah Larson, T.V. Paul and William Wohlforth, *Status in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2014), 19–27; David R. Mares, "Emerging Powers in an Era of Systemic Change: Brazil as an Emerging 'Revisionist Status Quo' Power?" (presented at the Rising Powers: Is Peaceful Accommodation Possible?, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 2013).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

diplomacy are often revealing because they are moments when it is possible to observe which powers, rising or established, have the greatest influence in shaping the rules governing the global order. Opportunities may also emerge as different domains of the international order, such as security, finance, trade, or the global commons, become more or less salient in interstate relations. This provides rising powers with windows in which their capabilities might have an outsized impact relative to their historical means. For example, a

state's capacity to respond to global conflict such as World War I required different aspects of state power than responses to a global financial crisis such as the Great Depression. Contemporary challenges in the global commons, such as coordinating responses to climate change or public health, may emphasize yet another currency of power. These moments are both challenges for the established powers and opportunities for the emerging powers.

BRAZIL'S RISE IN HISTORY

Brazil's long-held aspiration for greatness is captured in a quote by Joaquim Nabuco, Brazil's first ambassador to the United States (1905-1910), "Brazil has always been conscious of its size, and it has been governed by a prophetic sense with regard to its future."¹¹ Brazil's intention has been to achieve equality with the major powers in the international system both *de facto* as well as *de jure*.¹² While this aspiration would require reform or revision of the existing international status quo, Brazil has never had the intention or capability to revolutionize the international system. Given Brazil's ambitions, its strategies have focused on how to take advantage of opportunities to rise and alter the international order to accommodate its preferences while avoiding direct confrontation with the established powers.

Brazilian thinking about the international order has historically been the province of three elites—diplomatic, economic and national security—that by and large share the aspiration to major power status. Until very recently, Brazilian society has been inward looking and preoccupied with domestic politics, although this has begun to change.¹³ Most foreign policy debates still occur among a very limited range of actors. These elites may differ in their analyses of the most relevant capability for Brazil's rise, but frequently their prescriptions are similar. They share a consensus that economic development is a necessary precondition for

achieving an international status commensurate with Brazil's geographic and demographic size, although there is a range of views on the degree to which protectionism or openness should govern the economy.¹⁴ Brazil's elites also share a preference for peaceful relations among states and non-intervention in others' affairs. While alternative views, by economic elites favoring an open economy or national security elites favoring military capabilities, have held sway for short periods of time, they have not produced an enduring shift in the historical trajectory of Brazilian foreign policy.¹⁵

Brazil's capabilities have been those of a developing country for much of its history. Until it industrialized during and after World War II, Brazil largely relied on commodity exports such as rubber, sugar, and coffee for its income. Industrialization expanded Brazil's capabilities in the 1960s and 1970s, but it struggled to maintain macroeconomic stability throughout much of this period, leading to bouts of hyperinflation and a severe debt crisis in the 1980s. Its military capabilities remained quite modest during much of its history. Professionalization began with the influence of German and later French military missions before and after World War I. Equipping the armed forces required assistance from allied powers in World War I and World War II since Brazil lacked a significant defense industry until the 1970s. The military by and large focused on internal affairs, even though its primary mission was theoretically the defense of

¹¹ Celso Lafer, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future," *Daedalus* 129, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 207–238.

¹² Miriam Gomes Saraiva, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: Causal Beliefs in Formulation and Pragmatism in Practice," in *Latin American Foreign Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism*, ed. Gian Luca Gardini and Peter W. Lambert (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 52–55; Celso Lafer, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy."

¹³ Celso Amorim, "Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): An Overview," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, no. SPE (2010): 239.

¹⁴ Andrew Hurrell, "Brazil: What Kind of Rising State?," in *Rising States, Rising Institutions*, ed. Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 131–133.

¹⁵ Gomes Saraiva, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: Causal Beliefs in Formulation and Pragmatism in Practice," 52–53.

Brazil's sovereignty.¹⁶ Although it was large in size and natural resources, shortcomings in technology, industry, education, and infrastructure meant that much of Brazil's potential, particularly in terms of hard power, remained latent.¹⁷

Still, as the largest country in Latin America, Brazil has consistently been able to assert its interests in the region, and to outside powers; its size makes it a natural 'representative' for South America. Brazil's chancellor (1902-1912), Baron Rio Branco, first saw an opportunity to rise in the shifting balance of power that preceded World War I. He sought out diplomatic settings and partnerships where Brazil's marginal additional contribution to maintaining the status quo might be parlayed into a seat at the table when the rules were discussed. Brazil participated in the international congresses and meetings that proliferated before World War I, initially advocating the juridical equality of states under international law, which was then a status largely restricted to the European powers. Part of his strategy was devoted to developing an informal alliance with the United States, a country that had sided with Brazil in a number of territorial arbitrations in South America. Brazil had traditionally good relations with the United States during the 19th century, which it viewed as another outsider in a hemisphere of Spanish-speaking republics. The United States was also a power that was successfully rising in the early 20th century, and similar to Brazil, it was suspicious of European great

power politics; Brazil therefore viewed the United States as potentially most sympathetic to its own aspirations.¹⁸

World War I provided an expanded opportunity for Brazil to pursue its ambitions in the renegotiation of the international order that subsequently occurred at Versailles. It not only joined the Allied cause in World War I as a co-belligerent, providing anti-submarine naval patrols in the Atlantic, but also sought a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations in the peace that followed. This pursuit of a status in the League of Nations reserved for the great powers is illustrative of Brazil's self-perception as a potential major power. Brazil actually withdrew from the League in 1926 when the recently defeated Germany was granted membership in the Council in precedence over Brazil's claim as a member of the victorious alliance.¹⁹ Withdrawal from the League was a recognition that Brazil's strategy had failed to convince the existing major powers that it should have the same status in decisions about the structure of world order.

In the inter-war period, Brazil initially hedged its bets by maintaining good relations with the United States and very active trade with Germany.²⁰ Brazil's leaders viewed the competition among major powers as an opportunity to extract assistance and concessions. Still, Brazil joined the Allied cause after the United States entered World War II and

¹⁶ Frederick M. Nunn, "Military Professionalism and Professional Militarism in Brazil, 1870-1970: Historical Perspectives and Political Implications," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, no. 1 (May 1972): 29-54.

¹⁷ Rosemary Thorp, *Progress, Poverty and Exclusion: An Economic History of Latin America in the 20th Century* (Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1998), 54-63; Stanley E. Hilton, "The Armed Forces and Industrialists in Modern Brazil: The Drive for Military Autonomy (1889-1954)," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 62, no. 4 (November 1982): 629-673.

¹⁸ E. Bradford Burns, "Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 9, no. 2 (April 1967): 195-212.

¹⁹ Stanley E. Hilton, "Brazil and the Post-Versailles World: Elite Images and Foreign Policy Strategy, 1919-1929," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12, no. 2 (November 1980): 341-364.

²⁰ Stanley E. Hilton, "Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro 'Axis' during the World War II Era," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 59, no. 2 (May 1979): 201-231.

again sought to become a major power by joining the victorious Allies in the hope it would be able to help write the rules governing the peace. To strengthen its claims, Brazil participated to a more significant extent than in World War I, contributing an army division to the Italian front. Brazil also participated vigorously in the diplomacy surrounding the founding of the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt even advocated for Brazil's permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council when this body was first proposed. However, this idea was met with resistance from the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and after Roosevelt's death, President Harry S. Truman agreed and dropped the proposal.²¹

Brazil's first two attempts to rise reflected reformist goals, as it sought admittance to great power status through allying with the leading powers of the system. Although Brazil was able to participate diplomatically to a very significant extent in post-conflict negotiations, the shortcomings in its hard and soft power capabilities were such that the existing major powers were able to set aside Brazil's claims to higher status. Its contributions to resolving the crisis were sufficient to gain it admission to global diplomatic councils, but did not allow it to claim permanent status as a major power.

One consequence of these failed attempts to rise was an increase in the distance between the United States and Brazil. Perceptions of US ingratitude following WWII and periodic criticism of Brazilian policies during the Cold War contributed to a belief among some Brazilians that the United States was at best unreliable, and at worst trying

to hold Brazil back from its natural place as a major power.²² One of the lessons Brazil drew from its experience mobilizing for war on the Allied side in World War II was that its nascent industrial base made it highly dependent on the United States for technology, military and development assistance. During the war, Brazil sometimes considered the priority placed by the FDR administration on supplying Brazil's requirements inadequate. Following the war, Brazilian governments expressed dismay at a U.S. policy of balancing between Argentine and Brazilian requests for aid. Brazil considered this a particularly noxious policy given that they had fought with the US during the war while Argentina maintained neutrality and harbored Axis sympathies.²³ They also were critical of the perceived higher priority placed by the United States on rebuilding defeated enemies in Germany and Japan rather than on providing help to its allies. These Brazilian criticisms did not consider the broad array of interests that the U.S. managed after the war, but they became part of an enduring 'black legend' in U.S.-Brazil relations.

The proliferation of new actors in the international order in the 1960s provided a new kind of opportunity for Brazil, one that would lead it to briefly adopt a more revisionist stance towards the international order. Decolonization produced a large number of new states led by relatively inexperienced leaders. Brazil stood out in this setting where its capabilities, relative wealth, and diplomatic experience provided it with an advantage over the smaller and newer states. Many of the newly independent states viewed the rules of the international order as devised by the victorious

²¹ Celso Lafer, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy"; *Ibid.*

²² Sean W. Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), 24-28.

²³ Hilton, "The Armed Forces and Industrialists in Modern Brazil: The Drive for Military Autonomy (1889-1954)."

powers as inequitable. In response, Brazil's immediate post-WWII civilian presidents—Vargas, Quadros and Goulart—pursued a foreign policy that cultivated solidarity among newly decolonized developing countries in Africa and Asia. Though foreign policy diversification ceased following the 1964 military coup, as the Brazilian armed forces viewed it in the same context as Goulart's lean to the left in domestic politics, it re-emerged four decades later. During the 2000s, Brazil sought status vis-à-vis major powers as a representative and spokesperson for 'the rest,' taking advantage of its position as a middleman between developing and developed countries to extract concessions and advance its own interests.²⁴

The decline of U.S. power during the 1970s relative to other actors in the system provided Brazil another opening to claim the status of rising power. The so-called 'Brazilian Miracle' during the 1960s and 1970s, which combined industrialization, technology acquisition, and sustained high rates of economic growth, prompted renewed global attention to the possibility that Brazil was an emerging power.²⁵ This was also a period of military government in Brazil. Even though the armed forces' focus was national security, they were keenly interested in the interrelation of economic and military power.²⁶ The Brazilian defense industry developed rapidly, which allowed Brazil to become a major arms exporter to developing countries.²⁷

Brazil also moved vigorously to acquire nuclear technology. The military governments went so far as to institute parallel nuclear programs: an official program to acquire nuclear technology for power generation and an unofficial program designed to acquire the capability to develop nuclear weapons. Germany agreed to assist Brazil with its official program despite opposition from the United States, although the technology it transferred for fuel enrichment was not well-tested or particularly successful. Brazil refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty advocated by the United States because it would enshrine an unequal status for nuclear and non-nuclear states in international law. Moreover, the treaty would preclude Brazil from acquiring the full spectrum of nuclear technology, including the option to acquire weapons. Brazil's parallel covert military programs also acquired considerable technology useful for overall nuclear development, although it is still debatable how close Brazil was to acquiring nuclear explosive technology when its new democratic leaders decided to end the program in the late 1980s.²⁸ While this opportunity was sufficient to allow Brazil to evade compliance with new rules introduced by the United States, it fell short of shaping the new non-proliferation regime to meet its own preferences.

Brazil's changing approach to improving its position in the international system during the

²⁴ Sean Burges, "Brazil as Bridge between Old and New Powers," *International Affairs* 89, no. 3 (2013): 577–594.

²⁵ Emanuel Adler, *The Power of Ideology: The Quest for Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Ronald M. Schneider, *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976).

²⁶ David Pion-Berlin, "Latin American National Security Doctrines: Hard and Softline Themes," *Armed Forces & Society* 15, no. 3 (Spring 1989): 411–429.

²⁷ Ethan B. Kapstein, "The Brazilian Defense Industry and the International System," *Political Science Quarterly* 105, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1990): 579–596.; Etel Solingen, *Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).

²⁸ Brazil eventually signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998. Ibid.; Togzhan Kassenova, *Brazil's Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014).

20th century reflects an adaptation to emerging opportunities more than a response to domestic politics. Initially, Baron Rio Branco and his successors saw that working with the United States, a state that had its own interest in revising the global order and shared Brazil's identity as an outsider in Latin America, was preferable to attempting an alliance with a European power that would defend the status quo. The military came to share this view, especially after working with the US armed forces during World War II. Once it was clear after the war that rising as a partner of the United States would not succeed, Brazil shifted course and focused on developing its own capabilities. This view was supported by Brazil's national security elites, particularly the military. However, the military also supported rapid economic development and pursued a largely peaceful foreign policy during its time in power, policy preferences shared by diplomatic and economic elites. While there are differences among elites as to the means to power Brazil's rise, the fact that they share the same goal and values often produces a convergence amongst them on foreign policy.

Despite relative agreement on foreign policy, shifts in domestic politics affected Brazil's rise through their impact on capabilities. Brazil's troubled politics during the 1950s and 1960s, marked by repeated military interference in civilian politics, made it difficult to make the case for Brazil becoming a major power. After the military came to power in 1964, repression and economic growth at home provided sufficient stability to support a renewed emphasis on Brazil's rise in the 1970s. The return to democracy in 1985 brought civilians back into control of Brazil's foreign policy, but its opportunity to rise was again eclipsed by domestic politics. The new democratic governments inherited a major debt crisis which forced Brazilian leaders to prioritize economic development and macroeconomic stability in the 1980s and 1990s. It was only after the successful policies of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration (1995-2003) laid the foundations for economic and political consolidation at home that Brazil was able to resume its rise.

REACHING AGAIN FOR MAJOR POWER STATUS?

Brazil's actions on the international stage today suggest that it still aspires to join the ranks of major powers. Brazil has a new opportunity in the fading of the post-Cold War unipolar moment and the simultaneous rise of a number of emerging powers. Growth, macroeconomic stability, and democratic consolidation have enhanced its capabilities. When it comes to global diplomacy and governance, Brazil actively participates in the same institutions and forums as the major powers with the intention of shaping the rules of the coming world order. Brazil has taken advantage of its rise during the past decade to campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and it has taken a greater role in U.N. peacekeeping operations through its command of the military mission in Haiti since 2004. Brazil has also joined the G-20 group of Finance and Economy Ministers, and has engaged in multilateral efforts to address the consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Additionally, Brazil has taken a leadership role in the WTO, particularly during the Doha trade round, where it led a major group of developing nations that opposed European and US proposals on global trade. In global climate change negotiations and public health, Brazil has established itself as a leading voice.²⁹

In terms of hard power capabilities, Brazil's economy is the 7th largest in the world in terms of GDP

(2013), and the country has made large strides in reducing poverty and growing its middle class.³⁰ Its national development bank, BNDES, is a very significant player in both internal and regional development, with a total lending volume three times that of the World Bank in 2011.³¹ This lending is part of an industrial policy designed to require borrowers to buy products from Brazil, contributing to its economic development while at the same time increasing its international influence. However, Brazil has shied away from committing economic resources beyond South America. It has also been reluctant to use the 'hard' dimension of economic power, either in the form of sanctions or side payments to other states. Its international development assistance, largely focused on Africa, remains quite modest.³²

Gross Domestic Product: Top 10 Countries

	GDP (current US\$, in trillions)	GDP per capita (current US\$)	GDP as share of world GDP (%)
United States	16.24	51,749	22.42
China	8.23	6,091	11.36
Japan	5.96	46,720	8.23
Germany	3.43	41,863	4.73
France	2.61	39,772	3.61
United Kingdom	2.47	39,093	3.41
Brazil	2.25	11,340	3.11
Russian Federation	2.01	14,037	2.78
Italy	2.01	33,072	2.78
India	1.84	1,489	2.54

Source: World Bank Data Bank; 2012 data

²⁹ Paulo Sotero, "Brazil's Rising Ambition in a Shifting Global Balance of Power," *Politics* 30, no. S1 (2010): 71–81.

³⁰ S. Tamer Cavusgil and Ilke Kardes, "Brazil: Rapid Development, Internationalization, and Middle Class Formation," *Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais* 8, no. 1 (2013): 1–16.


³¹ Seth Colby, *Explaining the BNDES: What It Is, What It Does and How It Works*, CEBRI Artigos (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2012).

³² Peter Dauvergne and Déborah BL Farias, "The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power," *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 5 (June 2012): 903–917, doi:10.1080/01436597.2012.674704.

Brazil's military capabilities remain particularly constrained relative to other dimensions of state power. This reflects Brazil's historically peaceful security environment and its preference for diplomatic over military solutions to conflict. In 2012, Brazil was 68th in the world in terms of military expenditure as percentage of GDP, and 11th in the world in terms of total dollars spent (measured in current 2012 USD).³³ Brazil spends 1.5 percent of its GDP on defense, which is a relatively lower percentage by the standards of other emerging powers. Additionally over 80 percent of its defense

spending goes to salaries and benefits which, while not unusual for a developing country, undermines Brazil's ability to equip its armed forces. Experts assess that over 50 percent of the Brazilian Navy ships and Air Force platforms are non-operational.³⁴ Although Brazil has steadily increased defense spending over the past two decades—and its defense budget accounts for over half of Latin America's total defense expenditure—this has not yet translated into concrete capabilities that would allow its armed forces to operate effectively beyond its borders outside of peacekeeping missions.³⁵

Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2012



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
 Figures for China, Russia, Germany and Italy are SIPRI estimates

³³ Data for 2012 are drawn from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) statistics. Regarding its methodology, SIPRI's website states, "Where possible, SIPRI military expenditure data include all current and capital expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. Such expenditures should include: (a) military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and maintenance; (c) procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country). Civil defence and current expenditures on previous military activities, such as veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion and weapon destruction are excluded." http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/copy_of_sources_methods.

³⁴ Susanne Grätius, *The International Arena and Emerging Powers: Stabilising or Destabilising Forces?*, FRIDE Comment (Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, April 2008), http://www.fride.org/download/COM_emerging_powers_ENG_abr08.pdf; João Fábio Bertonha, "Brazil: An Emerging Military Power? The Problem of the Use of Force in Brazilian International Relations in the 21st Century," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, no. 2 (2010): 107–124.

³⁵ Hart and Jones, "How Do Rising Powers Rise?," 68.

In contrast, Brazil wields significant soft power relative to many states. It ranks 17th in the world, according to the *Monocle/Institute for Government 2012 ranking*, ahead of developing countries and many of the rising powers.³⁶ The emphasis of its foreign policy on equity, inclusion, and universal institutions are appealing to many states, especially small and middle powers. Its diplomats are widely respected for their professionalism and effectiveness. Brazilians consider themselves to be particularly adroit at bringing together parties with opposing points of view.³⁷ Domestically, Brazil provides an attractive narrative of economic growth with a strong state and a growing degree of social inclusion—something that many developing countries want and many developed countries attempt to promote through their foreign assistance programs. As Brazil has substantially consolidated its democracy over the past three decades, its political success story contributes to its prestige in international and regional forums. Brazilian culture has long been attractive around the world, ranging from its highly innovative music to stellar soccer teams to sophisticated *telenovelas*.³⁸ Even when Brazilian Minister of Defense Celso Amorim talks about hardening Brazil's power, most of his proposals feature the use of diplomacy and cooperative defense relations to extend the zone of peace around Brazil.³⁹

Brazil still faces the puzzle of how to become a major power, given that it has an unbalanced portfolio of capabilities.⁴⁰ When it comes to issues involving the global commons, such as the environment and public health, Brazil has enough soft power and economic significance to block actions by other major powers. The impact of Brazil's capabilities in the arena of global economic governance are more ambiguous, since Brazil's economy is large enough to justify participation in major power forums, but it is reluctant to commit its resources to maintaining or revising the existing order on global trade or finance. On the security dimension, Brazil has by far the weakest hand to play, and it has had to accept the decisions of other major powers and try to ameliorate their impact, as occurred during the Libya 2011 and Syria 2011 conflicts.

Brazil's contemporary rise benefits from two new opportunities. The first is Brazil's ascendancy in South America. For most of the 20th century, Argentina was a regional rival to Brazil in economic and military terms. The Argentine-Brazil rivalry is now history. The likelihood of interstate war in South America that would involve Brazil has become very low, which reduces Brazil's need for military capabilities, an area in which it has lagged behind other rising powers.

³⁶ Jonathan McClory, *The New Persuaders III: A 2012 Ranking of Soft Power* (London: Institute for Government, 2012). According to the study, it is based on "a broad set of statistical metrics and subjective data (50 metrics in total), comparing countries according to the quality of their government; diplomatic infrastructure; cultural output; capacity for education; and their appeal to business. The data is normalised, grouped into sub-indices, and calculated using our composite index formula to arrive at a single score for each country included in the study."

³⁷ Andrew Hurrell, "Brazil and the New Global Order," *Current History* 109, no. 724 (February 2010): 60–66.

³⁸ Lourdes Casanova and Julian Kassum, *From Soft to Hard Power: In Search of Brazil's Winning Blend*, Faculty & Research Working Paper (INSEAD, 2013); Andreia Soares e Castro, "2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games: Brazil's Strategy 'To Win Hearts and Minds' Through Sports and Football," *Public Diplomacy*, Winter 2013, 28–35.

³⁹ Celso Amorim, "Hardening Brazil's Soft Power," *Project Syndicate*, July 16, 2013, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-more-robust-defense-policy-for-brazil-by-celso-amorim> on January 8.

⁴⁰ Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático, *Brazilian foreign policy handbook*. (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2008); Matias Spektor, "Ideias de Ativismo Regional: A Transformação Das Leituras Brasileiras Da Região," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, no. 1 (2010): 25–44.

The other new opportunity arises from the fading of the post-Cold War unipolar moment of US hegemony in favor of greater multipolarity in the last decade. This offers rising powers the possibility to influence the international order more actively as their own capabilities improve relative to those of established major powers. Moreover, there are a number of powers who are critical of the existing liberal international order to varying degrees: Brazil, Russia, China, India, South Africa, Turkey, and Iran.⁴¹ This allows Brazil to seek out collaborators with common interests in revising the international system in the hope that the sum will have greater impact than any one alone. Brazil also has an advantage in seeking collaboration with other critical powers because it is not a regional rival of any of them.

More broadly, the proliferation of states in the international system due to decolonization after World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union

in 1991 offers Brazil the opportunity to lead in multilateral settings by serving as a bridge between the major powers and the developing world.⁴² Brazil had once experimented with this in the 1960s, but the present global setting offers even more possibilities to leverage the number of actors in the system to its advantage in seeking major power status.

This next section discusses how Brazil is taking advantage of new opportunities, first in South America and second through its relations with other emerging powers and developing states. It will then examine Brazil's participation in global governance—the shaping and maintaining of international order—across three different domains: security, economics, and the global commons. These domains are chosen because they emphasize different aspects of state power, and highlight how Brazil's uneven capabilities either contribute to or limit its ability to successfully act as a major power.

⁴¹ Hart and Jones, "How Do Rising Powers Rise?"

⁴² Burges, "Brazil as Bridge between Old and New Powers."

BRAZIL AND A NEW SOUTH AMERICA

Although its diplomats are fond of denying any ambition to regional leadership, Brazil has made a significant effort to establish itself as the major power in South America, albeit using a cooperative approach based on building new regional institutions. However, its reluctance to use hard power and its avoidance of constraints or costly commitments have all limited its ability to enforce the new arrangements. So while Brazil can point to any number of regional initiatives it has established, its leadership is hollowed out by its inability to compel, convince or pay off other states in the Western Hemisphere to follow its lead consistently.

During the past decade, Brazil has worked steadily to limit potential and actual challengers to its rise within South America. Its principal vehicle has been regional integration and multilateral diplomacy. Lafer argues that Brazil has long had an interest in integrating the South American region, but in practical terms, concrete moves towards regional integration only gathered momentum in the 1980s following the re-democratization of Argentina and Brazil.⁴³ Previously, Brazil and Argentina had viewed each other as peer rivals in military and economic terms. Argentina's defeat in the Malvinas conflict with the U.K. removed the basis for military rivalry, and democratization brought to power civilian leaders inclined to prevent it from recurring. Brazil negotiated a bilateral nuclear nonproliferation regime with Argentina and ended its covert nuclear program. The reduc-

tion in security tensions was complemented by the negotiation of Mercosul, a new common market arrangement initially with Argentina in 1988 but by its ratification in 1991 also with Paraguay and Uruguay. The Brazilian intention was for Mercosul to eventually negotiate the incorporation of the South American region into Brazil's economic orbit. At the prompting of Argentina, Brazil also agreed to add a political dimension to Mercosul through its support for a defense of democracy clause as a requirement for membership. It is worth emphasizing that this set of negotiations and agreements transformed Brazil's main rival in South America into a partner.⁴⁴

The other major obstacle to Brazil's preeminence in South America is the United States, who has historically played a leadership role in the Western Hemisphere. In particular, Brazil's rise was threatened by a revitalized United States agenda for hemispheric cooperation and economic integration in the wake of the Cold War. During the Clinton administration, the United States initiated a process of presidential-led Summits of the Americas in 1994, where it also proposed the negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. Additionally, it began a hemispheric security discussion through a series of Defense Ministerials of the Americas. Containing the U.S. agenda was a difficult challenge for Brazil not only due to the power disparity between the two states but also due to Brazil's particular weakness in the wake of the major 1980s debt crisis. Nevertheless, Brazil used its institutional role as co-chair of the FTAA to raise questions about the U.S. hemispheric trade project. In discussions with other Latin American

⁴³ Lafer, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future."

⁴⁴ Luigi Manzetti, "The Political Economy of MERCOSUR," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 35, no. 4 (1993): 101–141; Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez, "Civil-Military Affairs and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone: The Sources of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation," *Latin American Politics and Society* 46, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 29–60.

states, it cast FTAA as an expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which might threaten regional economic development prospects. It also offered to expand Mercosur as a regional platform that might precede an FTAA, thereby allowing South America to negotiate on a more equitable basis with the United States.⁴⁵ This enabled Brazil to delay any agreement on the FTAA, and the negotiations concluded without success in 2005.

Brazil laid the groundwork for securing its regional leadership through new multilateral institutions that excluded the United States. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso convened a summit of South American presidents in 2000 where he proposed an *Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana* (IIRSA or South American Initiative for Regional Infrastructure Integration) with support from the Brazilian development bank Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES). This evolved under President Lula da Silva through a short-lived Council of South American Nations, which then became the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008. UNASUR not only excluded the United States, but also Canada, Mexico, and Central America, which were seen as too close to the United States. South American regional institutions proved useful to Brazil during the 2008 crisis between Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, in which the three countries engaged in military mobilization following a Colombian airstrike on a FARC rebel encampment in Ecuadorean territory. They also played a role in resolving the crisis over the 2009 coup in Honduras. In both cases, Brazil was able use its alternative regional institutions to lead the response to the crisis while

limiting the role of the United States.⁴⁶ Most recently, Brazil has worked to create the *Comunidad de Estados de Latinoamérica y el Caribe* (CELAC), which includes South, Central American and Caribbean states but excludes the United States and Canada.

However, Brazil's historical reluctance to pool sovereignty with other states through international regimes is reflected in the characteristics of the South American multilateral institutions it created over the past decade. Mercosul, UNASUR and CELAC all have limited budgets, personnel, and inconsistent leadership. After more than a decade, IIRSA has in fact built very little infrastructure for regional integration. Brazil has also has been willing to undermine or ignore Mercosul standards when it was convenient, whether it was in market disputes over auto exports or in the admittance of Venezuela in 2012 to membership in violation of accession standards. This highlights an essential problem in Brazil's multilateralism: a reluctance to commit to the rules of the institutions it creates. In the absence of capacity and commitment, the new multilateral institutions have essentially devolved into opportunities for presidential summitry in the region. They provide forums for ad-hoc crisis resolution or interpersonal negotiations rather than regimes that govern interstate relations or bind the actions of their member states.

Brazil may have successfully excluded the United States from UNASUR and CELAC, but it is not able to prevent or persuade other states in the region from defecting from the regional institutions it has organized to conclude their own arrangements with Washington. Although some scholars have

⁴⁵ Richard E. Feinberg, *Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report* (Washington DC: Peterson Institute, 1997).

⁴⁶ José Antonio Sanahuja, "Multilateralismo Y Regionalismo En Clave Suramericana: El Caso de UNASUR," *Pensamiento Propio* 33, Los Desafíos Del Multilateralismo En América Latina (June 2011): 115–158.

focused on declining U.S. influence in the region, U.S. bilateral and multilateral initiatives have expanded across the region. The United States has concluded free trade agreements with Colombia, Chile and Peru, and with the Central American region through the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA); it is now engaged in a major multilateral trade negotiation, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, with Mexico, Peru and Chile and a range of Asian states.⁴⁷ On the defense front, the United States has continued its extensive military-to-military relations with states across Central America and the Caribbean, and since 9/11, it has greatly expanded security ties to Mexico. In South America, the United States has built a strong partnership with the Colombian government, up to and including negotiations for basing agreements for U.S. forces. While the close U.S.-Colombia relationship has discomfited Colombia's neighbors, Brazil has been able to do little about this relationship given its unwillingness to assume the diplomatic, economic, or security costs of assisting the Colombians in resolving their internal conflict. Thus while Brazilian influence has grown across South America, it has not prevented external powers such as the United States from pursuing their own interests in the region.

Despite Brazil's relative size and capabilities, it has deliberately avoided using military power in South America to protect its interests or assert its leadership. The armed forces are mostly

concerned with the defense of sovereignty, borders, and infrastructure. This focus is partly driven by a mission to protect the 'green' Amazon (its internal territory) and the 'blue' Amazon, where its offshore deep water oil reserves are located.⁴⁸ Brazil's 2008 national defense strategy and the new Brazilian defense white paper developed from 2011 to 2013 call for investment in advanced technologies, space, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; this is in keeping with the government's focus on national development. Brazil has opposed most forms of overt military intervention in the affairs of other states, and since its democratization in 1985, it has mostly limited its participation in military operations to internal tasks and U.N. Chapter VI peacekeeping operations within the Americas and the Lusophone world, most recently leading the U.N. peacekeeping mission to Haiti.⁴⁹ Even behavior by neighboring states that affected Brazil's interests directly—for example, Bolivia's expropriation of Brazilian Petrobras interests in 2006, the Colombian-Venezuelan-Ecuadorean crisis in 2008, or the Colombian agreement over US military basing rights in 2010—has been dealt with diplomatically rather than militarily.⁵⁰ By minimizing the security dimension of regional relations, Brazil is attempting to avoid incentives for its neighbors to remilitarize. However this low-risk strategy does not dissuade other states in the region from challenging its leadership because they find dissent relatively costless.

⁴⁷ Russell Crandall, "The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* 90 (June 2011), http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/fora90§ion=49; Christopher Sabatini and Jason Marczak, "Obama's Tango, Restoring U.S. Leadership in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, January 13, 2010, 3; Adam Isacson, Joy Olson, and Lisa Haugaard, *Below the Radar: US Military Programs with Latin America, 1997-2007* (Center for International Policy, the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America, March 2007), <http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/27932>.

⁴⁸ Andrew Fishman and Max Manwaring, *Brazil's Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine*, Colloquium Brief (Carlyle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2009); *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional* (Brasília, Brasil: Ministério do Defesa, 2012), <http://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/ultimas-noticias/3869-24072012-defesa-politica-estrategia-e-livro-branco-de-defesa-nacional-conheca-os-documentos-enviados-pela-presidenta-da-republica-a-apreciacao-do-congresso-nacional>.

⁴⁹ Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez, "Different Paths and Divergent Policies in the UN Security System: Brazil and Mexico in Comparative Perspective," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 3 (June 2009): 364–278.

⁵⁰ Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa and Manuela Trindade Viana, "Security Issues during Lula's Administration: From the Reactive to the Assertive Approach," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, no. SPE (2010): 91–114.

Brazil's strategy of consensus and institutional building has only had limited success in persuading other states in South America to adhere to the new order it has created or to support it in global forums. During the 2000s, Venezuela's efforts under President Hugo Chávez to raise its own status through oil diplomacy and relations with leftist and progressive movements in the hemisphere posed a challenge to Brazil. Brazil was able to contain Chávez by incorporating some of his proposals into UNASUR and CELAC without giving Venezuela a leadership role.⁵¹ But even once Venezuela's regional challenge faded, other alternative sub-regional institutions have emerged as an alternative to UNASUR and Mercosul, particularly the Pacific Alliance between Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Mexico. The Pacific Alliance is a challenge to

Brazil's leadership since it promotes free market policies based on global trade rather than more protectionist market policies based on regional integration. This undermines the integration logic that Brazil has promoted within UNASUR. In addition, Mexico's re-engagement with the international relations of South America, undermines Brazil's claim to uncontested regional leadership. In Brazil's most ambitious international gambit, permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council, Mexico, and Argentina have consistently networked with other states concerned about Security Council expansion to undermine Brazil's claim.⁵² If Brazil cannot depend on the regional institutions it creates to build support its rise, then Brazilians should consider whether these institutions are useful in their present form.

⁵¹ Daniel Flesmes and Thorsten Wojczewski, "Contested Leadership in Comparative Perspective: Power Strategies in South Asia and South America," *Asian Journal of Latin American Studies* 24, no. 1 (2011): 1–27.

⁵² Andrés Malamud, "A Leader without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy," *Latin American Politics and Society* 53, no. 3 (2011): 1–24; Amaury de Souza, *Brazil's International Agenda Revisited: Perceptions of the Brazilian Foreign Policy Community* (Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais, 2008).

BRAZIL AND THE REST: RELATIONS WITH RISING POWERS AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD

As previously mentioned, another major opportunity for Brazil has been the emergence of other major powers and candidates for this status, particularly India, China, Russia and South Africa. Rather than viewing these states as competitors, Brazil has sought cooperative ties with powers that are critical of the present order. Brazil's global diplomacy also tries to position it as a leader of the developing countries and as a representative of the rest of the world to major power councils.⁵³ The underlying logic is to build support for Brazil's own rise among developing countries and other rising powers, and then to parlay that leadership into efforts to gain recognition as a major power.

Brazil's multilateral networks among the rising powers—BRICS, IBSA, and BASIC—have served a similar function to the alternative institutions Brazil created within South America. They create venues that exclude the traditional major powers and provide opportunities to highlight the importance of the new major and rising powers. Brazil does not have much in common economically, politically, or culturally with other members of the BRICS, yet these states do share a critical view of the existing order. The rising powers have a shared interest in defending their sovereignty and autonomy of action, as well as in opening room for their par-

ticipation in rule shaping related to the international order.

Unlike other rising powers, Brazil's benign security environment means that it is not concerned with regional rivalries, as is the case in the India-China relationship. This offers Brazil the opportunity to play the role of coalition builder among the emerging powers. Recognizing a strong brand, Brazil has been active in diplomacy among the BRICS, a concept first popularized by Goldman Sachs to single out the rising economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China, to which South Africa was later added.⁵⁴ Although the output of the BRICS networking has produced little by way of institutions, there have been five summits of the BRICS presidents so far, mostly recently in 2013. Brazil has also pursued the IBSA concept, which is a more politically congenial subgrouping of the most democratic BRICS that includes South Africa and India.⁵⁵ Another multilateral grouping that has emerged, this time at the sidelines of global climate change talks in Copenhagen in 2009, is BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China); they have advocated for the developed world to assume a share of the cost of remediating climate changes in proportion to the historic damage caused by its economic growth.⁵⁶ Solidarity among the powers critical of the present order potentially provides Brazil with leverage in global negotiations and intergovernmental forums when it does decide to engage with the traditional major powers, as we will see when we examine Brazil's actions in the security, economic and global commons domains.⁵⁷

⁵³ Burges, "Brazil as Bridge between Old and New Powers"; Hart and Jones, "How Do Rising Powers Rise?"

⁵⁴ Leslie Elliott Armijo, "The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?," *ASIAN PERSPECTIVE-SEOUL*- 31, no. 4 (2007): 7–42.

⁵⁵ Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira, "The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 7 (October 2005): 1077–1095, doi:10.1080/01436590500235678.

⁵⁶ Stephen Minas, "FPC Briefing: BASIC Positions-Major Emerging Economies in the UN Climate Change Negotiations" (Foreign Policy Centre, June 2013).

⁵⁷ Corival Alves do Carmo and Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo, "The Dynamics of Crisis: Brazil, the BRICs and the G-20," *OIKOS (Rio de Janeiro)* 11, no. 2 (2012): 306–325; Hart and Jones, "How Do Rising Powers Rise?," 75–76.

Brazil's other opportunity to justify accession to the ranks of the major powers is its claim to represent the growing number of small and middle powers in the international system when it comes to concerns about equity, distribution of resources, and the implementation of the current world order.⁵⁸ Brazil was a founding member of the Group of 77, a multilateral forum of developing countries formed in 1964 that is still active today with over 130 members. As recently as November 2013, Brazil led the G-77 at global climate change talks in Warsaw, Poland, proposing a methodology for assessing historical responsibilities for greenhouse gas emissions that put the burden of remediation on the developed world.⁵⁹ Brazil also plays a leading role in discussions on global health issues, particularly as they relate to criticizing the level of patent protection for drugs required for treatments of diseases such as HIV/AIDS.⁶⁰ While Brazil clearly benefits from lower costs of treatments for its own citizens, it can also position itself as a champion of the interests of other developing countries. Lowering the cost of treatment by waiving intellectual property protections for drugs is an issue area where Brazil's rising power status helps it to achieve its own objectives in the face of the countervailing interests of the established powers.

Central to Brazil's claim to represent developing countries is its criticism of the existing international order for not taking into account the interests and

wishes of the broader global community. Brazil's former Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota captures this view succinctly, stating that "the G-20 and other restricted groupings will only succeed in consolidating their authority if they remain sensitive to the ambitions and interests of the over 150 countries who are not present at the meetings."⁶¹ Brazil has based its critique of instruments such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and privileges such as permanent member status in the U.N. Security Council for the P5 on the argument that they embody in international law a tiered system of states. Essentially, Brazil's soft power of attraction vis-à-vis the developing world is not simply cultural or economic, it is the promise that its rhetoric about more democratic, equitable and universal international institutions will endure once it becomes a major power.

There is also a danger in Brazil's claim to simultaneously be an emerging power and a leader of the less-developed countries. This is a muddled message because each claim is based on a different premise. As a BRICS country, Brazil is making the claim that it is part of an exclusive group of states whose power is such that they should be counted as rule shapers in the international order alongside the traditional powers. As a leader of the developing world, Brazil is making the claim that the world order as a whole should be more equitable to give all states a greater role in shaping the rules. These two claims are not compatible.

⁵⁸ Sean W. Burges, "Strategies and Tactics for Global Change: Democratic Brazil in Comparative Perspective," *Global Society* 26, no. 3 (July 2012): 351–368, doi:10.1080/13600826.2012.682272.

⁵⁹ Antto Vihma, Yacob Mulugetta, and Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, "Negotiating Solidarity? The G77 through the Prism of Climate Change Negotiations," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 23, no. 3 (October 2011): 315–334, doi:10.1080/14781158.2011.601853; Alex Morales, "US, EU, Reject Brazilian Call for Climate Equity Metric," *Bloomberg News*, November 14, 2013, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-15/u-s-eu-reject-brazilian-call-for-climate-equity-metric.html>.

⁶⁰ Stephanie Kage, *New Powers for Global Change: Brazil at the UN*, FES Fact Sheet, Dialogue on Globalization (New York, NY: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, October 2006); Jillian Clare Cohen and Kristina M. Lybecker, "AIDS Policy and Pharmaceutical Patents: Brazil's Strategy to Safeguard Public Health," *The World Economy* 28, no. 2 (2005): 211–230.

⁶¹ Burges, "Strategies and Tactics for Global Change," 353.

BRAZIL'S CONTEMPORARY ROLES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Brazil has worked strategically to take advantage of the present opportunity structure, but the real test of its ability to act as a major power lies in its contributions to shaping and enforcing the rules that govern the international order. This next section examines three cases in which Brazil has participated alongside the major powers in devising the rules and regimes that organize the international system: the global financial crisis, the global response to climate change, and international responses to imminent threats to human security. Consistently, Brazil has privileged the use of diplomacy over all other state capabilities. This is an effort to play to Brazil's strengths and avoid its relatively limited capacity to contribute to security outcomes. Though Brazil has succeeded in ensuring its participation in major power debates on global governance, its reluctance to assume economic and military costs frequently prevent it from effectively shaping the solutions. Moreover, its desire to minimize the role of security concern sometimes leads it to propose solutions that are discarded as unrealistic by the established powers.

The global financial crisis in 2008 provided Brazil with an unprecedented opportunity to insert itself into the heart of international economic and financial governance. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the coordinated efforts by the world's central banks to lower interest rates, and the massive bailout plans necessary were just a few indicators of the seriousness of the crisis for advanced economies. The financial difficulties faced by the developed world were a stark contrast to the

relative macroeconomic stability of Brazil, India and China, all of which rode out the crisis with relatively little trouble. Such stability provided Brazil with moral high ground during the crisis. The G8 (a traditional venue for coordination among the major powers) faded to the background with the rise of the G-20—the broader group of Economy and Finance Ministers that included both the rising and traditional powers—which became the main avenue for responding to the crisis. The rising powers garnered even more importance once reform and recapitalization of the IMF became necessary, and traditional powers turned to Brazil, India, and China for support. In this reform process, Brazil worked with India and China to secure a larger voice and a larger share of the vote on the institution's operations. Brazil was the most vocal critic in the G-20 of the rules for global economic governance that preceded the crisis, and its critiques reflected its historical advocacy for more equitable and universal international institutions. The IMF under Dominique Strauss-Kahn moved to adopt a broader view of acceptable development strategies that made the institution, at least rhetorically, more aligned to Brazil's own views on the issue. Brazil's role as a key participant in the small group of states that coordinate international economic policy indicates that it has joined an exclusive group of major powers, at least in the financial domain. This is quite a contrast to Brazil's acceptance of IMF rules and conditions during the 1980s Latin American debt crisis. However, Brazil's advocacy for universal and equitable institutions, even in the midst of crisis, reflected the contradictions inherent in its approach to international relations, simultaneously seeking access to exclusive rule-making clubs and acting as representative of developing countries.⁶²

⁶² Andrew F. Cooper, "The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee And/or a Contested 'steering Committee' for the World," *International Affairs* 86, no. 3 (2010): 741–757; Ngaire Woods, "Global Governance after the Financial Crisis: A New Multilateralism or the Last Gasp of the Great Powers?" *Global Policy* 1, no. 1 (2010): 51–63.

Global climate change negotiations showcase another example of Brazil's transition from the target of international rules and norms to one of the key rule-writing states. Brazil's rapid development brought about significant environmental degradation, and it was criticized for its role in Amazonian deforestation during the 1970s and 1980s. Brazil responded by becoming a major player in international environmental policy discussions so that it could better counter this criticism and protect its development interests, going so far as to host the key U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Several competing dynamics are at play in this discussion: the urgency of developing and implementing plans to reverse, mitigate or adapt to climate change; the developing world's claim that developed countries should assume the historical responsibility for generating climate change; and the developed world's counter arguments that emerging powers such as Brazil, India, and China are no longer developing countries and should assume the responsibilities (and costs) of being major powers with large economies. Since most prescriptions for addressing climate change have distributional consequences through their limits on growth, the rising powers have a major interest in ensuring that the established powers assume most of the costs. In this, they are echoed by the developing world which is also unwilling to assume a proportional share of costs. Importantly, the climate change debate involves a global commons, meaning that the developed world is unable to achieve policy success without addressing the positions of countries such as Brazil. While Brazil was able to

successfully mobilize G-77 and BASIC support for its positions at Copenhagen, it was only able to block the proposal of the developed countries but not to secure its own preferences. Brazil then hosted the 'Rio+20' conference in 2012, which was designed to both commemorate the original 1992 Rio conference and continue the process of international negotiations on global climate change. The conference was successful in attracting nearly 40,000 participants, and this event continued intergovernmental negotiations on climate change while also hosting a large number of non-governmental actors working in this issue area. Brazil considers Rio+20 to be a success, not only because it showcased Brazil's preference for multilateralism, but was also inclusive of a large range of non-governmental actors. Brazil's successful formulation of a compromise outcome document that was accepted by the participants affirmed the strength of its diplomacy. Still, Rio+20 was not considered particularly successful in producing meaningful commitments by the participants to actions that would be consequential for global climate change. In the future, diversity among developing countries on this issue and the evolution of Brazil's own position on climate change based on the 'greening' of domestic politics, will make it increasingly difficult for Brazil to position itself as a bridge between the developed and developing world on this issue.⁶³

Brazil has been less successful in asserting its role as a major power in responding to international security crises, where its reluctance to use hard power leads it to propose solutions that are sometimes

⁶³ Andrew Hurrell and Sandeep Sengupta, "Emerging Powers, North-South Relations and Global Climate Politics," *International Affairs* 88, no. 3 (2012): 463-484; James Van Alstine, Stavros Afionis, and Peter Doran, *The UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20): A sign of the times or "ecology as Spectacle"?*, SRI Papers (Leeds, United Kingdom: Sustainability Research Institute, August 2012).

rejected as unhelpful or unrealistic by the established major powers. Brazil is frequently critical of the selectivity with which international law is applied by the major powers, especially in cases where the international community intervenes in the internal affairs of states. Brazil's stance runs counter to the prevailing liberal international order, which is willing to set aside sovereignty and use force to pursue humanitarian goals or contain rogue states. When Brazil has proposed alternatives, it has not succeeded in securing the support of the major powers.

Two recent cases illustrate this dynamic: the Brazil-Turkey-Iran nuclear deal, and Brazil's role in the U.N. Security Council during and after the intervention in Libya. In 2010, Brazil and Turkey brokered an agreement that would have allowed Iran to exchange enriched uranium for fuel for a medical reactor. Through this proposal, Brazil hoped to protect its own commercial interests vis-à-vis Iran as well as the general principle that states have a right to peaceful nuclear development. Brazil hoped the proposal would resolve the crisis since the deal had been brokered in line with the elements of an earlier nuclear fuel swap proposed in 2009 by the United States. Western powers rejected the proposal because of their concerns over Iran's intentions and potential for military use of nuclear power, including future enrichment of uranium; the United States proceeded to impose new sanctions.⁶⁴ The rejection of the Brazilian and Turkish proposal came as a blow to President Lula da Silva's hope that this deal would showcase Brazil's unique ability to convene opposing parties and

further justify its participation in major power debates over international security.

Brazil's ambition was that its participation on the U.N. Security Council during the 2011-2012 term would further its case for a permanent seat in this body and thus a permanent role in shaping international security.⁶⁵ Instead, the term highlighted the tensions between Brazil's views of international politics and those of the West. Brazil's decision to caucus with BRIC countries during its term in the UNSC was not viewed positively by the Western members of the Council. The U.N. response to the conflict in Libya in 2011 led to a further split between Brazil and the West when the initial authorization to intervene was used by NATO to justify an expanded campaign against a broad range of government targets in Libya, leading to the fall of Colonel Gaddafi. The expansion of the intervening powers' objectives provoked criticism from the BRICS and developing countries that Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was being used as a cover for regime change. In her 2011 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, President Dilma Rousseff instead put forward the concept of Responsibility while Protecting (RWP), advocating that states using force to protect civilians in humanitarian and human rights crises carefully consider the damage they inadvertently cause. RWP has been rejected by the United States and many European states as unrealistic, but it highlighted ongoing disagreement between Brazil and the West over norms governing the use of force in response to humanitarian crises. This issue became salient once again during the Syria crisis, in which the European

⁶⁴ Carlo Patti, "Brazil and the Nuclear Issues in the Years of the Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva Government (2003-2010)," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, no. 2 (2010): 178-195.

⁶⁵ Permanent membership is an ambition Brazil shares with Germany, India and Japan (known as the G-4). They have collaborated on U.N. Security Council reform for over a decade. Amado Luiz Cervo, "Brazil's Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 53, no. SPE (2010): 7-32.

states initially split from the United States over the use of force.⁶⁶ Brazil's use of its prominent role in UNSC allowed it to insert itself into core debates among the major powers, but it was not able to shape the rules governing the use of force in the international system.

This is by no means an exhaustive catalog of how Brazil has used its status as a rising power to become a central actor in global debates on public health, human rights, social inclusion, and development. Rather, these examples have highlighted

Brazil's willingness to participate in the shaping of the rules governing the global order, and the challenge major powers face when they include Brazil in their deliberations. However, participation does not necessarily translate into effective rule-making, as seen in the failure to adopt RWP or to effectively address climate change. Brazil's power is based on its ability to generate friction and inflict diplomatic costs in multilateral forums, but this does not extend into the shaping and maintaining of the contemporary order.

⁶⁶ Alcides Costa Vaz, *Brazilian Perspectives on the Changing Global Order and Security Challenges*, CEPS Working Document (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), February 2013).

THE LIMITS ON BRAZIL'S RISE: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Brazil's leaders have some difficult decisions ahead in 2014 and 2015. Brazil needs to implement an economic adjustment plan to address its overvalued currency, persistent inflation, high levels of consumer debt, and slowing economic growth. Brazil's prospects in the energy sector, particularly the offshore oil field known as the pre-sal are not as bright as they once seemed. Finally, the Brazilian middle class will continue to demand improved government effectiveness, efficiency and accountability.

None of these issues present an insurmountable obstacle to Brazil's rise, or even reflect a long term threat to Brazil's success. Brazil has an unprecedented set of opportunities to rise: a large economy, considerable soft power, lack of regional rivals, and a network of partners among other rising powers and the developing world. Brazil has become an important player on the world stage, but thus far its rise is constrained by an incomplete range of hard and soft power tools necessary to become consequential in and for the international order. Its participation in global governance during its current attempt to rise is undercut by its reluctance to assume the costs—military or economic—that are required for shaping and maintaining, let alone revising, the present international order.

Brazil can take four steps to remedy the shortcomings that its recent participation in global governance has revealed while still maintaining its commitment to the norms that have historically guided

its foreign policy. Brazil's shortage of military hard power is likely to be enduring since its regional security environment is—and is likely to remain—peaceful. This means Brazil lacks one of the main tools used by other major powers to participate in international order making. However, given that interstate conflict is not a major threat to Brazil and that global or systemic conflict is improbable, its government is right not to emphasize this dimension in its rise. Rather, Brazil should improve its contributions to international peacekeeping. The first step should be to extend the geographic scope of its peacekeeping contributions beyond the Americas, Africa, and the Portuguese-speaking world in keeping with its status as an aspiring global power. Brazil should also focus on developing the types of capabilities that are in short supply among peacekeeping contributing nations: intelligence, logistics, aviation, communications, command, and control. Building on its experiences in Haiti, Brazil should commit to develop the capability to deploy military units that have additional staff and support capacity to form the nucleus of a large peacekeeping force that incorporates contingents from other states. This is in keeping with the contributions of other major powers to international peacekeeping. By developing these capabilities that are in short supply, Brazil would acquire greater influence on the terms under which its peacekeepers deploy and their objectives while on the ground, giving it another avenue by which to shape the international order.

The second area where Brazil can achieve greater influence is by extending the reach of its humanitarian and development assistance to a global scale. Brazil currently ranks 23rd among international donors of humanitarian assistance.⁶⁷ Major powers

⁶⁷ "Speak Softly and Carry a Blank Check," *The Economist*, July 15, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/16592455>; Global Humanitarian Assistance, *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2013* (Bristol, UK: Development Initiatives, 2013).

use contributions to international institutions and direct aid to create incentives for small and middle powers to accept their preferred international order. Brazil's overseas development assistance has risen in the past decade. Nevertheless, possessing the seventh largest economy in the world means that Brazil should be able to increase its contributions in this area over the long term above the 0.2 percent of gross national income that it contributed in 2011. Brazil has extensive domestic experience in designing social programs designed to reduce poverty and build state capacity as part of its internal development agenda. It is already using this knowledge and technology in its international assistance programs in the Americas and parts of Africa. Brazil can readily increase its contributions to global governance simply by extending the geographic scope, increasing the budget it commits to these programs, and raising the visibility of its development strategy. Such use of its development assistance to promote poverty reduction and social inclusion would have a positive impact on global development and contribute to its own status and to its soft power.

Thirdly, Brazil should reconsider its strategy to secure its 'near abroad' by proliferating multilateral institutions. Although Brazil has been able to avoid the rise of regional challengers, it has not been able to persuade other Latin American powers such as Argentina and Mexico to back its rise. Brazil has been reluctant to endow new international institutional arrangements with resources or powers that might limit Brazil's own freedom of action, but this means they do not limit any other state's actions as well. Defections and rule bending by member states do little for the credibility of institutions Brazil creates. Brazil would therefore do well to endow a few key regional institutions with more binding rules, greater capacity and stronger

incentives for other states in Latin America to participate. Brazil should then commit to these abiding by these rules. Not only would this give Brazil improved mechanisms for building regional support for its preferred policies, but it would signal to states such as Mexico and Argentina that Brazil's rise is not a threat as it is bound by a shared set of institutional arrangements and commitments to the region.

Finally, Brazil should identify additional issues on which it takes a collaborative approach in international forums vis-à-vis the established powers. Brazil has been generally successful and skillful in its deployment of soft power to attract support from the developing world and other rising powers. Brazil's domestic achievements present an attractive narrative for major power democracies such as the United States. However, in the absence of hard power, attracting the support of established powers for Brazil's rise requires a collaborative agenda that gives major powers a stake in Brazil's success. Brazil's repeated criticism of the U.S.-led liberal international order negates its ability to deploy soft power in its relationship with the West. Its reliance on a coalition that includes authoritarian regimes – the BRICS—and is also frequently critical of liberal international objectives has led the leading powers to label Brazil as difficult to work with. While Brazilian diplomats may see their stands on sovereignty, non-intervention and international law as principled, Brazil may consequently only get a seat at the table but not a role in the rule-shaping. For example, as the world moves into an era of mega trade deals, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership, Brazil has so far been excluded. This suggests that Brazil needs to pick and choose with care what policies it attempts to block and present positive and realistic alternatives when it does not agree

with the policies advocated by the established powers. This would begin to erase Brazil's reputation for obstructionism among Western powers and further build the case for its inclusion in shaping the international order.

There are two important and related questions that U.S. policymakers should consider: Is Brazil likely to change its ideas about the international order sufficiently so that the two countries will expand common ground on which to work together? Should the United States encourage Brazil to more fully develop its military and economic capabilities so that it can contribute more effectively to global order?

The answer to the first question may depend as much on the evolving role of domestic politics in shaping Brazil's foreign policy as on conversations among diplomats. Brazil's foreign policy is beginning to democratize in the sense that influence is held by a wider array of voices than traditional elites. Brazilians' core values of democracy, equality, inclusion, development and human rights are fully compatible with the existing international order on many dimensions. As Brazil's democracy further evolves and deepens, its government may face increasingly direct questions about its reluctance to support democracy and human rights in illiberal or authoritarian regimes. This may force a more realistic assessment of the policies Brazil proposes and may lead Brazil to re-examine the appropriate balance between supporting the non-intervention norm and supporting democracy and human rights abroad.

The United States should also consider the shadow of the future.⁶⁸ As this paper documents, Brazil's

aspirations and trajectory have been clear for some time. Attempting to block Brazil's rise would only increase the distance between the United States and one of the few rising powers whose citizens share many of the same values as U.S. citizens. On the other hand, if the U.S. bets on cooperating with Brazil as it becomes a major power, then it is in the United States' best interest to encourage Brazil to commit more fully to developing its capabilities to support global order, much as the US has done with allies in Europe and Northeast Asia. The United States has considerable knowledge on how to structure effective development assistance. It also has experience in providing support to multinational military coalitions, which although different in their objective than peacekeeping missions, require some of the same capabilities in the area of logistics, intelligence, communications, and mobility.

Brazil faces important choices about the future at this stage in its rise. It is still highly ambivalent towards the deployment of hard power. Brazil's society still largely perceives itself as living in a developing country that has persistent social ills, unaccountable politics and fragile economic foundations on which to build its emerging middle class. Targeting resources to foreign policy, peacekeeping, and international assistance is a hard sell for Brazilian diplomats and politicians. However, the alternative is for Brazil to fall short in its rise, unable to effectively shape the global order in a way that protects its interests, benefits its citizens, and fulfills its aspirations.

⁶⁸ Hart and Jones, "How Do Rising Powers Rise?"



BROOKINGS

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
brookings.edu