The role of civil-military-police coordination in supporting durable solutions to displacement

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Front cover photo: Zambian peacekeepers from the United Nations Mission in Sudan patrol streets lined with looted items awaiting collection in Abyei, the main town of the disputed Abyei area on the border of Sudan and South Sudan (UN Photo/Stuart Price, May 24, 2011 www.unmultimedia.org/photo/).
THE AUTHOR

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## I. Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, Colombia)</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>FARC</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)</td>
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<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO’s Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>Kosovo Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPC</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPS</td>
<td>Kosovo Police Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOHAC</td>
<td>United Nations Organisations for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination</td>
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II. Introduction

The relationship between displacement and security would appear to be obvious: refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often displaced because of a lack of security, and cannot find solutions to displacement until security is reestablished, either at their place of origin or new location. In a similar vein, the fact that large numbers of people are displaced can have serious security implications—potentially impeding stability and peacebuilding efforts. Overcoming conflict requires finding durable solutions to those that have been displaced.

It is surprising, then, that despite these linkages, actors focusing on durable solutions to displacement and those focusing on security tend to work in isolation from one another. Displacement-focused actors like UNHCR and its partner NGOs certainly recognize the importance of security in finding durable solutions to displacement—indeed, security is the foundation of any durable solution, be it return to the place of origin, local integration into the place of refuge, or settlement elsewhere. And yet they are often unable to bring the displaced into either peacemaking or longer-term peacebuilding processes with security actors.

Likewise security actors, including military, peacekeepers and police forces, do not always recognize the broader peace implications involved with finding durable solutions to displacement. Unresolved displacement issues can lead to any number of security problems. In some cases, refugees or IDPs can be “spoilers” to peace processes, and camps or settlements can harbor rebels or militias that oppose peace. In other cases the mere presence of large numbers of displaced people—often impoverished and living in slums or remote camps without adequate livelihoods, and in some cases lacking freedom of movement—can cause instability. Compounded with other socioeconomic and political pressures, and often living in areas that are already poor and potentially unstable, the presence of the displaced needs to be considered in efforts to secure peace and stability. Sustainable peace can hinge on finding durable solutions to displacement.

The fact that these displacement-focused development/humanitarian actors and security-focused actors have not been able to coordinate more closely is thus a serious issue that relates to some of today’s most challenging conflicts around the world. To that end, there seems to be growing interest in the relationship between ending displacement and peacebuilding, as underscored in several recent initiatives by the UN Secretary-General. Moreover, there is some literature that speaks to this seemingly

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1 For analysis of some of these security concerns, see, for example, Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006). It is important, however, not to see IDPs and refugees exclusively in terms of security as there is a danger that this can be used to justify restrictions on the displaced, and increase discrimination and limitations on their freedoms.
obvious and yet complex relationship between security actors and durable solutions to displacement. Perhaps the most encouraging has been the recent momentum of global initiatives: the upcoming World Humanitarian Summit; the UN Secretary General’s establishment of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to review UN Peacekeeping; the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 2185, which makes policing an essential part of peacekeeping; and the Sustainable Development Goals that emerged from the Rio+20 Conference. These are just a few of the initiatives in the coming year that present new energy and possible opportunities to draw closer linkages between actors working on these complex issues.

Peacekeepers are already mandated to do what they can to create “conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, and to do as much as possible to ensure security in and around refugee and IDP settlements or camps.” And yet the continually unfolding emergency in South Sudan is also raising new issues about the involvement of peacekeepers with IDPs. Since fighting broke out in December 2013, more than 120,000 IDPs have taken refuge at United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeeping bases in South Sudan. These bases are not equipped to meet the basic needs of the IDPs who are sheltering there, nor can they offer sufficient protection. IDPs are wary of the peacekeepers and do not see them as neutral. The security and humanitarian situation remains tenuous, and there is concern that if the bases were to be overrun by militias, they might not be able to protect the civilians who have sought protection there or even their own staff and assets. With a mandate to protect civilians, UNMISS forces cannot force the IDPs to leave the bases for areas that are not safe. And yet peacekeeping forces are poorly equipped to manage humanitarian operations.

The case of South Sudan raises fundamental issues of mandates and operations of peacekeeping missions, of training of peacekeeping forces, and questions of equity between those living on UNMISS bases and the 90 percent of IDPs who live elsewhere, in less secure sites. As one participant in the expert workshop said, “Finding solutions for IDPs is UNMISS’ only exit strategy.” Although the particular IDP protection challenges facing UNMISS may turn out to be unique, they do raise broader questions about the relationship between peacekeeping and solutions for displacement.

This report affirms that finding durable solutions for those displaced by the conflict is critical to building sustainable peace in post-conflict situations. It also asserts that closer collaboration and coordination between security and displacement-focused actors is a complex process that requires working across institutional boundaries and sometimes addressing broader political issues. As William O’Neill writes, “…people do not leave their homes, livelihoods, and familiar surroundings for trivial reasons. Ensuring that the

4 This report is part of a larger Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement project on the role of the military and police in finding durable solutions to displacement, which included an expert seminar in New York in May 2015. It was carried out with the support of the Australian Civil-Military Centre. See below for more.
state institutions charged with providing security and order to groups forcibly displaced inevitably requires changes in political systems and the distribution of power so that displacement does not recur.\(^5\)

With the support of the Australian Civil-Military Centre, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement has undertaken research on the role of military and police forces in supporting durable solutions to displacement in post-conflict situations. In 2014, it commissioned four case studies to explore this relationship: Timor Leste, Colombia, Liberia and Kosovo.\(^6\) It also carried out a workshop in May 2015 with approximately 25 experts from governments, the UN, NGOs, academia and research institutions representing security (military, police and peacekeeping sectors), development and humanitarian sectors.

The workshop ultimately sought to increase understanding of the synergies between peacebuilding, conflict prevention and durable solutions to displacement. It sought to inform and strengthen the capacity of key actors (including states and UN agencies) to integrate the resolution of displacement into peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies, and at the same time to integrate peacebuilding and conflict prevention perspectives into the strategies developed by humanitarian and development actors to support the resolution of displacement.

This report synthesizes relevant background literature, shares findings from the workshop and case study reports, and outlines recommendations for moving forward.


III. Definitions

Experts, practitioners, academics, researchers and others continue to debate the various terms used to describe the linkages between durable solutions to displacement and security. Besides theoretical debates about terminology, contextual realities on the ground also demonstrate the wide array of definitions used in practice. Acknowledging these debates, below are some working definitions of key terms used in this project.

Security sector reform (SSR) - According to the UN Secretary General report, the security sector is a term that “describes the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country,” which includes defense, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. The judicial sector can also be included with respect to the adjudication of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force. It also includes actors that help to manage and oversee the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-state actors can also include customary or informal authorities and private security services.

Security sector reform, then, is “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation of the security sector, led by national authorities, and that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples, without discrimination and with full respect of human rights and the rule of law.”

Justice-sensitive security sector reform - Building on the SSR definition above, justice-sensitive SSR tries to improve the performance of not only the police but also the interactions among the police, the courts, and the penitentiary systems.

Durable solutions - In an IDP context, a durable solution is achieved when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through: sustainable reintegration at the place of origin (“return”); sustainable local integration in areas where IDPs take refuge (local integration); sustainable integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere in the country). This can be a long, complex process, and there is no one-size-fits-all approach for all IDPs.

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8 For more, see O'Neill, “Police Reform in Situations of Forced Displacement,” July 2012, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement. Participants at the workshop noted the complexities and overlap between many of these definitions.
9 “Rule of law,” for example, which already has an extensive literature, is quite similar to “justice-sensitive security sector reform.”
Durable solutions for refugees are somewhat similar in that they are defined as: return to the country of origin; local integration into the host country; or resettlement to another country.

In both cases, finding durable solutions is a complex and difficult process, particularly when displacement is protracted. The solution that “fits” one refugee or IDP may not “fit” another, and different solutions may be appropriate at different times during displacement. Increasingly, displacement drags on for years—sometimes for generations—and solutions may be different even within families. For example, parents may hold on to a dream of returning home to their rural communities, while their children prefer to remain in towns or cities where they have grown up. Moreover, the political, social, cultural and economic fabrics of displaced communities and the host communities in which they reside are altered by their long-term presence, and this can complicate how solutions are achieved. Hosts that were originally welcoming may grow frustrated with the passing of years as the displaced put pressures on social services and natural resources. On the other hand, host communities may welcome the presence of international aid, attention and investment that often comes with a refugee presence and thus be open to local integration. These are just some of the factors that affect the types of durable solutions considered for refugees and IDPs.

**Peacebuilding** - This includes re-establishing security and law and order; reconstruction and economic rehabilitation; reconciliation and social rehabilitation; and political transition to creating more accountable governance structures and institutions.¹⁰

**Internally displaced persons (IDPs)** - Internally displaced persons can be defined as those “who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”¹¹

**Refugee** - The 1951 Refugee Convention spells out that a refugee is someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”¹²

**Protection** - This can be considered to be “…all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant

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bodies of law (i.e. HR law, IHL, refugee law).”

**Peacekeeping operations** - “The UN Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council can establish a UN peacekeeping operation. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council. Their tasks differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents.”

“UN Peacekeepers provide security and the political and peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. UN Peacekeeping is guided by three basic principles: 1) consent of the parties; 2) impartiality; 3) non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. Over the past two decades, peacekeeping missions have been deployed in many configurations, and there are currently 16 UN peacekeeping operations deployed on four continents. Today’s multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.”

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IV. Background

There is a significant body of literature on the role of the military and the security sector in the provision of humanitarian assistance, but considerably less on the issue of drawing connections between security actors to durable solutions to displacement. This section reviews some of this literature, highlighting some of the key themes that relate to the case studies, insights gleaned from the workshop, and recommendations. It is not comprehensive, but seeks to contextualize the issue by providing a short overview of some of the main works in the field.

The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement study, “Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace-Building,” analyzes the ways in which IDPs have been incorporated in peace negotiations, peace agreements and peacebuilding. In general, neither IDPs nor refugees have participated in formal peace negotiations, although in some cases, peace agreements have called for support to return those displaced by the conflict. It also provides recommendations to governments, UN agencies, NGOs and civil society for including the priorities of internally displaced persons in peace agreements. For example, the study identifies some good practices in peace agreements, recommending that they include specific provisions for the displaced, such as clear definitions and terms; guarantees of the parties’ cooperation in the process of finding durable solutions; a specific enumeration of rights of displaced persons; and the definition of an implementation process. These provisions do not only benefit IDPs, but also improve the likelihood of success in peacebuilding and foster greater security. The U.S. Institute for Peace and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement’s “Peacemaker’s Toolkit: Integrating Internal Displacement in Peace Processes and Agreements,” also provides information on various ways in which mediators can include the concerns of the displaced in negotiations, including cases where it is impossible to enable their participation in face-to-face negotiations between the parties (see grid in Annex E of this study).

Walter Kaelin also calls for greater attention to the relationship between peacebuilding and durable solutions to displacement. He writes, “…resolving displacement is inextricably linked to achieving lasting peace,” and that “…the ways in which IDPs benefit from peacebuilding processes may well affect the success of country-wide peacebuilding initiatives.” He notes that if the displaced do not perceive their communities of origin as safe, they are unlikely to return—or if they do, they may be displaced again. Likewise, if reconstruction and economic rehabilitation are not sufficient to enable the displaced to resume livelihoods, return will not be sustainable. To that end, he notes that IDPs can play an important role in rebuilding their homes and communities, thus contributing to the economic development of the country. Moreover helping displaced persons return and reintegrate can address the root causes of a

conflict and help prevent further displacement. The return of displaced persons can also signify peace and the end of conflict, and may validate the post-conflict political order (e.g. by legitimizing elections). In cases where IDPs have become party to the conflict, their inclusion is necessary for conflict resolution; returns that are not well-managed may trigger new tensions with local communities or cause returnees to leave again and thus become a destabilizing factor.\(^{19}\)

Another important work in this field is William O’Neill’s “Police Reform in Situations of Forced Displacement,” which outlines the ways in which the structures of the security sector are in need of reform to help the displaced secure safe and dignified return, relocation or local integration. He points out that some of these security actors may have been perpetrators of persecution or conflict, and that unless they are reformed, durable solutions for the displaced are unlikely. Indeed, in many countries, government security forces have perpetrated or been complicit in the violence which has displaced people. When the military was part of the problem, he questions how durable solutions can be found without reforming these forces. He writes,

“…for both IDPs and refugees, some mix of persecution and fear of violence based on ethnicity, race, or religion plus violations of human rights and repression based on political beliefs and opinions often characterizes forced displacement. The actions and structures of the security sector—especially the police, military, paramilitary groups, intelligence, border patrols, and prison guards—often play a crucial role in this persecution and repression. Securing the safe and dignified return, relocation, or local integration of the displaced will therefore require reform of these institutions, along with a revamped judiciary and a stronger respect for the rule of law by all state agencies. For refugees, helping to ensure that the police in their host country will respect rights is another important element.”\(^{20}\)

O’Neill looks at the cases of Chad, Zaire, and Kosovo, and makes the important point that police reform is a long-term process that involves transforming power relations, independent oversight, and coordinated approaches from key actors.\(^{21}\) He further demonstrates that supporting durable solutions to displacement should be seen as an opportunity for police reform.

While they tend to focus on humanitarian crises (rather than durable solutions which is the focus of the present study) and civil-military coordination in humanitarian response, Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon’s “Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: A Review of the Literature” provides one of the most comprehensive analyses on humanitarian civil-military coordination.\(^{22}\) They argue

that humanitarian and military actors increasingly operate in the same space (in part because of a proliferation of humanitarian actors and the globalized nature of humanitarian and military action, but also because emergencies are larger in scope today). However, the debates over the respective roles have tended to focus on principles rather than the practical nature of the relationship and the ways their interaction affects the people in need of humanitarian assistance and protection. They trace the rise of military engagement in humanitarian action and also provide some guidance on civil-military coordination.

They identify some key challenges to coordination, including:
- Different cultures of military and humanitarian actors;
- Different motivations, goals and approaches due to:
  - increasing politicization and militarization of humanitarian assistance
  - challenges inherent in the nature of the humanitarian community itself
  - a failure of humanitarian and military actors to adhere to their own guidance.23

They note that these tend to be studied from a process, not outcome-driven, perspective. They also discuss “comprehensive” and “stabilization” efforts, UN “integration,” the principle of “last resort,” private military and security actors, coordination during disaster response, coordination in terms of protecting civilians, the protection of civilians and the responsibility to protect, differences between military understandings of protection and UN peacekeeping approaches, and international police forces.24 All of these are relevant discussions to the present study. Metcalfe et al.’s diagram is particularly helpful in showing the range of civil-military relations and coordination, ranging from cooperation in peacetime to coexistence during combat.25

24 See their diagram on p. 21 for an excellent outline of the evolution of humanitarian and military approaches to protection of civilians.
In addition, Metcalfe’s “Protecting Civilians? The Interaction Between International Military and Humanitarian Actors” considers the rationale, risks and challenges of relations between military, peacekeeping and humanitarian actors.²⁶ It provides a foundation for analysis on the relationship between the two sectors, and builds on the literature review.

Fairlie Chappuis and Aditi Gorur also unpack the relationship between the mandate to protect civilians in peacekeeping operations and security sector reform in "Reconciling Security Sector Reform and the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Contexts."²⁷ They demonstrate the tension in trying to carry out both the protection of civilians and security sector reform, and suggest some steps to encourage a more mutually reinforcing relationship between the two. Many of these steps are relevant to finding durable solutions to displacement.

From a security perspective, Dirk Salomons’ “Security: An Absolute Prerequisite” argues that peace processes cannot come to fruition without former combatants (sometimes also displaced persons) being effectively integrated into society.²⁸ He writes, “security—that is, freedom from violence and coercion—is the one absolute prerequisite to any effective recovery process after the intensity of armed conflict subsides.”²⁹ Military personnel may also encourage IDP solutions (particularly return to their places of origin) in order to complete the mission of achieving stability.

Naomi Weinberger’s “Civil-Military Coordination in Peacebuilding: The Challenge in Afghanistan,” discusses how military and humanitarian coordination are carried out in Afghanistan, where the tensions between military and humanitarian operations have long been recognized. She writes, “prevention and rebuilding are inextricably linked at the societal level, leading to the conclusion that a formal agreement ending a civil war is meaningless unless coupled with long-term programs to heal the wounded society.”³⁰ Translated to the context of displacement (also a feature of the Afghan conflict) this demonstrates the importance of working through different interests and approaches.

There is also some literature that points to philosophical differences that can make collaboration and coordination challenging among those seeking durable solutions for displaced persons and security actors.³¹ Indeed, some military actors are interested in finding durable solutions to internal displacement not primarily because they are

²⁹ Ibid. p. 19.
³¹ See, for example, Jane Barry and Anna Jeffreys, A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response, Network Paper 37, Overseas Development Institute, 2002.
concerned about human rights, but rather because they want to minimize a security threat. Military or other security actors may be accustomed to different ways of thinking, different leadership/hierarchies and different approaches than other actors, such as NGOs or UN agencies. Thus, “[e]ffective civilian-military collaboration starts with developing shared objectives, a unity of purpose, and a relationship of shared trust.”

The U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned outlines some of the philosophical differences in *A Commander’s Guide to Supporting Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Observations, Insights and Lessons*. It uses security-focused (rather than human rights/displacement-focused) language in approaching displacement. For example,

“A commander entering or assigned to an area that has a significant refugee or IDP population must understand the important of ensuring that population group is not neglected. A neglected refugee or IDP population can cause additional security and logistic problems and can hinder the mission. They will leave their camps searching for additional provisions if there is not an adequate supply, which could interfere with the operation. If the camp security situation is not acceptable, they could also leave or band together and form an insurgency, which could cause problems in the future” (emphasis added).

The chapter goes on to urge commanders to meet with NGOs and aid organizations that specialize in refugee and IDP issues, recognizing their expertise and wealth of knowledge on culture and the “on-the-ground” situation. As these organizations are also more likely to have the trust of the people in the camps, they offer an “advantage” to the military. Thus “managing” refugees and displaced persons, and more broadly “populace and resource control” is linked directly to mission success. This approach and language is certainly different than that used by human rights- and refugee-focused organizations, illustrating different philosophical starting points.

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33 Ibid. p. 46.
35 Ibid. p. 32.
36 The key underlying humanitarian principles are generally understood to include impartiality, humanity, neutrality and independence. There may be times where these conflict with security priorities, even if the intermediate and/or end goals may be the same at times (durable solutions in order to have a broader, more sustainable peace). Craig also emphasizes the vulnerability of refugees and IDPs, and the importance of military police in “dislocated civilian” operations planning and execution (*A Commander’s Guide*, p. 32). A civil-military operations center is also important for maintaining a venue where military and civilian agencies—NGOs, host nation military, state agencies or other civilian groups—can meet to promote unity of effort and reduce duplication of effort (*A Commander’s Guide*, 33). These meetings are also meant to build trust among the NGO community, which may be hesitant to work with the military. It may also reveal ways that the military can assist in humanitarian supply movement (*A Commander’s Guide*, 34-35).
Focusing on a specific case, Brooke Lauten and Melanie Kesmaecker-Wissing’s “IDPs’ Decision-Making in the DRC: Defining a framework to support resilience in humanitarian responses to multiple displacement” provides an excellent look at physical security and durable solutions.\(^{37}\) Put simply, the study begins with the notion that the lack of security is, of course, the main reason IDPs and refugees flee. They cite one woman from a focus group: “The factors that determine where we go to are, first of all, the security situation in the place we go to. After you first move, you can think about where to find your family and where you can be employed to work in someone else’s fields;” thus, security precedes concerns about livelihoods, social networks, or anything else, even though they are frequently linked to each other.\(^{38}\) They continue, “[t]he most cited driver of displacement in the Kivus is insecurity caused by armed conflict… Ninety-eight per cent of IDPs interviewed in Masisi and 90 per cent in Uvira said they had fled conflict, but they have often moved to places where the threat of further conflict and the likelihood of having to move again are high. IDPs who engage in pendular displacement also accept security risks in returning periodically to their place of origin.”\(^{39}\) They cite one interviewee: “At the time we are fleeing, the first reflex is to run to the village or place where bullets are not popping, a place from which you have good memories from the last time you were displaced there, where you have friends, family members, members of your congregation…”\(^{40}\) They point to a greater need to understand how insecurity is defined and perceived vis-à-vis push and pull factors for displacement.

Madeline England’s “Linkages between Justice-Sensitive Security Sector Reform and Displacement: Examples of Police and Justice Reform from Liberia and Kosovo” also asserts that the causes of displacement are widely known, but the lack of physical security and weak or non-existent security institutions, or institutions that undermine security, make durable solutions a challenge. She also indicates that displacement can be a “…source of instability that requires a heavy investment of security resources that might otherwise be invested in reform projects….no group has more at stake in [transforming a weak security sector]…than vulnerable populations, including those who have been displaced.”\(^{41}\)

She further highlights that state security forces can often be the perpetrators of violence that causes displacement, and that this can lead to resistance and distrust toward these actors.\(^{42}\) Therefore she argues, that SSR processes must take into account the needs of the displaced and durable solutions to end their displacement, at the very least to reinforce SSR objectives. She emphasizes supporting justice-sensitive approaches to SSR, which focus on accountability, public service mentalities, democratic norms, and

\(^{38}\) Ibid. p. 11.
\(^{39}\) Ibid. p. 11
\(^{40}\) Ibid. p. 11
\(^{42}\) Ibid. p. 4.
citizen ownership. She focuses on rule of law reform in Liberia and Kosovo (and to some extent Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste), especially in reference to police and justice systems, amidst the wider context of SSR strategies. She writes:

“Police and justice reform are directly connected to durable solutions because: first, effective rule of law is essential for a secure environment, and therefore a necessary precondition for the return, resettlement/repatriation, and local integration of displaced populations; and second, they are the most visible public security institutions for local populations, and are therefore critical for demonstrating integrity and building legitimacy with displaced populations.”43

In reference to durable solutions, then, England emphasizes a conceptual shift that takes a long period of time. It is further complicated by different timelines—SSR and durable solutions operate differently, “…with a spontaneous return of displaced persons following the cessation of conflict or signing of a peace agreement juxtaposed with the very slow, gradual progress of SSR…”44

Other literature outlines how refugees, IDPs and other displaced persons can be “spoilers” to peace agreements, or security threats in other ways, such as harboring rebels or using camps and bases to serve in cross-border attacks.45

43 Ibid. p. 5.
44 Ibid. p. 16.

She continues, “A UN secretary-general’s note on SSR offers this suggestion on balancing post-conflict initiatives: that only after basic stability has been achieved, including the return of refugees, should substantial political attention and resources be directed to security sector reform….. Justice-sensitive SSR has clear synergies with durable solutions in providing protection in the interim phases for IDPs and refugees and thus facilitating the return or resettlement process. But the most substantial work begins with reintegration. In reintegration, justice-sensitive SSR plays a dual role. First, it provides protection to displaced persons and ensures effective rule of law, with integrity and subject to accountability, in order to foster an environment conducive to reconciliation with the local population. And second, it builds security sector legitimacy with displaced populations and encourages ownership and empowerment over the security sector, by increasing representation within the security sector and responsiveness to and accountability for displaced security needs among their security providers” (p. 16).

45 See, for example, Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, 2006.
Finally, Sarah Bailey and Sara Pavanello’s “Untangling Early Recovery” provides a helpful diagram to think about the overlapping sectors and phases between conflict and peace. In addition, some work has been done on the relationship between displacement and transitional justice mechanisms, including criminal justice, gender justice, reparations, restitution, justice-sensitive security sector reform and truth-telling mechanisms, and prosecutions. Traditionally, these mechanisms have not focused on displaced populations – in part perhaps because of fear that the sheer numbers would overwhelm fragile mechanisms or simply be too expensive. Colombia provides an interesting case in this respect where the government has adopted an ambitious restitution and reparations policy applicable to the more than 6 million people displaced by the conflict. While the government has directly linked resolving displacement with transitional justice mechanisms, the process of both adjudicating and implementing claims has proven to be complex and slow.

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46 Sarah Bailey and Sara Pavanello, “Untangling Early Recovery,” Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Brief 38, October 2009, p. 3. Other forums, like the Global Public Policy Institute also carry out research relevant to this topic.


V. Summarizing the Case Studies

Four case studies were commissioned by experts in security sector reform and displacement to examine the connections in Kosovo, Timor Leste, Liberia and Colombia. In all four cases, conflicts caused widespread displacement and in all four cases, military forces and issues of security sector reform have had an impact on both the conflict and displacement. The full versions are available from the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement website. Themes from these reports guided the workshop discussions, and are outlined below. The summaries here are revised versions of the executive summaries included with each case study.

A. Kosovo

The case of Kosovo provides many interesting insights about the linkages between SSR and durable solutions to displacement. Rooted in political exploitation of ethnic rivalries between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, the Kosovo conflict made headlines in 1998 and 1999. Some 1.9 million Kosovo Albanians (or 90 percent of the population) were displaced by targeted violence from Serbian troops and security forces of the Milosevic regime. After a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention – a bombing campaign of strategic targets in Serbia – Serbia agreed to withdraw its troops in June 1999.

In the chaotic months that followed, the majority of displaced Kosovo Albanians returned, while (the threat of) reprisals displaced some 245,000 Kosovo Serbs, Roma, Egyptians and Ashkali, some of whom returned in subsequent years, but many of whom remain displaced. In 2014, 17,300 Kosovars remain internally displaced within Kosovo and there were still some 220,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Serbia and Montenegro. Some of the key ingredients for durable solutions for Kosovar IDPs include justice and security objectives, such as restitution of property, justice for abuses committed during the conflict and a justice and security system that they trust to guarantee their safety, in addition to sufficient income and access to health care, education and other social services.


Given the absence of a Kosovo security and justice system after the withdrawal of Serbian troops, many SSR efforts were undertaken under UNMIK and subsequently

European Union’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The Kosovo Police Service (KPS – renamed Kosovo Police (KP) after independence) was established, as well as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) – a lightly armed civilian force with an emergency response and humanitarian mandate. To placate the ambitions of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to be the new security sector in Kosovo, KLA ex-combatants made up the KPC as well as approximately 50 percent of the KPS. The KPC was disbanded after independence, and the Kosovo Security Force established, which was more multi-ethnic and had a somewhat wider mandate that included international peacekeeping. In the judiciary, governance structures were established, the legal system was revised, equipment provided and infrastructure rehabilitated. Inclusion of community voices was actively sought in an internationally-driven Internal Security Sector Review process and the international community took great care to ensure that the Kosovo institutions were multi-ethnic and broadly representative of all the groups in Kosovar society. This was especially successful in the case of the Kosovo Police, which is one of the most trusted Kosovar institutions. Programs also focused on careful vetting of security and judiciary personnel to avoid having the new security and justice apparatus tainted by the presence of perpetrators of conflict abuses.

These reforms and security and justice developments had an impact on durable solutions. Trust-building elements of SSR, such as inclusiveness, multi-ethnic representation and vetting can assuage mistrust of IDPs, and begin to build legitimacy. However, such processes also lead to some issues in responsiveness to IDP security concerns, as for example when Kosovo Serbian police officers refused to protect Kosovo Albanian IDP property from attacks by Kosovo Serbs. As such, the Kosovo case shows that to build a truly multi-ethnic security sector, filling quotas needs to be complemented by political commitment to overcome ethnic tensions, training and time to build positive experiences. Similarly, slow vetting processes in the judiciary slowed down the already back-logged justice system. This had particular consequences for those IDPs waiting for property disputes to be resolved as an essential ingredient for durable solutions. Though many disputes were handled fairly quickly and efficiently by the Kosovo Property Agency (a special body created to deal with property disputes resulting from the conflict that can be seen as a positive example of dealing with property disputes related to a conflict), those who had to go through the ordinary justice system have had to wait many years for the adjudication of their cases. This was further slowed down by delays in the vetting process. As such, an examination of the Kosovo case suggests that there is a need to balance the need for vetting with the need for immediate dispute resolution and service provision.

For the international community, the Kosovo case demonstrates the intrinsic link between SSR efforts and durable solutions. If SSR efforts were to include a focus on IDP security and justice needs – for example by incorporating IDPs as a disaggregated category in SSR assessments and monitoring, training development and delivery, and policy development – they could make a significant contribution to durable solutions to displacement. At the same time, humanitarian actors working with IDPs would be well-advised to pay attention to longer-term peacebuilding activities addressing justice and security challenges, to ensure that IDP concerns are taken into account. By ensuring
communication and coordination between the two, durable solutions would be more achievable.

**B. Timor-Leste**

Timor-Leste experienced two distinct but interrelated conflicts that caused mass displacement over the past 12 years. In August 1999, a United Nations-run Popular Consultation took place to determine the future of the small territory. The people of Timor-Leste voted overwhelmingly for independence – a result which led to widespread violence – with the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militias destroying 70 percent of the country’s buildings and infrastructure as they departed. About 450,000 people were displaced by the mass violence and widespread destruction. Between 1999 and 2002 most of the displaced had returned or resettled. Most, however, did not return to their places of origin. Instead, many IDPs and refugees chose to settle in the capital city of Dili, often occupying land that did not belong to them.

In 2006, a new crisis occurred that displaced approximately 150,000 people in Dili and led to the crumbling of the security sector. While the crisis is often attributed to the breakdown of the security sector, in fact the roots of the conflict are a complex interplay of political, economic and social factors that resulted from incomplete handling of the first displacement in 1999. These factors include: a failure to define land and property regimes to settle competing claims; latent tensions between the lorosa’e (easterners) and loromonu (西部ites) exacerbated by these communities’ uneven access to land and property in Dili after the 1999 returns; lingering unresolved tensions between citizens dating back to Portuguese times; impunity with regards to serious crimes and the use of arson as a common retaliatory tool; and widespread poverty.

The first wave of Timor-Leste’s displacement in 1999 was resolved through a mixture of return and integration in another part of the country, in this case the capital city. In the second wave of displacement in 2006, the government tried to assist IDPs to settle elsewhere in the country as its preferred solution. This ended up being unfeasible for various reasons, and the government ended up pursing a return policy.

The United Nations and international security forces exercised extraordinary involvement in Timor-Leste during this turbulent time from 1999 through independence in 2002 and continuing all the way to 2012. During this thirteen-year period, Timor-Leste hosted five different United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations missions and two separate multinational military forces. While each mission played a unique role in the peacebuilding process, it was the interplay between stabilization forces and the peacekeeping missions that was most important in bringing an end to each of the conflicts.

The rapid deployment of multinational military forces under a Chapter VII mandate in 1999 and then again in 2006 was essential to stabilizing the situation and preventing new displacement. Both forces were then followed by UN Security Council-mandated peacebuilding missions that included substantial police contingents. The UN mission from 1999-2002 helped create the conditions for rapid return of IDPs and refugees, but
the follow-on missions did not ensure the sustainability of those returns because of their failure to address the key drivers of conflict.

The humanitarian phase of the IDP crisis in 2006 was also fairly effective. By July 2006 the new displacements had stopped, and some IDPs had returned home. However, some 100,000 people had not returned. While the UN mission and the international military forces were successful in preventing new large-scale displacements, they were unable to gain the confidence of IDPs that they would be safe in returning home.50

A return process was finally initiated in 2008 with the support of both cash payments and reconciliation measures, and was a remarkable success that appears to have ended displacement in a durable manner. What it failed to do, which was also the case in 1999-2005, was to address the underlying issues of land title reform, the ability of the security sector to provide long-term stability, or to develop a fully-functioning community dispute resolution mechanism blending customary practice with formal justice.

Returns eventually turned out to be successful, and many of the components for durable solutions to displacement were identified and implemented. However, the long term development challenges and the contributing factors to conflict have fallen through the gaps in a system of overlapping mandates, different working cultures and competition for funding.

The case of Timor-Leste demonstrates a need for greater civil-military coordination and the development of intentional overlapping of mandates between humanitarian, peacebuilding, and peacemaking, and peacekeeping actors. Structural barriers exist for holding separate agencies responsible for overlapping areas of work. Thus there is a need to go beyond a general understanding of how each area in peace operations works. Strategic and operational plans are needed in which areas of overlapping mandates are made explicit and actors are held accountable for their activities.

Quick response military forces proved particularly effective during both conflicts in stabilizing the situation until a UN mission arrived. They also established conditions which enabled the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, there is the need for both more rapid and more permanent policing presence in IDP camps. If done in a sensitive manner, this would help instill a greater level of familiarity and trust in the United Nations Police services by the displaced.

The two main successes in response to the displacement were community reconciliation processes in 1999, and the dialogue teams that assisted with returns after the 2006 crisis. In both cases the use of traditional structures and customary practice played a large role in successfully creating the conditions for IDPs to return in safety and security to their communities. The weakness of these processes is that they were

50 “Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis,” International Crisis Group. 2012,
compartmentalized and limited to IDP situations rather than being applied holistically to a wide range of root causes, which continue to remain unaddressed.

C. Liberia
Current challenges to durable peacebuilding in Liberia are anchored in the limited responses to the issues and concerns that have confronted those who were displaced as a result of the fourteen year civil conflict (1989-2003) that disrupted the judicial, political, economic and social systems of the country. Since Liberia’s origin in 1847, political exclusion, economic marginalization, ethnic hostilities and intense disagreement over patterns of resource distribution have formed the basis of conflict in Liberia.51

The initial conflict between Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Samuel Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) turned into a civil war, with other armed groups motivated not primarily by ideological differences, but by personal grievances and economic interests.52 During the fourteen-year war, widespread killing of innocent people, abductions, torture, rape and other forms of human rights abuses and violations were committed by all armed factions, leading to mass population movements both inside and outside of the country.53 Displacement was virtually universal as almost all Liberians were forced to leave their homes at one time or another. Many fled to the capital city of Monrovia. The massive internal displacement increased pressures on urban services and transformed the livelihoods of the population. Before the war, about 70 percent of Liberians were rural farmers; after the war in 2008, almost one-third of the country’s population lived in Monrovia.54

In examining the relationship between displacement, conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Liberia, there is evidence that although the government of Liberia has made great efforts to set up and develop its internal security apparatus, the country would have relapsed into conflict without the significant external assistance to displaced people and the role played by the international community in helping to preserve peace. Liberia has made significant progress on various fronts, especially infrastructure development and security issues. However, current prospects for sustainable peace in Liberia remain weak. Almost all Liberian security forces were involved in the war and thus have faced difficulty in being seen as neutral or objective. Prior to the war, the justice system in Liberia was manipulated by powerful individuals who used these structures for their personal benefits. Broadly considered then, the prospects for stability and peacebuilding will require attention to improving the state of security in Liberian

society and resolving displacement.

While most internally displaced persons (IDPs) still contemplate return, this solution is limited by their inability to secure livelihoods, shelter, food security and health services in their places of origin. These are gaps that need to be addressed. In the case of Monrovia, growing urbanization fueled by internal displacement has exerted pressure on fragile environments, limited resources and exacerbated health hazards. Instead of policies aimed at expulsion and exclusion, which have recently been pursued by the government, the authorities should seek their positive inclusion into the urban fabric. These slum communities have a potential for productivity and social contribution which has yet to be explored and realized.

The Liberian peace and reconstruction process followed the usual pattern of the UN’s *modus operandi* since the end of the Cold War, which is largely characterized by a sequence of activities in the following order: peace agreement, deployment of peacekeepers, a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program, security sector reform and, finally, elections. In Liberia, regular elections have been crucial for maintaining peace, but they have not addressed the issue of socio-economic development and popular participation in democratic governance.

In an attempt to fill important peacekeeping gaps, a Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation was formulated in March 2013. The roadmap was to foster coherent institutions and systems; to support national healing and reconciliation; and to strengthen efforts towards sustainable peace. However, despite this initiative, intra-communal cohesion and trust, both of which are important indicators of reconciliation, have yet to be achieved. Some communities remain fragmented, and perceptions of entitlement and legitimacy are often distorted. Reform and conflict resolution mechanisms at the local and national levels do not adequately address inter-ethnic, inter-religious and inter-generational tensions over natural resource management and long-term, secure access to land. The long conflict in Liberia polarized communities that once co-existed, as the major warring factions and their supporters divided along ethnic, religious and social lines.

The role of the relief community in supporting the basic social needs and services of Liberians provided an essential safety net for most people; but the inability of the Liberian government to resume the responsibilities for social services once provided by the humanitarian community is a challenge that can hardly be met.

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57 Ibid.
Almost ten years ago, the Liberian government decided to close the IDP camps and to begin a national process of reconstruction and reconciliation. Rather than considering the particular needs of IDPs and returning refugees (many of whom undoubtedly became IDPs), the government decided to prioritize issues of youth employment and rural development. These are both issues which affect IDPs, but it is regrettable that the government and the international community did not prioritize consideration for the needs of the displaced. Without basic data on the numbers of displaced who found solutions or who remain in limbo, it is difficult to draw conclusions about their on-going needs, or about the relationship between ending displacement and security. Given the number of competing problems (including the recent Ebola epidemic) and the scarcity of resources, the government has not made IDP issues a priority.

Fundamentally, the wars and displacement changed the economic basis of Liberia’s existence. It is unlikely, for example, that IDPs who have lived in Monrovia and other cities for years will return to their rural communities. This trend has implications both for the urban and rural areas.

There are several lessons to be drawn from the Liberian conflict. Mistakes made early in the process of response to displacement have had repercussions in subsequent years. The government and international agencies did not implement a registration procedure, nor did they implement a process to ascertain the solutions that IDPs themselves wanted. The authorities assumed that all the IDPs were willing to return, an assumption that proved erroneous. The weak follow-up programs for IDPs and returning refugees, especially in cities, were a direct consequence. Hence, there is concern that the lack of solutions for the displaced could threaten the country’s fragile peace and security. Resolving displacement is also central to the government’s development agenda.

Although Liberia recently celebrated ten years of relative peace, the postwar DDR programs left most of the youth without prospects for a better future. Liberian women, and in particular, rural women and displaced women living in the border areas, continue to experience various forms of human rights abuses, marginalization and exclusion. Incidences of violence incurred during 14 years of war have continued to manifest in continued widespread cases of rape, domestic violence and other forms of gender-based violence. Under the circumstances, there is a critical need for policies by both government and non-governmental institutions to address some of the consequences of the country’s massive and long-term displacement, particularly its impact on urbanization.

59 An inter-agency assessment in April-May 2006 found approximately 28,000 individuals still residing in former IDP camps, of whom just over 16,000 had received return packages but had either not departed or had done so but later returned to the camps. Ibid, p. 7.
D. Colombia

Half a century of violence in Colombia has left hundreds of thousands of people dead and millions displaced. The complex conflict involves a complicated mix of political motivations, crime (especially drug-related), and economic activity, as guerrillas (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), paramilitaries, state security forces, and criminal gangs (BACRIM as per the Spanish acronym) all use violence to reach their goals. Each of these groups has committed human rights abuses, some using this as a specific tactic in their operations, of which minority and vulnerable groups such as indigenous and Afrocolombian communities have borne the brunt. Though peace negotiations with the FARC are ongoing, it is unlikely that a peace agreement will end the cycle of violence. As such, an agreement will not include all actors implicated in the violence, nor will it remove all the drivers of violence, such as drug-related crime. In fact, some expect the violence to get worse in the aftermath of a peace agreement with the FARC, as other actors will seek to fill the void left by the group.

An estimated 5.4 to 5.9 million people have been internally displaced because of the violence.60 Though most people fled because of guerrilla and paramilitary activity, in recent years BACRIM activity has become a main cause of displacement. Presently, displacement is also on the rise from land-grabbing for resource extraction and mass-scale agricultural projects. Most people flee from rural areas to cities, but recently intra-urban displacement (and secondary displacement) has increased. Only three percent of IDPs say they would like to return to their community of origin. Reparations and especially land restitution and compensation for lost property are primary concerns for durable solutions.

In spite of Colombia’s well-developed support framework for internally displaced persons (IDPs), including laws and justice mechanisms, dedicated social services, substantial resource allocation, and a large international response, most displaced people find themselves in very vulnerable positions. Most live on the dangerous margins of cities in inadequate housing, far away from both income opportunities and basic services such as schools and health care. This gap between a well-thought out institutional framework and practice on the ground can be attributed to a top-down approach to planning that leaves local implementers and their concerns and needs out of the planning process. Weaknesses in local implementation are due to a lack of capacity and resources, sometimes further complicated by a lack of political will, resulting from cooptation or intimidation by violent actors.

Even amidst the ongoing violence, Colombia has made impressive efforts on peace and security. This has included a massive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program; a military reform process to improve the military’s capacity to combat guerrilla forces; police reform programs, including a focus on community policing to address ineffectiveness, corruption and police brutality; and a consolidation plan to bring security and state control to areas of the country where this has been absent.

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60 This figure has risen to over 6 million since this case study was done – in large measure because of improved registration measures.
Unfortunately, similar to the IDP policies and programs, implementation of such plans is often less than perfect due to shortfalls in local capacity, will and resources.

The Colombia case demonstrates that what happens – or what does not happen – when SSR impacts opportunities for durable solutions to displacement. In general, trust-building elements of SSR, such as inclusiveness, representation, accountability measures and vetting, can assuage the mistrust IDPs feel of the security sector. By overcoming this mistrust, IDPs’ sense of security can increase and with it their possibility of finding durable solutions. However, Colombia’s SSR efforts have focused very much on the effectiveness of the security sector to combat guerrillas and (to a lesser extent) criminal actors, at the expense of accountability, oversight and vetting. In fact, impunity is rampant and security actors are often seen as collaborating with criminal actors. Consequently, trust in the security sector is low. In addition, the focus on effectiveness to end the conflict – through an attempt to bring peace in the long-term and thereby contribute to durable solutions – has increased insecurity and displacement in the short-term. As such, the Colombia case demonstrates the challenges of trying to ensure that SSR contributes to durable solutions for internal displacement in a context of ongoing violence.

At the same time, the Colombia case exemplifies some positive examples of how SSR can contribute to durable solutions. Efforts focused on building trust with communities – such as community policing and working with local community security teams in unsafe neighborhoods to reintroduce police presence – have had some positive effects on building the legitimacy of the security sector, including among IDPs. Moreover, Colombia’s system of legal pluralism – by which certain groups, such as indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, are constitutionally allowed to run their own (parallel) administrations – allows for an alternative way of representation and inclusiveness, which could contribute to durable solutions. Such a system opens opportunities for building trustworthy security and justice services in communities that are particularly affected by violence and displacement. Colombia is also trying to address insecurity around economic activities, in particular extractive operations, as evidenced by the development of a policy in 2014 to ensure that human rights are observed when protecting such operations. However, this policy, based on the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, is a recent development and it is too soon to tell what impact this will have on displacement and durable solutions.

Overall, the case of Colombia demonstrates that if SSR efforts are to reduce some of the negative impacts security forces and their activities have had on displacement and improve prospects for durable solutions, they need to address IDP security concerns specifically. Addressing impunity within the security sector itself is one important component of this. Another component is ensuring that local security needs are taken into account in security operations in order to limit further displacement. Including local voices – of those who implement SSR and IDP policies as well as of the communities that are supposed to benefit from them – is essential to ensuring that national-level plans adequately address local issues, and have the appropriate resources, capacity and support to be effectively implemented. Finally, to ensure that programs and policies
for SSR and durable solutions contribute to sustainable peace, actors working on these issues, both international and national, need to overcome their tendency to work in silos – and their mistrust of each other – to ensure effective coordination and collaboration.

E. Mini case study: Mozambique

The military and police have had an important role in ending displacement in Mozambique, just as relief and development actors were crucial to making peace (DDR in particular) sustainable. From independence in 1974 until 1992, Mozambique was plagued by civil war that cost the lives of more than 1 million people, left nearly 6 million people displaced – some 4-4.5 million IDPs and 1.5 million refugees – and 370,000 demobilized soldiers and their dependents.

Peace was finally achieved in 1992 when the Mozambique Liberation Front government (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) signed a peace accord known as the General Peace Agreement. To maintain peace, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) maintained 6,500 troops and military observers in the country. ONUMOZ was an integrated mission: in addition to verifying the implementation of the military aspects of the Peace Agreement and overseeing the electoral process, ONUMOZ launched a humanitarian assistance program to help 3.7 million displaced persons resettle in their communities. It also created an integral component for humanitarian operations—UNOHAC. Starting in 1993, UNHCR began the repatriation of 1.5 million refugees—the largest ever undertaken by UNHCR in Africa. UNOHAC also aided in the resettlement and reintegration of some 3 million IDPs and 200,000 former combatants and their dependents.

DDR was part of the General Peace Agreement, and demonstrates some overlap between security/SSR and durable solutions to displacement. As Alden writes, “[e]xtending the scope of humanitarian assistance to include aspects of the demilitarization process was a unique feature of the UN mission to Mozambique.” DDR in Mozambique consisted of (1) a strictly military dimension (monitoring ceasefire, cantonment, demobilization/repatration of soldiers, collection/destruction of weaponry; integrating opposing forces into a new national military); and (2) more broadly based humanitarian dimension (long term integration of demobilized soldiers & de-mining). ONUMOZ also provided food and relief assistance to demobilized soldiers, and in trying to make their reintegration successful, proposed an approach based on training and

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employment opportunities; vocational kits (consisting of agricultural tools, seeds and food rations for up to 3 months) and credit scheme; counseling and referral services.  

Humanitarian assistance was thus used to bolster security by supporting DDR initiatives. Food, shelter, medical treatment, vocational training and literacy programs were all offered to encamped soldiers and their dependents awaiting demobilization. Transportation, food and accommodation were also offered to demobilized soldiers and their dependents at their preferred destination.

A strong ONUMOZ civilian police component (CIVPOL) was also established in 1994, though a number of security concerns were not addressed. Nevertheless, Mozambique’s DDR process represents a case where collaboration and coordination between security actors at ONUMOZ and relief/development actors focused on durable solutions to displacement.

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V. Analysis and Conclusions

Analysis of the case studies
This report has considered the ways in which SSR, peacebuilding processes and actors, and humanitarian/development actors working on durable solutions to displacement are linked. It has built upon four case studies—Colombia, Kosovo, Liberia and Timor-Leste—which provided insight, context, and guidance to the discussion. The report also draws upon existing literature as well as the comments and presentations from an expert-level workshop in New York in May 2015.

While there are significant differences between the Kosovo, Liberia, Colombia and Timor-Leste case studies and the mini case study on Mozambique, some common themes on SSR and durable solutions to displacement emerge. Above all, the cases demonstrate the interdependence between security/SSR and durable solutions to displacement: security is in part reliant upon durable solutions, and durable solutions are in part reliant on security.

The Kosovo case highlights that durable solutions for IDPs needed to include justice and security objectives, such as restitution of property, and justice for abuses committed during the conflict. As in all the other cases, IDPs also needed to be confident that the justice and security sectors can keep them safe (and ideally that they can also find security in terms of health care, education and other social services.) Police reforms and justice/security developments were thus directly related to durable solutions to displacement. Trust-building, inclusiveness, multi-ethnic representation and vetting helped security actors begin to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of IDPs. This was a theme that emerged in all of the case studies. Kosovo is unique, however, in that the UN had executive authority to dictate SSR, and created a police force from scratch. It also rebuilt the penitentiary and judiciary systems.65

Like the other cases, the study on Colombia also demonstrates that security is at the root of all attempts to end displacement. Reparations, land restitution and compensation for lost property are key to durable solutions and in spite of many protection processes and systems in place, many IDPs remain vulnerable. Trust building elements of SSR, such as inclusiveness, representation, accountability measures and vetting, can help to assuage the mistrust IDPs feel toward the security sector. By overcoming this mistrust, IDPs can feel more secure and possibilities of finding durable solutions improve. In Colombia, some security actors are viewed as collaborating with criminal actors and trust remains low. Ongoing violence also complicates SSR in relation to durable solutions and more broadly. At the same time, the Colombia case exemplifies some positive examples of how SSR can contribute to durable solutions. Efforts focused on building trust with communities – such as community policing and working with local community security teams in unsafe neighborhoods to reintroduce police presence – have had some positive effects on building the legitimacy of the security sector, including among IDPs. Legal pluralism in Colombia allows for an alternative way of

65 O'Neill 5.
representation and inclusiveness, which could contribute to durable solutions. Such a system opens opportunities for building trustworthy security and justice services in communities that are particularly affected by violence and displacement.

In Timor-Leste, the interplay between stabilization forces and the peacekeeping missions was critical to ending the conflicts; aid was contingent upon a quick response from military forces; and there was insufficient policing in IDP camps which led to lack of familiarity or trust in UN police. The study also demonstrates that the failure to find solutions the first time around can contribute to an outbreak of violence—and subsequently more displacement—later on.

In Liberia, the preferred solution of return was unattainable to many IDPs, who continue to face insecure livelihoods, shelter, food security, and health services in their places of origin. This relates to both security and humanitarian priorities. The government has also neglected to prioritize IDP needs or solutions, instead letting the international community take the lead in IDP assistance. In the end, the lack of solutions to displacement could potentially threaten peace and stability, as well as the country’s development priorities.

The case of Mozambique also demonstrates how security-led initiatives can both support and be supported by humanitarian and development initiatives to maintain prospects for peace. Indeed, a key pillar of the program in Mozambique centered on reintegrating former soldiers. Without significant coordination with humanitarian and development actors, this would not have been possible.

All of the cases demonstrate that SSR efforts need to incorporate IDP security concerns. This relates to addressing impunity by security forces, and ensuring that local security needs are taken into account in order to limit further displacement. The inclusion of local voices – of those who implement SSR and IDP policies as well as of the communities that are supposed to benefit from them – is essential to ensuring that national-level plans adequately address local issues, and have the appropriate resources, capacity and support to be effectively implemented. Finally, to ensure that programs and policies for SSR and durable solutions contribute to sustainable peace, international and national actors working on these issues need to overcome their tendency to work in isolation, instead building trust to ensure effective coordination and collaboration.66

Ultimately, this report highlighted the innate linkages between civil-military-police and durable solutions to displacement. While it is obvious that displacement and conflict almost always go together, security, development and humanitarian actors tend to work in silos, aware of one another’s work, but lacking coordination and collaboration

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amongst one another. The report honed in on peacekeeping operations and SSR vis-à-vis displacement, and points out ways for moving forward. It also demonstrates how displacement is more than a mere byproduct or consequence of conflict; it can be a cause of conflict, a tool or objective of those fighting, an aggravator or exacerbation of conflict and tensions, a "spoiler" to peace agreements, or a bargaining chip. However, finding durable solutions to displacement, and including them in the rebuilding of society after a conflict can provide a strong momentum to sustain and strengthen peace. To that end, improving the ties between security, development and humanitarian actors is more than a theoretical exercise in better collaboration. It is an important step in building and maintaining peace and stability for all those involved—the displaced, security forces, and other civilians.

**Broader issues**

This research project intended to conclude the study with a set of practical recommendations to enable greater synergies between military forces concerned with stability, and humanitarian actors focused on finding solutions to displacement. As this study has emphasized, the linkages between the two sets of issues and actors are clear. But the deeper the researchers delved into the subject, the more they felt that they were just scratching the surface. For example, while training police or peacekeepers on the particular needs of IDPs would likely be a positive development, it will not mean much if the police were corrupt or the peacekeeping forces were perceived by IDPs as supporting one side in the conflict. It is even less effective when the government is the perpetrator of violence that caused displacement.

The reality is that there are no easy fixes or short-cuts to either resolving displacement or establishing security in post-conflict situations, and that both security and humanitarian/development actors face very real limitations in bringing about change. It is suggested here that issues of political will, the diversity of national and international actors, contextual factors related to specific displacement situations, and institutional factors are the key issues in determining how security and humanitarian/development actors can work together rather than specific trainings or new programs. For refugees and IDPs to find durable solutions, they need to feel secure and to have trust in institutions to protect them. Rooting out corruption and criminal violence would have a major impact on the ability of the security sector to support durable solutions for the displaced. Establishment of rule of law is a complex and long-term process but one which certainly has more impact on solutions for displaced populations than humanitarian actions.

In addition, sustainable development, particularly around the reestablishment of livelihoods, is crucial to finding durable solutions for both IDPs and refugees. Even if IDPs and refugees feel secure when they return to their communities, if they cannot support themselves, they are likely to move elsewhere or to turn to activities, such as crime, which increase their insecurity and that of their communities.

Some of the broader issues which need to be addressed in order to move forward in finding solutions for those displaced by conflict and human rights violations include:
The key role of political will
Participants in the workshop raised the point that in many cases, the UN is working with
governments that are either uncommitted, uninterested, uncooperative, or worse, are
perpetrating the violence against the displaced. This is an understudied reality that
affects the way security, development and humanitarian actors respond, and the way
SSR is implemented. As noted in the case of South Sudan, peace support operations
are carried out with the support of the host government and that relationship affects how
peacekeeping forces are perceived by the population as well as the ability of the
mission to carry out its mandate.

In looking at national responses to internal displacement, there is no escaping the
central role of national authorities to protect and assist IDPs and to find solutions for
their problems. If a government wants to help IDPs return or settle elsewhere, it can do
so. If a government is not interested in resolving displacement, for whatever reason, the
actions of outside actors are extremely limited. In a few cases, the problem is one of
capacity; the government simply does not know what should be done or does not have
the capacity to implement policies to support IDPs. However, most of the time, the lack
of capacity is accompanied by the government’s ambivalent feelings about IDPs. For
example in Iraq in the mid-2000s, the international community invested heavily in
building the government’s capacity to respond to the growing number of IDPs, and
some positive measures were taken to support returns of both refugees and IDPs. But
institutional development was weak, in part because the government’s priorities were
elsewhere. Similarly in Ukraine today, the government has taken some positive actions
to support IDPs, but still seems to view them with suspicion and has done little to
address the stigma of displacement.67 There are cases where governments have taken
positive steps to address IDP needs, as in Yemen, but these have been overtaken by
renewed violence. In some cases the government even has a vested interest in not
resolving displacement, either because it is involved in the displacement (as in Darfur)
or because the presence of IDPs is a testament of a political grievance (as in
Georgia).68 Although this study has focused on the relationship between security sector
actors and humanitarian/development actors, the fact remains that it is national
governments which set the tone and make decisions about both how IDPs will be
treated and about how security will be provided, including security sector reform.

Fundamental philosophical differences amongst actors69
While much of the literature and this report tend to take for granted that closer
coordination between development/humanitarian actors and security actors is a positive
step for all involved, there are those who take issue with a closer relationship. For

67 Elizabeth Ferris, Suleiman Mamutov, Kateryna Moroz and Olena Vynogradova, “Off to a Shaky Start:
Ukrainian Government Responses to Internally Displaced Persons,” Brookings-LSE Project on Internal
Displacement, May 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/05/ukraine-
68 From Responsibility to Response: Addressing National Approaches to Internal Displacement,
Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, November 2011,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2011/12/05-responsibility-response/from-responsibility-to-
response-nov-20111doc.
69 Metcalfe et al., 2012 provide some helpful analysis on this topic.
example, some humanitarian actors would protest being more closely linked to security actors, asserting that it would compromise their integrity and reputation as impartial and neutral. This in turn may have negative consequences for the safety of their staff in accessing dangerous areas. Being linked to security actors, particularly those related to a party to the conflict, can be interpreted as taking sides in the conflict.

This speaks to a larger debate about the extent to which the fundamental philosophical differences between development/humanitarian actors and security actors “matter” in civ-military relationships. As discussed above, even when there are pragmatic reasons for working together to resolve displacement, development/humanitarian actors tend to work from a human rights perspective and lean toward understandings of protection from a human security perspective, whereas security actors, unsurprisingly, usually emphasize physical security.

To that end, this report and the workshop have utilized a very traditional understanding of security – a focus on a broader concept of human security would offer a broader understanding that is more in line with the broad definition of protection used in discussing durable solutions to displacement.

➤ Government accountability
Above all, governments should be held to account by the UN Security Council, by regional bodies and through bilateral relations for their actions which have displaced people. It is national governments which are the key actors in supporting solutions for those displaced within their territory. Governments also play the key role in resolving refugee situations – in creating the conditions for refugees to return to their countries of origin, in supporting the integration of refugees in host countries, and in creating possibilities for refugees to resettle in third countries. International and other actors can support governments in these endeavors, but if there is insufficient political will, these efforts will be limited.

Much more work is needed to understand how political will is built and maintained in post-conflict situations. Earlier research by the Brookings-LSE Project indicated that governments who prioritize finding solutions to IDPs rarely do so because of altruism or because of a commitment to upholding the rights of vulnerable groups. Rather they work on solutions to IDPs because they perceive it to be in their national interest – either as a way of addressing potential instability/insecurity or because of domestic political pressure (e.g. Kenya and Colombia), or because the sheer scale of displacement threatens security and development (e.g. Uganda). This suggests that while humanitarian actors have often found it repugnant to talk about displacement in security terms, a focus on unresolved displacement as a security issue may have more resonance with governments than humanitarian or human rights arguments. In this respect, there might be ways for security actors and humanitarian/development actors to work together more intentionally to press governments to resolve displacement. For example security actors could emphasize the importance of resolving displacement as a security issue, while humanitarian/development actors could offer tangible advice on

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70 Ibid.
specific ways of doing so. It also suggests that security and humanitarian actors could more intentionally play ‘good cop/bad cop’ vis-à-vis governments.\(^71\)

➢ **Effectiveness at the local level**
There are crucial differences between ministries working at the national level on issues related to displacement, for example between education and defense ministries or between social welfare departments and interior ministries. With a few exceptions, security sector and humanitarian/development actors tend to relate to different ministries, and consequently may have very different views of displacement. Sharing information about those relationships could be an important step in working to support common objectives. Another important political difference is between governmental agencies working at the national level and sub-national or municipal authorities. The fact is that IDPs are most likely to interact with local rather than national authorities, for example with the local police and local health services. In almost all countries, there is a disconnect between policies taken at the national and local levels. In Colombia, for example, national policies on IDPs mandate the provision of a number of services, but implementation at the municipal level has been uneven at best.\(^72\) Indeed, it is likely that on the practical level of finding solutions for IDPs, the actions of local security and civilian authorities will have more of an impact than national-level policies. This suggests that international security and humanitarian/development actors alike need to support not only the development of political will by national authorities, but also the implementation of policies on the ground. This leads to the suggestion that local civil society and human rights groups must play an important monitoring role at the local level, and that international actors should support the development of robust civil society actors.

➢ **The complexity of the actors engaged**
Security sector actors take many different forms – from national security forces, peacekeeping operations, civilians working on security sector reform, and police forces as well as those involved in broader questions of justice and judicial reform. More work is needed to distinguish between the different roles, perspectives, mandates, and capacities of these different actors working in the security sphere. Similarly further attention should be focused on the relationship between the different security actors and the governments. There was acknowledgement in the brief discussion on South Sudan, that UNMISS must work with the government, and yet doing so causes it to be perceived by IDPs as taking sides in the conflict.

The question of how international actors relate to national governments is often a sensitive one for both civilian and military actors. However, it is particularly relevant to IDPs given the fact that they were displaced by conflict, and that resolving that conflict


and creating conditions for ending displacement require action by security forces. There is no getting around it – resolving displacement means that security forces must not only be able to provide security, but be trusted by the population in doing so. In order for them to play this role, institutional change in the security sector is needed. Oversight mechanisms need to be developed, reward and incentive structures need to be changed, and recruitment and vetting mechanisms need to be considered. These are all long-term, complex processes— but essential if durable solutions are to be found for the displaced. 

Similarly, there are major differences between humanitarian and development actors in terms of their relationships with national authorities. For development agencies, national ownership and capacity is absolutely essential, while humanitarian organizations have tended to operate on the principle that protecting and assisting vulnerable groups is the priority. Humanitarian and development agencies have different mandates, capacities, experiences and institutional cultures, which make it difficult for them to collaborate effectively in supporting solutions to internal displacement or resolution of refugee situations.

➢ Very different contexts

There are differences in the causes of displacement, which in turn affect solutions. In some cases (though decreasing in number), people are displaced by conflict between two warring parties. However, more common are situations where there are numerous armed groups which may have different interests in terms of displacing people or desired solutions to displacement. Displacement by criminal organizations in places such as Central America suggests that different solutions – and a different role for security forces – may be necessary than in cases where displacement results from more traditional conflicts. For example, those who have fled criminal gangs may need particular assurances that information about their whereabouts will be kept confidential.

Finally there are differences in settlement patterns of IDPs. In some cases they are concentrated in one particular part of the country (as in Northern Uganda until 2012 while others are dispersed throughout the country (as in Colombia). Some live in camps where international actors play a major role (as in Darfur), while others live in informal settlements with little international engagement (as in Syria), and still others live dispersed in urban and non-urban settings throughout the country (as in Colombia, Ukraine, and Mexico). Relationships between governments and IDPs vary tremendously; some governments want to close the “IDP file” as early as possible (as has occurred in Liberia, Kenya and Sri Lanka), others see political advantage in not finding durable solutions for IDPs for political reasons (Azerbaijan and Georgia).

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Additional questions
Some additional questions include:

➢ **Collaboration/coordination vis-à-vis funding**
Issues relating to funding affect coordination between humanitarian and security actors. Security, humanitarian and development actors sometimes find themselves in competition for funding in post-conflict situations which can create obstacles to better coordination. Even when conflicts end, there is still a need for humanitarian funding at the same time that development funds are needed to support essential tasks such as reconstruction and the development of rule of law. All of these impede coordination that might otherwise improve peacebuilding and speed up access to potential durable solutions to displacement. At present, there are no potential solutions to this in place.

➢ **Refugee>IDP “spoilers” and human rights concerns**
As noted earlier, refugees and IDPs, particularly those in protracted situations without access to livelihoods, can threaten peace processes. Settlements and camps may serve as safe havens for rebels or groups who are not seeking peace, and large numbers of marginalized, impoverished displaced persons along borders, in slums, or in remote rural areas can threaten stability and security, and upend peace processes. While IDPs may present security threats, at the same time, it can be dangerous to “securitize” the displaced too much, as those seeking to repress the rights of the displaced often use security-related arguments. Politicians, for example, may argue that the displaced must remain in settlements or camps without freedom of movement or the right to work because they are a danger. This may be untrue and simply an excuse to repress, which, in turn, may make the situation worse. Finding the right balance between associating the displaced with security and not “over-securitizing” their situation is important to the discussion.

➢ **Organized crime**
Refugee>IDP settlements and camps are too often ripe for organized criminal actors to flourish. Zaatari Camp in Jordan, for example, is notorious for lawlessness and a proliferation of organized crime, creating a host of problems for Syrian refugees, local communities and Jordan more broadly. A lack of security actors—both Jordanian and among refugees—has fostered the ability of organized criminal actors to operate. Consequently refugees in the camp and Jordanians living nearby fear the forced recruitment of teenage boys, gender-based violence toward women, and other serious security issues. There has been little research carried out on organized crime in camps or settlements, and security actors and humanitarian/development actors alike have an interest in addressing it to a greater extent.

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➢ **Protracted cases**
Protracted displacement can also exacerbate security problems. Refugees or IDPs living “in limbo” without prospects of durable solutions, without livelihood options and stigmatized as “others” or “less than” can create resentment and instability. These situations, if left to fester, can also derail delicate peace processes. Without adequate security—both military and police protection that is trustworthy, accountable, and transparent—are inherently unstable. As noted above, tensions with host communities may increase over time. Durable solutions in protracted situations are also elusive because political stalemates can become entrenched. And unlike emergency crises that remain in the news headlines, the media and international community usually lose interest in these “frozen” protracted situations, particularly as new crises emerge.

➢ **Gender**
Both those working on security and on durable solutions should consider the gender dimension of their actions. In Liberia, for example, women’s groups played an important role in the peace process in raising issues around refugees and displacement. Women’s groups often play an important role both in humanitarian assistance and in supporting durable solutions. For example, sometimes displaced women find it easier to find jobs than men, leading to changing gender roles within the family (and sometimes to increases in sexual and gender-based violence). Another more positive aspect is that gender roles can change during displacement, women in IDP communities may take on leadership that is essential to acknowledge and factor in during peacebuilding, reconstruction, SSR, DDR and other processes. Women’s groups and women in leadership positions may also pose unique opportunities to improve the sustainability of peace.75

➢ **Labels**
Participants also raised the issue of labels, both in the context of stigmatizing the displaced (perhaps justifying less police or military attention) and in terms of distinguishing between groups in particular need of assistance. While the humanitarian community has traditionally focused on refugees and, to a lesser extent, IDPs, the lines between these two groups are often blurred. For example, returning refugees who are unable to return to their communities of origin become IDPs. Moreover, other groups – such as those displaced by disasters, stateless people, besieged communities and migrants caught up in crises – may have similar needs for protection and assistance but be inaccessible or ignored by international actors. In addition, people often fall into several categories such as displaced person and ex-combatant, or former child soldier. The way the displaced are labeled and stigmatized has direct bearing on how security actors perceive them and subsequently offer protection.

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75 “Addressing Internal Displacement,” Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2007. A range of scholarship has been conducted relating to how gender roles can change during displacement (see, for example, “Gender and Displacement,” * Forced Migration Review*, December 2000). For example, traditional gender roles from village life may be altered when the displaced spend years in a camp or settlement managed by international actors that value and promote gender equality, women’s empowerment and other types of initiatives. All of these changes relate to durable solutions and the wider security picture in conflict and post-conflict settings.
The way forward

Future research should include deeper exploration of the relationship between contextual variables, such as government attitudes and characteristics of IDP situations, and the different roles played by security and humanitarian actors.\footnote{Creating a “relationship matrix” might also reveal more about these relationships.} For example, when a state is responsible for displacing people, better understanding is needed on how this affects its relationships with other actors, including relationships with security actors working in peacekeeping operations and security sector reform, and with humanitarian/development actors. Likewise, further research should explore cases where the government plays security and humanitarian/development actors against each other, and other times when these actors are working in ways that are mutually supportive. These relationships might also change with the passing of time as conflict and/or displacement becomes protracted, and may also vary depending on whether IDPs are living in rural camp settings versus urban settings. Rather than generalizing about how security actors support solutions to displacement, it might be helpful to focus on specific cases, such as the role of police in defusing community tension in certain urban neighborhoods such that IDPs can integrate into local communities.

There are also institutional interests which influence the nature of interactions between actors working in different areas. It seems true across the board that as actors develop more expertise and become more professional, they develop ways of working (such as increasingly sophisticated terminology and narrower specializations) that make it difficult to interact with others outside their area. This does not just apply to differences between military and humanitarian/development actors, but even within different sectors. Military actors, for example, may tend to lump all civilian agencies together (while those agencies bristle at the suggestion that UNDP and ICRC can be considered in the same category). And civilian agencies tend to lump all security actors together as “the military,” underestimating differences between branches of national military forces as well as between military, police, and peacekeeping branches. A better understanding of institutional characteristics and constraints within and between the different sectors would be a concrete way of beginning to bridge some of the differences. But this is a time-consuming endeavor. Civilian affairs officers in military forces provide important liaison roles, as do those working on civ-mil issues within humanitarian/development actors. One concrete suggestion would be to expand the number and role of these liaison officers as a way of bridging the gap.

Although this concluding section has focused on some of the “big-picture” issues which complicate finding durable solutions for IDPs – and some of the limitations of international actors generally – some specific and hopefully actionable recommendations for improving coordination between the security sector and humanitarian/development actors include:

➢ Increased training of peacekeeping forces on displacement and on the role of humanitarian/development actors. Peacekeeping forces need more and different capabilities to step in as a security provider as well as an actor that may or may
not be appropriate to help to slowly build trust in the national security forces. It would be particularly helpful to examine lessons learned from UNMISS in South Sudan and to disseminate those lessons broadly within the international community.

➢ Increasing training and support for humanitarian/development and security actors to engage with each other in considering solutions to displacement. For example, it might be helpful to look at relatively successful cases where displacement was resolved (e.g. Northern Uganda and focus on the role played by different actors).

➢ Organizing joint meetings between security sector and civilian representatives at both headquarters and field levels to discuss ways of finding solutions for internal displacement or supporting solutions for refugees. These could result in coordinated plans which give consideration to overall funding needs and decrease competition between different types of actors working toward the same end.

➢ Refining needs assessments and programming so that SSR actors incorporate IDPs and local communities, and focus on building trust with populations. Conversely humanitarian/development actors should include security and justice needs of the displaced in their assessment tools.

➢ Humanitarian actors would be well-advised to pay attention to longer-term peacebuilding activities and to transitional justice mechanisms. It is difficult when humanitarian needs are so pressing to step back and look at these larger issues, and yet they are likely to be the “exit strategy” for humanitarian actors.

Improving collaboration between security and humanitarian/development sectors in resolving displacement is not an easy undertaking, but as this study has illustrated, doing so can not only contribute to stability and peace, but can enable millions of people to get on with their lives.
APPENDIX A: SHORT REPORT FROM THE WORKSHOP

Summary
On May 8, 2015, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement convened a workshop at the Australian Mission to the United Nations, which brought together scholars, government, UN, and IGO/NGO experts to look at the role of military and police forces in resolving displacement. This workshop was part of a larger research project supported by the Australian Civil-Military Centre. Participants prepared by reading the four case studies commissioned by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement (Kosovo, Colombia, Liberia, Timor Leste), as well as the concept note (see appendices for links to the case studies and the concept note). The workshop focused on tracing the intersections between security, development, and humanitarian actors, with a particular focus on security sector reform and peace support operations. It highlighted the importance of coordination between humanitarian, development, and military actors in working together to find durable solutions to displacement. After the welcome and introduction, there were two panels, the first of which examined connections between security sector reform (SSR), peacebuilding, and ending displacement. The second focused on how peace operations could more effectively support durable solutions to displacement. There was also time for formal and informal discussions following the panels.

Opening remarks and introduction
The workshop opened with a welcome and statement by Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations, Caitlin Wilson. Her comments helped frame the workshop by highlighting key issues relating to police, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and finding durable solutions to displacement. She emphasized that restoration of national authority is key to protection and that national protection mechanisms are linked to sustainable development goals.

Beth Ferris, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, then provided an introduction to the day’s discussion and an overview of the relationship between displacement and peace processes. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) tend to be given limited roles in peace negotiations and when they are referenced in peace agreements, it is usually only in terms of their return home, rather than the range of durable solutions outlined in international law. She stressed that displacement and security are interconnected. IDPs cannot return or find other solutions without security. At the same time, it is difficult to provide security and stability when large numbers of people are displaced. Too often the peacebuilding/security component is considered separately from durable solutions discussions, and actors in the security and humanitarian relief/development sectors tend to work separately. The UN,

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77 Note: Chatham House Rules applied during the workshop so that participants could speak more freely.
78 The Brookings-LSE Project would like to extend a special thanks to the Australian Mission to the United Nations, who helped make this workshop possible by providing the venue and logistical assistance, as well as substantive input, analysis, and preparatory insight.
governments of affected countries, donor governments, NGOs, and academics all struggle with this disconnect.

Participants were thus challenged to consider the siloes in which we work, many of which are the products of humanitarian and security professionals simply being so busy and with the lack of tangible career pay-offs to work with institutions beyond one’s own sector. Cooperation between security, humanitarian, and development actors is further limited by different institutional mandates, constituencies, cultures, budgets and capacity constraints. By bringing together participants from different organizations and different areas of expertise, this workshop sought to identify ways of improving collaboration between those working to find solutions to displacement and those with a mandate to enhance security and stability in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Session I: Examining connections between Security Sector Reform (SSR), peacebuilding and ending displacement

- **Durable solutions and security**
  Displacement occurs because of the lack of security as well as the loss of livelihoods and breakdown of social services which result from conflict. In some cases, displacement is more than a by-product of conflict, but rather is an *explicit objective* of armed groups, seeking ethnic/sectarian cleansing or control of territory. Governments, who are responsible under international law for protecting and assisting IDPs, have often played a role in displacing people. Understanding and addressing the root causes of conflict are thus difficult and complex tasks. And yet it is difficult to find durable solutions for those displaced without tackling these root causes. Moreover, large-scale displacement itself can actually become a source of conflict or political instability, especially in cases where displacement is the product of identity or sectarian conflict.

Durable solutions require political commitment and political solutions. The international community often talks of the humanitarian/development nexus, but there is a need to reconsider it as a relief “and” development process rather than a relief “to” development process; it is not a linear process. It is also important to acknowledge the importance of a triangular relationship that includes political/humanitarian/development considerations. Too often actors pass the buck between humanitarian aid and development projects without acknowledging the need for political action. Security, humanitarian and development actors also sometimes find themselves in competition for funding in post-conflict situations which can create obstacles to better coordination. Even when conflicts end, there is still a need for humanitarian funding at the same time that development funds are needed to support essential tasks such as reconstruction and the development of rule of law.

A holistic perspective is needed so that the needs of both host communities and IDPs are addressed in order to avoid further conflict, particularly over livelihoods and land. One participant cited the example of Cambodia, where refugees returned but
issues over land ownership led to tensions between returning refugees and those who had remained – tensions which lasted for years.

Speakers also noted that displaced persons—including both refugees and IDPs—are often perceived as victims or second-class citizens, and thus are not entitled to the same level of security services as other citizens. A lack of security for the displaced can jeopardize broader peace and security.

Some participants stressed the need to look beyond traditional, narrow understandings of security focusing on physical safety, to broader conceptions of human security affecting not only those who are displaced, but also groups such as besieged populations and stateless people who are often excluded in these discussions.

➢ **SSR in particular**

Security sector reform, a key component of post-conflict programming, is not a technical exercise, but rather is a hugely political undertaking with significant implications for solutions to displacement. Reintegration of IDPs and refugees depends on protection and effective law enforcement. In communities with a large number of IDPs, security forces often have a large role in reconstruction and creating connections between IDPs and host communities, particularly in cases where there is competition over resources and livelihoods. In Bosnia, for example, military escorts were needed to support returnees as they went back to reclaim houses. Likewise in Cambodia, the military contributed to the security of refugees returning by train. At the very least, security forces are needed to help maintain order as rebuilding happens. In some cases, security forces may be the only actor with the ability to do “heavy lifting” (e.g. help move heavy machinery or large loads of supplies).

One way that SSR can contribute to solutions to displacement is by developing and implementing vetting processes to ensure that the perpetrators of violence that led to displacement do not end up in the security sector. The case studies of Kosovo and Colombia also demonstrate that SSR actors can practically link to durable solutions to displacement when SSR actors incorporate IDPs and local communities in needs assessments and programming for SSR. SSR actors can also play an essential role in rebuilding trust between those displaced and the new security and political sectors. Just as SSR actors should consider the impact of their activities on displaced populations, humanitarian and development actors should include security and justice needs of the displaced, and SSR programming in assessments and programming for sustainable solutions.

Speakers also commented on new trends, including the fact that massive numbers of IDPs have taken refuge in UN compounds in South Sudan, and complex operations such as the one in Central African Republic, where populations needed to be evacuated in order to protect them. The case studies prepared for the workshop, including Colombia and Kosovo, brought out broader themes in the discussion, including the need for the displaced to have more than just effective...
security forces protecting them, but also a sense of trust in security actors before returning to their communities of origin or integrating into host communities. In many cases the state was the perpetrator of violence that caused displacement, and thus efforts to reform the security sector are essential to both protect those who are displaced as well as to contribute to durable solutions. In order for displaced persons to see security actors as trustworthy and legitimate, they need to see accountability for past and potential future wrongs. They also need to feel that the security forces represent their communities and to see security and justice as a public service, which includes justice for past wrongs, solutions to property disputes, and access to justice services. There are also opportunities to apply lessons learned from civ-mil coordination mechanisms in other areas to strengthen relations between those working on SSR and resolving displacement.

- **Discussion**
  In the discussion, participants emphasized the importance of humanitarian engagement with peacebuilding processes. Providing emergency assistance year after year is not a solution. Moreover, it is important at the outset of a crisis to think about what will happen in five or six years. National government and development partners need to be engaged from the outset in thinking about long-term solutions, even in the earliest phases of emergency response. Given the protracted nature of displacement, one participant suggested that actors need to develop outcome goals or targets: “In X years, how many of the displaced can be returned or integrated?” But more is needed beyond enhancing collaboration between those working on displacement and SSR. Several participants emphasized that UN member states need to hold each other accountable for protecting civilians. In situations such as Syria where displacement is used as a weapon of war and communities are besieged, there is a need to clearly call out whoever is responsible. The Security Council should make issues around both the protection of civilians and resolving displacement central to its work. And the Security Council needs to recognize that there are solutions other than return for those who are displaced.

Participants also noted that the time is right to push for greater collaboration between different actors. Indeed, there is a confluence of global reviews of peace support operations and sustainable development goals. The upcoming World Humanitarian Summit will also be an opportune time to highlight the connections between peacebuilding and humanitarian action, such as resolving displacement.

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79 In 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which was to make a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN peace operations today, and the emerging needs of the future. It was the first such panel to examine both peacekeeping operations and special political missions. For more, see http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49221#.VVfVvEv6H8E.

80 See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org for more.
Session II: How can peace operations more effectively support solutions to displacement

- Considering some examples, including South Sudan
  The second session considered how peace operations can more effectively support solutions to displacement, beginning with an examination of the particular challenges to durable solutions and security in South Sudan, which is a continually unfolding emergency. Presently almost 120,000 IDPs have sought protection in UNMISS bases. These UN peacekeeping forces have been unable to protect all of the IDPs, or even to meet the basic needs of IDPs living on the bases. The IDPs do not necessarily trust the peacekeepers, who are not seen as neutral and are vilified by the population, and the peacekeepers have focused on protecting the bases themselves and have been unable to guarantee protection outside of the camps – where 90 percent of IDPs are living.

  There has been significant pressure from UN headquarters and from some leadership within the mission around the peacekeeping mission on ground to relocate people currently living in the bases to other places. There are also concerns that UNMISS cannot protect civilians within bases if they were overrun by militias. The peacekeeping forces also face financial and staffing pressures, and struggle to protect their own staff, installations and assets in addition to civilians.

- Broader concerns and comments on peacekeeping amidst displacement
  Participants raised the question of how the UN can carry out peacebuilding in partnership with governments that are perpetrating human rights violations and causing displacement in the first place. Among the lessons learned from the South Sudan case and more broadly in reference to peacekeeping, humanitarian and development work, speakers noted that integrated missions can perform well when there is strong leadership from OCHA; more clarity on red lines in negotiating access; more information sharing between peacekeepers and other actors; a strong protection cluster (UNHCR needs to be especially strong, particularly when the government is the perpetrator of human rights violations); a strong civilian component to peacekeeping; biometric registration; more flexibility with executive orders for police to provide protection; creative thinking around how the UN and countries with more experience in vetting security actors can work together; more independent analyses of conflicts; and more coordination between donors and embassies.

  Speakers during this session also reminded the group that peacekeepers and police forces cannot do everything and be everywhere, and are not a one-size-fits-all solution (“they are paramedics, not elective plastic surgeons”). Police in particular are not always armed, and while they may be able to provide some policing functions, they are generally deployed to offer advice and to build the capacity of the host state police force. This is obviously a difficult task when the state is complicit in the abuses. Moreover, peacekeeping operations do not usually have executive mandates which allow them to arrest people. While they usually have the authority to detain, they then turn over those arrested to the national criminal justice system that may not comply with international standards. Ultimately the key role of uniformed
personnel in post-conflict settings is to restore public safety, which in part requires understanding why people are displaced. Once that is identified, both a counter-force and internal reform are needed.

Participants once again highlighted the need to address the stigma attached to IDPs. An IDP camp of 60,000 people, for example, is not served in the way as a town of 60,000 (which would have a town hall, courthouse, police forces, and other security and justice institutions). IDPs are somehow seen as being less entitled to support and there is thus a need to emphasize that while IDPs have specific vulnerabilities due to their displacement, they are entitled to the same rights as all citizens and others living within the territory.

- **Discussion**
  - In response, participants offered a variety of questions and comments. Some reiterated the “do no harm” principle, given the reported sexual abuses by French soldiers in the Central African Republic, which speaks to broader concerns about accountability for peacekeepers. Indeed, accountability for peacekeepers’ actions is also needed for the displaced to gain trust in their presence and actions. Emerging from conflict situations where security institutions failed to provide safety or were complicit or responsible for displacement, it is not surprising that displaced populations are often wary of peacekeeping forces or other security actors. Many also see organized crime thrive in the absence of proper police and security forces among displaced populations who are lacking solutions. Thus, peacekeepers and other security actors must actively earn the trust of displaced persons.

  At the same time, there is a need to strengthen not just peacekeeping and law enforcement personnel, but also broader institutional capacity, such as relevant ministries. Others noted the key role played by civilian components of peacekeeping (e.g. civil affairs officers, protection advisors), who may be well-placed to serve as links with the humanitarian community.

  Participants also emphasized that peacekeeping institutions need to be aware of the particular vulnerabilities of IDPs, and to incorporate this analysis into their assessments and plans. Although many peacekeepers on the ground routinely see the intersection between activities such as the protection of civilians, security sector reform, and displacement at the headquarters’ level, these are usually dealt with by different agencies or departments.

  Other participants commented on terminology, and the ways that actors still struggle to define and understand concepts like SSR (versus rule of law/justice) and durable solutions (versus protection). These concepts have been the subject of discussion for years, but there are still gaps between conceptual and practical understandings of the terms. In order to resolve displacement in the long term, national governments must include IDPs in their own national development plans.
**Conclusions and moving forward**

In summing up, Elizabeth Ferris emphasized the need to look for solutions from the beginning of a crisis (e.g. Ukraine is showing all the signs of becoming a protracted crisis) and suggested that the security of displaced people is essential not only to finding solutions to displacement, but also to long-term peace and stability in the affected country. The intersections between security and displacement suggest many areas of overlap and mutual interest between security, development and humanitarian relief sectors.

Some of the main themes emerging from this workshop that deserve further discussion and exploration include:

- The central role of restoration of public safety in resolving displacement;
- The need to do everything possible to break out of the siloes in which both national and international actors work;
- The need to recognize that linear solutions are not effective and that development, humanitarian and political actors need to work simultaneously and with each other;
- The recognition that actors seeking better collaboration are not starting from scratch. There are some cases where there have been good relations between military and humanitarians, as in the Balkans and Cambodia in supporting solutions to displacement;
- There is a need for stronger information flows between those working on DDR and SSR in post-conflict situations with those humanitarian and development actors focused on resolving displacement;
- Those working on peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations need to recognize durable solutions to displacement as their only “exit strategy;”
- After security, the question of livelihoods is the most important factor shaping durable solutions to displacement;
- Durable solutions to displacement are unlikely without security actors (e.g. the recovery of property);
- Using civilian advisors in peacekeeping operations may help to build links between security and humanitarian actors;
- This particular moment in time offers many opportunities to advance collaboration between these disparate sectors, including the review of peace operations, the review of peacebuilding, and the review of the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325, as well as the discussions around the Sustainable Development Goals, the World Humanitarian Summit and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Beijing+20) process.

This workshop will feed into a longer, more substantive report prepared by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, highlighting many of the themes and issues that emerged, and outlining some recommendations for enhancing collaboration between actors working on peacebuilding/security and humanitarian/relief/development for durable solutions to displacement.
Appendix B: Agenda for Workshop

The Role of Civil-Military-Police Coordination in Supporting Durable Solutions to Displacement
May 8, 2015
Agenda

8:45 A.M. Coffee/tea

9:15-9:30 A.M. Welcome and Introduction
- Caitlin Wilson, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations
- Elizabeth Ferris, Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement

9:30-10:45 A.M. Examining connections between SSR, peacebuilding and ending displacement
- Izumi Nakamitsu, Assistant Secretary-General and Assistant Administrator, Crisis Response Unit, UNDP
- Udo Janz, Director, UNHCR New York
- Maria Derks-Normandin, Consultant, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement

10:45-11:00 A.M. Break

11:00 A.M.-12:00 P.M. How can Peace Support Operations more effectively support solutions to displacement
- Alison Giffen, Senior Associate and Co-Director of Future of Peace Operations Program, Stimson Center
- Andrew Carpenter, Chief, Strategic Policy and Development Section, Police Division for Peacekeeping Operations

12:00-12:15 Brief discussion and closing remarks
- Elizabeth Ferris, Senior Fellow and Co-Director, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement

12:15-1:15 P.M. Lunch

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81 The agenda was adjusted the day of the workshop in order to accommodate some last-minute changes. Two speakers were unable to attend, and the last panel was thus canceled. Instead, the other two sessions were given more time with the intention that speakers could go a little longer and that there would be more time for discussion.
APPENDIX C: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN WORKSHOP

1. Raiman Khalid Al-Hamdani, Yemeni Mission to the UN
2. Mohammed Alnaqshabandi, Iraqi Mission to the UN
3. Katrina Burgess, Canadian Mission to the UN
4. Aurelien Buffler, OCHA
5. Andrew Carpenter, Police Division for Peacekeeping Operations
6. Ha Thanh Chung, Vietnamese Mission to the UN
7. Leah Denman, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement
8. Julio Dery, Philippine Mission to the UN
9. Maria Derks-Normandin, Consultant, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement
10. Elizabeth Ferris, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement
11. Alison Giffen, Stimson Center
12. Jaime Fernando Hidalgo, Philippine Mission to the UN
13. Ernesto Granillo, ICRC
14. Agnes Hurwitz, UNHCR
15. Udo Janz, UNHCR
16. Allanah Kjellgren, Australian Mission to the UN
17. Hilde Klemetsdal, Norwegian Mission to the UN
18. Hossein Maleki, Iranian Mission to the UN
19. Zoe Martin, Australian Mission to the UN
20. Sarah Miller, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement
21. Izumi Nakamitsu, UNDP
22. Aroldo Rodriguez, Argentine Mission to the UN
23. Bianca Selway, Australian Mission to the UN
24. Leanne Smith, DPKO
25. Eugeniusz Szajbel, EU Liaison to the UN
26. Elio Tamburi, UN-DPA
27. Sonam Tobgye, Bhutanese Mission to the UN
28. Louise Virenfeldt, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement
29. Ambassador Caitlin Wilson, Australian Mission to the UN
Appendix D: Concept Note for Workshop

Concept note and links to case studies

Introducing the issues
Finding durable solutions for those displaced by the conflict is critical to building sustainable peace in post-conflict situations. When refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) are unable to find solutions to their displacement, stability and peace are more difficult to sustain. Rather than being a part of the peace and rebuilding process, refugees and IDPs may be left out at best, or at worst, become obstacles to maintaining peace and stability. At the same time, durable solutions for the displaced usually depend on ending the conflict and establishing security, rule of law and legitimate government in areas where the displaced are living or to which they hope to return. Put simply, without security, there cannot be solutions to displacement; and without solutions to displacement, peace and security can be challenging to maintain.

This complex relationship has received increased attention, as underscored in several recent reports by the UN Secretary-General. However, in practice organizations that focus on displacement and actors that work on peacebuilding, security and conflict prevention tend work separately with little overlap, and lack knowledge of how durable solutions strategies and peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies may be combined. Indeed, peace operations and the overarching peacebuilding architecture do not always intersect with plans for durable solutions to displacement. The different sets of actors working on displacement on the one hand, and peacebuilding and security on the other, do not always coordinate with one another, or even take into account broader implications for this complex relationship. Moreover the existing infrastructure of relations between these actors may not be well-suited for greater collaboration.

With the support of the Australian Civil-Military Centre, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement is holding a half-day workshop on the role of military and police forces in supporting durable solutions to displacement in post-conflict situations. The workshop is intended to expand the understanding of the synergies between peacebuilding, conflict prevention and durable solutions to displacement. It also seeks to inform and strengthen the capacity of key actors (including states and UN agencies such as UNHCR and UNDP) to integrate the resolution of displacement into peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies. The workshop is being hosted by the Australian Mission to the United Nations on 8 May 2015.

The results of this workshop, together with previously-published case studies (briefly described on the next page), will feed into a longer research brief published by

Brookings on the role of the military and police in supporting solutions to displacement in post-conflict situations. The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement has worked for over twenty years to promote more effective national, regional and international responses to internal displacement and to support the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs. In recent years, the Project has focused much of its work on the challenging question of how to support solutions for IDPs.

Case studies informing the discussion
Four case studies were commissioned by experts in security sector reform and displacement to examine the connections between peacebuilding/conflict resolution and durable solutions to displacement in Kosovo, Timor Leste, Liberia and Colombia. In all four cases, conflicts caused widespread displacement and in all four cases, military forces and issues of security sector reform have had an impact on both the conflict and displacement. Broadly speaking, the cases further demonstrate the need for overlap in planning and response strategies between military, police, humanitarian and civilian actors.

In Kosovo, security and justice developments directly impacted durable solutions for the displaced. Trust-building within security sector reform (SSR) was essential to assuage the mistrust of IDPs toward security actors. Without trust, durable solutions could not even begin to be entertained and without solutions for the displaced, progress toward peace and security was difficult. For the international community, the Kosovo case demonstrates the intrinsic link between SSR efforts and durable solutions. Both humanitarian and security actors need better communication and coordination.

While there were a number of successful humanitarian, peacebuilding and development initiatives in Timor Leste, those successes were compartmentalized. Lessons from reconciliation and peacebuilding activities were not applied to a transitional development plan, and the 2006 crisis could have been mitigated if more attention had been paid to ensuring that the returns of IDPs carried out in 1999 had been durable ones.

Experiences in Liberia – where most of the population was displaced at one time or another during the country’s fourteen years of war – indicate some of the difficulties that result when a government is anxious to close the IDP file before durable solutions are found.

The case of Colombia demonstrates that SSR efforts need to address IDP security concerns directly in order to succeed more broadly. This includes addressing impunity within the security sector itself, and ensuring that local security needs are taken into account in security operations in order to limit further displacement. The case study also

83 For some preliminary reflections on the interconnections and links to the four case studies, see http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/09/17-durable-solutions-displacement-peacebuilding-ferris
indicated that local voices – of those who implement SSR and IDP policies at the local level, as well as local communities that are supposed to benefit from them – are essential to ensure that plans developed at the national level address the appropriate issues at the local level, and have the appropriate resources, capacity and support to be effectively implemented.

Kosovo case study available at:  

Colombia case study available at:  

Timor Leste case study available at:  

Liberia case study available at:  
**Appendix E: Quick Reference to Integrating Internal Displacement**


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INTEGRATING INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: QUICK REFERENCE

**STEP 1: ASSESS THE CAUSES, DYNAMICS, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT**
- Be Clear about Why Internal Displacement Matters for Peace
  - IDPs may directly affect the peace process in positive or negative ways
  - Explicitly addressing the specific needs and interests of IDPs can help in resolving some of the causes of the conflict
- Ending internal displacement in durable ways is essential to building and sustaining peace and to address one of the most burdensome legacies of armed conflict
- Understand the Causes and Patterns of Displacement and the Role of the Parties
- Understand the Characteristics of IDP Groups
  - Be aware that the IDP community in a particular situation will likely not be a monolithic bloc
  - Consider characteristics of IDP groups including leadership structures and any linkages to belligerents
- Evaluate the Role of IDPs as Actors in the Peace Process
  - On the basis of size of IDP constituency, degree of leverage IDPs can exert on the parties or the process, security arrangements associated with engaging IDPs, ability to secure commitments from parties for active IDP participation

**STEP 2: CREATE A FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATING INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT**
- Use a Mission Statement to Guide the Integration of Internal Displacement
- Understand the Legal and Policy Foundations
  - Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
  - National Legislation
  - International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law
  - Resolutions, Declarations, and Decisions of International Organizations
- Apply the Framework to Assist Mediation Efforts
  - Create space for consultation with or even participation of IDPs in peace processes
  - Identify those IDP-specific human rights and interests that should be reflected in peace agreements
  - Keep the end goal in view
  - Empower IDPs to contribute to peace processes
  - Avoid political manipulation of internal displacement

**STEP 3: ENGAGE IDPs IN THE PEACE PROCESS**
- Assess Different Processes for Consulting with IDPs
  - Stand-alone processes/linked processes/inclusive processes
- Decide on the Type of Process
- Consider General Guidance for Engaging with IDPs
  - Seek informed consent and be clear about expectations
  - Be available for consultation and communication
  - Demonstrate commitment to the concerns and interests of IDPs
  - Design the method of consultation to fit the purpose
  - Identify representative and credible IDP interlocutors
  - Ensure security and confidentiality of IDP interlocutors
- Engage IDPs throughout the Stages of a Peace Process
  - Stage 1: Mediation Process Design, Pre-negotiation Preparation, and Consultation
  - Stage 2: Internal Consensus Building
  - Stage 3: Seeking Agreement between the Parties
  - Stage 4: Implementation
- Troubleshooting: How to Overcome Obstacles to the Engagement of IDPs
  - Deal with Elusive Views among IDPs
  - Deal with Refusal of the Parties to IDP Participation
  - Deal with Inadequate Resources or Time for Full Consultation

**STEP 4: INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF IDPs IN THE PEACE AGREEMENT**
- Consider Two Key Issues
  - Where to Place Provisions on Internal Displacement
  - How to Balance Maximalist and Pragmatic Approaches
- Focus on Areas
  - Use clear and consistent definitions
  - Incorporate displacement-specific rights and protections
  - Incorporate interests of IDPs
  - Specify roles and obligations of relevant actors with regard to IDPs
  - Specify clear implementation process

**NOTE:** Steps are not sequential. They overlap and should be performed throughout the entire process.
The Role of Civil-Military-Police Coordination in Supporting Durable Solutions to Displacement