Increasing the Size and Power of the U.S. Military

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Summary

Facing the dangerous world of the 21st century, the U.S. military is too small to meet current needs or expected contingencies. After opposing force increases for many years, the Administration, through the new Secretary of Defense, proposed in January 2007 a combined increase in active-duty soldiers and Marines of some 65,000 above current levels. Even greater increases in the size of the ground forces may be prudent. Highly plausible scenarios involving Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other large countries (such as Indonesia, Congo, and Nigeria) illustrate the need to provide the next President with the capacity to muster large new forces without delay.

This growth should occur without a return to a military draft, which would be impractical in terms of numbers and counterproductive in terms of maintaining personnel quality. Additionally, investments in technologies are needed, in order to replace outmoded systems and to maintain our military's edge. Some savings can be achieved, but, in general, overall requirements portend a substantial increase in the defense budget over several years.

Context

There is a rational need to worry about America's security in a fiery world. Today, war is common and ongoing; tomorrow, additional conflicts are quite possible. Consider, for example, the Iranian government's repeated rejection of international demands to stop enriching uranium. What will happen if a U.S. or Israeli government becomes

convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? One need not consider the military option the best or most likely instrument of American policy in this setting to recognize the possibility that it may be used—and that the plausible capacity to threaten its use may be critical for achieving a viable policy outcome. North Korea, of course, has crossed the nuclear threshold already, creating significant regional ripples. Although in the background for now, Sino-Taiwanese tensions remain serious, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Venezuela and the United States, and others. Key countries like Pakistan and Indonesia also continue to struggle with possible challenges to their internal cohesion.

As bad as things are in Iraq, they could get worse. What would happen if Shi'ite ayatollah Ali al Sistani were to die, if Moqtada al Sadr were to lose control of his militias (as may be happening already), or if another attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing were to occur? Meanwhile, Afghanistan's stability appears to hinge largely on its president, Hamid Karzai, whose influence within the country may be eroding. That stability could come apart if Taliban fighters in Waziristan, who have entered into a cease fire with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, cross the porous border.

Sound U.S. grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that the world is long going to be a very unsettled, dangerous place. Responses to this recognition must go beyond rhetoric to the development of armed forces capable of protecting America's vital interests through a hazardous arc of time.

Build Up Military Forces

The U.S. military now suffers from the greatest strain it has encountered since conscription ended in 1973. Soldiers and Marines are deploying for their third tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, and historical evidence suggests that the third tour seriously erodes morale and reenlistment rates. We must anticipate the possibility that our remarkable men and women in uniform at some point will begin to crack, despite the resilience and dedication they have shown to date. Many analysts believe

that even multiple redeployments are not providing enough boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, in neither country have U.S. forces been able to provide security to the citizenry, an essential precondition for successful counter-insurgency operations. The new "surge strategy" that one of the authors (Kagan) has advocated (and the other has supported, at least on a provisional basis) will strain the force further.

The U.S. military is simply too small to meet current needs or expected contingencies. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has realized this point and, in January 2007, proposed a combined increase in active-duty soldiers and Marines of some 92,000 above current levels—but only after too many years of resistance from the administration. It is not clear, however, that, in the face of a challenging recruiting environment, he has found adequate mechanisms to induce more individuals to join the Army and Marine Corps. Moreover, in our judgment, even greater increases in the size of the ground forces may be prudent.

How large do U.S. forces need to be? Iraq and Afghanistan could engage well over 100,000 soldiers for many years. In addition, even a cursory look at potential crises turns up several that would demand the prolonged deployment of large numbers of U.S. forces Regime collapse in Pakistan, or regime change in Iran, easily could require an American commitment of 200,000-300,000 soldiers, as could various scenarios for conflict in Korea.

Moreover, we must prepare for the aftermath of combat. Most recent significant American combat operations have initiated long-term deployments of U.S. soldiers, Marines, sailors, and airmen, which have significantly outlasted hostilities. U.S. forces remained in Panama after the 1989 operation, in and around the Persian Gulf for 12 years after Operation Desert Storm, in Bosnia for a decade after the Dayton Accords, in Kosovo after the 1999 attack on Slobodan Milosevic, and, of course, in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003. The only two significant operations that did not see a substantial post-conflict deployment were the debacle in Somalia in 1993 and the peaceful regime change in Haiti in 1994—both strategic failures. Expanding the

historical horizon only makes the point sharper. Consider America's prolonged deployments in Germany and Japan after World War II, in Korea after 1953, and in the South after the Civil War. Protracted post-war deployments are more common than not, and often essential to success, especially in regime-change situations.

Although modified slightly by the Bush administration, the United States retains a strategic doctrine requiring that our military be prepared to fight in two theaters simultaneously. The logic of being able to do more than one thing at a time is rock solid. Even when involved in one major conflict, the United States needs additional capability to deter other crises, as well as to maintain forward presence, carry out joint exercises with allies, and handle smaller problems. Stretched almost to the breaking point in Iraq, the U.S. military now is patently unable to contemplate another war with anything less than horror. Our inability to cope with an additional crisis only increases the likelihood that one will emerge, as opportunistic enemies exploit our weakness.

There should be little debate over the proper direction of change: both the Army and Marine Corps must grow, as fast as is practicable, for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the change is badly overdue, and, as a result, increasingly hard to accomplish.

Prepare for Possible Scenarios

Beyond Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and Korea, the United States may have to address several additional potential crises through military means. The following scenarios do not advocate a particular approach to any of these situations, since solutions will have to be tailored to fit precise circumstances; rather, they put a firm, lasting floor under the size of American ground forces in the future. For present planning, together with the ongoing strains of Iraq and Afghanistan, these scenarios are further strong evidence of the need for a dramatically larger force.

Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe in South Asia

A collapsed Pakistan ranks very high on the list of military scenarios that would threaten U.S. vital interests. The combination of Islamic extremists and nuclear

weapons is extremely toxic; if parts of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal fall into the wrong hands, Al Qaeda could gain access to a nuclear device.

Granted, Pakistan's collapse appears unlikely in light of its relatively pro-Western, secular officer corps. But, the intelligence services, which created the Taliban and apparently abetted Islamic extremists in Kashmir, are less dependable. And, the country as a whole is so heavily infiltrated by fundamentalist groups—as multiple assassination attempts against President Musharraf make clear—that the terrifying scenario of civil chaos must be considered.

It is unclear how the United States and like-minded states would or should respond to a rise to power of extremist forces in Pakistan. Surgical strikes on nuclear targets are unlikely, because extremists might be able to seize these assets beforehand, because the United States probably would not know the location of nuclear weapons and materials precisely enough to strike them, and because any Pakistani government would oppose such a move, even under duress. The only alternative might be to try to restore order before the weapons could be taken by extremists and transferred to terrorists. In the event of a ground intervention, the scale of the undertaking could be breathtaking. Pakistan has a population of more than 150 million, a land area roughly twice that of Iraq, and a vast perimeter. Stabilizing a country of this size could require several times as many troops as the Iraq mission—possibly up to one million.

Of course, any international force would have help. Presumably, some of Pakistan's huge security forces would remain intact and willing to help defend their country. But, if a substantial fraction of the military, say a quarter to a third, broke off from the main body and joined up with extremist militias, the international community probably would need to deploy 100,000 to 200,000 troops to ensure a quick restoration of order. Given the need for rapid response, the U.S. share of this total would probably constitute a majority, at least 50,000 to 100,000 ground forces, in what is almost the best case among potentially dire Pakistan scenarios. And, it is easy to imagine scenarios requiring much larger U.S. forces.

Responding to War over Kashmir

What if war breaks out between Pakistan and India over Kashmir? U.S. interests in Kashmir are not great enough to justify armed intervention on one side in such a war, and no formal alliance commits us to step in. There are other ways in which foreign forces might become involved, however. If India and Pakistan came close to using, or actually used, nuclear weapons, they might consider what was previously unthinkable (to New Delhi in particular)—pleading to the international community for help. For example, they might ask the international community to run Kashmir for a period of years in order to prevent a nuclear war that would kill tens of millions, shatter the tradition of nuclear non-use so essential to global stability, and make Pakistan's nuclear arsenal vulnerable to extremists.

What might a stabilization mission in Kashmir entail? The region has about half of Iraq's population and area. That suggests initial stabilization forces of about 100,000, with a U.S. contribution of 30,000 to 50,000. The mission would make sense only if India and Pakistan blessed it, so there would be little point in deploying a force large enough to defeat one of those countries. But, robust monitoring of border regions, as well as counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist strike forces, would be necessary.

Stabilizing an Indonesia, Congo, or Nigeria

Severe unrest in any of several large countries, including Indonesia, Congo and Nigeria, is now rated as of secondary strategic importance to the United States. This means that Washington may support and help fund a peacekeeping mission, but is unlikely to commit troops, and certainly will not intervene with a muscular force.

This reluctance could well fade under plausible developments. For example, if Al Qaeda or another terrorist group developed a stronghold in a large country, the United States might have to consider overthrowing the country's government or helping it reclaim control over the terrorist-held region. Or, the United States might intervene on one side in a civil war, or strike at an officially tolerated terrorist force.

The requirement for foreign forces would be a function of how much of the country in question became unstable, the extent to which indigenous forces remained intact, and how strong the insurgent force proved to be. General guidelines for force planning for such scenarios would suggest foreign troop strength up to 100,000 to 200,000 personnel. U.S. contributions might be only 20 to 30 percent of the total, but, even so, at least two American divisions would be required.

Contending with a Coup in Saudi Arabia

A fundamentalist coup overthrowing the royal family in Saudi Arabia would raise the specter of a major disruption to the oil supply. Saudi Arabia, along with the United States and Russia, is one of the world's big three oil producers (in the range of 11 million barrels per day), and is the largest oil exporter (9 million barrels per day, or about a quarter of the world total). It also has the world's largest estimated oil reserves (more than 260 billion barrels, or about a fifth of the world total). A sustained cutoff in Saudi oil production would wreak global havoc.

Additionally, a coup in Saudi Arabia would raise the harrowing possibility of the wealthy nation's pursuit of nuclear weapons and an intensified funneling of funds to Al Qaeda and to hate-mongering *madrassas* in Pakistan and other countries. What military scenarios might result in such circumstances? If a fundamentalist regime came to power and became interested in acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States might have to consider forcible regime change. If, by contrast, the new regime were merely intent on curtailing oil supplies, more limited measures, such as seizing the oil fields, might be adequate. Indeed, it might be feasible not to do anything at first. But, in the end, the United States and other Western countries might have to use force. We do not predict such a scenario and would, of course, be extremely reluctant to contemplate American military intervention in Saudi Arabia, even under extreme circumstances. But, even if the chances of such a mission are low, force planners must allow for the possibility.

Saudi Arabia has a population nearly as large as Iraq's and is more than four times Iraq's size. Since virtually all Saudi oil lies in the eastern coastal area or in Saudi territorial waters in the Persian Gulf, a military mission to protect and operate the oil wells would have geographic limits. For the million or so people living in eastern Saudi Arabia, about 10,000 foreign troops could be required for policing. However, requirements could be much greater to maintain a robust defensive perimeter against incursions by raiders.

Putting these missions together might imply a total of some three American-sized divisions plus support for a sustained operation to secure the coastal regions of Saudi Arabia. The resulting total force strength might be 100,000 to 150,000 personnel.

Summary Force Requirements

As described, the rise of any of the suggested scenarios involving Pakistan, another large country, or Saudi Arabia would engage tens of thousands and perhaps several hundred thousand U.S. armed forces personnel—in addition to the forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and any commitment involving Iran or Korea. Multiple events and prolonged deployments would, of course, increase this requirement.

Enhance Personnel *and* Technology

The current national security debate is not simply over the appropriate size of the armed forces, but about their nature as well. Since the early 1990s, analysts have argued that the armed forces must "transform" themselves to meet future challenges. For a long time, the emphasis on transformation was technologic: the military must invest in information technologies, including means to identify, track, and destroy targets with precision-guided munitions from stand-off distances. As the decade progressed, the Army accepted this requirement and added another aspect of transformation: greater strategic mobility. A C-5 or C-17 airlifter can typically carry only one large vehicle, like a 70-ton M-1 tank, or, at most, two. In the face of a rising need to move large ground forces to distant theaters quickly, this situation seemed unacceptable. In the wake of September 11, transformation changed its meaning again. Now, for many, it meant reliance on special forces and airpower to assist

indigenous troops in their own struggle, avoiding the use of large numbers of American soldiers and Marines. The epitome of this approach was the 2001-2002 operation in Afghanistan (which some held out as the model for Iraq).

All these transformation initiatives are expensive, even when they involve relatively affordable electronics and automation or relatively modest increases in special forces. Moreover, when vehicles are systematically replaced, as they sometimes must be, the bills can go through the roof. Further, re-equipping ground forces, purchasing advanced fighter-bomber aircraft for the Air Force and Navy, and designing future Navy vessels to maximize their ability to hit distant targets precisely are all extraordinarily expensive.

The defense community owes the country vigorous debate over very costly changes, since they may not always be worth the money. Still, many changes are clearly necessary, to keep ahead of the capabilities of potential foes. The M-1 tank was designed in the early 1970s. It will not remain survivable on the battlefields of the future, and its weight and fuel-inefficiency are significant defects. The F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft, for all its flaws, replaces a generation of fighters designed in the 1960s, and China's rise—together with the more general and global spread of advanced air defense technologies—argues for a stealthier U.S. aircraft inventory. The U.S. Navy has not fielded a new design for a major surface combat vessel since developing the Aegis missile guidance system in the 1970s, and the first ship so outfitted was the USS *Ticonderoga*, launched in 1981. The "procurement holiday" of the 1990s, when the services mostly avoided large purchases and development of new weapons systems, exacerbated the need for modernization—and for simply buying more equipment to replace aging inventories. New technologies do provide opportunities, both for us and for our enemies. We must exploit them properly if we are to maintain the military predominance essential to our security.

As the Iraq War proves, however, technology will not let us cut back on people. Other recent operations—in Afghanistan as well as Bosnia, Kosovo, Panama, and elsewhere—also reveal the ineffectiveness of attempting to replace people with machines on a

large scale. In most post-conflict stabilization or counter-insurgency operations, there is no substitute for large numbers of trained and capable ground forces, deployed for a long time.

*It is unacceptable, therefore, to accept a soldiers-*vs.*-systems trade-off in the defense budget.* Prioritizing systems at the expense of soldiers has had dreadful consequences. The nation is at war now, the strategic horizon is very dark, and armed forces sized in the 1990s are inadequate today. Transformation must proceed, possibly with a change in its intellectual basis and its precise course, and the ground forces must be expanded significantly. Meeting both requirements will demand increased defense expenditures for many years. Some prudent approaches can mitigate the increase in cost. But, whatever the cost, a nation at war and in a dangerous world must maintain military forces adequate to protect its vital interests or else face an intolerable degree of national insecurity.

Expand Ground Forces Now

The current military transformation depends on increasingly questionable assumptions. Merely gathering and disseminating target data and striking the identified targets has proven insufficient in complex urban, post-conflict, counter-insurgent, and stabilization operations. Meanwhile, the *urgent* need is to focus on expanding America's ground forces.

As the previous discussion implies, the United States now needs at least 100,000 additional active duty soldiers and Marines. Even more important than such an overall goal is the need to start moving in the right direction, immediately, building as rapidly as recruiting constraints allow. The war in Iraq amply demonstrates the need. In Iraq, there has been extensive, perhaps excessive, reliance on National Guard and Reserve forces, the Army has cycled troops through combat zones more frequently than normal, and tours have expanded from six to 12 months. Even with the additional 30,000 active duty troops temporarily authorized until now, maintaining about 130,000 Army soldiers in Iraq for three years has been devastating to the force.

Enlargement will not be easy. Trends suggest a shortage of healthy young men and women willing to serve, and the services already have trouble finding acceptable recruits. In the face of these challenges, and for other reasons, some argue to reintroduce conscription.

Should We Restore the Draft?

Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY), new chair of the House Ways and Means Committee and a Korean War veteran, is the leading congressional supporter of reinstating conscription. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) has called for a serious national debate on the topic. The Department of Defense, though, has not conducted any serious planning to introduce a draft.

Does a draft make sense? The short answer is no, given the outstanding quality of the all-volunteer force to date, which would surely be compromised by conscription, and the impossibility of designing a fair system of conscription.

Far fewer lawmakers today have had military experience than during the Cold War. With policy elites less likely to have served in the armed forces or to have children who are serving, some observers argue that these leaders have become less sensitive to the human costs of the use of force. (See, for example, P.W. Singer's article in this series: *Bent but Not Broken*.) Surely it is undesirable that an increasing share of total military personnel come from certain geographic regions, ethnic groups, or socioeconomic sectors and that, on the whole, a much smaller percentage of today's population shows any interest in military service than in the past. Having large swaths of the country's population effectively elect out of military service cannot be good for the nation's cohesion. (It is also troublesome that, even in the aftermath of September 11, most Americans have made little or no sacrifice in financial terms—even enjoying tax cuts in the face of large war appropriations and mounting deficits.)

But, are these trends really problems that would justify creation of a draft system? Having only a modest fraction of the population wishing to serve may be just as well. Today's U.S. military is smaller than before, while the population has grown, so there is not room for everyone who could potentially serve within the armed forces. Far too many young men and women come of military age every year than could possibly be accommodated within a military of reasonable size. Conscripting just 20 percent of them for two-year stints would generate ground forces of more than one million, including the professional officer corps. The corollary is that only one in five young people would be *required* to serve, which would generate an enormous sense of injustice. It was precisely that sense of draft "winners" and "losers" that helped destroy conscription in the 1970s. Attempting to reinstitute a draft, either through a lottery or a broad array of exemptions, would create a similar political backlash, while severely damaging U.S. military capabilities.

And, the fact that certain groups serve disproportionately also means that the military offers opportunities. Society asks a great deal of its military personnel, especially in wartime, but it also compensates them better than ever before—with pay, health care, education, retirement payments, and the chance to learn skills that are often highly marketable thereafter. Total compensation is quite high by historical standards. Most enlisted military personnel are now compensated considerably more generously than individuals of similar age, experience, and educational background working in the private sector, once health and retirement benefits are factored in.

The military, while not without problems of discrimination and prejudice, is now among the most progressive institutions in America, providing excellent opportunities for minorities and economically disadvantaged youth. Yet today's military is not dramatically unbalanced racially. Enlisted personnel in the current American military are about 22 percent black (reflecting a fairly steady level since the early 1980s), 10 percent Hispanic, and six percent other non-white races. In addition, minorities do not make up a disproportionate share of the personnel in the most dangerous jobs. For example, of the Army's 45,600 enlisted infantrymen at one point early this decade, only 10.6 percent were black. One must be careful not to break an institution in order

to fix it. The U.S. military is probably the most impressive in history in terms of technical skills, with astonishing expertise in fields ranging from piloting to computing to equipment maintenance to engineering to linguistics to civil affairs. One needs only to review the decisiveness of recent American military victories in diverse combat scenarios, as well as the professionalism of U.S. forces in post-conflict environments.

With no disrespect intended to those in earlier generations, the U.S. military today is far superior to the conscripted forces of the past. Today's soldier, Marine, airman, airwoman, or sailor typically has a high school degree, college experience, several years in the military, and a sincere commitment to the service. Contrast that with the abbreviated tours of duty in most draft systems, the length of training, which leaves only a small fraction of service time to spend in an operationally deployable unit, and the resulting mediocre quality of militaries, including several in Europe, that are still dependent on the draft.

It is important to maintain a link between society and the military. But, that link is not so tenuous today as some assert, given the important role of the Guard and Reserve in any overseas mission. Moreover, the frequently heard assertion that policymakers have become insensitive to casualties is exaggerated. Less than a decade ago, the nation was purported to have the opposite problem, an extreme over-sensitivity to casualties that prevented the country from considering decisive military actions that its national security required—helping create a perception of American weakness that allegedly emboldened some adversaries.

Someday, this situation could change—and we may be dangerously close to such a moment if we do not take the types of steps recommended here. The most likely cause would be an overuse of the all-volunteer force, particularly in the Army and Marine Corps, leading to an exodus of volunteers and general avoidance by would-be recruits. Then, to maintain a viable military, the nation might decide to consider reinstituting the draft—though in an era of high technology and highly skilled armed forces, such a policy would surely create as many problems as it would solve.

Since the draft is not an option, or at least not a good one, we will have to be creative in order to "grow the force" by 25,000 or more a year. The Army is already bending rules on age, aptitude, criminal record, and physical capabilities to meet current targets. We need fresher approaches. A serious idea worthy of consideration, supported by Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations and one of us (O'Hanlon), among others, is to promise American citizenship to qualified foreigners who enlist in the armed forces. Some of these individuals could actually be recruited abroad, through new overseas recruiting offices for the U.S. military.

Cut Waste in the Defense Department

Although the nation's security is the single most important responsibility of the President and Congress, fiscal priorities—ensuring the nation's prosperity and maintaining good stewardship of the federal budget—are close behind. In fact, irresponsible fiscal actions could compromise the nation's security by leaving it unable to defend its global interests vigorously. Moreover, for every dollar wasted, government deprives itself of means to provide for the education, health care, public safety, and other needs of American citizens, jeopardizing lives every bit as much as do foreign threats. Defense policymakers have a responsibility not to squander resources.

Through carefully crafted changes involving electronics and operational reforms, the President and Defense Department could save, relatively painlessly, about $10-15 billion per year. These savings could support a portion of the needed increases in personnel and technologies.

Emphasize Advanced Electronics and Computers

Weaponry is a leading cause of future growth in the Pentagon budget. Some of this upward pressure involves high-profile projects, such as missile defense; however, most of the pressure emanates from the need to replace main combat systems that are wearing out. As such, modernization accounts can be trimmed, but they cannot be radically reduced. That said, even modest-scale savings are worth pursuing.

Despite President Bush's 2000 campaign promise to "skip a generation" of weaponry, his Pentagon has canceled only three major systems: the Navy's low-altitude missile defense program, the Army's relatively inexpensive Crusader howitzer, and the Army's Comanche helicopter. Some planned increases in weapons funding are not essential. Economies can be found through expanded applications of modestly priced technologies, including the precision weapons, unmanned vehicles, and communications systems used to great effect in Afghanistan and Iraq.

One of us (O'Hanlon) has advocated, as a discriminating and economy-minded modernization strategy, equipping only part—as opposed to nearly all—of the armed forces with extremely sophisticated and expensive weaponry. That high-end component would hedge against new possibilities, such as an unexpectedly rapid modernizing of Chinese forces. The rest of the U.S. military establishment would be equipped primarily with relatively less expensive upgrades of existing weaponry, including better sensors, munitions, computers, and communications. Over the long term, this approach would contemplate expanded use of unmanned platforms and other new concepts and capabilities, while necessitating patience in deploying them.

Reform Operations and Maintenance

Defense planners typically try to save money in the relatively low-profile portion of the Pentagon budget known as operations and maintenance. Nonetheless, these accounts—supporting the near-term military readiness areas of training, overseas deployments, upkeep of equipment, military base operations, and health care costs—have been rising fast in recent years, and it will be hard to stop the upward trend.

Consider a few opportunities. Overhauling military health care services by merging the independent health plans of each military service and introducing a small co-payment for military personnel and their families could save $2 billion per year (although even such modest reductions in military quality of life may be unwise, given current strains on recruiting and retention and the need to expand the force rapidly). Encouraging

local base commanders to economize by letting them keep some of the savings for their base activities could save one billion dollars a year or more. Improving the efficiency with which military forces are deployed and employed, such as slightly decreasing the size of the Navy fleet, could generate cuts in personnel and equipment over time. (For example, more ships could be based near the regions where they are used, as with attack submarines on Guam, and fresh crews could be airlifted from domestic bases to relieve crews on ships overseas.)

Many other possible savings can and should be found in a bureaucracy as large as the Pentagon's, and they can help offset the high cost of repairing and transforming the nation's armed forces. But, that repair and transformation are an absolute priority and cannot be put off without seriously endangering our national security now and in the future.

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Opportunity 08 aims to help 2008 presidential candidates and the public focus on critical issues facing the nation, presenting policy ideas on a wide array of domestic and foreign policy questions. The project is committed to providing both independent policy solutions and background material on issues of concern to voters.

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