FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Successful democratic transitions hinge on the establishment of effective civilian control of the armed forces and internal security institutions. The transformation of these institutions from instruments of brutal repression and regime protection to professional, regulated, national services – security sector reform (SSR) – is at the very center of this effort. In Egypt, as in other transitioning Arab states and prior cases of democratization, SSR is an acutely political process affected by an array of different actors and dynamics. In a contested and unstable post-revolutionary political sphere, the reform of Egypt’s security sector requires urgent attention.

Egypt’s revolution of January 2011 was sparked by the brutality of deposed president Hosni Mubarak’s police and security forces. The most notorious and feared divisions of this security apparatus, State Security Investigations (SSI) and the Central Security Forces (CSF), quickly became the target of revolutionary actors across the political spectrum. The SSI’s longstanding record of unlawful detentions, disappearances, and systematic torture was well known; its “Human Rights Unit” was tasked not with protecting rights, but monitoring and repressing rights activists. The CSF, meanwhile, was seen as the armed enforcer of the regime’s will – stuffing ballot boxes or quelling demonstrations as needed.

The cause of overhauling these institutions to ensure effective governance, oversight, and accountability has been taken up by a range of stakeholders since the revolution, with varying degrees of success. Civil society actors have taken the lead, and one promising project is the National Initiative to Rebuild the Police Force (NIRP). The emergence within the police force of a cadre of reformist officers is also encouraging and may help shift the balance of power within the Ministry of Interior. These officers have established reformist organizations, such as the General Coalition of Police Officers and Officers But Honorable, and begun to push for SSR themselves. The prospects for implementing these civil society and internal initiatives, however, remain uncertain; they focus on admirable ends but are less clear on the means of implementation. They also have to reckon with strong elements within the Ministry of Interior – “al-Adly’s men” (in reference to Mubarak’s longstanding minister) – who remain firmly opposed to reform.

Government-led security sector reform initiatives have proved similarly problematic. After his appointment as minister of interior in March 2011, Mansour Issawi sacked hundreds of generals and disbanded the SSI. However, many have criticized his reforms as cosmetic – the new National Security Apparatus continues many of the SSI’s practices, and officers’ past abuses remain largely unpunished. From January 2012, a new parliament dominated by former (largely Islamist) dissidents – themselves victims of police brutality – took up the cause of SSR and approved amendments to the Law on the Organization of the Police. Again, though, there were criticisms of the reforms as insufficiently comprehensive, and the work of the parliament was in any case cut short when the body was disbanded by a Constitutional Court ruling.

The major obstacle to successful security sector reform in Egypt’s transition, however, has been the role played by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, an inherently SSR-averse body which retained executive powers until June 2012. Unlike in Tunisia and Libya, pro-revolution forces in Egypt did not enjoy any real power in the immediate after-

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math of their uprising, and the country’s first freely elected parliament had a limited mandate.

The election of President Muhammad Morsi and his bold attempt to tilt the balance of power between the civilian administration and the military establishment have dealt a significant blow to opponents of security sector reform. By reclaiming executive powers for the presidency and culling Egypt’s top military brass and security sector chiefs, he has removed major obstacles to civilian control of the armed forces and security apparatuses. Furthermore, the president’s choices of ministerial appointments will allow him to advance a pro-reform agenda in key areas through ministries that wield significant, if soft, power, such as the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Parliamentary and Legal Affairs.

The paper’s final section includes recommended steps to be taken as the newly-elected government seeks to extend civilian control of the security establishment – an initiative that will be an important test both of Morsi’s administration and of Egypt’s democratic transition. These recommendations include the following:

• **Establish a presidential committee for security sector reform.** This committee, composed of a range of reformist forces, should have the specific responsibility and powers to reform and restructure the Ministry of Interior and should answer directly to the president.

• **Establish proper oversight and monitoring of the security sector.** The Internal Monitoring Sector (*al-Taftish*) should be empowered to do more than just investigating officers in reaction to complaints. It should be given a mandate to monitor and regularly appraise the performance of police officers. Oversight by external bodies, including an independent ombudsman and a representative prosecutor in each major police station, should be regulated in a new police law.

• **Cleanse the Ministry of Interior and Public Prosecutor’s Office through presidentially appointed committees.** The Ministry of Interior must be cleansed of officers who committed torture, murder, extra-judicial killings, and other crimes, especially in the CSF, the SSI, and the SSI’s successor the National Security Apparatus (NSA). It will also be necessary to cleanse the Public Prosecutor’s Office and State Security Prosecution of officials who condoned or participated in abuses, including doctoring evidence, faking charges, or accepting “confessions” extracted via torture.

• **Change the promotion criteria within the Ministry of Interior.** A meritocratic system in which promotion is determined by performance, training, and qualifications should be established and elaborated in the new police law.

• **Conduct a comprehensive review of Police Academy training curricula and systems.** The review should focus on de-militarization of the police, as well as on altering training materials to reflect concepts of human security (as opposed to state security) and police functions as a “service” to society.

• **Restructure and downsize the Ministry of Interior.** Non-security functions and departments should be separated from the Ministry of Interior. Activities for which the ministry is currently responsible such as Passport Administration, Civil Records, Civil Defence, pilgrimage organization, and others, should be placed under different ministries. At the same time, the ministry should stop intervening in affairs outside its mandate, including media, culture, and academia.

• **Provide the Central Security Forces with comprehensive training in non-lethal riot control tactics.** Internationally approved training procedures should be adopted, and the equipment necessary for effective riot control should be supplied.

• **Draft a new police law to replace the Police Institution Law No. 109 of 1971.** The law should be drafted while legislative powers are temporarily held by the President (until a new parliament is seated). It should reflect all the aforementioned recommendations.
INTRODUCTION

The January 25 Egyptian revolution was sparked by police brutality. The context was set by the murder of internet activist Khaled Said in June 2010 by two policemen, followed by the brutality of both officers and plain-clothed “thugs”\(^2\) during the fraudulent parliamentary elections later that year. January 25 was also Egypt’s Police Day. The date was no accident; “[We wanted] to ruin their party like they ruined our lives,” one activist from the April 6 movement\(^1\) said. Indeed, for many revolutionaries, the police were the main line of defense protecting the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. “We had to break it … I wish there was another way but there wasn’t … Now we have got to fix it,” said a young activist on the way to Tahrir Square on January 28, 2011.\(^4\) Indeed, following the removal of Mubarak, security sector reform became an immediate objective of both revolutionary and reformist forces, regardless of ideological or political affiliations.

By March 2011, accumulated grievances led to another confrontation, this time with State Security Investigations (SSI), the domestic intelligence service. The evening of March 5 in Cairo was reminiscent of Berlin on January 15, 1990. Thousands of Egyptian protesters stormed SSI headquarters not only in Cairo but also in Alexandria, Assiut, and other cities, just as German protesters had done to the offices of the hated Stasi. In both cases, the protests had been sparked by state security officers destroying files that documented their institutions’ corruption and repression. Demonstrators gathered, attempting to safeguard what remained of the incriminating evidence. Details of secret graveyards and almost medieval dungeons, files of political dissidents held for more than a decade, names of judges who helped to fix elections, and lists of informants – celebrities, religious figures, talk-show hosts, and “opposition” leaders – were all captured on camera and uploaded onto popular websites.

Torture rooms and equipment were captured on camera in every SSI building stormed by protesters. Even for apolitical Egyptians, the sheer volume and graphic detail of the released files were shocking. Although unlawful detentions, kidnappings, disappearances, systematic torture, and rape had been documented by both human rights organizations and Egyptian courts over the last three decades, most media outlets never dared to cross such “red lines” while Mubarak ruled.

This paper focuses on the politics of police reform and oversight in Egypt, addressing several dynamics that affect such efforts. These include the role played by the police and domestic intelligence (SSI) in provoking and sustaining public outrage before and during revolution; the reversal whereby those most oppressed by the SSI are now the strongest force in the country’s new democratic politics; and the emergence of individuals and groups of police officers who are trying to reform a repressive system. The paper begins with an overview of the concept of security sector reform, drawing on lessons learned elsewhere. It goes on to discuss the historical relationship between the police and politics in Egypt. The third section outlines some of the reform initiatives proposed by stakeholders: civil society groups, reformist officers, the Ministry of Interior, the dissolved parliament, and the presidency. The study concludes with an assessment of some of the obstacles to SSR in Egypt and policy recommendations for the country’s first elected civilian president, Muhammad Morsi.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: PRINCIPLES, OBJECTIVES, AND LESSONS

Security sector reform (SSR) can be described as “the transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.” The philosophy behind SSR is rooted in human security: the idea that the primary objective of the security apparatus is the security of the individual citizen, not that of ruling regimes. It is an idea that contrasts distinctly with the reality under Mubarak, where the daily threat for many law-abiding citizens was not al-Qaeda or the Mossad, but the Egyptian security establishment itself.
Ideally, the reform process should embrace all branches of the security sector, from the armed forces to the customs authorities. The focus of this paper, however, will be limited to the Ministry of Interior, which in Egypt includes the police, paramilitary forces (Central Security Forces), and domestic intelligence services (SSI, now renamed the National Security Apparatus).

Two core objectives of SSR processes are critical in the case of Egypt:\(^6\)

1. Establishment of effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the security system.

2. Improved delivery of security and justice services.\(^7\)

To achieve those objectives, any comprehensive SSR process must include a number of key initiatives. First, oversight and accountability must be improved, whether internally through the executive branch, through parliamentary oversight and legislation, or through the judiciary. Civil society actors, and indeed individual citizens, can also play a role in enhancing accountability through independent monitoring mechanisms such as public complaints commissions, independent ombudsmen, or inspectors-general.\(^8\) Defining a clear legal framework and mandate for the security services that integrates established human rights norms is also of crucial importance.

Within the security services themselves, there is a need for enhanced capacity building through improved police training, staff development, and personnel policies. There must also be an emphasis on decentralization and on “civilianizing” the police force through measures such as ensuring civilian leadership, reforming ranking structures, and even redesigning uniforms. Ultimately, the security services must build a new, de-politicized identity, based on a strong professional and meritocratic culture.

These elements constitute the pillars of security sector reform and the core of successful democratization in several other transitioning countries. In Spain, such steps were gradually introduced after the death of General Francisco Franco in November 1975, leading up to the transfer of power to the Socialist Party following the country’s landmark 1982 elections.\(^9\) In South Africa, a comprehensive reform program for national defense was introduced in the White Papers of October 1994. This included the establishment of a new professional identity for intelligence personnel, bolstered by a code of conduct stressing compliance with democratic values, respect for human rights, and adherence to the principle of political neutrality.\(^10\) More recently, in Indonesia the “New Paradigm,” a framework for the democratization process, emphasized the de-militarization of the police and parliamentary oversight over the security services. The latter measure was introduced under President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2000) and produced three parliamentary commissions that monitor the Indonesian security apparatus.\(^11\) In Georgia, the de-militarization of police was partly implemented between 2004 and 2005; the interior minister, deputy interior minister, and chief of domestic intelligence are now all civilians. Additionally, the interior ministry signed a memorandum on the monitoring of detention centers with a human rights ombudsman.\(^12\) In Chile, following the repressive period of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), the Senate approved the creation of a civilian National Intelligence Agency (ANI) in 2003 and, pursuant to a law enacted in 2004, security agencies have to provide all requested information to that body.\(^13\)

Beyond these transitional cases, highly professional security agencies in consolidated democracies are monitored by external bodies like the Intelligence and Security Committee in the United Kingdom or the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) in Canada. Typically, these bodies have the authority to examine information concerning the activities of intelligence agencies and report back to the government or parliament.

In the context of other Arab states undergoing transitions, security sector reform is similarly critical and, as in Egypt, remains a sphere of political contention. In Tunisia, the country that sparked the Arab Awakening, the current interior minister Ali Larayedh is a civilian who was himself a tor-
ture victim during the sixteen years he spent in jail under the Ben Ali regime. The Tunisian Ministry of Interior laid out a comprehensive roadmap for reforming the country’s security sector in a white paper entitled “Security and Development: A White Paper for Democratic Security in Tunisia.” The paper discussed turning the security sector “from a police order to a police service that can respond urgently to the new challenges of crime.” However, leaders of the ruling Islamist al-Nahda Party believe the White Paper was produced by former regime figures within the Ministry of Interior who are not necessarily pro-reform. “There are some good elements. But it offers no comprehensive reform,” said Amer Larayedh, the head of al-Nahda’s Political Bureau.

Indeed, resistance to reform is evident within the ranks of the ministry, as the case of Colonel Moncef al-Ajimi demonstrates. Al-Ajimi, the director of the ministry’s “Intervention Forces,” was charged with firing on peaceful protesters in the towns of Thala and Qasarin during the revolution. In the course of al-Ajimi’s trial, Minister Larayedh attempted to remove the colonel from his position. In reaction, hundreds of policemen from the Bouchoucha barracks physically blocked access to al-Ajimi and then organized a strike to protest his attempted dismissal. Around 13,000 members of the Intervention Forces withdrew from key locations in several Tunisian cities and returned to their barracks. “We will not be a scapegoat for the families of the martyrs,” said one of the protesting policemen. As a result, Larayedh was forced to keep al-Ajimi in place at the ministry. In June, a military court found al-Ajimi not guilty. Though Tunisia’s military prosecutor will appeal the verdict, the incident revealed the level of internal resistance to reform faced by the Nahda-led government.

In Libya, successful security sector reform, alongside demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) processes, could well turn the oil-producing country into a democratic Dubai. If it fails, however, we are likely to see further incidents such as the September 11 attacks on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and even the possibility of broad civil conflict. The decentralized nature of Libya’s “liberation army” has had several important implications for the country’s transition. On the positive side, it was in many ways a “people’s army” – popular, legitimate, and inclusive. It avoided many of the potential depredations which a single, hierarchical rebel army might have inflicted on local populations. At the same time, however, the absence of a clear command-and-control structure meant that the units “coordinated” but did not “obey.” This led to a long list of rogue acts, the most shocking being the murder of rebel commander General Abd al-Fattah Younis by his own side in July 2011. Since the removal of Qadhafi, rival provincial militias have engaged in skirmishes in Tripoli and elsewhere, and these militias continue to exert some control over the executive branch.

The SSR process, however, does show some promise. The appointment of Salem al-Hasi as the head of the Libyan intelligence agency, the Foreign Security Apparatus (FSA), makes him the first civilian opposition figure to lead an Arab intelligence service. Al-Hasi was a member of the armed wing of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) and spent more than two decades in exile in the United States. “All of the Arab intelligence services were there to protect the regime and oppress citizens. I will change that. The Libyan intelligence will be under the control of the elected executive and the direct oversight of the legislative assembly,” al-Hasi said upon taking his post. Whether he will succeed or not is another matter. Accusations have been levelled against al-Hasi and his agents for allegedly tapping phones and electronically monitoring Qadhafi loyalists using equipment inherited from the former regime. The General National Congress and future parliaments will need to craft laws for oversight and control of the security and intelligence apparatuses, as well as a clear mechanism for enforcing that control. Such steps will require the help of the UN Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as well as independent experts.

Beyond its technical, organizational, and administrative dimensions, SSR is a highly political process. Indeed, that political dimension can dictate the direction and success of the entire project. SSR processes usually result from, and succeed because of, major shifts in the balance of political power. Ultimately, successful SSR separates demo-
cies from autocracies; genuine democratization in Egypt hinges on the effective reform of its security sector.

EGYPT’S POLITICAL POLICE

The history of police institutions in Egypt goes back to 1805, when Muhammad Ali, the ruler and so-called “founder of modern Egypt,” established a small department to keep law and order in Cairo. In 1857, this department became the Ministry of Interior. Today, the ministry comprises a massive bureaucracy employing more than 1.5 million people: officers, petty-officers, soldiers, conscripts, and civilian administrators. This labor force includes more than 831,000 full-time jobs and a complex network of more than 300,000 paid informants and ex-convicts (for information gathering).

The Ministry of Interior’s involvement in Egyptian politics has been well documented. Historically, the position of interior minister has been manipulated by different political forces. Following the 1919 revolution, Wafdist prime minister and liberal revolutionary leader Saad Zaghloul held the position in 1924 and used its authority against his political opponents. Following the popular coup of 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser held the position and kept it even when he became prime minister the following year.

Meanwhile, two major police sectors – State Security Investigations (SSI) and the Central Security Forces (CSF) sectors – have had significant impact on the Egyptian political scene. The predecessors of the SSI date back to before 1952, when the “Political Bureau” was in charge of reporting and occasionally cracking down on dissidents. There is no comparison, however, between the influence of the SSI and that of the Political Bureau. After the success of their July 1952 coup, the victorious “Free Officers” dissolved the Political Bureau, which had been reporting on them in the years prior. Once they faced political opposition and worker strikes in the industrial town of Kafr al-Dawar, however, they decided to reestablish a similar state security body with the help of senior officers from the old Political Bureau. On August 22, 1952, only weeks after the July coup, the General Investigation Apparatus was established. It was renamed the General Administration of State Security Investigations (SSI) in 1971 when Anwar al-Sadat assumed the Egyptian presidency. By the time of Mubarak’s ascent to the presidency in 1981, the SSI had become the most powerful police sector in the country. It employed an estimated 100,000 individuals, and the influence and authority of its captains exceeded that of generals in other sectors.

Today, the mandate and internal organization of the SSI remain vague. At time of writing, the SSI’s successor agency the National Security Apparatus (NSA) is the only sector whose internal structure is undisclosed on the Ministry of Interior’s website. However, a clear organizational framework can be drawn from the documents confiscated by activists who stormed SSI headquarters following the revolution, as well as from interviews with former officers. From these documents, it becomes clear that the mandate of the SSI was almost exclusively focused on subduing, neutralizing, annihilating, or co-opting dissent.

Organizationally, the largest administrative components within the SSI were the “general administration,” organized either by region or by thematic specialization. Each general administration contained a number of successively smaller components: “central administrations,” “groups,” and then “units.” The largest of the general administrations was Extremist Activity, whose mandate was to counter any religious-based activism in the country. (Some officers still refer to it by its former title, Religious Activism, or al-Nashat al-Dini.) Sub-units within Extremist Activity included Countering Brotherhood Activism, Extremist Organizations, and Prison Security (tasked with countering Islamist political activism in prisons and detentions centers).

Other SSI components that repressed political dissent included the Student Activity Units, the Human Rights Units (whose mandate was to monitor and suppress human rights activists), the Arab Activism Group (mainly tasked with countering the influence of Arab nationalists), Workers Units, and
the Sectarian Activity Group (which was mandated with dealing with Christian activists and included a Church Activity Unit). In addition, there was the General Administration for Foreign Activity (with units for Europe and America) and an Electronic Monitoring Group (responsible for monitoring internet activists, with a unit specializing in hacking websites and blogs), and finally the state-of-the-art Counter-Terrorism Group.26

Whereas the SSI in general stands accused of systematic torture, kidnapping, and illegal detentions, the majority of these accusations have been directed at the Extremist Activity administration and Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG). These groups have also been accused of extrajudicial killings and ordering assassinations. One former SSI officer described an incident indicative of the institution’s casual abuse of power: “We arrested this guy and Extremist Activity and CTG officers got into an argument. They got the information they wanted, but neither wanted the guy. Then a CTG officer ended the argument. He pushed the guy out the window. It was Ramadan and he was late for the suhur meal27 … The guy died instantly and it was registered as resisting arrest ... They laughed about it afterwards.”28

CTG officers were also accused by a government-appointed fact-finding commission of sniping at protesters in and around Tahrir Square in January 2011. At time of writing, none had been tried.29

Additionally, SSI, Criminal Investigations, and CSF officers have regularly been accused of rigging elections, stuffing ballot boxes, and terrorizing voters since the first parliamentary elections under Mubarak in 1984. Lt. Colonel Mahmoud Abd al-Nabi, a co-founder of the Officers But Honorable (OBH) organization, outlined the details of the rigging process, in which he had participated since 1995.30 “Habib al-Adly, head of Cairo’s General Security Directorate back then, asked around 500 officers to carry between 200 to 400 pro-NDP ballots and to stuff the boxes with them. The SSI and CSF officers were to provoke some violence outside the voting center for distraction. Then the Criminal Investigation officers inside the voter center would shut it down because of the violence outside. We would ask the representatives of the candidates to leave. Then the stuffing begins ... Back in 1995 only one officer, out of the 500 or so, refused to participate. He was a Major back then. His name is Omar Afifi.”31

When asked about the incident, Colonel Afifi said, “I am not going to tell you that I was a hero ... Al-Adly ordered us not to carry a gun or a police ID to avoid scandals. This meant that if the rigged ballots started falling from the huge black jackets they gave us, I would be torn apart by angry voters. I concluded that al-Adly and the police commanders would sacrifice the officers like insects ... and for the dirtiest cause. This was a turning point for me.”32

The other relevant police sector is the Central Security Forces (CSF). It was established in 1969 to address the police’s limited capacity to quell demonstrations following the military defeat of June 1967. Back then, the CSF was composed of 189 officers and 11,690 soldiers.33 On January 25, 2011, the CSF had more than 300,000 officers, soldiers, and conscripts within its ranks.34 If the SSI was the brains protecting the regime, the CSF was its muscle and iron fist. The arms used by the CSF reflect the breadth of its mandate: they range from armored vehicles and sniper rifles to iron bars and electric prods. “This was Mubarak’s internal army against the people,” said one activist interviewed.35

The history of the CSF is not, however, one of totally unwavering loyalty to the Mubarak regime. In a mutiny in 1986, CSF soldiers protested ill-treatment in camps and a possible increase in the period of conscription (from three to five years). The protesters burned camps and nearby tourist hotels, and clashed with army forces. The mutinous CSF conscripts were defeated in a few days, but hundreds were killed. In the immediate aftermath, Interior Minister General Ahmed Rushdi was sacked, new conscription regulations were enforced, and better treatment was ordered. But that confrontation deepened the mistrust between the armed forces and the CSF. “Let them try it again. We will happily crush them. We didn’t forget 1986,” a young Special Forces army officer said in April 2012.36
Not long after the mutiny, the CSF became the main enforcer of a counter-insurgency campaign in the 1990s, primarily against the Islamic Group (al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya). The years of the conflict created animosities and vendettas between the CSF commanders and Islamic Group fighters, even after the latter renounced violence and “apologized.” “The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is not gutsy enough. They shouldn’t allow murderers in the parliament. They should disband it, even if they have to stage a coup,” said a former CSF general, referring to the MPs of the Construction and Development Party, the newly established political wing of the Islamic Group.

Even after Mubarak’s removal on February 11, 2011, the brutal behavior continued. The CSF, NSA, and other security apparatuses (including the Military Police, which operates under the Ministry of Defense) were involved in wide-scale repression campaigns that resulted in more than 100 deaths and thousands of injuries. The most infamous of these happened in: Maspero, mainly against Christian protesters (October 2011); Muhammad Mahmoud Street, mainly against youth revolutionary groups (November 2011); near the Cabinet building (December 2011); and in the Abbasiyya district of Cairo (July 2011 and April 2012). These various security apparatuses were also responsible for hundreds of torture cases, political detentions, and military tribunals for civilians between February 2011 and October 2012.

Overall, the legacies of the security establishment in general and the SSI and the CSF in particular had disastrous consequences for the Egyptian political and social landscape, both prior to and during the revolution. These institutions were the two principal tools used by the Mubarak regime to frustrate any meaningful steps towards democratization or fighting corruption throughout the three decades of his rule. Such legacies have had, and will continue to have, a significant impact on Egypt’s transitional period. Under SCAF, the abusive behavior of the security apparatuses persisted. In many respects, Egyptian security apparatuses suffered and still suffer from an entrenched pattern of abusive behavior. As a result, various initiatives have been proposed to address the repressive tendencies of Egypt’s security sector.

SECURITY REFORM IN A REVOLUTIONARY ENVIRONMENT: STAKEHOLDERS AND INITIATIVES

Since March 2011, Egypt has seen more than ten initiatives for Security Sector Reform. The proposals – which vary significantly in terms of quality and comprehensiveness – have been put forward by a range of stakeholders including civil society groups, disenchanted police officers, the Ministry of Interior, and the parliament.

Civil Society Initiatives

Civil society organizations have offered various initiatives focused on legal reform, oversight, and civilianization of the security sector. Perhaps one of the most comprehensive initiatives is the National Initiative to Rebuild the Police Force (NIRP). Put forward by a broad group of 19 authors (including police officers, academics, lawyers, and businessmen), the initiative goes beyond technical details, and addresses the political dimension of the challenge of security sector reform.

The NIRP includes fourteen short-term and fourteen long-term proposals. Six of the former focus on issues of transitional justice, such as holding police officers accountable for killing protesters. Three other demands relate to promotions and referrals, and call for the replacement of the senior leadership of the security establishment, including “members of the Supreme Council of Police [the highest commanding body in the force] … [and] directors of departments and branches of State Security in all governorates where killings and wounding occurred during the revolution.” This is in addition to the replacement of “all officers and other members of the Criminal Investigations department” with “trained officers known for their good conduct and behavior.” The remaining short-term proposals focus on the monitoring of the police force. They include a proposal on societal monitoring, similar to initiatives implemented...
in other SSR cases:42 “The interior minister should allow representatives of civil society organizations to enter police headquarters at any time, without notice, to inspect places of detention and the condition of the detainees, and to access any information they require.”43 For the long term, the NIRP focuses on redefining the police mandate, civilianizing the police force, reforming the admission process of the police academy, abolishing the use of army conscripts in the police, and implementing organizational restructuring.

The NIRP is a thorough and ambitious initiative that tackles the fundamentals of security reform. Prospects for its implementation, however, appear limited. Aside from “calling on the minister of interior” – a phrase often repeated throughout the NIRP document – it provides no clear course of action. Another important shortcoming of the initiative is a failure to address the factional makeup within the interior ministry. Any successful initiative will need to take into consideration the balance of power between pro-status-quo generals and those willing to implement reforms.44

The Disenchanted: Police Officers’ Initiatives

As mentioned, the police force was directed by the Mubarak regime to suppress the January 25 Revolution. It incurred heavy losses as a result. More than 95 police stations and over 4,000 police vehicles were torched during the 18 days of the uprising. Officers and soldiers faced public animosity, physical and verbal attacks, and reputation-smearing. “It is a broken army. More or less like the Egyptian army after the defeat of 1967,” said Muhammad Selim al-Awa, a presidential candidate who discussed security reforms with former interior minister General Mansour Issawi.45 These important shifts have had an effect on the psychological state of many officers. “Many are in need of psychological rehabilitation. The revolution broke some of them, while others became more brutal and violent.... Both situations are equally bad,” said Tamer Makki, a former major in Public Security and a current member of the upper house of parliament.46

Before the revolution, several officers had spoken out against human rights violations and paid a high price as a result. Colonel Afifi, referred to earlier, was not the only one. Others included higher-ranking officials, such as General Ibrahim Abd al-Ghaffar, a former director in the Prisons Sector and one of only a few reformist generals. After opposing torture in prisons, he was threatened with detention by the former head of the SSI, Hasan Abd al-Rahman.47 The cases of these officers, however, were individual exceptions. Prior to the revolution, there was no organized, collective attempt to defy orders that violated either law or basic morality. Moreover, to make an example of them, almost all of these officers were smeared, demoted, or dismissed. While heroic, their efforts were hardly effective in terms of SSR.

The revolution, however, gave rise to a new generation of reformist officers. Many mid-ranking police officers responded to the systemic abuse by forming groups pushing for internal reform. “We want to save face and tell our people that we neither sold them nor killed them; the traitor al-Adly and his gang did. Now the whole police force is paying the price for his policies,” said Lt. Colonel Muhammad Salah, an officer commanding a CSF brigade and a member of the General Coalition of Police Officers (GCPO).48 Having emerged as the country’s largest independent officers’ organization, the GCPO is lobbying for official recognition as a police union with an elected leadership. At the time of writing, the Ministry of Interior continued to resist those efforts and had even referred two GCPO leaders, Lt. Colonel Nabil Omar and Major Ashraf al-Banna, to a disciplinary hearing for “the abdication of their professional duties and disobeying orders.”49

Smaller, like-minded organizations have also emerged, including Officers But Honorable (OBH), Warrant Officers But Honorable (WOBH), and Officers Against Corruption (OAC). (OAC merged with the Police Martyrs Rally movement to form the GCPO at a later stage.) The initiatives proposed by these organizations focus on: cleansing the police force of corrupt generals; enhancing work conditions, training, media and public relations; and increasing salaries and pensions. For ex-
ample, the GCPO began by laying out eleven objectives, the first of which is to “enact a law to severely punish anyone who physically attacks the police, as well as any police officer who gets convicted with a crime.”

Some members of the GCPO have put forward their own SSR initiatives. One proposed by Lt. Colonel Halim al-Deeb, a former SSI officer who was head of the Planning Unit in the Police Academy’s Institute for Training Officers, highlights a number of police abuses. Among these is the practice of putting random citizens on political blacklists, then extorting them when they apply for jobs or promotions requiring a police report. According to al-Deeb, “This practice was very common and helped many officers to get rich.” The initiative also addresses the institutional culture of the force. Al-Deeb laments a culture within the police that belittles and ridicules human rights – partly, he says, a result of the fact that only SSI officers provide instruction on human rights at the Police Academy.

Al-Deeb outlines a series of proposals, including a new code of honor for the police force that stresses their political neutrality and independence and the service-oriented nature of their job.

The rise of reformist officers from the lower and middle ranks is a good indicator of the changing internal dynamics within the Ministry of Interior. Under Mubarak, any opposition to the many abuses of the security establishment was severely punished. Colonel Afifi, for example, had to flee Egypt and seek refuge in the United States following severe harassment and even an assassination attempt. His crime was simply refusing to participate in the rigging of elections – a far cry from the comprehensive reforms called for by this new cadre. “The balance of power within the ministry is not the same. This is the first time I see younger officers refusing to carry out orders violating the law. This is good. Though I am worried about too much defiance,” General Abd al-Ghaffar said in an interview.

Restructuring and Reforms by the Ministry of Interior

On March 3, 2011, after sacking the Mubarak-appointed government of Ahmad Shafiq, SCAF appointed a “revolution-friendly” government headed by Prime Minister Essam Sharaf. The appointed interior minister, Mansour Issawi, was a general who had retired 14 years earlier. Issawi, who was credited with earlier changes and reforms within the Ministry of Interior, had a clean reputation and remained popular among officers. On taking office, he disbanded the SSI – with SCAF’s support – and sacked or retired 505 major-generals, 82 brigadier-generals, and 82 colonels. Meanwhile, the GCPO managed to negotiate some benefits for officers, including a new limit of eight working hours per day.

Some officers consider these reforms to be “the largest changes in the history of the Ministry of Interior.” Others believe that they are merely cosmetic. “It is just an increase in the numbers of retired generals, plus sacking some of the notorious ones. Those generals should be in jail, not on pension and benefits,” said an ex-police major who participated in the revolution. General Abd al-Latif al-Badiny, a former deputy interior minister, agreed: “The budget of the Ministry of Interior is around EGP 85 billion ($14.1 billion) and there are some 37,000 officers. At least EGP 4.1 billion ($600 million) used to be distributed among al-Adly’s loyalists: around 300 generals and 50 colonels. This corruption has not changed much…. Let’s take the SSI as an example, the same notorious characters – minus a few – are running its successor, the National Security Apparatus.”

General Issawi’s decision to dissolve the SSI and establish the NSA was initially applauded, but criticisms quickly resurfaced. A number of factors support a negative assessment. Generally, the entire process lacked transparency. There was no vetting system put in place to guarantee that, pending investigation, SSI officers suspected of serious human rights violations did not remain in the NSA. More specifically, the SSI-like intervention into seemingly every aspect of political life has remained intact. The NSA has eleven administrations comprised
of “groups” with vague mandates that range from “Monitoring and Analyzing Popular Discontent” to “Human Rights Studies.” The SSI’s “Sectarian Activity” (in charge of monitoring Christian activists) was renamed the “Protection of Religions and Beliefs” with almost no other change, according to some observers. Meanwhile, the existence of an “Appraisal of Security Performance” group risks reviving the SSI’s dominance over all other police sectors. This dominance stemmed partly from its power to “appraise” performances of officers in other departments and therefore to control promotions, demotions, reprimands, and punishments.

SECURITY REFORM, SCAF, AND EGYPT’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Overall, a number of proposals for security sector reform in Egypt have been put forward. To varying degrees, though, most of these initiatives suffer from a lack of comprehensiveness and a failure to consult best practices from other countries. Still, the main problem lies not in planning but in execution. There are many reasons for this. Unlike their counterparts in Libya and Tunisia, pro-revolution forces in Egypt did not enjoy any real power in the immediate aftermath of their uprising. Their influence on security matters – and on high politics in general – was therefore quite limited. Within official institutions, the revolutionary parliament had a limited mandate, and due to SCAF’s retention of executive powers, it lacked the authority to sack ministers and form a government of its own. Additionally, the MPs had either limited or no experience in SSR and the mechanics of its implementation. This applies even to members of the parliament’s National Security Committee.

SCAF’s own approach to SSR was anything but “revolutionary.” The generals sought only to tinker around the margins of the status quo rather than face the consequences of genuine change. Even if there had been the political will within SCAF, the path to effective reform would not have been an easy one. “If I sacked all those involved in the violations – and there are a lot of them – and if I don’t have the funding to reintegrate them or give them alternative civilian jobs or proper pensions, we would be creating disasters,” said one influential army general. As the experiences of Chile and the former Soviet Union suggest, he has a point. While sacked security officials in these countries did not pose a significant threat to the course of political transitions, they did often join or form organized crime syndicates that continue to plague their societies.

A final challenge to SSR is related to the balance of power inside the Ministry of Interior. According to GCPO and OBH officers, some deputy Interior ministers – “al-Adly’s men,” as they call them – continue to resist any serious attempt at reform. The GCPO issued a statement on the tragic clashes of Muhammad Mahmoud, which left 51 protesters...
dead. It concluded that the government’s use of violence was shameful and unnecessary. As one GCPO officer noted: “The ones responsible for this massacre are Generals Sami Sidhum and Mohsen Murad, [the heads of Public Security and the Cairo Security Directorate].… Both were promoted from Deputy to First Deputy Interior Minister after the Muhammad Mahmoud massacre.… No serious investigation was done for tens of deaths and thousands of injured.… The man arguing for negotiations with protesters and meaningful internal reforms [General al-Badiny] was reprimanded. What exactly does this tell you?”

The acquittal in Mubarak’s trial of the generals who, as deputy interior ministers, ran the country’s repressive institutions will have some serious consequences for Egypt’s SSR prospects as well as the transition process. Hasan Abd al-Rahman, the head of the SSI, Ahmad Ramzi, head of the CSF, Adly Fayyid, head of Public Security, Ismail al-Shaer, head of the Cairo Security Directorate, Osama Youssef, head of the Giza Security Directorate, and Omar Faramawy, head of the 6th October Security Directorate, were all found not guilty of killing protesters. Life sentences were handed down to Hosni Mubarak and his interior minister Habib al-Adly, but both sentences will be appealed. The verdicts reinforced a culture of impunity within the security services. And they were not – by any means – an exception. A series of other verdicts acquitting dozens of officers also accused of killing protesters followed. Those acquittals include the infamous case of General Farouq Lashin, head of the Qalyubia Security Directorate, and three other generals accused of killing more than 20 protesters. These acquittals empowered the anti-reform faction within the ministry, but not for very long.

SURGICAL STRIKES: MORSI AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND SECURITY APPARATUS

The aforementioned challenges to SSR have been mitigated by the election of Egypt’s first civilian president. A bold attempt by President Muhammad Morsi to tilt the balance of power between the elected civilian administration and the military establishment has so far been successful. After only two months in office, not only was the president able to annul the Constitutional Declaration enforced by SCAF in June 2012 (which stripped the presidency of many of its powers), but also to forcibly retire those who had issued it: Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawy and his deputy General Sami Anan. It was the first time in Egypt’s history that a serious attempt had been made by an elected civilian to control the armed forces and security establishment.

A range of circumstances – particularly the massacre of Egyptian troops in the Sinai and the subsequent removal of _ancien regime_ generals – have strengthened the president’s capacity to balance civil-military relations. In the new cabinet of Prime Minister Hisham Qandil, formed on August 2, only ten of the 35 ministries went to pro-revolution forces, with the other ministers being a combination of old-regime figures and technocrats without any publicly declared political affiliation. But the choice of those ten ministries was strategic. Five of them – the Ministries of Information, Higher Education, Youth, Labor, and Housing – were given to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Other pro-revolution elements assumed control of Education, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Industry and Foreign Trade, and most importantly, the Justice Ministry. All of these ministries wield significant, if soft, power and represent official institutions which can enhance the capacity of pro-change forces to mobilize students, workers, and youth. These institutions can simultaneously give reformist elements religious legitimacy (via the Ministry of Religious Endowment), and remove the threat of judicial repression (via the Ministry of Justice) while strengthening unofficial networks on the ground.

Moreover, beyond the culling of SCAF’s top brass, the Sinai massacre sparked the process of removing some of the most powerful generals across the security sector. These included the head of the General Intelligence Directorate (Murad Muwafi), head of the Presidential Guard (Nagib Mohammed Abd al-Salam), head of the Military Police...
(Hamdy Badin), head of the Cairo Security Directorate (Mohsen Murad), and the head of the Central Security Forces (Emad al-Wakil). These generals all shared an anti-reform stance, defiance of elected civilian rule, and a desire to maintain as many Mubarak-era policies and practices as possible. Two of these generals, Badin and Murad, were specifically accused by several revolutionary and reformist groups, including the GCPO, of organizing a campaign of repression against revolutionaries.

Overall, the purging of these generals removes a major obstacle to civilian control of the armed forces and security apparatuses. But a comprehensive SSR process will have to go well beyond the removal of a few of the anti-reform generals. The balance of power does seem to have shifted somewhat towards the country’s newly elected civilian authorities, led by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). In the FJP’s Renaissance Project – the official program adopted by the organization – SSR features as one of seven pillars. Given the experiences of the Brotherhood in Mubarak’s prisons, current threats to domestic security, and the shift in the balance of power, SSR is likely to remain at the forefront of the organization’s priorities.

The Brotherhood’s approach to SSR is gradual, however, not revolutionary; working within the rules of the system rather than fundamentally altering them. The most recent case in point is President Morsi’s appointment of General Khaled Tharwat as the new head of the NSA in October 2012. Tharwat comes from the very core of the SSI. He used to head “Internal Activity,” the general administration in charge of monitoring and investigating civil society groups, political parties, and media outlets. At one point, he also headed the “Countering Brotherhood Activity” group.

On the more strategic front, the presidency has sought advice from both independent experts and foreign officials. President Morsi met with British prime minister David Cameron during the United Nations General Assembly’s meetings in September to discuss how the United Kingdom can help with the situation in Sinai. The British experience in security sector reform was also discussed. As a result of the meeting, it was arranged for General Sir David Richards, the chief of Britain’s defense staff, to visit Sinai and oversee the formation of a British team of field experts from the Department for International Development who will advise on the two issues of stabilizing Sinai and SSR.

The involvement of the United Kingdom, the United States, and other democracies in SSR is useful for knowledge transfer – for example, oversight training for MPs, non-lethal riot control training for the CSF, and de-politicization – as well as advanced equipment supply and training. However, direct Western support of Egypt’s SSR process may be used by anti-reform generals, Mubarak regime remnants, and even some opposition groups to delegitimize SSR as a foreign conspiracy to weaken or infiltrate the country’s security services. Morsi’s rivals may well use such cooperation to further advance an “Islamist-Western” conspiracy theory and undermine the credibility of the president and the fortunes of his party in forthcoming parliamentary elections.

In any case, what remains certain is that, ultimately, no democratic transition is complete without targeting abuse, eradicating torture, and ending the impunity of the security services, with effective and meaningful civilian control of both the armed forces and the security establishment. This will be the true test of both Morsi’s presidency and Egypt’s democratic transition.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Several steps remain to be taken on the difficult and politically complicated path toward establishing democratic control of the Egypt’s security sector. Outlined below are a set of policy recommendations explaining what they entail:

1. Establish a presidential committee for security sector reform.

In order to ensure that SSR remains a prime focus of the Morsi presidency, and to strengthen executive control over the process, a committee with the specific responsibility and powers to reform and
restructure the Ministry of Interior should be established, answering directly to the president. The committee should include reformist figures from the Ministries of Interior and Justice, reform-minded judges, at least two representatives from the pro-reform police organizations, a representative from the Public Prosecutor’s Office (not associated with the State Security Prosecution), and a representative from the lawyers’ syndicate, as well as civil society activists and independent experts.

2. Establish proper oversight and monitoring of the security sector.

The establishment of proper oversight and monitoring of the behavior and practices of police officers is integral to successful SSR. The Internal Monitoring Sector (al-Taftish) should be empowered to do more than just investigating officers in reaction to complaints. It should be given a mandate to monitor and regularly appraise the performance of police officers. This internal accountability mechanism has to be transparent and its results known to the public, including the number of complaints made against officers each year and the process by which the Taftish is investigating them. Meanwhile, oversight by external bodies such as the public prosecutor’s office, the parliament, the National Council for Human Rights, and civil society groups should be regulated in a new police law, replacing the current Police Institution Law No. 109 of 1971. Civil society groups could sign a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Interior, regulating such a monitoring procedure.

Additionally, an independent ombudsman with direct access to the presidential office should be created to deal specifically with violations in the security sector, while a representative prosecutor (wakil niyaba) should be installed in each major police station to ensure oversight and facilitate investigations. Finally, on an international level, President Morsi should facilitate visits by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. Both have been unsuccessfully demanding access to Egypt since 1996 and 2008, respectively, with the Mubarak regime repeatedly blocking such access.


There will be a need to offer specific training for MPs and other civil society groups engaged in the process of monitoring the security sector. Such expertise in training is offered by IGOs (such as the United Nations) as well as several NGOs.

4. Cleanse the Ministry of Interior and Public Prosecutor’s Office.

In order to achieve justice and establish a meaningful reform process, the Ministry of Interior must be cleansed of anti-reform generals and lower-ranking officers who committed torture, murder, extrajudicial killings, and other crimes, especially in the CSF, the SSI, and its successor the NSA. It will also be necessary to cleanse the Public Prosecutor’s Office (most notably State Security Prosecution) of officials who condoned or participated in inhumane treatment, including doctoring evidence, faking charges, or accepting “confessions” given under torture.

The cleansing process should be conducted by investigation committees appointed by the president. These committees should include former police commanders with reputations for ethical conduct, judicial figures, representatives of human rights organizations, and victims of torture. The files and documents of the Internal Monitoring Sector (al-Taftish) and the SSI should be reviewed by the committees to acquire a complete picture of the professional history of the generals and officers under investigation. As part of this process, the Ministry of Interior should initiate a series of promotions to replace offending generals with younger, mid-ranking officers.

5. Change the promotion criteria within the Ministry of Interior.

The promotion criteria inside the Ministry of Interior should be significantly altered. At present, they are based primarily on graduation class, age, and time spent in the force. A meritocratic system in which promotion is determined by performance,
training, and qualifications should be established and elaborated in the new police law (see below).

6. **Conduct a comprehensive review of Police Academy training curricula and systems.**

A comprehensive review of the curricula and training manuals of the Police Academy and other Police Institutes should be conducted. The review should focus on de-militarization of the police, as well as on revising training materials to reflect concepts of human security (as opposed to state security) and police functions as a service to society. The four-year compulsory residence in police faculties (which insulates students from the society with which they will be interacting) should be abandoned. As part of a new alternative system, university graduates could be admitted for one- or two-year training in police sciences.

7. **Restructure and downsize the Ministry of Interior.**

Non-security functions and departments should be separated from the Ministry of Interior. Activities for which the ministry is currently responsible, such as passport administration, civil records, civil defence, and pilgrimage organization, should be assigned to a different ministry. At the same time, the ministry’s interventions – often in the form of requesting security approvals – in the spheres of media, culture, and academia should be brought to an end.

8. **Provide the Central Security Forces with training in non-lethal riot control.**

The Central Security Forces will need comprehensive training in non-lethal riot control tactics. Internationally approved training procedures should be adopted, and the equipment necessary for effective riot control should be supplied.

9. **Draft a new police law.**

While legislative powers are temporarily held by the president (until a new parliament is seated), a new version of the Police Law should be drafted to replace the Police Institution Law No. 109 of 1971. The law should include all aforementioned elements, in addition to those proposed by the presidential committee. Most importantly, it should include clauses regulating external oversight, empowering internal monitoring, and criminalizing torture and degrading treatment (with a clear definition in congruence with international law).

10. **Pass a freedom of information law.**

A freedom of information law should be passed, either by the forthcoming parliament or by the president during the current interim period in which he holds legislative powers. Such legislation should facilitate public oversight of government officials to ensure the Ministry of Interior’s budget is spent on providing security for citizens rather than endangering them. The law should both regulate “affirmative disclosures” (whereby the ministry automatically publishes certain classes of information without a request) and establish an information request process (enabling citizens to request information in the Ministry of Interior’s possession which is not automatically published). An independent body of judges, civil society groups and Ministry of Interior commanders should advise on the law and regularly review the process of information disclosure.
NOTES

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2. The term “thugs” or baltagiyya is commonly used to describe hired attackers, who disrupt political gatherings (demonstrations, sit-ins, electoral campaigns, queues in front of electoral centers, etc.). They are usually a mix of ex-convicts, criminal elements, and plain-clothes policemen. They can be armed with anything from knives and swords to tear-gas bombs and AK-47 automatic rifles.

3. A leftist youth revolutionary movement that co-organized the January 25 protests and marches.

4. Author’s interview with activist, Cairo, November 21, 2011.


8. See for example OECD, OECD-DAC Handbook on Security Sector, 112-118.


14. Querine Hanlon, “Security Sector Reform in Tunisia, a Year After the Jasmine Revolution,” United States Institute of Peace, March 2012, 8. It should be noted that the ruling coalition led by the Nahda Party is planning to implement a thorough security sector reform plan unrelated to the “White Paper” referred to here.


16. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


22. Author’s interview with General Ibrahim Abd al-Ghaffar, Cairo, September 1, 2012.

23. The author collected more than 100 of these documents.

24. Author’s interview with former SSI general, Cairo, March 2012.

25. Ibid; the organizational structure of the SSI can be deduced from the documents confiscated, for example those entitled “Tanaqulat Aghustus 2008 (Movements of August 2008),” which are signed by General Hasan Abd al-Rahman, the former head of the SSI.

26. Ibid.
27. A meal eaten before sunrise to prepare for fasting during Ramadan.
28. Author’s interview with former SSI officer, Cairo, February, 2012.
31. Ibid.
32. Author’s interview with Colonel Omar Afifi, April 24, 2012.
33. Muhammad al-Gawadi, Qadat al-Shurta fi al-Siyasa al-Masriyya (Police Commanders in Egyptian Politics), (Cairo: Madbouli Publishers, 2003), 68.
35. Author’s interview with activist, Cairo, January 25, 2012.
36. Author’s interview with Special Forces officer, Cairo, April 13, 2012.
37. Author’s interview with CSF general, Cairo, April 17, 2012.
38. In each of these cases there were other protesters who did not fit these general profiles.
41. Ibid, 9-10.
42. See for instance, Darchiashvilli, “Security Sector Reform in Georgia,” 33.
44. See the last section of this paper for a discussion of these matters.
45. Author’s interview with Muhammad Selim al-Awa, Cairo, September 19, 2011. Dr. Al-Awa was referring to the Egyptian armed forces after the humiliating defeat by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in June 1967.
46. Author’s interview with Major Tamer Makki, Cairo, August 28, 2012.
47. Author’s interview with General Ibrahim Abd al-Ghaffar, Cairo, September 1, 2012.
52. Ibid, 4.
53. Author’s interview with General Ibrahim Abd al-Ghaffar, Cairo, September 1, 2012.
55. Ibid.
56. Official records show the budget is only EGP 18.4 billion (US $3 billion). However, General Badiny was probably referring to official and unofficial budgets.
58. Author’s interview with GCPO member, Cairo, March 15, 2012.
60. This parliamentary committee was headed by a former commander of the Security-Military Apparatus (Jihaz
al-Amn al-Harbi) of the Egyptian Military Intelligence, General Abbas Mukhaymar. Among the tasks of this unit is the suppression of any ideologically inspired activism or political discussion within the army, with a specific focus on Islamist activism.

61. Author’s discussion with former member of parliament, Cairo, May 24, 2012.
62. Author’s meeting with Egyptian Armed Forces general, Cairo, November 22, 2011.
64. “GCPO” statement, February 1, 2012.
65. Author’s interview with GCPO officer, Cairo, March 15, 2012.
66. In this attack, an armed group killed 16 Egyptian border guards and stole two armored vehicles, before crossing into Israel. One of the vehicles was destroyed by Israeli helicopters, and a fire-fight with Israeli soldiers ensued, in which six were killed.
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