TEN YEARS AFTER HUMANITARIAN REFORM: HOW HAVE IDPS FARED?

AUTHORED BY:
Elizabeth Ferris
Front Cover Photograph: Displaced women arriving at the IDP camp established near the AMISOM base near Jowhar, Somalia (UN, Tobin Jones, November 12, 2013).
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**THE AUTHOR**

**Elizabeth Ferris** is the co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and a senior fellow in Foreign Policy, where her work encompasses a wide range of issues related to internal displacement, humanitarian action, natural disasters and climate change.

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<td>ACAPS</td>
<td>Assessment Capacities Project</td>
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<td>BACRIM</td>
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<td>CCAs</td>
<td>Common Country Assessments</td>
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<td>CIREFCA</td>
<td><em>Conferencia Internacional sobre Refugiados, Desplazados y Repatriados de Centro América</em> (International Conference on Central American Refugees, Displaced and Returnees)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPSS</td>
<td>Displacement and Protection Support Section</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>ExCom</td>
<td>UNHCR Executive Committee</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td><em>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</em> (The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo)</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
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<td>HC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
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<td>HRR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Review</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
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<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td><em>Médecins Sans Frontières</em> (Doctors Without Borders)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NHRIs</td>
<td>National Human Rights Institutions</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OECD DAC</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>PDS</td>
<td>Protection and Displacement Section</td>
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<td>PDSB</td>
<td>Policy Development and Studies Branch</td>
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<td>ProCap</td>
<td>Protection Standby Capacity Project</td>
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<td>PRSPs</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator</td>
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<td>RSG</td>
<td>Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Transformative Agenda</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDAFs</td>
<td>UN Development Assistance Frameworks</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<td>WG</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
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In 2004, the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) undertook a study that found major shortcomings in the ways in which the international community was responding to internally displaced persons (IDPs). In light of these findings, Brookings and OCHA developed a number of recommendations aimed at improving IDP protection and assistance. The study, entitled *Protect or Neglect: Toward a More Effective UN Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons*, directly contributed to the humanitarian reform initiatives launched by the Emergency Relief Coordinator in 2005.¹

Much has happened in the ten years since the 2004 study, including political changes in countries with large numbers of IDPs and reform of the international institutional architecture. It thus seemed timely to take a step back and review the extent to which these changes have addressed the shortcomings in IDP protection and assistance identified in the 2004 review. Building on the initial Brookings/OCHA report, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement developed a research plan for an independent study around the overarching question: *How are IDPs Faring Ten Years after Humanitarian Reform?* The study sought to assess whether institutional reforms of the humanitarian system (such as those carried out through the cluster approach) have improved IDP protection and assistance, as well as the extent to which national authorities are protecting and assisting IDPs within their borders.

**Methodology**

The study was based on field research in three countries: Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia, all of which were included in the 2004 report.² Of the nine countries in the original study, internal displacement (or at least reported internal displacement) had significantly decreased in five: Russia, Liberia, Angola, Sri Lanka and Nepal and their governments considered that internal displacement had ended. (For a brief overview of the displacement situation in these countries, see the Annex to this study.) Although there was considerable discussion about including Burundi as one of the three case studies for field research, it was decided – in consultation with the reference group – to focus on the three countries with the largest number of IDPs: Colombia, DRC and Somalia.

In addition to field research in the three countries, the researchers sought to assess the situation of IDPs in other countries – Syria, Pakistan, Kenya and Haiti – through desk research and telephone interviews because of the particular challenges they present. Given limitations of time, priority was placed on looking at the protection and early recovery clusters as two areas of

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² Nine countries were included in the 2004 report. These countries were: Russia, Somalia, Burundi, Liberia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, Sri Lanka and Nepal. While it would have been useful to revisit the IDP situation in all nine of these countries, given limited resources, it was decided to focus on DRC, Colombia and Somalia all which have large-scale protracted displacement. The Colombia report is available at: [http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/12/29-idp-colombia-displacement-ferris](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/12/29-idp-colombia-displacement-ferris). The DRC report is available at: [http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/12/29-idp-drc-displacement-white](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/12/29-idp-drc-displacement-white). The Somalia report is available at: [http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/12/29-idp-somalia-displacement-drutmra](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/12/29-idp-somalia-displacement-drutmra).
particular importance to IDPs. However, other clusters play important roles in both protecting IDPs and supporting durable solutions.3

The list of key issues which were intended to guide the research included:

1. Development and implementation of IDP policies by governments;
2. National programs and national/international partnership/coordination to respond to internal displacement;
3. Awareness and advocacy of IDP protection and assistance issues at the country level;
4. Availability of international funding for IDPs;
5. Inter-agency coordination and coherence as it relates to internal displacement, including the role of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) and development actors and, where relevant and possible, other non-humanitarian actors, such as United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions;
6. Impact of operational activities on IDP protection, including the role of information management/profiling and consultation with affected populations.

This study was conducted over an eight-month period, beginning with a full desk review of normative products, evaluations and other studies related to IDPs. The Field Research Phase (July-September 2014) included visits to the three IDP case study countries where qualitative interviews with national and international actors and with IDPs were carried out.4 The Validation and Reporting Phase included fact checking and additional key informant interviews at headquarters’ levels as well as development of lessons learned and recommendations. The draft report was circulated to key informants in the three field research countries and then to a wider group of stakeholders for their comments. The final version of the report is being widely disseminated to governments of countries with large numbers of IDPs, international organizations, donor governments, civil society actors and IDP associations. A small reference group of distinguished IDP experts was set up to support the study. Although scheduling of conference calls proved to be difficult, individual conversations were held with members of the reference group prior to the field research and the draft study was shared with members of the reference group for their comments and input.5 Financial support for the study was provided by OCHA, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Swiss government.

3 This study was also intended to complement a broader ‘Independent Whole of System Review of Protection in Humanitarian Crises’ which will look at the engagement of a broad range of actors in protection. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ToR%20Whole-system-review%20GPC%20TT-PP.pdf
4 Field research was carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo by Stacey White, in Somalia by Jeff Drumtra and in Colombia by Elizabeth Ferris.
5 The reference group included Chaloka Beyani, Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, Walter Kälin, former Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs, Roberta Cohen, co-founder of the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement, and representatives from OCHA, the Global Protection Cluster, UNHCR, IDMC and the Swiss Government.
Caveats

The researchers recognized at the outset that it would be almost impossible to draw definitive conclusions about the impact of humanitarian reform on the lives of IDPs over the course of the past decade. There are simply too many ‘intervening variables’ to attribute all changed conditions for IDPs – either positive or negative – to humanitarian reform. For example, even when clusters have been improving conditions for IDPs, renewed conflict can overturn these positive results. Changes in government and governmental policies can have more of an impact on IDPs than anything the international community does. There may be progress in understanding protection and incorporating protection into programming even as armed violence intensifies. Moreover, there is no counter-factual reality – no way of assessing what a situation would have been like without humanitarian reform. Uncertainties in estimates of the number of IDPs – much less their protection and assistance needs – makes longitudinal analysis difficult.

The three cases in which field research was carried out are not necessarily representative of other IDP situations; for example, the conclusions might have been different if the cases had included Pakistan or Iraq or the Philippines. While an effort was made to broaden the scope of the research through telephone interviews with humanitarian staff in four other countries – and these yielded some interesting perspectives – they were not sufficient to enable across-the-board conclusions. In spite of these limitations, it is important to point out the three field cases represent almost 10 million IDPs, about a third of the world’s total; between the field research and the desk studies, 17 million IDPs in five regions were covered. The researchers hope that the observations from this study raise questions and trigger discussion.

In answering the question ‘what impact has humanitarian reform had on the lives of IDPs?’ this study concludes that overall humanitarian reform has strengthened the international response to IDPs and that many IDPs are better off in 2014 than they were in 2004. But some are better off because of changed political conditions rather than humanitarian reform while others remain in terrible situations despite the efforts of the international community. And in still too many cases, IDPs are not protected by either their governments or by the international community. The international humanitarian response to IDPs is more coordinated and more effective, but this study underlines that there are limits to humanitarian action in preventing and resolving displacement. While overall international response to IDPs has improved (although there are still distressing shortcomings even in response) it is hard to be too positive given the increasing number of IDPs in the world and the protracted nature of their displacement.

Before going into these findings and systematically assessing progress against the recommendations made in the 2004 study, it is good to review the development of awareness, frameworks and institutional arrangements for responding to internal displacement. While there are many shortcomings and much remains to be done, the international community should also take pride in how much progress has been made in recognizing the need to protect and assist millions of people displaced within the borders of their own country. It hasn’t been that long since internal displacement was not considered worthy of international attention. Renewed efforts are now needed to prevent the reversal of gains made over the past decade, to ensure that IDPs remain on the international agenda and to address the gaps which continue to limit protection, assistance, and solutions for more than 33.3 million people.

While the international community’s engagement with refugees dates back to the 1920s, awareness that those displaced within the borders of their countries are a matter of international concern only gained momentum some 25 years or so ago. In the early 1990s, a small group of human rights advocates began pressing the UN Human Rights Commission to take up the issue of IDPs and in 1992 the Human Rights Commission named a Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG) on Internally Displaced Persons. Over the course of the next six years, Francis Deng, the first RSG, oversaw the compilation of existing international law applicable to IDPs and, on this basis, brought together leading legal experts to formulate the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. At the same time, humanitarian agencies grappled with the issue of international responsibility for operational response to IDPs. Within the course of a decade, the issue of IDPs was lifted from obscurity to the top of the international humanitarian agenda.

But beyond increasing awareness of the scope of internal displacement, there was a political dynamic at play. Post-Cold War conflicts and the widespread displacement they caused – in places such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Somalia – led to fears of regional instability. At the same time, governments of some countries experiencing displacement recognized the importance of addressing displacement as a key component of stabilization and conflict-resolution. Western governments in particular were concerned with the growing numbers of asylum-seekers arriving on their borders in the post-Cold War era and thus saw a need to address the particular needs of IDPs so that they would not have to leave their countries. If IDPs are assisted and protected in their home countries, the argument went, they wouldn’t seek entry into European, North American or other countries. Over a decade later, some are making similar arguments today with respect to Syrian displacement. Although it is important to underscore that now, as in the past, in times of conflict and tension, most people flee to safer parts of their own countries rather than cross borders as refugees.

When first counted in 1982, the number of IDPs was estimated to be 1.2 million in 11 countries. Over the years, methodologies were developed and refined to estimate the number of IDPs in particular situations although these estimates continue to be a somewhat imprecise endeavor. In 1998 the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) was established by the Norwegian Refugee Council at the request of the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) to collect data on the number of IDPs. With the improvement of data collection, the magnitude of internal displacement became more difficult to ignore. The most recent estimates are that 33.3 million

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For a history of the way in which IDPs became an issue of international concern, see Thomas G. Weiss, and David A. Korn, Internal Displacement: Conceptualization and its Consequences, New York: Routledge, 2006.

Although there was awareness of internal displacement dating back at least the Biafra conflict in the 1960s, the first estimates of global numbers were reported in the World Refugee Survey in 1982. See Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998, p. 3.
people have been internally displaced by conflicts, disasters and human rights violations\(^8\) with another 22 million displaced by natural disasters.\(^9\)

![IDP Numbers, 1989 to present (in millions)](image)

In the years since IDMC’s creation, the availability of information on IDPs has increased and some of the increase in the estimated number of IDPs is likely due to improvements in data collection. In particular, the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS)\(^10\) was established in 2009 and has produced a number of reports detailing or profiling the nature and characteristics of displacement. Data collection by IDMC on displacement expanded to include those displaced by sudden-onset natural disasters\(^11\) – a cause of displacement included in the definition of IDPs. In 2014 IDMC began to tackle the more difficult question of displacement caused by slow-onset disasters.\(^12\) Moreover, over the past two decades, a significant body of research on IDPs was developed which supported the emergence of both national and international policies to protect and assist IDPs.\(^13\)

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Numbers matter. The availability of more data on IDPs has drawn attention not only to the scale of displacement but also to the protection needs of IDPs. While methodologies and analyses have improved over the past decade, there are still shortcomings in the estimates, particularly for IDPs living outside of camps or settlements, IDPs in areas where access is limited by insecurity and in protracted situations where it is difficult to determine whether IDPs have in fact found solutions. In some cases, estimates of the number of IDPs vary significantly between national government agencies, civil society, and international organizations.

**Development of the Normative Framework**

Unlike refugees, there is no legally binding instrument upholding the specific rights of internally displaced persons. However, “as victims of armed conflicts or disturbances, internally displaced persons unquestionably come under the mandate of the ICRC. They consequently enjoy the general protection and assistance it affords to the civilian population...”¹⁴ But while international humanitarian law, international human rights law and (by analogy) refugee law are all applicable to IDPs, the legal provisions certainly do not have the visibility accorded to other groups protected by these international instruments. Moreover the compilation of legal instruments by Francis Deng in 1995 found a significant number of gaps in international law when it came to IDPs.¹⁵

The *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* were developed to address this gap. Presented to the UN in 1998, these *Guiding Principles* reflect and are consistent with existing international human rights law and international humanitarian law and restate in greater detail existing guarantees which apply particularly to IDPs. The *Guiding Principles* are not an international convention or treaty or a legally binding instrument, but have had a significant impact as soft law and have perhaps been even more helpful than a binding convention would have been.¹⁶ While there are occasionally calls to develop an international convention on IDPs, this has been resisted as a time-consuming process with uncertain prospects for success. However, the *African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons*, which is based on the *Guiding Principles*, entered into force as a legally binding instrument in 2012. The Kampala Convention, as it is known, was adopted by African heads of state and government at a Special Summit in Kampala, Uganda on October 22-23, 2009. This is the first instrument intended to legally bind an entire region on matters related to preventing situations of mass displacement and to addressing the vulnerabilities and needs of those who have been displaced.¹⁷

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http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JMF3. However, ICRC engagement with IDPs is limited to situations which rise to the threshold of internal conflict. International humanitarian law also does not cover post-conflict situations where IDPs still remain in need of protection and durable solutions.  
¹⁷ The development of the Great Lakes Protocol (Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, 2006, Article 12, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region: The Pact on Security, Stability and Development For the Great Lakes Region), was both a legally-binding instrument for the 11 countries of the sub-region and a precursor to the Kampala Convention.
Central to the Guiding Principles and indeed to international law generally, is the affirmation that responsibility for protecting and assisting IDPs lies with national authorities, which is obviously problematic in cases where national authorities have contributed to the displacement, as in Sudan, Syria, Sri Lanka and dozens of other cases.

On the political level, the development of the Guiding Principles was paralleled by growing interest in the broader political question of the international community’s role in protecting people when their governments were unable or unwilling to do so. This concern, initially conceptualized as ‘humanitarian intervention,’ emerged in 2005 as the concept of Responsibility to Protect. In both cases, the thorny issue of sovereignty was re-characterized as sovereignty as responsibility. And both the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and Responsibility to Protect were affirmed by the 2005 World Summit.\(^\text{18}\) The Guiding Principles have been repeatedly reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.\(^\text{19}\)

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Operational Response to IDPs

The development of a normative framework for IDPs was paralleled by discussions within the international humanitarian community about how to respond to this particular group of people. In 1990, the UN General Assembly assigned to resident coordinators the function of coordinating assistance to IDPs and in 1991, created the post of Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) to promote a more rapid and coherent response to emergencies. In 1992, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee was created and a task force on IDPs was established which designated the ERC as the ‘reference point’ for requests for protection and assistance for IDPs. The task force on IDPs discontinued its work in 1997 and in the Secretary-General’s 1997 reform program, the role of the ERC was reaffirmed as being responsible for ensuring that protection and assistance of IDPs were addressed.20

In the early 2000s, the international humanitarian community struggled to find appropriate ways of responding to a growing number of internally displaced individuals in the absence of clear institutional mandates. RSG Deng had prioritized the strengthening of the institutional architecture for IDP protection and response. To this effect, he identified three options: create a new UN agency with responsibility for IDPs, assign the task of protection and assistance of IDPs to an existing UN agency (particularly UNHCR), or ask agencies to work together in each situation to determine which agency was in the best position to be able to protect and assist IDPs.21 There was (and is) little support among states for creating a new UN agency for internal displacement. UNHCR has assumed a leadership role in some, but not all, IDP situations.

Discussions among humanitarian agencies about how to work together in IDP situations were centered in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.22 The absence of clear institutional mandates for IDPs – at a time when there was growing awareness of the magnitude of internal displacement – led to a decade-long process of institutional discussions. While having the expertise of dealing with displacement, UNHCR did not have a clear mandate to work with people displaced within their country’s borders.23 As early as 1997, discussions at the IASC recognized that there was a gap in the international institutional response to IDPs and particularly that there was no focal point for IDPs at UN headquarters. The IASC Working Group (WG), in February 1997, agreed that the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) system would, “in full consultation with the country teams, be responsible for operational coordination of assistance and protection of IDPs at the field level.”24 The same year, the Secretary-General designated the Emergency Relief Coordinator [ERC] as “the focal point for the internally displaced within the UN system.”25 IDPs also became a standing item on the agenda of the IASC Working Group for

22 The following historical overview is drawn from “Institutional Architecture for IDPs: Where do we want to be in five years?” Background document prepared by Manisha Thomas, for the December 2012 Stocktaking meeting on IDPs. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/11/28%20stocktaking%20idp/taking%20stock%20of%20internal%20displacement%20report%20nov%202012.pdf.
the next few years (although once the cluster approach was introduced in 2005, this focus on IDPs by the IASC significantly waned.)

In December 1999, the IASC adopted a policy paper on the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons introducing the “collaborative approach” which reinforced the previous decisions of having the ERC as the focal point for IDPs at headquarters and the RC/HC as the focal point at the country level. The scale and magnitude of internal displacement was felt to be too great for any single agency to be mandated with the response. Thus a collective effort or “collaborative approach” was required. Organizations were to work together to respond to the assistance and protection needs of IDPs, based on their organizational strengths and mandates. A Manual on Field Practice in Internal Displacement was also published by the IASC Working Group the same year.26

But the collaborative approach never worked very well. While there had long been calls to have a single IDP agency,27 the debate resurfaced in January 2000, when following a visit to Angola, US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke called for UNHCR’s mandate to be expanded to include IDPs. Instead of the collaborative approach, he pushed for a “single agency approach,” arguing that “a coordinated response is inadequate… Agencies are supposed to act as ‘co-heads.’ In practice, however, co-heads means ‘no-heads’.”28

In September 2000, the Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement was created “to review UN operations in selected countries and provide suggestions to ensure that the UN has a ‘coherent coordination structure’ in place.”29 In April 2001, the Senior Coordinator on Internal Displacement, Dennis McNamara, presented his interim report to the UN Secretary-General based on several inter-agency country visits and the work of the Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement. Building on the approach taken in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the report reinforced the primary responsibility of states towards their internally displaced populations. It recommended that the collaborative approach was the way to move forward and called for the creation of a non-operational unit within OCHA, ideally staffed with secondments, whose “main role would be to monitor situations of internal displacement and ensure that the UN response is improved.”30

An evaluation of the protection of IDPs, carried out by Simon Bagshaw and Diane Paul in 2004, found that the UN’s response to IDP protection was “still largely ad hoc and driven more by

29 ICVA, “Last Chance for the UN to Prove it Made the Right Decision on IDPs?” Talk Back, Volume 2-6, October 2, 2000.
personalities and convictions of individuals on the ground than by an institutional, system-wide agenda.”  

In September 2004, *Guidance for UN Humanitarian and/or Resident Coordinators and Country Teams on Implementing the Collaborative Response to Situations of Internal Displacement* was published by the IASC, which included the “procedural road map” for developing an IDP response strategy in-country. The HC and/or RC was to lead the development of a clear IDP response strategy through consultation with all appropriate actors, a needs assessment, and then formulation of a response strategy that complements the role of government, wherever possible. If there were gaps that could not be addressed, the HC was to approach the ERC and the IASC to ensure a response was agreed to fill the gaps.  

**Humanitarian Reform**

In the same year, 2004, ERC Jan Egeland commissioned the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR), partly in reaction to the inadequate international response to IDPs in Darfur, Sudan and his assessment that more was needed to improve the international approach to internal displacement crises. The HRR identified the major institutional gap as lack of clear responsibility for IDPs and recommended that action be taken “immediately” by the ERC/IASC whereby “The IASC should identify and assign lead organizations with responsibility at sectoral level, especially in relation to IDP protection and assistance and develop a cluster approach in all priority sectors.” These clusters were intended to ensure a more predictable, consistent, and accountable response across crises.

Three clusters were created to specifically address needs of IDPs in conflict situations: protection, camp management and camp coordination, and emergency shelter. UNHCR was the designated lead agency for these three clusters in conflict situations while in disasters, IFRC was tasked with facilitating the emergency shelter cluster and IOM was to lead the cluster on camp management and camp coordination. It has proven to be more difficult to assign responsibility for protection in natural disasters.  

...cluster lead agencies were to be both the “first port of call” and the “provider of last resort.”

Within the clusters, agencies were to coordinate their actions to ensure that needs were met. In a move towards greater accountability, cluster lead agencies were to be both the “first port of call” and the “provider of last resort.” In addition to establishing clusters, a second component of humanitarian reform focused on strengthening the role of HCs, who would continue to have an

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important part to play in ensuring that IDPs’ needs were not falling through the cracks. A third component was to strengthen funding mechanisms.

While the humanitarian reform stems from the gap in response to IDPs, the irony is that internal displacement seems to have largely fallen off the agenda since the reforms were implemented. At the same time, the process of humanitarian reform has expanded beyond internal displacement to encompass most aspects of humanitarian response.

Over the years, there have been mixed reviews of the general effectiveness of the cluster system, and in particular its ability to meet the needs of IDPs. Some cluster lead agencies were concerned that they were being unfairly criticized as “providers of last resort” when they were unable to meet the needs on the ground. As discussed further below, clusters were intended to strengthen emergency response to enable more nimble and predictable action and in some cases, they have served that function.

The Transformative Agenda

While the clusters continue, the transformative agenda (TA) put forward by Valerie Amos to the IASC does not refer specifically to IDPs, but focuses on improving three areas of emergency response: leadership, coordination, and strategic systems, with accountability to affected populations being an overarching issue. Commitments were once again made to only introduce clusters when needed, so as not to duplicate or replace existing coordination structures – an element of the original humanitarian reform that was not always followed. Mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the international “system” would be able to respond quickly and effectively to a major (“Level 3” or “L3”) emergency; there was more focus on ensuring that strategic systems were in place to respond; and perhaps, most significantly, a clear commitment was made to ensure accountability to affected populations, which was largely absent from the original humanitarian reform. Although the cluster system was intended to increase accountability, this largely focused on clarifying which international agency was tasked with leadership in a given sector rather than accountability to IDPs. While the TA was intended to address some of the weaknesses of the humanitarian reform process, there are fewer and fewer references in the parlance of humanitarian reform to IDPs. Many feel that IDPs’ needs are being met by the system and that there is no longer any need to single out IDPs from the broader affected population.

This section looks at some of the overall conclusions from this study on how IDPs are faring in 2014 while the next section reviews progress made in the international institutional response to IDPs over the past decade by systematically reviewing each of the main conclusions of the 2004 study, Protect or Neglect.

In comparison with the situation in 2004, the international community has made significant progress in responding to IDPs’ needs. Sometimes humanitarian actors become so involved in the details of institutional response and are so conscious of the enormity of unmet needs that they fail to see the significant accomplishments which have taken place. Indeed, one of the reasons for doing an independent review such as this is to step back from the day-to-day operations and see the big picture. And the big picture is that the international institutional architecture has definitely gotten better. Humanitarian reform has made a difference in improving the effectiveness of international response. Coordination mechanisms have been established where none existed. There is more awareness of the specific needs of IDPs by Humanitarian Coordinators and international agencies. There is greater understanding that protection must be part of the humanitarian response for IDPs requiring not only the commitment of the mandated protection agencies, but all humanitarian organizations. Funding mechanisms have improved and the importance of funding protection is recognized. There is more clarity about the responsibility of specific international agencies for IDPs.

While the system is far from perfect and there are shortcomings and persistent problems, it is important to affirm that the overall international response to IDPs has improved over the past decade.

While the system is far from perfect and there are shortcomings and persistent problems, it is important to affirm that the overall international response to IDPs has improved over the past decade. Given the large-scale effort and energy which was mobilized to introduce and implement the key components of humanitarian reform, it is heartening to note that these efforts have paid off. Most fundamentally, reform efforts have contributed to more effective international response which has alleviated suffering and saved lives. But there are still serious shortcomings in the way the international community is responding to IDPs.

Although all represent large-scale protracted displacement, the case studies on which this study is based – Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Colombia – are very different situations and the role of international actors is different in each of them. The causes of the conflicts are different, the armed actors are different (al-Shabaab is not the same as BACRIM), the capacity of the state is different (the transitional government in Somalia dates back only two years, while the state in Colombia is solidly established), and the role of state armed forces is different (the
Colombian armed forces are worlds apart from the FARDC). It would be hard to pick any three countries which could be said to be ‘representative’ of internal displacement generally and this study does not assume that lessons drawn from these three cases can be generalized to all IDP situations.

Nonetheless, it is possible to identify common themes and recommendations from these three disparate cases (as well as from other contexts) where further discussion might be useful.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Maintain the visibility of IDPs

Although there is now much greater awareness of protection than when Protect or Neglect was published, there are signs that internal displacement is slipping off the international agenda. There is a danger of losing progress made on IDPs over the past two decades. The trend toward mainstreaming, the decreasing visibility of IDPs on the international agenda, the decline in numbers of staff focusing explicitly on IDPs in international organizations such as UNHCR, OCHA, and ICRC and the weakening of the position of Special Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs all raise alarm bells. Calls to protect IDPs are being replaced with references to ‘vulnerable groups,’ ‘civilians,’ and ‘affected communities.’ While clearly other groups – such as those unable to move or communities hosting IDPs – also have urgent needs, there is a danger that lumping IDPs in with the larger conflict-affected population makes them invisible and makes it less likely that measures will be taken to address the specific vulnerabilities associated with displacement, such as the need for shelter, protection, documentation, access to services, and solutions. While the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement remain an important normative framework, more effort is needed to strengthen regional instruments and to support the development of national laws and policies.

1.1 Leaders of both international humanitarian and development organizations should be more outspoken on issues of internal displacement, both globally and in particular country situations, especially where access to – and news reports of – IDPs are limited.

1.2 OCHA, and the Emergency Relief Coordinator in particular, should engage more systematically with the issue of IDPs, including highlighting their particular needs in statements and reports on protection of civilians and more systematically collecting and disseminating information on IDPs in hard-to-access areas, such as Syria.

1.3 The Humanitarian and Resident Coordinators should be asked to regularly report on the situation of IDPs in their countries, with a particular focus on protection concerns and on progress toward solutions.

1.4 Discussions are now needed with the UN secretariat and states about the establishment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the human rights of IDPs which is properly staffed and funded in order to ensure that the position has the visibility and the capacity needed to play a catalytic role in advocating on behalf of IDPs. The establishment of such a position should complement enhanced efforts by all international agencies to develop programs and policies for IDPs.

1.5 The international community should continue to support the development of normative frameworks, including support for implementation of the African Union Convention on Internal Displacement, for the development of other regional instruments in other parts of the world and for national governments to develop laws and policies on IDPs.
2. Always bear in mind that governments are – or should be – the key actor in preventing, responding to and resolving internal displacement

National authorities are responsible for protecting and assisting those displaced within their borders. The Framework for National Responsibility\(^{38}\) lays out twelve steps which governments can take to exercise their responsibility toward IDPs. Some governments have indeed taken important measures to address internal displacement while others try to ignore the fact that large numbers of people have fled their homes and still others are actively engaged in actions which are displacing people. While national authorities should be in the driver’s seat in responding to IDPs, international agencies need to be more intentional about their roles vis-a-vis governments. Sometimes there is tension between efforts to support national authorities and to build their capacities while at the same time maintaining a critical independent perspective. To what extent is the need to respond quickly to IDPs balanced with the longer-term objective of building national and local capacity?

There are questions about how effective international response has been in building capacity of national and local authorities. A Kenyan NGO respondent noted that “when the post-election violence broke out, the government was paralyzed and simply could not act. We needed the international community to respond. Our government simply could not do it.” But as one international staff member involved with clusters in responding to Kenya’s post-election violence poignantly remarked, “the clusters did a good job in responding to Kenyan IDPs, but at the end of the day, I ask myself ‘what did we leave behind?’ Is it the task of the international community to respond to IDPs’ needs or to build the capacity of national/local authorities so that they can better respond the next time? If this is the case, what does it mean to build the capacity? Some tasks – such as providing technical assistance to support development of laws and policies – seem relatively straightforward. Others – such as strengthening governmental ministries or relying on government security forces to provide security – are not so clear.

There is also an inherent tension between international actors working to support governments while maintaining their independence. It is a delicate line between being supportive and being co-opted.

There is also an inherent tension between international actors working to support governments while maintaining their independence. It is a delicate line between being supportive and being co-opted, between working to strengthen governments’ and criticizing them when they get it wrong. This study suggests that the theme of ‘how we work with governments’ needs much more attention with a particular emphasis on three issues: the role of internationals vis-à-vis sub-national authorities, the delicate task of maintaining an independent critical perspective, and work with civil society.

Although they are very disparate cases, all three case studies illustrate the need to work much more intentionally with governmental authorities at the sub-national levels. In Colombia, which has strong national laws and programs, the big weakness – recognized by everyone – is at the municipal level. In Somalia, humanitarian actors find themselves negotiating with different governmental entities in different areas of the country and in DRC, with a shifting landscape of local authorities. Tellingly, in all three cases, at least some respondents remarked that local cluster coordination was stronger than national coordination. While humanitarians do engage with local authorities, there does not seem to be a concerted joint strategy for doing so.

Development of such a strategy could provide both an impetus to do more with the local level as well as to develop more complementary approaches. In terms of their interactions with governmental authorities, most IDPs will have more contact with local authorities than with national ones and it is municipal authorities who bear the brunt of finding resources to meet the needs of IDPs. However, decisions about which municipal areas to work in often run into the next theme – how closely to work with governments – particularly when governments identify certain areas as ‘consolidation zones’ (Colombia) or ‘islands of stability’ (DRC). When a government calls for concerted action in a particular area, humanitarians can face the same dilemmas they find in integrated missions – maintaining the independence of humanitarian action when the overarching pressure is to use humanitarian aid as part of a strategy of peacebuilding or consolidation or stabilization.

International actors working in countries with strong governments face a particular set of challenges. Several respondents from different country contexts remarked that ‘clusters were set up for failed states. Their role just isn’t clear when the state is strong.’ When the government is strong, as in Colombia, the issue of how internationals should support the government becomes complicated – particularly when the government does not perceive a need for independent international action. How independent should international actors be in working with governments on IDPs? The Somali case study notes the ambivalence among the international community about working with the government – at least this particular government. In the Colombian case, there seems to have been much more appreciation of the international community’s role when previous Colombian administrations were ignoring IDPs than now when the government has mostly assumed its full range of responsibilities. In such a situation, what is the role of international humanitarian actors? Is it to watch from the sidelines and offer suggestions when asked? Is it to wait in the wings in case things go terribly wrong or another government comes in which is not as responsive? In countries with strong governments – not only Colombia but also countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Syria – international agencies seem particularly aware of the fragility of their presence. The fear of being expelled from the country (or Memoranda of Understandings being re-negotiated) or bureaucratic obstacles being placed in the way of their operations is constant, giving rise to a certain risk aversion. This also suggests that the role of the protection cluster may be fundamentally different in countries with strong governments. For example, several international respondents working in the Pakistani context noted that the protection cluster gave their agencies cover in pushing for greater humanitarian access. As one respondent explained, “our agency didn’t have to stick its neck out and go it alone but could say this was the view of the protection cluster.”

In looking at national and local capacity, the key role of civil society and national NGOs was a recurrent theme. In DRC, it seems that internationals do not trust national NGOs because of concerns about corruption while in Somalia, there seems to be a reliance on local NGOs to carry out the work (particularly via remote management) but also uncertainty about their capacity and
political interests. This was also a concern raised in the context of cross-border operations in Syria. In Colombia, the situation is very different, perhaps the result of several decades of work by donors to build up the capacity of civil society organizations during a time when displacement was increasing and the government was not responsive to the needs of IDPs. Colombian NGOs play a very important role in IDP work, including advocacy at the international level and monitoring and providing legal and other assistance at the local level. An important role for protection clusters could be in building long-term capacity, particularly when it is difficult to work with governments. Although the research didn’t focus on the role of national NGOs in the clusters, other research has indicated that national NGOs often feel marginalized from the clusters. In one of the telephone interviews conducted for this study, a Kenyan national NGO representative remarked, ‘National NGOs participated in the cluster meetings, but most did so in the hopes of getting more funds.’ Much remains to be done to strengthen ties with NGOs and civil society groups.

A final observation is that history and reputation of international action (or inaction) impact current and future possibilities. In Colombia, although the government raised concerns about the relevance of international actors today, there was also widespread appreciation for the tenacity of internationals in raising human rights issues in the country over the long haul. In Somalia the UN is hampered by the bad reputation of the Humanitarian Country Team for failing to prevent the 2011 famine. A number of those interviewed by telephone regarding the UN’s humanitarian response in Syria were extremely critical. As one international respondent noted, “someday we’ll look back on our work in Syria with shame. It will make Sri Lanka look good.” The ‘Rights up Front initiative’ underscores the importance of responding early to human rights violations – including when the rights of IDPs are violated – even when doing so brings international actors into conflict with governments.

There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to international-governmental collaboration in humanitarian work beyond affirming the primary responsibility of national authorities for internal displacement. In some cases of weak governments, such as Somalia and DRC, the international humanitarian community largely substitutes for the government in provision of key services. While the UN always requires the consent of the government, there are also cases where other international actors have bypassed governments in order to respond to the needs of IDPs as in current cross-border operations in Syria and earlier operations in Eritrea, Cambodia and Burma. Even strong states – such as Colombia, Pakistan and Kenya – sometimes do not have the will or capacity to respond to displacement and need both the support and the critical perspectives brought by international actors. The Global Protection Cluster has developed a useful template for developing a strategic approach to humanitarian response which could serve as the basis for further reflection on the roles of international agencies vis a vis governments. At the same time, Humanitarian Country Teams are charged with agreeing on common strategic

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issues related to humanitarian action and thus provide another forum for discussion on this and other issues.

2.1 In developing the workplans of individual humanitarian agencies and in activating clusters, the issue of building national capacity should be central in countries whose governments are willing to exercise their responsibilities toward IDPs. In particular, strategies are needed to develop more supportive relationships by internationals vis-à-vis sub-national authorities, for honestly considering the delicate task of maintaining an independent critical perspective, and for working with civil society.

2.2 Existing coordination mechanisms (for example, the clusters and country teams) should grapple with some of the burning issues around IDP protection, for example, the relationship between IDPs, vulnerable groups, and affected communities and particular issues emerging in specific contexts, as for example in Somalia the role of ‘gatekeepers’ in controlling relief distribution and in Colombia, the response to displacement caused by organized criminal groups.

2.3 The Global Protection Cluster should assess how these strategic reflections are going and make the necessary changes to ensure that the clusters are continually dealing with new challenges which come their way. It might be helpful, for example, to have a team of external consultants work with the clusters in developing these plans or to hold the cluster leads individually responsible for ensuring that this strategic review is carried out or to circulate these strategic plans between protection clusters for ‘peer review’ critique.

3. Consolidate progress in humanitarian reform

Overall, the processes of humanitarian reform have strengthened the capacity of the international humanitarian system to respond to the needs of IDPs. The main components of humanitarian reform – the cluster approach, strengthening the role of humanitarian coordinators, and more flexible forms of funding (e.g. CERF) – are sound and need to be affirmed. The IASC should leave no room for doubt that it remains committed to these absolutely key components of humanitarian assistance and protection, and to their continued strengthening and improvement.

At the same time, measures should be taken to overcome some of the shortcomings identified in this study. Cluster systems at the country level must be prepared to respond rapidly and effectively to new emergencies, which includes having early warning systems and contingency planning in place in order to respond to crises as they develop. Given the protracted nature of displacement, some cluster systems at the country level have become accustomed to maintaining ongoing operations and have not responded deftly to new emergencies in-country – whether provision of humanitarian aid in DRC to response to famine in Somalia to the phenomenon of criminal violence-induced displacement in Colombia. For example, the study on Somalia – which no doubt applies to other countries as well – found that ‘humanitarian agencies have fallen into a dangerous habit of focusing on protracted assistance needs while ignoring emergency needs that are more dire and require a rapid priority response.’

Complaints about the bureaucratic nature of the clusters are common. “We spend a lot of time talking about our internal organization, such as who will lead a cluster and how we’ll coordinate with other clusters,” one respondent noted. Another bitterly remarked: ‘you’d hardly know there was a war going on. It’s like you’re watching a neighbor bleed to death and all you can talk
about is the need to trim the hedges.’ Others complained that there were too many meetings while others lamented that the leadership and participation in clusters was inadequate. There seemed to be a consensus that protection clusters in particular functioned more effectively with dedicated cluster leadership. However, it is hard to see how cluster coordination can function without meetings. By definition, coordination requires time and energy and coordination meetings always take time away from programmatic work. That is the nature of the coordination beast. But the question should be are coordination meetings enabling a more effective humanitarian response? Can they serve as forums for analysis and development of strategies for issues that no one agency can deal with on its own?

For example, all three of the case studies identified really difficult issues confronting humanitarian actors in their work with IDPs where some in-depth analysis and brainstorming within the clusters could be useful. In Colombia, for example, there is recognition that most of those newly displaced are fleeing criminal violence rather than the conflict with the guerrillas. But this raises a number of thorny questions: are the needs of IDPs the same in these situations? Should the responses be the same? For example, are there protection concerns around expecting those displaced by gangs and cartels to register with state authorities? Are different protection models needed for those seeking to escape transnational criminal organizations – more along the lines of witness protection programs? Who is working with those displaced between communities within urban areas? In Somalia, the issues of aid diversion and of working with ‘gatekeepers’ in IDP settlements raises very difficult issues for humanitarian actors. Could the clusters be a forum for analyzing alternative ways of addressing these issues? In DRC, while it seems to be recognized that IDPs in settlements are receiving much more attention than those living dispersed in communities, can the clusters analyze this in terms of the consequences on protection? Are there ways of addressing these disparities beyond calling for more funding? Also in DRC, discussion of solutions seems to focus almost exclusively on returns. Could the clusters be a forum for discussing/advocating for other solutions?

A rarely-discussed but persistent theme running throughout global discussions as well as these studies concerns the relationship between IDPs, affected communities and vulnerable populations. There seems to be a movement toward considering IDPs as part of a larger category of people in need – whether as ‘victims’ in Colombia or as affected communities elsewhere. As the researcher for the DRC study noted, ‘it is hard to know who is displaced and who is more vulnerable.’ While IDPs may not always be the most vulnerable (for example, in comparison with those unable to escape), they often have specific needs related to their displacement (e.g. shelter, solutions, loss of documentation.) Are these particular needs adequately dealt with through programs and approaches for ‘vulnerable groups’ or ‘affected communities?’

As noted above, the Global Protection Cluster has developed a helpful framework for collectively reflecting on the principal strategic questions facing clusters working in particular
countries—assessing risks, identifying responsibilities, assessing capacities, and developing responses. This may be working well in some country situations, but could be more effectively used. In fact, this strategic approach is probably the most important task for the protection clusters. Rather than being a routine ‘box to tick.’ It should be prioritized as a dynamic, forward-looking process to guide the clusters and their members in their future work. In cases where humanitarian country teams have developed strategic plans for humanitarian response at the country level, reflections from the protection clusters should feed into these larger strategy documents.

While considerable resources have been devoted to training in the context of protection clusters, the record is less clear on the training by individual agencies and clusters on internal displacement. In some cases, such as OCHA, there are no training materials on IDPs and while training modules on IDPs have been developed by UNHCR, it is uncertain how many staff—including those deployed to situations of widespread internal displacement—have completed this training. While an IDP component is now included in training of Humanitarian Coordinators, some of the telephone interviews conducted for this study raise questions about the effectiveness of this approach.

Similarly, although the study found greater awareness of the need for protection in situations of internal displacement, serious gaps in the timely deployment of protection staff were reported, for example in Syria. And while there was appreciation for the work undertaken by ProCap staff, concern was expressed that these staff were in effect ‘letting UN agencies off the hook’ by allowing them to forego the necessary training and preparation of regular agency staff to work in IDP situations.

While humanitarian reform has improved operational short-term response, it has had little effect either protecting people from new displacement or in finding solutions for those displaced. Questions of access and staff security continue to be the major limitations in protecting and assisting IDPs. Addressing the causes of displacement and providing the security necessary for humanitarian access are not the responsibility of humanitarian actors, but they can support resilience and self-protection strategies by IDPs themselves. Too few international efforts are devoted to this and yet engaging more directly with IDP communities is in line with the key objectives of the Transformative Agenda.

3.1 The InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) should reaffirm its commitment to the three essential components of humanitarian reform in 2015, 10 years after the original adoption of the reforms. In particular, the IASC should affirm and emphasize that the

41 See for example: the Local to Global Protection initiative: http://www.local2global.info/
The principal role of the cluster system is to ensure a timely, predictable and accountable response to new emergencies.

3.2 The Protection Clusters should ensure needed staffing, particularly full-time dedicated cluster coordinators, and training for cluster members, including on internal displacement. In addition, international agencies should ensure that staff working in situations of internal displacement receive training on both the particular vulnerabilities of IDPs and the basic principles of IDP normative frameworks.

3.3 Humanitarian actors, particularly through the protection clusters, should do more to understand how IDPs protect themselves when states cannot do so, including when international actors are not present, and do more to support their autonomy, resilience, self-protection and self-reliance strategies. This could be included in the strategic reflections referenced in the recommendations regarding protection clusters above.

3.4 Much greater attention is needed by almost all actors to IDPs dispersed with host families. While the increased awareness of IDPs living outside of camps is commendable, there is still a paucity of knowledge on best practices of responding to their particular needs and the families/communities that host them.

4. Prioritize finding solutions to displacement and the challenge of engaging development actors

While the most important humanitarian policy advance of the last decade has been the remarkable evolution of protection, the issue for the coming decade is about the protracted nature of displacement, the need to develop effective ways of engaging development actors, redoubling the search for durable solutions, and working much more intentionally on the issue of ‘transitions.’ Specifically, the most important IDP protection challenge in the coming years is bridging the much-lamented relief-to-development gap. In spite of decades of repeated calls for increased engagement of development actors, the relief-to-development gap remains a glaringly apparent problem that is simply unacceptable in view of the long-term hardship it imposes on beneficiary populations and the fact that the gap is entirely the creation of an international system that aids and abets a wide separation between relief actors and humanitarian organizations. There have been many efforts to bridge this gap over the years. To cite but one recent example, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs made this one of his two main priorities in December 2012 and yet there is no discernible sign that development and humanitarian actors are working together more effectively in situations of protracted displacement. On the contrary, the dysfunctional gap between relief and development programs has gained a strange acceptance over the years as a frustratingly predictable, consistent, vaguely unfortunate but normal practice.

Humanitarian reform has had little effect on finding solutions for IDPs. Although the protracted nature of displacement is widely lamented, there seems to be a paucity of creative thinking in coming up with ways for development and humanitarian actors to work together to find solutions. There have been many efforts to overcome this in the last five years – Transitional Solutions Initiative, the Secretary-General’s Framework for Solutions, the Solutions Alliance, the Early Recovery Cluster – not to mention efforts dating back to ICARA II in the mid-1980s.
Not only have none of these initiatives yielded substantive improvements but there has been little accountability for their failure.

In all three countries, humanitarian actors continue to be confounded by the issue of durable solutions to displacement. Efforts in Somalia have been minimal and the case study on DRC concludes that “IDPs remain as vulnerable and aid-dependent today as they were a decade ago,” noting that only recently have efforts been made to implement transitional programming. Colombia offers more hope for durable solutions to displacement but this is in large measure the result of the government’s action rather than the international community.

Durable solutions have been high on the agenda of international actors for years and yet the fact that so little progress has been made leads to several different types of questions.

- **a.** How do we know when IDPs find solutions? Given the decline in numbers of IDPs in some countries, can it be assumed that they have found some kind of solution? Is there a need to verify or monitor to be sure that individuals and communities have found solutions? If so, is this a task for humanitarian organizations?

- **b.** Are the standards for durable solutions as laid out in the Framework for Durable Solutions too high? While those who developed the Framework were probably right to emphasize that ending displacement is a process and that efforts should be made to resist governmental pressure to simply ‘declare that displacement has ended,’ has the bar been set too high? Can the Framework be operationalized to be able to recognize when people should no longer be considered IDPs?

- **c.** Is there a single standard or set of standards that applies to IDPs in all situations and contexts? For example, the Framework for Durable Solutions does not include an indicator on self-perceptions of displacement (which is obviously very difficult to quantify or measure). But there are cases where people feel displaced decades after they were forced to move\(^{42}\) in spite of being better off by objective indicators in their new locale. There are also cases where people displaced long ago are now hosting more recently displaced individuals.\(^{43}\) Is it possible to think of a continuum by which ending displacement occurs – where people feel ‘less displaced’ than they were?

- **d.** Is the task of finding solutions for internal displacement beyond the mandate and the competence of humanitarian actors? For example, in all three of the case study countries examined here, the issue of land is key to resolving displacement (either restituting land so IDPs can return or compensating them for land so that they can start anew somewhere else or ensuring land titles in their area of displacement to enable local integration). Although some humanitarian actors (such as the Norwegian Refugee Council) have developed expertise in land issues, by and large the skills needed to respond to a new mass displacement are not the same as to sort through complex legal issues around land tenure and ownership. Land issues are also inherently and intensely political with costs to humanitarian actors who seek to find answers for IDPs in need of land to resolve their displacement. Although there have

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been a few efforts by some development agencies in this direction, displacement is still considered a humanitarian issue and development agencies are reluctant to add more issues to their already-full development agendas.

The single biggest failing of the cluster system is the Early Recovery cluster. There is an urgent need to clarify its status, both at the global and the field levels. In none of the three countries studied, Somalia, Colombia, and DRC, was the Early Recovery cluster active despite obvious opportunities for early recovery programs. Although the cluster has taken new initiatives in the past several years – such as deploying Early Recovery advisors – progress has been painfully slow. Either the IASC should make a fresh commitment to making the Early Recovery cluster function as it should, or a new system should be installed in its place. UNDP should be held accountable for the widespread failures of the Early Recovery cluster and the IASC should take action to make the necessary changes to ensure that this necessary task is being addressed. Ultimately it is the responsibility of the IASC to make sure that cluster leads are upholding their responsibilities. Until that happens, the closure of desperately needed nutrition programs and health clinics after relief operations cease, the degradation of emergency water systems after humanitarian organizations leave, and the collapse of shelter/housing programs after the emergency passes will continue to be the fault not of combatants or natural disasters, but of humanitarian and development policy makers, as well as the donors who fund such a system.

Although this study has not focused on the role of donors, the World Bank, the regional development banks and other development agencies – such as UN Habitat, UN Women, and the UN Population Fund – these actors also should be pressed to become more effectively involved in resolving displacement. The reality is that many of the issues limiting durable solutions for IDPs are development issues – such as re-establishment of livelihoods and rule of law – rather than humanitarian ones. National development plans need to incorporate displacement and allocate funds for durable solutions. It simply does not make sense for humanitarian agencies to devote scarce resources to building expertise in areas where development actors already possess years of experience and good practices. As evidenced by funding difficulties experienced by the Early Recovery clusters, humanitarian donors do not seem to prioritize financial support for transitions to development programming.

Although the IASC has adopted the Framework for Durable Solutions which provides a comprehensive tool for determining solutions, this framework does not yet serve as a practical tool for most governments. Further work is needed to provide guidance to governments and international actors alike on how to adapt the framework to specific national contexts.

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In the absence of the engagement of development actors, humanitarians are often faced with the need to work with IDPs for years and yet are restricted in planning the efficient use of resources for more than a one-year funding cycle. Indeed, one of the impediments to long-term planning and action in protracted situations is the short-term funding cycle of donor governments. Providing funding on an annual basis encourages short-term programming (usually some form of ‘care and maintenance’ operations) rather than the longer-term action needed to support solutions to displacement. Some donors have begun to change this timeframe and this should be encouraged.

4.1 The IASC should evaluate the Early Recovery cluster, hold UNDP accountable for its performance, consider whether it can be strengthened and, if not, rapidly establish another modality for ensuring a transition from humanitarian response to development action.

4.2 The UN Secretary-General should also hold the Early Recovery Cluster and the Global Protection Cluster accountable for progress in implementing his 2011 Policy Decision on Durable Solutions which instructed Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, with the support of UNDP and UNHCR, to develop strategies for durable solutions for internally displaced people.

4.3 Development actors, such as the World Bank Group and the UN Development Group, should develop tangible policies to support solutions for internal displacement and consider ways in which pilot projects, such as those included in the Solutions Alliance and those undertaken by the World Bank, can be scaled up.

4.4 Protection clusters should convene meetings with government officials, development actors and (where they exist) early recovery clusters to review the Framework for Durable Solutions and adapt and operationalize it to the particular context so that it serves as an effective tool for finding solutions. This should form an integral part of strategic planning.

4.5 Donor agencies should be encouraged to make funding decisions for humanitarian programs on three year cycles unless and until development actors are active in long-term displacement situations.

5. **Think boldly about protracted displacement**

It is the responsibility of national authorities to establish conditions and support the means for IDPs to find durable solutions to their displacement. And yet the dominant characteristic of internal displacement in 2014 is its protracted nature. Solutions simply aren’t being found and national governments seem unwilling or unable to take the lead in resolving displacement. This study found a certain complacency, inertia, and tiredness in international response to long-standing IDP situations. Given the impact of protracted crises on the ability of the humanitarian system to respond to new emergencies and the failure over the past 25 years of effective humanitarian-development collaboration to find solutions for protracted displacement, the time has come for more radical thinking. Perhaps a UN resolution is needed to set time limits for

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humanitarian actors after which point development agencies would be expected (and held accountable) for taking over. Or perhaps it is time to establish a new UN agency for ‘transitions’ – perhaps a hybrid organization including staff from humanitarian, development and peacebuilding agencies charged with supporting transitions and finding solutions. Or perhaps it is time for the UN to organize a global effort – such as World Refugee Year in 1960 – to end protracted displacement for the millions of IDPs and refugees who have been displaced for more than a decade. Or perhaps regional initiatives – à la CIREFCA (the International Conference on Central American Refugees, Displaced and Returnees) or the Comprehensive Plan of Action – should be organized in which a variety of partners (national governments, international actors, civil society) are mobilized to do their part to find durable solutions for those suffering the effects of protracted displacement. These ideas would all require a massive investment of time, energy and funding – and yet the costs of continuing to devote most of the world’s humanitarian resources, year after year, to assisting those in protracted displacement are very high.

Humanitarian actors are well-aware of the fact that most of the world’s ‘humanitarian caseload’ consists of people living in protracted displacement, either as refugees or IDPs. Indeed estimates are that 80 percent of the world’s displaced have been uprooted for more than 5 years. This leads to a certain complacency, inertia, tiredness in international response in long-standing IDP situations. It also should lead to questions about the role and exit strategy of humanitarian organizations. For example, some international organizations have been providing humanitarian assistance in Colombia for 40 years. While there are clearly humanitarian needs – and while the work is good and much-appreciated in Colombia – something is wrong with the international system when humanitarian aid is provided, decade after decade. The DRC case study concluded that ‘the humanitarian community has been conducting its approach in the same way for nearly two decades and yet vulnerability remains on the rise.’ As noted above, the expertise and skills needed for emergency response are arguably not the same as for long-term protracted situations.

The humanitarian landscape has changed, especially in 2014. As one respondent cited in the Somalia case study remarked, “ten years ago, at the time of the Protect or Neglect report, Darfur was the big new emergency. Now there are probably ten emergencies the size of Darfur. I hope the system catches up with the changed landscape but so far we have not caught up.” While the researchers hope that the number of large-scale complex emergencies in 2014 is an aberration, the fact that the international humanitarian system is being called to respond to simultaneous new major emergencies brings into sharp relief the fact that probably most humanitarian work today is essentially to provide care and maintenance to those living in protracted displacement. As another respondent in the Somalia study noted, “the pervasive incentive is to continue the status quo. There is a kind of complacency. Donors are complicit in this. The global humanitarian system is really creaking at the seams.”

It is hard for humanitarians to turn away – or to leave – when immediate human needs are still acute and governments are unable to protect and assist those displaced within their territory. This is the essence of the humanitarian calling and yet there are costs of continuing to devote most humanitarian funding to long-term protracted displacement situations.
In the absence of solutions and the protracted nature of conflicts, in recent years, ‘stay and deliver’ has been the admirable policy guiding humanitarian action in on-going conflict situations. The “stay and deliver” policy emphasizes the importance of finding ways to continue humanitarian programs and to avoid closing programs and evacuating staff when the security risks are deemed too severe. It is a noble policy that has been pursued in difficult displacement situations such as DRC and Somalia. However, the practice comes at an operational cost, particularly when extended over many years. Deciding to ‘stay’ has sometimes compromised the standards used in delivering assistance, leading to situations with weak program management, poor program monitoring, and deliberately false or inaccurate reporting about program results. Discussion of these operational compromises is sensitive but necessary, particularly in light of the review of UN operations in Sri Lanka, in order to ensure accountability for the humanitarian decisions and compromises being made to continue operations. There is a fundamental tension between the “humanitarian imperative” on the one hand and “humanitarian standards” on the other which was particularly highlighted in the case study on Somalia, but certainly applies more broadly. Given the difficulties of carrying out humanitarian operations in situations of open conflict, a balance between the two is probably the only way forward. Yet there needs to be a regular opportunity or mechanisms for humanitarian actors to step back and reflect on whether particular humanitarian programs should be continued.

5.1 The Global Protection Cluster, the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, UNDP, the IASC, UNHCR and OCHA (particularly in planning the World Humanitarian Summit) together with the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs are encouraged to create forums and devote energy to thinking boldly about actions needed to address protracted displacement. And the Secretary-General should provide momentum and leadership to implementing his 2011 framework for ending displacement.

5.2 In countries where prevailing insecurity means that operations cannot be adequately monitored, regular discussions should be held between the protection cluster, the humanitarian coordinator, and senior officials from headquarters of humanitarian agencies (perhaps UNHCR and OCHA) to assess whether humanitarian action should continue.

5.3 The international humanitarian system, including donor governments, should undertake a specially focused examination of how the cluster approach can function – or should function – in situations that pose exceptionally high security risks and limited humanitarian access, such as in present-day Somalia, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The Global Protection Cluster should consider setting up a mechanism to ensure accountability for humanitarian decisions to continue operations in risky settings where standards may be compromised.

6. Devote more resources and creativity to data-collection on IDPs to support policy and programming decisions

Counting IDPs and assessing their needs and capacities is an inherently difficult task, particularly in urban settings where even identifying IDPs is a challenging undertaking. But the lack of accurate data – on numbers, demographic characteristics, needs and intentions – limits the ability of governments and international responders to tailor suitable programs for them. It also limits our understanding of displacement trends and dynamics. This study has found, for example, that
it is impossible to assess whether IDPs are better off through comparison of objective indicators over a ten-year period – e.g. poverty, protection, health, livelihoods. This is due to the lack of basic data – as well as of disaggregated data by gender and age. There are inconsistencies in the way data is collected which are related to conceptual differences in definition (for example, are children of IDPs counted as IDPs? How are secondary and multiple displacements counted?) There are difficulties in monitoring displacement over time as well as gaps between the type of data collected by national governments and by a range of international organizations carrying out assessments at different times and for different purposes. Too often this information is not made publicly available, leading to both a paucity of timely information and to duplication of data-collection efforts. While there are exciting new technologies which offer hope for more accurate data-collection, further work is equally essential (though perhaps less-exciting) on how the data will be disseminated and used, especially by governments of affected countries.

6.1 National governments and international agencies should review their existing methods of collecting data on IDPs and consider ways of improving these methodologies. This could include:

- Working with governments to gather data on the situation of IDPs as part of their standard data mechanisms, including censuses and population surveys;
- Working with research institutions and specialized agencies to develop tools and gather data on forecasting displacement;
- Working with the private sector to use technology, such as satellite imagery, cellphone data usage, etc. to gather data on displacement with a view to understanding trends and dynamics of displacement.

6.2 In designing data collection methodologies and technologies, specialized agencies such as the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Joint Internal Displacement Profiling Service should work with the end-users of this data – national and local authorities and international humanitarian and development actors to ensure that the data collected is what is needed to promote both protection of and solutions for IDPs.
A Snapshot of Conditions in 2004 and in 2014

The 2004 Brookings-OCHA study, Protect or Neglect, was based on field work in 9 countries, and identified a number of gaps which are summarized below. In many cases, these gaps have been addressed by the international community as noted.

2004 Finding: Reluctance by senior UN officials to advocate for the rights of the displaced

2014 Assessment: Certainly senior UN officials are much more aware of IDPs and have taken some important initiatives in the past decade. UN Secretaries-General, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon have each made statements attesting to the importance of internal displacement.

Kofi Annan, 2005

"Displacement remains arguably the most significant humanitarian challenge that we face."46

"The number of refugees in Africa today is about one fifth of its peak in the mid-1990s, a welcome decline. But there are nearly 12 million people forcibly displaced by conflict within their own countries in Africa – nearly five times the number of refugees. When persons displaced by causes other than conflict are included, this figure is even higher. Everyone displaced by conflict or natural disaster is an individual. A person, likely a woman or child, who may be undernourished and living in fear of recruitment or rape. A person whose potential remains unrealized, with dreams unfulfilled and contributions forgone. You have come together to forge a better future. We must invest in disaster risk reduction and incorporate the needs of the internally displaced in poverty reduction strategies to ensure their full and active participation in these processes. While prevention of displacement is important, so, too, is protection of the displaced. Millions remain in protracted displacement for years, and even generations, after they have fled their homes. Finding durable solutions for them is one of the greatest challenges in post-

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As mentioned above, Jan Egeland, ERC (June 2003-December 2006), frequently referred to IDP concerns, and indeed it was concern with IDPs that drove the humanitarian reform that he ushered in. John Holmes (ERC January 2007-September 2010) made a number of statements about IDPs while Valerie Amos (ERC September 2010-Present) does not seem to have prioritized internal displacement although has mentioned it in specific contexts. Rather for Amos, as for other UN entities, focus seems to have shifted from IDPs to a broader concern with ‘affected populations,’ ‘vulnerable groups,’ and ‘protection of civilians.’

“Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are less clearly identified and protected than refugees but are often particularly vulnerable. They may lose their property and access to livelihoods; they run a high risk of being separated from family members; they may be discriminated against merely for being displaced; they often lack identity cards, which makes it more difficult for them to access basic services and prevents them from exercising their political rights. They are also often more vulnerable than other groups to abuse by others – as reflected in the high levels of sexual and gender-based violence in IDP settings[...]. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement clearly spell out the rights of IDPs and the corresponding obligations of national authorities. Their publication ten years ago by the former Representative of the Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng, and the former Emergency Relief Coordinator, the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, was a watershed event in protecting IDPs.”

John Holmes, Emergency Relief Coordinator, 2008

Iraq faces a very serious humanitarian crisis. Up to 1.8 million Iraqis have been displaced since January and many of them are living with families and communities. Some in abandoned and unfinished buildings. 20 million people across Iraq have been affected since the first wave of displacement took place in January this year. Some families have been displaced multiple times and have been left terrified by what has happened to them. Winter is fast approaching and there is huge amount of work needed to ensure that families have protection from the cold. The United Nations and its humanitarian partners continue to provide assistance, often in very dangerous circumstances, to all those in need across all of Iraq.

Valerie Amos, 2014

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The IASC has taken a number of actions related specifically to IDPs over the past five years and individual UN agencies, particularly UNHCR, have taken measures to address internal displacement within the past year, most recently the High Commissioner’s 2013 high-level dialogue on internal displacement and development of policy guidelines.

2004 Finding: A lack of awareness among HCs and RCs of their responsibility to provide protection for IDPs (specific recommendations on induction course for new RCs, monthly reports should include displacement)

2014 Assessment: HCs and RCs are certainly more aware of protection concerns of IDPs and the induction course for new RCs now includes a segment on IDPs. In some cases monthly reports from HCs and RCs reference IDPs. However, interviews with humanitarian actors in countries with large numbers of IDPs reveal a more mixed situation, with some HC/RCs active advocates for IDPs but at least in some cases, there is still a sense that RCs/HCs are perceived as valuing good relations with the government over assertive advocacy on IDP issues. It is striking, however, how much ‘personalities’ still matter in the international humanitarian response system.

2004 Finding: Sharp division within the UN between the humanitarian and political sides of the house with protection relegated in nearly every case to the humanitarian agencies

2014 Assessment: Over the past decade, the UN has increasingly relied on integrated missions in which the SRSG is responsible for the UN mission as a whole, including its political, military and humanitarian responses. This has been intended to increase the coherence of the UN response to particular crises and to overcome the ‘sharp division’ which was has been widely

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56 Perhaps the most dramatic case of this tension was in the 2012 report on Sri Lanka, “Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka” which found that the UN country team had failed to advocate for the rights of those affected by the war, in part because of fear of further alienating the government, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf.
noted, including in the 2004 report. However, humanitarian organizations have been critical of integrated missions, arguing that the subordination of humanitarian action to larger political objectives calls into question revered humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.  

A recent study by the Overseas Development Institute and the Stimson Center found both negative and positive consequences of integrated missions on humanitarian response, makes the case that while integrated missions remain a polarizing issue, they are likely to be the *modus operandi* going forward and recommends a number of concrete measures to make the best of the situation.

More generally, since 1999 the United Nations has prioritized the issue of protection of civilians in mandates of peacekeeping operations and in actions by the Security Council and in some cases, Security Council resolutions have explicitly addressed internal displacement. While the 2004 study lamented the fact that protection was relegated to humanitarian agencies, by 2014 there seemed to be an acknowledgement that other UN actors were indeed assuming responsibilities for protection, but that there were still serious shortfalls in the way this protection was provided.

The case studies of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia in this study highlight some of the tensions with the way in which protection is carried out by other, non-humanitarian actors. The Colombian case suggests that even when there aren’t peacekeeping troops involved, it is still difficult for the UN to speak with one voice.

### 2004 Finding: Serious underfunding of protection programming

### 2014 Assessment: A 2012 study on funding of protection in humanitarian work commissioned by the Global Protection Cluster, found that while protection tended to be underfunded in comparison with most other sectors in global appeals, complexities around data collection made it difficult to draw clear conclusions. For example, data on funding of

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protection work is collected in different ways (and indeed protection is conceptualized differently by different actors). Moreover, there is great variation in how protection programs are funded in different countries and at different points in time. The study recommended that a dual strategy be employed: advocating for more funding to be allocated to protection while improving the quality of protection work to ensure that protection does not fall short of expectations.

Another dimension of the issue of funding is the extent to which funds are channeled to support IDPs. A January 2014 scoping exercise by Development Initiatives on humanitarian financing allocated to IDPs and refugees illustrates the difficulties of sorting out funding patterns. Based on data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) creditor reporting system for one year, 2011, the researchers noted that there is no code or categorization allocated to either refugees or IDPs in the database so that the researchers had to come up with a coding and analysis mechanism. Using this methodology, the researchers found that US$2.7 billion was targeted for either refugees or IDPs—21 percent of total bilateral humanitarian funding in 2011. US$847 million was targeted for refugees alone and US$143 million for projects serving only IDPs. But more funding - $1.7 billion came from projects where IDPs and/or refugees were mentioned along with other beneficiary groups. Over US$2 billion – 75 percent of the funding – was for material relief assistance and other services with $132 million directed at for relief coordination, protection and support services. The countries receiving the largest amount of combined humanitarian assistance for refugees and IDPs includes Libya ($289 million), Iraq ($225 million), Afghanistan ($183 million), Kenya ($175 million) and Pakistan ($162 million.) The largest volumes for projects focusing solely on IDPs, included Georgia ($39 million), Pakistan ($13 million) and Somalia ($13 million). The top delivery channel for combined financing to IDPs and refugees is UNHCR which accounted for 41 percent of reported funding while national NGOs were the primary channels for projects exclusively benefiting IDPs.

Because of the way budgets are allocated and aggregated, it is difficult to determine the amount of funds dedicated specifically to IDPs in a given country by either UN agencies such as UNHCR, and by national governments. An exception seems to be Colombia where, for various reasons spelled out in the case study, there have been important political factors supporting transparency in funding work with IDPs.

Specifically from the field visits, the 2004 study noted:

**2004 Finding:** Poor coordination in protection by UN country teams, in particular insufficient attention to engaging ‘protection allies’ including IDPs and others at risk in joint planning and activities to enhance physical safety. The report called for the designation of a focal point on protection to lead country team; more efforts to coordinate the work of international agencies; the creation of a protection standby force and provision of IASC guidance to country teams

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**2014 Assessment:** Although more detail (and more nuance) is provided in both the preceding section and in the analyses of the three field research countries, a quick assessment is that significant progress has been made in all of these areas. The development of the cluster system, and in particular the protection clusters, has increased coordination by UN actors as well as other international and local actors in protection activities. The clusters have generally provided a forum for engaging with important protection allies in civil society and among other international actors. Focal points on protection have been identified – in the cluster leads for protection – and there have been increased efforts to coordinate the work of international agencies. The Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap) was developed in 2005 as a way of providing the protection standby force called for in the 2004 study. The IASC has developed guidance for country teams (now called Humanitarian Country teams, in most settings to reflect the inclusion of non-UN actors as well) on IDPs. While none of these changes has been perfect and indeed there are varying degrees of shortcomings for all of them, a comparison of the overall institutional situation in 2004 and 2014, the result has been a definite and significant improvement in the way in which protection has been approached by the international community.

There are exceptions, however, and in this respect, the case of Syria stands out. Even given the difficulties of operating in the midst of a civil war and the many obstacles placed by the regime to humanitarian action, the work of the protection cluster in both Syria and cross-border operations has been lacking. The UN was slow to deploy protection staff to Syria and there have been tensions within the international community. As IDMC recently reported, “Given the already challenging environment, consultation and coordination between UN humanitarian organizations and NGOs would have enhanced the effectiveness of their respective assistance programs. Instead, tensions rose when international NGOs criticized UN aid agencies for regarding the Syrian government as a ‘genuine partner’ when it was actually obstructing aid to rebel-held areas and carrying out massive human rights violations.” The Protection Cluster in Turkey for northern Syria has not been activated and Syrian NGOs, who are carrying out the bulk of the work in northern Syria have little trust in the UN.

**2004 Finding:** Insufficient presence of international staff outside the capitals and among vulnerable populations (there should be increased deployment of protection and human rights officers and funding of this; increased training; Security Council mandates

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63 “ProCap is an inter-agency project that responds to priority gaps and needs in emergency protection response. The purpose of the project is to maintain and further develop a protection standby capacity of qualified and experienced protection officers to support the strategic and operational protection response of UN agencies for the internally displaced and other vulnerable populations. ProCap aims to strengthen the collaborative response between protection mandated organizations, and supports the objectives of the Humanitarian Reform Agenda. Agencies receiving ProCap personnel are expected to contribute to the Country Team’s overall collective protection response.” Humanitarian Response. “ProCap – What We Do” https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/home.


should include protection of civilians; donor governments should become more proactive in the field; There is an absence of monitoring and reporting on protection problems and needs of IDPs and other vulnerable groups. There should be routine mechanisms for monitoring, a central humanitarian situation room, information networks established with national NGOs, special attention paid to SGBV and to working with future prosecutions.

**2014 Assessment:** Although the situation varies significantly in terms of deployment of international staff outside capitals and among vulnerable populations (from very little in the case of Syria to fairly good in the case of Pakistan), the main obstacle to greater deployment of international staff to areas of particular vulnerability/protection needs is lack of access. While access was a problem in 2004 for security reasons – particularly in situations such as Chechnya and Sri Lanka – it appears to be more problematic in 2014. Deployment of protection and human rights officers seems to have increased over the past decade although specific information seems only to be publicly available for specific cases.

Training on protection has increased significantly although it is difficult to determine the extent to which training on internal displacement is actually being used. UNHCR’s Global Learning Centre provides comprehensive training on protection to all staff and has developed an e-learning module on internal displacement which is also available to all staff. UNHCR provides important support to governments seeking to develop national laws and policies on internal displacement through training workshops, deployment of technical advisors, and, in collaboration with the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, organizes an annual course at the Institute for International Humanitarian Law at Sanremo. The Coordination and Leadership Learning Programme (successor to UNHCR tri-cluster training, developed in 2011) prepares UNHCR staff members to work in protection, shelter and camp coordination and camp management clusters and other inter-agency coordination mechanisms. This is also open to non-UNHCR staff from partners engaged in inter-agency coordination.

OCHA has developed a number of training courses to train field staff and to promote effective humanitarian-military relationships, but there are no IDP-specific OCHA training materials.

UN Security Council mandates have almost all included protection of civilians in its peacekeeping operations although the pattern is less clear in hybrid arrangements. AMISOM, for example, does not have a mandate to protect civilians. While donor governments have been more conscious in programming on protection issues, as noted above in the discussion on funding for protection, there simply isn’t evidence that they are prioritizing situations of internal displacement. While considerable effort has been made to develop protection monitoring tools and both the Global Protection Cluster and country-level clusters provide a useful forum for exchanging information and reports on protection needs of IDPs, it is probably fair to say that

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66 See for example: http://www.unhcr.org/53989c766.html.
this is applied unevenly. In some cases, such as Syria, UN reports on protection problems faced by IDPs are rare although other groups, such as human rights groups and the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) try to fill this gap. In other situations, such as Colombia, protection monitoring appears to occur regularly through the protection cluster, UNHCR and through OCHA.

Sharing of protection information generally has increased significantly within the international humanitarian community. Under OCHA’s management, www.reliefweb.int and www.humanitarianresponse.info provide a wealth of information as do the websites of individual agencies, including at the country level. In some cases, NGOs working in a particular country or situation have set up their own networks (e.g. NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq) which provide useful information, including protection assessments. The establishment of protection networks with national NGOs seems to occur regularly through the work of some clusters (such as Pakistan where it is a standing item on the protection cluster’s agenda) while in other cases, it seems to happen less systematically.

- There has been a considerable increase in attention to gender and to gender-based violence over the past decade as witnessed by the development of a GBV area of interest within the Global Protection Cluster and the development of tools and resources on monitoring of gender and GBV. Given the number of reports of increasing incidents of GBV, it is hard to know whether the scale of GBV is increasing or if because of increasing awareness of the phenomenon, there is more comprehensive recording of incidents of such violence. In any event, in spite of increasing international attention to GBV, it continues to be widespread and it is likely that figures are underreported.

2004 Finding: Ineffectiveness on the part of the UN at both field and headquarters levels in addressing the denial of humanitarian access and to address widespread impunity for those committing acts of violence. Need for increased advocacy particularly questions of access; engagement with non-state actors

2004 Assessment: The issue of humanitarian access has been front and center on the international humanitarian agenda for the last 14 years. In February 2014, and again in July 2014, the UN Security Council adopted resolutions on humanitarian access in the politically-sensitive case of Syria. In its Resolution 2165 in July, the Security Council authorized UN engagement with cross-border delivery of relief items without the express permission of the

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70 Assessment Capacity Project, http://www.acaps.org/
Syrian government (although as of September 2014, the resolution appears to have had little impact for most internally displaced Syrians and others in need.)

While the denial of humanitarian access remains a problem in many displacement situations, including all three of the countries examined through field research in this study, it is probably fair to say that no issue has received more attention from the humanitarian community in the past decade and that the problem with access is not one primarily resolved by humanitarian actors. However, the telephone interviews did reveal different patterns of action by clusters in negotiating such access. In some cases, such as Pakistan, the clusters were felt to have increased the ability of international organizations to negotiate collectively with the government for access. In other cases, security restrictions seemed to limit the ability of UN agencies in particular to negotiate with non-state actors to secure access. Humanitarian actors have traditionally kept some distance from initiatives to address impunity through justice mechanisms. While transitional justice mechanisms have increased in the past decade, humanitarian actors have not incorporated support for such mechanisms into their on-going work with internal displacement in the field.

2004 Finding: Dissemination and promotion of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and support for the development of national legal frameworks for IDPs on the national level; training on the Guiding Principles; raise the profile of protection in vulnerability assessments

2014 Assessment: Since 2004, considerable training has taken place at the international level on the Guiding Principles, for governments, civil society, for international actors and a large number of training resources have been developed, including online courses in forced migration.

Training on the clusters has been widely carried out and a task force on learning and protection has been set up within the Global Protection Cluster. At the same time, there is a general sense that training needs are on-going given the frequent rotation of staff and the need for specific training on the Guiding Principles – much less the AU Convention on Internal Displacement – does not seem to be a priority. As noted in the section below, there seems to be a trend to shift

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77 The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement provides trainings for a range of actors including governments, UN Agencies, NGO’s, and civil society groups to promote key international normative frameworks, such as the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. For more information on the training see: http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp/resources/training.

78 The IDMC conducts tailored in-country training for multi-stakeholder audiences on topics ranging from protection in internal displacement to protection coordination on protection analysis and “soft skills” for cluster members. For more information on the training see: http://www.internal-displacement.org/about-us/training

79 See Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migration: http://isim.georgetown.edu/ and the University of London’s Refugee Protection and Forced Migration Program: http://www.londoninternational.ac.uk/refugee-migration.

away from a focus on IDPs specifically to broader categories such as vulnerable groups and affected populations in which an understanding of the Guiding Principles is perhaps not given the same importance. As noted above, progress has been made in including protection in vulnerability assessments.

**2004 Finding:** Staff security, including consideration of use of armed escorts

**2014 Assessment:** Over the past decade, much more attention has been focused on staff security, including at the highest levels of the United Nations. The issue of using armed escorts continues to be a contentious issue and one that is often not openly discussed but the IASC has taken a common position on this.

**2004 Finding:** Do more on prevention and early warning, increase international presence and preparedness, including deployment of OHCHR human rights advisors

**2014 Assessment:** International presence seems to have increased in the past decade, perhaps primarily through NGOs who are now deployed in war zones that ten years ago they may not have attempted. However, there are still criticisms that agencies are ‘cherry-picking,’ or choosing to operate in easier locations as expressed in the title of a recent MSF study, “Where is everyone?” OHCHR has deployed human rights advisers in a number of countries, including some in which internal displacement has occurred.

In spite of the development of better sources of information, prevention and early warning remain underdeveloped tasks. While early warning mechanisms have improved over the past decade, this has not been translated into effective preventive action, as illustrated by the Somali famine of 2011 and by present concerns of a much-too-late international response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa. In spite of all the efforts outlined here to improve coordination mechanisms to enhance protection and assistance of IDPs, the number of IDPs displaced by conflict has increased in the past decade and now stands at over 33 million. As Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council said on the occasion of the launch of IDMC’s 2014 Global Overview of Internal Displacement:

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82 At the request of the IASC Working Group, the IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Space and Civil-Military Relations created the “IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys,” a set of guidelines for a range of actors on how and when to use military personnel or armed escorts to protect humanitarian convoys. The guidelines were approved by the IASC Principals on February 18, 2013. Inter-Agency Standing Committee. IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys. February 2013, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/523189ab4.pdf.


“This record number of people forced to flee inside their own countries confirms a disturbing upward trend of internal displacement since IDMC first began monitoring and analyzing displacement back in the late 1990s. The dramatic increase in forced displacement in 2013 and the fact that the average amount of time people worldwide are living in displacement is now a staggering 17 years, all suggest that something is going terribly wrong in how we are responding and dealing with this issue."\(^{85}\)

As discussed above, the fact that the number of IDPs has increased reflects both new displacement emergencies but especially the failure to find solutions for many of those displaced years ago. Obviously, new initiatives and concerted action are needed to support solutions for those living in protracted displacement.

**2004 Finding:** Strengthening local and national protection capacity (work with NHRIs and other national human rights actors)

**2014 Assessment:** As mentioned above, information-sharing with national protection actors has improved significantly over the past decade. In some cases, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) have increased their engagement with IDPs\(^{86}\) while in other cases, they have been weakened as a result of internal processes, e.g. Kenya. National human rights actors generally remain a strong natural partner for those working on IDP issues, but there does not seem to be much of an increase in the visibility of such actors on IDP issues over the past decade. In some cases, such as Colombia (as detailed in the field research report in this study), many of the human rights groups which once championed IDP issues are now focusing on broader categories of affected populations, such as ‘victims.’

**2004 Finding:** Integrating protection into development instruments (CCAs, UNDAFs and PRSPs, World Bank ensures displacement and protection issues in revising PRSP source book, support ‘transition gap’)

**2014 Assessment:** With a few notable exceptions such as the World Bank’s Global Program on Forced Displacement in the Social Development Department\(^{87}\) and the incorporation of

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85 “Annual report shows a record 33.3 million were internally displaced in 2013,” UNHCR, May 14, 2104, http://www.unhcr.org/537334d0427.html.
displacement into UNDP’s 2014-2017 Strategic Plan, this continues to be a weak area in response to displacement, particularly in terms of searching for solutions to IDPs. UNDP has reportedly identified IDP focal points at headquarters which seems like a promising initiative. The World Bank has supported training on internal displacement as a development issue within the context of the AU Convention on Internal Displacement and has carried out important work on internal displacement in Georgia, Azerbaijan and other countries with a focus on livelihoods and solutions. Although this research did not include a comprehensive assessment of the extent to which displacement is included in the principal development instruments, the opinion of most of those consulted in the field and at headquarters is that the humanitarian-development gap is alive and well. In particular there is a sense that the Early Recovery Cluster has failed and some confusion about whether the Global Early Recovery Cluster/Working Group still exists.

2004 Finding: Support to community-based protection. Developing protection strategies for women, children and vulnerable groups. Promoting protection in the design of humanitarian programs

2014 Assessment: There seems to be much more emphasis on protection in developing humanitarian programs, including increasing incorporation of protection strategies for women, children, and other specific groups with vulnerabilities. Issues around elderly and persons with disabilities were hardly recognized ten years ago but progress has been made in raising awareness of, collecting data on, and designing programs to meet these needs. Community-based protection has received less attention although given the growing focus on resilience, this would seem to be an area with potential for more attention.

Declining Interest in IDPs?

In terms of international interest in internal displacement, there is a paradox. While IDMC’s 2013 Global Overview revealed that the number of IDPs has reached an all-time high, international attention has become more diffuse. It may be that IDPs have become effectively mainstreamed and thus while specific institutional visibility of IDPs within institutions has declined, IDPs are receiving protection and assistance on a par with other affected groups. Or it may be that IDPs are no longer considered a category of people to be singled out for special attention. In any event, it is illustrative to look at how the international community has organized its work with IDPs.

In 1992, the then-UN Commission on Human Rights established the mandate of the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs and appointed Francis Deng to this position. In 2004, the CHR appointed Walter Kälin as Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs. Over the years, this position has served as the single most important voice on IDPs in the international community. In 2010, the UN Human Rights Commission appointed Chaloka Beyani to succeed Kälin, with the title of Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs. Although resisted by IDP advocates, this change in title was the result of a reform initiative of the UN Secretary-General to have greater consistency and accountability with respect to his special representatives, but it led to a perception that the position had been ‘downgraded’ within the UN system. And in fact, the change in title does affect the mandate-holder’s access to senior officials and ability to do his work.

Agencies which are operational in humanitarian response have responded to internal displacement in different ways. UNHCR and ICRC have both moved away from having a dedicated IDP unit or focal point to a policy objective of trying to mainstream internal displacement into their work. OCHA seems more focused on broader protection of civilians than on IDPs. WFP and UNICEF both engage in major assistance programs in IDP situations but neither has ever had a specific department focusing on internal displacement. Nor has either formally adopted a policy on internal displacement.

OCHA established an Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division in 2005-06 which was replaced in 2007 by a Displacement and Protection Support Section (DPSS) which in turn was transformed into the Protection and Displacement Section (PDS) within the Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB). While the PDSB is responsible for work with IDPs, as well as other issues, dedicated staffing for IDPs has declined. The issue of ‘protection of civilians in armed conflict’ has become the focus of that section, particularly since the establishment of the ‘informal group of the UN Security Council on Protection of Civilians,’ which meets prior to each peacekeeping mandate renewal, and which is briefed by OCHA’s PDS section. Also, while DPSS had 6-8 professionals who supported OCHA field offices on IDP issues, this function is now very ad hoc and carried out part-time by one staff at the most.

Initially, following the humanitarian reform, UNHCR had a senior focal point on IDPs, as well as an IDP Advisory Team, which had direct access to senior management. However, the emphasis on mainstreaming IDP issues within UNHCR and the disbanding of the IDP Advisory Team raised concerns that UNHCR was less active on IDP issues. However, the high-level

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92 There are also broader concerns around mainstreaming particular issues, whether gender, environmental concerns, or IDPs as a way of continuing to manifest continued interest in an issue without having to commit dedicated resources to it.
dialogue on IDPs in December 2013, the leadership role played by UNHCR in the Global Protection Cluster, and the active engagement of UNHCR in many IDP operations have been important efforts to assert UNHCR’s continued engagement. While ProCap has provided important staff resources for response to IDPs, there is concern that UNHCR is relying too much on ProCap resources rather than building its own staff capacity in this area.

At the October 2012 meeting of the UNHCR Executive Committee (ExCom), the High Commissioner raised a very real dilemma facing the agency with regards to its operations. The High Commissioner asked ExCom, ‘what is UNHCR to do when there are both refugees and IDPs to which to respond, but there is only a finite amount of money and resources?’ He noted that UNHCR has a qualitatively different mandate for refugees, but has, at the same time, to be driven by “the overarching imperative of responding to the most acute needs. Human dignity is not dependent on status.” UNHCR’s Global Priorities do not provide guidance on how to deal with such a situation of balancing priorities between new and protracted situations; between urban and camp situations; or between refugees and IDPs. While the major humanitarian emergencies of 2009-2010 were marked by large scale internal displacement situations (Pakistan, DRC, Haiti), since 2013, the major humanitarian emergencies have also been refugee emergencies (Libya, Somalia, Mali, Syria).

ICRC has long maintained that there should be an “all victims approach” when responding to conflict situations, but has, over the years engaged in various discussions and debates around IDPs. In 2006, the ICRC Position on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) was issued and in 2010 an external review of ICRC’s response was undertaken. It was decided that IDPs had become generally mainstreamed and so instead of an organization-wide focal point, there are IDP focal points within the divisions of protection and assistance.

IFRC was initially skeptical but in 2007 the organization introduced a policy on internal displacement, which was endorsed by the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The International Federation’s 2009 Policy on Migration replaced the earlier Federation policy on refugees and other displaced people. In addition, the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted in November 2009 a Movement Policy on internal displacement, Resolution No. 5, which outlines 10 principles for addressing forced displacement.

In December 2012, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement convened a meeting to take stock of where we are with respect to internal displacement. Participants identified a range of remarkable gains that have been made on the IDP issue over the past twenty years. These include:

- **Putting IDPs on the agenda at the national, regional and international levels**

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• Developing and securing support for the normative framework on internal displacement
• Developing a more systematic international response to internal displacement
• Strengthening civil society advocacy on internal displacement
• Developing a strong research base on internal displacement to inform policy

The following challenges were listed:
• Keeping internal displacement on the agenda
• Continuing to strengthen the institutional architecture for responding to IDPs
• Ensuring robust support for protection

Among the participants, there was widespread concern that financial cutbacks risk undercutting IDP protection, with donors indicating that in a time of austerity, agencies such as UNCHR should “focus on their core mandate,” mistakenly implying that IDP protection is a luxury. Participants noted that when resources are limited, IDPs are often the first to suffer cuts, even in agencies that have taken on leading roles on the issue, and lamented the complacency that in some instances accompanies these decisions.

• The role of civil society and IDP participation

Various participants expressed concern that IDP issues have been de-prioritized within the international NGO community, and highlighted the role of ICVA and InterAction in revitalizing the issue. Others underscored the value of better engaging major human rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International on internal displacement, while also stressing the need to amplify the voices of local and national actors in countries directly affected by internal displacement. This includes churches and other religious organizations, NHRIs and IDP groups.

• Implementing normative frameworks through the development of laws and policies

While acceptance of the Guiding Principles is now widespread, implementation of this standard at the national and regional levels remains inadequate. Given the potential for backsliding on commitments to the Guiding Principles, there is a need for continued efforts to promote the Principles and their integration into domestic laws and policies. This will require cooperation between actors at different levels (national and local governments, regional organizations, UN agencies, NGOs, NHRIs, etc.), and commitment to ensuring that where laws and policies are developed, they are in line with international standards. Laws and policies on internal displacement must not be merely symbolic, but must clearly delineate institutional responsibilities for IDPs, and be accompanied by appropriate levels of budgetary support.

• In pursuit of a paradigm shift: Displacement as a development concern

There was strong consensus among the participants that there is a need for fresh approaches and concerted action to achieve a “paradigm shift” so that displacement is clearly recognized as a critical development concern and in particular that finding solutions to displacement require the engagement of development actors.

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96 A background study undertaken by Manisha Thomas for the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement informed discussions on the international institutional architecture for responding to IDPs.
Yes, we can conclude that the process of humanitarian reform has strengthened international response to IDPs and has addressed many of the shortcomings identified in the 2004 study Protect or Neglect. There are many cases where international efforts have relieved suffering and kept people alive. Some, perhaps many, IDPs are better off than they were in 2004. But there are still too many IDPs living in dangerous situations with inadequate protection and too many living in protracted displacement without prospects for durable solutions.

Perhaps most troubling, international commitment to addressing internal displacement seems to be diminishing – precisely at a time when the number of conflict-induced IDPs has never been higher and the prospect of even larger numbers displaced by disasters and climate change looms on the horizon. The international system is clearly over-stretched by the number of large-scale, complex crises in the world today. The increasing financial demands on a handful of governments to support unprecedented appeals for humanitarian funding are a signs of a system that is ‘creaking at the seams.’ And it is not just bank accounts that are under pressure; staff are overstretched and creativity is in short supply. At precisely the time when bold ideas are needed, the present system lends itself to continuing business as usual and avoiding risk.

The mantra of the past decade has been ‘mainstreaming’ – protection mainstreaming, gender mainstreaming, IDP mainstreaming, etc. But the risk is that an issue will be ‘mainstreamed into oblivion.’ There is a danger in lumping together people with different needs into a generic category of ‘civilians’ or ‘affected populations’ or ‘vulnerable groups.’ Those who are displaced within the borders of their country have certain identifiable needs which those who are not displaced do not have. Most obviously, they need shelter. They often need to have documentation replaced in order to access services. They often face physical protection threats because they are closer to the conflicts which forced them to leave their homes. In order to find solutions – to either return to their homes or to settle elsewhere in the country – they need access to livelihoods, and almost always support in reclaiming or being compensated for land and property lost. While the international community has made great strides in recognizing the particular needs of IDPs and developing tools to meet those needs, the momentum needs to continue.

While international response to internal displacement has clearly improved since 2004, it is important to recognize a) that the bar was pretty low in 2004, b) that other factors beyond humanitarian reform were responsible for many of the improvements, and c) that there are many areas where further work is both needed and possible. We hope that this study leads to further discussions and action among humanitarian actors and that when the next 10 year retrospective study is done – in 2024? – the conclusion will be not be ‘yes, the system is better but too many IDPs are still unprotected and living in protracted situations…’ but rather ‘yes, there are fewer IDPs, there is a better response to those who are displaced and most of those who were displaced in 2014 have found solutions.’
ANNEX 1: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES? 97

In 2004, the Brookings-OCHA study, Protect or Neglect, looked at the international response to internal displacement with visits to nine countries. This 2014 study has carried out field research on three of those countries, the results of which are presented in some depth in this study. But we thought it would be useful to look back at the six countries which were reviewed back in 2004 but which aren’t included in this present study: Russia (Chechnya), Burundi, Liberia, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. The following sections thus provide short overviews of what has happened in these six countries in the intervening decade, including the number of Internally Displaced Persons, UN actions in 2004 and 2014 and a list of evaluations conducted on operations. Annual UN High Commissioner for Refugees and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs budgets are included for the two years, but it should be noted that these budgets are indicative only as both organizations are involved in work with other populations of concern.

97 With thanks to Daniel Johansen for his research assistance.
Angola

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Angola IDP Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>450,000&lt;sup&gt;98&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>~0&lt;sup&gt;99&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cluster System Status: Cluster approach not implemented.<sup>100</sup>

UN Engagement on IDPs Issues

2004:

UNHCR Angola program budget: $19,188,432 (2004)<sup>101</sup>

OCHA total staff and non-staff costs: $3,010,706 (2004)<sup>102</sup>

In 2004, Angola was still recovering from a civil war that had, with a few interruptions, been raging for 26 years. The civil war erupted shortly after Angola became independent from Portugal in 1975 and was primarily a conflict between The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), two former liberation factions.

The war ended with the signing of the Luena Peace Accord in April of 2002, and two years later, more than four million IDPs and 300,000 refugees had returned to their areas of origin. In the meantime, the humanitarian situation had stabilized, and UN assistance focused on the transition from immediate humanitarian assistance towards longer-term rebuilding and development assistance efforts.<sup>103</sup>

By 2004, UNHCR was heavily involved in assisting return efforts of IDPs and refugees, but still faced significant access barriers. UNHCR Angola efforts were located in an HQ office, two sub-offices and six field offices, with 137 staff in total. UNHCR had signed an MoU with WFP to cover food assistance to returnees and refugees. The policy document “Norms for the Resettlement of the Internally Displaced” adopted by the government in 2001 under the leadership of the Ministry of Social Welfare was the primary vehicle for government efforts to tackle the IDP crisis, in cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs.<sup>34</sup>

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Facing the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs, OCHA established a Transitional Coordination Unit (TCU) to facilitate coordination, information and management of the humanitarian response in the period up to the end of 2005, at which point the responsibility was handed over to the Angolan government. The humanitarian response consolidated appeal was only 60% funded by September of 2004.  

2014:
UNHCR Angola program budget: $4,770,320 (2014)45

By 2014, the countries in the region hosting significant populations of Angolans had, together with UNHCR, declared the cessation of refugee status for Angolans who arrived before 2002. Voluntary return to Angola continues to be promoted. As of 2014, UNHCR has no dedicated budget towards IDP projects in the country.  

Solutions/Resolution
In September of 2004, the Angolan government announced that they planned to close all IDP camps and return all remaining IDPs before the end of 2004. As of 2014, the IDP situation in Angola is considered resolved.

Operational Evaluations/Reviews
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Burundi IDP Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>140,000¹⁰⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>78,900¹⁰⁷ ↓ 61,100 (43.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cluster system status:** No currently active clusters.¹⁰⁸

Previously activated clusters: **Food Security:** Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO/WFP), **WASH:** UNICEF, **Education:** UNICEF, **Health and Nutrition:** merged World Health Organization (WHO)/UNICEF, **Logistics and ETC:** merged, WFP/UN Office in Burundi, **Early Recovery:** UN Development Programme (UNDP), **Protection:** UNHCR/UNICEF/OHCHR¹⁰⁹

**UN engagement on IDPs issues**

**2004:**


UNHCR Burundi program budget: $6,720,331 (2004)¹¹¹

OCHA total staff and non-staff costs: $1,383,106 (2004)¹¹²

Despite a fragile political process and ongoing fighting between Burundi Army/National Council for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) and National Forces of Liberation (FNL) rebels, a significant number of refugees and IDPs had started to return by the end of 2004. By December 2004, UNHCR, together with the National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Disaster-affected People (CNRS) had initiated housing programs for returning IDPs in five communes where the security situation had improved enough for IDPs to return.¹¹³

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Inter-agency issues of protection were discussed through the Technical Follow Up Group, a weekly discussion forum of UN agencies, international NGOs and government representatives. OCHA functioned as the focal point for IDP issues, and the focus of the UN agencies was primarily on IDP and refugee return. By the end of 2004, OCHA, together with the Burundi government, had conducted a survey of all IDP sites in the country, assessing housing needs in preparation for IDP and refugee returns. UNHCR and UNICEF also targeted returning IDPs specifically in their individual response plans.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{2014:}

UNHCR Burundi program budget: \textsuperscript{115} $25,094,771 (2014)

As of 2014, the primary populations of concern to the UN agencies in Burundi are refugees, not IDPs, especially people fleeing the situation in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and returnees from neighboring countries in need of reintegration support. Still, the remaining IDP population still numbers almost 80,000.\textsuperscript{21} UNHCR remains the lead in supporting the Burundi government in finding sustainable and durable solutions for the IDPs. UNHCR currently works with the Ministry of National Solidarity on IDP registration in 19 sites in seven provinces of the country, with a view towards developing national capacity for IDP reintegration.\textsuperscript{116} Most IDPs are currently living in host communities and settlements, but 5 IDP camps continue to host at least 12,000 people. Significant work by UNICEF with the IDP population is ongoing in the WASH and Child Protection sectors.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{Solutions/Resolution}

The Burundi government is currently conducting preliminary work, in cooperation with UN partners, in provincial assessments of local integration and relocation of the remaining IDPs. A pilot IDP return project was also planned in cooperation with national and international partners.\textsuperscript{118} Since there has not been significant new internal displacement in a relatively long period of time, and the security situation has stabilized, the primary priority is now on return and reintegration.

\textbf{Operational evaluations/Reviews}


\textsuperscript{118} IDMC, http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/burundi/summary/.

Liberia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Liberia IDP Estimates</th>
<th>↓477,000 (95.4%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>500,000\textsuperscript{119}</td>
<td>23,000\textsuperscript{120}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cluster System Status: No currently active clusters.\textsuperscript{121}

Liberia was one of the original Cluster Approach pilot countries where the approach was implemented by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) principals in 2006.\textsuperscript{122} As a pilot country, Liberia was part of the first round of cluster approach evaluations in 2007.\textsuperscript{123 124}

Previously activated clusters: Health, Nutrition, WASH, Protection, Early Recovery, Education\textsuperscript{125}

UN Engagement on IDPs Issues

2004:

UNHCR Liberia program budget: \$18,369,918 (2004)\textsuperscript{126}

OCHA total staff and non-staff costs: \$2,701,387 (2004)\textsuperscript{127}

After civil war erupted in 1989, Liberia had in 2004 been through several cycles of internal strife, dissolving peace agreements and open internal conflict. Fighting between the Liberian army and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel groups had by 2004 displaced half a million people throughout the country.\textsuperscript{128}

A UN peacekeeping force, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by UNSC Resolution 1509 on September 19, 2003. After violence during the course of 2003, prompting the withdrawal of many foreign aid workers and halting support to IDPs, WFP and UNHCR began distributions of food and NFIIs to IDPs in May of 2004 as

\textsuperscript{120} IDMC, as of December 31, 2013, http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/liberia/?Year=2014
\textsuperscript{121} OCHA, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/clusters/countries.
the situation calmed somewhat. The status of the government of Charles Taylor, who had been accused of war crimes and gross human rights violations meant that international support to humanitarian needs in the country were low; out of the UN Inter-Agency appeal launched in August 2003, requesting $69 million, less than 25 percent was met.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Joint Mission of the OCHA IDP Unit and UNHCR found, in March 2004, that the international community had “no “strategic action plan” establishing the broad framework under which UN agencies, NGOs and the government should provide protection and assistance to IDPs”\(^\text{129}\).

The peace agreement signed in 2003 led to an improving security climate which allowed UN agencies and NGOs to increase their support to the massive IDP population. UNHCR took the lead in providing assistance to refugees in camps around Monrovia, and in managing IDP camps. As access was reestablished in many areas, UNHCR set up new field offices. UNHCR worked with the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC) to establish strategies for community rebuilding and IDP return.\(^\text{130}\)

2014:

UNHCR Liberia program budget: \textbf{$35,325,663$ (2014)}\(^\text{131}\)

An influx of refugees from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 led to a large increase in UNHCR program budget requirements. As the IDP population of concern to UNHCR has dwindled significantly, most of the resources are currently directed towards the return of refugees from neighboring countries, as well as reintegration of returnees from other countries in the region.\(^\text{132}\)

The Liberia IDP camps were permanently and officially shut down in April 2006 after a significant return effort by the Liberian government, UNHCR and local and international partners.\(^\text{133}\) Liberia has signed, but not yet ratified the Kampala Convention, but has indicated intentions to do so with the establishment of a task force to harmonize domestic legislation with the convention.\(^\text{134}\)

Solutions/Resolution

The Liberian government considers the displacement situation solved, and no official tracking mechanisms are currently in place. The Liberia IDP camps were officially closed in April 2006. Yet, significant IDP populations have yet to return to their area of origin, and have settled on public land, vulnerable to forced evictions leading to secondary displacement.\(^\text{38}\)

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\(^{129}\) Ibid, p. 10.
\(^{132}\) Ibid.
Operational Evaluations/Reviews


Nepal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nepal IDP Estimates</th>
<th>↓ 50,000-150,000 (25-75%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>100,000-200,000\textsuperscript{135}</td>
<td>\textsuperscript{135}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>50,000\textsuperscript{136}</td>
<td>\textsuperscript{136}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Note on Nepal IDP figures:} The absence of official registration, verification or population movement tracking means accurately estimating the number of people displaced since the eruption of conflict in 1996 (especially 2004 figures) is difficult. The following numbers are estimates based on UN and NGO studies, as well as media reports.

\textbf{Cluster System Status:} Cluster system active since 2008.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active Clusters\textsuperscript{138,139}</th>
<th>National-level Cluster Lead/Co-Lead Agency</th>
<th>Activation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Coordination and Camp Management</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Shelter and NFI</td>
<td>IFRC,NRCS/UN-Habitat</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Telecommunications</td>
<td>WFP/UNDSS</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>FAO/WFP</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UN Engagement on IDPs Issues

2004:


OCHA RDRA funding for South Asia: $410,493 ¹⁴³

Before the cluster system was implemented in Nepal in 2008, UN assistance to IDPs were coordinated through the UN Country Team, with UNHCR, OHCHR and OCHA taking the lead on the IDP response. After the cluster activation, which was primarily a response to flooding in eastern Nepal, IDP issues fell under the responsibility of the Protection Cluster, led by OHCHR. ¹⁴⁴

In April 2005, Walter Kälin, Representative of the United Nations' Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons visited Nepal, and called for increased efforts of actors both national and international to assist the large population of vulnerable IDPs in Nepal. ¹⁴⁵

Up until 2008, UNHCR supported the formation of Task Forces for IDP identification and registration, as a response to the lack of accurate IDP population verification. UNHCR ended its IDP projects in March of 2008. ¹⁴⁶

A United Nations monitoring and peace support mission, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was formed in 2007, following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 21 November 2006 between the Government and the Communist Party of Nepal. After a phased withdrawal, UNMIN was deactivated in January 2011. ¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁰ An Early Recovery Network was established in 2009/2010 following the Koshi floods.
¹⁴¹ The Protection Cluster transitioned to a Protection Working Group in January 2013, with no single dedicated lead agency.
2014:

UNHCR Nepal program budget: $15,579,191 (2004)\textsuperscript{148}

Of total budget: IDP Projects: $0 (2014)

UNHCR ended its support of IDP projects in March 2008.\textsuperscript{149} IDPs are not mentioned specifically in the UNHCR 2014-2015 Global Appeal for South Asia, which focuses mainly on assistance to refugees from other countries, especially Bhutan.

OHCHR ceased all new substantive work in Nepal as of December 2011 in an agreement with the Nepal government.\textsuperscript{150}

Solutions/Resolution

As of 2012, the Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction consider all IDPs either returned or resettled.\textsuperscript{151} Many organizations have however pointed out that durable solutions are still not in place for thousands of displaced, and that the government IDP policy has been weak and ineffective, leaving thousands of IDPs without return assistance, land and property restitution or other types of resettlement, and reintegration assistance.\textsuperscript{152}

Operational Evaluations/Reviews


## Russia (Chechnya)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russia IDPs (Total)</th>
<th>Chechens displaced within Chechnya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>255,000&lt;sup&gt;153&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>↓ 155,000-215,100 (60.7-84.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>39,900&lt;sup&gt;154&lt;/sup&gt; - 100,000&lt;sup&gt;155&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>↓ 125,000 (89.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note on Russia/Chechnya IDP figures: The exact number of IDPs from Chechnya is difficult to establish, and with reliable figures hard to come by, estimates vary significantly from source to source. The numbers above are estimates of the total number of Chechen IDPs within Russia, and estimates for Chechen IDPs within Chechnya in 2004 and 2014.

Cluster system status: Cluster approach not implemented.

UN engagement with IDPs

2004:

- Total humanitarian funding appeal: $61,923,703 (2004)<sup>157</sup>
- UNHCR Russian Federation annual program budget: $15,805,379 (2005)<sup>158</sup>
- UNHCR Russian Federation IDP operations budget<sup>6</sup>: $4,966,889 (2005)<sup>159</sup>
- OCHA total staff and non-staff costs: $1,507,420 (2004)<sup>160</sup>

The UN system had an active response to the second Chechen war, with UNHCR taking the lead on issues of protection, human rights, and rule of law, including the response to the population displacement. However, the still volatile security situation in Chechnya meant that the UN agencies, including UNHCR, were still prevented from establishing a presence in Chechnya as of 2004<sup>161</sup>. Although local and federal authorities worked to re-

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<sup>155</sup> Institute of Modern Russia, http://www.interpretermag.com/despite-promises-putin-has-done-little-for-ethnic-russian-refugees-from-chechnya/.


<sup>159</sup> UNHCR, 2007, above.


establish civilian administration and encouraged the return of IDPs, continuing instability meant that few were eager to return.

The UN system subcontracted with the Ingush non-governmental organization (NGO) Vesta to monitor Temporary Accommodation Centers (TACs) and IDP movements from Ingushetia, the neighboring republic sheltering the bulk of Chechen IDPs. Guided by the Common Humanitarian Action Plan, UNHCR, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and UN World Food Programme (WFP) conducted assessment missions in late 2003 into Chechnya to monitor programs and discuss with local authorities. Due to the still volatile security situation, as of October 2004, UNHCR refrained from promoting voluntary repatriation for displaced Chechens.

As per the 2004 Humanitarian Appeal, the UN inter-agency response targeted nine sectors; protection; food; shelter and non-food items (NFIs); health; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); education; mine action; and economic recovery.

2014:

UNHCR Russian Federation annual program budget: $8,331,881 (2013)

OCHA total program budget for Caucasus and Central Asia: $1,656,133 (2013)

UN agencies exited the North Caucasus region in 2011.

Solutions/Resolution

As the security situation began to stabilize, displaced populations started to return by 2005. Amid accusations of human rights abuses by Russian security forces and their allies in the region, the security situation eventually stabilized enough to allow most of the IDPs to return home. By 2008, more than 57,000 IDPs had returned to Chechnya while 70,000 remained displaced throughout North Caucasus. An unknown number of people had moved and presumably resettled in other parts of Russia. By 2008, the Federal and regional governments had set up property compensation and housing programs to allow Chechen IDPs to resettle elsewhere. However, the compensation offered under these programs was often insufficient to buy alternative housing.

The Russian government has been eager to classify the displacement caused by the Chechnya conflict as resolved, and most UN agencies left North Caucasus in 2011. International assistance has consequently dropped dramatically with only a few international NGOs remaining.

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Ethnic conflict in Russia continues to cause civilian casualties and small-scale population displacement. For example, in 2013 more than 100 civilians were killed by clashes between government forces and non-state armed groups in North Ossetia, and thousands are still displaced from earlier conflicts in Chechnya and North Ossetia. More recently, conflict between Russia and Ukraine has led to large scale displacement within Ukraine and the movement of over 700,000 Ukrainians into Russia.\(^{168}\)

**Operational evaluations/Reviews**

*None found.*

\(^{168}\) http://www.unhcr.org/53e0bfi99.html.
Sri Lanka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sri Lanka IDP Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>386,000(^{169})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>90,000(^{170})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

↓ 296,000 (76.7%)

Cluster System Status: No currently active clusters.
Cluster approach implemented in 2008. Cluster system deactivated on July 10, 2013.\(^{171}\)

UN Engagement on IDPs Issues

**2004:**

UNHCR Sri Lanka program budget: \(\$8,304,384\) (2004)\(^{172}\)

OCHA Regional Disaster Response Advisor (RDRA) funding for South Asia: \(\$410,493\)\(^{173}\)

By early 2004, more than 345,000 of an estimated 730,000 IDPs had returned to their areas of origin after the end of the civil war in 2002. UNHCR was the lead agency in the UN response to internal displacement in Sri Lanka. UNHCR worked closely with the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Refugees on facilitating returns and community rebuilding. Additionally, UNHCR was central in the delivery of NFIs to vulnerable IDP populations, and worked with the ICRC on IDP protection schemes.\(^{174}\)

With its field presence, UNHCR continued to play a central role in monitoring of IDP movement and returns, and the provision of humanitarian assistance where needed. In December of 2004, more than 860,000 people were displaced, many for a second time, by the Indian Ocean tsunami, UNHCR played an important role during the immediate emergency response phase.

In 2005, Walter Kälin, Representative of the United Nations' Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons visited Sri Lanka to discuss the human rights situation of IDPs following the tsunamis in December 2004.\(^{175}\) In 2007, Kälin

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returned to Sri Lanka to acknowledge the country’s commitment to durable solutions for
IDPs following both the tsunamis in 2004 as well as the escalation of violence in 2006. Kälin traveled to Sri Lanka in 2009 to express his concerns about the human rights of
IDPs trapped by violence in the no-fire zone of Vanni. In 2013, Special Rapporteur,
Chaloka Beyani traveled to Sri Lanka to reiterate the role of IDP participation and
consultation in post-conflict reconstruction.

2014:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Budget (2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR Sri Lanka program budget:</td>
<td>$10,253,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of total budget: IDP Projects:</td>
<td>$1,264,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA total program budget:</td>
<td>$1,813,032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presently, UN and UNHCR efforts towards the remaining IDP population are mostly
related to advocacy for durable solutions, reintegration and post-return support.
Additionally, the UNHCR country program includes continued measures to strengthen
national institutions and service delivery capacity. Direct support to IDPs on the ground
is scheduled for reassessment by 2015.

Solutions/resolution

In September of 2012, the Sri Lankan government announced that all IDPs had been resettled
and that all IDP camps were to be closed. According to UN estimates however, a significant
IDP population of more than 90,000 people remains.

Operational Evaluations/Reviews

United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations
Action in Sri Lanka, November 2012,

176 Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, UN Expert Emphasizes Sustainable and Durable Solutions for
177 Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, UN Expert Appeals to Save Lives of Internally Displaced
Persons Trapped by Sri Lankan Conflict, April 7, 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/idp/sr-
178 Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, “Constructing a Development Based Strategy for Durable
Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons in Sri Lanka in the Aftermath of Conflict is Now Essential,” UN Rights
sri-lanka-ids.
182 Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense and Urban Development, September 26, 2012,
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?name=All_IDP_resettled_20120925_02.