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THE BATTLE OVER THE BORDER:  
PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION AND CULTURAL CHANGE  
AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE ELECTION

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DIONNE: I want to welcome everybody today. I'm E. J. Dionne. I'm a senior fellow here at the Governance Study Program at Brookings. And I have to say that working with Robbie on these polls and these presentations is one of the favorite things I get to do. We are excited to be releasing the findings of another PRRI-Brookings survey. Again, we deal in large part with immigration, something we've done together before, and we look forward to another great discussion from our panels. Some people have called this our dream team. I like a term invented in the last century by a fellow Red Sox fan. This panel is the all-star team the Red Sox traded. No longer the case. It was true in the last century.

We are going to talk about how American's views on immigration and cultural change have shaped the 2016 election. I won't even mention a certain name but I'm sure it will come up. We here at Brookings, my colleague Bill Galston and I have had a real joy in collaborating with Robbie Jones and Dan Cox at PRRI on many surveys. I hope we can continue to do that.

I want to begin -- because things get lost at the end, I want to begin by thanking Robbie, Dan, and Joanna Piacenza for their tireless work on the survey. I want to thank the Brookings staff who have worked so hard on this -- Anna Goodbaum, Liz Sablich, Beth Stone, Elizabeth Thom, and Elizabeth McElvein.

This morning, Robbie, in one of his patented PowerPoint presentations, will present the findings from the survey, and we'll hear from Henry Olsen, Karlyn Bowman, and we hope our friend Joy Reid. Joy is stuck in some transportation problem at the airport. We think she's on her way, and we really hope she will be there. And also, my Brookings colleague, Bill Galston.

I also should brag on him because he is too humble to brag on himself, that when you pick up this Sunday's New York Times Book Review, or if you look at it online, you will find an extraordinarily favorable -- and I say justifiably favorable review -- of Robbie's new book, "The End of White Christian America." And so I commend the book to you. We are doing an event here on Robbie's book in a couple of weeks, but it is a great book, and the review essentially said if you want to understand the dynamics of selection, read Robbie's book.

And so without further ado, the brilliant author and colleague and friend, Robbie Jones.

(Applause)

MR. JONES: All right, thanks, E.J. I'm not sure quite how to follow that. Thank you for such a generous introduction.

I do also want to extend just a couple thank-yous of my own and then I'll jump in to kind of cover the data here. But in addition to Dan Cox, I want to thank Rachel Lennish and Betsy Cooper of the research team, and also in addition to Joanna and the communications team, two of the newest additions to the PRI team, Harmit Cambose and Jesse Walthal as well. So thank you to the whole PRRI team, without whom we would not be here today.

So this is a new survey. As E.J. said, we are now in our seventh year of collaborating with the Brookings Governance Studies Program here and very grateful for them. The other thank you I should make sure that I do not forget is a thank you to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, who funded the study and made this all possible today.

Also, before I get into the data, just to let you know, this is a survey of over 2,600 Americans. It's a random probability sample of the country conducted both in English and in Spanish, and we were out of the field the first week of May. So we're going to talk a little bit about, for example, a couple of numbers on terrorism here, but just to be clear, we were out of the field before the tragic events in Orlando. So the numbers that you see here don't actually reflect any reactions that we may see to that. So you might want to keep that in mind just as you're seeing the numbers.

So let me jump in. And I'm going to start actually something very close to that topic, and that is perceptions of personal vulnerability. One of the things that we've seen in this survey, and just if we step back in the big picture, we do see heightened anxieties among Americans. For those of you who were here in the fall when we released the American values survey, you recall that we had some of these same themes that were apparent in our November survey last fall -- heightened anxiety, concerns about cultural change. We're still seeing that very evident in this survey. And in fact, one of the things -- one of the most notable things in terms on that topic that we've seen is this shift about how worried people are that they or someone in their family will be a victim of terrorism. So this is not just a kind of general worry about terrorism; this is a personal concern, a very personal question about you or someone in your family will be a victim of terrorism.

Over time, when we asked this question first back in November of 2014, it was about two to one saying not that worried, and we're now at parity with as many Americans saying that they are worried about this as say they are not so concerned about this. So that's a big jump in a short period of time, so just kind of thinking about context. And again, these numbers don't reflect the Orlando event. So this is actually before those events we see this jump in heightened concerns about terrorism.

You can see that there are some differences. If we look among -- kind of partisan differences. We're thinking about the election and trying to put a lot of these numbers into context and help us understand the dynamics happening in the election. So you'll see all Americans and independents are basically divided on the question. Independents look like the general public here but there are pretty big partisan divides. If you look at Republicans, you'll see about 6 in 10 Republicans. It moves up a little bit more, nearly two-thirds of Donald Trump supporters. I should also say when we have Donald Trump supporters here, we're defining Donald Trump supporters as those who identify as Republican or independents who lean Republican who said they supported Donald Trump as their preferred candidate in the republican primary. So that's who that group is when you see the numbers here.

And so this is where Republicans are. And Democrats, much less worried. Less than a majority. A little more than 4 in 10 saying that they are somewhat or very worried that they'll be a victim of terrorism. So more heightened concerns on the Republican than on the Democratic side. Independents and the country about divided on this question.

Another notable thing on the economic front is that we have this question about whether the country is still in an economic recession, and despite the fact that we continue to get fairly good macroeconomic reports and other kind of economists telling us we are long out of the recession, it has not gotten down to the general public. So we are still showing 7 in 10 pretty consistently all the way back to 2012 saying that they think that the country is still in a recession. So I think this kind of economic angst, in addition to these kind of personal vulnerability questions, I don't have a slide here but we did have another couple of questions you'll see in the report about concerns about being a victim of crime. We see fairly high numbers of that, majorities of Americans saying that they're at least somewhat concerned they'll be a victim of violent crime, and also, about half of Americans saying that they're

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worried about losing a job. So those kind of economic and cultural concerns are both playing a role together.

There's also we had a question here about whether the American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence, and this is something that's sort of come up in the campaigns as well. We do find a majority of Americans agreeing with that statement, 55 percent agreeing with that statement. Again though, we see these very large partisan divides. So if you look at Donald Trump supporters, where more than 8 in 10 Donald Trump supporters agreeing with that statement. Among Republicans, more than 7 in 10. Independents, again, look about like the country, kind of divided on the question with a slight majority, a slim majority saying they agree. And Democrats down here, only about 4 in 10 democrats agreeing with this statement. So again, the kind of protectionism impulse much more heightened, or cultural protectionism on the Republican side rather than on the Democratic side.

Another kind of bell weather question we have that actually divides the country right in half is whether -- we said does it bother you, or do you agree or disagree that it bothers me when I come into contact with immigrants who speak little or no English? The country is divided right in half on this question. Now, you might anticipate what the rest of these are going to look like, and you'd be right. About three-quarters of Donald Trump supporters and two-thirds of Republicans say that this bothers them when they come into contact with immigrants who speak little or no English. Independents, basically divided. Democrats, really on the other side, almost 2 to 1 the other way saying no, no, no, this does not bother me when I come into contact with immigrants who speak little or no English. So big partisan divides here.

On a basic question about race and what might be so-called reverse discrimination, we've asked this question for a while now. We haven't seen a lot of shifts in this question but I did want to put the kind of recent data up here. Today, discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks or other minorities. The country is evenly divided on this question. If you look at Republicans and Trump supporters, again, very similar to the previous question, 8 in 10 Trump supporters, 7 in 10 Republicans agree with this statement. Independents, basically divided. Democrats, you know, it should be noted among whom many are minorities or many more minorities here, but two-thirds of Democrats saying they disagree with this statement.

The other question that we asked is kind of more about Christian identity. E.J. mentioned my book is "The End of White Christian America" and thinking about America -- I've done a lot of thinking about America as a Christian nation and what that kind of identity -- what role that kind of identity is playing in our national politics. So this question gets at that in a way, and we basically see about 4 in 10 Americans kind of on two sides of this question. America has been and is currently a Christian nation, about 4 in 10. America was a Christian nation in the past but is not now, and then the one that only has a minority of folks, merit less than 1 in 5, America has never been a Christian nation.

And one of the kind of remarkable things here is if you look at the age divides on this question, right, so very clear generational divides here with seniors, about half of them saying, yes, America has always been and is currently now a Christian nation, something only about a third of the youngest Americans under the age of 30 agree with. So kind of big divide here and maybe one of the most surprising things on this question is this, that we see among white evangelical Protestants a shift over the last four years in how they're answering this question. So four years ago we had 45 percent saying yes, America has always been and is currently a Christian nation; 48 percent saying it was in the past but is not now. And what we've seen is an 11 point uptick in the number of people who say it was in the past but is not now. So even among white evangelical Protestants who have those kind of conservative views on this question, more have kind of moved into the category of saying no, this is a thing of the past, not a reflection of who we are today. And I think that slip in kind of how white evangelicals are perceiving American identity is kind of an important one to note.

Another interesting thing about -- this comes in terms of perception of cultural change that we found is this: so most of the slides that I'm putting up today, and if you look through the survey, you tend to see these very big, in our polarized world, polarized political world, these very big partisan divides. But if you look at this question, you really don't see that; right? It's very flat. So this is a question, percent who say immigrants are changing their community. So their local community, their kind of lived experience, really, there's no partisan -- these differences are not statistically significant. So no partisan differences on this question, only about 1 in 5 to maybe a quarter saying that immigrants are changing their local communities a lot. However, if you ask about how immigrants are changing American society despite the fact that the partisans don't see this local community issue differently, look

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what happens when you ask about how immigrants are changing American society; right? The partisan differences show up again.

So what this tells you is that there is some sense, I think, or at least suggests that some of these perception differences of how much cultural change is happening are rooted less in people's every day lived experience and rooted a little bit more in kind of partisan or ideological concerns or identities. So I think that's one of the more interesting things that we have in terms of perceptions in this survey.

So policy. We've heard a lot of policy proposals coming, particularly from the Trump campaign, about kind of protectionist policies around immigration. So we decided to ask about some of these and get a read on where the public is, and particularly, kind of to think about the question, how might these proposals play as we turn from the primaries into the general election.

So we have three policies here. Passing a law to prevent Syrian refugees from entering the U.S., building a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico, and temporarily banning Muslims from other countries from entering the U.S. Only about 4 in 10 Americans agrees with any of these policies. However, if you look at Republicans and Donald Trump supporters, you can understand why these policies were a good play for the republican primaries; right? They have a lot of support among Republicans and even higher support among the subset of republicans and leaners that are supporting Donald Trump. Again, independents look about like the rest of the country, only about 4 in 10 agreeing with these policies. And then Democrats are only about a quarter or so agreeing with these policies. So again, big partisan divides on these questions.

The other question we've been asking for a while is a basic question about comprehensive immigration reform or a path to citizenship, so essentially, how should we deal with immigrants who are currently living in the U.S. illegally? Our question, since early 2013, has had these three options: (1) allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain requirements; (2) allow them to become permanent legal residents but not citizens; or (3) identify and deport them. About 6 in 10 Americans favor the first option; about 1 in 5 favor the second; and about 1 in 5 favor the third. Democrats are here, about 7 in 10 favoring the first option, and independents look about like the rest of the country, and then we see this divide among Republicans and Trump supporters, but it's maybe not

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quite as pronounced as one might expect. We still have about half of Republicans overall actually choosing the first option, saying provide a way, a path to citizenship. And another one-fifth saying provide them a way to become permanent legal residents. Even among Donald Trump supporters, we still have 45 percent, nearly half, choosing the first option. The biggest difference here is this identify and deport number among Donald Trump supporters where it jumps. Only about 3 in 10 Republicans prefer that option. Among Donald Trump supporters it jumps to 4 in 10. So that seems to be the biggest difference between Trump supporters and Republicans over all.

I mentioned that this question really hasn't changed. So this is the first option, allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain requirements. These are the numbers since early 2013. You can say there's some wiggles in the numbers here, but really fairly stable over time. About 6 in 10 back in 2013; about 6 in 10 today. And even the partisan numbers haven't slipped that much. We were at 53 percent in early 2013. Our most recent numbers are at 49. So really, not a big movement at all. The attitude has been fairly stable over time.

So economic protectionism, we also saw on a couple of questions we talked a lot about cultural protectionism, but what about economic protectionism? So free trade. And on this question what we see is among all Americans, Americans actually are leaning in towards favoring or opposing free trade agreements saying that they're mostly harmful because they send jobs overseas and drive down wages; 52 percent chose that option versus 41 percent who say they're mostly helpful because they open markets for U.S. companies and allow Americans to buy goods more cheaply. And here we actually see Trump supporters and Republicans being the most opposed, saying they're mostly harmful. Independents, again, looking mostly like, a little more divided than Americans overall but basically the same, and then Democrats also being fairly divided on this question. So mostly Republicans and Trump supporters being the most likely to oppose free trade agreements.

And then this is interesting as well. Some growing support for increasing the tax rate on wealthy Americans, those earning more than \$250,000 a year. So the last time we asked this question in 2012, we saw this partisan divide, right, a kind of very big and maybe predictable partisan divide. All Americans, 6 in 10 supported this, but only about a third, maybe a little more than a third Republicans versus 80 percent of democrats supporting this policy. But one of the interesting things that we've seen,



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uptick in all Americans, but most notably an uptick among Republicans on this question. Fifty-four percent of Republicans now say that they favor increasing taxes on wealthy Americans. So that's something generally new that we haven't really seen before, and I think fits into this narrative of kind of, you know, a little more populous sentiment really among Republicans here.

So finally, I'll wrap with this last section on leadership in the 2016 election and a couple of things on Trump and Clinton and then something on leadership here.

So we've all seen lots of numbers here but I wanted to kind of make sure we had our numbers on the record. This is Donald Trump's favorability. In our survey, about 7 in 10 posting an unfavorable view of Donald Trump with fairly big racial and ethnic divides on this question. So among whites, it's 63 percent unfavorable, among Latinos, it's 86 percent unfavorable, and among African-Americans it's 91 percent unfavorable. So these are fairly stark numbers when you get outside -- stark numbers overall and particularly when you get outside of white, non-Hispanic Americans.

There's maybe not some great news for Hillary Clinton in these numbers either. We actually asked about the favorability of Bill Clinton versus Hillary Clinton in these numbers and broke it down by gender. So you may want to kind of place your bets now. So here's what Bill Clinton versus Hillary Clinton among men looks like. So 56 percent favorable Bill Clinton, 38 percent favorable among Hillary Clinton. You might say, okay, well, there's the gender thing, but here's women. So Bill Clinton's numbers don't move. Between men and women, Hillary does better, but still not as good as her husband Bill Clinton among women overall.

So the last thing I'll kind of wrap up here with is there's some other things in the report we can talk about during the Q&A about leadership style, and I think one of the things we've seen is, you know, Donald Trump saying "Let's make American great again," and I think projecting this persona as a leader who is just a fixer. Going to fix things for folks. And so we asked this question really thinking about whether people might support a leader who might be willing to kind of go outside the lines a little bit in order to kind of make things right.

So the question reads exactly like this: "Because things have gotten so far off track in this country, we need a leader who is willing to break some rules if that's what it takes to set things right." Do you agree or disagree with this statement? The country is basically divided on this question, which I think

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says something; that the country itself is divided on this question. And I'll do it backwards this time. So among Democrats, only about 4 in 10 agree with this statement. Nearly 6 in 10 disagree with this statement. Independents, basically divided on this question. Republicans, about 6 in 10 the other way. So they're basic mirror images of Democrats. If you look at the Democrat number and the Republican number here, really mere images of each other. But again, among those who basically have supported Trump in the primaries, that number is 72 percent. So that I think tells you is part of I think Trump's appeal here encapsulated in this question. So stuff is going wrong, I'm going to fix it, and that he's convinced a fair number of folks and that that's, I think, a positive quality in a leader among Trump's supporters.

So we're going to have a rich discussion about the data. There is in front of you, as you can see, a 50-page report. There's a five-page executive summary if you want to cut to the chase in the front, but I'll kind of welcome, is it Bill, back up to the podium now to introduce the rest of the panel. Everybody up, yes. Great, thanks.

(Applause)

MR. GALSTON: Okay. I'm Bill Galston, a senior fellow in Governance Studies here at Brookings, one of E.J.'s many colleagues. And I am also the token Democrat on the opinion pages of the Wall Street Journal, an interesting job. And by popular acclaim, we have brought back our analytical dream team for repeat engagement, and we are very grateful to all of them for taking the time to wade through the survey and the cross tabs and to go back through their own files and their own memories and to come up with what is bound to be a fascinating analysis.

You all have the extended biographies in your event packets, and I'm not going to waste time reading them. Suffice it to say, I will introduce them in the order in which they will be making their comments. Karlyn Bowman is a senior fellow and research coordinator at the American Enterprise Institute, and she has been applying her trade for a very long time and is one of the most seasoned and thoughtful and balanced commentators on American public opinion and is widely respected in that capacity.

Henry Olsen is a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, and he does a lot of commentary on American politics. Some of you may follow it. And he focuses on how to address the

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electoral challenges facing modern American conservatism in a manner consistent with conservative principles, an important caveat. And his work is leading up to a book entitled "New Century, New Deal: How Conservatives Can Win Hearts, Minds, and Elections", I guess in that order.

And Joy Reid, who has braved the vagaries of our crumbling transportation system but has managed to get here on time. Thank you very much. She is the host of AM Joy on weekends, 10 a.m., on MSNBC, and author of the book, "Fracture: Barack Obama, the Clintons, and the Racial Divide." She is the managing editor of TheGrio.com, which is an online news and opinion platform that focuses on stories and perspectives that reflect and affect African-American audiences.

MS. REID: Former.

MR. GALSTON: Former, ah. Who replaced you?

MS. REID: David Wilson.

MR. GALSTON: Okay, fair enough. Well, thank you for updating the bio.

And with that, we'll start with Karlyn for remarks, not to exceed seven minutes, and I will be -- I will be a tough moderator so that we have time for crosstalk and plenty of questions from the audience.

MS. BOWMAN: Thank you, Bill. It's a pleasure to be back at Brookings for another one of the installments of the PRRI-Brookings Surveys funded by Carnegie Corporation.

And I'd like to say how important I think this survey is because most of the major pollsters today are consumed with the campaign, as you all know, trying to find the highest unfavorable rating for Hillary Clinton or David Trump day after day, and this survey really provides an extraordinary amount of rich data on a variety of topics. And what's more, Robbie, I really congratulate you because you really continue to update trends that show us how and why the society has changed.

I'm going to focus today on some historical data primarily about immigration and what I've learned in studying public opinion on immigration over a long time. And I would say that ambivalence about immigration is a longstanding feature of public opinion as is anxiety about cultural change.

Before we came in, Bill and I were talking about whether or not cultural anxiety is greater today because of the significant demographic changes taking place in our population, or whether or not we look back to a period, let's say, and you have a question in the survey about nostalgia for the 1950s

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and how popular that idea is, whether we look back to a halcyon period that may never have been. But that's a big question that we can debate later. But I've never seen a poll in which Americans favored increasing immigration.

In the late 1930s and the early 1940s, Americans were overwhelmingly opposed to allowing more European refugees into the United States. After the war, Americans opposed open borders with our ally Great Britain. Gallup has asked the identical question about immigration 29 times since 1965, a 50-year period. They asked people whether immigration should be kept at its present level and whether it should be increased or decreased. No more than 27 percent have ever said they wanted to see immigration increased. In 2015, a quarter gave that response. Almost always decreasing immigration was more popular than keeping it at its present level, though the margin was frequently very close.

The new PRRI survey expanded our understanding of this question by asking about immigrants coming from seven different places. People were generally satisfied with the level of immigration from Asia and Africa, but in none of the seven cases did more than 15 percent say the number of people coming from all seven areas was too low.

There are very few surveys in the literature about immigrants' attitudes towards immigration. Gallup built a survey in 1995. They built the survey over a couple of years to look at immigrants who had been here 0 to 10 years, 10 to 20, and 21 years or more. Looking at the total immigrant population, only 15 percent of the immigrant population wanted to increase immigration, while 30 percent wanted it decreased, and 44 percent kept it about the same. The longer immigrants were here, the more they wanted to roll up the welcome mat.

As Gallup wrote at that time, and I'm quoting, "Immigrants' attitudes toward illegal immigration suggests that they are nearly as protective of U.S. borders as the general public." In a Public Agenda survey of immigrants from 2002 funded by Carnegie, 31 percent of immigrants said that the U.S. was too open to immigrants from other countries; 44 percent said the balance was about right. Only 13 percent said the U.S. was too closed to immigration. In both of these surveys of immigrants, the longer the immigrant had been in the United States, the more resistant he or she was to increased immigration.

While Americans are not now, and have never been particularly enthusiastic about

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immigrants, though some are more concerned than others as we've seen in Robbie's slides, neither do most people want to punish immigrants. In PRRI's poll, and in almost all other recent ones, people favor a path to citizenship for people who are already here. Interestingly, all but 2 of 18 Republican primaries and caucuses where the question was asked, majorities of voters in GOP contests favored a path to citizenship over deportation.

At the same time, in every state where the question was asked, large majorities of voters in Republican contests favored a temporary ban on Muslim immigrants, and as Robbie pointed out, 40 percent in your survey nationally favored this. Republicans are much more concerned about terrorism than Democrats in the new PRRI survey. For people voting in Democratic primaries and caucuses, they were asked this year about four different issues and terrorism almost always ranked last in terms of priorities. The possibilities that Republicans are thinking more about terrorism when they answer the temporary ban question and not about immigration is underscored I think by the ranking and the new PRRI poll of critical 2016 election issues. Eighty-five percent of Republicans said terrorism was a critical issue. More than 25 percentage points higher than any other issue PRRI asked about.

I thought it was interesting, and Robbie pointed this point, that there were strong partisan differences about how immigration was changing American society but there were no significant partisan differences and perceptions of the degree to which immigrants were changing local communities. I tend to trust what people say about their own circumstances because, of course, this is what people know best.

In a 1997 Knight Ridder survey, 50 percent said recent immigrants had created problems for the country as a whole, but far fewer, only 16 percent felt that way about their neighborhoods, and a quarter gave that response about the largest city and town near them.

I'm not familiar with the psychological literature on the battery of questions used in this survey on authoritarianism and autonomy. It's an interesting part of the report, you should read it, and I think perhaps the authoritarianism label is not the best for this long, psychological literature. But they looked at approaches to authority and how those approaches to authority may influence cultural attitudes in politics, and I'm a bit skeptical of the index.

The four questions they asked that make up this index are about desirable childhood

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traits. Do you want your child to be independent or have respect for elders? Self-reliant or obedient? Curiosity or good manners? Creative or well-behaved? In each one of these questions, blacks, Hispanics, and the white working-class had much more in common with one another than they did with whites with a college education.

Take the question of good manners. Eighty percent of blacks, 80 percent of Hispanics, 79 percent of working-class whites said good manners were more important than curiosity. Only 52 percent of whites with a college education agreed. Call me an authoritarian based on this index.

Nor is it surprising, I think, that the white working-class, and blacks, and Hispanics were more worried about becoming unemployed or becoming victims of crime than those with a college education. The college educated are insulated in a way these other groups are not.

On another topic, the economy, the stubbornness of the negative attitudes I think is very, very interesting. The psychological scarring from the 2008 market crash and the recession is still with us. Americans felt the economy could collapse in 2008 and they don't feel a lot more confident about it now.

On the gay marriage question, you have a long trend on that. I think we've reached a pause but not a plateau. I think the attitudes will continue to change over time as one generation replaces another, but still, it's pretty clear from your recent data that we're pausing with still about 35 to 37 percent in most national polls opposed to gay marriage.

And finally, since you talk about nostalgia in the survey I thought I would mention one question that you briefly alluded to. You talked about Hillary Clinton and Bill Clinton and Donald Trump's favorable and unfavorable ratings, but I thought it was important, and this may be nostalgia, but Ronald Reagan was viewed far more positively than any of the current other candidates.

MR. GALSTON: Henry, the floor is yours.

MR. OLSEN: Thank you very much.

What I'd just like to briefly touch on is I thought it was interesting that Robbie used the word "protection" over and over again because I do think that is one of the underestimated influences going on right now in the campaign, is that the common narrative of the Trump campaign either places his appeal on the locus of his personality or in a racial appeal. And what your data suggests to me is something that other data also suggests, which is that there's a common sense as well of protection; that

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there are people who feel that as American citizens they have certain things that the government ought to be doing to ensure that they have a decent chance for a life of dignity, comfort, and security, and they don't believe that the government is doing those things, and that means that they are people that feel that they need protection against things that are changing and that are harming them. And the data that Robbie brings up is consistent with that theme across the idea of cultural protection, across the idea of economic protection, that there are groups that feel that things are changing to their disadvantage and that they want a leader and they want a government that will step in and stop them from being harmed. And in some cases, restore them to a case of either economic or cultural advantage which they believe they once at a time identified with or had.

One thing I would have liked to have seen in this survey, and perhaps you have them in cross tabs, and that is both with respect to Trump supporters, I would have loved to have seen Republicans who are non-Trump supporters, because when Trump supporters as you've defined it is a subset of the Republican, the real difference to see is not between the broader category that includes the Trump supporters but rather between the complete division. And I think you would have seen very large differences there. For example, if you take a look at the "willing to break the rules" question, 72 percent of Trump supporters agree with the statement, "We need a leader who is willing to break some rules if that's what it takes to set things right." Republicans, only 57 percent. But again, remember that 57 percent includes 100 percent of the 72 percent, which suggests, you know, I don't know what share of the Republicans your poll had as Trump supporters, but nationwide it was a little bit under 50 percent, which would suggest that the non-Trump Republicans, just doing some basic math, would have been 42 percent. In other words, non-Trump Republicans look like democrats on this question if Trump supporters are about half of Republicans. That would have been interesting to see. And the same is true on the other question. So I would love to know whether or not you have those data to illuminate, because that could also help explain the intransigence and the deep opposition to Trump among many non-Trump Republicans, is that on a number of attitudes they actually look not slightly different but significantly different than the Trump supporter. Again, taking a look here at the white working-class, 6 in 10 white working-class Americans agree the U.S. needs a leader willing to break some rules, shared by only a third of white college-educated Republicans. Again, we know that Trump support was disproportionately

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white working-class. What does that say if we broke that into a Republican standpoint? Would there be a very sharp difference there that, again, could help explain what we're saying, which is to say both the deep and continued resistance in certain quarters to the Trump candidacy.

The other group, and of course, as we know, over the last 15 or 20 years, the changes in the economy have probably hit the white working-class harder than virtually any other group. There's certainly, after the recession, Hispanics were hit very hard, so hard in fact that we started to see some reverse migration, but by and large, the sort of industries that are contracting and the regions that are not doing very well tend to be the areas that are inhabited by white working-class Americans. So it doesn't surprise me that they are strongly in favor of economic protection. It does not surprise me that they would be the sort of people that who would say that things are so bad that we need a leader that's willing to break the rules because from their perception things are so bad as opposed to other groups where the data may be either contrary to that, or the experience may be contrary to that, or there is more of a mixed signal.

The other group I would have liked to have seen difference between are between evangelical Republican, evangelical Protestant Republicans, and non-evangelical Protestant Republicans. Again, the data suggests that about half of the Republican Party, maybe slightly more than half are white evangelical Protestants, but about half are not. And again, we see large differences between white evangelical Protestants and Republicans generally. It would have been nice to see that because one of the things we've seen in the Republican Party for quite some time that predated Trump is the war between non -- the white evangelical wing and the nonwhite evangelical Protestant wing. I think that would have been interesting to help, again, explain what we are seeing.

I think one thing to understand about the white evangelical Protestant community is how much they feel that -- or a large number of them feel that the thing that they once had, which was cultural dominance in America, has been lost. And lost, and I think over the last four years a growing number have seen that it's lost irretrievably. That's what I think the large increase in the "was a Christian nation" answer was. Well, that has massive implications for politics going down the road because the entire Christian right movement that was started in 1980 was built on the idea that that cultural primacy could be reasserted through political action. If that is no longer --



(Phone ringing)

MR. GALSTON: That's a nice ring. Is it the results of Brexit?

MR. OLSEN: That's mine.

MS. REID: It's you.

MR. OLSEN: Yeah, no, I have to change that to Big Ben after today.

I would have liked to have seen that. And also, I think, as a final point plays into the attitudes towards Islam, that one of the things we know about a large segment of white evangelical Protestants is that they have a belief that American citizenship is in some way intertwined with religious belief. Not in a European theological way in the sense of empower, you know, restricting freedom to practice religion or in the sense of creating a hierarchy of religious leaders who issue orders, but rather in the sense that a belief in the moral teachings of the Bible is intrinsic to American citizenship.

Consequently, if that's a belief that you have, then your beliefs towards Islam will be very different than people who don't have that belief, both in respect to is Islam compatible with American life where we find white evangelicals Protestants are the group likeliest to say they are incompatible, but also with respect to things like the Muslim ban. If you believe that American citizenship is intrinsically tied in some way with biblical Christianity, increasing numbers of people who reject that rather openly is not something that you would consider to be good for the country.

I think the Trump appeal among evangelicals is that combination of cultural protection in the discussion of Islam and economic protection because white working-class Americans overlap very highly with white evangelical Protestants among the religious groups. In the Republican Party, that's the group that is most, highest among -- highest percentage of white working-class voters. When you have that overlap of economic protection and cultural protection, although not the religious liberty side but the sense of religious identity of America in the conflict with Islam, I think that explains a lot of why Donald Trump was able to do well with what I'll call the casual evangelical, the person who doesn't go to church two or three times a week but shows up a couple of times a month, and that is a very strong reason why his appeal is going to continue to be strong throughout the general election.

MR. GALSTON: Thanks so much, Henry.

(Applause)

MR. GALSTON: Joy, the floor is yours.

MS. REID: Okay. First of all, thank you, William. Thank you, E.J. It's always great to be here. And Robbie, he and E.J., I kidnap for my show frequently. I'm going to have to start grabbing Karlyn and Henry, too, and add you guys to my human chain that I form around everyone here at Brookings, and I would love you to come down as well. So, I come here to cast my show is what I'm trying to say. (Laughter)

It's really great to be here as always. I really enjoyed reading through the survey. Fascinating data. And one of the reasons that I do love Robbie's work is that it answers this question that I have been obsessed about since the launch of the Donald Trump campaign, which is when he says "Make America Great Again," when does he think America was great? What does the "again" refer to? And this survey and other research really does pin down the "when" to the '50s, the 1950s. And this really strong nostalgia for the '50s. And the question is whether that nostalgia is because the '50s was sort of the era when the great kind of flattening of economic opportunity happened, the post-World War II economy meant that, you know, every home could have a washer-dryer and, you know, a new-fangled refrigerator and all that kind of stuff, or whether it's something else, more of what Henry was talking about, which was kind of a moment of cultural ascendancy that was tied directly to race. And it's increasingly clear to me, and I think this data reinforces it, that more of Donald Trump's appeal has to do with this desire for racial restoration than it does to do with economic restoration. For instance, Donald Trump's adherents, make more money than either Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders. They're not poorer than average Americans, actually are better off, and that their anxiety about ethnic descendancy and about cultural displacement is actually stronger than their anxiety about things like crime or things like the economy.

Just through a couple of these data points, not only the preponderance of particularly white evangelicals who say things have gotten worse since the '50s, and in previous surveys Robbie has made an even more specific question that says has the country gotten worse since white men lost cultural dominance, and you've seen a high correlation between a yes on that question and support for Donald Trump, but you also have these really strong aversions that you see in the poll to things like coming in contact with immigrants who speak little or no English among Trump supporters, that being 77 percent.

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Really high also among just Republicans, 66 percent; whereas, independents it's split; whereas, Democrats it's 35/64 the other direction of people saying they do not feel that kind of discomfort. And then the other data point being on the question if immigration, it not being immigration broadly but being immigration specifically from non-English speaking countries and non-European countries. On the question of whether immigration from predominantly Muslim countries is too low, about right, too high, it's about right, 41 percent; too high, 34 percent. When you get down to Mexico, it's too low, 4 percent; about right, 40; too high, 46; and it's the highest, too high in the survey. You get to China and India, you get 24 percent saying it's too high. And then you get to Europe. Europe and predominantly Christian countries give you the highest too low, 14 and 15 percent, and only 12 percent saying too high, so that you have partly the anxiety being about immigration not from everywhere but there not being enough immigration from the point of view of a lot of sort of Trump base from white European countries and that being tied to the idea that we're not upholding these Christian values, white Christian values very specifically.

There's been data that also talks about the decrease in negative attitudes specifically towards immigrant groups, but specifically Hispanics as they become less stereotypical Hispanic. So as they speak less Spanish publicly, as they become more like Marco Rubio. A Ted Cruz faces less sort of overt hostility from republicans than if he was Rafael Cruz, which is his actual name. That Bobby Jindal presents better to republicans than if he was Piyush Jindal, which is his actual name. So that you have a notion of assimilation being really tied to people's sense of whether immigrants are actually becoming American enough and whether they're acceptable. It's part of the reason why Hispanics have been the target of Republican outreach efforts. Surveys have shown that only about 25 percent of even what we would consider black Hispanics, Afro-Latinos, identify themselves as black. Even most Afro-Latinos identify themselves as either Hispanic or white. You have a very low identification with Africanness even among Latinos and you have a greater sort of striving to blend in particularly as people are in this country more so that they are more of a target.

I'm really interested in -- there's a great piece I recommend you guys reading today by Peter Beinart, which if you had your survey would have been even better, but it was really good in the Atlantic where he talks about California, a state which is 39 percent white at this point, 39 percent Hispanic. It's 11 percent African-American. I mean, 11 percent Asian-American, and only 6 percent

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black. Between World War II and the sort of 1990s, California was basically a Republican state. It voted 9 out of 11 times for Republican presidents, 7 out of 11 times for republican governors. Richard Nixon obviously came out of there. Ronald Reagan. What really changed and flipped California was partly demographics but it was also the incredible backlash to the increasing Hispanicization of that state, that as the Latino population grew, you had Pete Wilson, the former governor, Republican governor, sign into law a raft of measures designed to essentially punish illegal immigration and keep services out of the hands of people that he portrayed as law breakers who were essentially stealing from the good, hard-working people of California. But the result of that really was to flip California the other direction, because what has happened over time is as the anti-immigrant sentiment has washed over Hispanics who traditionally are very atomized, meaning that a Puerto Rican felt that they were Puerto Rican more than they felt that they were Latino and didn't feel they had as much in common with let's say a Mexican-American. Mexican-Americans and Cubans feeling very distinct from one another, culturally having -- really not feeling that they had any reason to be cohesive politically, and that resulting in Mexican-Americans being 65/35 percent Democrat, while Cuban-Americans were like 90/10 Republican, so that there was all this cultural distinction.

What's happening over time is that Latino groups are starting to coalesce together and starting to all feel more Latino and starting to identify with each other and to reduce the amount of atomization in the same way that African-Americans and black Caribbeans and African black people since the 1960s have reduced their atomization and become a very cohesive voting bloc. You're starting to see that happen to Latinos, and so the big threat to the Republican Party is that as they have begun to create more stringent demands on Hispanics to de-Hispanicize and at the same time have become more hostile to immigrants in general who are non-English speaking, they are actually hardening and creating a more cohesive Hispanic voting block which means that as goes California, ultimately could go the country, it could be very difficult for Republicans to win elections if that's what happens to them with this very fast-growing immigrant group.

MR. GALSTON: Thanks so much, Joy.

(Applause)

MR. GALSTON: Okay. Before we get to the panel crosstalk, I'm going to call an audible

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here for just a minute. Henry put a specific data question on the table about intra-Republican differences, and as it happens, Robbie came on with the answers to your questions.

MR. JONES: Maybe not all of them, but the biggest answer is absolutely yes. And I think it's a great idea. We like do a kind of intra-Republican division right here, so I think it'll be great. Kind of run down a number, and I'm happy to get all of that to you later. But just a couple of benchmarks I think will give you the flavor here.

So I think the answer is yes and no. So we see some places where there are these big divides between Trump supporters and non-Trump Republicans. There's other places where we don't, and I think that might actually be really instructive to figure out what that is. So just a couple of points.

On the one you started with, is leader willing to break the rules? We see Trump supporters jumping way up. I mean, there we have some hints that those are really different. So if we look at Trump supporters, that number again from the slides was 72 percent, right, of Trump supporters saying things are so bad we need a leader willing to break the rules, set things right. If we just look at non-Trump Republicans, that is Republicans who supported any other candidate in the race, that number is 49. So 72/49. So that's a big, big, you know, 20-plus point gap. White evangelical Protestants on that question are only at 53 percent. So the majority but not nearly up at 72. The GOP as a whole is at 57, but as you can see, the GOP has been pulled largely by that Trump supporter number into 57 percent.

But if you look at a couple of other questions, you see less of that. So like the 1950s, that kind of nostalgia question about whether things have changed for the better or the worse, there you see 68 percent of Trump supporters versus 64 percent of non-Trump supporters. There's no daylight really between those groups. Evangelicals are at 70 percent on that question. The GOP as a whole is at 68 percent, so there's really not any daylight there. So I think if there's a thing, you know, I mean, I've argued that one of the things that's happened in this election is that the values voters have essentially been converted into nostalgia voters, and they're coalescing around that in the election.

Just one more real quickly. We see also less daylight on this kind of thing that Joy brought up about being bothered by immigrants who speak little or no English, which we think is a great proxy for kind of a reaction. So there we see Trump supporters were at 77 percent, almost 8 in 10, but non-Trump supporters are less, but still at 6 and 10 on that. So that's a lot of difference. It's nearly 20

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points but they're still at 6 and 10. GOP as a whole is at 64 percent -- sorry, 72 percent. White evangelicals are at two-thirds on that question. So some daylight there but not a lot. The leadership style one though is the one you really see the daylight. And there's probably some other places we could look as well, but that just gives you some of the flavor.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. E.J., you get to start the crosstalk.

MR. DIONNE: Good. Just a piece of relevant news that just popped over my phone, the Supreme Court ruled four to four today on President Obama's immigration orders, which means that the lower court order forbidding him from launching his new program for deferred status stays in place. So the president lost on a four-four vote on the court.

Thank you all very much. I just want to thank Joy for calling attention to that chart on page 33 because it's a question we wanted to ask to make -- precisely to see precisely what you talked about. This is, you think, the number of immigrants coming from the following places has been too high, too low. It is so interesting. The gap between Mexico and Central America, too high, 46 percent and Europe at 12 percent really tells us a lot. And I think there's a rich piece of data here.

One other fact I want to put on the table and then I have my one question. The fact is, 1970, my assistant, Elizabeth Thom and I were looking at these numbers yesterday. In 1970, 4.7 percent of Americans were foreign-born; now around 13 percent are. So wherever you stand on immigration, if you wonder why we are royal by this issue at the moment, that number is very important.

My question goes to one of my favorite questions in the survey as it was Henry's and Karlyn's, which is this you need to break the rules -- we need a leader who will break the rules. During the presentation I was wondering if white working-class voters like good manners so much, what in the world did they see in Donald Trump. And some of the answer is in that question. And I asked Robbie to break this down for me, and there's a lot of mystery about why are white evangelicals split on Trump. Here is a fascinating fact, and I just want Robbie and others to comment more on this. You know, some would say it's an authoritarian question. I have a question about authoritarianism. Some would see it slightly differently. But among white evangelical Protestants who agree we need a leader willing to break some rules to set things right, 59 percent have a favorable view of Donald Trump. Among those who disagree with that, only 33 percent have a favorable view of Donald Trump. I just think, Robbie, this is

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one of the most fascinating cleavages in the survey, and I wonder if you could elaborate a bit on that. And if any of our other panelists have a view of this question and sort of related questions.

MR. JONES: I'll say a little bit about it. I mean, one of the things that struck me about it is if you think back, I mentioned the kind of value voters frame that I think has been so prominent in GOP politics. But I mean, always buried in that was a kind of style of ethics that was about principles and character. And so I think that -- and this question is essentially, if you kind of dial back up your Philosophy 101 class, this is a utilitarian versus deontological question. So do we have a desired outcome that is so clear that whatever means we need to get to reach there are okay, right, the kind of classic, you know, kind of justifying the means by the ends. That's a kind of utilitarian approach to, we know what the end is. Whatever we have to do to get there is therefore okay because the end is so important. I think that's a really key thing. Now, we're in such desperate times and this end, if we don't reach this end now, we may never reach it. That sense of a kind of visceral desperation even in some cases I think is part of what's driving this. And this was always so, right.

I wrote about this in February. One of the things that struck me when I was watching after the South Carolina primary where Trump won one of the first big evangelical states, about 7 in 10 South Carolina GOP primary voters are white evangelical Protestants. And after that thing, and they were giving their various speeches, Cruz's supporters ended the thing with a kind of basic, you know, "Cruz, Cruz, Cruz," and Rubio ended his thing saying, "Rubio, Rubio, Rubio." At the end of Trump's victory lap speech, his supporters were chanting "USA, USA." Right? Not "Trump." And I think that sense of bringing, you know, "Make America great again," and this sense that, okay, we know where we need to be, and whatever we have to do to get there is okay, I think is part of what's happening. But I should say it's a complete abandonment of a kind of deontological principle-based, character-based style of politics. It's a very different way of approaching it.

MS. REID: You know, and I would wonder whether, because some of the other data that you have uncovered and that you've uncovered the last few years in the survey is the sense, number one, that the deck is stacked against white Christians; that white Americans face discrimination that is equal to or worse than discrimination against blacks and minorities. And then you have to remember that the face of authority is a black man who a lot of people in the Trump sort of world view as tyrannical, as coming

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after their second amendment rights, coming to confiscate their firearms as a tyrant. So I think if you believe that the rules have been rewritten to your disfavor and that the rules have been rewritten to delegitimize you culturally, to take away from you, and that the person who is enforcing the rules is a black man who is against you, then I think that you would believe that breaking the rules is completely legitimate because you don't really believe in the rules.

MR. JONES: I'll just throw that number in just real quick, but we did ask, not only has discrimination against blacks and other minorities -- against whites has become as bad as discrimination against blacks and other minorities, we also had a new question that asks whether discrimination against Christians has become as bad as discrimination against other groups. Seventy-seven percent of white evangelical Protestants agree that discrimination against Christians now rivals that of other groups. So that's a big, big number.

MR. DIONNE: By the way, I just want to observe, it's really cool to have a pollster who uses the word "deontological."

Does anybody else have anything to say on that question?

MS. BOWMAN: Just to add to what Joy said, I think if you feel you've lost so much ground, of course you want somebody who is strong to try to help you get some of that ground back. Particularly the question on being unemployed. And those numbers were really high among those particular groups becoming unemployed, and so I think that follows sort of logically from that.

MR. GALSTON: Just throwing in my own two cents before I ask my one question of the panel, if you don't think the system, the political and regulatory system is working, I mean, it's not just the urgency of the ends; it's the ineffectiveness of the means I think that's contributing to this sense, and most Americans don't think that their governmental institutions are working the way they were designed to work or the way they used to work. And they're right, by the way.

Here's my question, and it concerns not authority but the most violent attack against authority, namely terrorism. I note with interest in this survey, Robbie, that both Republicans and Democrats are more likely to say that terrorism is the most -- is a critical issue than any other issue. It's true that Republicans care about it more, but Democrats care about it more than any other issue unless I'm misreading these numbers. Okay. So we already note an important fact about the election as it's



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forming up, namely that an election that everybody expected to be dominated by economic issues has a second powerful gravitating force in the middle of it, namely terrorism and our response to it.

But here's my analytical question for you. I totally understand why white working-class voters feel more exposed to the threat of crime than their more fortunate white, upscale peers. I do not so clearly understand why white working-class voters feel so much more exposed and vulnerable to terrorism, right, the threat of which you don't think of as being class based. So my question to you and the panel is why the pervasiveness of this sense of threat, regardless of the objective warrant for the sense of threat among white working-class voters?

MR. JONES: So I'll keep it short but I'll say a couple things. I do think that there is just this palpable sense among particularly white working-class voters of just personal vulnerability, being exposed. I think that is very, very -- you can look at a number of questions in the survey and you just see that. So I think there's some kind of bleed over effect here that sort of even four things for which there may not be statistical evidence for or even personal experience of, there is this sense of -- and back to what Henry -- accent to the protectionism piece, this sense that we are exposed and there's really nobody who has our backs I think is very, very palpable among these groups. I think that's some of what's going on.

The other thing I would say, too, is that media consumption makes a difference in these things. So I think if you have a steady diet of NPR versus a steady diet of FOX News -- we have a question about that. I can look up the numbers if you want it later. But there is different kinds of exposure to media that I think can also heighten those kinds of concerns.

MS. REID: You know, I think this is a very interesting question. I would love to see a correlation between those who believe that President Obama is a Muslim and those who have a personal fear of terrorism as well. I thought that was one of the most striking numbers in the piece. I was actually tweeting about this last night with a bunch of people. The high percentage of republicans who feel they are personally -- they are at least somewhat worried about being personally affected by terrorism, 62 percent versus only 44 percent of democrats thinking of terrorism as a threat that can affect them personally, and then on the flip side it's people of color, it's blacks and Hispanics, who feel much more afraid of being personally affected by crime, which is something that if you're living in a lower

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socioeconomic neighborhood, is actually a legitimate thing to be afraid of. But the idea that you have people who are physically disconnected from the World Trade Center, from the sort of obvious targets of terrorism, the big blue state sort of totems of Americanness that get targeted by things like terrorism, you know, they're not near where the Boston Marathon bombing took place or the World Trade Center; they're in places that are out of the way and that would not even be on the radar if somebody in a far-off country that was plotting some sort of, you know, affinity to ISIS attack, but they have more fear of personal involvement. I wonder if that is tied to sort of the paranoia about Islam in general and about the president not being interested or willing to protect them from it.

MR. DIONNE: Just a quick thought on this building on that, which is, I think, one of the interesting things to look at is the relationship, a partisanship here because I think on a lot of these questions the chicken and egg issue. Does a view cause you to support a party? Does your partisanship encourage you to hold a view? And my hunch, but we can check this, is that there is a substantial part of the white working-class is Republican, and for the last 15 years since 9/11, Republicans have been more likely to rate terrorism as a more important issue than Democrats, so I wonder if there is a specific partisan or ideological element to this answer?

MR. OLSEN: And I agree with that. And I'd also like to see if there were distinctions among the white working-class between white evangelical Protestants and non-white evangelical Protestants, because again, data suggests that there is a strong aversion of Islam across the board that is stronger among white evangelical Protestants, and to what extent with the chicken and the egg, is it an evangelical Protestant view that's being reflected because more of them are white working-class and how much of it is something different?

I don't think we should forget that San Bernardino happened in a working-class community. We can talk about the high-profile American acts of terrorism being primarily concentrated out of areas that could actually be trafficked by normal Americans, but San Bernardino was not that at all, and I think that's one of the things that penetrated, was that it could really happen to me. It could happen with the person who is walking down the street who seems normal, and then he could whip out a gun and me and my kids are dead. I think that's just different than what happened with 9/11, what happened with some of the other shootings, and I think that penetrated people's consciousness a little bit more.

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MS. BOWMAN: I think when you're fearful and anxious, it just bleeds into so many things. I think you're absolutely right. I've just been looking at some questions about how your kids are doing in school or what kind of school your children are going to. It just bleeds into all of these things and people are more concerned.

MS. REID: I would love for you to do this same survey in Europe. I mean, they're going through Brexit right now in part for some of these same reasons in Britain as these fears of immigration, fears of Islam, Islamophobia and then throughout Europe you're having really the same phenomenon happening. It's fascinating.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. Back to my seat.

Okay. We have a hard stop at 11:30 I understand, so we have 20 minutes for Q&A from the floor. I have to warn you apologetically but necessarily that not every question can be recognized in 20 minutes, but let's see if we can get at least some on the table.

Yes, sir?

SPEAKER: I can probably speak loud enough.

MR. GALSTON: Short and a question.

SPEAKER: Yes, very much.

Bernie Sanders. Never mentioned in all of this. Everything is between Trump supporters and non-Trump supporters among Republicans and so on. What would happen if you could introduce Bernie Sanders into this and slice and dice everything according to Bernie Democrats, Bernie independents, et cetera?

MR. JONES: So the good news is we can do that. So it just didn't make the presentation. There is some talk of that in the report, but we actually have Sanders supporters versus Clinton supporters. We can break some of that out and if we have time maybe I'll look for a quick number to give you a window into that.

MR. GALSTON: Yes, ma'am?

SPEAKER: In terms of --

MR. GALSTON: Please wait for the microphone to reach you. I should have said that.

SPEAKER: In terms of the leadership question with the 72 percent, does that not reflect

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they want the white guy to do it as opposed to the woman or the black guy? And I ask that because the Supreme Court, Obama has, in immigration particularly, has been attacked by the Congress as well as others in terms of lawsuits by challenging his efforts on immigration, which he contends he's taken because of gridlock. So first choice would have been legislation. Second choice, executive action. And yet, so that 72 percent seems to me to assume that that's not people supporting Hillary Clinton going further on Obama's executive orders.

MR. GALSTON: Thank you.

SPEAKER: Do you follow the question?

MR. GALSTON: I do. Who wants to respond?

MS. REID: I tend to think, because this kind of the pretext of my book, I tend to think that a lot of what we're seeing is the backlash to electing the first black president. But not just electing the first black president but him breaking sort of an unspoken pact which is that if you become a nationally accepted black leader, you are supposed to affirm that all racial issues are by your very presence cleansed. And to the extent that you cleanse the country of anything to do with racism and race and that you absolve the country constantly with your sort of racial magic wand, you're okay. So if you're Ted Cruz and you say there is no racism or you're Ben Carson and you say there is no racism, look at me, I'm here, you're okay, but I think Barack Obama stepped across that invisible line when he sided with Trayvon Martin over George Zimmerman. When he did certain things that racialized him in the minds of a lot of Americans, he broke an unspoken pact to deracialize the country, and I think part of what we're seeing is a backlash saying we do want to undo and erase him with the opposite of him, which is Donald Trump.

MR. GALSTON: With apologies to the front row, are there questions in the back? Yes, there's a gentleman over there.

SPEAKER: How would you say that this kind of American attitude to immigration is different from the European counterpart, which is definitely like anti-immigration feelings are definitely on the rise?

MR. DIONNE: I just want to say my view is that Donald Trump is the entry of the European far right into American politics. I think that if you look at Donald Trump's collection of positions that include economic nationalism, limited support for the welfare state, very strong anti-immigration

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feeling, you know, a tinge or more of a tinge of racism, and also, religious bigotry. I think that this election, you know, it's a paradox because he talks a lot about putting American first, but I think there's a distinctly European right element to the Trump appeal. I don't know if anybody wants to dissent from that.

MR. OLSEN: I think –

MR. DIONNE: I thought Henry might. That's why I invited it.

MR. OLSEN: No, I would generally echo that. I think what we're seeing is across the world a general set of anxieties rooted in cultural change and economic threat that is causing native white working-class voters to find political expression. In Europe's multi-party system it happens through parties. In ours where it's much more cost-effective to launch a hostile takeover of an existing party rather than set up a new one, we see it in primary challenges. But I think the way I would explain Donald Trump to an English or a British audience is that he's Nigel Farage with Boris Johnson's hair. (Laughter)

MR. DIONNE: I think, by the way, as of tomorrow, you're going to see an enormous amount of polling analysis comparing the leave vote with the Trump vote, and it'll be fascinating to see, you know, to the extent that that's comparable.

MR. GALSTON: Well, consider the U.K. Independence Party slogan, and I quote, "We want our country back."

MR. DIONNE: And also "Put Britain First" is another slogan as well.

MR. GALSTON: But, you know, "Britain First," yes, but it seems to me the resonance of that slogan, "We want our country back," that says it all. And I absolutely agree with Henry's description of the relationship between the leaders of these two movements. Perfect.

Robbie?

MR. JONES: I'll jump in very quickly with your Bernie Sanders data that you requested. So it turns out on immigration, they don't look that different, Sanders and Clinton's support of immigration questions, but on the economic questions where you might expect to see it, Sanders supporters are much more likely to say the gap between the rich and the poor is a critical issue in the country than Clinton supporters are, and one that's maybe the best window into it, they are mirror images of each other on free trade. So Bernie Sanders supporters, the majority oppose free trade and Clinton supporters, the majority supports.

MR. GALSTON: Despite the fact that she doesn't.

Yes, sir? Microphone over here, please.

SPEAKER: On the question about the perception gap between immigrants changing their own community in American society, do you have a religious breakdown of that? Because I'm thinking Latinos are overwhelmingly either evangelical or Roman Catholic, and it will be interesting to see if there's any differential there. Also, the same on the questions toward the end about taxes and those things. Are there any religious breakdowns on those?

MR. JONES: Yes. So it turns out, interestingly enough, so one big picture thing about Catholics, on these issues, white Catholics and Latino Catholics are in different universes on many of these issues. So on immigration, on whether it bothers you whether you encounter someone who speaks mostly English, and it's part of the kind of white working-class sort of grouping that I think white Catholics are a part of that's kind of pulling them in that direction, but there's a huge divide. However, on this question, if you think immigrants today are changing American society and way of life a lot or a little, there are no statistical differences between white and Hispanic Catholics on that question.

MR. DIONNE: Could I just say, watching that number reminded me of the late Andy Kohut study with his colleagues at Pugh, and I loved Andy Kohut, where if you wanted to see the two groups who are most opposed to immigration, they tended to be either people who live in areas of high recent immigration, which is completely understandable in a sense people feel the community around them is changing too fast, but the other group that opposed it were people who lived in areas of absolutely no immigration or very little, which suggests a sense of the other. And I thought of Andy when you saw it because that's a fascinating difference, that big gap between those two bars.

MR. JONES: And it should be noted also that on the question of changing your community, actually, not surprisingly, white and Hispanic Catholics look different on that question. So they actually -- Hispanic Catholics were much more likely to say that immigrants are changing their local communities, but when it comes to society, they don't differ on the question.

MR. GALSTON: I'm going to move back to the front now and I'm going to take your question and your question, and then the gentleman over here, and then we'll move around the room again.

SPEAKER: When we talk about immigrants, we usually consider them as a big community, but when I was reporting the primary in California I discovered there's a clear split between immigrants from Asia and immigrants from Mexico because, like, language difference, cultural difference, and economic difference. To some degree, they don't really get along with each other, so like I guess my question is, in terms of voting preference, do you think we can still, like generally speaking, consider immigrants as a big community, or do you think the Republican Party will reach out to a certain group of immigrants in order to gain more support in the immigrants' community?

MS. REID: It's been interesting because you're right. There typically, even within Asian-American groups, there's not been any cohesion between let's say Vietnamese immigrants and Chinese-American. They've been very different, and there's not a lot of data on the Asian-American community. That's one of the big failings. Pew wrote this sort of big mea culpa recently about how they just couldn't do it because of too many language groups, too many national groups, it's just too hard. But there is data out there that shows that despite the fact that you have a lot of intra-racial and intra-ethnic differences, both within Asian-Americans and between Asian-Americans and Hispanics, what you're starting to see is both groups coalescing towards the Democratic party because of the question of immigration in general and hostility to immigration tends to wash into every immigrant community and create sort of a cultural bias against Republicans because of a sense that they start with the Hispanics and next they're coming to us. So I think Republicans have another long-term problem. The Asian-American cohort is growing quickly, too, and Republicans are not any more successful. They used to be more successful. Asian-Americans, as well as Arab-Americans used to be very open to the Republican Party. That opportunity is fading with every immigrant group even when they don't like each other.

MR. DIONNE: The most striking thing in the last election is that Mitt Romney not only lost Latinos three to one, he lost Asian-Americans three to one. And now part of the problem is Asian-Americans includes a heck of a lot of different kinds of people. In my book, "On the Right," I quoted Jim Brulte, the Republican chair in California, who is very concerned about how the party has become perceived as anti-immigrant, and he's trying to rebuild the Republican Party starting with Asian-Americans, because he figures that's the first group they can win back, and he's elected at the local and state legislative level -- helped elect I think a Vietnamese candidate, a Korean candidate. He has sort of

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seized the first opportunity for pushing back the democrats' gains in the Asian American group.

MR. JONES: Just one quick plug. We did have one good dataset in 2012 that was funded by the National Science Foundation on Asian-Americans, and they've just announced last month they're re-upping that study. So Janelle Wong and her colleagues at University of Maryland and a few other universities will be conducting that survey. I don't think we'll have the data till 2017, but we will know kind of what happened. It will be a retroactive look back but we'll have the data.

MR. OLSEN: One of the things with respect to the Asian-Americans that republicans need to understand is how few of them are Protestant Christian. You know, Vietnamese, a number of the Vietnamese came over because of the boat people and the Communist takeover of the country and they initially reacted in becoming Republican, for the same reason that Cubans or Hungarians were. Filipinos are Catholic. But other than that, Indian-Americans who many Republicans want to outreach to Asians say, well, they're highly educated. They're the wealthiest immigrant group. Why don't they vote for us? And this is the question 50 years ago that was asked about Jews, and the answer might happen to be that only 15 percent are Christian. According to the NSF study, almost half of Chinese express no religion, which if you know something about the Chinese culture doesn't surprise you. You know, that's one thing that a Republican Party that is identified with informally the idea of a Christian identity is essential to American identity would necessarily be a barrier issue, even above immigration because that's one thing at least that most Latino immigrants share is a Christian background, even if it's primarily a Catholic background. Many Asian immigrants don't even share that, so that's an additional potential barrier republicans will have to cross.

MR. DIONNE: Amen. That's a huge fact.

MR. GALSTON: They may also have figured out the truth of the old saw, that if you want to live like a Republican, vote Democratic. But let's not go there.

I think -- oh, yes, yes. I'm sorry. We have time for two more questions in the front and then we'll have to wrap.

SPEAKER: So I write for the Hispanic Outlook. I cover Hispanic issues in Congress the last 10 years. I'm from California and I'm super aware of the Asian-American surge there. And the thing I love covering about Hispanics is they are so diverse, and they are assimilating. It doesn't seem like you



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talk about that. And to me the symbol of the simulation are the millennials and you haven't talked about the millennials either.

MR. GALSTON: Okay. Well, you've given the panel two questions to respond to.

MR. JONES: Do you want to go ahead and take the other one?

MR. GALSTON: No, no. Just respond here and we'll go to the second one.

MR. JONES: I mean, one of the things that we sort of know about the kind of Latino population over time is that sort of -- because most of the immigrants from Mexico, about two-thirds Catholic coming in, and then over second and third generations, less Catholic. But what's interesting, I think the attention has all been on less Catholic and more evangelical, and that's true. But only about half of those people who are leaving Catholicism, half of the Latinos who are leaving Catholicism in the second and third generations are going to the evangelical world. The other half are going into the unaffiliated world. They're going nowhere in terms of religion. And so that's a really interesting thing, and that actually keeps the -- if you think of the kind of ideological needle, it keeps it right down the middle because there are just as many going -- and they tend to be very liberal, the ones who go, and they tend to be younger, very liberal, and are not religiously attached at all, and then they're counterbalanced by this other part that's like evangelical and fairly conservative.

MS. REID: And I think you have to also realize, too, that because you had a sharp drop in new immigration, particularly from Central America and Mexico, the Hispanic population is now aging, is now starting to age as well, and so you're starting to have a lot of cultural norms of being a Democrat baked in to people who are net older than they were before, while at the same time among younger Latinos, the distinction between being Hispanic and being Latino is starting to grow; that there is an increasing identity among particularly younger Latinos to reclaim their identity. And so you do see a lot of pride and cultural pride in being Latino that is against this idea of just sort of merging into a generic American identity, and I think opposing that and vocally being negative towards that does not help a political party to gain interest among those groups.

MR. GALSTON: We have time, two minutes, for one last question, and one last answer.

SPEAKER: Well, I hope this can do justice to the vigor of the conversation. It's a speculative question. Holding everything constant that you've talked about this morning but with one

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change, i.e., the U.S. economy was growing today at the rate it was growing in Eisenhower's second term, in Reagan's second term, and in Clinton's second term --

MR. GALSTON: What difference would that make?

SPEAKER: What difference would we have?

MR. GALSTON: Panel?

MS. BOWMAN: We have a lot of information from the period around 2000 when things were going very well, and Americans felt better about everything. They felt better about immigration. They felt better about the environment. It had nothing to do with the economy. They just felt better across the board. So if the American economic engine were to revive, I think that would have significant consequences.

MS. REID: I have some doubt. I think you'd still have backlash because I think that if you look at the polling before and after President Obama's remarks about Trayvon Martin, that was during a period when the economy was actually growing and we'd passed the Economic Rescue Package, and there was a little more hope from getting out of the recession. I think a lot of this is cultural. I don't think it's all economic.

MR. GALSTON: Well, there you have it, folks. We could go on for another hour and a half. We can't. I strongly suspect that Robbie and at least some members of the panel will be able to stick around a little bit longer to answer less formal questions, and if there are people in the press who want to pose questions to Robbie and some of the other panelists, you'll have that opportunity.

Please join me in thanking this all-star crew.

(Applause)

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