Latin American Urban Violence as a Development Concern: Towards a Framework for Violence Reduction

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Summary. — Despite growing recognition of urban violence being a serious development constraint in Latin America, there is contestation concerning its categorization, underlying causes, costs and consequences, and violence-reduction solutions. This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of everyday violence in poor urban communities in terms of both ongoing analytical debates as well as operational solutions. Drawing on the research literature, as well as recent participatory urban appraisals of violence in Colombia and Guatemala, and Central American violence-reduction guidelines, it develops a framework to explain the holistic nature of violence and to provide operationally relevant methodological tools to facilitate cross-sectoral violence-reduction interventions.

Keywords — violence, urban, violence-reduction interventions, Latin America, Colombia, Guatemala

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of violence as a development problem in urban Latin America, in terms of both analytical debates and policy-focused operational solutions. Accompanying the growing prevalence of everyday violence in cities across the region, there is widespread contestation concerning violence categories, causes, costs and consequences, as well as debates concerning the comparative success of sector-specific violence-reduction interventions. This highlights the fact that this is still a new area of development inquiry. This article seeks to contribute to this debate by introducing a cross-sectoral violence-reduction framework that includes not only the evidence of professional researchers, but also the perceptions of poor people themselves, facilitated through the use of participatory urban appraisals (PUAs).

In urban areas of Latin America, violence has become increasingly ubiquitous (Torres-Rivas, 1999, p. 287) as an ‘everyday’ (Scheper-Hughes, 1992), ‘common,’ or ‘endemic’ phenomenon that permeates daily life, especially of poor populations (Koonings, 1999;
Poppovic & Pinheiro, 1995). While the definition, nature, and extent vary between and within countries, as a region Latin America has a dramatically high level of violence, as defined by homicide rates, compared to other regions. Although such rates only provide a proxy for violence levels, the rate of intentional homicide in Latin America increased by 50% from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, with marked rises in Panama, Peru, and Colombia (Fajnzylber, Lederman, & Loayza, 2000). While the global average in 2000 was a homicide rate of 5 per 100,000 inhabitants, the estimated average for Latin America was 27.5, the highest for any region in the world (WHO, 2002).

Although more recently violence measured in terms of homicide rates has declined in some cities (Mockus, 2001), researchers have identified that for many urban dwellers a complex layering of multiple forms of violence, and above all its associated fear and insecurity, has become “routinized” or “normalized” into the reality of daily life (Pecaut, 1999). This includes widespread theft, mugging, and burglary, crimes associated with alcohol and drug misuse, gang violence and prostitution, and commonplace intra-family abuse.

At the same time, the economic impact of violence, as well as its associated linkages to poverty, inequality, and exclusion, has only recently been recognized as a development concern (Fajnzylber et al., 2000; WHO, 2002). In much of the earlier development literature of the 1960s and 1970s, violence was viewed as an individual issue of criminal pathology. This was linked particularly to rapid urbanization and the “marginality” of the newly arrived migrant populations (Lomnitz, 1977; Perlman, 1976). Young male migrants were often perceived as embedded in a “culture of poverty” (Lewis, 1966, 1969), psychologically unable to deal with urban life and anomie, turning to crime and violence as a coping mechanism or expression of frustration. The shift in the literature from individual to more structural causes of violence was influenced by Neo-Marxist and Dependency debates of the 1970s and 1980s, which led to the recognition that a complexity of institutional and structural factors also affects violence levels (Ayres, 1998).

Again the common stereotype that poverty is the primary cause of violence has been challenged, with Latin American evidence showing that inequality and exclusion, associated with unequal distribution of economic, political, and social resources in urban contexts, intersect with poverty to precipitate violence (Fajnzylber, Lederman, & Loayza, 1998, 2000). Such linkages do not simply relate to income disparities, but also to exclusionary factors concerning unequal access to employment, education, health, and basic physical infrastructure. In addition, the absence or inadequacy of state security protection, policing, and judicial systems particularly affect the poor. In turn, they are unable to pay for their own services, and therefore are more susceptible to the impunity, corruption, inefficiency, and even brutality often associated with such institutions.

In contexts of severe inequality, the urban poor’s living conditions can heighten the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime, or violence (Vanderschueren, 1996). The adverse effects of globalization and the related spread of neo-liberalism have also arguably led to increasing social polarization, with those “disconnected” at the local level more likely to experience crime and violence (Briceno Leon & Zubillaga, 2002; Willett, 2001). Globalization has also facilitated the development of a “global criminal economy” in drugs, firearms, prostitution, and extortion (Castells, 1998). Finally, everyday violence has tended to continue unabated in countries emerging from political conflict and undergoing democratization efforts. In Latin America, the shift from authoritarian regimes toward democratic governments has arguably led to the democratization of violence itself with the use of force no longer the primary preserve of armies, guerrilla, or paramilitary groups (Koonings, 2001; Kruit & Koonings, 1999). This is reflected in the emergence of street gangs comprising former guerrilla, paramilitary, or military members, and a burgeoning drugs industry with networks established during times of conflict (Kincaid, 2000; Pearce, 1998). It is now recognized that violence adversely affects a country’s macro- and micro-economic growth and productivity. A typical civil war is estimated to reduce incomes by around 15% and increases the number of people living in absolute poverty by about 30% (Collier et al., 2003, p. 2). In Colombia, for instance, urban violence and armed conflict from 1991 to 1996 totaled a net cost of 18.5% of GDP, representing 3.1% of GDP per annum (Trujillo Ciro & Badel Pueda, 1998, p. 25).

Violence has a range of direct and indirect impacts. It can directly undermine the functioning of health services, security forces, judicial systems, housing, and social services—when
public servants are bribed, intimidated, or fail to provide the services for which they are responsible due to fear and insecurity. Indirectly, violence can result in higher morbidity and mortality due to homicides and suicides, alcohol and drug abuse, and mental health disorders. Labor market and intergenerational productivity are also affected by economic multiplier effects, with interpersonal relations and the quality of life influenced by social multiplier effects (Arriagada & Godoy, 2000).

(a) The contribution of PUA to violence debates

In the past decade, a range of academic disciplines have undertaken research on urban violence using established quantitative and qualitative methodologies. To date, much less participatory research has been conducted on violence and security, other than on natural resource conflicts (see Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1997). However, participatory methodologies can complement quantitative research (Kanbur, 2002). They are useful not only to identify how people understand and perceive the complexity of daily violence in their communities, but also to “make sense” of it from a policy perspective. As the ubiquity of violence has shifted towards more locally contingent forms, so local communities have emerged as a critical arena for understanding violence. Increasingly in contemporary conflicts, “the community represents the nexus of conflict action . . . today’s battlefield is the city or the village, not the field or the beach” (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, pp. 17–18).

Participatory methodologies can also play a catalytic role in bridging the divide between researchers and practitioners, as has already been well illustrated by recent debates on the reconceptualization of poverty. In this case, it involved a transition from static, quantitative, approaches based on poverty lines, toward dynamic, qualitative, and participatory approaches (Chambers, 1995; Moser, 1998). The latter brought the so-called “voices of the poor” to the attention of policy makers, with this “co-production with poor people of information about poverty which reflects their perspectives,” resulting in a convergence between participation, poverty, and policy (Brock, 2002, p. 1; see also Narayan, Chambers, Shah, & Petesch, 2000a; Narayan, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher, & Koch-Schulte, 2000b; World Bank, 2000). However, the limitations of participatory research need to be noted. It is not a replacement for the ethnographic research required to uncover the “multiple layering of violence,” often over a long time period (see, e.g., Robben & Nordstrom, 1995; Schepers-Hughes, 1992). In addition, the extent to which people are genuinely empowered through participatory methodology is widely contested (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995; Guitt & Shah, 1998). There are also data analyses constraints; researchers need to “mediate findings,” making choices as to what to highlight. Caution is needed to be exercised to ensure against the “filtering” of policy messages such that “certain messages disappear from view” (Norton et al., 2001, pp. 16–17). Finally, there are security risks for both researchers and community members when working in violent communities.

The data incorporated into this article come from PUAs of violence undertaken in 1999 in 18 urban poor communities in Colombia and Guatemala (Moser & McIlwaine, 2004). These provide perceptions of women and men, girls and boys whose daily lives are influenced by violence, insecurity, and fear, in towns and cities that reflect different geographical zones and types of violence. In both contexts, silence (known as the “law of silence” in Colombia and the “culture of silence” in Guatemala) was often a barrier which influenced the data obtained. The article also draws on earlier frameworks that developed violence-reduction guidelines on Central America for development agencies such as DFID [the UK Department of International Development/Sida [Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency] and on urban violence and gender-based violence, the World Bank. Finally, the article includes the recent Latin American violence-related research of anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists, as well as policy-focused debates, such as those of criminologists and epidemiologists.

2. AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR VIOLENCE REDUCTION

Understanding everyday violence in poor urban communities requires a holistic framework that positions violence in terms of three interrelated components; first, the different categories of the phenomenon, second, the underlying causal factors, and third, the costs and consequences of violent actions. It is the
interrelationship between these three components that provides the necessary contextualization for the identification of the fourth component, namely the range of violence-reduction interventions.

This section introduces such a framework in terms of each of these four components. First, it systematically categorizes the multiple forms of violence and presents a “violence roadmap” as a context-specific diagnostic tool; second, it proposes that the interrelated causal factors underlying violence need to be understood in terms of a nexus linking structure, identity and agency; third, it addresses the costs of violence with a particular focus on its impact on the capital assets of poor households; fourth, it concludes by outlining a matrix that categorizes seven prominent “ideal type” policy approaches to violence prevention and reduction.

(a) Categorizing violence

The range of types of urban violence is both complex and context specific. Data from the PUA in nine Guatemalan poor urban communities, for instance, showed an average of 41 types of violence, while in Colombia, the comparable average was 25, with one community in Bogotá, the capital city, distinguishing among 60 types. Responding to the question, “what are you afraid of,” a 13-year-old girl in Cali identified five types of violence (fights, rapes, drunks, mistreatment, and gangs), while at the same time illustrating the strong association between fear and guns (see Figure 1). 8

The fact that Colombia was in the middle of a brutal “civil war,” and Guatemala a post-conflict context that has only recently emerged from 20 years of internal conflict, raised important definitional issues concerning the distinction between war/conflict and violence/crime. Until recently, these have been considered as separate and distinct domains; war usually refers to conflict between countries that involves forms of collective violence and the mobilization of military armed forces or groups (Allen, 2000); in contrast, crime is an act punishable by law, in other words, the breach of a legal prohibition. Crime becomes violent when it involves any act that causes physical or psychological

Figure 1. Drawing of “what are you afraid of?” in El Arca, Cali, Colombia (drawn by a 13-year-old girl). Translation: Peelas = fights, violaciones = rapes, borrachos = drunks, maltrato = mistreatment, pandillas = gangs.
damage (Vanderschueren, 1996), usually at the individual level (Reiss & Roth, 1993).

Recent trends have tended to undermine such distinctions and have led to a blurring of boundaries. The decline in interstate armed conflict and wars, especially since the end of the Cold War, and the shift toward civil wars and internal conflicts have resulted in more hybrid forms of conflict within and across state boundaries. These are often protracted in duration, underpinned by social and ethnic cleavages, and driven by so-called conflict entrepreneurs and political opportunists (Duffield, 2002; Goodhand & Hulme, 1999). In addition, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between different types of violence, especially politically motivated as against non-political violence.

Such problems have resulted in contestation of the very concept of violence itself (Taussig, 1987). Although a commonly used instrumental definition denotes violence as the use of physical force, which causes injury to others in order to impose one’s wishes (Keane, 1996), other definitions have been broadened to refer to psychological damage, material deprivation, and symbolic disadvantage (Galtung, 1985, 1996; Schröder & Schmidt, 2001). At the same time, violence has increasingly been viewed as complex, chaotic, and multidimensional (Robben & Nordstrom, 1995). As well as the use and negotiation of power, constructions of violence are heavily contingent on local time- and place-specific perceptions and values. Tolerance levels differ from one society to another and change over time. As violence becomes “routinized” or “banalized,” forms that were unacceptable in the past may become so, especially if they are essential to the functioning of society (Bourgois, 2001).

Building on this violence definition, the framework makes a fourfold distinction between political, institutional, economic, and social violence. Each is identified in terms of the physical act that consciously or unconsciously is used to gain or maintain power, and is based on the primary motivation behind the violence identified (see Table 1). For instance, much social violence, motivated by the will to attain or keep social power and control, is gender based, and often linked to gendered power relations and constructions of masculinities (Greig, 2000; Pickup, Williams, & Sweetman, 2001). Gender-based violence includes intimate-partner violence inside the home, as well as sexual abuse in the public arena (WHO, 2002). Social violence also refers to ethnic violence, disputes among peers, or territorial or identity-based violence linked with gangs.

Economic violence, in contrast, is motivated by material gain manifested in violence associated with street crime, including mugging, robbery, and violence linked with drugs and kidnapping. Closely related is institutional violence, perpetrated by state institutions, such as the police and judiciary, sector ministries such as health and education, as well as extra-state institutions such as social cleansing vigilante groups. Finally, political violence, driven by the will to win or hold political power, includes guerrillas, paramilitary conflict, and political assassination. Although closely linked to conflict and war, political violence also occurs during peacetime.

This definition of violence is a starting point for those trying to make senses of the enormous complexity of the phenomenon, but has considerable limitations. In focusing primarily on physical violence, it gives less weight to non-physical forms such as intimidation, threats, and other types of psychological abuse. Similarly, in emphasizing the issue of power, it may not be appropriate for some types of violence (such as reactive violence when acts of violence are committed as revenge) or for violent manifestations that do not clearly contain a power dimension (such as violence among two inebriated individuals).

In addition, since any categorization is static, this fourfold typology is conceived as an overlapping and interrelated continuum with important reinforcing interconnections between different types of violence. For social actors involved in violence as perpetrators or victims, different categories are not always mutually exclusive; the same act can be committed for different reasons depending on the identity of the perpetrator and victim. The Colombian PUA shows perceptions of the interrelationships between different types of violence in a causal flow diagram drawn by three young men from Bucaramanga (see Figure 2). They identified socially constituted intra-family violence as the basis of other types of violence. This leads some young people to leave home and join gangs (understood to be alternative support structures), or turn to drugs, which are linked with insecurity, as well as the economic violence of robbery, attacks, crime, and delinquency. The outcome is increased fear, together with the erosion of trust, unity, and social institutions, associated with the erosion of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Manifestation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power</td>
<td>Guerrilla conflict; paramilitary conflict; political assassinations; armed conflict between political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to exercise institutional power at individual or collective level over other groups and individuals</td>
<td>Violence perpetrated by state “political institutions” such as the army and police as well as line ministries such as health and education; social cleansing by civil vigilante groups; lynching of suspected criminals by community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power</td>
<td>Street crime; carjacking; robbery/theft; drug trafficking; kidnapping; assaults including killing and rape made during economic crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to obtain or maintain social power</td>
<td>Interpersonal violence such as spouse and child abuse; sexual assault of women and children; arguments that get out of control</td>
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*Source:* Adapted from Moser and McIlwaine (2004).
social capital (see below). This causal flow dia-
gram points to the tensions inherent in differenti-
tiating between specific types of violence in a
reality where it is their interconnectedness that
creates a web of fear and insecurity (Figure 2).

Despite limitations such as these, a categori-
zation that differentiates between different types
of violence serves a number of purposes. It
encourages policy makers to move from indi-
vidual violence-reduction interventions towards
more integrated strategies that acknowledge the
linkages between different types of violence. In
addition, it highlights the policy implications
of multiple identities and motivations of perpe-
trators. For example, ending political violence
in countries dominated by guerrilla warfare
may require both a negotiated solution that ad-
dresses guerrilla groups’ political motives and
job creation for demobilized combatants, to ad-
dress the economic motives behind such mem-
bership. Finally, the categorization facilitates
explanations as to why interventions to reduce
one type of violence may not result in similar
reductions in other types, with the converse
also occurring.

A “violence roadmap” provides a useful
diagnostic tool, first to list the extensive mani-
festations of violence in a specific context, and
then to categorize them so that policy makers
can identify appropriate solutions. Table 2 pro-
vides one such example, taken from a consulta-
tion process in Honduras, in which the
predominant categories, types, and manifesta-
tions of everyday urban violence were identi-
fied. In a context where the economic and
social violence of youth gangs (maras) was a
primary concern of the state and civil society
alike, the roadmap was an important diagnostic
tool to encourage policy makers to also take
account of the numerous manifestations of
institutional violence, as well as the linkages be-
tween institutional and gang violence (Moser &
Winton, 2002).

(b) Causal factors underlying violence

Causal factors relating to the individual, the
family, the community, and the broader na-
tional context all combine to play a role in vio-
lence perpetration or victimization. In addition,
no single factor explains why some individuals
behave violently toward others, or how some
communities are more violent than others.
Such issues point to the fact that causal factors
underlying violence are multidimensional and
interrelated. Consequently, as with categories
of violence, holistic approaches, rather than
those focusing on a specific type or level of
violence, are more useful.

Among different approaches developed to
deal with the interrelated nature of violence,
the most common is the “ecological model.”
Originally used by Bronfenbrenner (1977) to
explain human development, it has been
adapted by violence researchers, particularly
those working on public health issues. It has
been used to elucidate the complex causes of,
for example, child abuse (Belsky, 1980), youth
violence (Garbarino, 1995), sexual coercion
(Brown, 1995), intimate partner violence
(Heise, 1998) and, most recently, by the World
Health Organization in their global violence
survey (WHO, 2002). The model identifies vio-

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Figure 2. Causal flow diagram of intra-family violence and insecurity in Bucaramanga, Colombia (drawn by three young men from a youth center). Source: Moser and McIlwaine (2004).
and individual levels, examines the relationship between individual and context-specific factors, and considers violence as the outcome of multiple levels of influence on behavior (WHO, 2002).

Other causal interpretations also distinguish between different levels. While Turpin and Kurtz (1997) differentiate among interpersonal, collective, national, and global levels, Arriagada and Godoy (1999) propose a “multi-causal epidemiological” approach that identifies three sets of contributory factors relating to social and familial situation, social, economic, and cultural factors, and institutional and contextual factors. In the case of gender-based violence, a distinction has been made between structural or external causes such as poverty, together with societal influences such as patriarchy, and individual level trigger risk factors (Pickup et al., 2001).

All these approaches share common characteristics, particularly in relation to underlying structural factors. Building on recent anthropological and sociological debates that emphasize the need to understand sociological phenomena in terms of both identity and agency (Arce & Long, 2000; Giddens, 1991; see Jabri, 1996 on violence), this framework introduces a model of causality that identifies factors underlying violence in terms of the interrelationship among structure, identity, and agency. Figure 3 provides a simple triangle representation.

Table 2. A violence roadmap: a diagnostic tool to identify context specific categories, types and manifestations of violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of violence</th>
<th>Types of violence by perpetrators and/or victims</th>
<th>Manifestations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Political            | State and non-state violence in situations of political conflict | — Guerrilla and paramilitary conflict  
— Armed conflict between political parties  
— Political assassinations |
| Institutional        | Violence of the state and other “informal” institutions, including the private sector | — Extra-judicial killings by security forces  
— State or community directed social cleansing  
— Lynching  
— Doctor/patient and teacher/pupil abuse |
| Economic/institutional | Organized crime, protection of business interests | — Kidnapping  
— Armed robbery  
— Drug trafficking  
— Car theft  
— Small arms dealing  
— Trafficking in prostitutes  
— Violence intimidation to resolve economic disputes |
| Economic             | Delinquency/robbery | — Street theft;  
— Robbery |
| Economic/social      | Youth gangs (maras) | — Collective “turf” violence; robbery, theft |
| Social               | Street children (boys and girls) | — Petty theft  
— Physical, sexual or psychological abuse |
| Social               | Gender-based intimate partner and sexual violence between adults | — Physical and sexual abuse, particularly in the home |
| Social               | Child abuse: boys and girls | — Physical and psychological abuse |
| Social               | Intergenerational conflict between parent and children (both young and adults) | — Lack of citizenship in areas such as traffic, road rage, bar fights and street confrontations |
| Social               | Gratuitous/routine daily violence | — |

Source: Adapted from Moser and Winton (2002).
of these concepts to illustrate how they are interconnected.

Acknowledgement of the context-specific nature of people’s experiences of violence does not preclude an analysis of the structural inequalities of power that underlie these variations. These relate to wider political and socio-economic power structures within which local and individual realities emerge. Violence may be embedded in social institutions and material structures in ways that are taken for granted by Western society as normal, natural, and even enlightened (Foucault, 1977; Kruijt & Koonings, 1999; Robben & Nordstrom, 1995). As mentioned above, widely cited structural factors include severe inequalities in the distribution of economic, political, and social resources that are closely linked to poverty and inequality. In recent years, such inequalities have been exacerbated by globalization, structural adjustment, and democratization.

How people experience violence depends not only on a range of underlying structures of power, control, and domination, but also on differences in their identity position. This is influenced primarily by gender, age, ethnicity, and race. For any given individual there may be a plurality of identities. For instance, the construction of masculinities is closely linked with the exercise of male power over women and manifest in violence against them (Greig, 2000). Yet the discourse of “women as victims, men as perpetrators” are not always appropriate, as illustrated by the important role of female combatants during armed conflicts (Jacobs, Jacobson, & Marchbank, 2000). Similarly, generation and age are also significant, with the elderly and the young particularly vulnerable to violence in different ways from the adult population in general.

Identity is also associated with individual agency. Individuals as social actors react to situations and formulate objectives in different ways. Stereotypes that deny individual agency are frequently found, especially those that link certain individuals or groups with particular forms of violence. For instance, common stereotypes that link poverty with high crime rates dangerously suggest that all poor people are violent. Equally, specific localities within cities can be stigmatized, especially those where the urban poor live (Rodgers, 2004). In Central America, the widespread emergence of a ubiquitous gang (mara) culture, fed by the media, has led to a blanket association of youth gangs with violence. Treating certain people or groups as “objects”, denies their agency and their role as actors.

Overall, it is the combination of structure, identity, and agency that assists in understanding the underlying factors causing violence. Results from the PUA illustrate how this model of causality can be a useful operational tool to better understand factors underlying different categories of violence. One such example is provided in Figure 4, a causal flow diagram from Aguazul, Casanare, Colombia. Nine community members illustrated their perception of the causal interconnections between three types of violence. Political and economic related violence over land, caused by long-term historical structural issues of unequal distribution of

Figure 3. A causal triangle: An explanatory tool of interrelated causes of violence.
resources, unemployment, and poverty, is inter-related with social and economic violence between neighbors. In this case, issues of agency are identified as more important including such individual characteristics as envy, infidelity, and alcohol. In turn this is closely linked to intra-family social violence, where factors relating to gender and age-based identity make spouses and children particularly vulnerable.

(c) Costs and consequences of violence

The costs and consequences of violent action are closely interrelated with the causal factors underpinning it. Most research has focused on the quantitative measurement of monetary costs, which provides a common, interpretable metric for analyzing the impact of crime on both individuals and society. This can be compared with the costs of other social problems, and therefore is a useful tool for cost–benefit analyses of various policy options (Macmillan, 2000). However, measuring the costs of violence faces considerable constraints. These include not only methodological issues but also, in many contexts, lack of access to information on violence-related expenditure assessments of the police, the judiciary, the penal system, and even the armed forces.

Equally important, many of the indirect costs and consequences of violence are intangible for individual victims as much as for society (Buvinic & Morrison, 1999). This has led researchers to suggest that reliance on available data on the costs of violence neglects insidious and intangible effects of violence on people’s lives such as insecurity, fear, terror, and a deteriorating quality of life (Rubio, 1997). Violence also impacts on people’s wellbeing in terms of their livelihood security, and the functioning of local social institutions. This framework therefore focuses less on monetary costs of violence, and more on its consequences and impacts in terms of the capital assets of poor households. In identifying the violence–assets–security linkages, the intention is to complement existing quantitative research on the costs of violence.

Concepts such as capital assets, capabilities, and livelihood security, strongly influenced by Sen’s (1981) pioneering work on famines and entitlements, are now commonly used to analyze the risks and vulnerabilities experienced by the poor (World Bank, 2000). However, these rarely extend to violence. Yet, identifying how the poor cope with both short-term shocks and longer-term exigencies through mobilizing their entitlements or assets also assists in analyzing the effects of violence and insecurity on people’s wellbeing; the more assets people have, the less vulnerable and secure they feel in the face of violence, while the more their assets are eroded, the greater their insecurity and perceived susceptibility to violence (Moser, 1998).
To achieve positive livelihood outcomes, no single category of assets is sufficient on its own (DFID, 2000). This is particularly the case for poor people. With limited access to any single asset, they have to manage complex asset portfolios. From the extensive debate on this subject, there is widespread consensus that the five most important capital assets of the poor are categorized as physical, financial, human, social, and natural capital (Carney, 1998; Chambers & Conway, 1992). Using these categories, the framework identifies how the costs and consequences of violence have direct and indirect impacts on the different capital assets of the poor.

Physical and financial capital, for instance, comprises the stock of plant, equipment, infrastructure, and other productive resources owned by individuals, the business and public sectors, as well as the monetary resources available to people (such as savings and credit). Costs of violence include the drain on savings and loss in earnings from resources allocated to reduce or control the phenomenon. When households and businesses are unable to control rising violent crime, and can afford the costs, they often rely on private security to control the phenomenon. When households and businesses are unable to control rising violent crime, and can afford the costs, they often rely on private security to control or prevent violence (Arrigada & Godoy, 2000). However, in some contexts, such as in small towns in the Colombian PUA, local populations have no option but to learn to live with the extortion of different armed actors, both left-wing guerrilla and right-wing paramilitary groups. Several focus groups from both communities in Casanare commented that guerrilla and paramilitary groups alike were involved in levying so-called “vacunas” (literally vaccinations but referring to illegal taxes). For instance, taxi drivers had to pay US$19 per day in order to operate; butchers had to pay US$62 every 3–4 months, while cattle farmers were paying US$1–2 per head of cattle per month.

Human capital assets refer to individual investments in education and health and nutrition, which affect people’s ability to use their labor and the nature of their returns from their labor. A major direct consequence of violence is increased spending on health. Gender-based violence has serious associated consequences for human capital assets. These include the impacts of injuries experienced by women (particularly if pregnant), injuries to children, unwanted and early pregnancy (due to rape or lack of control over contraception), the contraction of STDs (including HIV), as well as psychological consequences such as suicide, and mental health problems (Heise, Pitanguy, & Germain, 1994). Gender-based violence can also undermine women’s economic productivity and contribute to increasing poverty. Children living in violent situations are affected in terms of their health, with further research showing that they are more likely to use violence within their own relationships, and to have long-term loss of human capital through reduced educational performance (Pickup et al., 2001).

Natural capital includes the stocks of environmentally provided assets such as soil, atmosphere, forests, water, and wetlands. In rural communities the critical productive asset for the poor is land, while in urban areas it is land for shelter. As illustrated in Figure 4, violence over land in rural Colombia has fundamentally disrupted rural household livelihoods and resulted in displacement and migration to the urban communities where the PUA was undertaken.

Social capital is the most commonly cited intangible asset, as well as the most contested (Bebbington, 1999). This had been defined as the “rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and societies’ institutional arrangements, that enable its members to achieve their individual and community objectives” (Narayan, 1997, p. 50). Social capital is generated and provides benefits through membership in social networks or structures at different levels, ranging from the household to the market place and political system (Portes, 1998). Increasingly, the exclusionary effects of social capital are being recognized, together with a more sophisticated analysis of the relationship between violence and social capital (McIlwaine & Moser, 2001). Violence erodes social capital in terms of reducing trust and co-operation within communities, or reconstitutes it in different ways (Colletta & Cullen, 2000).

When the governance capacity of formal institutions is eroded by violence, this affects human rights violations and impunity rates (Turshen, 2001). Equality of access to judicial, educational, health, media, and security institutions is also reduced when they cannot function in a transparent manner. Informal community-level organizations are also affected by insecurity and personal safety, which influence the nature of cohesion among members. Women play a crucial voluntary role in informal organizations. When women fear leaving home, the
functioning of informal organizations can be fundamentally affected. At the same time, in contexts of extreme armed conflict, female-dominated organizations can play a crucial role in reconstructing social capital during peace processes (Coral, 2001).

The analytical distinction between productive and perverse social capital is of particular relevance to research on violence (Rubio, 1997). Different perceptions of a community’s trust in social institutions in the Colombian and Guatemalan PUAs showed that violence both erodes and reconstitutes social capital in context-specific ways. In Guatemala, for instance, armed conflict has left a legacy of widespread social fragmentation with little trust between local people. The PUA identified an extensive number of social organizations, mainly service related, including schools, hospitals, churches, and international NGOs including Médecins Sans Frontières and World Vision. However, there were far fewer local membership organizations, reflecting their erosion during the long armed conflict.

Figure 5, drawn by two shoemakers from San Marcos, Guatemala, shows how armed conflict eroded social capital. It highlighted a severe lack of institutional diversity in this community (with few membership organizations), identifying both the positive ties among different evangelical schools, schools, and hospitals, and the negative ties among bars (cantinas), Alcoholics Anonymous, brothels, and police. Comparative quantitative results from the Colombian PUA showed that one in four membership institutions generated perverse social capital, and that violence-related membership organizations such as the guerrilla and paramilitary were least trusted, followed by institutions of the police and judicial system. Social capital can also be reconstituted in positive ways to address the problem of violence. In both the Colombian and Guatemalan PUAs, local community-based women’s organizations were identified as the most trusted social institutions. Such trust, by women and men, and young and old, was associated with the horizontal nature of their organization, their physical location within the community, and their non-threatening functions within the community.

(d) Policy approaches to violence reduction

As violence has increasingly been identified as a development constraint with no blueprint solutions, the gap between theory and practice has grown, although it is more marked in some disciplines than others. Well-established violence-focused disciplines such as criminology and epidemiology, whose research methods have traditionally been based on formal “etic” quantitative methodologies, have well-developed solutions associated with their particular approaches to the problem. In contrast,
other disciplines, particularly those based on “emic” methodologies that emphasize violence as experiential and multiplex, challenge policy makers’ practical categories (Halbmayer, 2001). Thus, they dispute “whose narrative and vision of the world can be considered more persuasive or ‘valid’” (Arce & Long, 2000, p. 3, 21).

What tends to emerge is a dualistic divide between academic research that emphasizes the complexity of violence, and policy-focused analysis that seek to categorize types of violence, measure its costs, and identify its consequences in terms of homicide and victimization rates. Ultimately, however, the “emic” layering of multiple forms of violence that affect the urban poor must be reconciled with policy makers’ “etic” needs to simplify reality. For only in this way can they propose sustainable interventions. Probably the greatest challenge, therefore, relates to identifying a policy framework that can reconcile the complexity of violence, identified by local people, with the sector or violence-specific solutions that policy makers propose.

The PUA provides insights that can inform such a framework. Figure 6, for instance, presents a diagrammatic representation of interventions to reduce violence in a small town in Guatemala, identified by an adult woman. She listed seven types of dangers with associated strategies and solutions. She clarified the distinction between strategies to avoid the problem adopted by people themselves, and the ranges of formal and informal institutions whose assistance was essential to confront it—a recommendation that concurs with quantified PUA results. At the same time she identified solutions ranging from criminal justice to building social capital through neighborhood groups.

Increased concern with violence across the region has resulted in an extensive number of direct and indirect interventions. As with the analysis of violence itself, interventions have tended to be compartmentalized into separate policy approaches, linked with an associated professional discipline. Each approach usually identifies a specific type of violence and targets a particular group with distinct policies focusing on economic, social, institutional, and political violence as separate domains. However, with growing recognition of the interrelationships between different types of violence and conflict, this paradigm is slowly changing (Turner & Kurtz, 1997).

Over the past two decades, violence-reduction initiatives have been transformed from those that seek to control violence, to those that concentrate on prevention (Buvinic & Morrison, 1999). While some aim to address the underlying structural causes of the phenomenon,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of danger</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Solutions</th>
<th>Who could help?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drunks (bolos)</td>
<td>Close yourself in and lock the door</td>
<td>Speak with them about Alcoholics Anonymous</td>
<td>Alcoholics Anonymous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River (flooding)</td>
<td>Leave the colonia to a higher place</td>
<td>Construction of flood walls</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs (maras)</td>
<td>Run</td>
<td>Greater vigilance by the authorities</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>Close yourself in the house</td>
<td>Arms control</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fights</td>
<td>Avoid them</td>
<td>Dialogue between neighbours</td>
<td>A neighbourhood group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>Put a padlock on the door and be careful</td>
<td>Catch and punish the thieves and send them to jail</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuse of girls</td>
<td>Don’t go out in the street; make people respect</td>
<td>Punish the abusers</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Diagram of interventions for reducing violence in Villa Real, Esquipulas, Guatemala (identified by one adult woman aged 38).
others respond practically to ameliorate context-specific problems. Equally some “support” victims while others “punish” perpetrators (Pickup et al., 2001). At the same time, armed conflict reduction increasingly emphasizes the negotiation of peaceful conflict resolution, as well as the legal enforcement of conflict reduction through the promotion of human rights (Collier et al., 2003). Other perspectives have introduced more holistic approaches that combine a top-down focus on citizen security or infrastructure renewal, together with bottom-up community driven development strategies to strengthen or rebuild levels of social capital. Summarizing these new policy debates, this section very briefly outlines a final diagnostic tool, a matrix that categorizes seven prominent “ideal type” policy approaches to violence prevention and reduction.17 This is informed by both the PUA research and the global violence literature (see Table 3).

(i) Criminal justice

In the Colombian PUA local community members highlighted the primary importance of the criminal justice system in controlling violence, while noting its severe limitations. For instance, in Burcaramanga, where a local level House of Justice (Casá de Justicia) had been installed to provide accessible conciliation and legal services for low-income people, a local community member noted: “no one trusts the Casa de Justicia (House of Justice)... It is the same as the police; it plays the same role.” In the Guatemalan PUA, communities were more preoccupied with the police force than the judicial system, especially police reform changes implemented as part of the 1996 Peace Accords (Call, 2000). A woman from San Marcos commented that the old police were worse than the delinquents and robbers they were supposed to be catching. They drunkenly traversed the community firing guns indiscriminately.

In fact, criminal justice is one of the most widely established, violence reduction approaches (Hirschi, 1994; Reiss & Roth, 1993). Addressing the symptoms of violence top-down, it focuses on deterrence and control of violence through higher rates of arrest, conviction, and punishment, facilitated by judicial, police, and penal reform. It is often popular among politicians seeking short-term solutions to the symptoms of violence. However, where justice and police systems are constituted by male-dominated elites they tend to exclude access to groups on the basis of gender, age, or ethnicity. Gender stereotyping of crime perpetrators equally means that young men are more susceptible to arrest and conviction. The criminal justice approach has been more successful in reducing economic violence than social, particularly gender based, violence (Morrison & Biehl, 1999), and has rarely been used as a mechanism to reduce political or institutional violence. However, recent innovations have sought to make the criminal justice system more gender aware and with greater community-based access. The establishment of Women’s Police Stations, such as those in São Paulo, Brazil, provides one such example (Mesquita de Rocha, 1999), while recent World Bank justice projects in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, and Argentina focus on community level access to justice with interventions that include alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that reduce court costs, legal aid, and small claims courts (Dakolias, 1996).

(ii) Public health

Most popular and commonly implemented is the public health approach. Focusing mainly on economic and social violence, it aims to prevent violence by reducing individual risk factors that may trigger violence. Indeed, in both PUA countries, community members cited the importance of drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs as critical to reduce violence inside the home. For instance, an indigenous teacher from Chinautla, Guatemala stated, “we need educational and rehabilitation programs in our community to reduce alcoholism, but these are hard to organize because people lack motivation.”

Drawing on the ecological model (see the discussion of causal factors above), the public health approach involves developing risk reduction and protection strategies to modify both individual behavior and the social and physical environment. To reduce homicide it examines not only individual risk factors, but also risk and protective factors in the family, community, and societal level (Heise, 1998; Reiss & Roth, 1993; WHO, 2002). It identifies specific “at risk” target groups by gender, ethnicity, and/or age in terms of their propensity to commit violence and crime. A useful example of this approach is the Program of Development, Security and Peace (Programa Desarrollo, Seguridad y Paz—DESEPAZ) established by the Mayor’s Office of Cali, Colombia in 1992. Following an examination
Table 3. An "ideal type" policy approach matrix to violence prevention and reduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Violence category addressed</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice</td>
<td>Violence <em>deterrence</em> and <em>control</em> through higher arrest, conviction rates and more severe punishment</td>
<td>Economic institutional</td>
<td>Top-down strengthening of judicial, penal, and police systems and their associated institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public health</td>
<td>Violence <em>prevention</em> through the reduction of individual risk factors that focus particularly on human capital</td>
<td>Economic social</td>
<td>Top-down surveillance; risk factor identification; resultant behavior modification; scaling up of successful interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict transformation</td>
<td>Non-violent conflict <em>resolution</em> through negotiated terms between conflicting parties</td>
<td>Political institutional social</td>
<td>Top-down or bottom-up conflict reduction negotiations between different social actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td><em>Legal enforcement</em> of human rights by states, and other social actors</td>
<td>Political social institutional</td>
<td>Top-down legal enforcement, reinforced by bottom-up participation and NGO lobbying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen security</td>
<td>Composite set of measures to <em>prevent</em> and/or <em>reduce</em> violence</td>
<td>Economic social</td>
<td>Top-down multi-sector government directed approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPTED*</td>
<td><em>Reduction</em> in violence opportunities through environmental, spatial interventions</td>
<td>Economic social</td>
<td>Top-down municipal level interventions to improve community level physical infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital/</td>
<td><em>(Re)building</em> trust and social capital through community level informal and formal social institutions</td>
<td>Political economic social</td>
<td>Bottom-up participatory appraisal; institutional mapping; community level reduction measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community driven</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Moser et al. (2000) and Moser and Winton (2002).*

*CPTED = Crime Prevention through Environmental Design.*
of homicide patterns, the main risk factors were identified as alcohol use, gun ownership, and leisure time. The program then restricted alcohol sales and initiated a disarmament program. Together with the formation of Municipal Security Councils, DESEPAZ was quite successful in reducing homicide rates (Guerrero, 1997).

(iii) Conflict transformation

In the Colombia PUA, a local-level peace initiative was identified in Medellín from 1994 to 1999, which involved extensive negotiation between a range of territorially based armed gang and militia warfare in the city. Using former guerrilla and gang members as negotiators, relative calm was achieved in the short term. This provides a local-level example of the conflict transformation approach, in which it is important to note the disjuncture between local, regional, and national level conflict transformation. Unless national level violence is resolved, local achievements will always be jeopardized (Gutiérrez & Jaramillo, 2004).

The conflict transformation approach is deeply rooted in the experience of reducing armed conflict and peace building; although it has increasingly been broadened to includes all types of violence. It is strongly influenced by the work of Galtung (1985), as well as by small pacifist groups, such as the Quakers. More recently, international organizations such as the United Nations have also begun to address political violence using conflict resolution techniques which focus on negotiation among conflicting parties, often relying on third-party mediation. While generally successful, the risk of this approach is that certain groups may be excluded from negotiating tables or peace talks.

(iv) Human rights

In the Guatemalan PUA, indigenous groups showed an awareness of their human rights as a result of the peace negotiations, and wanted to continue using the rights-based framework introduced by the UN-sponsored Truth Commission. Thus, an indigenous man from Huehuetenango, Guatemala, claimed, that when a violent event occurred: “we go to a human rights organization that will investigate the crime, or sometimes to the police that follow up the report through the Public Ministry.” Interestingly, several non-indigenous groups in Guatemala City also mentioned the importance of human rights to resolve intra-family social violence, perceiving this type of violence as an abuse of rights. This suggests that at the local level a human rights approach has been integrated into community perceptions concerning the resolution of conflicts.

A human rights approach to violence reduction is part of a growing shift toward a rights-based approach to development (Eyben, 2003). Applied to violence reduction, a human rights approach focuses on the role of the state and the international community in protecting citizens’ rights to be free from the threat or victimization of violence. Drawing on a range of international human rights conventions, this approach addresses armed conflict, and political and social violence. While initially, this perspective targeted governments that violated human rights, more recently it has included all social actors who deny or abuse rights, including guerrilla and paramilitary groups. Civil society institutions play a central role in the contestation of rights, especially for those populations excluded from the public policy process (UNDP, 2000).

Drawing on these single-sector approaches, some policy makers are gradually moving towards more integrated approaches. While this partly reflects an increasing sophistication in policy responses, it is also based on a more nuanced understanding of the multiplicity of violence and the plurality of actors involved, whether as perpetrators or victims.

(v) Citizen security

Citizen security is one such integrated approach, in this case linking violence reduction and protection prevention (through public health policy) with violence control (through criminal justice policy). The necessity for such integration was widely identified in the PUA, as illustrated in Table 4—where the measures of Alcoholics Anonymous to reduce alcohol-related violence were as important as police intervention to control arms.

In the past decade, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has developed an extensive lending portfolio of national and urban level programs to promote “peace and citizen security/coexistence.” Rather than tackling the underlying causes of violence, the objective is to increase security through the reduction of crime and violence. Interventions tend to be top-down and include institutional strengthening, juvenile violence prevention, community-police relations programs, and social awareness and rehabilitation programs (IDB, 2000; Shaw, 2000). At the global level
Table 4. *Example of an integrated framework for violence reduction*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of violence</th>
<th>Level of intervention</th>
<th>Types of solution</th>
<th>Reduction of violence</th>
<th>Improve citizen security</th>
<th>Increase community social capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Manifestations and institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional violence</td>
<td>By formal and informal institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic violence</td>
<td>Organized crime</td>
<td>_a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>_a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delinquency/robbery</td>
<td>_a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social violence</td>
<td>Street children</td>
<td>_a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
<td>_a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child abuse</td>
<td>_a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intergenerational conflict</td>
<td>_a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gratuitous random violence</td>
<td>_a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Adapted from Moser and Winton (2002).

*a* Similar range of interventions to those identified in the case of institutional violence.
citizen security forms the basis of the strategy of the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Program (UN-Habitat, 2002), while in Bogotá, Colombia a citizen security and coexistence program has improved access to justice, control of alcohol consumption and traffic accidents, assistance to vulnerable groups such as youth-at-risk, and the recovery of public spaces such as parks. However, threats of kidnapping and a chronic housing shortage continue to pose problems for citizen security and coexistence (Wilson, 2002).

(vi) Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)

In the PUA, fear and insecurity associated with violence was most visible in community maps that identified different spatial manifestations and concentrations. In both countries, dangerous local locations were linked with drugs and gangs. Street corners, basketball courts, parks, and river banks were most commonly mentioned. Girls and women particularly feared riverbanks due to the additional danger of rape in secluded locations. A community map of El Arca, Cali, for instance, identified a high proportion of the barrio as insecure, with the police station perceived as a place feared by all people. In La Merced, Guatemala City, another map showed how different gangs were linked with particular spaces. Since many dangerous areas identified were intended to be recreational areas (such as football pitches), this had implications for policy makers.

Building on a similar spatial preoccupation with violence, another cross-sectoral approach is “CPTED,” based on the rationale that the “physical environment can be changed to impact on criminal behavior in a way that will reduce the incidence and fear of crime and improve the quality of life” (Cooke, 2003). Focusing on crime settings rather than on the perpetrators, the approach concentrates on reducing the opportunities for perpetrating violence in specific community spaces through physical infrastructure up-grading and environmental renewal. This may involve municipal interventions to improve transport facilities, community sanitary facilities, and street lighting in open public spaces with support from schools, hospitals, transport systems, telephone companies, and public parks (Vancouver Police Department, 2000). CPTED addresses the physical manifestations of daily economic and social violence rather than its underlying causes, in this case focusing on reducing the opportunity for potential offenders to commit a crime (Kruger, Landman, & Liebermann, 2001).

(vii) Social capital/community driven development

In both Colombian and Guatemalan PUAs, local community members repeatedly affirmed that sustainable peace could only be built by generating trust and unity within communities—facilitated through community organizations. As a woman from Bogotá stated “peace is not to throw resources around without constructing projects from below, from the families and community organizations.” In similar vein, a woman from Nuevo Horizonte, Guatemala City, explained: “we have to organize ourselves and raise awareness in the community in order to reduce violence,” while a young woman in Esquipulas, Guatemala, explained the need: “to generate dialog and form a group of neighbors who will take care of the community.”

Reflecting this concern, a final approach is the community-driven social capital approach (Moser & Holland, 1997). This focuses directly on rebuilding social cohesion within communities through strengthening informal and formal institutions such as families, gangs, and community organizations. Based on bottom-up, participatory processes, it aims to create trust by building on community identification of needs, and focuses on the strengths and assets of communities affected by violence.

Although these policy approaches have been discussed as separate “ideal types,” in reality they overlap with programs often combining traditional with more innovative perspectives. Indeed, a cross-sectoral or integrated intervention framework is increasingly recognized as essential if policy makers are to recognize the endemic, multiple nature of everyday violence, as well as the agency and identities of different social actors involved. One brief example, among many, to illustrate this is Homies Unidos, a non-profit gang violence prevention and intervention organization in San Salvador, El Salvador (Homies Unidos, n.d.). Run by former gang members, the program combines a public health approach to drug education and rehabilitation and a conflict resolution approach to dialog and peaceful mediation. Both of these are integrated into a community social capital approach which gives the gangs ownership of the project to transform their negative organizational capacity into a productive force.
Support to assist this process is provided by leadership development training in non-violence, peer counseling, and skill building.

Ultimately, any operational framework for intervention must be designed in a context-specific manner. Depending on its target level, the framework can be undertaken at country, regional or city level. It is essential, however, to include all types of violence and wherever possible to highlight the interrelationships between them. Such a framework also needs to effectively map the existing interventions, identify critical gaps, and prioritize limited resources in terms of filling essential omissions.

By way of illustration, Table 4 shows a preliminary integrated framework for intervention developed in a participatory consultation workshop in Honduras. It identified three categories of violence, distinguished among interventions to reduce violence, improve citizen security, and increase community social capital, named five levels of intervention (from state policies at the regional level through to civil society programs and projects), and finally distinguished between measures with different time trajectories (differentiating between short term and medium/long term). Such a strategy mapping exercise highlighted less visible types of violence, such as intra-household violence, and underscored the fact that violence associated with organized crime required institutional reforms relating to the police force, justice system, penal system, and impunity. In addition, it assisted in identifying the appropriate balance of interventions in a resource constraints context, demonstrating how short, high-profile measures are needed to be complemented by longer-term strategies.

### 3. CONCLUSION

The integrated framework developed in this article recognizes the complex, endemic nature of urban violence emphasized in much of the academic violence literature, as well as in recent empirical evidence from the Colombian and Guatemalan PUAs. Neither source is exhaustive or comprehensive. The PUA provides new insights into violence. It recognizes the agency and identity of social actors experiencing this on a daily basis; stresses the importance of less visible forms, such as intra-family social violence; and emphasizes the interrelationship between different types of violence which make it necessary to address the phenomenon as a cross-sector concern. However, perception data have well-known limitations.

Therefore, the combined views of both “objective” outsiders and “subjective” insiders provide a more robust understanding of the violence, fear, and insecurity that dominate the daily lives of many Latin American urban poor. Together these views inform the development of an integrated framework for intervention. This includes a systematic categorization of multiple forms of violence, with an associated roadmap as a context specific diagnostic tool, a causal model of factors underlying violence, an asset-based analysis of the root costs and consequences of violence, and a matrix that categorizes seven predominant policy approaches to violence. Such “theoretical” tools require testing in “practice” in an integrated framework for intervention.

Obviously, this framework can only provide a preliminary guideline. Since this is a new area of concern, far greater elaboration is still required. This includes further PUA research that incorporates more violence-specific tools. It also requires more context-specific operational testing of such a framework. Above all it requires the development of adequate assessments (or base-line indicators) of designed interventions and the associated institutional capacity implementing institutions. Despite such limitations, it is hoped that the lessons learned and solutions proposed in this article will encourage further policy-focused research both in Latin America and in other contexts in the world where governments, civil society, and the private sector alike increasingly prioritize violence as a development constraint (Sachs, 2005).

### NOTES

1. City level differences in homicide levels range from 6.4 in Buenos Aires to 248 in Medellin (Piquet Carneiro, 2000). Cities such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Mexico City, Lima, and Caracas account for more than half of the total of their national homicides (Briceno León & Zubillaga, 2002). Latinobarometer data show that city
growth rate is a stronger indicator of crime rates than city size (Piquet Carneiro, 2000)—thus it cannot be assumed that violence is experienced in the same way in different cities even in the same national context. Within cities themselves more prosperous areas suffer from violent crime, while severe violence is generally concentrated in lower income areas (Gaviria & Pagès, 1999).

2. In Bogotá, Colombia, for instance, homicide rates decreased by 50% over six years during 1995–2000, largely due to a citizen security program championed by Mayor, Anatas Mockus (Mockus, 2001).

3. The “conventional,” “objective,” approach is based on income/consumption as the best proxy for poverty, usually measured through random sample household surveys. Subjective, “participatory” approaches, rejecting the reductionism view of development professionals, use multiple indicators of poverty identified by the poor themselves, collected through participatory techniques (Chambers, 1992, 1995).

4. Within the World Bank, participatory poverty assessments have been integrated into country poverty assessments (Norton, Bird, Brock, Kakande, & Turk, 2001).

5. Building on a methodology originally developed in a violence study in Jamaica (Moser & Holland, 1997), PUAs were undertaken in Colombia and Guatemala by the authors together with eight teams of 40 local researchers. A total of 1,414 people participated in focus group discussions in Colombia, with 1,860 taking part in Guatemala. Focus groups included different age and gender groups, as well as different ethnic groups, especially in Guatemala. This research was part of the “Urban Peace Program,” directed by Caroline Moser when Lead Specialist for Social Development, in the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Department of the Latin America and Caribbean Region of the World Bank. It was funded by Swedish International Development Authority (Sida). In Colombia, PUAs were carried out in three communities in Bogotá, and one, respectively, in Cali, Medellín, Bucaramanga, Girón, Yopal, and Aguazul. In Guatemala, research was undertaken in four communities in Guatemala City, and one, respectively, in Huehuetenango, San Marcos, Esquipulas, Santa Cruz del Quiché, and Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa (see Moser & McIlwaine, 2000, 2001).

6. Certain strategies were adopted to address this. For instance, in Guatemala, young people were often more willing to discuss violence because they were too young to have experienced the civil war (which officially ended in 1996). In Colombia, researchers often made appointments with community members to talk with them at “safe times,” without danger of guerrilla or paramilitary interference (see Moser & McIlwaine, 1999).


8. In a total of 244 children’s drawings from the Colombian communities, two-thirds depicted an association between fear and guns, with men the main perpetrators (80%), with most violence in the streets (82% of cases).

9. In Colombia, Pecaut (1999) identifies the problem of distinguishing armed confrontation among guerrilla groups such as the army, paramilitary, and drug traffickers, protection rackets run by urban militia, social cleansing operations, political assassinations, organized and petty crime, as well among intergang warfare, street fights, and vengeance attacks (see also Meertens, 2001; for Peru, see González-Cueva, 2000).

10. It is important to note that this fourfold categorization is not entirely logically consistent. While the political/social/economic division is based on motive (and was used to categorize the manifold types of violence local community members identified in the Colombian and Guatemalan PUAs), institutional violence is based on the character of the perpetrator or on the means of violence. This inconsistency is outweighed by the importance of drawing attention to frequently invisibilized state violence.

11. “The concept of agency implies volition, free will, and moral choice on the part of the individual. Agency refers to the power of actors to operate independently of the determining constraints of social structure” (McDowell & Sharp, 1999, p. 3).


13. Recognition of exclusion is part of a wider critique of the concept, which has questioned whether it constitutes “capital,” and how it serves neo-liberal ideologies of the “Washington consensus” (Fine, 1999).

14. Rubio (1997) distinguishes between “productive” social capital as that which may generate institutional change and favor growth, and “perverse” social capital as networks and legal and reward systems that encourage rent-seeking behavior and criminal activity. Thus, productive social capital generates favorable outcomes.
both for its members and for the community at large. In contrast, “perverse” social capital has positive benefits for its members but include negative outcomes for wider communities.

15. Formal “etic” research methods measure the outsider’s view using quantitative information, which may be subjected to formal statistical tests of significance. In contrast, informal “emic” research methods explore the actor’s view using qualitative methods to document perceptions, attitudes, preference, and priorities (Moser, Gatehouse, & Garcia, 1996).

16. In Colombia three-quarters of community members identified avoidance strategies, while in Guatemala the comparable figure was just over half.

17. This list is not intended to include all policy types, since this would be far more extensive.

18. Along with consultations in Nicaragua, this was a component of a DFID/Sida supported project to develop an integrated framework for violence-reduction in Central America. The fact that the Honduras workshop was attended by some 100 representatives of government and civil society, including the country’s then President, demonstrates the importance attributed to violence as a development constraint (see Moser & Winton, 2002).

19. For instance, despite the number and range of initiatives addressing youth violence in the region, there remains little analysis or monitoring of their impact on violence reduction (World Bank, 2002).

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