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Executive Summary

Conflict and war have long been accepted as significant constraints to development. In the past decade, however, violence in ‘non-conflict’ situations has been increasingly recognised as a core security and development priority. This issue is particularly critical in contexts of rapid social change, and often most evident in ‘failing’ or ‘crisis’ states. This working paper explores the relationship between change and violence, and seeks to identify the key cutting edge issues of rural-urban change, which are underlying causes or trigger factors of increasing violence and insecurity, or indeed consequences of the phenomenon itself.

From the complex diversity of rural-urban change issues throughout the world, four dimensions in particular are identified as crucial in terms of their impact on people’s well-being, security and livelihoods across rural and urban areas:

- Livelihoods, labour markets and natural resources
- Social structures and relations
- Political institutions
- Spatial organisation

This paper examines the relationship between levels of violence and insecurity in each of these four dimensions of change, with examples from Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union. This includes inter-linkages within as well as among different dimensions of change. It should be noted that there is no a priori association between violence and change; when a link is made, this is often related to poorly managed or planned-for change, rather than change per se. This desk review is intended to highlight issues considered to be of particular relevance regarding the potential change-violence nexus and which can contribute to the current security and development agenda.

1. Changing livelihoods, labour markets and natural resources

In this foremost area of change, two issues stand out as being of particular importance. First are the changes in global and national production systems and associated labour, which have critical implications in terms of levels of violence and insecurity. While globalisation, and the associated comprehensive restructuring of the world production system and division of labour, has generated unprecedented benefit, in particular ‘creating the opportunity to lift millions of the world’s poorest people out of their poverty’ (DFID, 2000: 15), globalisation also has a ‘dark’ side. Reduced employment opportunities for individuals and communities increasingly excluded from central processes of production and circulation has exacerbated livelihood insecurity. Accompanying this, in some contexts, are different forms of violence linked to alienated, frustrated or excluded populations, particularly associated with younger men. This includes economic-related gang violence and politically motivated identity conflict, as well as gender-based intra-household violence often related to loss of self-esteem. The ‘dark’ side of global economic progress is exacerbated by opportunities actually created by the phenomenon itself; this too has implications for levels of violence. Foremost are the range of violent manifestations associated with the rise of the international drugs trade, as well as with other illegal activities, such as sex trafficking and, more recently, the trafficking of illegal immigrants.

Secondly, and closely linked to changing production systems, is the violence associated with increasing inequality in access to natural resources, particularly land. Here, violence is often a hidden dimension of poverty itself. For instance, in rural areas where land, water and forests are all critical resources

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1 Table 1 in the main text of the paper provides a framework for understanding this potential relationship.
for livelihood strategies, unequal power relationships relating to land ownership and exclusionary agrarian systems are exacerbated when this becomes more exaggerated. While agrarian reform has been an important institutional response to rural violence that can ensue, reform itself has also provoked violent counter-reforms in some countries. Violence and conflict over land is also an urban phenomenon closely linked to both squatter invasions and forced evictions – both exacerbated by changing urban land ownership patterns and increased speculative investment, aggravated in some contexts by globalisation.

2. Changing social structures and relations
Global change processes such as these do not occur in isolation. Their impact at the local level, associated with changes in social structures and relations, demonstrates the importance of a continuum of change stretching from international and national levels through to communities and households. Again, two violence-related changes are particularly important. First is the impact of migration on household structure and levels of violence. Migration is both a global and a local phenomenon, with increasing population mobility a key feature of globalisation within as well as between countries. Migration changes households as social institutions and can be both a cause and a consequence of violence and insecurity. For instance, rural-urban migration in many contexts increases the number of female-headed households. Changed residence patterns have consequences for relationships between partners, with the pressure of separation often increasing marital conflict. Migration has profound implications for children, some associated with increasing violence. In contexts where children are fostered out by migrating parents, girls in particular can be exposed to emotional and physical abuse.

Secondly, and closely linked to migration, is the impact of rapid urbanisation on inter- and intra-community-level violence. While rural conflict can act as a push factor for urban migration, the phenomenon can itself exacerbate violence in urban areas. Rapid urban population growth, closely associated with overcrowding, inadequate housing and basic infrastructure provision (such as of water, electricity and transport), has important violence-related consequences, particularly when it is poorly planned for (indeed rapid urban growth per se does not necessarily correlate with violence). Conflicts occur when neighbours and communities compete for scarce resources, eroding social capital and reducing participation in CBOs. Violence associated with overcrowded services (such as public transport) often reduces income-earning opportunities. Insufficient state security protection, policing and judicial systems particularly affect poor people. Unable to pay for services, they are more susceptible to institutional impunity, corruption and brutality. In some regions, particularly in South Asia, a growing cause of concern is communal violence, identified as a consequence of urban inequality and competition over scarce resources. This goes beyond conflicts between neighbours or local communities, with cultural identity providing a base for contesting inequalities in housing and service provision.

3. Changing political institutions
Global change processes have also led to two major transformations of political institutions, namely, weakening of the state and the rise of alternative forms of social governance. Many states are increasingly unable to exercise coherent control over territories and peoples. This has allowed for the infiltration of organised crime, facilitating the building of international criminal networks, which has obvious consequences for violence and the rule of law. At the same time, state institutions are increasingly challenged by local-level non-state forms of social governance. Informal institutions such as gangs, vigilantes and unofficial justice systems can emerge to bring order within localised ‘governance voids’. Although these often support social cohesion and provide limited mitigation of conflict, they can also generate perverse rather than productive forms of social capital and hasten social fragmentation and the onset of violence. Moreover, they are frequently volatile and can rapidly
change from being productive to perverse.

Such global change processes have brought about fundamental transformations of state governance. Many states are undoubtedly weaker as a result of such transformations, and many also operate along fundamentally different lines to the past. The challenge to the state’s traditional monopoly over violence – coupled with the rollback of state institutions and reduction in public expenditures – means that states increasingly seek to dominate rather than control and survey. This particularly applies to specific populations perceived as primary sources of danger and violence, such as the poor. Reduced capacity for systematic policing of slums frequently results in policies aimed at regulating them through occasional, unpredictable and violent ‘surgical strike’ raids that create climates of terror and uncertainty. This is often linked to the rise of a new type of populist ‘anti-politics’, characterised by leaders promising to ensure security through brutal means involving few democratic checks and balances. A related governance issue is the increased privatisation of security, with many state authorities all over the world now contracting private security firms to conduct public policing. This so-called ‘outsourcing’ of state sovereignty blurs the boundaries between the public and the private, and often leads to new, vicious cycles of violence.

4. Changing spatial organisation

The transformation of state institutions is reflected at the local level in the rise of new forms of spatial organisation. Once again, two issues emerge as particularly important. The first is the development of new forms of socio-spatial governance, particularly in urban areas. The policing of urban order is increasingly concerned with the management of space rather than the disciplining of offenders. Urban regulatory mechanisms aim to eradicate offensive behaviour from specific places, rather than to punish offenders, thereby managing risk by anticipating problems rather than reacting to them. This is particularly reflected in the retreat of the affluent into ‘fortified enclaves’ in order to isolate themselves from high levels of crime and violence. This new form of governance produces new urban problems, as it changes notions about urban space: this is no longer seen to be about cohabitation but rather separateness. Forms of social discrimination overlay onto the new spatial order to create instances of heightened violence.

Secondly, new forms of violence are also generated by the emergence of new spatial forms. Cities are privileged spaces of accelerated social transformation, constituting crucial nodes for the coordination and servicing of economies that are increasingly internationalised. There are considerable social costs associated with this change process, including a growing polarisation between successful transnational elites and an increasingly impoverished and territorially immobile majority. The development of sprawling ‘precarious peripheries’, characterised by a lack of basic services, inexistent urban infrastructure, illegality, and disconnection from the city centres where jobs and cultural and economic opportunities are concentrated, is a reflection of such emergent disparities. This ‘territorial exclusion’ has a clear relationship to violence as those on the periphery seek to reach the centre. This process is also mirrored more broadly at the level of the rural-urban nexus, the changing nature of which has made it increasingly into a fault line of conflict. Whether this entails the blurring of the urban and the rural or growing rural-urban cleavages, this has frequently translated into new patterns of violence.

Violence in non-conflict situations can be clearly identified as a central issue for the security and development agenda. It is associated with processes of rapid social change that are magnified in the current context of globalisation, and that lead to multiple forms of exacerbation of levels of insecurity and fear in society, particularly in poor communities. This change-violence nexus is reflected at both global and local level, and is extremely complex. It has multiple causes, manifestations and consequences, and is often highly context specific. This paper identifies four critical dimensions that constitute significant potential channels for violence in contexts of rapid social change, thereby
providing a roadmap for the elaboration of context-specific policy recommendations that are relevant at different levels.
1. Introduction: Framework

Although conflict and war have long been accepted as critical development issues (Collier et al., 2003; Cramer, n.d.; Stewart, FitzGerald et al., 2001a & 2001b), it is only in the past decade that violence and insecurity have also begun to be recognised as significant development constraints in ‘non-conflict’ situations (Ayres, 1998; Findlay, 1994; McIlwaine, 1999; Moser and McIlwaine, 2004; Rodgers, 2003b). Moreover, there has been little systematic analysis to date of the specific relationship between change and violence. This is particularly problematic in contexts affected by rapid change, ranging from local-level context-specific displacements to wider structural transformations, such as those associated with globalisation (Appadurai, 2001; Briceño-León and Zubillaga, 2002; Friedman, 2003; UNRISD, 1995).

This working paper, therefore, focuses on rural-urban change as an underlying cause, trigger factor, or indeed consequence of increasing violence and insecurity. The development of a conceptual framework that can identify the complex relationships between change and violence and insecurity is intended to assist DFID’s Rural-Urban Change Team with their policy objective of ‘more effectively managing risk and maximising opportunities for the poor’ (DFID, 2004: 8).

At the outset, it is important to recognise that there is not necessarily an a priori association, or link, between change and violence. Different types of change, such as population change, migration, evolving labour market structures, and the transformation of production and political systems, for example, are frequently non-violent and/or peaceful in nature. At the same time, though, these can lead to violent manifestations. The challenge, then, is to identify in which change situations, and for what reasons, poor people experience increasing levels of violence and insecurity. Because change can have local implications for well-being, as well as broader connotations at national and international levels, this paper is wide-ranging and broadly comparative, intended to highlight similarities and differences across the globe – in Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union.

Change is manifest in multiple social, cultural, economic, spatial and political forms. Although a ‘rural’-‘urban’ distinction implies a dichotomy that encompasses both spatial and sectoral dimensions, in reality rural-urban interactions are increasingly recognised as central in processes of change. In addition, the definition of rural and urban settlements varies from country to country, with blurred boundaries resulting in the use of the intermediate term ‘peri-urban’ (Leaf, 2002). Not only are growing proportions of populations in the countryside involved in non-agricultural work, but also the agricultural process is one that encompasses both rural and urban areas. The recognition of rural-urban interactions as central to understanding processes of change in both city and countryside has led to an awareness of the need for more holistic approaches that focus squarely on the rural-urban inter-linkages (Tacoli, 1998a & 1998b).

Within the broad definition of rural-urban change, four more specific categories can be identified.

2 Underlying the simple term ‘rural-urban change’ is a highly complex notion. DFID’s Rural-Urban Change team defines it in the following way: ‘The patterns of urban and rural change are varied and include urbanisation, de-industrialisation in large cities, growth of secondary towns, and increases in off farm rural activity. The changes are complex and interrelated, and may lead to changes in regional growth patterns and growing regional inequality.’ (DFID, 2004: 1.)

3 The nature of the available literature has led to a certain bias towards Latin America in terms of coverage. In order to avoid an excessive focus on middle-income countries, special attention has been paid to examples from HIPC countries in this region (notably Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia); most examples from other regions in the world draw on poor countries as much as possible.
These comprise change in rural areas, change in urban areas, changes in both rural and urban areas, and finally changes in processes that link rural-urban areas. Despite the differences in these four categories of change, this paper adopts a holistic approach that concurs with the DFID Rural-Urban Change Team approach. This recognises that rural and urban areas are linked and interdependent rather than separate entities, with change a process that cuts across these different spheres of social life (DFID, 2004: 5). This means that rather than examining the potential association between violence and insecurity and change in the separately defined spatial areas of ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ identified above, this paper identifies four critical dimensions of change that crucially shape and affect people’s sustainable livelihoods, well-being and security across both rural and urban areas, and focuses on the relationship that each of these dimensions has with violence and insecurity. These four critical dimensions of change are:

- Livelihoods, labour markets and natural resources
- Social structures and relations
- Political institutions
- Spatial organisation

As summarised in Table 1, these four dimensions provide the necessary framework within which to explore systematically the complex relationships between change and violence. The paper is structured around this framework, with each of the four sections focusing on one dimension of change. Each dimension covers an extensive diversity of issues, covering causal factors underpinning violence, different violence manifestations, costs and consequences of violence for change and, finally, institutional responses to address the problem.

**Table 1: A framework for understanding the relationship between change and violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical dimensions of change</th>
<th>Detailed components within each dimension of change covered in paper</th>
<th>Priority policy implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Changing livelihoods, labour markets and natural resources</td>
<td>Changes in global and national production systems and associated labour markets</td>
<td>The violence costs of new livelihood opportunities resulting from the ‘dark side’ of global and national economic change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The increasing inequality in access to natural resources (particularly land)</td>
<td>Livelihood strategies constrained by violence related to inequality in access to natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Changing social structures and relations</td>
<td>The impact of migration on household structure and levels of violence</td>
<td>Social protection policy needs to include migration related risk factors at individual and household level. This is a shift from migration problems relating to political asylum and economic drugs and sex work to a broader range of social protection concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The impact of rapid urbanisation and globalisation on inter-community and intra-community level violence and conflict</td>
<td>Urban policy needs to incorporate violence reduction strategies into the nexus linking poverty, unemployment and inadequate basic services in rapidly growing cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Changing political institutions</td>
<td>The weakening of the state and the rise of forms of social governance</td>
<td>The limited and volatile nature of non-state forms of governance, particularly violent ones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The transformation of state governance</td>
<td>The ambiguity and increased violence and conflictual politics that result from the privatisation of public security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Changing spatial organisation</td>
<td>The emergence of new spatial forms as a result of globalisation</td>
<td>The development of new spatial forms simultaneously generate new forms of violence and create conditions for old forms of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The development of new forms of socio-spatial governance</td>
<td>Reactions to violence fuel new forms of exclusion and discrimination. that combine with new spatial forms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In a working paper such as this, it is not possible to cover in totality the full range of topics; consequently, as Table 1 also shows, the paper prioritises one or two ‘cutting-edge’ key issues within each dimension of change. These have been selected because they are considered most pertinent in the current context, as well as being of primary relevance to the emergent security and development agenda. Whereas some are causal in nature, others relate to the consequences or institutional responses of change.

Finally, it is important to mention the inter-linkages both within and between the different dimensions of change. One dimension of change and its associated violence frequently has important implications for or impacts on other dimensions of change. Such complexities, although an essential part of reality, are difficult to describe in a straightforward or simplified manner. Nevertheless, wherever possible, the paper seeks to identify such linkages, particularly in terms of their policy relevance.
2. Background: Definitional Issues

As contextual background, this section briefly clarifies some of the main concepts used in the paper, as well as data limitations (see Annex for more detailed elaboration, which includes issues of measurement and causality). This summary of definitional issues is intended to provide reference material useful to Section 3, on the four critical dimensions of change and their implications for violence and insecurity.

2.1 Definitions of violence, fear and insecurity

The starting point for most generic definitions denotes violence as the use of physical force, which causes hurt to others in order to impose one’s wishes. This refers to the ‘unwanted physical interference by groups and/or individuals with the bodies of others’ (Keane, 1996: 67). Broader definitions extend beyond physical violence to refer to psychological hurt, material deprivation and symbolic disadvantage (Galtung, 1985 & 1991; Schröder and Schmidt, 2001). Underlying these definitions is the recognition that violence involves the exercise of power that is invariably used to legitimise the use of force for specific gains.

Fear is defined as ‘the institutional, cultural and psychological repercussion of violence’ (Kruijt and Koonings, 1999: 15) that produces a sense of ‘insecurity’ and vulnerability (Arriagada and Godoy, 2000). Although perceptions of insecurity are not always borne out by statistical evidence, they fundamentally affect well-being (Kaplinsky, 2001). ‘Livelihood security’, denoting the ability to access resources to ensure survival, is closely interrelated with a series of structural factors underpinning violence, while citizen insecurity is also closely linked with a failure of government public security (McIlwaine and Moser, 2003).

2.2 Categories of violence

Although violence is a holistic, crosscutting and endemic phenomenon, a clear-cut categorisation is critical for policy initiatives. This paper draws on an ‘umbrella’ framework, as proposed by Moser and McIlwaine (2004), which makes a fourfold distinction between political, institutional, economic and social violence, as identified in Table 2. Since any categorisation is static, this fourfold typology is conceived as an overlapping and interrelated continuum with important reinforcing interconnections between different types of violence. Each category is identified in terms of the physical act that is consciously or unconsciously used to gain or maintain power, and is based on the primary motivation behind the violence identified. Table 2 also provides a summary ‘roadmap’ of some of the extensive and complex violent manifestations within these four categories. This is intended to illustrate the ubiquitous and all-pervasive diversity of violence in the daily lives of poor urban and rural communities, only a few examples of which can be highlighted in a synthesis paper such as this.

2.3 The rural-urban: global generalisations and local specificities

Given the global scope of this paper, it is necessary to mention the marked differences that can exist in the rural-urban, both between as well as within different regions. UNCHS (2001: 271–73) estimates the global level of urbanisation to be 47 percent, but with significant regional variations. In the Latin American and Caribbean region, the urbanisation level is 75 percent, compared with 37 and 38 percent, respectively, in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, intra-regional divergences should also be taken into consideration. Differences such as these clearly have important implications for the way

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4 This section draws heavily on Moser and McIlwaine (2004), as well as on Moser and Winton (2002).

5 Differences such as these clearly have important implications for the way
in which rural-urban change impacts in different settings.

Table 2  Roadmap of categories, types and manifestations of violence that can accompany rural-urban change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of violence</th>
<th>Types of violence by perpetrators and/or victims</th>
<th>Manifestations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Political            | • Political violence by state and non-state actors at international, national and local level | • Guerrilla conflict  
• Paramilitary conflict  
• Political assassinations  
• Armed conflict between political parties |
| Institutional        | • Institutional violence of the state and other ‘informal’ institutions  
• Including the private sector | • Extra-judicial killings by police  
• Physical or psychological abuse by health and education sector workers  
• State or community vigilante social cleansing of gangs and street children  
• Lynching of suspected criminals by community members |
| Economic             | • Organised crime  
• Business interests  
• Delinquency  
• Robbery  
• Violence by landowners and other protecting natural resources | • Intimidation and violence as means of resolving economic disputes  
• Street theft; robbery and crime  
• Kidnapping  
• Armed robbery  
• Drug trafficking  
• Car and other contraband activities  
• Small arms dealing  
• Assaults including killing and rape made during economic crimes  
• Trafficking in prostitutes and US-headed immigrants  
• Conflict over scarce resources |
| Economic/social      | • Gang violence  
• Street children (boys and girls) violence  
• Ethnic violence | • Territorial or identity based ‘turf’ violence; robbery, theft  
• Petty theft  
• Communal riots |
| Social               | • Intimate partner violence inside the home  
• Sexual abuse in the public arena  
• Child abuse: boys and girls  
• Intergenerational conflict between parent and children (both young and adults, particularly older people)  
• Gratuitous/routine daily violence | • Physical or psychological male-female abuse  
• Physical and sexual abuse, particularly prevalent in the case of stepfathers but also uncles  
• Physical and psychological abuse  
• Lack of citizenship in areas such as traffic, road rage, bar fights and street confrontations  
• Arguments that get out of control |

Sources: adapted from Moser and Winton (2002); Moser and McIiwaine (2004).

Similarly, the general assumption that rural areas are more peaceful than urban areas is far from true. In reality, both rural and urban areas can experience a range of forms of violence. Rural areas are often the arenas of long-running and brutal civil wars, for example, and can experience significantly higher levels of violence than urban areas in certain post-conflict situations. Although cities are often

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5 For example, in Latin America, Venezuela is 87 percent urbanised, whereas the corresponding figure for El Salvador is 47 percent. In Asia, Singapore is 100 percent urbanised, with Cambodia only 16 percent urbanised. In Africa, the comparative figures for Libya and Ethiopia are 88 percent and 18 percent respectively (UNCHS, 2001: 271–73).

6 In post-conflict El Salvador, for example, 76 percent of homicides occur in rural areas, as against only 24 percent in urban areas (World Vision, 2002; Cruz and Beltrán, 2000). Similarly, the homicide rate in Guatemala City in 1999 was 102 deaths per 100,000 persons; the highest rate – of 165 deaths per 100,000 persons – was recorded in the rural department of Escuintla (Rodríguez and de León, 2000).
very peaceful, global trends do tend to show that violence is commonly most severe in large urban areas, although it is important to note that levels of violence within cities can be very uneven and, moreover, often correlate with particular aspects of urbanisation rather than urbanisation *per se.*

7 Indeed, ‘mega’ cities such as Tokyo and Shanghai are among the safest locations on the globe (Fajnzylber et al., 2000; Brennan-Galvin 2002).

8 Using Latinobarometer data on the relationship between city size and crime rates, Piquet Carneiro (2000) shows how city growth rate in Latin America is a stronger indicator of crime rates than city size, for example.
3. Critical Dimensions of Change and their Implications for Violence and Insecurity

3.1 Changing livelihoods, labour markets and natural resources

Changes in global and national production systems and associated labour markets

‘Globalisation is a process that brings with it rapid change’ (DFID, 2000: 15). It has involved a profound and comprehensive restructuring of the world system of production and division of labour during the past twenty years, including in particular the emergence of new circuits of distribution, exchange and consumption (Robinson, 2002: 1060). In particular, national-level productive processes have become increasingly less relevant as new de-territorialised circuits have emerged. Although these changes are widely acknowledged to have generated unprecedented benefit, in particular ‘creat[ing] the opportunity to lift millions of the world’s poorest people out of their poverty’ (DFID, 2000: 15), they have also had negative consequences for individuals, communities, and even whole economies, as these find themselves more and more excluded from central processes of production and circulation. As such, globalisation can be seen as a fundamental underlying structural cause of violence, with the consequences of such change also often resulting in further violence. This is primarily economic violence, though also at times political in nature, with institutional policies both context and response specific (see Annex).

States such as Haiti, for example, can be characterised as ‘non-viable economies’ in the age of globalisation. They display negative trade balances and severe economic disequilibria as a result of non-competitive import and export structure. Imports have a high inelasticity of demand, while exports have a high elasticity of demand, and are ill-adapted to the new international demands. For such countries, the new global economy seems to offer little positive, and indeed, many are falling into vicious cycles of extreme poverty and chronic instability that have led to widespread violence within these countries (de Rivero, 2001).

Even thinking solely in terms of the opportunities created by globalisation, however, it is clear that not all of these are unmitigatedly positive. Some, such as the rise in international drug trade – during the past 20 years, the worldwide trade in opiates has increased by over 600 percent and that of cocaine by over 300 percent (UNODCCP, 2001) – can be said to represent the ‘dark’ side of globalisation. From an economic point of view, growing illicit drug crops makes clear sense, considering that ‘no other crop generates so high an income for a peasant’ (Briceño-León and Zubillaga, 2002: 23), something that is all the more attractive in the context of ‘non-viable economies’, where the earnings from legal crops increasingly do not permit anything more than subsistence. At the same time, the presence of drug crops frequently leads to violence, in a variety of ways, and with a variety of consequences:

In Afghanistan, warring warlord factions finance themselves through the thriving opium trade, using the profits to arm private militias that undermine the stability of the fledgling post-Taliban Afghan state (Ahmed, 2004).

Conflict between Peruvian producers of coca leaves and Colombian importers over access and price levels led to a series of violent confrontations in the border Alto Huallaga valley. In early 1989 this culminated in the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrilla organisation moving to help coca-growing peasants in the Alto Huallaga valley defend themselves against incursions by groups of armed Colombians seeking to seize coca stocks (Súarez Salazar and Fierro, 1993).
In Chapare, Bolivia’s largest coca-growing zone, coca crop eradication efforts between September 2001 and February 2002 led to 10 coca growers and four security personnel being killed, as well as over 350 protesters being injured or detained (WOLA, 2002).

Drugs are not just a problem for drug-growing countries in the developing world. The majority of drug crops are exported to North America and Western Europe, and drug trafficking is an increasingly embraced activity in countries through which drugs can transit on their journey from producing countries to market countries. This is particularly the case in non-viable economies, where alternative opportunities for capital accumulation are rare. In such contexts, drug trafficking can become a primary source of income in poor communities, but also has critical ramifications for local levels of violence, as the illicit nature of drug trafficking and consequent lack of legal regulation mechanisms mean that it is an activity that tends to come under the sway of violent organisations:

High levels of unemployment in Nicaragua, particularly of young men, combined with a general lack of economic opportunities, have made the facilitation of drug transportation through the country an attractive proposition in both poor rural Caribbean coastal communities (where the drugs are received from Colombia) and poor urban neighbourhoods in Managua (where drugs are loaded onto the Pan-American highway in the direction of Honduras). Drug trafficking in the former is controlled by ex-Contra guerrilla groups, while in the latter it is controlled by youth gangs. Both impose reigns of terror at the local level in order to ensure that their transactions go unchallenged (Rodgers, 2003a, 2004a & forthcoming).

In Nigeria, local crime barons in Lagos control the drugs trade as it passes from South Africa to Western Europe (Brennan-Galvin 2002), as do youth groups in rural Chad (Roitman, 2004). This has enhanced levels of violence, as rival groups compete brutally with each other for market shares, with particularly dire consequences for local communities (see Box 1).

**Box 1 The negative consequences of drug dealing for local communities**

‘Rivalries or “turf wars” between local drug dealers and traffickers can develop into violent confrontations in and around public places and, as a result, make such places “no-go areas” for the general public. The deterioration of law and order in neighbourhoods where drug-related crime and violence hold sway means that the public’s willingness to identify those involved, in an effort to stem the tide of violence, is held in check by a culture of fear and, in many cases, distrust of the police. Added to that is the fact that communities may become dependent on local illicit drug markets that support whole economies and, therefore, are both unable and unwilling to challenge the status quo, as doing so might jeopardize personal incomes. The authorities themselves may also be in no position to challenge violent drug-related crime in certain communities, as they too are at risk of violence or they have been influenced by corruption and are consequently in a state of inertia.’ (INCB, 2004: 6.)

National-level changes in production systems and associated labour markets can also have critical consequences in terms of violence and insecurity. Changes in rural production systems, and in particular the de-intensification of agriculture as a result of mechanisation (see Ashford and Biggs, 1992), are frequently associated with increased livelihood insecurity and violence as a result of the dislocations that are caused, particularly to rural labour markets, for example.

In Brazil, between 1967 and 1973, the military regime pursued an aggressive policy of ‘agricultural modernisation’, which involved the extensive mechanisation of agricultural production. This altered labour requirements in rural areas, spawning massive unemployment and generating an exodus from rural areas to cities (Graziano da Silva, 1982).

In post-communist Russia, the rise of large-scale private agribusiness has led to a significant displacement of small-scale rural farmers in southern Russia, resulting in extensive social dislocation (Childress, 2002: 983).
Changes in urban production systems are also frequently at the root of increased violence and insecurity. This is especially the case when long-standing patterns of production are transformed as a result of ‘de-industrialisation’ or industrial relocation, and lead to rises in levels of unemployment, which in turn can have negative consequences for livelihoods, in particular increasing livelihood insecurity:

In Qwaqwa (South Africa), the post-apartheid regime’s decision to cease the previous regime’s policy of industrial subsidisation meant that Qwaqwa underwent a process of ‘de-industrialisation’. Industries either closed down entirely or relocated to areas with greater locational advantages, such as Durban or Gauteng, leading to a sharp rise in unemployment. In the absence of factory-based employment opportunities, many people turned to informal retailing as a means to secure an income. Pickings from small-scale retailing tend to be limited and few participants gain a satisfactory income. Income tends to be irregular and above all, insecure (Slater, 2002).

The consequences of such changes to national-level production systems and associated labour markets manifest themselves more ambiguously when considered at household level. This is particularly the case in relation to levels of intra-household violence. Global evidence suggests that violence against women increases if the economic situation of households deteriorates as a result of macroeconomic changes (UNICEF, 1999 & 2000; Green, 1999). Increasing levels of (male) unemployment and associated poverty can increase pre-existing levels of intimate partner and sexual violence, along with the associated increased risk of women being victims.

In one district in Uzbekistan, for example, over 50 percent of family conflicts arose owing to men’s unemployment (Human Rights Watch, 2001b).

In a rubber development scheme in Papua New Guinea, a fall in rubber prices led men to vent their frustration by beating their wives (Bradley, 1994).

A comparative study of the impact of macroeconomic structural adjustments on local communities in Lusaka (Zambia), Guayaquil (Ecuador), Metro Manila (the Philippines), and Budapest (Hungary) found a direct link between declining male earnings and increasing domestic violence, often associated with male alcohol abuse (Moser, 1997 & 1998a).

It is not so much that poverty and unemployment cause violence, but rather that the costs of poverty and unemployment in the form of stress, loss of self-esteem and frustration can cause male abuse (Buvinic et al., 1999). In many cases, however, violence is caused by deeper changes in livelihood patterns wrought by changes in national-level production systems and associated labour markets. These put households under pressure to develop new survival strategies in contexts of change, the cost of which can strain intra-household solidarity and lead to violence:

In urban Mexico, the debt crisis of the 1980s led to increased levels of poverty, and households turned to new strategies in order to secure their economic survival. These revolved around the intensification of work, with households increasing the number of income-earners as well as broadening their resource base, turning to self-provisioning, recycling, and social exchange networks with relatives, neighbours and friends. The developmental model in the 1990s was less inclusive of low-skilled, low-educated workers than that of the 1980s, however, and led to increased levels of unemployment as the low-skilled sectors of the economy became both saturated and marginal. Poor households found it increasingly difficult to cope as the lack of employment opportunities closed off income-generating options, which impacted on other household provisioning activities such as social exchange networks, since these involve not
only social relations but also material resources, and when people do not have resources to invest in them, they can no longer participate. Stress, frustration, despair, and insecurity weakened solidarity within the household, often taking the form of increased domestic violence and tension between men and women (Gónzalez de la Rocha, 1994 & 1998).

The increased reliance on children’s labour in poor urban communities in Zambia, Ecuador, the Philippines, and Hungary during periods of macroeconomic structural adjustment exacerbated conflict between parents and children. This occurred when youth resisted added responsibilities, or when, with less parental supervision, they failed to study or help in the home, sons in particular spending too much time in the street, often dropping out of school, drinking, becoming involved in street gangs, and being exposed to drugs (Moser, 1997 & 1998a).

Intra-household violence can also be precipitated by the nature of the actual strategies that households resort to in order to cope with transforming systems of production and to grasp the opportunities the new order affords. Such changes can lead to significant household adjustments in order to adapt to new circumstances. Although such adjustments can potentially improve the gender distribution of responsibilities (Kabeer, 1994), in many cases they tend to have very high gender costs:

In Qwaqwa (South Africa), household diversification strategies as a result of ‘de-industrialisation’ processes included sending out more members to work, especially women. The increased participation of women in non-traditional activities (informal) led to growing tensions between husbands and wives. Many men expressed opposition to the door-to-door hawking, which women commonly undertook above all because it freed them from the dominating influence of their husbands, and this led to higher levels of violence against women (Slater, 2002; Sharp and Spiegel, 1990).

Economic need as a result of impoverishment and unemployment may force households and individuals to turn to risky income-generating opportunities. Women and children in impoverished households in Thailand enter into sexual commerce as a household survival strategy, for example (Montgomery, 2001), while in Zambia, orphans and other unsupported girls sometimes ‘trade sex to survive, having nothing else to trade’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002), as do women affected by famine, as for example in Ethiopia (Carroll, 2003).

Even targeted interventions to mitigate the negative consequences of changing production systems and labour markets, such as microfinance projects that aim to provide women with the means to grasp new opportunities resulting from change, can potentially have undesirable effects, particularly in relation to the transformation of gender roles. Bejar (1998), for example, argues that intra-family violence in El Salvador can often be attributed to the new economic and political role adopted by many women benefiting from such schemes in a wider setting of pervasive patriarchal culture. The evidence elsewhere is mixed, however:

Several studies of credit schemes in South Asia indicate that access to credit leads to an increase in violence against women (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996; Khan et al., 1998 cited in Hunt and Kasynathan, 2001; Jacobson, 1993). However, contrary evidence shows that the transformation of gender roles is more likely to reduce intimate partner violence. In Bangladesh, for example, it was found that women participating in credit programs were less likely to be beaten by their husbands (Schuler et al., 1996). Equally, in Honduras female maquiladora workers often cited an improvement in their relationship with their spouse since starting work (Ver Beek, 2001).
**Implications for donors**

It is widely recognised that changes in the global economy have both benefits and costs. These, however, tend to be discussed in terms of positive opportunities and negative effects. While mitigating the negative effects of globalisation is important, it is also key to realise that the opportunities generated by processes of globalisation are not all necessarily positive. Beyond debates about the trade-offs between short-term dislocations leading to long-term gain, it is clear that globalisation can also have a ‘dark’ side in terms of the opportunities it creates, as is evident in relation to the growing international drugs trade and its costs in terms of violence. From this perspective, the management of global change requires policies that not only increase the access of poor countries into the global economy, but also draw them in in a way that takes into account the costs of doing so. The same is true when considering the consequences of national-level changes to production systems and labour markets. The changes and opportunities these can give rise to can have highly ambiguous relations to violence, particularly at the household level.

*The increasing inequality in access to natural resources (particularly land)*

Although natural resource-related conflicts have been well documented in war contexts (see Collier et al., 2003), these are equally applicable in non-conflict situations, and may well be a precondition or underlying causal factor in the deterioration into conflict itself. In rural areas, land, water and forests are all critical resources for economic livelihood strategies associated with sustainability and well-being. Across the globe, reduced access to such scarce natural resources, which often occurs with changing land ownership and tenure systems, is the most important underlying causal factor behind the multiple manifestations of much of rural violence. Existing unequal power relationships relating to land ownership and exclusionary agrarian systems are exacerbated when already highly inequitable land distribution becomes even more exaggerated. For instance, in Brazil in 1985, just over 10 percent of the landowners controlled over 80 percent of the land. The resulting rural violence is linked to landless peasant movements invading or grabbing land.

This was one of the most important factors underlying the emergence of the Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Movement of Rural Landless Workers, or MST) and its concomitant policy of land occupation and often-violent confrontation with big landowners (see Box 2).

In the South African context, the proliferation of private game farms in the province of KwaZulu/Natal has lead to existing tenants and workers being evicted, and losing access to land on which to practice subsistence farming, essential resources such as firewood and water, and access to ancestral sites. This has resulted in resentment and serious tensions. Farmers are often attacked and their land burned; Indian, ‘coloured’ and white farmers have been the explicit targets of landless black workers, thus adding a racial dimension to the conflict. Orchestrated land invasions are also increasing in the region, with landowners threatened and sometimes shot (KNZ Violence Monitor 2001 & 2002). A Human Rights Watch (2001a) report suggests that legislation has been ineffective in protecting farm workers and tenants from eviction.
Box 2 Land grabbing by landless workers as an informal institutional response to land inequality – the case of MST in Brazil

Agricultural restructuring in the 1970s underpinned the formation of the Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Movement of Rural Landless Workers, or MST) by creating a large landless class. The 1985 return to democracy gave the political opportunity for organisation, with a network of progressive religious organisations providing institutional support that enabled the MST to establish itself throughout the country. MST land grabbing first occurred in 1986. At the same time, micro, location-specific dimensions explain why rural poor decided to join the MST in a given place at a given time. For instance, in Santa Catarina in south Brazil, where the movement predominantly comprised former small family farmers, the decision to join the MST was tied into a spatially expansive form of frontier production in which geographic mobility was seen as a ‘right’, a logical solution to limited land and degraded soil, as well as unfair rental conditions. The MST tactic of land occupation were seen as a legitimate and normal everyday practice. In contrast, in Pernambuco in northeast Brazil, where the MST mainly constituted former rural plantation workers, it encountered serious difficulties in mobilizing members. Here, sugarcane plantations were characterised by a strong culture of private property and hierarchy, which made the MST’s methods of land occupation seem illegitimate. Following the crisis of the sugarcane industry in the early 1990s and the consequent restructuring of the region’s agricultural sector, however, the MST and its associated tactics of violent land occupation increasingly became an option for a growing number of impoverished, unemployed rural workers who felt they no longer had any other option and felt that violating social norms was better than starving (Wolford, 2003).

Conflict over land is by no means a new phenomenon, but rather one that has dominated the history of many countries around the world. As part of long-term structural change, conflictual relations between peasants and landholders were key elements of rural uprisings in the 1789 French Revolution and the 1910 Mexican Revolution (Goldstone, 2002). In Latin America, for instance, it is significant that the two countries in the region with relatively little rural violence – Argentina and Costa Rica – both have comparatively more egalitarian agrarian structures and larger middle-class farm sectors than the other countries (Kay, 2000).

Thus, agrarian reform has been an important institutional response to such rural violence. In the recent peace processes in El Salvador and Guatemala, land redistribution was used as a way of resolving social conflicts (Kay, 2000). However, agrarian reform itself – designed to reduce violence – has also provoked violent counter-reforms in some Latin American countries.

In Chile, agrarian reform under the Allende government was largely non-violent, but was met by an agrarian counter-reform imposed by an authoritarian state through state-directed violence, where peasant leaders were murdered and thousands of peasant activists expelled from their newly reformed land.

In Peru, agrarian reform policy inadvertently opened the way for new grievances in rural areas. Disillusionment with agrarian reform, combined with a power vacuum, led to the rise of the Shining Path, and a decade of violence and conflict.9

In Nicaragua, persistent conflicts exist as a result of legal ambiguities surrounding property ownership following regime transition. Agrarian reform under the revolutionary Sandinista government led to a redistribution of agricultural assets expropriated and confiscated from elite families and political enemies. After the 1990 election, the conservative Chamorro government began a massive programme of privatisation with millions of acres and hundreds of state enterprises, as well as the return of or compensation for confiscated property, which

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9 Other important factors included entrenched racism and the marginalisation of the indigenous population; a newly educated but jobless youth, frustrated in their upward social mobility; and the illegal cultivation of coca.
has continued under the subsequent liberal Alemán and Bolaños administrations elected in 1996 and 2001 (see Box 3).

**Box 3 Competing claims over agrarian reform property and violence: the case of Nicaragua**

In contemporary Nicaragua, violent clashes relating to competing claims over property have become increasingly common. For example, in 1998 a conflict between former Sandinista military personnel and ex-Contra guerrillas over a 1,500 hectare estate and 17,000 heads of cattle in the province of Chontales degenerated into a violent shoot-out in which four people were killed. The causal factor underlying such violence is the fact that different constituencies appeal to different authorities for their claims – some basing themselves on pre-revolutionary land titles, others on revolutionary land titles, and others still on post-revolutionary promises of compensation. Political polarisation in Nicaragua is such that any form of convergence is improbable, legal ambiguity will persist and conflict is likely to become endemic as protracted confrontation and social violence over property rights continue (Everingham, 2001).

Population increase, along with increasing scarcity of land and renewable resources such as cropland, forests and fresh water, is another causal factor underlying rural violence. In the case of Pakistan, for instance, this is linked to ethnic, communal and class-based rivalries. Traditional Pakistani state patronage to certain regions and ethnic groups fuels conflicts along regional and ethnic divides, with resentment growing among those who consider that they are treated unfairly in terms of resource distribution.

In Pakistan, disputes between provinces and central government over canal and dam diversions of the Indus River in Punjab distribution have had important consequences for infrastructure projects (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon, 1996: 6).

Conflict over resources is closely linked to communal violence in India, with violence the means by which elites maintain power, rather than by which such power is challenged. The weaker party, although experiencing injustice, is less likely to instigate violence. As such, ‘the critical issue in violent conflict of this type is not the motivation but the opportunity’, with violence constituting a ‘controlled tool of the political system, and used to preserve economic inequalities’ (Vaux and Butalia, n.d).

For example, intense violence in 1991 between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu over the allocation of water from the Kauveri River was reported as spontaneous, but in fact was exploited by the Karnataka government, which created a permissive environment in which old resentments against Tamils could re-emerge. There was actually less violence in irrigated as opposed to non-irrigated areas, indicting that conflict over access to water had been transformed into violence against Tamil settlers (Vaux and Butalia, n.d).

Situations of environmental scarcity can lead to ‘resource capture’, whereby resources are appropriated by elites whose preferential access and control effectively mean that ‘resources are a key means by which power and privilege are retained and expanded in the country’s corrupt political system’ (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon, 1996: 10). Associated with this is increasing environmental scarcity among poorer and more disadvantaged ‘ecologically marginalised’ groups. Again, it is distributional inequalities that lead to conflict and violence between power-holding elite traditional leaders, withholding or exploiting essential resources from marginalised peasants.

In the Sind region of Pakistan, violent attacks regularly occur over the ‘timber mafia’ of tribal groups in the forests, and over land barons. In the 1990s, organised armed bandit gangs held for ransom a fertile region, demanding protection money from wealthy landholders every time a new crop was harvested. Those who refused were subjected to abduction or the destruction
of their crops and electricity transformers. As a result, many landowners and entrepreneurs fled to the city or left the province altogether.

Because it is generally the poor rather than the elites who suffer from the scarcity of land and resources, it is they who are also more susceptible to natural disasters, which can lead to heightened violence. Tensions can be exacerbated when exclusion from sustainable livelihood strategies is associated with ethnic identity or indigenous groups. Such pressures threaten both short- and long-term food security and may lead to political instability.

In Rwanda, extreme pressure on agricultural land owing to high population growth and unsustainable government agricultural policies – combined with a lack of non-farm employment – fostered an ‘economic desperation’ that helped fuel the ethnic conflict (Hines, 2001: 35).

Finally, it is important to recognise that violence and conflict over land is not limited to rural contexts. Decades of urban squatter movements across the globe have been caused by structural factors associated with elite urban land ownership patterns, the failure of state housing provision, and the associated inability of poor urban households to find any other form of shelter. Recently, freer currency and financial investment markets, associated with globalisation, have exacerbated high land prices caused by speculative investment (UNCHS, 2001).

In different contexts, squatter movements have ranged from the ‘mass invasions’, such as those first documented by Turner in Lima, Peru, to individual incremental squatting. Conflict and violence are fundamentally interlinked with urban land strategies for and by poor households. Invasions themselves are often violent in nature; so too are evictions, when squatters are forcibly removed from well located land that previously was of little value. Undoubtedly the most dramatic examples of such forced violent evictions occurred during the apartheid period in South Africa, yet documentation of such evictions show that they occur in many urban contexts.  

In South Africa, forced removals dispersed previously close-knit communities and created tensions among newly grouped migrants. For example, in the highly conflicted removal of Cape Town’s District Six, some 50,000 ‘coloured people’ were evicted from a tightly knit, racially mixed, inner-city community located on prime land, to racially homogeneous townships on the urban periphery of the Cape Flats (Hart, 1990: 118). Two decades of oral accounts and newspaper reports documented not only the fear, humiliation and anger that accompanied the displacement, but also the ‘fragmentation of the identity and heritage of a particular community’ (Western, 1981). Such removals not only destroyed community networks and imposed harsh physical and economic conditions, but also intensified gangsterism.

Implications for donors
Livelihoods policies are at the cutting edge of poverty reduction. Livelihoods can be seriously constrained by violence that is either a cause or consequence of increasing inequalities in access to natural resources, particularly land. Recognition of this growing problem calls for the introduction of a security perspective into livelihood strategies. Closer monitoring of growing or changing inequalities in access to resources will assist in designing strategies to prevent conflict eruption – of particular importance in the case of communal violence. This requires greater awareness of this issue on the part of donors, as well as a strengthening of the capacity to deal with counterpart institutions (both government and NGO) concerned with agriculture, natural resources and environmental issues.

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10 See http://www.cohre.org/ for extensive information on the Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions.
3.2 Changing social structures and relations

The impact of migration on household structure and levels of violence

Although migration has long been an established livelihood strategy, migration flows have increasingly become key features of current processes of globalisation both within countries – from rural to urban areas – and between countries – such as from poor to rich countries. Migration is both a global and a local phenomenon, with causes and consequences interrelated in a systemic manner. Migration can be both a cause as well as a consequence of violence and insecurity, often in a mutually reinforcing way.

Box 4 Families or households? Redefinition in the change context of transitional South Africa

During the dramatic change period in the late 1980s, the transitional government in South Africa was involved in a complex debate about the ways to perceive ‘families’ in the ‘new South Africa’. Different assumptions about household structure and composition affected proposed policies. The first position focused on reuniting families separated by apartheid laws and migration labour practices; others focused on acknowledging the existence of different family models, including those that were matrifocal, as the fastest developing form. To ensure that past inequalities of race and gender were addressed along with poverty, current stereotypes relating to the family were carefully examined. These included assumptions about (a) the nuclear family as the ‘ideal’ post-apartheid ‘stable’ family type; (b) traditional gender roles and relations within the family; (c) the family as a social unit based on kinship, marriage, and parenthood; and (d) the household as a unit based on co-residence for such purposes as production, reproduction, consumption and socialisation.


Regardless of causal factors at both structural and individual level, migration frequently results in changes in households as social institutions, and their associated structure. Here, the popular stereotype is often one of a move from ‘traditional’ extended family, with patriarchal structure and relationships, to one where the vulnerable, particularly women, increase their power and influence. Equally widespread is the perception that families fall apart, losing trust and cohesion. However, within a context of extensive global variations, the reality is more one of household restructuring and adaptation, rather than destruction. Indeed, to state that families break down with migration processes assumes that the ‘family’ breaking down is synonymous with the ‘in-tact’ male-headed unit, the standard from which other configurations deviate (Chant, 2002b). Countries in transition often provide important examples of different ideological positions within society with regard to the family (see Box 4).\(^{11}\)

In fact, households are not static entities: as social institutions, they restructure through their own ‘developmental cycle’, undergoing change in headship and in composition, structure and dependency ratios as a result of normal life events, including birth, death, marriage, marital conflict and needs for childcare and the elderly. But households also go through complex cyclical break-ups and transformations in response to external change. These include problems in access to housing, employment, education and health, and lack of income or security.\(^{12}\) Change impacts on different aspects of household structure, including female-headed households, children, relations with spouses,

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\(^{11}\) In a study on reactions to family change among 176 low- and middle-income women and men from northwest Costa Rica, it was found that concerns about ‘family breakdown’ were more common among adult males than among their female counterparts (Chant, 2002a).

\(^{12}\) In the short term, households often act as ‘shock absorbers’ reducing the vulnerability of individuals who join them; in the longer term, restructuring can increase or decrease levels of poverty depending on the financial and labour contributions of the reconstituted household (Moser, 1998a).
and extended familial structures – each of which has implications in terms of violence, particularly gender-based social violence (see Box 5).  

**Box 5 The causes and consequences of gender-based violence**

Regardless of socioeconomic, religious or ethnic group, there is very high prevalence of gender-based violence all round the world – especially as documented in Africa and Latin America – varying in its intensity, and affecting primarily women but also to a lesser extent children and older persons. Because it is located within the private domestic domain, gender-based social violence, although by far the most widespread, is the least visible manifestation of the many interrelated categories of daily violence – frequently silenced, or ‘invisibilised’ and often viewed as a ‘routinised’ feature of gender relationships (Kelly and Radford, 1998). Such violence is attributed to unequal power relations between men and women, through which men assert their dominance and control over women (Pickup et al., 2001; UN, 1995).

One important result of rural-urban migration is the widespread increase in female-headed households. This includes both male migration patterns, with women left behind in rural areas, as well as autonomous female migration to urban areas. Female headship may be a temporary arrangement, semi-permanent, or permanent, as in the case of divorce or abandonment. Regardless of the type, the impacts on women are complex, combining both positive and negative implications in terms of violence.

Research on male rural-urban migration in Africa, for instance, has shown that this can ‘empower’ women left behind. As primary provider for family members, often in sole charge of productive farming, some women gain status through local political participation (Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1993). However, ultimately, the gains in women’s status associated with household headship, agricultural management and village politics may occur as ‘power within a context of increasing powerlessness’ (Mueller, 1977 cited in Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1993).

A recent study of the impact of male out-migration on women in Sudan (Saeed, 2001) found that although women were faced with a double workload, they gained economic independence and decision-making status in family affairs.

In parts of Southern Africa, the need for female heads to take control of family livelihoods is jeopardised by traditional gender norms which forbid women from cultivating crops and rearing and selling livestock without men’s approval (Oucho, 1998: 30), compounded by women’s lack of access to capital and inputs for agricultural production (Makinwa-Adebusoye, 1993).

Another example comes from South Africa, where poor households have historically shown tremendous diversity in structure and composition – with double-rooted,  

14 ‘split’ or ‘stretched’ households as a consequence of the apartheid policy of migrant labour system and influx control measures that separated workers (mainly men) from their families for long periods. The fragmentation has continued as households proactively restructure as a coping strategy in the post-apartheid context. Here, it is not only wage-earning men but also increasingly women and even some children who are absent from rural domestic units. Levels of intra-household violence in rural areas have historically been high, and have remained so. Conflict between partners over the short- and long-term use of income is widespread.

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13 The WHO (2002) makes a useful distinction between two types of gender-based violence: (a) intimate partner violence which occurs in the home within marriage or other intimate relationships, and whose manifestations include rape, physical violence, and psychological abuse; and (b) sexual violence, defined as abuse by non-intimate partners or strangers within the wider community. Its manifestations include rape and sexual assault, which are both spatial and context specific.

14 Double-rootedness is defined as households having more than one homestead, and migrants having more than one household (World Bank, 1997: 24).
Men are sometimes more disposed to ‘build the house’ by investing in agricultural resources (to secure their future rights and status in the village), whereas women want to obtain the daily means of subsistence for themselves and their children. Landless women attempting to earn income in rural areas, particularly from shebeens, pose particular problems for their husbands.\textsuperscript{15}

Changed mobility and residence patterns brought about by migration have clear consequences for relationships between partners, with the pressure of separation often ultimately leading to divorce, for a variety of reasons. It is difficult to maintain a relationship over distance, particularly when there is a perceived lack of spousal support.

A ranking of the causes of marital fragmentation in Sarawak, Malaysia, found the most frequently mentioned cause was a partner’s extramarital affairs, half of which were a result of men working away from home. Financial insecurity, resulting in frequent quarrels over money, and domestic and sexual abuse were the next most cited causes (Hew Cheng Sim, 2003: 100).

Although it is important not to overemphasise ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and the associated discourse ‘men as the problem, women as the victim’ (Cornwall, 2000: 22), nevertheless violence against women is a fundamental way in which men assert their masculinity, and ensure control over resources and decision-making at every level of society (Moser and Moser, 2003). This is particularly marked in contexts of change, and often associated with migration.

In South Africa, it has been argued that since the transition from the violent apartheid era, men’s sense of dominance and masculinity has been compromised, and is reasserted through violence (Maitse, 1998).

In Papua New Guinea, young men have lost the expressions of aggression that marked their masculinity in traditional society (such as warfare), so they seek an outlet through sexual assault (Bradley, 1994).

Migration also has implications for children, some associated with increasing levels of violence. Numerous studies draw attention to the problems women experience raising children without male support, in both rural and urban contexts. In rural Nigeria, Lesotho and Kenya, women had difficulties controlling, disciplining and caring for children; in Kenya, family separation is thought to contribute to rising problems of child abuse (Findley, 1997).

The fostering of children, another aspect of rural-urban migration, represents an additional form of household restructuring. Particularly in African countries, children – especially girls – are often fostered for economic reasons, to help kin in urban areas and to relieve the burden for the biological parents. Women migrants in urban areas also foster their children back to family in the villages (Findley, 1997).\textsuperscript{16} Documentation from South Africa shows that children are profoundly affected by fostering. Not only does it weaken ties between parents and children, particularly with the mother, but also it exposes them, particularly girls, to emotional and physical abuse.

\textsuperscript{15} For instance, in Qwaqwa, a rural Bantustan in the Orange Free State, ‘husbands who were migrant workers were afraid that if their wives sold liqueur from their homes they would be tempted into prostitution by their clients …they often threatened physical violence if their wives “wasted” the remittance on liqueur or the ingredients of home-brew’ (Sharp and Spiegel, 1990: 530).

\textsuperscript{16} The level of fostering is particularly high in West Africa, where 10 to 46 percent of all migrants have sent children to live with relatives in the village (Findley, 1997: 135).
A Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) in South Africa documented child abuse in poor households (including rape and children being forced into prostitution), caused by fractured and unstable families (stepparents as a source of abuse) and parental alcoholism. For many children, the home was not a safe place and they chose to live on the street (World Bank, 1997: 119).

**Implications for donors**

Social protection policy needs comprehensively to include risk factors associated with migration, as well as to develop contextually specific appropriate risk reduction, mitigation and coping strategies to address the issue. This relates not only to individual risks but also to those affecting households. Implicit in such policy is a shift from migration-focused problems relating to political issues of asylum, and economic concerns relating to drugs and sex work, to a range of social protection concerns with fundamental implications for poverty reduction.

*The impact of rapid urbanisation and globalisation on inter-community and intra-community level violence and conflict*

Conflict and insecurity in rural areas often constitutes a significant push factor for people deciding to migrate to the city, contributing to ‘the influx of villagers to towns and cities’ (Tibajuka, 2000: 2). While individuals and families migrate in order to escape conflict and build more peaceful lives, in many cases, migration itself can exacerbate existing violence or even cause new forms of violence in cities.

In Pakistan, a study of environmental scarcity showed that as peasants were excluded from essential environmental resources by land-holding elites, and conflict and instability increased, many migrated to the cities, particularly Karachi. In urban areas, existing grievances among rival ethnic groups worsened, because the inevitable close contact rendered inequalities more obvious, and were exacerbated by limited resources in the city. This in turn leads to greater group affiliation and cohesion, as well as violence along ethnic and class-based lines (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon 1996).

Even when rural-urban migration offers poor people new opportunities, these can lead to tension and violence because of changing gender relations within households, as documented in the case of displaced population in Colombia (see Box 6).

**Box 6 Tensions within displaced rural families as a result of displacement to Bogotá, Colombia**

‘The greatest contrast between women and men is in the opportunities they have to insert themselves newly into the labour market in the city and thus assure the survival and reconstruction of their lives… Most male refugees were previously employed in agriculture and livestock raising, which are not very useful skills in the new urban environment. …Consequently, unemployment and a feeling of uselessness were the lot of men in the city. But for the women, who before displacement, even if they worked in agriculture, dedicated a greater part of their time to domestic labor, forced migration did not mean such an abrupt change in labour routine. …It does not prove easy for men to handle unemployment in the city and to accept women as principal breadwinners. In this sense, displacement can add to tensions between couples. The self-esteem of the men suffered a serious blow in the gendered reorganization of the division of labour. One of the men interviewed in Villavicencio put it this way: “One who is educated in the countryside knows how to get along …but when a country person arrives in the city …that is a terrible thing! There are families who have gone to pieces …after one or the other deviates from what is normal… There are times when women make the decisions, and that is touchy…”’ (Meertens, 2001: 163–65.)
Rapid urban population growth, in many contexts exaggerated by high in-migration rates, is closely associated with overcrowding and lack of adequate housing as well as inadequate provision of basic infrastructure such as water, electricity and transport. This frequently gives rise to conflicts as neighbours and communities compete with each other for increasingly scarce resources, as well as with elite groups intent on gaining control over such resources (Goldstone, 2002). At the same time, it should be noted that rapid urban growth per se is not necessarily correlated with increased violence, but rather with rapid growth that is poorly planned for.

Despite the common stereotype that poverty is the primary cause of violence, inequality and exclusion are increasingly being considered more important, particularly in urban contexts (Esty et al., 1998; Londoño et al., 2000; Fanjinyelber et al., 1998 & 2002; Bourguignon, 2001). At the same time, in situations of widespread and severe inequality, the daily living conditions of the urban poor can heighten the potential for the emergence of conflict, crime or violence (Vanderschueren, 1996). Links between inequality and violence do not relate simply to income disparities, but also to more important exclusionary factors concerning unequal access to employment, education, health and basic physical infrastructure. In addition, lack of or inadequate state security protection, policing and judicial systems particularly affect the poor, who are unable to pay for their own services and therefore are more susceptible to the impunity, corruption, inefficiency and even brutality associated with such institutions (Moser et al., 2003).

Millions of predominantly urban poor people who use public transport feel fear every time they board a bus. Recent surveys reveal that 45 percent of respondents in San José, 66 percent in Santiago and 91 percent in Salvador, Brazil, are afraid of violence on public transport. Nor is this fear unfounded. Assaults on buses are common, with robbers boarding buses as they travel through the city to assault passengers, and even murder the driver or anyone who resists. In Brazil, the problem is so severe that there is now legislation to protect passengers (Briceño-Leon and Zubillaga, 2002). In Guayaquil, Ecuador, in a six-month period, one in five women was robbed on a public bus – attacked by gangs of young men armed with knives, machetes or handguns – and one in two witnessed such an attack (Moser, 1998a).

In a participatory urban appraisal (PUA) in poor urban areas in Jamaica, community members identified that lack of electricity and water contributed to growing fear, robbery, and police harassment. With electricity, the youth would be entertained and off the streets with music and television. One of the most serious causes of violence between women was conflict over shared standpipes in contexts of inadequate supply for basic needs (Moser and Holland, 1997).

In a low-income community in Lusaka, Zambia, vandalism of property has curtailed community activities. After losing electrical fittings, schools closed adult evening classes, while community centres, having lost their recreational equipment, furniture and teaching aids, ceased to offer programmes for women and youth (Moser, 1998a).

In poor urban communities, the consequence of increasing crime, robbery, rape and assaults is not only the erosion of human, natural and physical capital (see Moser, 1998a; Moser et al., 2003; Moser and McIlwaine, 2004): above all, it is the erosion of social capital – long-held reciprocal trust among
neighbours and community members.\textsuperscript{17} Increasing murder rates, street and public transport crime, and vandalism of public property all threaten personal safety, exacerbating isolation as people become reluctant to leave their homes after dark. This in turn has reduced participation in community-based organisations that play a critical role in negotiating for improved services supplied by government agencies or NGOs. A decline in ‘stocks’ of social capital has implications for accessing, and maintaining, vital social and economic infrastructure, particularly where communities lack confidence in the ability or willingness of the police to address such problems (Moser, 1998a).

Far more serious, however, is the conflict and violence within local communities that can be caused by large-scale influxes of population, because of the strained capacity of receiving hosts (Hines, 2001). Even when host capacity is not necessarily strained, a sudden rise in the influx of displaced persons can lead to significant shifts in perceptions and policies, at both national and local level.

The rapid increase in the number of refugees arriving in Tanzania during the late 1990s as a result of intensifying wars, insurgencies, repression, civil unrest, and natural calamities in Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Somalia led to a shift in the country’s traditional ‘open door’ policies. Refugees increasingly came to be ‘viewed in official quarters as “subversives” and “threats to regional security” and “house to house round-ups”, confinements and refoulement of Burundi refugees’ were carried out by the Tanzanian army in 1997, 1999, and 2001 (Chaulia, 2003: 159–61).

In the UK, the concentrated settlement of Bangladeshi migrants in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets led to tension and hostility from white working class communities, which frequently erupted into instances of violence between Bangladeshi and white working class youths throughout the 1970s and the 1980s (Eade and Garbin, 2002).

The exportation of violence through migration has been widely noted in Central America, where the deportation from the US of young Salvadorian, Guatemalan, and Honduran illegal migrants – often the children of illegal labour migrants – arrested for gang-related crimes has led to the establishment of a violent local-level US-style gang culture in these countries (Rodgers, 1999; Moser and Winton, 2002).

Finally, migrants can also fuel violence in their country of origin. Bangladeshi migrants in the UK, for example, actively raised funds and campaigned for the international recognition of the Bangladeshi war of independence in 1971 (Eade and Garbin, 2002).

Probably the most serious violence in many urban contexts today, particularly in the South Asian region, is the communal violence identified as a consequence of inequality and competition over scarce resources. This goes beyond individuals, neighbours or local communities, identifying cultural identity as the basis on which to challenge inequalities. Communal violence is primarily an urban phenomenon, with a prominent feature being the collusion of the state government. Rioting results in higher rates of mortality when the authorities fail to act, with a direct link between the official response and the seriousness of the rioting (Vaux and Butalia, n.d).

\textsuperscript{17} Although anthropologists have long recognised the importance of social capital in building and maintaining the trust necessary for social cohesion and change (see Fortes, 1958: 1), there has been a growing awareness within the development community of the importance that social capital can have in development processes and outcomes – for example in helping build human capital or in contributing to household welfare (Coleman, 1990) – and this has led economists increasingly to see it as key to the feasibility and productivity of economic activity (Putnam, 1993; Moser, 1996; Narayan and Pritchett, 1997). It should be noted, however, that the concept of ‘social capital’ has come under severe criticism, in relation to whether it actually constitutes ‘capital’ (Fine, 1999 & 2001; Harriss, 2001), as well as the extent to which it can have exclusionary and detrimental effects as much as beneficial outcomes (Harriss and De Renzio, 1997; Portes, 1998; Portes and Landolt, 1996; Putzel, 1997).
Such violence is played out against a backdrop of interrelated issues which include tensions between tradition and modernity, trade liberalisation and competition for resources. In the South Asian region, these include important linkages identified between globalisation and violence against minorities. The economic forces of globalisation relate to communal violence in two key ways. First, the scale of rapid economic change creates uncertainties regarding employment, thus creating a tendency towards tradition and authoritarianism. Secondly, the processes of trade liberalisation and privatisation tend to strengthen elites and thereby increase inequalities. Changing employment patterns have lead to a widespread loss of job security. For instance, the new opportunities for rural labourers in new peri-urban units have created tensions with traditional landowners. Despite Nehru’s hopes to the contrary, ‘factories became rigidly caste-based, with different sections allocated to specific caste groups. Modernisation challenges traditional caste hierarchies.’

Severe unemployment in Mumbai and Ahmedabad, for example, has ‘been the economic cause of “communal riots”’ (SEWA, 2002).

The Hindutva movement has fuelled anger among Dalits by spreading rumours that Muslims were responsible for their losing their jobs in the cotton mills (Devy in Varadarajan, 2002: 268).

Several examples in Karachi serve to illustrate ethnic urban violence, fuelled by competition for resources. The Muhajirs control much of the city’s business and industry; the Pathans have a monopoly over the transport sector, whereas the Sindhi minority dominates provincial government and educational institutions through a quota system. The long-standing rivalries among these groups are accentuated by high urban growth, as each struggles to maintain or improve status in relation to each other. Minibus accidents, for example, have been known to spark ethnic riots, owing to the Pathan dominance of the transport sector. Fights between the community and the police – heavily drawn from the northern provinces – are also common, and escalate ethnic tension. In one incident, the death of a Muhajir student triggered a succession of clashes between Muhajirs, police and transporters that lasted over a month and resulted in many deaths (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon, 1996: 31–32). Similar incidents have occurred in India, where property developers have used communal violence to remove Muslims from slums and sell their land, and landlords have used the riots to evict unwanted tenants (Vaux and Butalia, n.d).

Implications for donors
Urban policy that addresses the nexus linking poverty, unemployment and inadequate basic services in rapidly growing cities needs to be expanded to incorporate violence reduction – not simply as an issue of social pathology but as a fundamental livelihood constraint affecting levels of inequality and poverty reduction. This requires a holistic, integrative approach that addresses violence prevention as much as punishing offenders.

3.3 Changing political institutions

The weakening of the state and the rise of forms of social governance

An increasingly recognised issue relative to change in the world today concerns what has been termed the ‘crisis of the state’ (Gledhill, 1996; van Creveld, 1999). The twin processes of neo-liberalism and

18 Appadurai (2001) suggests that ‘minorities are the major site for displacing the anxieties of many states about their own minority or marginality (real or imagined) in a world of a few mega states, of unruly economic flows and compromised sovereignties. Minorities, in a word, are metaphors of the betrayal of the classical national project.’
Globalisation are seen to have debilitated states by respectively reducing the resources available to them as socioeconomic actors and subordinating their capacity to shape the national arena to certain supranational institutions and processes (Castells, 1997; Evans, 1997; Latham, 2000; Strange, 1996). As a result, states are increasingly limited in their ability to control and direct peoples, processes, and flows within their territorial boundaries.

This weakening of the state and decrease in ability to control territories and peoples, is seen to have translated into a spread of anarchy (Kaplan, 1994). There occurs a shift in the political economy of violence whereby it ‘cease[s] to be the resource of only the traditionally powerful or of the grim uniformed guardians of the nation ... and increasingly appears as an option for a multitude of actors in pursuit of all kinds of goals’ (Kruijt and Koonings, 1999: 11). This allows organised crime to infiltrate states and facilitates the building of international criminal networks. Such processes further debilitate state institutions and more often than not lead to instances of violence.

Illegal organised criminal organisations, such as the Sicilian or Russian mafia, have stepped up their infiltration of state institutions around the world and have plugged themselves into a range of emerging sectors of the new global economy (Castells, 1999).

Nigeria has become the pre-eminent centre of international criminal activity in Africa, including drug trafficking, financial fraud, and money laundering. Nigerian crime syndicates now reach out to over 60 countries. These crime syndicates have taken over the Nigerian state, with the major players being Lagos-based crime barons who are from the elite or among government officials (Brennan-Galvin, 2002).

**Box 7 The power of drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil**

Around 11,000 young men, about half of whom are under 18, belong to Rio’s drug gangs. Based in slums, where their authority is unchallenged, their power extends beyond them, as was dramatically highlighted in 2003 when they closed down large parts of the city during the world-famous carnival celebrations. Although the authorities knew that the gangs had something planned, they were powerless to stop events unfolding as these went on a rampage burning buses, attacking police posts, throwing bombs in middle-class areas and demanding that shops shut or face retaliation. The gangs released an ‘official statement’ to the public, signed by the Red Command faction, criticising ‘oppressive and cowardly’ policing of slums and accusing politicians of violence against the poor. Although some experts dismissed the communiqué as a farce, the politicised language was widely seen as disguising the drug gangs’ real, financial motivations, and the ‘shutdown’ was considered a show of force in response to recent police actions against gangs and drug busts. The state security secretary, Josias Quintal, said the group’s aim was to create ‘a wave of terror and climate of instability’ in retaliation for tough police action against them (Bellos, 2003).


This is particularly the case when criminal organisations are linked to illegal activities such as the drugs trade. The illicit nature of drugs and consequent lack of legal regulation mean that transactions need to be underpinned by alternative regulatory mechanisms. Violence is an obvious substitute for the rule of law. This can pose significant challenges to urban governance, as is particularly apparent in urban Brazil, where drug trafficking gangs command the ability to bring whole cities to a standstill (see Box 7). In contexts where state governance has ‘dissolved’, violent groups can constitute significant obstacles to the re-establishment of peace, as is the case in Somalia (Besteman, 1996).

At the same time, the state can be seen as a particular, historically constituted, institutional form of governance. From this perspective, other socio-political institutions can also provide governance, and the so-called ‘crisis of the state’ can be seen as a crisis of state governance, whereby state-based forms of governance are increasingly being challenged and/or superseded by non-state forms of social governance (Latham, 2000).
A recent PUA in Colombia Chiquita, Aguazul (Colombia) identified over a dozen non-state organisations as being of equal or greater importance to community organisation than five state institutions. There was a considerable diversity of institutions, which ranged from women’s associations to guerrilla groups, which were not all viewed in the same way. Figure 1 is an institutional map drawn by four men and three women, illustrating their perceptions of different institutions of governance in the community, indicating those viewed positively and those viewed negatively. Women’s associations were considered positive whereas guerrilla groups were considered negative. The former functioned for the benefit of their members but also for the community at large, through the generation of productive social capital. The latter, on the other hand, generated benefits only for their members, thereby fostering ‘perverse social capital’ that harmed the community (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004).

**Figure 1 Institutional mapping of Colombia Chiquita, Aguazul, Colombia**

Local-level informal institutions can be constructive and support social cohesion and the mitigation of conflict, but can also be perverted and hasten social fragmentation and the onset of violence. In the case of Colombia Chiquita, this dichotomy is to a certain extent linked to the fact that guerrilla groups are violent organisations whereas women’s associations tend to be peaceful. In certain cases, however, violent informal institutions can be socially constructive at the local level. This is particularly the case in contexts of state disintegration (see Isbester, 1996; Rodgers, 2004b).

In Nicaragua, vigilante-style youth gangs emerged as localised institutional arrangements that constructed a restricted form of social order in a context of generalised violence, insecurity, and state disintegration. The gangs transformed urban neighbourhoods into no-go zones for non-neighbourhood inhabitants during the 1990s to mitigate the high levels of unpredictable crime and violence. They protected local inhabitants from outsiders and engaged in a ritualised form of warfare with other gangs in a way that provided a sense of predictability within the limited space of the local neighbourhood in a wider context of instability (Rodgers, 2000 & 2002).

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19 When individuals have privileged access to certain forms of social capital, they can actively exclude people from its benefits, a process that Rubio (1997) labels ‘perverse social capital’.
More ambiguously, the incapacity of states to provide efficient law and order, often coupled with a
distrust of state institutions – evident in Figure 1, particularly in relation to the police – and widespread
impunity, can lead to the proliferation of organisations to fill the void of law enforcement. These are
mainly ‘social cleansing’ and lynching groups who take the ‘law into their own hands’ and are present
the world over.20

In Guatemala, between 1997 and 2001 there were over 350 incidents of lynching or attempted
lynching. The majority of the victims were suspected of property-related crimes, or of being
members of criminal gangs (Moser et al., 2003).

In Venezuela, a vigilante group known as the Grupo Extermino (‘extermination group’) is
reported to have been responsible for up to 100 killings in 2000–01 in the cities of Acarigua
and Araure (Moser et al., 2003).

Although responding to a definite need for order in wider contexts of instability, such social
arrangements are endemically violent and often highly precarious, partly because, unlike strong
states, they do not have a monopoly over the use of violence, or else the reach of their violence is
highly limited and they can therefore beget violent counter-reactions. The nature of such local-level
institutional forms can also change very quickly:

During the late 1990s, Nicaraguan gangs changed from being vigilante-style gangs to drug
trafficking gangs in the space of just a few years. The new manifestations of gangs no longer
attempted to protect local communities as in the past but rather imposed localised regimes of
terror in order to ensure that the drug economy that they were involved in was not threatened
by denunciation. They direct their violence towards the local communities within which they
are embedded in order to make them obey their will (Rodgers, 2003a).

Implications for donors
The weakening of states in the context of globalisation and neo-liberalism has led to their penetration
by a multitude of international criminal networks and institutions that can pose significant challenges
to governance. At the same time, the declining institutional capacity of states has led to the emergence
of alternative, non-state forms of social governance, particularly at the local level. These are frequently
violent, however, and not always beneficial to all in local communities. Moreover, they are often
highly volatile social forms, and the nature of their violence can change very quickly. In particular,
institutions that direct their violence outwards in order to protect local communities can rapidly turn it
inwards against these local communities. This terrain has particular relevance to the emergent agenda
on ‘development as state-building’, in terms of both strengthening capacity and institution building.

The transformation of state governance

Although many states around the world are weaker than in the recent past, all but the very weakest
– those that have ‘dissolved’ (Besteman, 1996) – continue to be important actors of violence, despite
the porosity of their boundaries, their declining monopoly and capacity to deploy violence, and
the increasing proliferation of violent non-state actors. In many cases, however, there has clearly
occurred a transformation of the nature of state governance such that it is perhaps inappropriate to
conceptualise states in terms of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’. Globalisation and the spread of neo-liberalism
have led to the rise of ‘neo-liberal states’, which operate along fundamentally different lines to states
in the past (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Gledhill, 1995; Rodgers, 2004b). Far from shrivelling away,

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20 Social cleansing is the process of killing those perceived as undesirable by certain sectors of society. It usually targets street
children, drug addicts, prostitutes and thieves.
the state has reorganised and transformed. Although the violence of the state is less potent than in the past, it is arguably more strategic and is not residual in character.

Recent transformations in the global political economy have fundamentally altered the connections between the state and violence (Bates, 2001). The rollback of state institutions as a consequence of neo-liberal policies and the concomitant reduction in public expenditure have inevitably curtailed state capacity for control and surveillance. As a result, ‘neo-liberal states’ have responded by changing their form of governance, which is no longer based on the need to control in an Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ way, but rather simply to dominate. The ability to dominate is not a function of the power to control constantly, but rather demonstrates the power to intervene in important spheres of life in symbolically important ways. For example, ‘neo-liberal states’ tend not to have the capacity systematically to police the poor slums that are a ubiquitous feature of such countries and that are perceived as primary sources of danger and violence. Instead, they dominate and regulate them through occasional, unpredictable violent raids that constitute ‘surgical strikes’ against perceived threats that demonstrate the power of ‘neo-liberal states’, and create climates of terror and uncertainty among the poor, thereby neutralising them.

This new form of domination is a function of the more limited capacity of ‘neo-liberal states’, considering that violent raids of short duration on informal settlements are easier than policing them on a continuous basis. But it is also a function of a shift in the nature of state governance, which corresponds to a reversal of the classic relationship between violence and power posited by Arendt (1969), whereby the exercise of power leads to violence rather than the other way round, which was the basis of prior forms of state governance (Rodgers, 2004b).

An important related process that has emerged as a consequence of this new form of state governance is the increasing privatisation of security around the world. State authorities are increasingly contracting private security firms to conduct public policing (Mandel, 2000). This is linked to the declining economic and institutional capacities of states as a result of globalisation and neo-liberalism, and has been described in the South African context as constituting an ‘outsourcing’ of state sovereignty (Buur, 2002). This privatisation of security is a logical outcome of neo-liberalism, blurring the boundaries between the public and the private, in essence transforming public security into a private issue. This generates new, vicious cycles, as private groups and individuals also resort to private security companies, which have arisen all over the world and offer various types of services and products, including the provision of private security guards (see Box 8).

**Box 8 The privatisation of security in the Philippines**

Private armies paid by wealthy provincial landowners control what goes on in much of the contemporary Philippines. The largest security force in the country is neither the 102,000-person national police nor the 120,000-person national army, but rather the 182,000 private security guards who are virtually an ‘army for hire’. With 228,000 licensed and unlicensed firearms present in the country, and lax controls easily overcome by bribes, the potential for anarchic coercion and violence is huge. Many of these private guards are clearly better equipped than government forces in some provinces, something that has caused concern among politicians and state functionaries. Indeed, a government official recently declared that ‘political warlords and their thugs have been responsible for some of the most gruesome and heinous crimes in the annals of our society and threaten the very existence of the Filipino state’ (Tiglao, 1993; The Economist, 1993).

These frequently supplant state security forces and are a source of increased violence, as many are either poorly trained, or else recruited from the disgruntled or expelled from armies and police forces that are being reformed during regime transition processes from authoritarianism to democracy. In both such cases, although for different reasons, private security guards often tend more readily to resort to violence and have less respect for human rights (Mandel, 2000). Moreover, owing to the
fact that the boundaries between state and non-state forms of violence are frequently highly blurred in ‘neo-liberal states’, informal justice systems often emerge in collusion with state actors, including the police in particular.

In Venezuela, state security forces were responsible for a total of 241 extra-judicial killings between October 2000 and September 2001, and more than 40 state police officers are suspected of having ties with the Grupo Exterminio vigilantes. They are currently under investigation by Venezuelan federal and state police, but the case has not progressed as two witnesses in the investigation have been killed, and judges and prosecutors have received threats (Moser et al., 2003).

In Haiti, the president himself recommended the use of vigilante ‘justice’ in 2001, claiming that ‘if a delinquent forces someone to hand over car keys and gets behind the wheel of that car, he is already guilty of a crime. So there is no reason to take him to court.’ The police interpreted the message as authorising the violation of due process, and a license to commit extra-judicial killings against criminals allegedly caught in the act (Moser et al., 2003).

As a result of both the shift in the forms of domination and the blurring of public and private security, ‘neo-liberal states’ are often characterised by ‘uncivil’ forms of democracy where, although political rights – such as the right to vote and participate in politics – are formally respected, the widespread violence, impunity, and weak or malfeasant judiciaries mean that the effective realisation of these rights is hampered (Holston and Caldeira, 1998).

In many such societies, crime, violence and impunity are now in fact greater preoccupations for citizens than the right to electoral participation. This has been linked to the rise of a new type of populist ‘anti-politics’ in a variety of contexts around the world. Linked to the increased role, legitimacy and support within the public arena for political ‘outsiders’ – linked to the privatisation of public life – this new form of populism is frequently characterised by highly violent practices, as leaders promise to ensure security through brutal means involving few democratic checks and balances. ‘Anti-political’ leaders often mobilise groups in opposition to stigmatised groups such as criminals in order to gain power, thereby cutting across class or ethnic divisions that constitute the basis of more traditional politics.

New populist politicians have emerged on both the right and the left of the political spectrum, and have moreover equally applied the neo-liberal reform agenda – as is the case of Alvaro Uribe in Colombia (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2003a & 2003b) or Digvijay Singh in the state of Madhya Pradesh in India (Srivastava, 2003), for example – or promoted traditional forms of corporate clientelism – as is the case of Laloo Yadav in the Indian state of Bihar (Gupta, 2002) or Hugo Chavez in Venezuela (Di John, 2003), for example.

**Implications for donors**

New forms of state governance emerging as a result of globalisation and neo-liberalism are more ambiguous in their use of violence and often blur the boundaries between the public and the private, leading to more unequal, exclusive, and violent forms of security and governance, as well as more conflictual modes of politics. This poses challenges for the global governance agenda in a context where it is not only the institutional capacity of states that is important to consider but also the nature of the particular institutional arrangement that individual states represent, as this will particularly have an impact on their security-oriented policies.
3.4 Changing spatial organisation

The emergence of new spatial forms

In the context of globalisation, cities are increasingly becoming privileged spaces of accelerated social transformations. New types of socioeconomic systems are emerging at the global and transnational regional levels, in which cities constitute crucial nodes for international coordination and servicing of economies that are increasingly international. ‘The combination of the geographic dispersal of economic activities and integration which lies at the heart of the current economic era has contributed to a strategic role for major cities in the current phase of the world economy...These cities now function as command points in the organisation of the world economy.’ (Sassen, 1994: 51.)

This new status comes with considerable social costs. The new economy valorises some, but marginalises others. Economic restructuring is accompanied by a growing social polarisation in occupational and income structure, and concomitant spiralling disparities between successful transnational elites and an increasingly destitute majority caught in the trap of relative territorial immobility (Sachs, 1993). Such forms of polarisation are signs of a shift in the nature of cities from spaces of cohesion and integration to spaces of fragmentation and segregation, which has led to the emergence of new forms of violence. Although in some cities successful efforts have been made towards confronting diversity and creating tolerance (e.g. Bogotá, Colombia), this is not the case with others:

The internationalisation of the urban labour market in post-communist Prague (Czech Republic), both in terms of the inflow of Western managers and employees as well as economic migrants from Ukraine, China, and Vietnam, has simultaneously priced out and undercut local residents from the housing market. This has resulted in growing socio-spatial differentiation and a reduction of middle-class households, which has provoked significant resentment towards foreigners. This has translated into support for right-wing parties and acts of violence against foreigners (Sýkora, 1999: 81–82).

Increasing disparities in neighbourhood income levels are linked to the levels and types of violence suffered within cities. More prosperous areas typically suffer from violent property-related crime, such as vehicle robbery (Gaviria and Pagés, 1999), whereas severe violence is generally concentrated in lower-income areas in the inner city and the marginal periphery (Briceño-Leon and Zubillaga, 2002; Reyna and Toche, 1999; Zaluar, 1999). Increasingly, vehicle robbery (as against vehicle theft) has heightened personal insecurity among the wealthier population – much of it associated with the growing risk of being killed in the process (Piquet Carneiro, 2000).

Although this is not necessarily the case of all cities around the world, urban economic and social disparities are also becoming reflected in the anarchic development of sprawling ‘precarious peripheries’ in cities, characterised by a lack of basic services, inexistent urban infrastructure, illegality, and disconnection from the city centres where jobs and cultural and economic opportunities are concentrated. This ‘territorial exclusion’ (Rolnik, 2001) demarcates deprivation, not only in terms of the quality of space but also in terms of access to a basic degree of urban life and opportunities, and is a powerful spatial expression of social exclusion that has a clear relationship to violence:

In the state of São Paulo (Brazil), 25 of the 28 cities characterised by the worst situations of territorial exclusion suffer the worst homicide rates in the state, while 14 of the 21 cities characterised by the least territorial exclusion were also the least violent in the state, while the remaining seven all had rates far below the state average (Rolnik, 2001: 478–79).
In Cairo (Egypt), the spread of peripheral ‘ashwaiyyat’, informal communities that are highly insular, have autonomous lifestyles, and constitute the spaces of rural migrants in a fragmented city, has led to the emergence of new forms of violence that challenge the Egyptian state. In 1992, Imbaba, an ‘ashwaiyyat’ with over one million inhabitants, was ‘taken over’ by the militant Islamic group Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Their penetration resulted in the creation of a ‘state within the state’ in Egypt, and was directly associated with the rise in Islamic terrorism that affected the country during the mid-1990s (Bayat and Denis, 2000).

Another expanding fault-line of crisis is the changing nature of the rural-urban nexus, which is undergoing significant transformation around the world as a result of processes of globalisation, new patterns of migration, and demographic shifts. In particular, there is an increased blurring of the distinction between the urban and the rural which has a variety of geographically diverse implications for violence:

The opening-up to outside investment and subsequent acceleration of economic change has prompted the development of a new rural-urban nexus in China and Vietnam. The strict segmentation between urban and rural sectors owing to prior controls on population movement has meant that, contrary to the traditional model of rural-to-urban-concentrated development, there has been an outward de-concentration from urban areas to peripheral villages. This development of this new ‘peri-urban’ spatial form has generated high levels of tension and conflict, owing to the dislocations resulting from the replacement of traditional agricultural life, including the near-total reconstruction of the built environment of many peri-urban villages in response to the need for industrial infrastructure (Leaf, 2002).

In Mexico, economic recession, NAFTA, and new policies encouraging decentralised production processes, coupled with lower rates of migration to Mexico City, have led to a shift in spatial patterns of urban settlement. The fragmentation of productive processes and the improvement of communication and infrastructure have led to a changed urban space in Mexico’s Central Region. There has been a de-concentration of population and economic activity from Mexico City to medium-sized cities, where manufacturing and commerce has grown more rapidly than in Mexico City itself. This has led to an increasing numbers of large urban centres with problems of overcrowding, poor infrastructure, unemployment, and social disorganisation, which are fuelling increasing levels of violence (Aguilar, 1999).

Different patterns of violence are resulting from emerging cleavages between rural and urban areas. This is particularly the case in Eastern European ex-communist states, where such cleavages are being generated by the turmoil of the transition from state socialism to market liberalisation.

Because the reform process associated with transition tends to favour industrial and service production, urban populations in Eastern Europe are more inclined to express support for the market and a diminished role for the state than are rural populations, for whom agricultural production is rapidly becoming unsustainable under the new conditions. This has led to an increase in tension between rural and urban areas, which has translated into a growth of support for right-wing parties in the latter and for left-wing parties in the former and, in a number of cases, instances of overt violence (Johannsen, 2003).

An interesting exception to this trend is Estonia, where emerging ethnic conflict between native Estonians and Russian immigrants from the Soviet era plays out along rural-urban lines, as the latter are concentrated in urban areas and the former in rural areas. Support for market liberalisation has become mapped onto notions of Estonian national identity, and the
predominantly native Estonian rural areas tend to support right-wing parties, as these are the ones supporting the policies widely associated with the annulment of 50 years of Soviet annexation, whereas Russian immigrants who dominate urban areas support left-wing parties associated with the old order (Johannsen, 2003).

**Implications for donors**

The changing role of cities in the global economy and the development of new patterns of rural-urban spatial organisation are generating new forms of violence as a result of the increasing fragmentation of urban space, and creating the conditions for the emergence of old forms of violence as a result of the dislocations wrought by the changing nature of the rural-urban nexus. Different patterns of spatial reorganisation lead to different patterns of violence. This has critical implications for approaches attempting to apprehend the distinction and the relationship between the urban and the rural spheres in relation to security and development issues.

**The development of new forms of socio-spatial governance**

The rules that organise urban space vary culturally and historically, and an increasing corpus of research highlights the way in which urban space around the world is being reorganised in response to crime and violence. This is a near universal process in the developing world, observed in Argentina (Svampa, 2001), Brazil (Caldeira, 1996a & 2000), Chile (Salcedo and Torres, 2004), Egypt (Bayat and Denis, 2000), Nicaragua (Rodgers, in progress), the Philippines (Connell, 1999), and South Africa (Beall, 2002), among others.

In São Paulo (Brazil), the spatial distribution of social classes and economic activities has changed significantly during the past two decades. The city used to be organised along the lines of a classic centre-periphery model, with the affluent living in the centre of the city and the poor on the periphery. A combination of inner-city decay, economic crisis, growing unemployment, and rising crime has led to high-income families seeking to isolate themselves from the growing mass of poor people in the city centre, who are perceived as the primary perpetrators of criminal violence. They move to self-sufficient, high-income ‘fortified enclaves’ on the outskirts of the city. These take the form of gated communities with high walls, sophisticated security technology, and 24-hour armed private security guards, which in addition to providing ‘safe’ residences also offer secure amenities such as shops, sports clubs, restaurants, and bars (Caldeira, 1996a & 2000).

It is not just the rich who change their patterns of behaviour in order to protect themselves from violence, however. The poor are also increasingly resorting to such spatial strategies, although for different reasons:

In Johannesburg (South Africa), poor KwaZulu/Natal migrant worker communities have created ‘fortified communities’ around their Soweto hostels in order better to resist the stigmatisation and hostility that they face from wider society (Beall, 2002).

The development of ‘fortified enclaves’, whether by the rich or the poor, is clearly a reaction to emergent forms of violence, but it also has important consequences for patterns of violence. The ‘fortified enclaves’ of the rich are justified through a discourse that emphasises the need for the rich to isolate themselves from the poor. This discourse has led to the spread of new forms of social discrimination.

In Brazil, the poor are increasingly stigmatised as inherently criminal, and are projected as
dangerous, unpredictable, and brutal ‘animals’. As a result, there have been growing calls for a reduction in the civil rights of the poor, and policing practices increasingly focus on patrolling poor areas of São Paulo, generally in a brutal manner that takes little account of even the most basic human right considerations (Caldeira, 1996b).

The ‘fortified communities’ of the poor also lead to further violence, particularly when they develop siege mentalities.

This siege mentality of migrant hostel ‘fortified communities’ contributed to the high levels of political violence in Johannesburg during the 1990s. ‘Besieged’ migrant hostels became focal points for violent shows of strength in support of the similarly ‘besieged’ KwaZulu/Natal-based Inkatha Freedom Party in its conflict with the hegemonic African National Congress party for a quota of political power in post-apartheid South Africa (Beall, 2002).

Such changing forms of urban spatial organisation are giving rise to the development of new forms of urban governance. The policing and governance of urban order is increasingly concerned with the management of space rather than the disciplining of offenders (Merry, 2001; Robins, 2002). ‘Fortified enclaves’, but also other spatial strategies such as the establishment of ‘prostitution-free zones’ to regulate the sex trade (Sanchez, 1997), are regulatory mechanisms that target spaces rather than persons, as was the norm in the past. They exclude offensive behaviour from specified places rather than trying to punish offenders, and manage risk by anticipating problems and preventing them rather than reacting to them.

These emergent forms of spatial governance are changing notions of public space in cities around the world. These notions no longer revolve around ideas of cohabitation but rather an ideal of separateness that assumes that social groups should live in homogeneous enclaves away from those perceived as different. As a result, urban life and communication change, with encounters in public areas becoming characterised by insecurity as they are framed by people’s fears and stereotypes. New forms of social discrimination and exclusion overlay the new spatial order, to create new forms of socio-spatial governance that make suspicion and violence the new marks of urban public intercourse.

The increasing recognition of the socio-spatial dimensions of violence and urban governance has led to the development of more positive alternative crime reduction strategies. An important example is Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). The fundamental concept of CPTED is that the ‘physical environment can be changed to impact on criminal behaviour in a way that will reduce the incidence and fear of crime and improve the quality of life’ (Cook, 2003). In other words, rather than focusing on perpetrators of crime, CPTED seeks to manipulate the spatial and symbolic – and, by implication, social – dimensions of patterns of crime in order to alleviate the fear of crime. Moreover, this approach is concerned not only with the criminal justice system, but also with private and public organisations and agencies, such as schools, hospitals, transport systems, shops, telephone companies, public parks and entertainment facilities (Clarke, 1997).

In South Africa, the CSIR Crime Prevention Center has adapted the components of CPTED into a comprehensive framework which provides practical recommendations on how to plan, design and manage the physical environment in order to reduce urban crime. A practical example of such a modified CPTED framework is the innovative German Bank for Reconstruction and Development (KfW)/City of Cape Town ‘Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading’ project in the Cape Town township of Khayelitsha (KfW/City of Cape Town, 2002). This settlement was founded in 1983, when township overcrowding in Cape Town and consequent squatting in defiance of apartheid laws led to the need for a new township on the south-eastern periphery of the city. It had minimal water and sanitation facilities and, although it was demarcated for formal housing only, by 1993 over 50,000
informal shacks had sprung up alongside the 16,659 formal homes in the township (Cook, 1992; Saff, 1998; Spinks, 2001).

The KfW/City of Cape Town Khayelitsha project feasibility study found that there was a striking relationship between the inadequate infrastructure and housing and spatial manifestations of violence. It identified violence-related impacts of inadequate or non-existent housing, sanitation, water, refuse, electricity, health, education, telecommunications, and transportation. This focus on the spatial manifestations of violence resulted in the prioritisation of spatial urban renewal solutions to violence, such as improved lighting, safer walkways, increased access to banking and safe deposit places, and the installation of sewers and associated phasing out of public toilets. One advantage of spatial solutions is that they are relatively straightforward to implement (Moser et al., 2003).

**Implications for donors**
The emergence of new spatial forms of governance based on the management of space rather than the disciplining of offenders is frequently a reaction to changing patterns of spatial organisation and distribution of violence. These frequently fuel forms of stigmatisation and discrimination that combine with the new spatial political economy to produce exclusive forms of socio-spatial governance that fragment urban space. At the same time, the conjunction of the social and spatial dimensions of violence can provide the means for more holistic violence reduction initiatives.
4. Concluding Comment

This working paper has sought to provide a preliminary examination of the relationship between change and violence in so-called ‘non-conflict’ situations. Change in the current context of globalisation is increasingly a violent phenomenon that exacerbates levels of insecurity and fear in poor communities. In describing the scale, characteristics and gravity of such violence, particularly in ‘failing’ or ‘crisis’ states, this paper has highlighted the ways in which this issue is becoming recognised as a core security and development priority.

The change-violence nexus has causes, manifestations and consequences at a number of interrelated levels, such that it is often difficult to separate them when identifying potential prescriptive measures. Moreover, there is not necessarily an a priori association between change and violence. Nevertheless, from a basis of examples from the diversity of rural-urban change issues throughout the world, this paper systematises this complexity by identifying four dimensions in particular as crucial in terms of their impact on people’s well-being, security and livelihoods across rural and urban areas. In each case, as a starting point to a much more comprehensive and context-specific elaboration, it also identifies priority policy implications.

In the case of livelihoods, labour markets and natural resources, the violence-related costs of new livelihood opportunities resulting from the ‘dark side’ of global and national economic change require identification, as do the constraints relating to inequality in access to natural resources. Although the relationship between globalisation and violent change must not be exaggerated, nevertheless its ‘dark’ side needs to be recognised. The fact that globalisation can have negative as well as positive impacts has important implications for economic development agenda, which may vary depending on a country’s GNP. For middle-income ‘neo-liberal’ countries currently struggling with the implications of privatisation and cutbacks in services, the rise of new (often more violent) forms of state and social governance provide ‘early warning’ indicators of the potential consequences in terms of weakening or regressing states. Although MDG-related development aid policy quite appropriately prioritises the HIPC countries, growing recognition of the globalisation-violence nexus may call for a reassessment in security and development assistance. Increasingly, institutional responses need to support ‘managing’ violence reduction-related change, rather than ‘responding’ to such change after it has happened.

Livelihood sustainability and associated poverty reduction are dependent on the capacity of poor households to cope, with social protection an essential preventative as much as a mitigating or risk coping strategy. Thus, changing social structures and relations has important implications for social protection policy. This needs to include migration-related risk factors at individual and household level, as well as a shift, from migration problems relating to political asylum, and economic drugs and sex work, to a broader range of social protection concerns. In addition, urban spatial policy needs to incorporate violence reduction strategies into the nexus linking poverty, unemployment and inadequate basic services in rapidly growing cities.

In examining changing political institutions, it highlights the limited and volatile nature of non-state forms of governance, particularly violent ones, as well as noting the ambiguity and increased violence and conflictual politics that result from the privatisation of public security and changing forms of state governance. The latter in particular have led to the transformation of state action, as many developing states increasingly seek simply to dominate rather than control and survey, which obviously has crucial security implications.

Finally, the fact that the development of new spatial forms simultaneously generates new forms of
violence and creates conditions for old forms of violence has important policy implications. This is particularly the case in cities, as poorly managed and/or planned for urban transformations are fuelling higher levels of violence and insecurity. Another important factor is the emergence of ‘precarious peripheries’ and processes of ‘territorial exclusion’ that contribute to the creation of areas of anarchy that are beyond easy state control, which also has critical security implications.

The fact that policies to address the change-violence nexus are not sector specific but cross-sector in nature requires a shift to cross-sector institutional structures capable of designing and implementing appropriate cross-sector interventions. This is further highlighted by the fact that violence is often an unintentional consequence of change rather than a necessary result per se. In contexts where sector-level line ministries or civil society institutions predominate, the shift to appropriate cross-sector interventions may require challenging institutional adjustments. This scoping study shows that the issue of violence, and its associated institutional responses and prevention/reduction strategies, needs to be mainstreamed into appropriate institutions which encompass governance, livelihoods, social protection and security concerns.

As a desk study, this working paper requires considerable consultation and debate with donor institutions before more specific policy recommendations can be elaborated. The intention is to provide a starting point for such an exchange. Given the critical importance of violence in ‘non-conflict’ contexts as a security and development concern, it is hoped that the issues raised in this paper can provide an incentive for a further initiative such as this.
Annex

1. The complexity of violence

Given its complexity, multiplicity and chaotic nature, as Michael Taussig (1987) has commented, violence is slippery and escapes easy definition. Definitions are highly contested, with no agreement as to what constitutes the phenomenon. Nevertheless, the starting point for most generic definitions denotes violence as the use of physical force, which causes hurt to others in order to impose one’s wishes. This refers to the ‘unwanted physical interference by groups and/or individuals with the bodies of others’ (Keane, 1996: 67). Broader definitions extend beyond physical violence to refer to psychological hurt, material deprivation and symbolic disadvantage (Galtung, 1985 & 1991; Schröder and Schmidt, 2001). Underlying these definitions is the recognition that violence involves the exercise of power that is invariably used to legitimise the use of force for specific gains.

Definitions of violence often overlap with those of conflict and crime, reflected in terms such as ‘violent crime’, ‘criminal conflict’, ‘conflictual violence’ and ‘violent conflict’. However, there are important distinctions among them. Violence and conflict are both concerned with power; conflict-based power struggles do not necessarily inflict physical or mental harm on others, whereas violence, by its very nature, does. Conflict, therefore, can be peacefully resolved through negotiation without recourse to force, but becomes violent/armed conflict when it includes fighting and killing. Alternatively, crime is an act (usually a grave offence) punishable by law, i.e. the breach of a legal prohibition. In turn, violent crime has been defined as any act that causes a physical or psychological wound or damage and which is against the law (Vanderschueren, 1996: 96). Finally, conflict situations, as against so-called ‘non-conflict’ situations, by their very definition are those countries, or regions within countries, that are undergoing or experiencing conflict.

Interlinked with the uncertainty generated by violence is fear and insecurity. Fear has been defined as ‘the institutional, cultural and psychological repercussion of violence’ (Kruijt and Koonings, 1999: 15), and identified as an outcome of destabilisation, exclusion and uncertainty (Garretón, 1992). In many countries, the contemporary construction of fear is more closely linked to state-sponsored political violence, such as that associated with the military and civil-military dictatorships. This manifests itself in repression, torture, ‘disappearances’ or deaths, and numerous other abuses of freedoms of civilian populations, usually perpetrated by the military, state or organisations linked with them (Corradi et al., 1992; Kruijt, 2001).

Fear of such violence produces a sense of ‘insecurity’ and vulnerability (Arriagada and Godoy, 2000). Although perceptions of insecurity are not always borne out by statistical evidence, they are often more important than the incidence of violence itself and fundamentally affect well-being (Kaplinsky, 2001). This refers not only to personal security but also to economic fear and insecurity (Kaldor and Luckham, 2001; Kaplinsky, 2001). Indeed, ‘livelihood security’, denoting the ability to access resources to ensure survival, is closely interrelated with a series of structural factors underpinning violence (McIlwaine and Moser, 2003).

Frequently, citizen insecurity is also closely linked with a failure of government public security. This section draws heavily on Moser and McIlwaine (2004), as well as on Moser and Winton (2002).

22 As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, for instance, ‘violence is: (i) the quality of being violent; violent conduct or treatment, outrage, crying; (ii) by law, violence is the unlawful use of physical force; or intimidation by the use of this’. In contrast, ‘conflict is: (i) a state of opposition or hostilities; fight or struggle; the clashing of opposed principles; (ii) the opposition of incompatible wishes or needs in a person; an instance of this or the distress resulting from this’.

23 National security refers to ‘safeguarding of the state’s sovereignty over the territory and population within its borders, and implies policies to confront any threat to that sovereignty’. Public security refers to the maintenance of civil order; citizen security relates to the freedom of individuals or groups to enjoy rights and freedoms (Kincaid 2000: 40).
As this increases, efforts to maintain public security systems, such as the police force, become more fragmented. Kincaid (2000) has noted that this often leads to the emergence of militarisation (the use of the military to maintain order in addition to the police), informalisation of public security (the emergence of neighbourhood vigilance committees or the use of criminal gangs to protect neighbourhoods, death squads or paramilitary activity, or lynching suspected criminals) and the privatisation of public security (the growth of private security firms, armed guards and house protection systems). Informalisation and privatisation varies according to socioeconomic status; the poor usually opt for the former, whereas higher-income groups pay for private security services (Arriagada and Godoy, 2000; Rodgers, 2004b; UNCHS, 2001). In many countries, the police or military were in the past the most feared; this position is now taken by local criminal organisations, neighbourhood gangs, and drug dealers.

2. Categorising violence
Although violence is a holistic, crosscutting and endemic phenomenon, a clear-cut categorisation of violence is critical for systematically developing coherent policy initiatives. However, the range of types of violence is both complex and context specific. For example, in a recent study of the perceptions of urban violence in Guatemala and Colombia, the average number of types of violence identified in nine Guatemalan poor urban communities was 41, while in Colombia the comparable average was 25 (Mosser and McIlwaine, 2004: 47). Consequently, for some degree of systematisation and categorisation, addressing the disjuncture between theory and practice requires a negotiated compromise between the multiplicity of everyday violence and policy requirements. This paper draws on an ‘umbrella’ framework, as proposed by Moser and McIlwaine (2004), that makes a fourfold distinction between political, institutional, economic and social violence (see Table 4). Since any categorisation is static, this fourfold typology is conceived as an overlapping and interrelated continuum with important reinforcing interconnections between different types of violence.

Table 4 Categories of violence with associated definitions and manifestations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Manifestation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power.</td>
<td>Guerrilla conflict; paramilitary conflict; political assassinations; armed conflict between political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to exercise institutional power at individual or collective level over other groups and individuals.</td>
<td>Violence perpetrated by state ‘political institutions’ such as the army and police, line ministries such as health and education; social cleansing by civil vigilante groups; lynching of suspected criminals by community members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power.</td>
<td>Street crime; carjacking; robbery/theft; drug trafficking; kidnapping; assaults – including killing and rape made during economic crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to obtain or maintain social power.</td>
<td>Interpersonal violence such as spouse and child abuse; sexual assault of women and children; arguments that get out of control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: adapted from Moser and McIlwaine (2004).
Economic violence, in contrast, is motivated by material gain manifested in violence associated with street crime, including mugging, robbery, and violence linked with drugs and kidnapping (cf. e.g. Rodgers, 2003a). Closely related is institutional violence, perpetrated by state institutions, especially the police and judiciary but also sector ministries such as health and education, as well as those operating outside the state, such as social cleansing vigilante groups. Finally, political violence, driven by the will to win or hold political power, includes guerrilla or paramilitary conflict or political assassination. Although it is closely linked to conflict and war, political violence is also committed during peacetime.

Finally, it is important to mention the concept of ‘structural violence’, which highlights the fact that violence is not just a physical act but also a process that can be embedded into wider social structures. This conception of violence understands it as relating to ‘those factors that cause people’s actual physical and mental realisations to be below their potential realisations’ (Galtung, 1969: 168), a definition that extends the notion of violence beyond situations of overt brutality to include more implicit forms, such as exploitation, exclusion, inequality, and injustice. From this perspective, ‘violence [can be] built into the structure [of society],’ ...show[ing] up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances’ rather than solely as ‘direct’ forms of violence (Galtung, 1969: 171).

3. Measuring violence
The measurement of violence is as contested as the concept of violence and is moreover limited by a number of important constraints. The most common concerns the use of mortality statistics as proxies for levels of violence. Such statistics are notoriously unreliable, owing to underreporting, difficulties in interpretation, and lack of reliability of data (Short, 1997: 14). This is particularly true of the most commonly used indicator of violent crime, the homicide rate. Not only does the homicide rate disregard non-fatal violence (and, within this, non-physical violence), but also generally includes both intentional and unintentional violent deaths. The latter, for instance, often includes car accidents. In addition, national and regional differences in data collection methods, recall periods, and cultural definitions of crime and violence make valid cross-country comparisons very hard to achieve.24

4. A note on the ‘causes’ of violence
One of the most important issues in discussing violence is the issue of causality. In identifying factors that underlie violence, it is important to distinguish between structural causes and trigger risk factors. Whereas underlying structural causes generally relate to unequal power relations, trigger risk factors, in contrast, relate to situational contexts that can exacerbate the likelihood of violence occurring. In the case of gender-based violence, for instance, these may include unsafe spaces and alcohol use (Moser and Moser, 2003). Understanding structural factors underlying violence requires a holistic approach: one of the best-known approaches grappling with the interrelated nature of violence is the ‘ecological model’ (Bronfenbrenner, 1977).25 This seeks to demonstrate that no single level or cause determines or explains violence and maps the way a set of factors combines together to contribute to gender violence, identifying causal factors at the individual, interpersonal, institutional and structural levels (Heise, 1998; World Bank, 2000; WHO, 2002).

A different holistic framework, building on recent sociological debates (Long, 1992; Giddens, 1991), locates the situation-specific nature of people’s experience of violence within a broader structural context. It identifies factors underlying violence, fear and insecurity in terms of the three interrelated

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24 Ultimately, these are only possible through specific global data sets, such as the International Crime Victimization Survey (UNICRI, 1995 & 1998) and the United Nations World Crime Surveys (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 1998).
25 First used to explain human development (Bronfenbrenner, 1977), the ecological model is a multilevel framework that incorporates both individual-level factors – biophysical, psychological, and social – and external factors that act upon the individual.
concepts of structure, identity and agency. Since issues of power and powerlessness are fundamental to understanding the causal factors that underpin violence, this allows for the analysis of wider political and socioeconomic power structures within which individual realities are manifest. It also recognises that experiences of violence depend on individual identity formation which includes gender, age, ethnicity and race. Finally, identity is closely interrelated with individual ‘human agency’. This recognises individuals as social actors who face alternative ways of formulating their objectives, however restricted their resources (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004).
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