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PROSPECTIVE ISSUES FOR THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION

Thank you, Bob, and good morning to you all. It's a great pleasure to be here today and with so many distinguished public servants. The record and the experience that exists in this room today are a real tribute to the spirit of public service and the commitment to our national well-being, prosperity, and security, which the country needs to be grateful for. And certainly, as somebody who has had a chance to work with some of you and with many of your successors, I express my personal appreciation for all of your dedicated service.

I also want to thank Ambassador Einaudi and the OAS for hosting us. Luigi was a colleague of mine at the State Department and is one of the most outstanding examples of that spirit of a person who has given his life to the cause of not only American well-being and security, but the world. And it is really fitting that we have a chance to be here in this building to talk about the issues before us today. I want to talk broadly about some of the challenges facing the United States and the world, and I look forward to the conversation that my colleagues will moderate later, getting into more of the detail on both the security and economic issues facing the country.

The last several years have posed extraordinarily difficult challenges for American foreign policy. The electoral triumph of President Bush in 2000 was supposed to usher in an era of unipolarity characterized by the unchallenged dominance of a single superpower with the will and capacity to secure its global interests. The proponents of that view expected that the rest of the world would quickly fall in line – some countries because they share America's vision, others because they had little choice.

Yet, in just a short time that optimistic hope has faded and the world has grown more treacherous for the United States. The 9/11 attacks brought home to the American public a mortal danger that some foreign policy experts had worried about for years. Even though the United States faces no conventional state adversary that could or would challenge our military might, a small group of determined terrorists can pose an asymmetrical, but equally deadly threat to Americans both abroad and at home.

The conflict in Iraq has also shown that sheer military prowess – prowess remarkably demonstrated by our troops in vanquishing Saddam and his army – is by itself insufficient to achieve broader political aims, such as bringing democracy to Iraq and the broader Middle East.

Countries whose actions pose a threat to our security – such as Iran and North Korea – have not responded to our exertion of force in Iraq by falling into line, as some had hoped. Today we face a risk that not just two, but many more countries may acquire nuclear weapons in the years to come, and that these weapons might fall into the hands of dangerous terrorists who will not be deterred by our own nuclear might.

Taken by themselves, these represent daunting challenges. But the task has been made far more difficult because, perhaps to an unprecedented degree, there is growing global skepticism about the wisdom of the path the United States has charted. For most of our history, we have been seen as benign power – a balancer at a distance, a leader who produces public goods as well as private goods, a nation whose power of attraction and example – our soft power – was every bit as influential as our hard power.

Over the last several years we have lost that advantage: we are increasingly perceived as a country that pursues our national interest at the expense of others' interests; a country that is resolute in tackling the issues that matter to us, with force if necessary, but largely indifferent to the issues that matter to others; a country that scorns the views of others when it comes to deciding what is necessary to sustain a stable international system in favor of an unqualified insistence on the justice of our own convictions about what is necessary, to be pursued through our own unfettered sovereignty.

A majority, 55%, even in our closest ally, the UK, think the U.S. does not take the interests of other countries into account at all or not much. In the 2003 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, this was reflected, to a greater degree, in Canada, Brazil, France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Russia, South Korea, Indonesia, Australia and Pakistan. Of the 21 surveyed, the only countries (besides the U.S. itself) where a majority did consider that the U.S. takes others' interests into account (a great deal or a fair amount) were Nigeria, Kuwait and Israel.

To be fair, there have been other eras where our motives and objectives have been questioned – one need only think about attitudes towards our policies in Latin America through much of the 1950s through 1980s.

But as poll after poll has demonstrated, America's standing in the world has reached disturbing, unprecedented depths. These doubts about America are particularly troubling because they affect both our long-time allies, and perhaps even more dangerously, publics in regions like the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia, where anti-Americanism can breed instability and foster terrorism. Perhaps most disturbing are the attitudes in countries that are frequently held up as models of moderate Islam – Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia, where large majorities view the U.S. unfavorably.

According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2003, 71% of the Pakistani public had a very unfavorable opinion of the U.S. (up from 58% in 2002), and 10% had a somewhat unfavorable opinion; in Turkey, 68% held a very unfavorable view (up from 42%) and 15% a somewhat unfavorable view; in Indonesia, these figures stood at 48% (up from 9%) and 35% respectively.

Of course, foreign policy is not a popularity contest, but when others mistrust us, it becomes harder to achieve our goals, particularly where we are deeply dependent on the cooperation of others – either for burden-sharing, or more importantly, for tasks which the United States simply cannot achieve by ourselves – ranging from suppressing terrorism to containing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to building global economic opportunity to fighting environmental damage and dangerous disease. A good example is Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, where public opposition to the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism increased from 45% in 2002 to 74% in 2003.

Over the past several years, we have too often seen the debate descend into two caricatures. On the one hand, a unilateral United States which seeks to solve all problems with force, indifferent to the views of others and openly derisive about the very idea of international community. On the other side, there are those (I won't call them "French") who exalt the literal language of the UN Charter, and who would deny countries the right to act to protect their interests unless approved by the Security Council pursuant to absolute principles that protect nations from interference in their internal affairs.

Neither extreme is a sustainable position over the long term. Without legitimacy, even a superpower will find itself unable to sustain its global interests for long – even if we are resolute and determined to spend whatever it takes to maintain our capacity for unilateral action. At the same time, to paraphrase Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the UN Charter is not – and cannot be – a suicide pact, and rigid, literal adherence to both its procedural and substantive requirements must give way to a more pragmatic understanding of contemporary international realities.

So we face a profound challenge – how to restore our standing in the world, while recognizing that we face serious dangers that will require effective action. In shorthand, what strategies can we pursue that will help restore the perceived legitimacy of our actions, without sacrificing the effectiveness that is needed for our survival? Let me suggest four basic elements to that strategy.

First, we must articulate and build policies around an expanded conception of national self-interest – one that recognizes the need to try where possible to accommodate others' interests as well as our own narrow goals. President Bush himself has acknowledged the importance of this approach. In the National Security Strategy he asserted: "We do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage"

There are several elements to such a strategy:

- We must be prepared to help others with problems that matter to them, where our own direct interest is small, but where the cost to us is moderate, and where acting does not conflict with our fundamental interests. Support for development assistance, helping others to resolve local conflicts, working to reduce small arms trade that fuel conflicts, are all examples of policies that fit this criteria. A special example of this kind of involvement concerns efforts to address the Israel-Palestinian conflict, where our engagement is not only responsive to the concerns of the parties, but also to many in the Arab and Islamic world, as well as in Europe. Our very power and influence

gives us opportunities that others simply do not hold to work as a force for peace – as we have seen in the Balkans and Northern Ireland. This is not to say that we should adopt policies to resolve the conflict simply to please others – but to recognize that we gain benefits as a leader by our willingness to put our prestige to play in helping the parties themselves reach a resolution.

- An expanded concept of self-interest also requires us to act when what we do matters to everybody – and where our failure to act makes it hard or impossible for others to achieve their goals. The clearest case is climate change – where U.S. non-participation will doom any effort to address this problem of the global commons. Again, this does not mean we must unquestioningly adopt the solutions advocated by others – only that we must act, and be seen to act in way that shows we understand others concerns, and are prepared to do our part to address the problem.

- The flip side of this prescription is that others must also recognize the unique interests and responsibilities of the United States. During the landmine convention negotiations, for example, President Clinton overruled many of his military advisors who rejected the whole concept because he believed it was important to show the rest of the world that the United States was sensitive to the humanitarian tragedy posed by unexploded mines. But when the United States asked its international partners to show understanding about the unique responsibilities the U.S. faced on the Korean peninsula – and where there was essentially no risk to innocent civilians – U.S. concerns were ignored. This has damaged the ability of those who would like to see greater U.S. participation in international legal regimes, such as the ICC, to argue that U.S. interests can be protected with international legal frameworks.

The second major element of our strategy is the need to work toward a practical evolution of the rules governing intervention and the use of force and the institutions through which force is authorized. As I said earlier, neither robust unilateralism, nor unquestioning fealty to non-intervention is an acceptable answer in an age when internal conflicts threaten global stability, and some threats simply cannot be addressed through traditional doctrines of self-defense like Article 51 of the UN Charter. Already, the world has taken important steps toward the evolution of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention – a doctrine which has been embraced by the UN Secretary General himself. We need to see a similar evolution with respect of the right of states to act in the context of states that harbor terrorists or develop illicit WMD programs. While the Security Council may be the venue of choice to address these concerns, time or geopolitical exigencies may make the Council unavailable, as was the case in Kosovo, and other mechanisms – such as regional organizations, or in some cases, even coalitions of the willing – may be acceptable, particularly as an alternative to, and check on, unilateral action.

In particular, the idea of a community of democracies has particular appeal, since there is reason to believe that a consensus among liberal democracies in favor of action would carry as much legitimacy as the decision by a non-democracy to block action at the Security Council. The Secretary General's High Level Panel, which is due to issue its report in two weeks, may help further global thinking on this pressing problem.

Third, and closely related, we must improve the tools of global governance. The institutions and regimes built in the years after World War II are not always well suited for the challenges of the twenty first century, and we must adapt some and build new ones. To take one important example, it is increasingly clear that the G-7/G-8 mechanism no longer reflects the emerging global economic and political landscape, and for efficacy *and* legitimacy purposes, key players such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa must be given a more prominent role.

Another key challenge is the need to revisit the structure of the NPT. The NPT was a bargain – the non-nuclear weapons states agreed to give up their right to develop nuclear weapons in return for a free hand on civilian nuclear energy and a commitment by the nuclear weapons states to disarm. Our experience has shown that the freedom to develop a full civilian fuel cycle – including reprocessing and enrichment – is tantamount to permitting all but the final screwdriver turn of a nuclear weapons program. And full nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapons states is unlikely – and possibly not even desirable. A new bargain would provide for international control of the fuel cycle to guard against de facto nuclear weapons programs, and actions by the nuclear weapons states to devalue the importance of nuclear weapons – through the ratification of the CTBT and abandonment of new nuclear weapons – in lieu of a non-credible commitment to complete disarmament.

As part of our overall global strategy against proliferation, the Administration's Proliferation Security Initiative is a promising start, but to enhance its legitimacy and bring it into conformity with other important international law regimes, the principles should be embodied in a Security Council resolution.

Finally, the Administration should revisit its opposition to the biological weapons (BW) protocol, for though it has many flaws, it is vital that we not make the best the enemy of the good in improving our chances of detecting dangerous BW programs.

The fourth element of a hard strategy requires us to strengthen our full arsenal of tools to meet the global challenge. We have made a major investment in our military capabilities, and that investment has been justified. But our other tools have not had the same degree of attention. While there have been limited increases in both funding for diplomacy and for assistance, they have not kept pace with the demands. Part of rebuilding our global image includes expanding our non-military presence abroad, and helping countries meet the social and economic challenges that arise from globalization.

This means more targeted assistance both for development and democracy, with greater emphasis on international cooperation, rather than unilateral programs. It means further progress on reducing trade barriers and other distortions such as agricultural subsidies (not only by the U.S. but other offenders as well), and it means greater outreach through a revived program of public diplomacy (including reviewing visa restrictions to reduce the sense that the U.S. is cutting itself off from the world, and supporting the U.S. Information Service's work which has included presenting a positive face to the world and which has suffered due to funding issues.) It also means getting our own economic house in order, both to sustain U.S. capability to meet global challenges, and to avoid imbalances which in the long run will threaten both U.S. and global growth.

This is big agenda, but it is a time that demands big ideas. With the re-election of President Bush, a number of favorable opportunities have come into view. The death of Yasser Arafat offers new opportunities for progress between Israel and the Palestinians, which would have an impact far beyond the parties themselves. The concerted efforts of the United States and Europe could offer an opportunity to break the impasse on Iran's nuclear program, not only shoring up the NPT, but also opening possibilities for addressing a range of bilateral issues between the United States and Iran, again with considerable spillover effect. China's burgeoning energy demand is awakening its leadership to the need to consider new solutions to the problems of global energy supply and the environment, bringing the possibility of new cooperative strategies on climate change. Progress on each of these fronts would not only address important short-term policy projects, but also restore America's image as a – dare I say it – an indispensable leader which has demonstrated its willingness to take on the responsibilities that come with the prerogatives of power.